Epistemic Invariantism

Epistemic Invariantism is the view that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions (e.g., "S knows that P") are fixed across all contexts, no matter the speaker, practical stakes, or conversational context.

Invariantists argue the word "knows" has a fixed, context-independent meaning. Unlike contextualists, they deny that high-stakes situations (e.g., life-or-death decisions) semantically raise the standards for knowledge. For example, if you "know" your flight leaves at 3 PM in a casual conversation, you still "know" it when betting $10,000 on the claim.

Most modern invariantists (e.g., Williamson, Rysiew) accept fallibilism: knowledge requires only adequate justification, not Cartesian certainty. This distinguishes them from absolutists, who demand infallible proof.

Invariantism blocks skeptical arguments that exploit variable standards. The skeptic can't claim "we never know anything because standards might tighten", knowledge is judged by stable, objective criteria.

Epistemic Primitivism or Primitivism about Knowledge^[1] is the view that knowledge is a fundamental, unanalyzable mental state. It is not a composite state built out of more basic components like belief, truth, and justification. Instead, knowledge is the starting point for understanding other epistemic concepts.

Related critiques: Contextualism, Pragmatism

• Epistemic Objectivism - We agree truth is mind-independent, even if I focus on language.
• Reliabilism - Your objective criteria for justification fit my fixed standards.

• Fallibilism - I accept your rejection of certainty, but not your contextualist friends.

• Contextualism - "Knowledge" isn't a moving target! Your stakes-sensitive shifts are semantic confusion.

• Pragmatism - Practical interests affect action, not truth conditions!

• Skepticism - I see through your context-manipulating games.