What is puzzling is that FMQ, being a top-notch logician, could well have recognized these ways of bridging the supposed paradox, but he didn't. Unless the argument is not logical but pragmatic, as I'm trying to show.","Thus, the core of the argument 'reason cannot demonstrate the incapacity of reason' is not in the paradox that is formed by the double use of the concept 'reason', but rather, in the 'cannot'. Reason cannot overthrow reason, skeptics cannot win, for it is philosophy that loses. It is, as I said, a vital tension that underlies the philosopher's project.","If scepticism wins, there is no place for philosophy, we would rather have to admit, as Richard Rorty (1996) once announced, the advent of a post-philosophical world. That would be a world in which there is no possibility of talking about fundamental principles and that is precisely the death of philosophy, because for FMQ philosophy is a theory of principles. If scepticism has won, our author believes, fundamental principles could not be recognized in each of the areas where we need a definitive answer from reason: in the social sciences, in politics, in the understanding of history, etc. If skepticism wins, then we are left with only one casuistry and the particular case. Let us understand, then, that the problem is vital and pragmatic.","Thus he defines the principles of reason: the principle of non-arbitrariness, the principle of follow-up, the principle of creativity and the principle of unity.","However, as he himself put it, it is only the principle of non-arbitrariness that can be universalized, only this principle is the minimum loophole of that ambitious program of classical rationalism. The tension in FMQ arises precisely because of this dilemma: rationalism cannot sustain itself in the face of a context as adverse as the one we have discussed above, but neither is it in a position to accept its definitive end. Then the timid but honest answer appears: classical rationalism is not saved, but a special type of rationalism is. A rationalism that preserves "a minimum of universality and necessity" as a fundamental instrument of scientific knowledge. If the premise is that, if skepticism were to be overcome, it is philosophy itself that would meet its end, then there is no denying that rationalism survives. This is how FMQ conceives it and establishes that this type of rationalism that survives is "the belief that, although imperfectly, reason allows us to found a very large, and always growing, field of knowledge whose suasive power is practically universal" (Miró Quesada, 2012f, p. 126).","He says that the whole problem of reason and knowledge is "only a methodological procedure" (Miró Quesada, 2012e, p. 97). That is to say, the problem of reason prepares us for the real problem of philosophy, which is none other than the problem of man.","Epistemological questions, that is, those that confront us with the problem of the possibility of reaching universal and objective answers by reason, are nothing but methodological questions that help us to recognize our real limits in the face of the other more fundamental anthropological questions. The problem in the end was not the problem of reason, it was only a preliminary step to face the vital question. A negative answer to the problem of reason closes off any possibility of development for the anthropological question, and then philosophy loses its meaning and the very life of the philosopher is harmed by it.

However, the skeptic still has one recourse. While philosophy may meet its end with the collapse of reason, the skeptic might argue that such a situation does not necessarily determine a worse world.","Well, in the world of possibility, any alternative is valid; but for FMQ, beyond the fact that it is a valid alternative, the end of philosophy represents a real loss for society. Philosophy is, according to our author, "the guarantee of the meaning of history" (Miró Quesada, 2012e, p. 92).","FMQ, philosophy was "the unyielding struggle to humanize the world" (Miró Quesada, 2012e, p. 103), therefore it is not a simple step to leave it. Philosophy fulfills a humanizing and liberating role. Faced with the squaring of a life imposed by parameters and bureaucracy, philosophy becomes the hope of a life driven by reason; a life guided by unquestionable principles that safeguard humanity. A life without philosophy is the condemnation to live at the expense of force, manipulation or automatism.","In short, what I have tried to do is to reveal a vital tension in FMQ. On the one hand, a context that forces him to accept the end of classical rationalism, the end of the noble pretensions of reason; that is, to recognize the impossibility of absolute knowledge. But on the other hand, the need not to be defeated by skepticism, because that would mean the end of philosophy. Our philosopher's answer is a new, much more timid type of rationalism that he recognizes as 'minimal', in which even if it is a principle it is saved. That minimal rationalism is at least the guarantee that we can still hope in reason and in the possibility of a theory of principles.","I will stand in front of FMQ and defend what I think our philosopher did not dare to conclude: the survival of a limited and pragmatic reason....FMQ is clear that there are many reasons to recognize a possible collapse of reason, but it is also clear to him that all this skeptical context cannot completely overcome and that at least a minimal reason must be saved. I believe, on the other hand, that what must be saved is not that minimal reason that we must find, but rather the kind of reason that has been revealed to us after the investigation; that is, limited and pragmatic reason. In his attempt to defend reason, in this 50-year struggle against skepticism, what appears evident are rather the limits of reason and the depth of pragmatic arguments. Many of those reasons that seemed to be transcendental were actually pragmatic, and that leads us to conclude that perhaps pragmatic reasons are the proper background and character of reason.

