The narrative that has settled around the collapse of electric ride-hailing cab company BluSmart Mobility is wrong in the conclusion many are drawing from it: that the electric cab model is broken. It is not. What failed in BluSmart’s case was a company’s financial architecture, governance structure and one set of promoters’ honesty. As per Securities and Exchange Board’s (SEBI’s) interim order dated April 15, 2025, BluSmart’s co-founders, Anmol Singh Jaggi and Puneet Singh Jaggi—who also ran EV-leasing firm Gensol Engineering, which owned most BluSmart vehicles—had allegedly diverted Rs 262 crore in loans meant to purchase 6,400 electric vehicles (EVs) towards a luxury apartment, foreign trips and transfers to relatives.

New players have rushed in to fill the market vacuum left behind by BluSmart. By May 2025, Evera Cabs, operated by Delhi-based Prakriti Mobility, had taken possession of 220 former BluSmart cabs, with plans to acquire up to 1,000 EVs in total. Evera CEO Nimish Trivedi reportedly said that the company—previously operating from Terminal 3 of Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport—aims to expand to Terminal 1. Chennai-based Refex Green Mobility—a subsidiary of the diversified Refex Group—has entered Delhi-National Capital Region (NCR) with a plan to deploy over 400 EVs in three months. Operating under the brand Refex Mobility, it runs 1,400 company-owned EVs in Chennai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad and Mumbai, serving over 70 corporate clients.

What Blusmart proved

Before asking what went wrong with BluSmart, it is worth being precise about what went right. BluSmart’s EVs completed over 300 million km of fare-generating trips in Delhi-NCR and Bengaluru. Its fleet ran reliably enough for the company to earn carbon credit accreditation from Verra, the global non-profit standard-setter, becoming the first Indian mobility firm to do so. Its customer satisfaction metrics outperformed conventional ride-hailing platforms. Its charging network—35 dedicated hubs across Delhi-NCR and Bengaluru—showed that fleet-scale EV charging is operationally achievable in India. Running costs were materially lower than comparable compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles and maintenance was less frequent. If investors, policy-makers and the public conclude that the failure means electric fleet operations do not work, the next set of operators will find capital more expensive, regulation more hesitant and public trust harder to rebuild...

This column was originally published in the July 16-31, 2026 print edition of Down To Earth

The Union Ministry of Power, in consultation with the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE), has issued a new draft amendment notification for the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) Phase II norms. While the regulation formally institutes a market-oriented system for tracking compliance credits and debits among Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), it introduces a direct buyout mechanism that weakens the compliance.

Under this new clause, non-compliant vehicle manufacturers can bypass statutory liabilities by purchasing regulatory credits directly from the BEE at a fixed rate of Rs 2,500 per gCO2/km—effectively halving the Rs 5,000 penalty framework originally established under the Energy Conservation Act.

This has serious implications for upcoming CAFE III norms, which will also rely on credit trading frameworks. This new proposal disconnects compliance from actual real-world emissions reductions by the performing OEMs. By creating an artificial and infinite supply of government-issued credits out of thin air, the policy undercuts the private trading market, capping the financial value of performance and stripping away the competitive advantage of progressive OEMs that invested in clean-tech innovation and electrification.

Furthermore, because these buyout revenues bypass the automotive engineering ecosystem entirely—with most of it diverted into general state accounts—this becomes an arbitrary revenue-generating stream for the state that does not offer any funding or incentive for the technological development for low carbon transport.

Key highlights of the proposed amendments

The amendment introduces a structured system using a “Passbook” to record, track, and carry forward “Credits” (accrued when an OEM performs better than the target) and “Debits” (shortfalls when an OEM exceeds target emissions).

It also permits “Pooling,” allowing OEMs to trade or exchange credits on mutually agreed terms to achieve compliance within a 5-year block (FY 2022-23 to FY 2026-27), with any un-traded credits lapsing at the end of the block.

A major systemic shift allows non-compliant OEMs to completely bypass peer-to-market trading by directly buying credits from the BEE.

All compliance penalty funds and buyout revenues are directed to the Central Energy Conservation Fund, with 90 per cent transferred to state governments (apportioned by vehicle sales volume) and 10 per cent retained by the Centre.

How the policy dilutes enforcement and compliance

The proposed amendment halves the financial liability. Under the Energy Conservation Act, a strict enforcement penalty rate was previously established at Rs 5,000 per violation metrics. The draft amendment allows non-compliant OEMs to offset their debt balance through a direct buyout from BEE at a fixed rate of Rs 2,500 per g CO2​/km. This creates a state-sanctioned route to cut non-compliance liabilities exactly in half.

Technically, this is replacing a penalty with an ‘administrative fee’. Instead of facing statutory enforcement penalties or being forced to adopt cleaner vehicle technologies, non-compliant OEMs can treat this buyout as a predictable, heavily discounted cost of doing business.

Disconnected from market-generated surplus credits

Market credits are generated when a progressive OEM outperforms standards through expensive technical upgrades. Conversely, BEE’s buyout credits are created out of thin air by a regulatory body—entirely disconnected from any actual physical or technological reduction in emissions.

Because BEE can sell credits without a matching volume of real-world carbon reductions, the mechanism allows the total net emissions of the country’s fleet to artificially inflate, breaking the core principle of a cap-and-trade system.

Undercutting market for performing OEMs

By establishing a statutory buyout floor at Rs 2,500, BEE effectively sets an artificial price ceiling for the entire private trading market. No non-compliant OEM will ever buy market credits from a clean peer at a fair value above Rs 2,500, severely reducing the economic reward for progressive manufacturers.

OEMs that invested heavily in R&D, electrification, and powertrain efficiency under the impression that their surplus credits would command premium market rates are left stranded. The state-driven supply of cheap, infinite regulatory credits devalues private market assets.

BEE acts as a non-market actor, fixing an arbitrary, non-dynamic price (Rs 2,500) for five financial years instead of letting prices reflect actual supply-demand dynamics or manufacturing complexities.

In a market mechanism, credit revenues flow directly from non-compliant OEMs to clean OEMs, subsidising and accelerating clean-tech research. Under this draft, the buyout revenue goes to the government, with 90 per cent diverted into general state accounts based on regional vehicle sales distribution. Consequently, the capital paid by polluters bypasses the automotive engineering innovation, with no support for the actual technology development.

Learn from global models

An analysis of global automotive compliance frameworks shows how emissions credit systems are governed internationally versus the mechanism outlined in India’s draft CAFE II amendment. Globally, regulators do not manufacture or sell compliance credits to industry players to offset shortfalls.

California (Advanced Clean Cars / ZEV Mandate): The California Air Resources Board (CARB) awards credits exclusively to OEMs based on the number of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) they manufacture and sell. Automakers facing a shortfall must purchase these credits on the open market directly from over-performing peers. CARB never sells credits to non-compliant automakers.

Europe (EU fleet CO2 standards): The European Commission defines strict corporate average fleet targets. Automakers can voluntarily enter into emissions “pooling” agreements where an under-performing fleet is legally grouped with a high-performing EV maker to avoid fines. The EU regulatory body does not generate or sell bypass credits.

