



FINAL RUNWAY EXCURSION INCIDENT REPORT 24 June 2025

Runway Excursion Divi Divi Air

Divi Divi Air, Air Operator Certificate No. 10
De Havilland/Viking DHC-6-300 TWIN OTTER
PJ-DVG, MSN 347
Flight DVR 269 from Aruba (TNCA) to Curaçao (TNCC)

Date & Time of Event: 22 September 2022, 15:35 UTC, 11:35 LT.

**Final Incident Report
CURCW/22/555-4**



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ORIGINATING AUTHORITY AS THE STATE OF OCCURRENCE, STATE OF OPERATOR AND THE STATE OF REGISTRY

Curaçao Civil Aviation Authority, CCAA.

Investigation

Aviation Safety Inspector, Operations:	Mr.. W. Stuijt
Aviation Safety Inspector, Airworthiness:	Mr. S. Kleinmoedig

Final Report

Mr. Leslie A. Laplace,
Advisor Special Projects to the CCAA/Incident reports,

Adopted

drs. Peter Steinmetz,
Director General,
Curaçao Civil Aviation Authority.
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24 June 2025.



ABBREVIATIONS

APP	Approach
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATCO	Air Traffic Controller
ATPL	Airline Transport Pilot License
CCAA	Curaçao Civil Aviation Authority
CCAR	Curaçao Civil Aviation Regulations
COA	Certificate of Airworthiness
CPL	Commercial Pilot License
CVR	Cockpit Voice Recorder
DME	Distance Measuring Equipment
DVR	Divi Divi Air
FL	Flight Level
F/O	First Officer
FDR	Flight Data Recorder
FT	Feet
IAS	Indicated Airspace
ILS	Instrument Landing System
KIAS	Knots Indicated Airspeed
KT/KTS	Knots
LT	Local Time
METAR	Meteorological Actual Report
NOTAM	Notice to Air Mission (Notice to Airmen)
PJG	Curaçao VOR/DME Navigation Aid
PM	Pilot Monitoring
TAF	Terminal Area Forecast
TNCA	Aruba Airport
TNCC	Curaçao Airport
TWR	Tower
UTC	Universal Coordinated Time
VHF	Very High Frequency
VOR	Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range (Navigation Aid)
Vref	Reference Speed



FINAL RUNWAY EXCURSION INCIDENT REPORT

No. CURCW/22/555-4

Divi Divi Air (DVR), Air Operator Certificate No. 10
De Havilland/Viking DHC-6-300 TWIN OTTER
PJ-DVG,
Flight 3R-269 from Aruba (TNCA) to Curaçao (TNCC)

Date & Time of Event: 22 September 2022, 15:55 UTC, 11:55 LT.

In the following, the CCAA, Curaçao Civil Aviation Authority, presents a comprehensive final report on the circumstances surrounding the Runway Excursion incident. This report is presented by the State of Occurrence, the State of Operator, and the State of Registry.

An Initial Incident Report was published on 27 December 2022, CURCW/22/555.

The sole objective of the investigation of the incident shall be the prevention of incidents or accidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability.

The investigation conducted is a formal ICAO Annex 13 incident investigation as the State of Occurrence, the State of the Operator and the State of Registry.

To comply with Local Curaçao Legislation, the report has been anonymized for publication. Original documents are retained on file..

ABSTRACT

This report explains the Runway Excursion incident involving a De Havilland/Viking DHC-6-300, Twin Otter, PJ-DVG, operated by Divi Divi Air, a local AOC Holder.

The safety issues discussed in this report focus on the need for:

- 1) Excessive speed during Approach & Landing:
- 2) Higher sensitivity for skidding as the aircraft was not equipped with anti-skid and blocked wheels protection, combined with the use of brakes on a wet runway which contributed to the effect of aquaplaning
- 3) Refresher on Standard Operating Procedures for operating on a wet runway.

Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed in this report.



SYNOPSIS

Divi Divi Air (DVR) flight DVR 269 departed Aruba, TNCA, on 22 September 2022, on a VFR flight plan enroute to Curaçao, TNCC, on a scheduled commercial flight.

On September 22, 2022, around 11:55 AM LT, flight DVR 269 arrived at Curacao Hato International airport from Aruba. PJ-DVG is a Twin-Otter turboprop twin engine aircraft. It had 8 passengers and 2 crew members on board. The crew performed a visual approach and after a positive touchdown on Runway 11 TNCC, the aircraft rolled out and at intersection C it received a gust of wind from the left causing the aircraft to move sharply to the right. The captain, who was also pilot flying, tried to correct this which failed and ended up on the right side next to the runway. The exact time between touchdown and a correction from the right towards the centerline could not be determined. The aircraft came to a stop at 1009 meters from the (displaced) threshold, off the runway in gravel and grass without any damage. The crew subsequently taxied the aircraft back onto the runway and continued to the apron. Both crew members and passengers remained unharmed.

The Meteorological Department Curaçao reported that at the time of the event the wind was coming from direction 020° with a speed of 21 knots and gusts of 31 knots with Rain MOD and thunderstorms in the vicinity FEW 018 TCU. With a runway of 3413 meters and sufficient length remaining, the approach and landing performance was not investigated. Considering the wind direction and gusting circumstances, it is likely that this was the significant factor that triggered the lateral displacement. The investigation focused on loss of directional control only.



1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of the Flight.

Divi Divi Air Flight Number: DVR 269.

Type of Aircraft: De Havilland/Viking DHC-6-300 Twin Otter nineteen (19) seater.

The type of Flight: Commercial Scheduled Air Transport.

Non-Dangerous Goods carrier.

Dangerous Goods on board: None.

Last point of Departure: TNCA, Aruba. Departure Time: 15:09 UTC / 11:09 LT

Destination: TNCC, Curaçao. Landing Time: 15:55 UTC / 11:55 LT

Date & Time of event: 22 September 2022, 15:55 UTC / 11:55 LT.