I think that having chosen the path of searching for a minimal reason was not really a response to the profound revolution that was taking place in Western culture. When Miró Quesada comes across Kurt Gödel's text, he recognizes the real revolution it can cause to our understanding of reason. Gödel reveals the drama of formalism that can never encompass all that intuitive processes are capable of achieving. It was really a profound revolution within the rationalist hopes configured since Plato; Quite a tragedy for formalism, but the conclusion he draws does not lead him to intuitive reason, which was the type of reason that had revealed itself to be the most solid, but rather he sees the defense of a minimal principle, that of non-arbitrariness: Formalism cannot be maintained because, as we have shown, one of the fundamental results of Kurt Gödel's theorem is that mathematics cannot be fully formalized. And if it cannot be fully formalized, it cannot be reduced to pure language. But if it cannot be reduced to pure language, it cannot be shown that the rules of inference are arbitrary. (Miró Quesada, 2012d, p. 139)

Rereading the quote, one discovers rather the drama of FMQ, the tension that I have sought to show: its need to save that minimum of reason which, however, is still conceived under classical parameters. The minimum reason is, at bottom, a quantitative change, which seeks to save at least some principle corresponding to reason. The configuration of a minimum ratio, which is the path chosen by FMQ, does not lead it to overcome the classical model, but rather saves the classical model with a minimum measure. FMQ does not recognize that with the drama of formalism the drama of the foundationalist model is also revealed

