

Research Briefing

11 August 2026

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Timeline of British military assistance to Ukraine (2022 to present)



Summary

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Summary

Military assistance is being provided to Ukraine by the UK and international partners in support of [Ukraine's right to self-defence under the UN Charter](#).

Level of military aid

The UK has been one of the leading donors to Ukraine, alongside the US and Germany. To date, the UK has pledged [£25 billion in support to Ukraine](#) since February 2022.

Of that funding, total military financing stands at £16 billion. £13.7 billion is military assistance that has been gifted, which is met from the Treasury Reserve and will not come from the Ministry of Defence's (MOD) main departmental budget. Spending on Ukraine does, however, appear in MOD spending figures towards the end of the financial year as part of the MOD Supplementary Estimates. [A government loan of £2.26 billion](#) announced in October 2024 as part of [the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Loans agreement](#) (ERA) (PDF), is additional one-off financing (and part of the overall £16 billion). It will be paid back from the proceeds of frozen Russian state assets. The final tranche of that ERA loan from the UK [was paid in April 2026](#).

In July 2026, Prime Minister Andy Burnham confirmed that the UK would continue to support Ukraine with £3 billion in military assistance each year [“for as long as it takes”](#).

What equipment and training has been provided?

The UK has provided both lethal and non-lethal weaponry and equipment, including tanks, air defence systems, artillery, and long-range precision strike missiles. While the UK has committed to training Ukrainian fast jet pilots, combat fighter aircraft will not be provided.

Except for the ERA loan, [military aid to the Ukrainian armed forces has been gifted by the UK](#). Equipment has been either donated from existing UK defence stocks, rapidly purchased from the defence industry in both the UK and overseas or purchased from the surplus stocks of foreign governments. Such acquisition has been either funded directly or coordinated through mechanisms such as the International Fund for Ukraine, to which the UK has committed money. Since 2025, the UK and Ukraine have also been working to

strengthen long-term defence industrial collaboration, signing several [agreements on technology sharing and production](#).

The UK is also hosting a training programme ([Operation Interflex](#)), which is supported by several allies. [63,000 personnel have been trained](#) to date. In June 2026, the Ministry of Defence announced that the programme will [transition away from large-scale infantry training](#) to provide more advanced and specialist training for the Ukrainian armed forces.

In February 2025 the UK also chaired [the Ukraine Defence Contact Group](#) for the first time.

Long term security guarantees

In July 2023, the members of the G7, including the UK, set out [a commitment to providing long term security guarantees to Ukraine](#) (PDF). On 12 January 2024, the UK was the first country to announce a ten-year year security cooperation agreement with Ukraine. In January 2025 the UK and Ukraine agreed [a 100-year partnership agreement](#), and in July 2026 published a [Declaration on Enhanced Security and Defence Industrial Collaboration](#).

As part of [peace efforts](#), the UK and France are leading efforts to [establish a 'coalition of the willing'](#), increasingly referred to as Multinational Force Ukraine, that could be used to defend any peace agreement that is eventually agreed. Russia has openly opposed the deployment of European forces on the ground in Ukraine.

Further reading

The Commons Library has an extensive collection of briefing papers relating to the conflict in Ukraine. These include a paper on broader military assistance to Ukraine and how that has [changed over the course of 2025](#).

The Library collection is available at: [The Conflict in Ukraine](#).

1

Legal justification

Military assistance is being provided to Ukraine by the UK and international partners in support of Ukraine's right to self-defence under the UN Charter.¹

In July 2024 the UK Government said:

We continue to provide military aid to support Ukraine's clear right of self-defence against Russia's illegal attacks in accordance with international humanitarian law. We are clear that equipment provided by the UK is intended for the defence of Ukraine.²

That position was reiterated by then Prime Minister Keir Starmer in a statement to the House of Commons on 21 November 2024:

The UK's support for Ukraine is always for self-defence, and it is proportionate, co-ordinated and agile. It is a response to Russia's own actions, and it is in accordance with international law. Under article 51 of the UN charter, Ukraine has a clear right of self-defence against Russia's illegal attacks.³

In a statement to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 28 May 2025, the government said it remained "resolute in its commitment to supporting Ukraine in the face of Russia's ongoing illegal invasion" and that it stood by "its economic and military support".⁴

Upon taking office in July 2026, Prime Minister Andy Burnham said that the UK would continue to stand with Ukraine, support was "unwavering" and the UK "will not backdown until we achieve long lasting and just peace for Ukraine".⁵

¹ NATO, [Relations with Ukraine](#) and [NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine](#) (accessed 29 June 2022)

² PQ129, [Ukraine: Guided weapons](#), 25 July 2024

³ [HC Deb 21 November 2024](#), c373

⁴ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, [UK statement to the OSCE](#), 28 May 2025

⁵ Prime Minister's Office, [Press release](#), 26 July 2026

2

Financial commitments

The UK has been one of the leading donors to Ukraine, alongside the US and Germany. To date, the UK has provided £25 billion in overall support to Ukraine (military aid, non-military aid, export finance and ERA loans). Of that funding, £16 billion is for military aid:

- £13.74 billion for military assistance that has been gifted to Ukraine.⁶
- £2.26 billion in additional one-off financing under the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans agreement (see below).

At the NATO summit in July 2024, then Prime Minister Keir Starmer pledged £3 billion a year in military support to Ukraine until 2030/31, or for as long as it is needed.⁷ That commitment was reiterated in [the UK-Ukraine 100-year partnership agreement](#) concluded in January 2025 (see below), and again by the new government under Prime Minister Andy Burnham in July 2026.⁸

Funding covers “a broad range of military support to Ukraine”, including the rapid procurement and gifting of equipment, development of the international capability coalitions and training support (for all, see below). However, successive governments have not provided a detailed breakdown of funding for operational security reasons.⁹

2.1

Funding from the Treasury reserve

The MOD has said that the provision of military equipment to Ukraine and the replenishment of UK stocks will be funded from the Treasury Reserve and will not come out of the MOD’s main departmental budget.¹⁰

Funding provided from the Treasury Reserve does, however, appear in the MOD’s budget toward the end of the financial year as part of the MOD Supplementary Estimates. Funding for military support to Ukraine for 2025/26 was claimed from the Treasury Reserve at the Supplementary Estimates in February 2026.¹¹

⁶ HM Government, [UK support to Ukraine: Factsheet](#), 24 July 2026

⁷ Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 10 July 2024

⁸ Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 26 July 2026

⁹ [HL Deb 26 March 2024](#), c573

¹⁰ PQ74916, [Ukraine: Military aid](#), 3 November 2022. The funding of military operations has historically come from the Treasury reserve.

¹¹ HM Treasury, [Supplementary Estimates 2025-26](#) (PDF), February 2026

2.2

G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans agreement

In June 2024, the G7 countries agreed to extend \$50 billion of loans to Ukraine, that will be “serviced and repaid” by future profits generated by immobilised Russian assets in the EU and the jurisdictions of the other non-EU G7 countries. Part of these loans will be used for military assistance, disbursed “through multiple channels that direct funds to Ukraine’s military”. Funds will also be used for Ukraine’s economic and reconstruction needs.¹²

The details of those loans were agreed in October 2024 and funds are being made available from the end of 2024 until December 2027.¹³ The UK’s share of that loan is £2.26 billion.¹⁴ This money is additional one-off financing and is separate to the £3 billion a year in military support that has been committed by the government.

On 8 November 2024, the government introduced [the Financial assistance to Ukraine bill](#) which allows the Treasury to make provision for the UK’s share of that loan. That legislation [received Royal Assent](#) on 16 January 2025.

ERA funds have been released in three tranches of approximately £752 million each in March and April 2025 and April 2026.¹⁵ The government said the funding had been divided into separate tranches “to give Ukraine more flexibility and allow them to swiftly adapt to the ever-changing battlefield”.¹⁶ With the last ERA loan instalment, UK military assistance to Ukraine in 2026 will total £3.75 billion.¹⁷

2.3

UK participation in the EU’s Ukraine Support Loan

In December 2025, EU leaders agreed a €90 billion support loan to Ukraine to help meet the country’s budgetary and military needs in 2026 and 2027.¹⁸ The loan replaced an earlier proposal by European Commission President Ursula

¹² [G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué](#), 14 June 2024

¹³ [G7 Annex to the G7 finance ministers’ statement on Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration \(ERA\) Loan initiative](#) (PDF), 25 October 2024

¹⁴ HM Treasury, [Press release](#), 22 October 2024

¹⁵ HM Treasury, [Press release](#), 14 April 2025 and Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 15 April 2026

¹⁶ HM Treasury, [Press release](#), 14 April 2025

¹⁷ PQ18657, [Defence: Finance](#), 20 July 2026

¹⁸ European Council, [European Council Meeting – Ukraine](#) (PDF), 18 December 2025

von der Leyen for a €140 billion reparations loan to Ukraine using immobilised Russian assets held by Euroclear.¹⁹

That support loan was finalised in April 2026. Of available financing, €60 billion has been earmarked for investment in Ukraine's defence industrial capabilities and the procurement of defence equipment from domestic industry, the EU, EEA-EFTA countries as well as third countries that have concluded a bilateral agreement with the EU or "demonstrated fulfilment of specific conditions and commitments".²⁰

In July 2026, the EU announced that the UK would participate in the EU Ukraine Support Loan as a third country.²¹ The participation of the UK will allow Ukraine to procure defence capabilities from UK industry using loan funds. In return the UK will make "a fair contribution to the cost to the EU of providing the loan, proportionate to the value of the contracts awarded to the UK's industry".²²

The UK is expected to make a financial contribution towards the loan from 2027. The MOD has confirmed that if no contracts are awarded to UK companies, the UK will not be required to make a financial contribution towards the loan.²³

¹⁹ Euronews, "[What is the reparations loan for Ukraine and why is the EU stuck with the plan?](#)", 25 October 2025

²⁰ Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 23 April 2026

²¹ European Commission, [Joint Statement of the European Union and the United Kingdom on United Kingdom participation under the Ukraine Support Loan](#), 13 July 2026 and Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 22 July 2026

²² HCWS226, [Ukraine support](#), 13 July 2026

²³ HCWS226, [Ukraine support](#), 13 July 2026

3

Timeline of military support (2022 to 2024)

The UK has sent around 400 different capabilities to Ukraine.

Prime Minister's Office, [Press release](#), 25 June 2025

UK military assistance to Ukraine is longstanding.²⁴ In October 2014, and in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, the Government announced that bilateral military assistance would be expanded at the request of the Ukrainian Government. That support included the provision of a package of non-lethal military equipment.²⁵

In 2015 the UK launched Operation Orbital, a non-lethal training and capacity building operation. It provided guidance and training to the Ukrainian armed forces through several advisory and short-term training teams. This has been the main vehicle for providing training and assistance to Ukrainian forces. The UK also launched an initiative to enhance Ukraine's naval capacity and provide training for its naval forces.

For more detail on historic UK military assistance to Ukraine see Library briefing: [Military assistance to Ukraine 2014-2021](#).