Position of the aircraft: Landing at TNCC.

Number of Crew and Passengers: Eight (8) Passengers,
2 Cockpit Crew, No Flight Attendant.

1.2 Injuries to Persons

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others
Fatal	None	None	None
Serious	None	None	None
Minor	None	None	None

1.3 **Damage to Aircraft:** None.

1.4 **Other Damage:** Damage found was the tire on the captain's side (Tread Rubber Reversion).

1.5 Personnel Information

Divi Divi Air uses a crew schedule system called LEON. Upon inspection of this system, there appeared to be no violations regarding Work & Rest hours.

Captain: Valid CCAA ATPL License, DHC-6-300.

Total flying time 12,507.25 hours

Flight time DHC6 previous 24 hours, 1.17 hours

Flight time DHC6 previous 30 days 53,39 hours. Duty time 105.04 hours

Valid Medical until December 02, 2022.

Valid Prof check until July 31, 2023.

CRM valid until September 06, 2025.

SMS valid until July 12, 2025.

Line check valid until August 11, 2023.



First Officer: Valid CCAA CPL License, DHC-6-300.

Total flying time 1783,29 hours.

Flight time DHC6 previous 24 hours, 0 hours.

Flight time DHC6 previous 30 days 51.09 hours. Duty time 108.32.

Valid medical until September 08, 2023

Valid prof check until July 31, 2023

CRM valid until September 06, 2025

SMS valid until July 12, 2025

Line check valid until August 11, 2023

No Flight Attendant on board and is not required.

1.6 **Aircraft Information**

a) **Airworthiness**

Divi Divi aircraft, PJ-SVG was airworthy with a valid Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA).

b) **The Weight & Balance is within limits. Not relevant.**

c) **Type of Fuel: Jet A-1. Not relevant.**

1.7 **Meteorological Information**

a) **METAR TNCC**

Wind 02021G31kt with Rain MOD and thunderstorms in the vicinity, FEW 018 TCU.

b) **Rainy, Good Visibility.**

c) **Runway wet.**

1.8 **Aids to Navigation**

Operating VOR DME, ILS, ADSB.

No relevant NOTAMS.

1.9 **Communications**

The aircraft was on TNCC Hato Approach/Tower, VHF frequency 118.3 MHz.

1.10 **Aerodrome Information**

Operation normal. No relevant NOTAMS.

1.11 **Flight Recorders**

DVR DHC-8-300, the aircraft is equipped with a CVR. No FDR installed and is not required.

No readout of the CVR was performed.



2. ANALYSIS

- 2.1 No technical evidence was discovered indicating any anomalies in the brake system, nose wheel steering system, flight control system, or flap asymmetry that could have adversely affected directional controllability.
- 2.2 The load sheet shows a gross weight computation with a landing weight (LW) of 10340 Lbs. Selecting flaps 10 degrees, gives a normal landing speed of V_{ref} 79 knots which is conform operational procedures.
- 2.3 In combination with crosswinds, gusts, and the absence of anti-skid or blocked wheel protection systems on the aircraft, and a wet runway, the aircraft exhibited heightened directional control sensitivity when brakes were applied. This sensitivity was further amplified by the captain's average touch down groundspeed of 96 knots.
- 2.4 No FDR was installed in the aircraft and no CVR readout was conducted. However, the flightpath before the incident has been made visible by Flightradar24 and shows an exact timeline regarding the approach, landing and roll-out, including the Ground speeds used. It shows that the approach groundspeed on short final was variable between 110 and 133 knots which indicates a non-stabilized approach.
- 2.5 The groundspeed just before touchdown was between 102 and 107 knots. It also shows that during the deviation from the centerline to the right the speed was above 50 knots and when the aircraft entered the grass/gravel it was 47 knots. The Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM) Twin-Otter normal procedures, states that at approximately 40 KIAS and a safe taxi speed controls will be transferred to the captain. This indicates 40 knots or less is a safe speed for using the nosewheel tiller as outlined in paragraph M of the referenced AOM.
- 2.6 The Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) section 10, safety and operational tips, states that "early use of brakes introduces lateral skidding which makes directional control more difficult and nose wheel steering should not be used until the aircraft has decelerated to taxi speeds".
- 2.7 **CCAA Interviews with Flight Crew**
Following the incident, the Civil Aviation Authority (CCAA) promptly convened an Operational Performance and Airworthiness Inspector team to visit HATO airport. Upon their arrival, they were met by the Accountable Manager, Quality Assurance Manager, Director of Maintenance, and the Chief Inspector. A comprehensive account of the incident was presented to them. Subsequently, the aircraft underwent an inspection, and the necessary documentation of both pilots was examined. Additionally, the pilots were interviewed to provide further details and insights into the events leading up to the incident.



Statement Captain:

"On Thursday September 22, 2022, I was captain and pilot flying on the Twin Otter of Divi Divi Air in Curacao, flight number 279 from Aruba to Curacao. My total hours are over 12000 and on the Twin Otter I have about 300 hours. I have been flying the Twin Otter for about 3 months now.

I can recall the tower informed us with landing clearance and wind/velocity 020/31. Despite the rain showers, we were able to perform a visual approach, and we could already see the runway 11 from 15 DME. I made a positive touchdown, throttle idle and nose down. While rolling out, I suddenly heard my co-pilot yell "gust". I didn't feel it but saw our plane going to the right, diverting from the centerline. I tried to recover and go back to the centerline, but we went violently to the right. I stepped slowly on the brakes and noticed we were moving with a speed of 50 knots. I tried to correct but we ended up in the grass/gravel on the right side of the runway. After that the plane slowed down and I taxied back to the runway.

I did the preflight inspection and walkaround before our first flight and had no observations. I think the other and last walkaround in Aruba was done by my first officer. I did not see any damage to any of the wheels during my walkaround. I have never had an incident/accident before".