From notes to outline. Rethinking Francisco Miró Quesada and in defense of a limited and pragmatic reason of reason, the model that sought an autonomous reason and completely transparent in its principles. What has been revealed to us is the impossibility of an autonomous grounding of reason and, at the same time, the impossibility of a full transparency of reason. As I argued in the second section, FMQ's main motivation was at bottom more pragmatic than theoretical. If his motivation had not been so vital, perhaps the question he would have faced was not "what is the principle that is saved from the classical model?" but rather why should we think that there are transcendental principles of reason? And why should we think that such principles can be known? Basically, we would have asked ourselves first of all whether it is the principles that precede human reason or are they those products of reason itself, that is, was reason nourished by these principles or was reason appearing with these principles? My proposal, rather, is heading in the opposite direction to that taken by FMQ. I am more and more convinced that the main character of reason is best described when we affirm that reason is limited and pragmatic, and that this explanation does not mean the end of reason. When I affirm the limited character of reason, I am not merely saying that reason is situated, and therefore conditioned, and that these conditions reveal limits. Beyond that, I want to say that the way in which reason manifests itself is precisely through those limits. Haven't we always heard that necessity sharpens our intelligence? Well, that's much more than just an expression of folk wisdom, it's actually a statement that reveals the very character of reason. I believe that it is a wrong way to try to understand human reason by understanding it as given (Kalpokas, 2010) or as transcendental to the vicissitudes of the person in his or her given context. But this wrong path is the one that has been constantly sought and is the background of the rationalist enterprise that FMQ itself also tried to defend. The reason given is actually a loophole from creationist models that deny the evolutionary view of all of nature. It means thinking that reason, reason, is a transcendental metaphysical entity that holds within itself all the truths or the meaning of all that is right and that serves as the ultimate criterion of what our concrete life should be. The rationalist project was engaged in the search for the basic principles of this reason in order to make it more within our reach, but when we felt all the objection of the Kantian models, in terms of the possibilities of reason itself to reflect itself, a post-Kantian way out was to search the very heart of mathematics for that answer. To a large extent, the FMQ project draws from the same expectation that animated the work of Russell, Frege or the first Husserl: to make the basic principles of reason transparent through the analysis of the foundations of mathematics. My way of dealing with the problem is different. I feel more indebted to authors like Charles Peirce, John Dewey, William James, Charles Darwin, the second Wittgenstein or Thomas Kuhn, and I think what they have taught us is that reason is understood in its exercise and not photographically. In other words, if our interest is to recognize the principles of reason, they cannot be sought a priori, since they have been presented in an evolutionary way as a response to the concrete urgencies of the life of the human being in a nature that was hostile and defiant to him. Phylogenetically speaking, what I have just stated means that human reason is, in its fundamental principles and in all its expression, a result of human evolution (Quintanilla, Mantilla & Cépeda, 2014); And like any product of evolution, the background is always pragmatic, that is, with the sole purpose of making life itself more accessible. In my opinion, there is no substantial difference between the formation of our fingernails and the evolutionary formation of our reason. In both cases, we are faced with "intelligent" solutions to evolution based on specific needs. I understand, however, that for many what I have just said may sound offensive, because it is a demystification of our reason and its superiority over all the rest of our body, its organs and its functions. But it is necessary to recognize that this mythification of reason, this supposed transcendentality of reason, is only the product of a modern idiosyncrasy that philosophy forged from a dissociation between subject and object. Of course, it was not only and exclusively 'modern' such an idiosyncrasy, for we could find traces of it in Greek philosophy, for example, in the philosophy of Plato. But it is clear that it is in Descartes' work that the thinking self and the body that works in the world are clearly divided. It is from this split that reason reveals itself to us with absolute transcendentality and consolidates the idea of its version as given, finished and alien to life itself. In the end, Darwin's and evolutionism's struggle against the idea of fixed, immutable species brought with it a series of epistemological repercussions that philosophy is gradually reconsidering (Dewey, 1994). Among these repercussions, of course, we must weigh the new way of understanding reason and its supposed transcendentality. The evolutionary view forces us to recognize that the path of development is one and the same, as I said before, both for the nails and for the reason; And that is why I can dare to say that there are no substantial differences between the formation of the nails and the development of our reason.","(since in practice we do not necessarily know what the best path is and we only have our resources to choose it)","pragmatic criteria only push us to recognize the complexity of our choice, but not to pretend that their decisions are smart because they are better.",Reason development:"The basic scheme on which reason seems to have manifested itself throughout the course is presented to us as starting from a need, moved by an interest and reaching a point of flexible satisfaction in which pragmatically one can recognize a overcoming of practical urgency. Such a schema can be recognized in the infant when he builds his spatiality in his first year of life, by the formation of meanings in children between the ages of 2 and 3, schoolchildren who elaborate their learning or adolescents who solve abstract problems. In all these cases, the scheme is almost the same. The starting point is always a situation that is perceived as an urgency of a practical nature (the need to move, the need for communication or the cognitive conflict created by the teacher). For the same reason, it also seems clear that there is always a self-interested motivation.