Since February 2022 the UK has been gifting [military aid to the Ukrainian armed forces](#). Equipment is either donated from existing UK defence stocks (which in turn is replaced), rapidly purchased from the defence industry in both the UK and overseas or purchased from the surplus stocks of foreign governments. Such acquisition is either funded directly or coordinated through mechanisms such as the International Fund for Ukraine, to which the UK has committed money. In its September 2024 report, the National Audit Office noted that "since mid-2023 the MOD has sharply reduced its donations of equipment, because it assessed that to continue would have imposed unacceptable risks to the UK's military readiness".²⁶

In answer to a parliamentary question on 29 April 2024, [the MOD published a list of the equipment that had been provided to Ukraine](#) by that point. A similar list was also published by the National Audit Office in its September 2024 report, [Investigation into military support for Ukraine](#) (see figure 8).

²⁴ In September 2014 the MOD gave an overview of the military assistance that has been provided to Ukraine in the previous six years ([PQ 209093](#), Ukraine, 13 October 2014)

²⁵ In July 2014 the [Council of the European Union](#) lifted the restrictive measures on export licenses to Ukraine that it had [previously imposed](#) in the February of that year in response to political violence in the country.

²⁶ National Audit Office, [Investigation into military support for Ukraine](#), HC 230, September 2024, p.27

When asked again in April 2025, the government said that it would not provide details of the equipment gifted to Ukraine since 2022 for security reasons.²⁷

In its [April 2025 factsheet on support to Ukraine](#), the government said that it had provided over 400 different capabilities to the Ukrainian armed forces in that period, although that information has been absent in subsequent updates.²⁸

Provision of defensive weaponry starts in late 2021

In early December 2021, and in light of Russian military activity on Ukraine's borders,²⁹ the Government said that the UK was "considering an extension of purely defensive support to Ukraine to help it defend itself".³⁰

In January 2022 the Ministry of Defence confirmed that, in addition to the existing support being provided, the UK would provide a new security assistance package "to increase Ukraine's defensive capabilities", including the provision of light, anti-armour weapons. A small contingent of British military personnel would also deploy to provide initial training for a short period of time, within the framework of Operation Orbital.

Announcing the decision, the Defence Secretary said:

Ukraine has every right to defend its borders, and this new package of aid further enhances its ability to do so. Let me be clear, this support is for short-range and clearly defensive weapon capabilities. They are not strategic weapons and pose no threat to Russia. They are to use in self-defence.³¹

Although intended for defensive purposes, the decision represented the first time the UK had supplied lethal weaponry to Ukraine. On 30 January 2022 the Government confirmed that 2,000 anti-armour missiles had been supplied.³² On 10 February the MOD confirmed that additional defensive equipment, including body armour, helmets and combat boots would also be provided.³³

In response to concerns of an imminent Russian invasion the UK announced in mid-February 2022 that all UK military training personnel would withdraw from Ukraine.³⁴

²⁷ PQ49128, [Ukraine: Military aid](#), 8 May 2025

²⁸ HM Government, [UK support to Ukraine: Factsheet](#), 15 September 2025

²⁹ This is examined in greater detail in Library research briefing, [Ukraine: Russia's "red line"](#)

³⁰ [HC Deb 7 December 2021 \[Ukraine\]](#), c188

³¹ HC Deb 17 January 2022, [Ukraine](#), c62

³² Downing Street, [Press release](#), 30 January 2022

³³ HCWS608, [Ukraine](#), 10 February 2022

³⁴ BBC News, ["Russia-Ukraine crisis: UK won't be able to fly people out – minister"](#), 12 February 2022

The Government will not send forces to Ukraine – February 2022

On 25 February 2022, then Minister for the Armed Forces, James Heappey, made clear that, while support for Ukraine would continue, there would be no “active” role for British or NATO troops in Ukraine:

All hon. Members in this House must be clear that British and NATO troops should not—must not—play an active role in Ukraine. We must all be clear what the risks of miscalculation could be and how existential the situation could quickly become if people do miscalculate and things escalate unnecessarily.³⁵

Pressed for further details of what additional military equipment and support the UK might be able to provide, the Minister said the Secretary of State had “instructed military officers in Defence to look across the full UK inventory for everything that we have right now that might be usable in the circumstances and to look at whether that could be sent forward and absorbed by the Ukrainians”.

He warned, however, of some of the difficulties involved, including the training that most systems would require, and issues relating to intellectual property. He emphasised that “we are leaving no stone unturned, and [...] we want to see as much British kit in the hands of the Ukrainians as we can manage”.³⁶

The government does not support a no-fly zone – February 2022

In response to Ukrainian requests in late February 2022 for a no-fly zone to be imposed over the country, the government made clear that it did not support such a move, for fear of escalation. On 25 February 2022, James Heappey said:

As Members will appreciate, a no-fly zone is somewhat difficult to implement in a hostile airspace against a peer adversary. We need to have our eyes wide open to the reality that in such an event NATO jets would, not just possibly but most certainly probably, come into a combat situation with Russian jets, and the risk of miscalculation, escalation and the triggering of article 5 could not be understated in those circumstances.³⁷

³⁵ HC Deb 25 February 2022, [Ukraine](#), c623

³⁶ HC Deb 25 February 2022, [Ukraine](#), c623

³⁷ HC Deb 25 February 2022, [Ukraine, c621](#)

On 11 October 2022 the government confirmed that its position on implementing a no-fly zone had not changed, but that it was committed to providing Ukraine with air defence capabilities.³⁸

Library briefing ‘[No-fly zones and Ukraine](#)’, gives further details of the calls for a no-fly zone in Ukraine, the response of the UK and its allies, their legal basis and examples of when have they been used before.

Further package of military support promised – March 2022

“We have provided Ukraine with military aid on the understanding that it will be used in accordance with international humanitarian law. We liaise on a daily basis with the Ukrainian Government, and they are clear that equipment provided by the UK is intended for the defence of Ukraine”.

PQ54667, [Ukraine: Military aid](#), 11 October 2022

On 2 March 2022, the MOD confirmed that a further package of military support would be provided to Ukraine, including “lethal aid in the form of defensive weapons and non-lethal aid such as body armour, medical supplies and other key equipment as requested by the Ukrainian Government”. Details of that aid were, however, withheld for operational security reasons.³⁹

The MOD later revealed that the UK had continued to supply next generation light anti-tank weapons (NLAWs), going beyond the 2,000 first announced on 17 January, deliveries of anti-tank javelin missiles would begin, and that the government was “exploring the donation of Starstreak high-velocity, man-portable anti-aircraft missiles”, which it believed remained within the definition of defensive weapons and would “allow the Ukrainian forces to better defend their skies”.⁴⁰

The MOD also announced the UK would be increasing supplies of rations, medical equipment, and other non-lethal military aid.

The Defence Secretary argued at the time that the government was exercising caution when deciding what military assistance to provide Ukraine, saying “everything we do is bound by the decision to supply defensive systems and is calibrated not to escalate to a strategic level”.⁴¹

A doubling of lethal aid – March-April 2022

At the NATO and G7 leader’s meeting on 24 March 2022, the then Prime Minister announced a major package of military support to Ukraine which would more than double the defensive lethal aid provided so far. A further 6,000 defensive missiles would be provided, including the Starstreak air defence system which had been under consideration.

³⁸ HC Deb 11 October 2022, [Ukraine](#), c33

³⁹ HC Deb 2 March 2022, [Support for Ukraine and Countering Threats from Russia](#), C1107

⁴⁰ HC Deb 9 March 2022, [Ukraine Update](#), c326.

⁴¹ HC Deb 9 March 2022, [Ukraine Update](#), c325.

The Prime Minister also announced £25 million in financial backing for the Ukrainian military. That financial support would come from the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund and help pay the salaries of Ukrainian soldiers, pilots and police and “ensure the armed forces are well equipped with high-quality equipment”.⁴²

In early April the MOD confirmed that a further £100 million package of military aid would be provided to Ukraine. Additional equipment would include more than 800 NLAW anti-tank missiles, more Javelin and Starstreak missiles, additional loitering munitions for precision strikes and additional non-lethal aid including body armour, ballistic helmets and night vision goggles.⁴³

Following a visit to Kyiv by the Prime Minister, Downing Street also confirmed on 9 April that the UK would provide Ukraine with 120 armoured vehicles and new Harpoon anti-ship missile systems.⁴⁴

At the end of April that was followed up with the gifting of a several “Stormer” armoured vehicles fitted with anti-air missile launchers.⁴⁵

A doubling of financial assistance – May 2022

In May 2022 the government announced that £1.3 billion of funding would be committed to military assistance to Ukraine and would be provided from the Treasury’s Special Reserve.⁴⁶ The funding included the £300 million military assistance package that the Prime Minister announced on 3 May, and included electronic warfare equipment, a counter battery radar system, GPS jamming equipment and thousands of night vision goggles.⁴⁷

⁴² Downing Street, [Press release](#), 24 March 2022

⁴³ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 8 April 2022

⁴⁴ Downing Street, [Press release](#), 9 April 2022

⁴⁵ Ministry of Defence, [Defence Secretary Statement to the House of Commons](#), 25 April 2022

⁴⁶ [HC Deb 20 June 2022](#), c559

⁴⁷ Downing Street, [Press release](#), 3 May 2022

Provision of long-range artillery – June 2022

“As Russia changes tactics, so must our support to Ukraine”.

Former Defence Secretary, [Ben Wallace](#),
6 June 2022

On 6 June 2022 the MOD confirmed that it would provide Ukraine with three M270 multiple-launch rocket systems, and associated munitions. The M270 can strike targets up to 80km away with precision and would “offer a significant boost in capability for the Ukrainian forces”. The decision came at the request of the Ukrainian government for longer range precision weapons to defend against Russian heavy artillery and was taken in tandem with the US decision to provide Ukraine with the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). Ukrainian troops received training on the new systems in the UK.⁴⁸

The MOD also confirmed the purchase of 20 M-109 self-propelled artillery units from a Belgian arms company which would be refurbished before sending them to Ukraine.⁴⁹

A further £1 billion in military support – June-August 2022

At the NATO Summit at the end of June 2022 then Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, announced a further £1 billion of military support to Ukraine as part of a “next phase” that would “enhance and sustain Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion”. Specifically, that funding would help supply capabilities including anti-tank weapons, air defence systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), electronic warfare equipment and thousands of pieces of kit for Ukrainian soldiers.⁵⁰

In a statement to the House on 21 July 2022, the Defence Secretary confirmed that “future planned military support will also include more sophisticated defence systems across a range of capabilities”.⁵¹

On 11 August the MOD confirmed that additional M270 multiple launch rocket systems would be sent to Ukraine, along with “a significant number” of precision guided M31A1 missiles. The Secretary of State said the latest equipment would help Ukraine “continue to defend against Russian aggression and the indiscriminate use of long-range artillery”.⁵²

⁴⁸ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 6 June 2022

⁴⁹ PQ20208, Ukraine: Military aid, 22 June 2022

⁵⁰ Downing Street, [Press release](#), 30 June 2022

⁵¹ HCWS259, [Military support to Ukraine](#), 21 July 2022

⁵² Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 August 2022

Additional air defence systems – October 2022

On 13 October 2022 the MOD confirmed that it would donate hundreds more air defence missiles to Ukraine to protect against Russian missile strikes and to protect critical national infrastructure after Russia launched a series of drone and missile attacks against civilian targets.⁵³ In that package were AMRAAM rockets, for use with the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) being provided by the United States. The AMRAAM rockets were the first capability pledged by the UK capable of shooting down cruise missiles. As part of this package of assistance, a further 18 howitzer artillery guns and hundreds of additional aerial drones were also donated.⁵⁴

During a visit to Kyiv on 19 November, the then Prime Minister announced “a major new package” of air defence support, including 125 anti-aircraft guns and counter-drone technology, including radars and anti-drone electronic warfare capability.⁵⁵

Provision of search and rescue helicopter capability – November 2022

In November the MOD also confirmed that the first of three Sea King search and rescue/reconnaissance helicopters had been delivered to Ukraine. The Sea King retired from service with the RAF and Royal Navy in 2018.