China (dual-credit policy): China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology mandates an open internal trading platform where automakers short on New Energy Vehicle credits must buy surplus NEV credits directly from competitors. The government does not supply compliance credits.

How governments generate revenue vs. open market trading

Globally, while governments do not typically sell compliance credits to OEMs, they utilise mechanisms to generate revenue and enforce climate action. Rather than a buyout, regulators impose direct penalty for missing fleet standards. For example, the European Commission levies a penalty for every single gram of CO2​/km exceeded. This acts as an enforcement penalty, not a credit buyout.

In economy-wide industrial cap-and-trade sectors—such as the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) — does generate massive revenue by auctioning off a set cap of carbon allowances to heavy industries, power plants, and maritime operators. However, the key distinction is that the total volume of these allowances is strictly capped and decreases every year, forcing an overall drop in emissions.

When governments earn from non-compliance fines or ETS allowance auctions, the capital is also ring-fenced. For instance, EU ETS revenues are directed into dedicated vehicles like the EU Innovation Fund and Modernisation Fund, which flow back into financing low-carbon technologies and renewable energy infrastructure.

Anomalous even in India

Providing a regulatory agency with the authority to issue and sell credits to non-compliant operators is avoided globally. In standard cap-and-trade networks, a credit must represent an actual, physically verified reduction in emissions by an industry operator. If a regulator possesses the right to sell infinite credits out of thin air, this detaches the financial market from real world improvements.

When a regulator sets a fixed buyout fee, it creates a legislative price ceiling. No non-compliant OEM will pay a clean manufacturer more than the regulator’s buyout price, undercutting the free market and reducing the financial incentive for progressive manufacturers to invest in technological breakthroughs.

There is also a lesson from India’s green energy market that establishes peer-to-peer trading as the standard rule for compliance, treating state intervention only as a strict exception. Under the renewable consumption obligations managed by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), obligated entities facing shortfalls must purchase market-driven Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) from over-performing peers via power exchanges. A state-administered “Buyout Price” mechanism and the CERC-notified rate, is strictly a fallback safety valve triggered only if a severe market shortage occurs. Even under this exception, the revenue is ring-fenced, with up to 75 per cent directed to State Energy Conservation Funds to drive clean technology development.

This reinforces why the proposed “BEE Buyout Option” under the draft CAFE Phase II automotive amendment is an unprecedented anomaly. Even in the domestic frameworks like the perform and Trade (PAT) scheme and the carbon credit trading scheme, BEE acts as a neutral regulator and never creates or sells compliance credits. Shortfalls in those industrial sectors must be offset by purchasing certificates anchored to real, physically verified savings from active market peers. Non-compliance triggers statutory penalties rather than a state buyout.

By directly manufacturing and selling credits for a cut-rate administrative fee under CAFE II, the state devalues peer-to-peer clean innovation. This becomes the only sector where non-compliance capital is diverted into general state coffers instead of supporting progressive industrial transitions.

For genuine technical progress, BEE must replace this anomalous revenue-generating bypass with a robust framework that legally rewards over-performing automakers and forces real, physically verified emissions reductions.

On July 1, Delhi’s newly notified Electric Vehicle Policy 2026-2030 came into force, with staged mandates to electrify two-wheelers, three-wheelers and goods carriers over the next four years. Buried in its infrastructure chapter is a single, non-binding sentence asking power distribution companies to explore battery storage systems at electric bus depots.

That sentence deserves more attention than its length suggests. Four years after the government launched a Rs 18,100 crore scheme to build domestic battery cell factories, no beneficiary has received an incentive payment, and barely 3 per cent of the promised 50 gigawatt-hour (GWh) manufacturing capacity is running. The missing ingredient, increasingly, looks like demand — and battery energy storage systems (BESS), at the scale India’s grid planners project the country will need, could be one of the more realistic ways to supply it. Combined with recycling-driven import substitution, that demand could also do something subsidies alone have not: bring down the cost of batteries, and with them, the upfront price of electric vehicles (EVs) across every segment.

An idle 50 gigawatt-hours

The Advanced Chemistry Cell Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme, launched in 2021 with an Rs 18,100 crore outlay, aimed to build 50 GWh of cell manufacturing capacity by 2025 and cut a cell-import dependence the Union Ministry of Mines puts at nearly 70 per cent, sourced mainly from mainland China and Hong Kong. In FY20 alone, India imported an estimated 450 million lithium-ion battery units at a cost of roughly US$865 million, according to the R&D Roadmap on Tropical EV Battery, a 2024 report built by the Department of Science and Technology (DST) with the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) among its lead authors.

Ten companies bid for the 50 GWh on offer, including Exide and Amara Raja — the only two with prior battery manufacturing experience. Both lost out to bidders promising steeper domestic value addition: Reliance New Energy, Ola Electric and Rajesh Exports, after an initial award to Hyundai fell through. Four years on, only 1.4 GWh — 2.8 per cent of the target — has been commissioned, all by Ola Electric, which has not met the scheme’s domestic value addition thresholds (25 per cent in year one, rising to 60 per cent by year five) needed to claim any incentive; incentives are payable quarterly only after a beneficiary clears that threshold and begins qualifying sales. Reaching the 60 per cent threshold across the scheme was meant to substitute around Rs 20,000 crore of imports annually, per the DST roadmap’s estimate — a saving that remains entirely theoretical. As of February 2026, no incentive payment has reached any beneficiary, and the Union Budget 2026-27 cut the scheme’s allocation by 44.5 per cent — an acknowledgment that disbursement is not materialising at the pace envisaged.

Shut out of the PLI, Exide and Amara Raja built capacity outside it instead — importing cells to assemble packs domestically for now, while localising cell production on their own timelines, much as the DST roadmap described the industry in 2024: pack assembly established at scale, cell production still confined to research and pilot facilities. Together with Tata’s Agratas, Waaree and Adani, the non-PLI pipeline now totals roughly 76 GWh of initial capacity and 112 GWh planned — larger than the PLI scheme itself, though still weighted toward assembly rather than cells. Firms holding allocated PLI capacity, the scheme’s own evaluators note, have been reluctant to scale up amid limited demand visibility; Ola Electric has scaled back its expansion plans considerably. Utilisation depends on the market waiting for what a factory makes, and for most of the past four years that market has meant largely one thing — EVs, mostly two-wheelers.

The reasons are structural. The DST roadmap is candid that most cell-manufacturing equipment is imported, and manufacturers import nearly all component parts — foils, separators, active materials, casings — a “component manufacturing vacuum” alongside the raw-material one. Recycling can only supply a fraction of what a scaled-up industry needs: even efficient recycling would cut new mining demand for lithium, cobalt, nickel and manganese by just 3 per cent by 2030, rising to 28 per cent by 2050, per modelling cited in the roadmap; CSE’s own estimate puts India’s cumulative recyclable EV battery material at around 245,554 tonnes by 2037 — useful, but partial.

One potential tailwind is not yet realised. Lithium Iron Phosphate (LFP)’s other components — iron oxide, phosphate, graphite — avoid the scarce nickel and cobalt NMC depends on, and their raw ores exist domestically. LFP cathode chemistry has become increasingly popular in India because of its thermal tolerance and durability features. But raw material availability is not the same as battery-grade cathode material (CAM) production: as of 2024, China alone made virtually all the world’s LFP CAM.  India’s first domestic LFP cathode plant — an 8 GWh Altmin facility in Telangana, developed with the government’s ARCI research centre — is not expected to begin operations until Q4 2026, meeting roughly a tenth of India’s LFP demand. Until such plants scale up, the domestic-material advantage is a structural possibility, not a present reality.