As experts say, none of those moves are free. The driving force behind all of them is the need to transform a limiting situation or make a circumstantial requirement more bearable. The individual is then interested in the type of outcome they will obtain (Priniski et al., 2019). Of course, interest goes hand in hand with expectations and a flexible consideration of satisfaction. John Dewey asserts that such a tendency in philosophy derives from a contempt of philosophy for interest or interest due to a habit that was formed from the Greek world. Interest is associated with the manual, the practical, the non-sublime or the mundane, which for the Greek world was the least dignified within the social (Dewey, 1995). If the life of the individual shows us the opposite of this habit of philosophy, and rather we see a development of reason always on the basis of interest, then it only seems obscure to deny that interest is part of the essential structure of reason. Finally, I have referred to flexible satisfaction as a point of arrival (final cause) in order to assume it as a final part of that scheme of reason that I am proposing. This idea of a flexible point of satisfaction is another term to indicate that the very character of reason is adaptive. The latter does not only mean that reason accommodates itself to its conditions, but also that, by adapting to its limitations or even taking advantage of them, expectations adapt and thus the point of arrival is made. It is, therefore, a position that denies any possibility of a final cause that was configured before the very process of the exercise of reason began, that is, it is a matter of development without telos. To paraphrase Otto Neurath's famous metaphor: we rebuild the ship in the same way."

"Conclusion

What I have tried to show, especially in the previous section, is not a proposal opposed to FMQ's, but rather a proposal that risks taking that last step that our philosopher did not want to take at all. I think FMQ walked a path that brought it closer to this very end, but – as I showed in the first part – it fought tensely against that ending. For me, the following quotation is eloquent in which an FMQ appears acknowledging this dynamism of reason, but at the same time the inability of philosophy to grasp it, to deal with it in all its complexity and instability: "Everything forces us to accept that there is a dynamic of reason, a way of functioning of rational thought that, due to its depth and lack of adequate analytical means, it has escaped philosophical understanding" (Miró Quesada, 2012d, p. 397).

At the end, I was left with a question to discuss, and that is that, as we said, FMQ's refusal to take that step towards the recognition of a limited reason is accompanied by the fear that this will mean the end of philosophy and the victory of skepticism.","Therefore, I must say that I do not believe that this step that I take towards a pragmatic and limited reason can necessarily mean the end of philosophy, perhaps the end of philosophy as we know it, but also perhaps the opening to a new philosophy based this time on an evolutionary and pragmatist epistemology. What I can assure you is that this is also a gamble, since I have arguments that impel me to recognize this new form of epistemology (and its counterpart of philosophy), but I do not believe that these arguments are definitive or that they guarantee us an obvious and safe path; On the contrary, I think this definition is a gamble with some degree of uncertainty, but why not learn to live with a little uncertainty?"

https://ap.isu.ac.ir/article_75886.html : https://archive.ph/gvsh5/again?url=https://ap.isu.ac.ir/article_75886.html : ap.isu.ac.ir/article_75886_496c1042e68b898789e0593af05db76f.pdf AR t.:"According to the minimum reason, experience is only useful in the case of constant observation, and according to the maximal reason, even permanent occurrence does not lead to certainty; because due to the formation of the inductive forces on the perceptibles" EN:"Based on minimal reason the method of experience brings about pure certainty only in the case of useful constant observation. But in the maximum reason even in the manner of permanent occurrence can't be lead to certainty because due to the experience-based on sensations which according to Avicenna’s final analysis are pseudo-certainty" (minimal/maximal reason);

PER: p.1: Review

One of the most important features of empirical theorems from Ibn Sina's point of view, which makes it possible for him to enter into the Hadith of Burhan is their justice. . In many cases، the fact that these cases are certain or asserted that the rank of the Imams has been denied from him in a certain way and only from the mujratbat. In this research، we have shown using text-based interpretation method and critical analysis that the theoretical and somewhat practical foundations of Ibn Sina cannot be considered useful for sure. Theoretically، the duality of the theory and the maximum to justify this issue can be mentioned: According to the minimum reason، the experience of a person in the process of perpetual abandonment is useful for total certainty and according to the maximal reason، even the permanent occurrence does not lead to certainty because of the existence of proximity to the sensible - which according to Ibn Sina is definitely fast - the experiences of the kind will surely be of the same kind and of course this will be the case The Martyrdom of Imam Ali (a.s.) is the most important of the Qur'an in the Holy Quran. Keywords: Ibn Sina, Experience, Certainty, Perception.

