Pakistan’s Diplomatic Pivot Makes It a Trump-Era Power Player

Pakistan’s role in the peace talks between the United States and Iran would have been impossible just two years ago. The core U.S. grievance with its nominal, but always contentious, ally was Afghanistan. Washington believed Islamabad was offering partial help on counterterrorism goals while either tolerating or actively aiding others, especially the Taliban and the Haqqani network—the forces killing U.S. and Afghan allied troops.

Most stopped short of alleging full complicity. Not U.S. President Donald Trump, who in 2018 tweeted: “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit.” Most famously, CIA director and later Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta alleged that Pakistan was either “involved or incompetent” over the hiding of Osama bin Laden less than 800 yards from its national military academy.

But paradoxically, the final rift with the United States opened up room for change in Pakistan. Diplomacy in the region was upended following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. The main basis for cooperation had been removed, leaving only grievances and allegations. Some in Washington saw it as proof that Pakistan’s long game against the U.S. had worked. Pakistan’s deepening dependence on China, especially through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and defense technology, boded very ill for long-term relations.

Pakistan feared it would be seen as a fair-weather counterterror partner, not as an economic partner or trusted power broker. Following concerns about nuclear-capable Pakistan’s development of intercontinental missiles and the political persecution of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, sanctions came in 2024, and in March 2025, a bipartisan bill called for personal sanctions on Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, among other leaders.

The position was intolerable for Pakistan for many reasons. It was becoming as concerned by Chinese dominance of its ports as the Americans were. It felt that Washington failed to appreciate how much loss Islamabad had itself suffered at the hands of terrorists. And worse still, from Islamabad’s perspective, was that the U.S. was firmly aligning with India, starting with the Kargil War in 1999 and culminating in India’s central role in Washington’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy and deeper intelligence and defense communications agreements in the form of the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement in 2018 and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement in 2020.

It was Munir himself who eventually led this successful yearlong effort to change Islamabad’s standing in Washington and convert Pakistan’s geography into diplomatic leverage. Munir, a former military intelligence chief who became the nation’s army chief in 2022, has become the figure through whom Pakistan’s courtship of Trump, its domestic political needs, its rivalry with India, and its Iran mediation have converged.

He understood, or at least benefited from others around him understanding, that Trump prefers to do diplomacy with individuals he thinks are able to take decisions immediately, not with diffuse, creaking foreign-policy bureaucracies. Munir therefore presented himself as the center of gravity; as a disciplined, control-oriented military figure; and as that strongman that by the end of 2025 had earned him the Trumpian epithet “my favorite field marshal.”

The first step was a visit to the White House, which required a reported $5 million spent on Trump-friendly Washington PR firms that followed directly after Trump’s proposed sanctions in March. Money flowed into D.C. to advance Pakistan’s case against the tariffs, and to extol the many virtues of Pakistan’s mineral-rich regions, particularly in Balochistan. One contract, for more than a million dollars, which sought “leadership level engagements at the White House,” was subcontracted by Seiden Law LLP to Javelin, whose founders included George Sorial, a former Trump Organization executive, and Keith Schiller, Trump’s former bodyguard and White House aide. Munir, freshly promoted to field marshal, had his meeting with Trump inked in for June 18, 2025.

In the months leading up to the meeting, Pakistan helped capture a senior Islamic State figure whom U.S. officials held responsible for the 2021 Kabul airport bombing that killed 13 U.S. service members and about 170 Afghans. Trump praised Pakistan in his March address to Congress. This gave Trump, and his system of tariff diplomacy, a public win, but also eased Islamabad’s insecurity over being seen as a duplicitous counterterror partner.

Bigger still, after the brief war with India in May, Pakistan’s leadership had the strategic presence of mind to credit Trump for the cease-fire breakthrough. Indeed, they nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize that year. India, on the other hand, denied that U.S. mediation had anything to do with the truce and was deeply frustrated by Trump’s portrayal of its and Pakistan’s behavior as equivalent, as well as by his ignoring the cross-border terror attack that provoked India to commence strikes in the first place.

Pakistan then moved into Trump’s political and commercial ecosystem. Islamabad hired Washington lobbying firms with ties to Trump’s business and political world, including figures connected to the Trump Organization and former Trump aides. The policy movement that followed is striking considering the sanctions imposed just a few weeks before. Pakistan’s proposed tariff rate was reduced from the 29 percent initially threatened to 19 percent. India’s rate rose to 50 percent, largely because of Trump’s anger over New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil.

Islamabad also pitched oil exploration, agricultural access, critical minerals, and crypto cooperation. The New York Times reported that Munir eagerly pushed what became a $500 million mineral-extraction agreement and opened its markets to American farm goods. The Washington Post reported that World Liberty Financial, a Trump family-backed cryptocurrency company, signed a letter of intent with Pakistan’s Crypto Council, and that Pakistan had also offered cooperation on rare minerals and energy.