Statement First Officer:

"On Thursday September 22, 2022, I was the first officer and pilot non-flying on the Twin Otter of Divi Divi Air in Curacao, flight number 279 from Aruba to Curacao. I am in possession of an FAA license with a Curacao equivalency. I have 1774 hours in total of which 1426 commercial at Divi.

We made a visual approach with a positive landing. During the rollout I felt we got gusty wind from the left. I immediately yelled 'gust'. This is not a callout, but I felt I had to do this to warn the captain. The Captain reacted a little too late, but eventually he did. I don't know if the captain braked at the same time, but he later told me he did. I was questioning that because the runway was very wet. I then saw that the captain was at the nose wheel steering at a relatively high speed and the captain later told me that he did this out of instinct to correct and try to save the situation. He told me that the speed of the aircraft was then 50 kts while the nose wheel steering may only be operated from 40 kts. The captain did not have the controls in the wind during the rollout. I therefore come to the conclusion that gusts, then overcorrection and then aquaplaning was the reason that we ended up next to the runway on the right side. The weather was quite bad during the last flight, and I also heard the captain say after landing that he was happy to have landed because of all the rain and showers and the associated stress. Maybe that's why he didn't finish the last bit correctly.



The first walk around was done by the captain and the last walk around in Aruba was not done. I have to say that after the first walk around no more walk rounds have been done all day. You show me pictures of the tires but as I didn't do any walk arounds I can't say anything about the condition of the tires when I started my shift today”.




- 2.7 During the landing roll out, the First Officer stated that he noticed no corrective action by the Captain to compensate for wind gust from the left after which he saw that the nose of the aircraft started to deviate 10/20 degrees to the left. After the first officer's call out "gust", probably due to startle effect, the captain overreacted by pulling power levers to Beta and tried to steer to the left by using nose wheel tiller and rudder pedals to counteract the first



deviation from the centerline to the right, as it acted around the vertical axis in the same direction. As from this moment, conform the first officer's statement, the captain applied brakes and by using the steering tiller to correct the movement to the right this contributed to an oscillating and excessive movement and finally hydroplaning. Flightradar24 does not show the complete timeline in seconds, so it is not visible that the pilot started a correction towards the centerline.

- 2.8 The movement to the right occurred in such a way that the aircraft finally stopped off the runway. Once the nose wheel got more out of line of the aircraft displacement, the possible drag caused by nose wheel skidding, further contributed to the displacement to the right. As directional control was being lost, a lateral runway excursion was inevitable. The aircraft ended up 90 meters to the right of the centerline or +/-60 meters from the runway edge.



Tire Tracks



Incident DHC-6-300 Aircraft



Tire PJ-DVG



Tire PJ-DVG



Tread Rubber Reversion

An oval-shaped area in the tread similar to a skid, but where rubber shows burning due to hydroplaning during landing, usually caused by wet or ice-covered runways.
Action: Remove from service if balance is affected, or normal wear criteria is exceeded.

Good Year Maintenance Manual

2.9 See Appendix G for the Aircraft EMMA Inspection.



3. CONCLUSIONS

3.1 Findings

- a. The captain and the first officer of the aircraft were properly certificated and qualified under the CCAR, Curaçao Civil Aviation Regulations.
- b. There was no evidence of any medical or behavioral conditions of the flight crew that might have adversely affected their performance during the incident flight.
- c. The incident airplane was properly certified and maintained.
- d. Weather, cross wind and a wet runway were factors in this incident.
- e. The Weight & Balance of the flight was not a factor.
- f. The captain's inability to maintain lateral control of the aircraft was a factor.
- g. No walk around was performed in Aruba before departure so the condition of the tires could not be verified before the incident. Since the crew, in accordance with their statements, failed to perform the walkaround before the flight, it cannot be confirmed that the condition of the tires originate from the relevant runway excursion event. However, the first officer stated that aquaplaning was a fact. In the Goodyear Maintenance Manual effective 01/2020, Aircraft Tire Care & Maintenance, tread conditions are described where aquaplaning clearly matches the overview Tread Rubber Reversion of the incident aircraft.

3.2 Probable Cause

The crosswind and gusting wind conditions on a wet runway were the main factors that started and limited the ability of the crew to maintain, or regain, directional control in combination with the incorrect use of the nosewheel tiller and braking. No technical evidence was found of any anomaly in the brake system and of the nosewheel steering. The higher IAS, conform the AFM, contributed to the runway excursion effect that had already been set in motion.

3.3 Contributing Factors

1. Excessive speed:
 - a) during the approach; and
 - b) during the landing and roll out.
2. Higher sensitivity for skidding as:
 - a) the aircraft was not equipped with anti-skid and blocked wheels protection, combined, with;
 - b) the use of brakes on a wet runway and the use of the nosewheel tiller above recommended speed which contributed to the effect of aquaplaning.
3. In response to a wind gust, the captain failed to take prompt corrective action, resulting in a delayed response. This delay prompted the first officer to identify the gust, necessitating the captain's countermeasures to mitigate the lateral diversion that had already been initiated.




4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1.1 Expanded simulator awareness training sessions for DVR Flight Crew. Attention to be paid to the landing roll and directional control in combination with crosswind, wind gusts, wet runway, cross wind landings and the steering and brake controls to be used or avoided in these situations.
- 1.2 Awareness to flight crew of the essential necessity to adhere to the walkaround requirement before each flight.
- 1.3 It was decided, in consultation with the accountable manager of the airline, to keep both pilots on the ground and to have them undergo a medical assessment whether both pilots are considered fit to fly. See Appendix H for the report of the medical examiner.
- 1.4 Implement a flight crew procedure to pull the CVR (and FDR if available) circuit breaker immediately after an incident, serious incident or accident.
- 1.5 Refresher for flight crew on the limitations of aircraft systems, i.e. the use of the steering tiller, and Standard Operating Procedures in adverse weather conditions.



APPENDICES

APPENDIX A – TNCC ICAO Airport Layout



AERO INFO DATE 23 FEB 23



MINISTRY OF
TRAFFIC, TRANSPORT AND URBAN PLANNING
CURAÇAO CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

APPENDIX B – Aircraft Technical Log.