What Delhi’s mandate could add up to

Delhi’s own mandates suggest how large vehicle-driven demand could get. From January 2027, only electric three-wheelers and light goods carriers can be newly registered in the capital; from April 2028, the same applies to two-wheelers. Delhi’s fleet is dominated by two-wheelers — over 1.04 crore (10.4 million) of them, with roughly 5.7 lakh (0.57 million) new ones added annually. At an assumed 2.5 kWh per battery, the mandate alone would generate close to 1.4 GWh of annual cell demand once fully in force; add roughly 25,000 new three-wheelers a year at 4 kWh each, and Delhi’s mobility mandate alone could plausibly pull in 1.5-1.7 GWh annually — comparable to the entire 1.4 GWh of cell capacity India has commissioned nationally to date.

The storage clause adds a smaller stream on top. Delhi has begun upgrading charging infrastructure at eight bus depots as it works toward expanding its electric bus fleet from around 4,500 today to 14,000 by 2028-29. A handful of 1-2 MWh storage units at these depots would add up to perhaps 10-20 MWh of stationary demand — modest, but an early signal of a market that could grow substantially.

The bigger prize: a 236 gigawatt-hour national market

Delhi’s numbers are small next to what India’s grid planners project nationally. The Central Electricity Authority’s National Electricity Plan estimates the country will need roughly 74 GW/411 GWh of total energy storage by 2031-32, of which about 236 GWh is expected to come from batteries. As of September 2025, India had installed barely half a gigawatt-hour of BESS capacity nationwide — meaning nearly the entire target still has to be built within six years.

Several companies chasing EV battery demand are positioning for this too. Amara Raja is building a separate 5 GWh BESS integration facility at Divitipally (expandable to 10 GWh). Waaree, Tata Power’s renewable arm and JSW Energy have each set out lithium-ion storage plans or targets running into the tens of GWh. Much of this is independent of any state’s EV policy — but a policy that builds storage into its own remit, rather than treating it as an afterthought, is better placed to connect that demand to a market it can shape directly. Tamil Nadu’s electricity utility, which has cleared battery storage procurement exceeding 1,000 MWh, shows what a more developed version looks like. Delhi’s current provision, by comparison, is an early, exploratory step.

From battery scale to affordability for EVs

This demand story matters beyond manufacturing statistics because of what it could do to the price of a battery, and with it, an EV. Battery costs follow a well-documented learning curve: BloombergNEF estimates a historical learning rate of around 18 per cent — for every doubling of cumulative global production, average pack prices have fallen by roughly that much. That is how a pack costing over $1,100/kWh in 2010 fell to a record $108/kWh in 2025, with cells (roughly 80 per cent of pack cost) falling even faster. Stationary storage, the application with the largest, most standardised order volumes, saw the steepest price decline of any segment last year — 45 per cent, to $70/kWh.

Indian manufacturers are nowhere near that curve. An industry that has commissioned 1.4 GWh against a 50 GWh target has not generated the volume needed to compress costs the way the global market has. Combining EV mandate demand with BESS demand — a 236 GWh national requirement growing from almost nothing — is one of the more realistic routes to the volumes at which the learning curve can start to work domestically, rather than depending on imported cells that have already benefited from someone else’s scale.

The second lever works on cost rather than volume: recycling and domestic material substitution. Every tonne of cobalt, nickel or lithium recovered from spent batteries is a tonne that does not have to be imported at prices set by a handful of volatile, concentrated sources. The DST roadmap’s Rs 20,000 crore-a-year import-substitution estimate captures the manufacturing side of that saving; recycling adds a material-side saving worth an estimated 245,554 tonnes by 2037. LFP’s cost advantage would add to this too, once domestic cathode-material capacity — still pre-commercial today — actually comes online.

Together, these are the two ingredients needed to bring cell costs down structurally rather than through incentive-dependent discounting: assured volume, and cheaper, more secure inputs. Lower cell costs would flow through to lower pack costs, and from there to lower upfront prices across every segment currently propped up by purchase incentives — two-wheelers, three-wheelers, goods carriers, eventually cars — precisely where the price gap with petrol and diesel vehicles remains the biggest obstacle to adoption once subsidies taper off. It would also speak to the deeper problem behind the PLI scheme’s stalled payouts: manufacturers are short not just of demand but of a credible path to profitability without permanent subsidy. Demand at BESS scale, paired with a functioning recycling stream, is one of the few visible routes to that path — though a path, not a guarantee: global battery costs are also shaped by competitive dynamics and raw material cycles outside any Indian policy’s control.

What this could look like in practice

The contrast with Delhi’s treatment of vehicles is instructive: purchase incentives specify rupee-per-kWh rates to the last thousand rupees, and mandates carry firm calendar dates; storage gets one sentence asking distribution companies to explore deployment, with no capacity target, funding line or timeline. That is a shared opportunity, not a Delhi-specific gap. Most states are rewriting their EV policies just as grid-side storage becomes central to stability of tariffs. Building that requirement into policy now, rather than reacting once grid strain is visible, would let states shape a domestic order book ahead of need — and, if the cost logic above holds, make EVs more affordable rather than only more subsidised.

For states now revising their EV policies, this is a natural moment to build a defined BESS provision into the framework — a capacity target, a funding line, and coordination between the transport department, the power regulator and distribution utilities. Delhi’s clause offers a workable starting template; deepening it would give manufacturers a buyer they can plan around, at a scale that could let them compete on cost rather than survive on incentive.

A comprehensive six-year data analysis (2021-2026) done by Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) has revealed that ground-level ozone (O₃​) has expanded beyond isolated, short-lived spikes to become a widespread, year-round urban and regional problem in different regions of the country — and Delhi-NCR is emerging as the largest regional hotspot.

Driven by intense and rising heat, bright sunlight and rising emissions of gases that form ozone, this invisible secondary pollutant is transforming the country’s air quality profile and associated risks.

“Our analysis reveals that rising ground-level ozone and prolonged exposure windows are transforming India’s localised, winter-time particulate problem into a year-round, transboundary crisis that peaks during the summer across all regions. Ozone is damaging public health, agricultural productivity and regional climate systems. As a climate pollutant, ozone traps heat in the air, which raises temperatures and causes even more ozone to form, creating a dangerous feedback loop,” says Anumita Roychowdhury, executive director, CSE and the lead researcher and author behind the CSE analysis. 

“While the current national clean air programme (NCAP) focuses particulate matter reduction, NCAP 2.0 must adopt a multi-pollutant strategy. By targeting precursor gases like NOx and VOCs that form ozone in the air, the new framework can accelerate the shift toward clean combustion, zero-emission pathways and integrated regional airshed management,” Roychowdhury adds. 

“Six years of data reveal that ground-level ozone is intensifying with higher number of days exceeding the standards, lengthening of daily exposure especially during summer, and persistence during nights due to atmospheric trapping. More ozone hotspots are proliferating in different regions of India,” adds Sharanjeet Kaur, deputy programme manager, Urban Lab, CSE and the co-author.