Whether or not these deals ever bear fruit, Pakistan gave Trump what he loves most: the performance of successful peacemaking and dealmaking. New Delhi did not play the game. It remains the larger economy, the more important technology partner, the larger market, and the more obvious long-term U.S. partner in any strategy toward China. The Washington Post noted that Pakistan’s trade volume with the United States is only about 5 percent of India’s.

Pakistan, however, became better at operating inside Trump’s style of politics.

Islamabad presented Trump with a figure, Munir, who looked like he could deliver, and who had the rare chance to lunch with Trump directly. The hotline to the White House was thus established.

On June 22, 2025, the day after nominating Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, U.S. strikes against Iran commenced. Pakistan publicly condemned the strikes as a violation of international law and a threat to regional peace. It even affirmed Iran’s right to self-defense, a calculated affront to Trump that would open its eventual route to performing dual-track diplomacy with the trust of both warring parties.

By the time the second phase of the Iran war in 2026 created a need for channels, Pakistan had already built much of the infrastructure that made its role plausible. It had a working line to Trump’s circle. It had maintained relations with Tehran. It did not recognize Israel. It had ties to Saudi Arabia, China, Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar, all of which had strong reasons to avoid a wider regional war. It also had direct exposure to the costs of escalation.

Pakistan sits at the intersection of difficult relationships: the United States and China, the Gulf and Iran, Afghanistan and India. Yet Munir knew exposure to the risks also meant diplomatic inventory and credibility. About 90 percent of Pakistan’s fuel imports come through the Strait of Hormuz, and the near-closure of the strait forced the government, which lacked strategic reserves, to raise fuel prices. It also reported unrest inside Pakistan after U.S. and Israeli strikes killed Iran’s supreme leader, including clashes that left 22 people dead and more than 120 injured, and an attempted mob attack on the U.S. Consulate in Karachi.

At first, Pakistan’s role was as a messenger. The April cease-fire pushed Pakistan’s role into agenda-setting, with an April 6 Pakistan-assembled plan to end hostilities and reopen the Strait of Hormuz delivered to Tehran and Washington. At times, Pakistan was the sole communication channel in the talks. Talks were reportedly hours from collapse after an Iranian strike on a Saudi petrochemical facility.

Munir led Pakistani officials on an overnight push involving contacts with Trump, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps figures, Saudi officials, and others. Minutes before Trump posted the announcement, he was reportedly on the phone with Munir. In the last two weeks, as these negotiations continue, some 8,000 Pakistani soldiers, a fighter jet squadron, and air defenses have been deployed in Saudi Arabia.

As rumors of a final deal grow, Pakistan is now best placed to help both sides avoid the humiliation of a climbdown on sanctions relief, frozen Iranian funds, Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, and the question of whether Lebanon could be tied to the deal. Its non-recognition of Israel and persecution of Khan are now pragmatically tolerated by the U.S., as does Iran tolerate Pakistan’s alliances in the Gulf. Over a year, Pakistan has finally shown the promise of its grand strategy at the intersection of Iran, the United States, China, the Gulf, Afghanistan, and India. Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping praised Pakistan’s constructive role after Munir returned from Tehran.

The Pakistani media environment amplified the effect with ecstatic coverage of the Iran talks, with many outlets under pressure from the military. Former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Maleeha Lodhi called it a “feel good” moment that elevated Pakistan’s image and prestige, while warning that ordinary Pakistanis would move on unless the government addressed structural economic problems. Indeed, some have already taken to criticizing Munir as attempting to divert his country’s attention away from his own controversies and deflect personal U.S. sanctions, as indeed had been happening until so very recently.

The opportunism at the heart of the new U.S.-Pakistan relationship, of course, makes it fragile. There is skepticism from former officials and analysts about Pakistan’s ability to deliver on its promises. Pakistan’s oil dreams have disappointed before. Its rare minerals are in difficult and insecure areas that require well-planned infrastructural projects, certainly with U.S. support, to profitably exploit. Its crypto ambitions likewise seem unlikely to outlast the current presidency.

India remains the more logical long-term partner for Washington in balancing China, on whom Pakistan is still dependent. Pakistan will, however, remain more flexible than its rival in New Delhi, who could not validate U.S. mediation over Kashmir without creating a sovereignty problem, nor easily stop buying Russian oil. It could not reorganize its diplomacy around Trump’s appetite for praise and visible personal credit. Pakistan could.

A policy process that rewards lobbying, commercial proximity, public praise, and personal back channels will attract governments skilled in those tactics. Pakistan has proved skilled. Peace negotiations require efficiency, stakes, and trust. Islamabad learned the language of Trump’s diplomacy and spoke it more fluently than its rivals, and now the diplomatic crown in the region is its to lose.