Date: 22 Sep 2022		Registration: PJ-DUG		Ac type: DHC-6-300		Captain:		F/O:					
Type of Flight / FL No.		Departure		Arrival		Flight Time		FUEL prior to start Qty (Lbs)		TOTAL FUEL Lbs		Walk Around Sign Off & Fuel Inv. No.:	
LEG		From	Time	At	Time	Minutes	LH / FW	RH / AFT	UPLIFT	REMAIN			
1.	260	CUR	10:46	AUA	11:15	.29	800	800	485.1	1325	1889	1/22	
2	261	AUA	11:31	CUR	12:02	.31	650	625	—	1025	tail		
3.	212	CUR	12:30	BON	12:51	.21	625	625	236	1160	1889	1/22	
4	213	BON	13:10	CUR	13:34	.24	525	525	—	900	tail		
5.	268	CUR	14:23	AUA	14:54	.31	750	750	616	1300	1889	1/22	
6	269	AUA	15:09	CUR	15:55	.46	600	600	—	950	tail		
7	218	CUR	:	BON	:								
8	219	BON	:	CUR	:								
9			:		:								
10			:		:								
Total prev page:		Flight time this page:		Total Airframe Time:		OIL ADDED (QTS)							
Total prev Landing:		Landings this page:		Total Airframe Landings:		STAT/LEG							
						LENG							
						RENG							
ECTM (Twinn otter only)													
FTLVL				TS		TRQ		PROP		Ng		FF	
KIAS		LENG											
T2		RENG											
Oil temp		Oil press											
Next.....Inspection at.....Tot Airframe Time													
No:	PILOT/MAINTENANCE REPORT			Entry made by:	No:	CORRECTIVE ACTION			STA	Tech name, Certificate#, Date, Time/UTC, Sign			
01	Due to exist & suspected hydro plane, airplane went off runway.			Ch.	01	Aircraft has been inspected and has replaced the NOSE WHEEL TIRE ASSY 1AW Vikings DHC 6 NH 381-40-63. Card No. 301 Item A1-A6 has been accomplished. Card No 3 and No 1 Item has been accomplished Satisfactory.			CUR	DVI 22 Sept 22 11:00			
CERTIFICATE FOR RELEASE TO SERVICE													
I hereby certify that the above maintenance work was carried out in accordance with the requirements of CCAA approved company procedure and current CCAA regulations and in that respect the aircraft/aircraft component is considered approved for release to service.													
NAME:		SIGNATURE:		LICENCE NO:		DVI 407		DATE:		22 SEPT 2022			
Description		Part Number		Serial OFF		Serial ON							
NOSE WHEEL TIRE ASSY		3-1197		3257/3257		3263/3263							
Routing: White - Maintenance, Blue - Flight Crew, Yellow - Stays in book, Copy for outstation. (if required)													
REV:1 1 Sept 2017													



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APPENDIX C

Pilot Report – Captain

Curaçao Luchtvaart Autoriteit	
Datum ontv.	Agenda No.
23 Sep '22	22/555-2
Par.	



Form DI-001
Safety Event Report

Rev No: 01
Date: 01 Feb 2021
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NOTE: THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT IS CONFIDENTIAL. DETAILS CONTAINED IN THE REPORT ARE USED FOR TREND ANALYSIS ONLY. PLEASE FILE WITHIN 24 HOURS AT DIVI DIVI HEAD OFFICE OR SAFETY/QA DEPARTMENT. THE ONLY EXEMPTION IS THE CURAÇAO ACCIDENT / INCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD AND OR THE CURAÇAO CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY REPORTABLE EVENT; PER CCARS CREWMEMBER NAMES MUST BE INCLUDED WITH OTHER APPLICABLE INFORMATION AND MUST BE FILED WITH SAFETY DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATELY AT: dividivisafety@gmail.com.

Name: _____

Company ID: _____

Response requested? Yes No

Event Date: 22 Sept '22 Time: 11:55 lt Flight # 269 # of Pax: 8
Depart: TNCA Arrive: TNCC A/C Type DHCB-300 PJ-DVG

Phase of Flight				
☐ Pre-depart	☐ Boarding	☐ Pushback	☐ Taxi	☐ Takeoff
☐ Climb	☐ Cruise	☐ Holding	☐ Descent	☐ Approach
☒ Landing	☐ Parking	☐ Deplane	☐ Post Flight	☐ Other: _____

Environment / Event type				
Wind <u>020 @ 21 G31</u>	Temp <u>-</u> °F / °C	Altimeter <u>2988</u>		
Clouds _____	Lightning _____	Day ☒	Night ☐	Twilight _____
Visibility restrictions: ☒ Rain	☐ Haze	☐ Dust	☐ Vog	☐ Fog
☐ Smoke	☐ Smog			
Sign Weather: ☒ Thunderstorm	☐ Windshear	☐ Turbulence	☐ Svr	☐ Mod
☐ Icing				
☐ Pax injury	☐ Pax Complaint	☐ Bom threat	☐ Door problem	
☐ Pax ill	☐ Unruly pax	☐ Evacuation	☐ Smoking	
☐ Interrupt sterile flt deck	☐ Other: _____			