Geographic extent

Of 25 major Indian cities analysed between March 1 and May 10, 2026, 15 recorded summertime averages well above the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) of 100 microgramme per cubic metre (μg/m³) for a maximum eight-hour exposure.

Chandigarh recorded the highest average summer ozone concentration among all cities. Jaipur recorded the second-highest ozone concentration. Delhi-NCR recorded the most persistent summer ozone pollution, with 71 and 62 exceedance days, respectively, followed by Bhopal (60), Bengaluru (55), Patna (24) and Muzaffarpur (21). Ahmedabad recorded the third-highest average summer ozone concentration.

The problem has expanded far beyond traditional pollution zones, heavily concentrating in northern and western India. Chandigarh registered the highest summer-time average at a striking 173 μg/m³, followed by Jaipur (120), Ahmedabad (115) and Bhopal (109). Mumbai exhibited a near year-round ozone footprint, with recurring exceedance clusters from January to April and again during November-December, indicating that ozone is no longer only a summer problem. Chennai recorded the highest episodic ozone concentration among all cities. Bengaluru is increasing spatial spread and prolonged ozone exposure.

Delhi-NCR exceeded the eight-hour national standard every single day during the 71-day study period. Within the capital, a widespread layer of toxic ozone uniformly blankets the monitoring network, with an average of 8.79 stations in active violation daily. NCR towns averaged 3.2 stations exceeding the standard daily.  The ozone hotspots were Pusa IMD in Delhi, Greater Noida Knowledge Park-V, Sector 125 in Noida and Vasundhara (Ghaziabad).  

Lengthening exposure durations and toxic nights

Ozone is staying at high concentrations for longer intervals. Bhopal logged the highest sustained exposure, remaining above safe limits for an average of 17 hours per day, followed closely by Lucknow (16.3 hours) and Mumbai and Bengaluru (15.9 hours each). Counting ‘bad days’ alone masks the true health risk. It is necessary to understand how quickly or how long it takes for the ozone build up to dissipate. If high levels persist for longer hours, it will prolong the toxic burden. Among the longest exposure durations, Bhopal recorded the longest average ozone exposure (17 hours). Lucknow is an emerging hotspot with over 16 hours of average ozone exposure. Mumbai recorded one of the highest ozone peaks and persistent night-time ozone, with average exposure lasting 15.9 hours.

Historically viewed as a day-time problem that drops off after sunset, toxic ozone is now regularly persisting well into the night. Trapped by low night-time boundary layers and sustained by a lack of fresh chemical breakdown from reduced nocturnal NOx​ emissions, Delhi logs 20 to 30 night-time exceedance days per month during heatwaves, while Mumbai displays an even more pronounced nocturnal pattern. Night-time ozone is emerging as a growing concern, with Delhi-NCR recording the highest number of night-time exceedance nights (46), followed by Bengaluru (14), Bhopal (13), Patna (8) and Muzaffarpur (8).  

The way forward

In a statement, CSE urged a number of measures to tackle ozone pollution.

CSE called for controlling all key gases from combustion sources. All gases (NOx, VOC, CO etc) that mix under high heat and solar radiation to form ozone need be controlled. Both VOCs and NOx need to be controlled together to prevent ozone spike.

NCAP 2.0 must adopt a multi-pollutant approach, according to CSE. Air quality management requires a new playbook. As policymakers draft the next phase of national guidelines, NCAP 2.0 must urgently include ozone and evolve into a multi-pollutant strategy. The current NCAP is locked into a single mandate of reducing coarse dust. This ties action and funds to PM and dust control.

India must adopt an ozone-centered, airshed-wide approach that coordinates rapid energy and zero emissions transitions and clean combustion to match global best practices, according to the think tank. Moving past rigid municipal boundaries, the policy must transition to an integrated airshed-based regional action plan across states to coordinate strict and simultaneous PM2.5, NOx​ and VOC controls across transport, industries and households.

In early 2022, Amit Dholakia, a businessman residing in the Bhagwati Bhuvan Cooperative Housing Society in Mumbai’s Malabar Hill, purchased an electric vehicle (EV). Equipped with a private garage and a willingness to install a certified charger entirely at his own expense, he approached his housing society with a straightforward request for permission. The society’s response was a definitive no. This denial was not because the installation was deemed unsafe, nor because the building’s wiring was inadequate. Rather, it was simply because no existing policy was in place to grant such a permission.

Dholakia wrote to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. He approached the Urban Development Department. He appealed to the State of Maharashtra. Yet, no one moved. Ultimately, he took his case to the Bombay High Court.

In January 2025, a division bench of Justices G S Kulkarni and Advait Sethna ruled in his favour. The Court directed the Registrar of Cooperative Societies to finalise rules under Section 79A of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, thereby establishing a binding framework that compels housing societies to permit EV charging installations. In its ruling, the Court held that a clean, unpolluted environment is an integral part of the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, and underscored that this right must heavily weigh on the minds of authorities tasking themselves with measures toward mass EV adoption.

That case ‘Amit Dholakia v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.’ (Neutral Citation: 2025: BHC-OS:1513-DB), was not the end. It was the opening of a national conversation. Housing society management bodies and resident committees in several other cities—acting without technical expertise or legal jurisdiction—are arbitrarily rejecting and stopping private EV infrastructure installations. This is forcing citizens into protracted, and expensive court litigation just to exercise a basic, clean-energy right.

The problem scales up

Dholakia’s struggle in Mumbai is being replicated daily in cities across India. A resident of Greater Noida’s Nirala Estate Phase-3, a massive complex of roughly 4,000 flats, found his housing society installing just two shared EV charging points while arbitrarily withholding ‘No Objection Certificates’ from residents wishing to set up private chargers in their allotted parking bays. Resident of that society, Rachit Katyal, took his fight even further than Dholakia. He bypassed lower jurisdictions and filed a petition directly under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court of India.

On February 24, 2026, a bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi issued notices to the Union of India, the State of Uttar Pradesh, Nirala Estate’s management, and its facility manager, Cushman & Wakefield. The bench sought their responses on why the Union Ministry of Power’s Guidelines for Installation and Operation of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure, 2024 were not being implemented. While the matter (Rachit Katyal v. Union of India) remains pending, its very admission signals that the Supreme Court views the obstruction of residential EV charging infrastructure not as a mere private housing dispute, but as a significant constitutional question.

These two cases, taken together, expose a central failure in India’s EV transition: the breakdown at the last mile of the charging network. The apartment parking bay, the society basement, and the private garage remain gatekept not by clear legal statutes, but by committee secretaries and resident management bodies—entities that possess neither the technical expertise nor the legal authority to dictate energy infrastructure access.

The law already says yes

What makes this obstruction especially indefensible is that the legal framework supporting charging access already exists, it simply lacks explicit enforcement teeth at the residential level. Section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003 mandates that every distribution licensee shall, upon application by the owner or occupier of any premises, provide an electricity supply within one month. The use of the word “shall” establishes a mandatory duty. Nowhere in this provision is the consent of a Resident Welfare Association (RWA) or housing society listed as a precondition. Rule 4 of the Electricity (Rights of Consumers) Rules, 2020 further reinforces this principle, declaring that every consumer has a right to access electricity, with connections required to be provided within seven days of application in metropolitan areas. Once again, no society approval is required.