translatedict: p.2: Lami Hekmat Sinavi, Vol. 25, No. 66, Autumn-Winter 1400

Introduction

In Ibn Sina thought, experience is a methodological process that leads to the formation of "experienced" theorems and given that the inductions are among the bases of argument (Ibn Sina, 1381, p. 123), the experimental method and the resulting knowledge have a very high place in the epistemology and scientology of this philosopher. However، the main purpose of this article is to investigate the epistemological certainty in the Majbabat، as an introduction، it is necessary to have sensory strengths And to explain the wisdom in forming the empirical process: experience is like seeing and feeling objects of a single kind.

They will be followed by a sequel or a sequel. And when this is repeated separately,

It is a matter of the nature of this thing, and that it is a matter of chance.

It cannot be achieved because the event does not last1 (Ibn Sina، 1404 BC، c. 3، Alborhan، p. 223-224)2.

The starting point of the empirical process is sensory perception and، more commonly، observation. Mono-sensory perception, in a process that is not explained in this article4, provides the ground for the input of the Wise Power. Participation of reason in experimental method, in the form of creating a KQ-A

The main axis and cornerstone of its analogy is as follows: a) the observed event is the most frequent or permanent (most or permanent occurrence of the event).

It is).

1. Experiencing the same kind of behavior as in the case of a person or a person who is not in a state of the same kind as a person who has been involved in the interaction of the act. Consequently, the repetition of the many acts of ignorance is strictly rational and therefore happens to be uneventful. 2. In the translation of Ibn Sina's words, these works are used: Qanoona (translation and interpretation of Abdorrahman Sharafkandi), references and punishments (translation and description of Hassan Malekshahi), and Burhan Shafa (translated and interpreted by Mehdi Ghavam Safari). All translations have been adapted to the original text، and the necessary incorporation has been made to improve the translation and understand the original text more accurately. 3. In Ibn Sina's thought، observations are divided into two groups، apparent and esoteric and both groups can be the basis of experience (Ibn Sina 1381، p. 124). 4. To get to know some other forces involved in the process of experimentation, see Ibn Sina, 1404 AH-B, vol. 3, Alborhan, p. 33 Ibn Sina, 1396, p. 335-336.

translate.google : *Qanoona (legally) *Burhan Shafa (proof of healing)

p.3: Blessed is the Lord of the Heavens and the Heavens, and the Lamb of God, and the Lamb of God.

(b) The event is not a majority or permanent (it is not observed in a majority or permanent manner). Conclusion: The observed event is not a coincidence (Ebnesina، 1379، p. 113-114). Explain this to the Guru of the Qur'an, which is the essence of the Qur'an.

"Coincidence" is famous. This rule is one of the important theoretical foundations in Abnes Jena's thought (b.h.v., in natural discussions) and he has repeatedly mentioned it in his various works1. Shekhal Raiss has put this rule forward under discussion of "your natural swap" and as a result, our rule was linked to the discussion of causality. The medicine of this rule, where the total cause (the intrinsic cause) is present, the effect will be permanent (in the absence of a condition) or most (if there is an obstacle) and consequently, the cause of the event in which the effect occurs at least is the transverse causation in which all the components of the cause are not present (Ibn Sina 1404 BC-A, c.

1, Al-Isma al-Natural, p. 62-65). Bearing in mind these two important points about the neuro-sensory perception and especially the rational tone in The experimental method from Ibn Sina's point of view can be based on the main research query of this research.

Size، the famous view of Ibn Sina on the certainty of the cases of this method، Brass Ambani

His own view is justified.