MINISTRY OF
TRAFFIC, TRANSPORT AND URBAN PLANNING
CURAÇAO CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY



Form DI-001
Safety Event Report

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Date: 01 Feb 2021
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*Mandatory Reporting to the CCAA		Mandatory Company Reportable	
☐ ATC clearance discrep.	☐ ATC incident/delay	☐ Altitude bust	☐ Bird strike* ☐ FOD
☐ Unstable approach	☐ Lightning strike	☐ W&B error	☐ HazMat/DG * ☐ TCAS RA *
☐ Runway incursion	☐ Nav error	☐ GPWS alert	☐ Unlawful Interference *
☒ Runway excursion	☐ Pax misconduct	☐ Engine failure	☐ Crew illness/injury
☐ Wake turbulence	☐ Vehicle conflict	☐ Turbulence	☐ Pax injury/fall/ill
☐ Wind shear	☐ Stall Warning	☐ Ground damage	☐ Deviation from regs
☐ Smoke in the cabin	☐ Fumes	☐ In-flight Fire	☐ Loss of power both engines
☐ Property damage	☐ Engine shutdown	☐ Brake loss	☐ Damage from exhaust system
☐ False fire warning	☐ Flight Control Malfunction/Failure	☐ Ramp procedures/equip	
☐ Landing gear problem	☐ Hydraulic system failure requiring use of sole source or manual reversion		
☐ Near miss	☐ Electrical failure requiring sustained use of emergency source		
☐ Fuel system problem	☐ Mechanical irregularity (please describe system on next page)		
☐ Emergency Equipment	☐ Emergency door/system failure	☐ Evacuation using emergency egress	
☐ Component failure	☐ Structure damage needing repair	☐ Requiring emergency action	
Action Taken (check all that apply)			
☐ Declared emergency	☐ Emergency procedure	☐ Call for security	☐ Divert
☐ Abnormal procedure	☐ Go-Around/Missed Approach	☐ Air turn back	☐ Stop
☐ Ground Return	☐ Confer w/Captain	☐ Flight Delay	☐ Flight Cancel
☐ Request paramedic	☐ Reject TakeOff	☒ Notify Airport OPS	
☒ Other: <u>inform ATC</u>			
Contributing Factors (check all that apply)			
☐ Distraction	☐ Fatigue	☐ Personal issue	☐ Time Pressure ☐ Not trained for this
☐ Intentional	☐ Illness	☐ Physical limitation	☐ Peer pressure ☐ Did not follow procedure
☐ Medication	☐ CRM	☒ Physical environment/Weather	☐ Company pressure
☐ Multiple events	☐ Procedure inadequate	☐ Other: _____	



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CURAÇAO CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY



Form DI-001
Safety Event Report

Rev No: 01
Date: 01 Feb 2021
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Narrative Description of Events

Divi Divi Flight 3R-269 departed Aruba to Curacao. We were visual at all times and deviating for weather. Approximately at 17 DME from PJG we saw the oil tanks and at 15 DME we saw the airport. We were cleared to land at 7 miles final (visual at all times), even with light rain. Tower (Hato) gave clear to land with winds 020 at 218 gusting 31. There was also a cell just north west that moved passed the airport. Upon landing →

Suggested Corrective Action

I, hereby, acknowledge that the above statement is true based on my perception

Name: _____ Date: 22 Sept 2022 Signature: _____

For Safety Department Only

Date Received: _____ Report #: 220922-1



a positive touchdown was made. During the rollout I noticed the airplane heading changing rapidly to the left by approximately 20° to the left and the Flo said "Gust".

I corrected to the right to come back to the center line. The aircraft went to the right to much passing the center line again. I tried to correct with brake to go back to the left back to center line. Unfortunately, there was no response.

But around 40850 kts I tried to bring the Plane to the left with the steering lever, at this time the plane responded but it was already late as we proceeded on to the grass. The ~~cam~~ plane came facing North just before/in front of the runway. I slowly added power and got back on the runway and taxied to the ramp. After the "After Parking checklist" was completed the event was reported immediately.



MINISTRY OF
TRAFFIC, TRANSPORT AND URBAN PLANNING
CURAÇAO CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

Pilot Report – First Officer



Form DI-001
Safety Event Report

Curacao Luchtvaart Autoriteit	
Datum onty.	Agenda No.
23 Sep 21	22/555-1
Par.	

Rev No: 01
Date: 01 Feb 2021
Page 1 of 3

NOTE: THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT IS CONFIDENTIAL. DETAILS CONTAINED IN THE REPORT ARE USED FOR TREND ANALYSIS ONLY. PLEASE FILE WITHIN 24 HOURS AT DIVI DIVI HEAD OFFICE OR SAFETY/QA DEPARTMENT. THE ONLY EXCEPTION IS THE CURACAO ACCIDENT / INCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD AND OR THE CURACAO CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY REPORTABLE EVENT; PER CCARS CREWMEMBER NAMES MUST BE INCLUDED WITH OTHER APPLICABLE INFORMATION AND MUST BE FILED WITH SAFETY DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATELY AT:
dividivisafety@gmail.com

Name: _____ Company ID: 10

Response requested? Yes No

Event Date: 22 SEP '22 Time: 11:55 loc Flight # 269 # of Pax: 8
Depart: JNCA Arrive: JUCC A/C Type DHL-6-300A/C PJ-009

Phase of Flight				
☐ Pre-depart	☐ Boarding	☐ Pushback	☐ Taxi	☐ Takeoff
☐ Climb	☐ Cruise	☐ Holding	☐ Descent	☐ Approach
☒ Landing	☐ Parking	☐ Deplane	☐ Post Flight	☐ Other: _____

Environment / Event type				
Wind <u>010 @ 25</u>	Temp <u>30</u> °F °C	Altimeter <u>29.88</u>		
Clouds <u>few 018 TCu</u>	Lightning _____	Day ☒	Night _____	Twilight _____
Visibility restrictions: ☒ Rain	☐ Haze	☐ Dust	☐ Vog	☐ Fog
☒ Thunderstorm	☐ Windsheer	☐ Turbulence	☐ Svr	☒ Mod
☐ Pax injury	☐ Pax Complaint	☐ Bom threat	☐ Door problem	
☐ Pax ill	☐ Unruly pax	☐ Evacuation	☐ Smoking	
☐ Interrupt sterile fit deck	☐ Other: _____			