The Royal Navy has provided training in the UK for Ukrainian personnel who will crew those helicopters, and associated engineers.⁵⁶

⁵³ President Putin said the attacks were in retaliation for an earlier attack on a bridge across the Kerch Strait linking Russia and Crimea (Sky News, [“Vladimir Putin says missile strikes across Ukraine are in retaliation for Crimea bridge- ‘terrorist’ blast”](#), 10 October 2022

⁵⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 13 October 2022

⁵⁵ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 November 2022

⁵⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 23 November 2022

Provision of Challenger II main battle tanks – January 2023

“A long and static war only serves Russia’s ends”.

Downing Street, [Press release](#), 14 January 2023

On 14 January 2023 the UK became one of the first allies to announce it would gift main battle tanks to Ukraine. Described as “the start of a gear change in the UK’s support” a squadron of 14 Challenger II tanks, thousands of rounds of munitions, and associated armoured recovery and repair vehicles would be provided.⁵⁷ The UK had already provided hundreds of armoured vehicles.

While the decision was welcomed by Ukraine and its allies, the then UK Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Sanders, was reported to have expressed concern that such donations may leave the British Army “temporarily weaker”.⁵⁸

During a meeting of the Defence Select Committee on 11 January 2023, Committee member Kevan Jones MP called the decision a “PR story”, questioning the ability to maintain the capability within Ukraine, including the longer-term provision of munitions which are not NATO standard.⁵⁹

The Challenger 2 tanks were received in theatre at the end of March 2023.⁶⁰

A significant uplift in combat support – January 2023

In addition to the Challenger 2’s, in January 2023 the UK also announced a significant uplift in combat support for Ukraine. Described by the MOD as “the most significant package of combat power to date”, the UK would also provide Ukraine with:

- 30 AS-90 self-propelled guns.
- Hundreds of additional armoured vehicles, including the Bulldog armoured personnel carrier.
- A manoeuvre support package including minefield breaching and bridge laying capabilities.
- Additional unmanned aerial systems to support Ukrainian artillery.

⁵⁷ Downing Street, [Press release](#), 14 January 2023

⁵⁸ BBC News, “[Ukraine: Military hardware donations weaken Army – UK chief](#)”, 17 January 2023

⁵⁹ Defence Select Committee, [Oral evidence: Land Acquisition](#) (PDF), HC978, 11 January 2023, Q.17

⁶⁰ Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, [@DefenceU](#), X (formerly Twitter), 27 March 2023

- Hundreds of additional missiles, including munitions for the M270 multiple launch rocket system, Starstreak air defence missiles, medium range air defence missiles and 600 Brimstone anti-tank missiles.
- A support package of equipment and spares to refurbish up to a hundred Ukrainian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.⁶¹

The AS-90 and the Challenger 2 tanks came from UK stocks, while other capabilities were purchased from the open market, or from third countries.⁶²

Announcing the package of assistance, then Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said that “equipping Ukraine to push Russia out of its territory is as important as equipping them to defend what they already have”.⁶³

The UK’s commitments form part of [the Tallinn Pledge](#), which was announced by the UK and eight other European allies on 19 January 2023. That pledge recognised the renewed effort that would be required to assist Ukraine in, not only defending Ukrainian territory, but in expelling Russian forces from the areas of Ukraine under Russian control. To that end, the signatories of the pledge committed to “collectively pursuing delivery of an unprecedented set of donations including main battle tanks, heavy artillery, air defence, ammunition, and infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine’s defence”.

On 21 April 2023, the MOD confirmed that the UK was set to provide more than 300,000 artillery shells to Ukraine during 2023.⁶⁴

Long-range strike capabilities – May 2023

On 8 February 2023, the then Prime Minister confirmed that the UK would provide Ukraine with “longer range capabilities” in its next package of military assistance, intended to “disrupt Russia’s ability to continually target Ukraine’s civilian and critical national infrastructure and help relieve pressure on Ukraine’s frontlines”.⁶⁵

Precise details of those long-range capabilities were not provided at the time, although discussions within government were thought to be focused on the potential provision of [Storm Shadow/SCALP air-launched cruise missiles](#).⁶⁶

The UK’s donation of Storm Shadow missiles was confirmed on 11 May 2023, although an exact number was not disclosed for operational security reasons.

⁶¹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 16 January 2023

⁶² Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 16 January 2023

⁶³ HC Deb 16 January 2023, [Ukraine: Update](#), c36

⁶⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 21 April 2023

⁶⁵ Downing Street, [Press release](#), 8 February 2023

⁶⁶ The Times, “Ukraine prepared to use British missiles to strike Crimea”, 10 February 2023

The Defence Secretary said the decision had been taken in response to Russia's "continued aggression" and that:

The donation of those weapon systems gives Ukraine the best chance to defend itself against Russia's continued brutality, especially the deliberate targeting of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure against international law. Ukraine has a right to be able to defend itself against that.⁶⁷

With a range of more than 250km, the Storm Shadow has a greater range than other capabilities donated so far, including the US HIMARS system, and allows Ukraine to strike targets "within its sovereign territory".⁶⁸ This could include Crimea which is recognised as being within Ukraine's 1991 borders.

The UK also committed to the provision of long-range attack drones, which have a range of over 200km, alongside hundreds of additional air defence missiles and other unmanned air systems.⁶⁹ The MOD did not provide any further detail on the long-range attack drone, or any information about its capabilities. The UK does not possess such capability in its own military inventory, leading to speculation that the capability would be purchased by the UK from a third country.⁷⁰

An air defence partnership- June 2023

In mid-June 2023, the UK, the US, the Netherlands, and Denmark announced that they would form a partnership to address Ukraine's most urgent air defence requirements.

Hundreds of Soviet-era short and medium range air defence missiles and associated systems were to be procured by the partnership and delivered to Ukraine over the following few weeks.⁷¹

This initiative is in addition to the air defence capabilities being provided under the second tranche of [the International Fund for Ukraine](#).

Support to the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package – June 2023

In June 2023 the Defence Secretary announced that the UK would contribute a further £60 million to [NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine](#).

⁶⁷ [HC Deb 11 May 2023](#), c475

⁶⁸ [HC Deb 11 May 2023](#), c477

⁶⁹ Downing Street, [Press release](#), 15 May 2023

⁷⁰ Breaking Defense, "[Mystery surrounds 'hundreds of UK long-range' attack drones heading to Ukraine](#)", 19 May 2023

⁷¹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 15 June 2023 and [Joint Statement](#), 15 June 2023

That brought the UK's support to the CAP to £80 million since February 2022 and was in addition to the bilateral assistance that the UK has provided to Ukraine so far.⁷²

Major new package of support – July 2023

At the NATO summit in July 2023 the UK announced that more than 70 combat and logistics vehicles would be provided to Ukraine, along with thousands of additional rounds of Challenger 2 munitions and a support package for equipment repair worth £50 million, including spare parts, technical support and maintenance training.⁷³

The UK also led a project to establish a new military rehabilitation centre in Ukraine that will support the rehabilitation, recovery and return of Ukrainian soldiers injured in combat. That centre is funded through NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package and supported by rehabilitation specialists from across NATO member states.⁷⁴

Support for the winter – September 2023-March 2024

With the onset of winter, there were concerns that Russia would renew its attacks against Ukraine's critical infrastructure and energy networks.⁷⁵

At the meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in September 2023, the UK outlined its priorities for the coming months, including the provision of further air defence and long-range strike capabilities, although did not provide specific details. The UK also committed to delivering tens of thousands of additional artillery shells by the end of the year and the provision of support to help Ukraine sustain the capabilities that the UK had already provided. This included the ability to recover and repair equipment used in Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive.⁷⁶

At the end of December 2023, the Government confirmed that an additional 200 Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (ASRAAM) would be delivered to re-supply UK developed air defence systems that were first provided to Ukraine in late 2022. Under that project, the ASRAAM missile has been re-designed into a ground-launched air defence capability, deployed on an all-

⁷² Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 16 June 2023

⁷³ Downing Street, [Press release](#), 12 July 2023

⁷⁴ Downing Street, [Press release](#), 12 July 2023

⁷⁵ The Economist, "Ukraine prepares for winter again as Russia targets its power grid", 2 October 2023

⁷⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 20 September 2023

purpose terrain vehicle.⁷⁷ Eight such systems, subsequently codenamed Raven, have been deployed in Ukraine.

In February 2024 the MOD also announced an additional 200 Brimstone anti-tank missiles,⁷⁸ and a new package of funding (£245 million over the course of 2024/25) to replenish Ukraine's artillery ammunition reserves.⁷⁹ The first deliveries under this new package were expected in the first quarter of the 2024/25 financial year.⁸⁰ The UK's efforts to provide munitions is separate to the Czech-led scheme on the urgent procurement of artillery shells for Ukraine, although the government confirmed that efforts were being coordinated.⁸¹

“Drones are one of the most important capabilities we have seen in Ukraine, and they have arguably transformed the nature of warfare in this conflict”.

Former Minister for Defence Procurement, James Cartlidge, 27 February 2024

At least £345 million of the £2.5 billion in financial assistance announced for 2024/25 (see above) has also been spent on the “rapid” procurement and manufacture of over ten thousand military drones, including surveillance, long-range strike and naval drones.⁸² Those systems are expected to be produced both in the UK and Ukraine as the UK looks to support Ukraine in strengthening its defence industrial base (See UK-Ukraine Agreement on Security Cooperation).⁸³ It will also form part of the longer term drone capability coalition that the UK announced it would lead, alongside Latvia, in February 2024 (see UDCG long-term Capability Coalitions).

The largest UK military assistance package to date – April 2024

On a visit to Warsaw on 23 April 2024, then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced the largest package of UK military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion in February 2022.

In addition to a £500 million uplift for 2024/25 which will be used to rapidly deliver ammunition, air defence missiles, drones and engineering support, the Prime Minister also announced: more than 1,600 strike and air defence missiles (including long-range storm shadow missiles), more than 400

⁷⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 29 December 2023

⁷⁸ [HC Deb 22 February 2024](#), c887

⁷⁹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 24 February 2024

⁸⁰ PQ15580, [Ukraine: Military aid](#), 5 March 2024

⁸¹ PQ21307, [Ukraine: Military aid](#), 23 April 2024 and Defence Committee, [One-off session with the Secretary of State](#) (PDF), 26 March 2024, Q.76 The Czech led scheme is examined in greater detail in Library research briefing: [Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion](#)

⁸² Initial investment was outlined at £200 million (Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 12 January 2024). That funding was increased to £345 million in early March 2024 (Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 7 March 2024).