Research Background

So far, several works on the study of experience from Ibn Sina's point of view have been considered to be the most common in these works, the certainty of the proximity of his point of view is a matter of certainty and analytical and extensive discussion has not been devoted to this issue. In the meantime, the critiques that have been raised about the certainty of the Sinoi experience are all based on the negation of rationality and the "disappearance of the de-at-at-tawqi". The series of this current in modern times is the Rational Historical Period (Al-As-Fitr al-Istiqra' (Al-'Idr al-'A' al-'Idr 1402 AH), which later its content was somewhat discussed in the article "Evaluation of Experience in Burhan" (Ghavam P. Fari, 1370) and

1. To study some cases where Ibn Sina has used this rule, see Ibn Sina (A), vol. 2, Al-Nafs, p. 197 Ibn Sina (1404 BC), c. 3, Alborhan, p. 95 and 224 Ibn Sina (a), 1379, pp. 114, 273 and 527 Ibn Sina (p. 63).

translatedict.com p.4: 36 Scientific Bi-Quarterly of Sinoi Hekmat (Scientific Quarterly), Vol. 25, No. 66, Autumn and Winter 1400

The explanation of the proof of Shafa (Mesbah Yazdi, 1384) was also rejected. The main critique of this rule is that since there is no specific criteria for determining the observation of the majority or permanent of the believers of this rule, it is possible to imagine the true states in which the rule is violated. Ultimately, he believes that this principle is based on the principle of self-restraint.

He cannot and cannot be the cornerstone of certainty (al-Sadr، 1402 AH، p. 40-45). However، in the Master's thesis of one of the articles of the article "Van Jayag" experience in Ibn Sina scientific methodology (Fadai، 2017)، the principles of Shikhal Raiss in the field of tangible things، certainly from the experience of the problem of the problem، in this article، the loss of two types of logical analysis، more and more accurate and accurate analysis of the uncertain and the understanding of the sensibility has been done. Their effect on the semblance of the lamb is explained in the case of experience, regarding the error in identifying the intrinsic cause of the cause of the experiment.

The new law of Ibn Sina has been used. 1. The Concept of Certainty in Ibn Sina Epistemology and its Place in Argument

Ibn Sina has given the Chase the door of the Chase to the Qiyyn and the most detailed description of him in this land, in the name of the Blessed One: Confirmation in terms of the type of belief and the rule that is in it, is not worthy of any respect: First, the affirmation in which the carry/removal of the predicate on the subject and in parallel with it, the second belief is also in actual or imminent form of b-d in the first instance in the knowledge that it is not possible at any time that the first conviction will not be established, the second belief, and consequently, the first belief must be permanent. Second, the first belief. (2) The second (not in actual or near actual) is in the mind of the resultant mind.

1. Of course, in the article published from this thesis entitled "Experience in Ibn Sina's Philosophy by referring to its practical application in his natural works" (Fadai and Akbari, 2018), this issue has been dealt with more briefly and more with the approach of practical discussions. 2. This article is extracted from the doctoral thesis titled "Experience and its Rational Foundations" by Jalino and Ibn Sina (Fadaii, 1400, Tarbiat Modarr University).

p.5 : Blessed is the Lord of the Heavens and the Heavens, and the Lamb of God, and the Seed of God.

He did not know that he would have a second opinion, and in the second instance he would have a reason to believe in it, the first act would be shaken in his mind. The second moment is not permanent in the mind of the individual and the possibility of its decline is possible at the same time, and at the same time, do not interfere with the belief in the first affirmation, so that the first affirmation does not actually occur in the mind. Third, the first minute, the second moment in actual or near actual form, is present in the mind of the first and the second moment in the actual or near the actual state, and this is the opposite of the first affirmation. Ibn Sina is sure of the first and the second time. The third affirmation is called a persuasive suspicion (Ibn Sina, 1404 AH-b, c. 3, al-Burhan, p. 51). The most important characteristics of the confidence of his freedom of the president in the two realms L