The Union Ministry of Power’s 2022 and 2024 consolidated guidelines went even further, explicitly stating that residents can install EV chargers using their existing electricity connections without requiring separate permissions, while directing DISCOMs to facilitate dedicated sub-meters for charging purposes.

The supporting constitutional framework is equally firm. In M C Mehta v. Union of India (1991), the Supreme Court recognised vehicular emissions as a major threat to the right to life under Article 21, mandating affirmative State action to promote cleaner alternatives. In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar (1991), the Court held that Article 21 encompasses “the right of enjoyment of pollution-free water and air for full enjoyment of life.” Furthermore, in Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996), the precautionary principle was firmly established within Indian environmental jurisprudence. This principle places the burden of proof squarely on those who resist cleaner technologies to demonstrate that their resistance is environmentally benign— an RWA that blocks an EV charger cannot discharge that burden.

Global lesson

India is not alone in this struggle. The countries that have successfully scaled residential EV charging did so by converting the “right to charge” from a mere policy aspiration into a legally enforceable entitlement. 

For instance, Denmark amended its tenancy legislation so landlords cannot unreasonably withhold consent for EV charger installations; where no structural modifications are required, the consent requirement is effectively eliminated.

The Netherlands embedded charging mandates directly into its building code (Bouwbesluit), requiring all new residential buildings to include EV-ready electrical infrastructure while placing a legal obligation on municipalities to ensure adequate public charging for residents without private parking.

Similarly, the United Kingdom’s Public Charge Point Regulations 2023 established strict reliability standards and payment interoperability for public chargers, while classifying private charger installation as a permitted development right that requires no formal planning permission. Finally, Sweden integrated EV infrastructure into its broader climate legislation, treating charging points as essential emissions-reduction infrastructure entitled to regulatory priority.

The common thread across these jurisdictions is not goodwill or voluntary compliance. It is mandatory. Each country recognised that leaving the right to charge to the discretion of private housing bodies would produce precisely the fragmented, litigation-driven obstruction that India is now experiencing.

From cases to statute

The Dholakia judgment pushed Maharashtra toward codified rules. The Katyal petition asks the Supreme Court to do the same for the entire country. Yet, court orders—however significant—remain an inefficient vehicle for solving a systemic crisis that manifests in every gated community, apartment tower, and cooperative housing society across urban India.

True transformation requires statutory clarity. The Electricity Act must be amended to establish the right to install a residential EV charger as an explicit, enforceable entitlement, legally obligating distribution licensees to facilitate connections without requiring third-party consent. Concurrently, state cooperative society laws should be amended to void any bye-law that restricts or conditionalizes this access beyond legitimate, specified safety requirements. Furthermore, the National Building Code must mandate EV-ready wiring in all new residential construction. Finally, DISCOMs should be directed, as a strict regulatory condition of their licenses, to process EV charging connection requests independently, bypassing society management bodies entirely.

India has made the policy commitment. The statutory foundations are largely in place. The constitutional framework is solid. What remains missing is the political will to convert a right that the courts have already implied into an operational reality that ordinary citizens can exercise without the burden of litigation.

As the Bombay High Court astutely observed in the Dholakia case, the right to clean air under Article 21 “ought to weigh on the mind of the authorities in taking prospective measures in the mass adoption of technological advancements.” The Supreme Court has now been called upon to give that observation national force.

The ultimate resolution, in both law and policy, must converge on a single outcome. There is need for a definitive “right to charge” that is explicitly written into the statute.

Let us begin with a number that should embarrass every transport policy planner in India: 1 per cent. That is electricity’s share of the national on-road transport energy mix in 2025-26. Not 10 per cent. Not 5 per cent. One per cent — up from 0.05 per cent in 2019-20, representing six years of subsidies, schemes, and political speeches about India’s electric future. Petrol continues to command 50 per cent of the mix. Diesel holds 39 per cent. CNG has grown to 10 per cent. The electric revolution, measured in actual energy consumed on actual Indian roads, has barely registered.

This is not a counsel of despair. India has achieved real things in its electric vehicle (EV) transition. Battery EV penetration in new vehicle sales reached 6.8 per cent nationally in 2025-26. Three-wheeler passenger vehicles have reached 35 per cent BEV penetration. Delhi’s bus fleet is at 79 per cent electric. These are genuine milestones, achieved through sustained investment and policy commitment. But they also reveal the structural limit of what subsidy-led demand creation can accomplish when it operates without the anchor of binding regulatory mandates. The data tells us clearly: India has reached the ceiling of what subsidies alone can deliver. What comes next requires a fundamentally different policy instrument.

The proof of concept is already there

Before making the case for mandates, it is worth understanding precisely what the data shows about where India’s EV market has succeeded and why. The three-wheeler segment is the most instructive example. Nationally, BEV penetration for three-wheeler passengers reached 35 per cent in 2025-26, and for three-wheeler goods vehicles, 22 per cent. States like Assam recorded 92 per cent electrification in three-wheeler passenger vehicles, Jammu and Kashmir 98 per cent, and Uttar Pradesh 75 per cent.

What drove this? A combination of factors that, when viewed together, look very much like a de facto mandate: permit structures that concentrated new vehicles in electrified categories, operational economics that favoured EVs on short urban routes, and targeted subsidy support. The segment did not electrify because consumers spontaneously chose electric rickshaws. It electrified because regulatory and commercial conditions were aligned to make the electric option the default option for new vehicle acquisition.

But the same story, when viewed with a higher vantage point tells what happens when system failures subsume the subsidy gains. Delhi has been leading the EV transition game in the country both in terms of policy rigour and market adoption. One of the most impressive jumps was seen in three-wheeler passenger segment wherein the segment’s EV penetration increased from 18 per cent in 2022-23 to 34 per cent in 2024-25. But what followed this subsidy-based gains reveal the user experience. Under the Supreme Court order, Delhi had capped the number of permits issued for three-wheeler passenger (autos) vehicles at 100,000, four thousand of which were blocked for any emergency policy implementation so effectively decreasing the number to 96,000 permits. This measure was taken to tackle the congestion issue (because capping private vehicles would mean disrupting the political privilege of the affluent class that tacitly influence any and every policy making).

What this means is any auto-driver wanting to purchase a new auto will have to forgo his older permit. And despite the subsidy gains and rigorous EV campaigns, the new vehicle the driver is choosing is not an EV, but a CNG vehicle, which is evident through the 2025-26 registration numbers. Around 6,300 autos were registered in Delhi, all CNG; not a single e-auto.  

There are hosts of infrastructure issues that need to be pondered into before declaring any band-aid measure that looks attractive for PR. Increasing the number of charging points is not going to do any good unless their accessibility to high miles segments like autos and cabs is codified in the upgrades. Assuming the auto and cab drivers do not belong to the affluent class with private parking and backend EV charging infrastructures, accessibility to home charging is yet another element to be resolved. Now what if until these infrastructure issues are resolved and the upfront costs of the new autos aren’t made attractive enough to make it a go-to choice? How can the upfront costs be made attractive — supply side and procurement mandates. When a Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) is mandated to ensure a certain percentage of their sales is BEVs, the economics will work for the buyer.