MINISTRY OF
TRAFFIC, TRANSPORT AND URBAN PLANNING
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*Mandatory Reporting to the CCAA		Mandatory Company Reportable	
☐ ATC clearance discrep.	☐ ATC incident/delay	☐ Altitude bust	☐ Bird strike* ☐ FOD
☐ Unstable approach	☐ Lightning strike	☐ W&B error	☐ HazMat/DG * ☐ TCAS RA *
☐ Runway incursion	☐ Nav error	☐ GPWS alert	☐ Unlawful interference *
☒ Runway excursion	☐ Pax misconduct	☐ Engine failure	☐ Crew illness/injury
☐ Wake turbulence	☐ Vehicle conflict	☐ Turbulence	☐ Pax injury/fall/ill
☐ Wind shear	☐ Stall Warning	☐ Ground damage	☐ Deviation from regs
☐ Smoke in the cabin	☐ Fumes	☐ In-flight Fire	☐ Loss of power both engines
☐ Property damage	☐ Engine shutdown	☐ Brake loss	☐ Damage from exhaust system
☐ False fire warning	☐ Flight Control Malfunction/Failure		☐ Ramp procedures/equip
☐ Landing gear problem	☐ Hydraulic system failure requiring use of sole source or manual reversion		
☐ Near miss	☐ Electrical failure requiring sustained use of emergency source		
☐ Fuel system problem	☐ Mechanical irregularity (please describe system on next page)		
☐ Emergency Equipment	☐ Emergency door/system failure	☐ Evacuation using emergency egress	
☐ Component failure	☐ Structure damage needing repair	☐ Requiring emergency action	
Action Taken (check all that apply)			
☐ Declared emergency	☐ Emergency procedure	☐ Call for security	☐ Divert
☐ Abnormal procedure	☐ Go-Around/Missed Approach	☐ Air turn back	☐ Stop
☐ Ground Return	☐ Confer w/Captain	☐ Flight Delay	☐ Flight Cancel
☐ Request paramedic	☐ Reject TakeOff	☒ Notify Airport OPS	
Other: _____			
Contributing Factors (check all that apply)			
☐ Distraction	☐ Fatigue	☐ Personal issue	☐ Time Pressure ☐ Not trained for this
☐ Intentional	☐ Illness	☐ Physical limitation	☐ Peer pressure ☐ Did not follow procedure
☐ Medication	☐ CRM	☒ Physical environment/Weather	☐ Company pressure
☐ Multiple events		☐ Procedure inadequate	Other: _____



MINISTRY OF
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Form DI-001
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Narrative Description of Events

at 7 miles final for runway 11, with
airport and runway insight, landing
clearance is received. After a positive landing,
I noticed no corrective action by
captain (PF) to compensate for wind
gust from the left during landing rollout.
Nose started to deviate 10-20 degrees to
the left. I call out the term GUST,
expecting corrective action by the captain.
Probably due to startle effect, captain
overcorrected by pulling power levers to beta

Suggested Corrective Action

I, hereby, acknowledge that the above statement is true based on my perception

Name: _____ Date: 23 SEP '22 Signature: _____

For Safety Department Only

Date Received: _____

Report #: 220922-2



used both the nosewheel lever and rudder pedals to bring the airplane back to runway center line. Result, airplane started to deviate excessively to the right. Captain applied brakes to compensate and the airplane started to hydroplane which resulted in runway excursion just after intersection C onto the grass. Captain managed to bring the airplane back ~~to~~ onto the runway to taxi back and vacate via intersection C.



APPENDIX D

Report Director of Operations Divi Divi Air



ATTN:
Des. Peter Steinmetz
Director General CCAA
Sera Mahuma z/n
Present

Date: 22 Sep 22

Contact Person:

E-mail:

Our reference:

Rapport 220922-3

Your Reference:

Subject: After Landing Incident PJ-DVG dd: 22 Sep 2022

Page(s)
1/3

Dear Mr. Steinmetz

After Landing Incident PJ-DVG dd: 22 Sep 2022

Preliminary Report, Report of events.

Aircraft: DHC 6-300

Registration: PJ-DVG

S/N: 347

Flight number: 3R269

Type of operation: Commercial Passenger flight in VFR conditions

Last point of departure: TNCA -AUA

Time of departure: 15:10 UTC Airborne (11:10 LT)

Point of landing, destination: TNCC -CUR

Landing time: 15:41 UTC (11:41 LT)

On Blocks 15:43 UTC (11:43 LT)

Parking position: TNCC Apron position 7 (originally 12)



Crew: Captain

Co-pilot

Pax on board: 8

Captain called Divi Divi Air flight OPS Director, Capt
within 10 min after blocks on.

Captain Koolman reported an incident took place after touching down at destination
CUR.

- Short review of the call: "I have some bad news for you, we landed in Curacao, the runway was wet and most probably due to a gust as well, veered of the runway near taxiway C, eventually ending up in the grass alongside (parallel to) the runway. After the nosewheel got grip again, I taxied the aircraft over the runway to our parking spot on the apron. No one is hurt. We have informed maintenance and are deboarding."
- We requested the crew to remain at the aircraft at that time and complete after flight (ground) procedures.
- Dir of Ops called the Accountable Manager, Maintenance and Divi Divi Ops to inform of the incident and that next following flight will be delayed, pending investigation and to expect follow-up and schedule and crew changes.
- Director of Ops called to inform the Flight Crew that once ready with after flight procedures to report to the Main office for a debriefing, and to complete the Safety Event Report per crew member as per SOP. Decided was that they would be relieved from their schedule for the following duty period.
- Meanwhile Inspector Capt. Oscar Wason was called and informed about the incident.
- Maintenance was called again to request if they were already present at the aircraft and if an initial damage assessment could take place, if any. At that time, it was decided that the aircraft would best be taken to the hangar, once



the crew was ready with after flight procedures.