⁸³ Prime Minister's Office, [Prime Minister Rishi Sunak's Address to the Ukrainian Parliament](#), 12 January 2024

vehicles (including further AS-90 artillery guns), 60 boats and nearly 4 million rounds of small arms ammunition.⁸⁴

Announcing the latest package of assistance, Rishi Sunak said that continued support to Ukraine was essential for UK and European security and that “If Putin is allowed to succeed in this war of aggression, he will not stop at the Polish border”.⁸⁵

During a trip to Kyiv on 2 May 2024, then Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron said Ukraine could use British supplied weapons to strike military targets within Russia, a statement that drew instant criticism from the Russian government.⁸⁶ However, those permissions did not extend to the use of Storm Shadow long-range missiles against military targets in Russian territory.⁸⁷ For UK Storm Shadow missiles to be used against targets in Russia, US permission is reportedly required as the missile uses a triple navigation system that partly uses the US GPS system.⁸⁸ However, other suggested that the issue revolved around allies being keen to present a coordinated response,⁸⁹ and at the time, authorisation for the use of US long-range missiles (ATACMs) had not been given.⁹⁰

Commitments by the new Labour government – July to December 2024

“The defence of the UK starts in Ukraine”.

Former [Defence Secretary John Healey](#),
10 September 2024

During a trip to Kyiv on 7 July 2024, the then Secretary of State for Defence, John Healey, pledged to “step up the UK’s support for Ukraine” and announced a new package of assistance, including additional artillery, ammunition and 90 additional Brimstone anti-armour missiles. He also pledged that the assistance announced in April 2024 would be fast-tracked and would arrive in theatre within the next 100 days.⁹¹ On 11 September the government confirmed that assistance “is on track for delivery”.⁹²

At the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on 6 September, the Defence Secretary also announced that the UK would provide Ukraine with 650

⁸⁴ Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 23 April 2024 and PQ23103, [Ukraine: Military aid](#), 26 April 2024

⁸⁵ Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 23 April 2024 and PQ23103, [Ukraine: Military aid](#), 26 April 2024

⁸⁶ Atlantic Council: Ukraine Alert, [“UK gives green light to use British weapons inside Russia”](#), 3 May 2024 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, [Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zhakaorva](#), 3 May 2024

⁸⁷ This issue is examined in greater detail in section 2.2 of Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion \(February 2022 to January 2025\)](#)

⁸⁸ MBDA, [Storm Shadow/ SCALP](#) (PDF), accessed 13 September 2024; BNN Bloomberg, [“US, UK discuss use of Pentagon missile guidance data for Ukraine”](#), 12 September 2024 and The Times, [“Britain won’t go it alone over long-range missiles for Ukraine”](#), 16 September 2024

⁸⁹ The New York Times, [“Biden poised to approve Ukraine’s use of long-range Western weapons in Russia”](#), 13 September 2024

⁹⁰ US Department of Defense, [Press briefing](#), 12 July 2024

⁹¹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 7 July 2024

⁹² [HL Deb 12 September 2024](#), c1641

lightweight multi-role missiles to boost Ukraine's air defence capabilities. In line with the government's commitment to speed up the delivery of equipment, the first batch of missiles entered theatre at the end of 2024.⁹³

A further £40 million was also committed to the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package, to provide Ukraine with assistance in counter-drone protection, the demining of recaptured territory and the medical rehabilitation of injured personnel.⁹⁴

In mid-July 2024, the UK and Ukraine also agreed a [defence export support treaty](#) that will enable Ukraine to access £3.5 billion of UK export finance to support the development of its defence capabilities and acquire military equipment from UK companies.⁹⁵ The export finance is in addition to the £3 billion for military assistance that has been committed over 2024/25.⁹⁶

New joint MOD/FCDO Ukraine unit

In October 2024, the government announced that it would establish a joint Ministry of Defence/ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Ukraine unit. The purpose of the new joint unit is to integrate expertise within government and promote a “new whole-of-government approach” to Ukraine.⁹⁷

Authorisation for the use of Storm Shadow missiles against military targets in Russia – November 2024

In September 2024, then Foreign Secretary David Lammy said that the operational caveat on the use of long-range missiles against targets in Russia was under review. He said that [Iran's provision of ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine](#) (an [allegation which Iran denies](#)) had itself escalated the conflict and that discussion on Ukraine's use of UK and US supplied long range missiles would now take place.⁹⁸

In mid-November 2024, and in response to [the deployment of thousands of North Korean soldiers to Russia](#) to support Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration lifted those restrictions, raising the question of whether

⁹³ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 6 September 2024

⁹⁴ Prime Minister's Office, [Press release](#), 10 July 2024

⁹⁵ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, [UK/ Ukraine: Framework Agreement on official credit support for the development of Ukraine's defence capabilities \(CS Ukraine No.2/2024\)](#)

⁹⁶ Prime Minister's Office, [Press release](#), 18 July 2024

⁹⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 26 September 2024

⁹⁸ US Department of State, [Joint press availability](#), 11 September 2024

the UK and France would follow suit with respect to the use of Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles.⁹⁹ On 20 November, reports that UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles had been used by Ukraine against targets in Russia were subsequently widely reported.¹⁰⁰

Like the US administration, the UK Government refused to comment on the reports for reasons of operational security. Giving evidence to the Defence Select Committee on 21 November 2024, then Defence Secretary John Healey said:

Although the Ukrainian actions on the battlefield speak for themselves, be in no doubt that the UK Government are stepping up our support for Ukraine and determined to continue doubling down on our support for Ukraine. This is what I told Minister Umarov [Ukrainian Defence Minister] in a long call on Tuesday. It is what I discussed with the US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin on Sunday. As I told you and the House yesterday—it holds for this Committee as well—I will not be drawn on the operational details of the conflict. It risks both operational security and, in the end, the only one who benefits from such a public debate is President Putin.¹⁰¹

In a Statement to the House of Commons on 21 November, then Prime Minister Keir Starmer reaffirmed that the UK's support to Ukraine was for self-defence and in accordance with international law:

The UK's support for Ukraine is always for self-defence, and it is proportionate, co-ordinated and agile. It is a response to Russia's own actions, and it is in accordance with international law. Under article 51 of the UN charter, Ukraine has a clear right of self-defence against Russia's illegal attacks. I say again that Russia could roll back its forces and end this war tomorrow. Until then, we will stand up for what we know is right, for Ukraine's security and for our own security, and we will back Ukraine with what is needed for as long as it is needed.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Institute for the Study of War, [Russian offensive campaign assessment](#), 17 November 2024 and BBC News, [“Will UK follow the US and allow the use of long range missiles?”](#), 18 November 2024

¹⁰⁰ Sky News, “Ukraine fires UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles at targets inside Russia”, 20 November 2024 and Reuters, “Russia says it shot down two British Storm Shadow missiles”, 21 November 2024

¹⁰¹ Defence Committee, [Oral evidence: Introductory session with the Secretary of State for Defence](#) (PDF), HC345, 21 November 2024

¹⁰² [HC Deb 21 November 2024](#), c373

4

Priorities for Ukraine in 2025-26

“This Government are clear that the frontline of British and European security runs through Ukraine”.

Former Minister for the Armed Forces, [Luke Pollard](#), 19 December 2024

During a visit to Kyiv in December 2024, then Defence Secretary John Healey announced a “new plan for Ukraine’s defence” over the course of 2025.

With a commitment to step up the UK’s international leadership on Ukraine and to “support Ukraine for as long as it takes”, the new plan would:

- Increase Ukraine’s military capability
- Build on the success of Operation Interflex by enhancing the training offered to Ukraine (see below)
- Strengthen defence industrial cooperation (primarily through [Task Force Hirst](#))
- Increase cooperation with allies to support Ukraine
- Increase pressure on Russia.¹⁰³

A new air defence system – January 2025

In January 2025, the MOD announced that a new air defence system (Gravehawk), which has been designed and developed in conjunction with Denmark, has been deployed to Ukraine.

The new system is able to retrofit air-air missiles for ground-based air defence, meaning it can use Ukrainian missiles already in their possession. Two prototypes of the Gravehawk system were tested in Ukraine in September 2024 and a further 15 systems are expected to be deployed in 2025.¹⁰⁴ It is the second air defence system which has been rapidly developed for deployment in Ukraine by retrofitting air to air missiles for ground-based air defence (in addition to the Raven system, see Support for the winter – September 2023-March 2024).

In February 2025, the MOD confirmed that the cost of designing and delivering the prototypes had been met by the UK (approximately £6 million) and that

¹⁰³ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 December 2024. Sanctions on Russia are discussed in Library research briefing [Sanctions against Russia \(February 2022 to January 2025\)](#)

¹⁰⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 16 January 2025

the cost of delivering the 15 follow-on systems will be met jointly by the UK and Denmark (approximately £7 million each).¹⁰⁵

A new package of military aid – February 2025

At the February 2025 meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (see below), the UK announced a further £150 million in military assistance to Ukraine, including thousands of drones, over 50 tanks and armoured vehicles (including modernised T-72 tanks) and air defence systems. Maintenance contracts worth £60 million, to support the in-theatre repair of critical capabilities already provided by the UK, were also announced. Then Defence Secretary, John Healey, also said that half a million rounds of artillery ammunition had now been provided to Ukraine.¹⁰⁶

£1.6 billion air defence missile deal – March 2025

In early March 2025, the government announced a £1.6 billion deal that would provide thousands of lightweight multi-role (LMM) air defence missiles to Ukraine. Following on from an earlier contract announced in September 2024 (see above), the deal (worth an initial £1.16 billion, with potential for a further £500 million) will be funded by a loan underwritten by [UK Export Finance](#).¹⁰⁷ In mid-July 2024 the UK and Ukraine agreed a defence export support treaty enabling Ukraine to access £3.5 billion of UK export finance to acquire military equipment from UK companies (see above). The financing is additional to the £3 billion in military assistance committed in 2025/26 (see Financial commitments).

Thales Northern Ireland will deliver the contract in collaboration with a Ukrainian defence industry partner, which will manufacture launchers and command and control vehicles for the missiles in Ukraine. The deal has been described as the first of a series of “mega projects” to be delivered for Ukraine through Task Force Hirst.¹⁰⁸

In October 2025, the government confirmed that the first tranche of hundreds of missiles had been delivered to Ukraine five months ahead of schedule.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ PQ29526, [Guided weapons: Procurement](#), 14 February 2025

¹⁰⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 12 February 2025

¹⁰⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 2 March 2025

¹⁰⁸ As above

¹⁰⁹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 10 October 2025

£350 million package of support – April 2025

At the April 2025 meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, the UK Government announced a £350 million package of military support to Ukraine. That funding is being supplemented by a further £100 million from Norway, via the International Fund for Ukraine (see below).¹¹⁰

£160 million of UK funding will provide for repairs and maintenance of vehicles and equipment already supplied to Ukraine. It will be delivered through a partnership of British and Ukrainian companies under Taskforce Hirst.¹¹¹

UK and Norwegian funding will also procure radar systems, anti-tank mines and hundreds of thousands of drones. The latter will support the work of the drone capability coalition being led by the UK and Latvia (see below). Equipment will be procured from a mixture of British and Ukrainian suppliers.¹¹²

Drone production/ partnership – June 2025

“Ukraine is the world leader in drone design and execution, with drone technology evolving, on average, every six weeks”.