The bus segment explains this impact more starkly. Delhi’s 79 per cent electric bus penetration in new registrations did not emerge from consumer choice — there are no individual consumers choosing buses. It emerged from government procurement mandates, specifically PM-e-Bus Sewa and state procurement programs that required transport undertakings to acquire electric vehicles. Nationally, electric bus sales increased significantly between 2021-22 and 2025-26, driven entirely by committed government purchase orders.

I am not here to say subsidies are bad, but rather subsidies have a limited role at the onset of any technology adoption. If the system is not built to pick up the pace organically, we are basically wasting the funds spent on subsidies.

The segments where subsidies have stalled

Contrast the three-wheeler and bus experience with the two-wheeler and passenger car segments, where the subsidy model has demonstrated its limits most clearly. National BEV penetration in two-wheelers stood at just 6.3 per cent in 2025-26.

The segment was initially pioneered by startups — Ather and Ola Electric — while traditional OEMs entered late and reluctantly. Critically, Honda, Yamaha, and Royal Enfield recorded no BEV sales in 2025-26. These are three of the most significant volume manufacturers in the two-wheeler segment. Their absence from the electric market is not accidental, it reflects the absence of any regulatory obligation to be present.

In Delhi, two-wheeler EV penetration stood at 7 per cent in 2025-26. Growth actually slowed during 2024-25 following the reduction in subsidy support under EMPS, before partially recovering. This is the clearest possible demonstration of the subsidy dependency trap: penetration rises when subsidies are available, stalls when they are reduced, and never generates the self-sustaining market momentum that regulatory mandates create.

The cab segment is equally revealing. India recorded a BEV penetration rate of just 1.6 per cent in cabs nationally in 2025-26. Maruti, the single largest player in cab registrations, has sold no BEVs in this segment. Delhi achieved 15 per cent cab electrification, but only because of the regulatory framework governing aggregator operations. The national figure shows what happens everywhere else: without binding requirements, the dominant players in a segment simply do not transition.

What a ZEV sales mandate would do

A mandatory ZEV sales percentage target for manufacturers — a gradually escalating requirement beginning in the 10 to 20 per cent range with clear compliance mechanisms — would accomplish what no subsidy scheme has been able to achieve: it would compel every OEM in the market, including the Honda-Yamahas and Marutis who have thus far been able to sit out the electric transition without commercial consequence, to commit a specified minimum share of their sales to zero-emission vehicles.

The mechanism is well understood from international experience. California's ZEV mandate, in place since 1990, demonstrated that binding manufacturer obligations, not consumer incentives, are what force sustained EV technology investment; even today, as the mandate faces federal legal challenge, the market transformation it created over three decades has proven irreversible. China is the more instructive contemporary example: its New Energy Vehicle mandate, requiring manufacturers to earn credits through EV sales or purchase them from competitors, pushed NEV penetration past 51 per cent of new car sales in 2025 — and rather than softening the policy at scale, China is tightening it, raising technical thresholds and quality standards to push the market toward higher-performing vehicles. The EU's experience offers a cautionary note directly relevant to India: the original 2035 ICE phaseout, which created significant battery investment momentum, was diluted in late 2025 under industry pressure to a 90 per cent emissions reduction target — precisely what happens when regulatory ambition is not anchored by binding, compliance-based manufacturer mandates from the outset.

In every case where electrification genuinely accelerated, the underlying mechanism was the same: the mandate removed the optional character of EV production. It is no longer a question of whether a manufacturer wishes to sell electric vehicles. It becomes a question of how.

For India, a ZEV mandate would have several cascading effects. It would put downward pressure on EV prices as manufacturers compete to meet targets. It would expand product diversity as OEMs develop electric variants across their lineup. It would free government capital currently tied up in demand subsidies — capital that could be redeployed toward charging infrastructure, battery recycling, and financing innovations for the informal sector buyers who constitute the primary market for two- and three-wheelers.

And crucially, it would create the investment certainty that the PLI-ACC battery manufacturing scheme requires to deliver its 50 GWh capacity target. As of late 2025, only 1.4 GWh of ACC manufacturing capacity was operational. A ZEV mandate is the demand signal that converts a battery factory from a financial liability into a financial necessity.

The investment gap that mandates must bridge

The scale of investment required makes the urgency of regulatory intervention unmistakable. According to estimates from the Institute of Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, approximately Rs 2.23 lakh crore was invested in the electric transport ecosystem between 2020 and 2025. The capital requirement to achieve 2030 targets is estimated at Rs 12.5 lakh crore. Current investments cover only 18 per cent of this requirement. The gap cannot be bridged by subsidy schemes operating within annual budget cycles. It requires the long-term market certainty that only binding regulatory mandates can provide.

EV battery demand in India was estimated at 17.7 GWh in 2025. Projected demand by 2032 is 256.3 GWh — requiring a compound annual growth rate of 35 per cent. This growth trajectory is only achievable if the vehicle market that consumes those batteries is being driven by regulatory requirements, not by the variable appetite of subsidy-dependent consumers.

The legal basis for a ZEV mandate exists. Section 31A of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, empowers pollution control boards to restrict or prohibit the use of polluting fuels. National Green Tribunal precedents on vehicle bans provide supplementary legal grounding. The Bureau of Energy Efficiency can develop accompanying credit mechanisms to provide manufacturers with operational flexibility while maintaining aggregate market targets. The legal scaffolding is there. What is missing is the political will to use it.

India’s oil import dependence has reached 88.7 per cent. Transport is the third largest energy consumer in the Indian economy. Without policy intervention, transport sector emissions are projected to peak only in the 2040s. A ZEV mandate is, therefore, not merely an environmental measure.

It is an energy security intervention of the highest order.

Heatwaves in India may have intensified toxic ground-level ozone exposure linked to more than 26,500 deaths in 2024, according to a new study by researchers at the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur.

The study published in the journal npj Clean Air on June 12, 2026 analysed the relationship between heatwaves and surface ozone levels across India between 2004 and 2024.

It found that heatwaves, long associated with heat stress, dehydration, heat exhaustion, heatstroke and cardiovascular strain, can also drive sharp increases in ground-level ozone, a harmful air pollutant linked to lung and heart disease.

“In 2024 alone, ozone exposure during heatwaves was associated with 15,615 deaths from ischaemic heart disease and another 10,898 deaths from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,” said P Sangeetha of the Kerala University of Fisheries and Ocean Studies, Kochi, one of the authors of the paper. 

The combined mortality burden was more than 26,500 deaths, the study said. By comparison, deaths attributed to ozone exposure before heatwave conditions were much lower, at 490 deaths from ischaemic heart disease and 342 deaths from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.

Heat and ozone combine

Ground-level ozone is not emitted directly. It forms when pollutants such as nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, carbon monoxide and methane react in sunlight.

Unlike ozone in the stratosphere, which shields the Earth from harmful ultraviolet radiation, surface ozone is a toxic pollutant. It can damage the lungs, aggravate respiratory illness and increase cardiovascular risks.