- After having initiated the debriefing at the main office, both pilots proceeded to the Divi Divi Air hangar where they were interviewed by the CCAA.
- Meanwhile the Accountable Manager was present at the Maintenance Hangar for a briefing with the Chief Inspector, the DOM, the QAM and once arrived the CCAA. The Accountable Manager also called Mr. Laplace and informed him of the incident. Afterwards there was a follow up conversation with inspector Wason.
- Both crew members were called to inquiry about their emotional status.
- Following the reports from the crew members and maintenance and advice of the CCAA it was decided that the pilots would be assessed by the medical physician prior to return to duty, and that the required reports would be completed and delivered to the CCAA within the next 48 hours.

Hoping to have informed you accordingly,

Director of Operations

Divi Divi Air

Curacao.



APPENDIX E

Report Airport Authority CAP, Curaçao Airport Partners.

Aircraft Incident / Accident Report		
Date: 9/22/2022	Time: 11:41 lt - 15:41 UTC	Type of Incident / Accident: Runway Excursion
Area: Maneuvering Area	Exact Location: Safety Area RWY/TWY east of Int C	Name TWR-controller/ Assistant: Mr. Hendrik
Weather condition: Cloudy	Wind direction & speed 25 knots	Visibility: Low visibility at the west
ETA (Estimated Time of Arrival): 11:35 LT - 1535 UTC	ATA (Actual Time of Arrival): 11:41 LT - 1541 UTC	Type of Flight: Commercial Pax flight
AOD (Airport of Departure): AUA	Aircraft type: DH-6	Aircraft Registration: PJ-DVG
Equipment type None	Vehicle type None	Vehicle / Equipment registration: None
POB (Passengers on Board): 12 pax	Notification time Hato Fire : 11:42 LT - 1542 UTC	Arrival time Hato Fires: No response needed
Notification CCAA: 12:00 LT - 1600 UTC	Location aircraft after landing: AC exit the safety area to ACS 7	Parking spot: ACS 7
Runway in use: RWY 11	Indicated problems: None	Transportation of passengers: Airport passengers bus
Removing procedures aircraft: Not needed	NOTAM (if required): NO	Specific Inspection executed: Yes, 11:47 LT -1547UTC
Property damage: None	Amount of injured victims 0 pax	AEP activation: Not needed

Detailed description of event:

On September 22, 2022 approximate 11:38lt / 1536 UTC OPS/ADM called Tower to get information of the RWY visibility and windspeed. ACTO confirmed that the visibility on the west side is very low (below 10) and the windspeed is fluctuates between 20 and 25 knots. During the conversation, all of a sudden Mr. Hendrik said DIVI ran out of the runway into the infield and hang up. Crash phone was activated at 11:42lt / 1542 UTC. Crash phone Information: "Divi just landed and lost control entering the infield". After a while, it was heard via the tower frequency that Divi 369 received approval to continue to taxi to the Apron. Hato Fire was called by ADM to double check if they received the information. At 11:44 lt/ 1544 UTC, OPS/ADM instructed AOO to conduct a specific inspection on the RWY and to focus on the area between Intersections Charly and Delta. Nothing particular was found. After inspection, AOO went to the aircraft at the ACS 7 to interview the captain. The Captain declared the following: They had a positive touchdown and while exiting the runway at Intersection Charly, a wind gust caused the aircraft to veer off of the Runway to the east, entering the infield as he gained control of the aircraft he re-entered the runway and continued on his own power to the Apron-ACS # 7. Mr. Llanes (CCAA Inspector) was informed by ADM at 12:00lt /1600 UTC about the incident. Some eyewitnesses informed that they saw the DIVI aircraft make a strange movement and entered the safety area and re-enter the Runway again. AOO La Pas took picture of the tire tracks in the safety area.





APPENDIX G
EMMA Controlled Inspection Program DHC-6-300

DHC-6 TWIN OTTER EMMA Controlled Inspection Program		CARD No. 1	
INSPECTIONS (CONT'D)		Mech. Initial	Insp. Initial
4 (Cont'd)	(f) If the lockwire was removed, secure the cable terminals with lockwire. NOTE: Refer to Service Bulletin No. 6/453 and A.D. CF-84-03, if applicable. (32-00-1, 32-04a)	N/A	N/A
*5	Main battery (SOO 6371) for condition and security; cables for security. Area around battery for spillage and corrosion. (24-01-1a)	N/A	N/A
6	DELETED	N/A	N/A
7	Nose gear shock strut for correct extension as given on data plate. Fork retaining nut properly secured. (32-02-2)	N/A	N/A
8	Steering actuator linkage for condition, corrosion, and security; fouling of linkage on shock strut cylinder body. (32-05)	N/A	N/A
9	Remove nosewheel and clean as required; inspect as follows: (a) Wheel for abrasions, cracks, chipped rims. (32-09-2) (b) Bearings for signs of wear, corrosion, fretting and blueing. Lubricate. (32-09-2, 32-09-4) (c) Bushings for signs of wear. (32-09-2) (d) Seals for distortion, fit, deterioration and security. (32-09-2) Install nosewheel assembly.	N/A	N/A
10	Nose cap lightning rod for condition and security. (23-04d)	N/A	N/A
11	Avionics Start Battery (Mod 6/2315) for condition and security; cables for security; support structure for condition and security. (24-03-3)	N/A	N/A
FINAL CLOSE UP			
12	Lower aircraft from jack.	N/A	N/A
13	Close panels F3 and F10.	N/A	N/A
14	Install nose baggage compartment radio equipment screens.	N/A	N/A
15	Close and secure nose baggage compartment door F2 and nose cap F1 (Short nose).	N/A	N/A
TOTAL SIGN OFF			

DVI
#07

EMMA Card No. 1

Page 2 of 2
Nov 30/18



MINISTRY OF
TRAFFIC, TRANSPORT AND URBAN PLANNING
CURAÇAO CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
EMMA Controlled Inspection Program

CARD No. 3

This Card Required for the EMMA Checks that follow:

1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47.

A/C Registration No. PJ-AVG

Date: 22 sept 2022

Area: 2. External

Trade: Airframe

Manhours: Prep: 0.3 Hrs. Total: 1.9 Hrs.