Ministry of Defence, 23 June 2025

In early June 2025, the government announced that it would invest £350 million in drone production in this financial year (2025/26), in order to achieve a tenfold increase in drone production and meet a new target of 100,000 drones delivered in 2025.¹¹³

An agreement to share battlefield technology to assist UK firms in rapidly designing and building drones, at scale, was also reached on 23 June 2025. For an initial period of three years, the partnership agreement will initially focus on information sharing. In the longer term, the agreement is also expected to pave the way for future collaboration on drone technologies “long after the war finishes”.¹¹⁴

Additional air defence using proceeds from sanctioned Russian assets– June 2025

At the end of June 2025, the government announced that 350 additional ASRAAM (advanced short-range air-to-air) missiles, that are capable of being

¹¹⁰ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 April 2025

¹¹¹ See also Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 7 March 2026

¹¹² Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 April 2025

¹¹³ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 4 June 2025

¹¹⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 23 June 2025

launched from the Raven ground-based air defence system, would be delivered to Ukraine.¹¹⁵

The ‘Raven’ system, which re-purposes ASRAAM missiles into a short-range ground-based air defence capability deployed on an all-terrain vehicle, was developed and deployed to Ukraine in 2022/23 (see Support for the winter – September 2023–March 2024).¹¹⁶ The government also confirmed that a further five raven systems were due for “imminent delivery”, bringing the total number of systems in Ukraine to 13.¹¹⁷

Those missiles, worth £70 million, have been financed through the UK’s contribution to the Extraordinary Acceleration Revenue scheme (see G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans agreement) and repaid with the proceeds of sanctioned Russian assets.¹¹⁸

A UK/ Germany air defence partnership - July 2025

At the July 2025 meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, the UK and Germany announced a new partnership agreement to provide air defence missiles to Ukraine.

Germany will provide €170 million which the UK will use to rapidly procure these air defence missiles through the International Fund for Ukraine (see below).¹¹⁹

Further support to the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package – July 2025

In July 2025 the UK also announced that it would donate a further £40 million to the [NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package](#) for Ukraine, which can be utilised on a range of programmes from demining to the rehabilitation of wounded soldiers.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ Prime Minister’s office, [Press release](#), 25 June 2025

¹¹⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Facebook](#), 10 May 2025 (accessed 1 July 2025)

¹¹⁷ Prime Minister’s office, [Press release](#), 25 June 2025

¹¹⁸ As above

¹¹⁹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 21 July 2025

¹²⁰ HC Deb 17 July 2025, [Ukraine](#), c475

Assistance to the Australian deployment of an E-7 airborne early warning contingent – July 2025

Since autumn 2023, Australia has deployed an E7-A Wedgetail early warning aircraft to Europe, along with up to 100 crew and support personnel, to help secure the route for humanitarian and military assistance into Ukraine.¹²¹

In June 2025, the Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles, said that deployment would be extended and in July 2025 confirmed that the next rotation would be jointly staffed by Australian and British military personnel.¹²²

Military support paid for using the proceeds of frozen Russian assets tops £1 billion – September 2025

At the September 2025 meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting, the UK Defence Secretary did not announce any new initiatives or packages of assistance. He did, however, confirm that more than £1 billion of military equipment and support had been purchased so far by the UK, for Ukraine, using the ERA loan that will be repaid from the proceeds of frozen Russian state assets.

Equipment includes hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition, hundreds of air defence missiles, spare parts, and new support contracts to help maintain and repair equipment and vehicles.¹²³

Project Octopus – September 2025

Building on the UK-Ukraine agreement reached in June 2025 to share battlefield technology (see above), in early September that agreement was

¹²¹ Australian Government, [Press release](#), 10 July 2023

¹²² Australian Government, [Press conference, Sydney](#), 25 July 2025 and [Statement on UK-Australia Ministerial Consultations \(AUKMIN\)](#), July 2025. Since 2023, UK personnel have been deployed in Australia as part of the E-7A Seedcorn training programme, which was established to help preserve a core of airborne early warning and control expertise within the RAF which is currently without an AEW capability. The [Wedgetail is due into service in the RAF at the end of 2025](#), at which point the Seedcorn training programme will conclude.

¹²³ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 3 September 2025

expanded to allow for the sharing and joint development of intellectual property.

The first project to be launched under this expanded technology sharing partnership (Programme Lyra) is a new, advanced, air defence interceptor drone, codenamed Project Octopus. Designed by Ukraine, with the support of UK scientists and technicians, the drone will be mass produced in the UK, at a rate of thousands per month.¹²⁴

In October 2025, the Defence Secretary said that the UK had committed more than £600 million on drones for Ukraine in 2025 and that 85,000 had been delivered over the previous six months.¹²⁵ In January 2026 the MOD confirmed that production of the first Octopus interceptors would begin before the end of the month.¹²⁶

Update on air defence - December 2025

At the meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group in December 2025, the Defence Secretary confirmed that more than 20 remotely guided counter-drone turrets that were being acquired from Estonia, would be delivered in 2026.

He also confirmed that five Raven air defence systems for Ukraine, first announced in June 2025 (see above), were in the process of being handed over to Ukraine, while deliveries of the Gravehawk system (see January 2025 above) were also underway.¹²⁷

£600 million has been committed to air defence over the course of 2025.¹²⁸

Project Nightfall: a new deep strike ballistic missile for Ukraine – January 2026

In January 2026, the government announced the intention to develop a new deep strike (long-range) ballistic missile for Ukraine. Codenamed Nightfall, the project envisages the rapid development of a ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of more than 500km that is capable of being rapidly launched from a range of vehicles. The initial intention was to produce 10 systems per month, with a maximum unit cost of £800,000 per missile which

¹²⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 10 September 2025

¹²⁵ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 14 October 2025

¹²⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 9 January 2026

¹²⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 17 December 2025

¹²⁸ As above. See also [Press release](#), 14 October 2025

the MOD says represents “a powerful, cost-effective long-range strike option, with minimal foreign export controls”.¹²⁹

Three development contracts, worth £9 million each, were expected to be awarded in March 2026 with a view to industry teams designing, developing and delivering their first three missiles for testing within 12 months.

Whilst intended to support Ukraine in the first instance, the project will inform the UK’s long-range strike options in the future.¹³⁰

In May 2026, the MOD confirmed that development contracts for Project Nightfall had been signed but provided no further detail.¹³¹

UK joins the NATO PURL initiative – February 2026

Announced in July 2025, the [Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List \(PURL\) mechanism](#) allows NATO allies to purchase air defence, precision guided missiles and munitions directly from the United States, for delivery to Ukraine.¹³²

At the Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting on 12 February 2026, the UK announced that it would join the PURL initiative, providing £150 million for the purchase, and rapid delivery, of air defence missiles to Ukraine.¹³³

A further £390 million contract for the delivery of an additional 1,000 Lightweight Multirole Missiles, manufactured by Thales in Belfast, was also announced. The contract builds upon an announcement made by the government in March 2025 (see £1.6 billion air defence missile deal – March 2025).

Collaboration on electronic warfare – March 2026

During a trade mission to Ukraine in March 2026, the UK and Ukraine signed an agreement to collaborate on electronic warfare technologies, which will

¹²⁹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 January 2026

¹³⁰ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 January 2026

¹³¹ PQ1367, [Guided weapons: Procurement](#), 22 May 2026

¹³² Further detail is available in section 1.2 of Commons Library briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine: What has changed in 2025-26?](#)

¹³³ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 12 February 2026

be combined with existing Ukrainian platforms to improve Ukraine's overall military effectiveness.¹³⁴

Additional air defence – March 2026

Following on from announcements of additional air defence support in February 2026 (see above), in March 2026 the government announced an additional £100 million to meet urgent requirements, taking the total committed in February and March 2026 to £600 million.¹³⁵

Largest ever drone package – April 2026

At a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group in April 2026, the Defence Secretary announced what was described as “the biggest ever drone package for Ukraine”. More than 120,000 drones are expected to be delivered in 2026, including long-range strike drones, intelligence and reconnaissance drones, logistics drones and maritime capabilities.¹³⁶

Gripen fighter jet deal – May 2026

In May 2026, Ukraine announced its intention to buy 20 Gripen E/F fighter aircraft, financed using the EU Support Loan agreed in April (see above). In conjunction with that deal, the Swedish government announced that it would also gift Ukraine a further 16 Gripen C/D aircraft from the Swedish air force's existing fleet.¹³⁷

The Gripen aircraft is a collaboration between Sweden, the UK and the United States. Over 30% of the aircraft is manufactured in the UK, including the radar and landing gear. UK workshare will continue under this new deal with Ukraine, which the MOD has said will support 5,000 UK jobs.¹³⁸

In July 2026, the UK announced that it would invest €300 million to support the Ukrainian Air Force in fielding a squadron of 16 Gripen E fighter jets by 2029. That package of support will also include pilot and engineer training, simulators, and spare parts.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 7 March 2026

¹³⁵ Prime Minister's Office, [Press release](#), 27 March 2026

¹³⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 15 April 2026

¹³⁷ Government Offices of Sweden, [Press release](#), 28 May 2026

¹³⁸ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 28 May 2026. See also Aerospace Global, [“The Saab JAS 39 Gripen: Where it's actually built”](#), 7 June 2026

¹³⁹ Prime Minister's Office, [Press release](#), 16 July 2026

Air defence funded from the ERA loan – June 2026

Air defence has continued to be a priority for the Ukrainian armed forces. In June 2026, the MOD announced a £750 million package that it will provide Ukraine with more than 350 air defence missiles and radars by the end of 2026, funded by the ERA loan to Ukraine.

In addition, the MOD confirmed that package will also fund 150,000 drones by the end of the year.¹⁴⁰

Project Brakestop: a new long-range strike capability for Ukraine – June 2026

Work has been underway since the end of 2024 on a UK programme to develop a long-range, low-cost, cruise missile for Ukraine (Project Brakestop).

Armed with a 225kg warhead, and capable of hitting targets more than 500km away, each missile is expected to cost around £400,000 and be manufactured at a rate of 20 per month.

Flight testing of three UK designed missiles has been underway since December 2025 and in June 2026 follow-on contracts, worth £15 million each, were awarded to three companies: MBDA, MGI Engineering and Rotron Aerospace.¹⁴¹

Project Brakestop differs from Project Nightfall, which seeks to develop a long-range tactical ballistic missile for Ukraine (see above).

4.1

Continued support under the Burnham government

After taking office on 20 July 2026, Prime Minister Andy Burnham said that the UK will continue to stand with Ukraine, that support is “unwavering” and the UK “will not backdown until we achieve long lasting and just peace for

¹⁴⁰ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 18 June 2026

¹⁴¹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 22 June 2026

Ukraine”.¹⁴² As outlined above, he has committed to £3 billion in military support to Ukraine each year “for as long as it takes”.¹⁴³

During his first meeting with President Zelenskyy on 26 July, the Prime Minister announced that the UK would share the intellectual property for a new electronic warfare capability: Stone Cloak, with Ukraine. Sharing intellectual property will allow Ukraine to mass produce the capability domestically and to incrementally improve its effectiveness as a direct result of deployment on the frontline.¹⁴⁴ The announcement builds upon the agreement signed in March 2026 to explore sharing electronic warfare technologies (see above).

In July 2026, the [UK assumed command of Multinational Force Ukraine](#) (MNF-U), the coalition force that has been prepared to deploy to Ukraine following the conclusion of any peace agreement and end to hostilities. Handover of MNF-U to the UK is part of a pre-planned rotation of command responsibility between France and the UK.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 26 July 2026

¹⁴³ As above

¹⁴⁴ Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 27 July 2026

¹⁴⁵ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 24 July 2026. The Coalition of the Willing is examined in Commons Library briefing, [Proposals for a Coalition of the Willing in Ukraine](#)

5

Coordination of military assistance

5.1

UK joint leadership of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group

The Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) has been the main forum through which the coordination of military assistance to Ukraine has been discussed and implemented (See Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine \(February 2022 to January 2025\)](#)).