The study found that surface ozone concentrations during heatwaves frequently rose to 85-110 micrograms per cubic metre, exceeding World Health Organization guidelines across all Indian regions.

“The most severe hotspots include north-west India, the Indo-Gangetic Plain, north-central India, the north-east, and the western Himalaya,” said the other author of the paper, Jayanarayanan Kuttippurath of CORAL, IIT Kharagpur.

Ozone levels in these regions exceeded WHO limits by 39-45 per cent, peaking at 115 per cent above the limit in the western Himalaya, he said.

The findings show that heatwave impacts go beyond direct heat-related illness, Sangeetha said. “Elevated ozone levels during these events significantly worsen respiratory and cardiovascular outcomes, creating a compound heat-air pollution crisis,” she said.

North India worst hit

The study found some of the most extreme and prolonged heatwave conditions in north-west and north-central India in 2024. In the north-west, two intense heatwave episodes occurred between May 16-23 and May 25-31 May. Peak temperatures reached 42.89 degrees Celsius (°C) and 44.12°C, and the events lasted eight and seven days respectively.

North-central India recorded two heatwave events between May 26-31 and June 14-18, with maximum temperatures reaching 44.33°C and 42.57°C. The study linked the severity partly to the absence of active western disturbances, which can otherwise bring relief from extreme heat in parts of northern India. No heatwave conditions were observed over north and central India during April 2024, owing to the frequent passage of active western disturbances from the far west, the researchers wrote.

Heatwave to severe heatwave conditions affected Jammu, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, Chandigarh, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Vidarbha and Maharashtra, before extending to Uttarakhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Bihar.

The highest temperature, 50.5°C, was recorded at Churu in western Rajasthan on 28 May 2024, the study said.

In peninsular India, a prolonged heatwave occurred from 29 April to 6 May, with the highest temperature reaching 41.34°C on 4 May. Severe heatwaves were also reported in south-eastern India, including Tamil Nadu, interior Karnataka and Rayalaseema. The duration of heatwave events across central and eastern India varied from four to eight days, indicating both regional heterogeneity and a broader expansion of extreme heat conditions across the subcontinent.

Health plans need ozone warnings

The study said chronic obstructive pulmonary disease is highly sensitive to changes in temperature, humidity and air quality.

During heatwaves, the body increases blood flow to the skin to release heat, raising blood pressure and respiratory rates. Ozone exposure can add oxidative stress and worsen respiratory and cardiovascular outcomes. The study noted that exposure to ozone during heatwaves can raise COPD mortality risk, with earlier research finding a relative risk increase of 1.0173 for every 10 micrograms per cubic metre rise in ozone.

Heat stress and ozone exposure can also independently increase the risk of ischaemic heart disease by contributing to vascular inflammation, changes in blood viscosity and higher risk of myocardial infarction, the study said.

Researchers warned that, as climate change intensifies extreme heat, compound events involving heatwaves and air pollution are likely to become more common. Current public health frameworks often treat heatwaves and air pollution as separate problems, the authors said.

Kuttippurath said most Heat Action Plans focus on heat stress and heatstroke, while overlooking ozone pollution. He said India urgently needed to integrate ozone forecasting systems, include air-quality health advisories and develop combined climate-air pollution response strategies. The study said such integration would be essential to protect public health in a warming climate.

Winter is usually seen as the battleground in the fight against air pollution. This is the season when cold air and low wind speeds trap particulate matter over cities, raising health risks. Summer, by contrast, is regarded as a period of relief, as stronger winds help disperse pollutants. But that seasonal respite is beginning to fray because of rising concentration of ground-level ozone.

Ground-level ozone is quite different from stratospheric ozone, which occurs naturally in the upper atmosphere and forms a protective shield against the sun’s harmful ultraviolet rays. At ground level, ozone is a pollutant. Colourless and invisible, it leaves no trail of soot. Instead, it triggers chemical reactions that turn surrounding gases into microscopic particles. These scatter sunlight, creating haze—and fuelling a growing but poorly understood atmospheric crisis. 

Unlike particulate matter (PM2.5 and PM10), which can be traced to a tailpipe, an industrial smokestack or a construction site, ozone is not emitted directly by human activity. It is a secondary pollutant, baked into existence in the open air. When primary air pollutants — nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO) and volatile organic compounds (VOC) — are released by urban metabolism such as vehicles, factories, diesel generators and the open burning of waste, they mix together in the lower atmosphere. Under intense heat and bright ultraviolet sunlight, this chemical cocktail undergoes a series of photochemical reactions, and results in the formation of ozone.

Higher temperatures, in fact, amplify the problem. They accelerate the chemical reactions that produce ozone, while also prompting vegetation and human activities to release more vocs. “Warmer air causes ozone to form faster, so periods with higher temperature (such as during heatwaves) can result in more ozone production, resulting in poorer air quality,” said Pallavi Pant, head of global initiatives at the US-based Health Effect Institute, which publishes the annual State of Global Air Report.

The latest State of Global Air 2025 (SOGA 2025) report offers some stark warning for India, ranking the country third among those with highest exposure to ozone pollution globally. While particulate matter remains the leading cause of air pollution-related deaths, ambient surface ozone is rapidly emerging as a major respiratory threat.

In 2023, noted SOGA 2025, long-term exposure to ozone was linked to an estimated 470,000 deaths worldwide; roughly half occurred in India. The country’s combination of high precursor emissions, intense sunlight and rising temperatures makes it particularly vulnerable to ozone pollution. 

To map India’s vulnerability to ground-level ozone pollution, the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE, Delhi, has analysed real-time data from the Central Pollution Control Board covering 25 major cities from 2021 to May 2026. The analysis suggests that ground-level ozone is altering the country’s air-quality profile.

Summer dataset for this year alone, from March 1 and May 10, showed that ozone exposure has expanded beyond isolated, short-lived spikes to become a widespread urban reality. Of the 25 major cities analysed, 15 recorded seasonal average concentrations well above 100 microgrammes per cubic metre (µg / m³), the limit set by cpcb under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for average eight-hour exposure. Beyond this threshold, ozone can pose significant risks to human health. (Because ozone is a highly reactive, toxic gas that causes acute, immediate damage to the respiratory system and lungs, exposure to it is measured using the maximum eight-hour average concentration. Exposure to particulate matter, by contrast, is measured using a 24-hour average.)

Pronounced summer wheeze

Ground-level ozone poses a distinct health risk. When inhaled, it irritates the airways and can make it harder to breathe. “Even short-term exposure can cause cough, throat irritation, chest tightness, wheezing, dyspnea and pain during deep inspiration,” said SK Chhabra, Emeritus Consultant, Department of Pulmonary Medicine, Primus Superspeciality Hospital in Delhi.

Doctors are reporting trends such as unexpected respiratory flare-ups and asthma attacks during the hottest months of the year. They cannot tell from their day-to-day clinical experience alone whether these cases reflect a broader shift in respiratory disease patterns. Establishing a direct cause-and-effect link would require detailed, city-specific epidemiological studies that match real-time health data with measurements of ambient air chemistry. Without attributing the change to any single environmental factor, Barnali Bhattacharya, a Pune-based consultant paediatrician and specialist in asthma and sleep disorders, said the seasonal rulebook appears to be changing. “During the summer months, doctors usually step-down medication for asthma and other chronic respiratory conditions because it is considered a safe period,” she said.  “But lately, I have been noticing sudden, severe flare-ups. In many cases, reducing the dosage is simply not possible.”