Accomplished at curacao Hours

Mech.
Initial

Insp.
Initial

PREPARATION

A Jack main landing gear.

B Special tools: Main Wheel Retaining Nut Wrench SD5523

INSPECTIONS

1 Remove and clean main wheels and inspect as follows:

(a) Wheels for abrasions, cracks, chipped rims, brake drive rings
(Pre Mods 6/2002 and 6/2317) for condition and signs of wear.
(32-11-2).

(b) Wheel bearings for signs of wear, corrosion, fretting and blueing;
lubricate.
(32-11-2).

(c) Seals for distortion, fit, deterioration and security.
(32-11-2).

(d) Brake housing for evidence of overheating.
(32-10a).

(e) Brake discs for scoring, distortion, evidence of overheating.
Brake disk guides (when installed) for condition and security.
(32-10b and 32-10d).

(f) Brake linings for wear within limits.

NOTE 1: (Post Mod 6/2002) Refer to Maintenance Manual,
PSM 1-64-2.
(Post Mod 6/2317) Refer to Maintenance Manuals,
PSM 1-6-2, 1-63S-2 or 1-63-2.

NOTE 2: (Pre Mod 6/2002 & 6/2317) If indicator pins are flush with
ends of adjustment nuts (brake pressure off), check that
brake lining wear is within limits. Refer to Maintenance
Manual, PSM 1-6-2 or 1-63S-2 or 1-63-2.

(32-10c).

2 Install wheels.

FINAL CLOSE UP

3 Lower aircraft from jacks.

TOTAL SIGN OFF

DVI
#37

EMMA Card No. 3

Page 1 of 2
Jan 7/16



Card No. SP1

A/C Registration No. <u>PI-DVFG²²</u>		Date: <u>22 sept 2022</u>	
Manhours: Prep: Total:		Mech. Initial	Insp. Initial
Accomplished at <u>CURACAO</u> Hours			
SPECIAL INSPECTIONS The following special inspections supplement the basic inspections to ensure that components and systems, vulnerable to malfunctions under adverse environmental conditions or continuous operation from rough, unpaved fields, are thoroughly inspected. In addition, special inspections related to conditions which are not environmental in nature are included. Accomplish the inspections as necessary, according to the conditions under which the aircraft is being operated.			
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS Unpaved landing fields, Arctic Conditions, Floats install from Salt Water, Converting to Wheels or Skis, High Salt Marine Environment, High Industrial Pollution, Desert or Areas of High Dust Content, Areas of High Humidity and Livestock or Corrosive Material Cargo. For information on the geographic locations related to High Salt Marine Environments, refer to PSM 1-6-7 Part 3, Para 5.B.			
OPERATING FROM UNPAVED LANDING FIELDS			
Daily			
A1	Antennas on underside of fuselage for cleanliness and damage.		
A2	Anti-collision light on underside of fuselage and taxi light (if installed) for cleanliness and damage.		
A3	For damage caused by flying debris; nose landing gear, main leg fairings, fuselage sides between nose and passenger doors, wing center and flap under surfaces.		
A4	Engine air intakes and ram air inlets for damage and obstruction by grass cuttings, weed, etc.		
Every 100 Flying Hours			
A5	Remove main wheels and inspect in accordance with instructions on Card No. 3.		
A6	Remove nose wheel and inspect in accordance with instruction on Card No. 1 (Item 9).		
OPERATING UNDER ARCTIC CONDITIONS			
Daily			
B1	Wire and whip antennas for ice accumulation.	N/A	
B2	Landing gear for cleanliness; areas around movable parts free of ice, snow or moisture.	N/A	
B3	Escape doors and/or emergency hatch for ice formation around seals.	N/A	
B4	Flight control cables. (PSM 1-6-7, SP1-B4).	N/A	



APPENDIX H

Medical Report – Captain



PORTO MEDICO N.V.
Curaçao airport
Willemstad - Curaçao
Tel: +599 9 888 7511
email: info@portomedico.com

Dr. Niet ingevuld
Curaçao

Patientgegevens:

06 January 1973

Curaçao

Betreft:

Curaçao, 23 September 2022

Dhr P.Steinmetz / dhr L.Laplace

Geachte heren Steinmetz en Laplace,

Bovengenoemde piloot was in command bij de landing van het Divi toestel dat van de baan slipte op 22/9/2022 rondstreeks 12 uur in de middag.

Vanmorgen heb ik hem uitgebreid gesproken. Na het invullen van het EASA Mental Health formulier heeft een "mental health assesment" plaats gevonden.

Als gelouterde en zeer ervaren piloot heeft zijn ego wel een deuk opgelopen door dit voorval. Hij voelt zich zeer "embarrassed". Ik zal dinsdagmiddag weer contact met hem opnemen. Verder zit hij goed in zijn vel. Afsproken is dat hij as woensdag 28/9/2022 weer fit to fly is.

hopende u hiermee van dienst te zijn, hoogachtend,

AME

M.D.
Porto Medico



Medical Report – First Officer



PORTO MEDICO N.V.
Curaçao airport
Willemstad - Curaçao
Tel: +599 9 888 7511
email: info@portomedico.com

Dr. Niet ingevuld
Curaçao

Patientgegevens:
20 January 1999
Curaçao

Betreft: Mitchell Homeyer

Curaçao, 23 September 2022

dhr P. Steinmetz / dhr L. Laplace

Geachte heren Steinmetz en LaPlace,

Bovengenoemde Co-pilot was niet in "control" toen het Divi toestel van de baan slipte bij de landing op 22/9/2022 omstreeks 12 uur in de middag.

Vanmorgen heeft hij het EASA Mental Health formulier ingevuld, waarop een "mental health assesment" plaats vond.

Ik acht hem mentaal weer volledig inzetbaar om te werken als co-piloot. Hij zal zijn werkzaamheden per maandag a.s., 26/9 2022 kunnen hervatten.

AME

M.D.

Porto Medico



23 SEP. 2022