Led by the US under the Biden administration, the future of the group had been questioned in the face of President Trump's [opposition to continued military support to Ukraine](#) and his [push for a negotiated peace settlement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict](#).

In January 2025 US officials said that it would be for the next administration to decide its policy on Ukraine but that the UDCG had been “built to adapt and built to last”.¹⁴⁶ The UK, Poland, France, Germany and Italy (the Group of Five), expressed their support for its continuation as an “important forum for us to announce and deliver military equipment for Ukraine”.¹⁴⁷

Consequently, in February 2025, the UK chaired a meeting of the UDCG for the first time. The US participated in the meeting, and in his opening remarks the US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth addressed speculation about future US leadership of the group by thanking the UK for “hosting and now leading the UDCG”.¹⁴⁸

Subsequent meetings of the UDCG at ministerial level, have been chaired by the UK and Germany. Rotation between the Group of Five nations had previously been considered a possibility.¹⁴⁹

5.2

UDCG long-term Capability Coalitions

The UK is committed to supporting several of the long-term Capability Coalitions that have been established by Ukraine's allies and partners, under

¹⁴⁶ US Department of Defense, [Press conference](#), 9 January 2025

¹⁴⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Joint Statement by Group of Five Defence Ministers](#), 13 January 2025

¹⁴⁸ US Department of Defense, [Opening remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group](#), 12 February 2025

¹⁴⁹ The Times, [“UK handed leadership role in Ukraine defence group as US pulls back”](#), 6 February 2025

the framework of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group.¹⁵⁰ At a meeting of the European Group of Five (E5: the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Poland) in March 2025, defence ministers committed to the longer term leadership of the capability coalitions, which they said represented “an important forum for capacity building and modernisation of Ukraine’s armed forces”.¹⁵¹

A Maritime Capability Coalition

On 11 December 2023, the Secretary of State announced that the UK will lead a new Maritime Capability Coalition, alongside Norway, that will develop Ukraine’s naval capabilities and strengthen its ability to operate along its coastlines and into the Black Sea. It will include the provision of ships, vehicles, training and infrastructure.¹⁵²

The UK will gift Ukraine 23 on and offshore raiding craft and 20 Viking amphibious vehicles. Ukraine will also procure two minehunter vessels from the UK. In response to increasing Russian attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure in the Black Sea and the targeting of vessels carrying grain, in November 2024 the Prime Minister announced that £120 million of additional funding would be channelled into the maritime capability coalition in order to protect the Black Sea grain corridor.¹⁵³

The coalition has been joined by another twenty partner nations, in addition to Norway.¹⁵⁴ A Maritime Regional Training Hub will be established in Romania as part of those coalition efforts.¹⁵⁵

Prior commitments under the Naval Capabilities Enhancement Programme

The UK’s commitment to strengthening Ukraine’s naval capabilities in the long term is not new and pre-dates the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In October 2020 the UK and Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Intent that would focus on developing Ukraine’s naval capabilities through a new Naval Capabilities Enhancement Programme (NCEP).¹⁵⁶ That was followed in June 2021 by a [Memorandum of Implementation](#) that would push the NCEP forward. Among the decisions taken at the time was the delivery of two refurbished Royal Navy Sandown-class minehunters in a government-to-government sale.

¹⁵⁰ Those coalitions are examined in greater detail in section 2.1 of Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion \(February 2022 to January 2025\)](#)

¹⁵¹ Ministry of Defence, [Joint Statement](#), 13 March 2025

¹⁵² Ministry of Defence, [Speech by Defence Secretary Grant Shapps](#), 12 December 2023 and HC Deb 19 December 2023, [Ukraine](#), c1254

¹⁵³ Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 23 October 2024

¹⁵⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Speech: Defending Britain from a more dangerous world](#), 15 January 2024

¹⁵⁵ Ministry of Defence, [UK Defence Minister Speech at Black Sea Security Conference 2024](#), 15 April 2024

¹⁵⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 8 October 2020

In August 2020, the UK also announced that it would lead a multinational Maritime Training Initiative for the Ukrainian Navy, intended to boost its capacity to act in the Black Sea.¹⁵⁷

More detail on the NCEP and maritime training initiative is available in Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine 2014-2021](#)

Provision of two ex-Royal Navy Minehunters and the Montreux Convention

In December 2023 the MOD confirmed the transfer of two ex-Royal Navy minehunter ships, HMS Grimsby and HMS Shoreham, to the Ukrainian Navy.¹⁵⁸

That decision pre-dates the Russian invasion of Ukraine and formed a key part of the Naval Capabilities Enhancement Programme (NCEP).

In early January 2024, however, the Turkish government said that it will not allow passage of the vessels through the Turkish Straits and into the Black Sea for as long as the war continues, and in line with the terms of the Montreux Convention.¹⁵⁹

Under the terms of that agreement Turkey has sovereignty over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits connecting the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. In February 2022 Turkey closed the straits to all warships (except those returning to their bases in the Black Sea), in an effort to preserve the naval balance of power in the region.¹⁶⁰ This means neither Russia nor Ukraine or its NATO allies can move military vessels into the Black Sea.¹⁶¹

In April 2024 the two vessels (re-named Cherkasy and Chernihiv) arrived in Portsmouth where they will be based ahead of a series of multinational naval exercises between the UK, US and Ukrainian navies later in 2024.¹⁶²

Drone Capability Coalition

A new coalition focused on developing Ukraine's long-term drone capabilities was [announced at the meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group on 23 January 2024](#).

In February 2024, the MOD announced that it would jointly lead that coalition, alongside Latvia. The coalition will supply thousands of drones to Ukraine, including first-person view (FPV) drones which the MOD says have been highly

¹⁵⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 18 August 2020

¹⁵⁸ Ministry of Defence, [Speech by Defence Secretary Grant Shapps](#), 12 December 2023.

¹⁵⁹ Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, [Statement regarding disinformation about UK mine hunting ships](#), 2 January 2024

¹⁶⁰ Deutsche Welle, [“The Black Sea’s role in Russia’s war on Ukraine”](#), 13 August 2023

¹⁶¹ An explanation of the Convention can be found in the [The Conversation: What the Montreux Convention is, and what it means for the Ukraine war](#), March 2022.

¹⁶² Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 April 2024

effective so far in providing situational awareness to target enemy positions. armoured vehicles and ships.¹⁶³

A competition to produce FPV drones “at scale and at an affordable price point” was launched on 3 June 2024.¹⁶⁴ It is the first project launched as part of the £345 million in UK funding for drone capabilities that was announced in January and March 2024 (see above).¹⁶⁵

In July 2024, the members of the drone coalition signed a Memorandum of Understanding establishing a framework for the coalition’s activities, including procurement mechanisms, and a Common Fund which will enable joint procurement. At the time, the UK, the Netherlands, Latvia, New Zealand and Sweden pledged over £45 million to the fund.¹⁶⁶

In November 2024, the UK Government outlined additional allied funding for the drone coalition, including a further £7.5 million of UK funding (£15 million of UK funding in total) which would be drawn from existing funding for 2024-25. The fund now totals £73 million.¹⁶⁷

In January 2025, £45 million worth of contracts for 30,000 FPV drones were placed by the coalition.

Are British combat aircraft likely?

Calls have, in the past, been made by President Zelenskyy for the provision of British combat aircraft.¹⁶⁸ In February 2023, the then Prime Minister said that “nothing is off the table”,¹⁶⁹ although the provision of combat aircraft was thought unlikely in the short term.¹⁷⁰

Ukraine has since built its air combat capabilities around the US F-16 combat aircraft, which the UK does not possess. Nevertheless, the UK has committed to supporting those efforts by working with other countries on the provision of F-16 aircraft through the Air Force Capability Coalition, and in the delivery of elementary flying training, which was announced by the UK in February 2022.¹⁷¹ In December 2023, the MOD confirmed that the first cohort of trainees had completed a basic training programme in the UK before moving on to advanced flight training on the F-16 in Denmark.¹⁷²

In January 2025, the UK Government said that it would expand its contribution to the fighter jet coalition, including intensifying language training and

¹⁶³ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 15 February 2024

¹⁶⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 3 June 2024

¹⁶⁵ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 15 February 2024 and [Press release](#), 7 March 2024

¹⁶⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Joint Statement by Ministers of the Drone Coalition](#), 10 July 2024

¹⁶⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 9 January 2025

¹⁶⁸ [President Zelensky speech in full](#), YouTube, 8 February 2023

¹⁶⁹ [Sunak and Zelenskyy hold joint news conference](#), Sky News, 8 February 2023

¹⁷⁰ The debate was examined at the time in Library Insight [Will the UK send combat aircraft to Ukraine?](#)

¹⁷¹ Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 15 May 2023 and [Statement on a Joint Coalition on F-16 Training of the Ukrainian Air Force](#) (PDF), July 2023

¹⁷² Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 26 December 2023

assisting coalition partners in increasing the number of F-16s being delivered to Ukraine. it also said that options for supplying Ukraine with other types of NATO fighter aircraft would be explored.¹⁷³ Indeed, in July 2026 the UK Government confirmed that it would commit €300 million to the development of Gripen E/F squadron for the Ukrainian Air Force (see section 4).¹⁷⁴

5.3

NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) Command

At the Washington Summit in July 2024, allies agreed to establish the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) Command.¹⁷⁵

Working alongside the UDCG, NSATU coordinates the provision of military training and equipment by NATO allies and provides logistical support. These roles were previously undertaken by the International Donor Coordination Centre (IDCC) in which the UK played a leading role.¹⁷⁶ In the longer term it will also support the transformation of Ukraine's defence forces and enable interoperability and further integration with NATO.¹⁷⁷ Specifically NSATU is expected to:

- Coordinate the training of Ukrainian personnel at facilities in NATO nations.
- Take responsibility for the planning and coordination of donations by allies.
- Manage the transfer and repair of equipment.
- Provide support to the long-term development of Ukraine's armed forces.¹⁷⁸

Like its predecessor, the IDCC, the UK is playing a leading role in NSATU. In April 2025, the Ministry of Defence confirmed that the UK will manage, through the International Fund for Ukraine (see below), the NSATU Trust Fund for rapid procurement.¹⁷⁹ That trust fund will help meet Ukraine's urgent equipment and logistical support needs, including spare parts and fuel for

¹⁷³ HM Government, [UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration](#) (PDF), January 2025, p.1

¹⁷⁴ Prime Minister's Office, [Press release](#), 16 July 2026

¹⁷⁵ NATO, [Washington Declaration](#), 10 July 2024, para.15. The new NATO Command of approximately 700 personnel is headed by [a three-star general](#) and is based in Germany, along with several logistical nodes in eastern Europe (US Department of Defense, [Press briefing](#), 12 July 2024)

¹⁷⁶ US Department of Defense, [Background briefing on Ukraine](#), 8 January 2025. The IDCC is examined in Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine \(February 2022 to January 2025\)](#)

¹⁷⁷ NATO, [Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Council](#), 11 July 2024, para.5

¹⁷⁸ US Department of Defense, ["US will continue to lead support of Ukraine through Contact Group"](#), DoD News, 9 July 2024

¹⁷⁹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 April 2025

vehicles, training and consumables to support troops on the frontline.¹⁸⁰ In June 2025, the UK Government announced that it would invest £40 million in the trust fund.¹⁸¹

5.4

Acquisition through the International Fund for Ukraine

In addition to direct acquisition, the UK, in coordination with several allies, has established an [International Fund for Ukraine \(IFU\)](#) to coordinate the purchase and transport of military equipment to Ukraine from third countries and/or industry.¹⁸²

Among agreements reached at an [international donor's conference in Copenhagen](#) (PDF) in August 2022 was the expansion of the IFU in order to finance the rapid purchase of military equipment for Ukraine, to support Ukraine in the procurement process and to facilitate training. The longer-term intention was to facilitate a move away from donations by individual countries from their own stockpiles, to purchases directly from the defence industry.¹⁸³

To date, over £2.7 billion has been contributed to the IFU by the UK, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Lithuania, Iceland, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Portugal, Canada, Finland, Belgium, Latvia and Montenegro.¹⁸⁴

Nine critical capability packages have been identified, including: artillery ammunition, drones, small boats, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance systems, electronic warfare systems, unmanned underwater vehicles, air defence, mine clearance equipment and combat vehicle spares.¹⁸⁵

The latest procurement round has focused on additional air defence and maritime capabilities.¹⁸⁶ In early March 2025, the MOD announced a £30 million contract, backed by IFU funding, for [Altius advanced attack drones](#).¹⁸⁷

The UK MOD has contributed £500 million to the IFU. £250 million was committed in August 2022, followed by a further commitment of £250 million in June 2023.¹⁸⁸ This money is part of the £16 billion in UK funding committed so far (see section 2 above).