What makes these summer flare-ups puzzling is that the usual triggers have changed little. Regional dust loads and seasonal pollen cycles do not typically undergo massive, erratic shifts from one year to the next. If the baseline allergens remain broadly constant, this unusual clinical shift warrants an investigation to determine what else is contributing to the problem and whether rising summer heat and air pollution is playing a hidden role.

Neeraj Gupta, senior allergist and paediatrician at Sir Ganga Ram Hospital in New Delhi, said, “It would be interesting to examine whether unexpected summer exacerbations correlate with days of ozone exceedance. This may represent an under-recognised environmental trigger deserving greater attention in both clinical practice and research.”

He added that ozone is a potent, aggressive oxidant and it can induce airway inflammation, increase bronchial hyper responsiveness, impair overall lung function, and directly amplify a patient’s response to inhaled allergens like dust and pollen. Several global studies have linked short-term ozone exceedances with increased asthma symptoms, a heavy reliance on rescue medication, emergency room visits, and severe exacerbations — particularly in children and individuals with underlying allergic airway diseases.

(This article is from Down To Earth’s cover story, “Silent Spread”, published in the upcoming June 16-30, 2026 issue.) 

Open your phone, and search for “Sameer” on the Play Store/App Store. Download it, and check your city’s Air Quality Index.

The Central Pollution Control Board launched the Sameer app in 2016 to give citizens real-time access to the National Air Quality Index. Sameer 2.0, released in September 2025 on CPCB’s 51st Foundation Day, brought a cleaner interface, location-based services and improved engagement features. It is a serious piece of public infrastructure.

This World Environment Day, the United Nations is asking a deceptively simple question: what signals are we sending back to a planet already in motion? The 2026 theme places climate change at the centre. For India, that conversation cannot begin without the air we breathe.

What it intends to do

Beyond the dashboard, Sameer carries a grievance redressal channel. A citizen can photograph a burning garbage heap or a smoke-belching truck and file a complaint directly with CPCB. It frames the citizen not as a passive recipient of data, but as an active participant in environmental accountability — a digital expression of Jan Bhagidari.

But intent and impact are two different audits. The honest question is not whether Sameer was well designed. It is whether it was designed for what air quality communication in India actually needs to achieve. If the AQI in your city reads 320 — “very poor” — what happens next?

The app has done its job and informed you. But information, on its own, rarely changes outcomes at scale. It does not tell your child’s school whether to cancel outdoor sports or trigger a protocol at the nearest primary health centre. It does not prompt a district health officer to issue a public advisory or adjust the care pathway for a tuberculosis patient whose lungs are especially vulnerable to pollution spikes. And for a lung cancer patient, every sustained spike is not a discomfort. It is a clinical event that no Indian care guideline currently accounts for.

The number is accurate and it is visible. But without a corresponding system of action, it is largely inert. Monitoring came first, as it should. The harder work — translating data into institutional action — must be the next phase.

Internationally, peer-reviewed studies of AirForU in the United States, AirRater in Australia and Canada’s air quality alert programme converge on a single finding: information changes behaviour only when it is paired with health-linked messaging, personalised design and active community engagement.

India’s own experience makes the gap clear. CPCB’s citizen guidelines for Delhi-National Capital Region mandate that complaints filed through Sameer be redressed within 24 hours. Yet in Hyderabad, 96 such complaints remained unresolved as of January 2025, with CPCB itself acknowledging to the Deccan Chronicle that, outside the NCR, the app simply forwards complaints by email to State Pollution Control Boards. But this chain breaks if no one is reading the inbox.

As of May 2026, nearly a decade after launch, Sameer carries a 2.3-star rating on Google Play across roughly 1,700 reviews and more than 100,000 downloads, in a country of 1.4 billion people. Complaints filed and closed without resolution appear repeatedly in recent user reviews.

The most affected and questions unanswered

When we consider who bears the heaviest burden of air pollution in India, it is rarely the smartphone-owning urban professional who might download an app like Sameer. The greatest risks are faced by the construction worker labouring outdoors when AQI levels soar above 400, often with little access to protective measures. They are borne by families living in poorly ventilated homes in coal-belt districts, where an ASHA worker may be the only link to the healthcare system. They are also carried by lung cancer patients, for whom every spike in pollution represents a serious clinical threat rather than a temporary inconvenience.

For these populations, a better app is not the primary need. What is needed is the translation of air quality information into practical public health action through ASHA training modules, district-level health advisories, school safety protocols, tuberculosis programmes, and cancer prevention and care guidelines that account for seasonal fluctuations in pollution exposure.

Achieving this does not require new technology. It requires connecting the knowledge we already possess with the health and governance systems that already serve these communities.

A few questions also deserve institutional answers. 

What, for instance, is a district health officer expected to do when the AQI remains above 300 for three consecutive days? At present, there is no national protocol and no administrative trigger within the public health system that links specific air quality thresholds to a defined health response.

This disconnect is visible elsewhere as well. Air pollution is a well-established risk factor for tuberculosis, yet India’s TB elimination programme and its air quality monitoring systems operate in separate institutional silos under different ministries, with little integration between them.

The gap extends to frontline healthcare. What guidance do ASHAs and Auxiliary Nurse Midwives receive when counselling pregnant women, children with asthma, or cancer patients undergoing treatment during periods of severe air pollution? In most cases, none. Standard training frameworks offer little support on how to incorporate air quality risks into routine health advice and care.

Perhaps, then, India does not need more dashboards, apps or data streams. What it needs is the harder and more consequential task of translating evidence into policy and embedding that knowledge within public health systems. The science is increasingly clear; the next layer of action must come from the health sector itself.

From measurement to movement

Here's a more polished and fluid version with stronger transitions and a sharper conclusion:

Sameer exists. So does the National Clean Air Programme, launched in January 2019, which brought 131 non-attainment and million-plus cities under city-specific clean air action plans and is now entering its next phase. Air quality monitoring stations have expanded across the country, and access to data has improved considerably.

But the next phase of Jan Bhagidari is more challenging than simply generating or sharing information. It is about ensuring that the number on a screen means something to a nurse in a primary health centre, a teacher deciding whether children should remain outdoors, an ASHA worker counselling vulnerable families, or a programme manager planning a local response. Most importantly, it is about ensuring that when air quality deteriorates, something within the health system responds.

On World Environment Day, much will be said about the signals the Earth is sending us. Sameer is one such signal, translated into a number we can measure and understand. The signal we send back, however, cannot be another dashboard or another app. It must be a response architecture—one that links air quality data to decisions in schools, primary health centres, district administrations and clinical practice. It must be a system that moves every time the air does.

India does not lack data about its air. The challenge now is to build what comes after the data.

Urvashi Prasad is Founder Director, PAVANA – Centre for Air Pollution & Environmental Health, Pahle India Foundation and Palak Mahajan is Research Associate, PAVANA

Views expressed are the authors’ own and don’t necessarily reflect those of Down To Earth