¹⁸⁰ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 4 June 2025

¹⁸¹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 4 June 2025

¹⁸² Norwegian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 27 April 2022

¹⁸³ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#) (in Norwegian), 11 August 2022

¹⁸⁴ Ministry of Defence, [International Fund for Ukraine](#) (accessed 4 August 2026)

¹⁸⁵ Ministry of Defence, [UK support to Ukraine: Factsheet](#), 6 February 2026

¹⁸⁶ As above and Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 9 September 2025

¹⁸⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 6 March 2025

¹⁸⁸ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 August 2022 and [Press release](#), 16 June 2023

6

A long-term training package for Ukraine (Operation Interflex)

More than 63,000 Ukrainian personnel have been trained so far.

The programme has been extended until at least the end of 2026.

In June 2022 the UK launched a new training programme for Ukrainian armed forces personnel to develop their combat expertise and rebuild their forces.¹⁸⁹

Based in the UK, the programme (Operation Interflex), had the initial aim of training 30,000 personnel by the end of 2023 in frontline combat skills, basic medical training, patrol tactics, mental resilience and the laws of armed conflict.¹⁹⁰ That milestone was reached in November 2023.¹⁹¹

Over 45,000 personnel had been trained by mid-2024, rising to 63,000 as of June 2026 (including 11,000 Ukrainian military instructors).¹⁹²

Approximately 1,050 UK service personnel run the programme, led by 11 Security Force Assistance Brigade, and supported by 13 allied countries.

The UK has also gifted clothing and equipment to support Ukrainian personnel in their training and following their deployment back to Ukraine.

In August 2025 the UK Government confirmed that the programme would be extended until, at least, the end of 2026.¹⁹³

6.1

International partners

Thirteen international partners have joined the UK in delivering the training programme so far:

- The Netherlands.¹⁹⁴
- Canada - Canadian forces have been deployed in Ukraine since 2015 as part of its military training and capacity building mission ([Operation Unifier](#)). Following a temporary pause following the Russian invasion of

¹⁸⁹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 9 July 2022

¹⁹⁰ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 9 July 2022

¹⁹¹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 10 November 2023

¹⁹² PQ26960, [Ukraine: Military aid](#), 24 May 2024 and Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 5 June 2026

¹⁹³ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 24 August 2025

¹⁹⁴ The Netherlands Ministry of Defence, [News release](#), 15 July 2022

Ukraine, those personnel have recently had their mandate extended until 2026.¹⁹⁵

- Sweden.¹⁹⁶
- Finland.¹⁹⁷
- Denmark – The country has provided longstanding training support to Ukraine, having participated in the UK's Operation Orbital training programme and Canada's Operation Unifier, since 2015.¹⁹⁸
- Norway.¹⁹⁹
- New Zealand.²⁰⁰
- Lithuania.²⁰¹
- Australia. In July 2025, the Australian Defence Minister, Richard Marles, confirmed that Australia's participation would continue until the end of 2026.²⁰²
- Romania.²⁰³
- Kosovo – joined the programme in January 2024.²⁰⁴
- Estonia - joined the programme in January 2024.²⁰⁵
- Albania – joined the programme in February 2025.²⁰⁶

6.2 Expansion of training

Since its inception, Operation Interflex has evolved to meet the requirements of the Ukrainian armed forces. In December 2024, the MOD confirmed that discussions were underway on enhancing the UK's training offer to Ukraine, to help them continue to fight on the frontline but also to provide a reserve of trained soldiers to strengthen Ukraine's security in the future.²⁰⁷

¹⁹⁵ Government of Canada, [Operation Unifier](#)

¹⁹⁶ Government Offices of Sweden, [Press release](#), 7 August 2022

¹⁹⁷ Finnish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 8 August 2022

¹⁹⁸ Danish Ministry of Defence [Press release](#), 10 August 2022

¹⁹⁹ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#) (in Norwegian), 11 August 2022

²⁰⁰ New Zealand Defence Force, [Press release](#), 15 November 2023

²⁰¹ UKRINFORM, "[Interview with the Lithuanian Defence Minister](#)", 24 August 2022

²⁰² Australian Government, [Press conference, Sydney](#), 25 July 2025

²⁰³ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 10 November 2023

²⁰⁴ DTT-NET, "[Kosovo soldiers to train Ukraine's army in UK](#)", 19 January 2024

²⁰⁵ Estonia Ministry of Defence, [News release](#), 24 January 2024

²⁰⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Facebook](#), 25 February 2025

²⁰⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 December 2024

Pilots and marines

On 8 February 2023 the Prime Minister announced plans to expand military training for the Ukrainian armed forces, to include fast jet pilots and marines. Pilots will be trained on NATO-standard aircraft with the aim of ensuring “Ukraine can defend its skies well into the future”.²⁰⁸ An elementary flying course for Ukrainian pilots started in summer 2023 and continued throughout 2024.²⁰⁹ In March 2024 the first cohort of Ukrainian pilots graduated from basic flight training. Those pilots will now move on to advanced flight training with the French air force.²¹⁰

The provision of training for fast jet pilots prompted wider discussions about the provision of British combat fighter aircraft to Ukraine (see above).

At the UK-France Summit on 10 March 2023, President Macron confirmed that French personnel would also contribute to the training programme for Ukrainian marines.²¹¹ Nearly 1,000 Ukrainian personnel completed the training in August 2023.²¹² Training for the marines subsequently moved from the UK to the Netherlands in February 2024.²¹³

Leadership and instructor training

In January 2025, the MOD confirmed that as part of a new training offer, Ukrainian officer cadets would be trained at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. No further details on the training package were provided, although the government made clear that “nothing is off the table”.²¹⁴

In August 2025, the MOD also said that in response to Ukraine’s evolving military requirements, Operation Interflex would gradually shift from “prioritising shorter courses centred on basic combat skills training, to a greater focus on leadership and instructor training”. It confirmed that two additional courses (an instructor training course and a platoon/section command course) were now being delivered alongside the basic infantry course.²¹⁵

In February 2026, the government confirmed that Ukrainian pilots had also begun training at a UK air base to become helicopter flying instructors. This is the first time the UK has offered rotary-wing instructor training to Ukraine.²¹⁶

²⁰⁸ Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 8 February 2023

²⁰⁹ Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 15 May 2023 and Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 26 December 2023

²¹⁰ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 22 March 2024

²¹¹ [UK-France Joint Leader’s Declaration](#), 10 March 2023

²¹² Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 August 2023

²¹³ National Audit Office, [Investigation into military support for Ukraine](#), HC 230, September 2024, p.27

²¹⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 16 January 2025

²¹⁵ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 24 August 2025

²¹⁶ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, [Press release](#), 24 February 2026

Additional training

Separately to Operation Interflex in the UK, the MOD confirmed in November 2022 that additional training assistance would be provided in the region, with the deployment of several army medical personnel and engineers.²¹⁷ The UK has also been providing combat medical training, in conjunction with the Netherlands and Iceland,²¹⁸ training in mine disposal techniques,²¹⁹ and in October 2023 announced a new programme of training to help Ukraine protect its critical national infrastructure.²²⁰

In 2023, the RAF also provided firefighting training to Ukraine's fire and rescue services, ahead of a delivery of 17 specialist firefighting vehicles from the RAF, Defence Fire and Rescue and the Welsh Government.²²¹

6.3

A new phase for Operation Interflex – June 2026

In June 2026, the MOD announced a new phase for Operation Interflex that is “designed to build long-term capability”.²²²

A new unified framework will bring together all UK-led training for Ukraine that has been taking place both in the UK and overseas (see above). To meet the changing requirements of the Ukrainian armed forces, the training programme will also transition away from large-scale infantry training towards specialist and advanced training in areas such as operational tactics, aviation, medical, engineering and logistics.²²³

The training programme will continue under the Operation Interflex name.²²⁴ In answer to a parliamentary question in June 2026, the MOD also confirmed that this is “an evolution and consolidation of the Operation Interflex training offer”, which would come at no additional cost.²²⁵

²¹⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 November 2022

²¹⁸ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 24 June 2023

²¹⁹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 25 September 2023

²²⁰ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 22 October 2023

²²¹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 7 July 2023

²²² Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 5 June 2026

²²³ As above

²²⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Letter to the Chair of the Defence Select Committee](#) (PDF), May 2026

²²⁵ PQ7770, [Ukraine: Military aid](#), 16 June 2026

7

Replenishment of UK equipment

Given the extent of UK military assistance to Ukraine, questions have been raised over the ability of the UK Government, and the defence industry, to replenish the stocks of equipment that have been gifted and how it will be paid for.

The MOD has said that it keeps weapons stockpile levels and requirements under review, “balancing current holdings against threats, availability, industrial capacity and evolving technology” and that such considerations inform “the numbers of munitions granted in kind to the armed forces of Ukraine”.²²⁶

The Department has said that it remains engaged with industry, allies and partners to ensure “both the continuation of supply to Ukraine” and to ensure that all equipment and munitions granted in kind from UK stocks are replaced as soon as possible.²²⁷

In September 2022 the then Defence Secretary confirmed that “letters of comfort” had been given to industry outlining the Government’s intention to place orders and to encourage manufacturers to expand production.²²⁸

In a debate in January 2023, then Minister of State, Baroness Goldie, said “We are absolutely clear that we will never go below the safe line that we require for the security of our own nation”.²²⁹

7.1

Funding for replenishment

In the 2022 Autumn Statement the Treasury announced that £560 million would be earmarked for the replenishment of the UK’s stockpile.²³⁰ A further £2 billion to replenish ammunition stocks and improve the UK’s munitions infrastructure was announced in the March 2023 Spring Budget, as part of a £5 billion uplift in the defence budget.²³¹

²²⁶ HL7885, [Defence equipment](#), 28 April 2022 and PQ1735, [Ammunition: Finance](#), 7 August 2024

²²⁷ Deposited Paper 2024-0156, [Letter from the Earl of Minto, Minister of State in the House of Lords to Lord Browne of Ladyton \(PDF\)](#), February 2024

²²⁸ HC Deb 5 September 2022, [Ukraine update](#), c31

²²⁹ [HL Deb 26 January 2023](#), c368

²³⁰ PQ93479, [Defence: Expenditure](#), 8 December 2022

²³¹ Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 13 March 2023. That £5 billion uplift forms part of an £11 billion increase in the defence budget that was announced two days later as part of the Spring Budget 2023 (HM Treasury, [Spring Budget Speech](#), 15 March 2023)

On the back of the conflict in Ukraine, a key commitment of the Conservative government's [Defence Command Paper refresh](#) (PDF), published in July 2023, was investment in the resilience and credibility of military capabilities, including the adequate provision of stockpiles and munitions.²³²

At the end of February 2024, the then Minister for Defence Procurement confirmed that a munitions strategy, outlining the work being undertaken to increase production, was being prepared.²³³ In April 2024, the Conservative government said that as part of [the uplift in defence spending to 2030](#), £10 billion would be invested over the next 10 years to grow the UK's domestic munitions production capabilities and increase stockpiles.²³⁴

7.2 Recommendations of the 2025 Strategic Defence Review

In July 2024, the government commissioned a new Strategic Defence Review which would “consider the threats Britain faces, the capabilities needed to meet them, the state of UK armed forces and the resources available”.²³⁵ The review was independently led, by the former Defence Secretary and former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson.

The government published the [Strategic Defence Review](#) on 2 June 2025. The government has endorsed the vision set out in the review and accepted all 62 of its recommendations.

The review said that the conflict in Ukraine provided “a stark reminder” of the imperative for maintaining sufficient inventories of munitions and spares and of the need for the rapid replenishment and resupply by industry and for the “rapid, continual cycle of innovation between industry and the front line”.²³⁶ As a result, it recommended creating “an ‘always on’ munitions production capacity, ready to scale up for higher-tempo production in the event of escalation to war”.²³⁷

To achieve this aim, the government announced that £6 billion will be invested in munitions in the current parliament (to 2029), including £1.5bn in an ‘always on’ pipeline for munitions. At least six new munitions factories will be built in the UK.²³⁸

²³² Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 18 July 2023

²³³ [HC Deb 27 February 2024](#), c143

²³⁴ HM Government, [Defending Britain](#) (PDF), April 2024, p.8 and 9

²³⁵ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 16 July 2024

²³⁶ HM Government, [Strategic Defence Review 2025](#), p.51

²³⁷ HM Government, [Strategic Defence Review 2025](#), p.97

²³⁸ As above, p.6

In September 2025 the government also published a new [Defence Industrial Strategy](#) which sets out how a more competitive defence sector will be achieved over the next ten years.

8

Long term security guarantees to Ukraine

On the side lines of the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023, the members of the G7 agreed a framework setting out long term bilateral security guarantees to Ukraine.

With a view to ensuring forces are capable of defending Ukraine and deterring any future Russian aggression, the [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#) (PDF) envisaged:

- Providing more defence equipment across the land, sea and air domains and increasing interoperability with Euro-Atlantic partners. Priority capabilities are air defence, artillery and long-range fires, armoured vehicles and combat air assets.
- Increasing and accelerating intelligence sharing.
- Strengthening Ukraine's ability to defend against cyber and hybrid threats.
- Expanding training programmes and joint military exercises.
- Developing Ukraine's defence industrial base.

These security commitments were to be implemented on a bilateral basis, in line with the nature of military assistance to Ukraine so far.

8.1

UK-Ukraine Agreement on Security Cooperation

On 12 January 2024, then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced that the UK and Ukraine had concluded a ten-year security cooperation agreement, making the UK the first country to deliver on the wider commitment to provide long-term security guarantees.²³⁹

The government described [that agreement](#) (PDF) as “the first step in developing an unshakeable hundred-year partnership between Ukraine and the United Kingdom”.²⁴⁰ It builds upon a [15-year Memorandum of](#)

²³⁹ Prime Minister's Office, [Press release](#), 12 January 2024

²⁴⁰ Prime Minister's Office, [Press release](#), 12 January 2024

[Understanding on defence cooperation that was signed in March 2016](#) and a [Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement](#) that was agreed in November 2020.

The new agreement is wide ranging in its ambition, but is centred around two main objectives:

- It formalises the support that the UK has been providing, and will continue to provide, including the provision of modern military equipment (primarily through Capability Coalitions),²⁴¹ intelligence sharing, protection of critical national infrastructure, cyber security assistance, medical and military training and long-term defence industrial cooperation, including joint programmes, the localisation of repair and maintenance and the manufacturing of UK defence equipment in Ukraine.²⁴² It also outlines long term support for defence governance and civil-military reform.
- It commits the UK to consult with Ukraine, within 24 hours, if it is attacked by Russia in the future and to provide “swift and sustained” security assistance.²⁴³

The long-term aim is to:

support an independent, democratic, and sovereign Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders, capable of deterring and defending against future attacks, as well as to deepen Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO, and to accelerate Ukraine’s transition to NATO equipment and standards.²⁴⁴

Beyond the security sphere, the agreement also sets out the commitment to support Ukraine’s reconstruction, including through continued humanitarian support and for the country’s future integration into the EU and NATO, including support for continued political and economic reform.²⁴⁵ The agreement notes that:

²⁴¹ Such as the international Air Force capability Coalition and the Maritime Capability Coalition. The latter was established in December 2023 and is being jointly led by the UK and Norway (See [UDCG long-term Capability](#) Coalition).

²⁴² A UK defence industry delegation conducted its first trade mission to Ukraine in December 2023. Further trade missions took place over 2024 (See Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 18 December 2023). In April 2024 the UK and Ukraine signed a new agreement on defence industrial cooperation intended to facilitate defence trade, enable industrial support to the Ukrainian armed forces and enable long-term relationships (Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 10 April 2024). The text of that agreement will not be published for reasons of operational security and commercial confidentiality (PQ22874, [Partnership and Cooperation Agreements: Ukraine](#), 29 April 2024)

²⁴³ [Agreement on Security Cooperation between the United Kingdom and Ukraine \(PDF\)](#), 12 January 2024, part VIII

²⁴⁴ [Agreement on Security Cooperation between the United Kingdom and Ukraine \(PDF\)](#), 12 January 2024, Part II, para.3

²⁴⁵ In November 2023 the European Commission published its [latest assessment of Ukraine’s reform efforts](#) (PDF) and recommended that accession negotiations be opened. That recommendation was

The legacy effect created by the war, such as the liberation of occupied territory, the transition from martial law, and the need to meet public expectations, will require Ukraine's institutions to be well adapted to manage such challenges.²⁴⁶

The provisions of this agreement came into force upon signature.²⁴⁷

8.2

UK-Ukraine 100-year partnership agreement

In January 2025, the UK and Ukraine signed a 100-year partnership agreement. The agreement aims to build upon existing agreements between the two countries and aims to “deepen security ties and strengthen partnership for future generations”.²⁴⁸ The agreement comprises [a legally binding treaty](#), and [a political declaration outlining specific areas of practical cooperation](#).

Described by the government as “historic”, [the “mutually beneficial partnership”](#) consists of nine ‘pillars’, the first three of which focus on defence and security. Much of the agreement builds upon existing military support and the provisions set out in the 2024 Security Cooperation Agreement (see above). However, the partnership declaration also envisages creating joint defence capability projects and defence industrial enterprises, “flexible rapid response mechanisms”, including military formations to respond to “challenges” that may arise in either country and assessing options for establishing and maintaining military infrastructure in Ukraine, including military bases, logistics depots, storage facilities and war reserve stockpiles.²⁴⁹

A new maritime security partnership will also be established to ensure the safety of navigation and the protection of trade in the Baltic, Black and Azov Seas, including operational cooperation through joint taskforces, where appropriate.

The agreement does not contain a mutual defence clause akin to [NATO's Article 5 provisions](#), but restates the commitment in the 2024 Agreement on Security Co-operation, to consult “within 24 hours” in the event of future aggression and to commit to providing “swift and sustained” security assistance as necessary. It does not oblige either party to deploy military forces.

approved at the European Council in December 2023, although formal talks will not begin until further reform is achieved in relation to the treatment of minorities, Ukraine's anti-corruption efforts and in limiting the powers of Ukraine's oligarchs (European Commission, [Press release](#), 8 November 2023)

²⁴⁶ [Agreement on Security Cooperation between the United Kingdom and Ukraine \(PDF\)](#), 12 January 2024, Part VII, para.1

²⁴⁷ See Part 4 of Library research briefing, [How Parliament treats treaties](#), June 2021

²⁴⁸ Prime Minister's Office, [Press release](#), 16 January 2025

²⁴⁹ Prime Minister's Office, [UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration](#), 17 January 2025

Progress against the Partnership Agreement, and the 2024 Security Cooperation Agreement, will be discussed at an annual UK-Ukraine Strategic Dialogue. A meeting to discuss progress made in the first year of the Dialogue was [held in March 2026](#). At that meeting the UK and Ukraine also signed an [Enhanced Security and Defence Industrial Collaboration Declaration](#).

8.3

Preparations for a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ (Multinational Force-Ukraine)

Since March 2025, several countries, led by the UK and France, have been working to develop a ‘coalition of the willing’ to defend any peace deal that is eventually agreed in Ukraine.²⁵⁰ A deal “without anything behind it”, is one which many, including the UK Prime Minister, believe that Russia will violate.²⁵¹

Proposals have made significant progress. A declaration issued by coalition members, alongside the US, in January 2026 confirmed the intention to deploy a European-led multinational force, in the event of a peace agreement in Ukraine. That force would have the proposed support of the US.²⁵²

The UK and France also signed a separate Declaration of Intent with Ukraine to deploy military forces on the ground to support the country’s defence, reconstruction and “strategic sustainability”. The UK and France said it was in direct response to “a request by Ukraine for military assistance to support the security and defence forces of Ukraine in preventing an armed aggression by third countries”.²⁵³

Russia, however, remains opposed to the deployment of European-led forces in Ukraine to monitor and enforce any peace agreement, calling it “demonstrably unviable”.²⁵⁴ In February 2026, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that the deployment of Western military personnel and infrastructure in Ukraine would be considered “foreign intervention that directly threatens

²⁵⁰ Prime Minister’s Office, [PM remarks at international leaders’ summit press conference](#), 2 March 2025 and [HC Deb 3 March 2025](#), c25

²⁵¹ Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 20 March 2025

²⁵² Council of the European Union, [Paris Declaration – ‘Robust security guarantees for a solid and lasting peace in Ukraine’](#), issued by France, 6 January 2026

²⁵³ HM Government, [Declaration of Intent between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The French Republic and Ukraine relating to the deployment of multinational forces in support of the defence, reconstruction and strategic sustainability of Ukraine](#), 7 January 2026

²⁵⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, [Foreign Minister’s statement](#), 18 February 2025; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, [Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s written interview with Brazilian newspaper O Globo](#), 28 April 2025 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, [Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on statements by British officials regarding the Ukrainian conflict](#), 18 August 2025

Russia’s security” and that Western military assets would be regarded as “legitimate targets” for the Russian armed forces.²⁵⁵

Further detail on plans for Multinational Force Ukraine is set out in Commons Library briefing, [Proposals for a Coalition of the Willing in Ukraine](#).

Library briefings on all aspects of the Ukraine conflict, including the latest peace talks, sanctions, humanitarian assistance and international legal issues are available on the Library’s [Ukraine Collection](#) page.

²⁵⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, [Answers to media questions](#), 2 February 2026

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