One is the accompanying acknowledgment of the content of the case with the second affirmation based on the possibility that the first acknowledgement of the other is permanent and xenophobic and b. the first acknowledgement. As for the concept of quasi-certainty, in which there is only the first affirmation, it is necessary to mention that Ibn Sina in some cases used this concept as non-complete certainty or certainty of "the time of the Ummah

(Temporary) is also called (Ibn Sina، 1404 BC، c. 3، al-Burhan، p. 78). According to Ibn Sina the main feature of the argument is the possibility of certain affirmation, and this phony has two aspects: both the premises of the Qaya Borhani are of the certainty and the results of these values will necessarily be of the certainty type: "Al-Burhan Qiyaas Author of the Actual Illighini" (Ab Nesina, 2017, p. 262)1. On the other hand, Shikhal Raiss believes that the purpose of presenting all the materials mentioned in the region and especially in Bakhkia is to achieve the truth and certainty (Abnesina, 1404 BC, c.3, pg.45) and AZ-E-G-O-T-O-N-O-N-R-n-r-n-r-n-n-r-n-l-n-r-n-r-n-n-r-n-n- T، B، B

Proofs are at the highest level of credibility and in other words, they are the ashraf of science. However, Bu-Ali in some cases has referred to certainty as exclusive to Qaya Jadali, and the Gul of Dance Te T (Ibn Sina, 1404 AH-b, c. 3, al-Burhan, p. 51), according to some of his other words, "Lambun an"

1. In this area also see Ibn Sina, 1404 AH-B, vol. 3, Alborhan, p. 79.

https://philarchive.org/archive/PENORI (2007) : p. 2: "important rider: however slightly. This is necessary "..." to emphasize that reasons might be of very limited force, could be overweighted, overridden, or disabled by countervailing considerations, and may not be strong enough to qualify as sufficient, good or compelling reasons. My question is whether even the slightest of reasons—which I will describe as "minimal reasons"—can be objective in the sense that they are reasons independently of whether anyone judges them to be reasons in the cases to which they apply."

https://philpapers.org/archive/PENORI.pdf (2007):

p.27: "resist... no reason", p.28 : "I claim only that if C is a sign that p is true, then we should treat C as a minimal theoretical reason for the belief that p because this is what reasonable, competent, well-informed, and unprejudiced judges would do."

https://philpapers.org/archive/PENFAT.pdf (2010): p.8: "Pendlebury (2007) argues that, independently of whether they are to be understood realistically, judgements of minimal practical reasons can be objectivity true" , Pendlebury (2009) explains "affirmations." "Here I prefer "propositions" ... because it fits better with the vocabulary of the Truth-maker Program."

http://web.archive.org/web/20240609134737/https://philpapers.org/archive/PENHTB.pdf (2010) : p.1: "factual belief"..."", "quasi-realist like me"

p.5:"are also factual as insofar as they are true or false according to whether they answer appropriately to an independent world"..."Correctness is truth in the case of propositions and beliefs, which are commitments to propositions. But other kinds of things can also be" in/correct.

http://web.archive.org/web/20240429062125/https://philpapers.org/archive/PENRIA-2.pdf (2013-11) :

p.4: essential to the Normative View... understanding of that phase 'for the reason that'...not equivalent to everyday's use 'because'...we say something like...going next door because he thinks Desireé is there'...Note also... one can say that an agent did something because of something without implying that she took it as a reason.

p.5: agent could express by saying 'p is a reason to Ф-ING'

p.13: concept Ф-ING..action which, in favorable cases, it motivates

p.20: A normative reason, to repeat, is a consideration that favors doing something. Here 'doing something' should be understood broadly so that it covers all doings which could be reasons. This includes not only performing intentional actions, but also not performing them, , having 'motivated desires' (Nagel 1970, p. 29), holding 'judgement-sensitive attitudes' (Scanlon 1998, p. 20), and doing things that are not intentional actions but are subject to indirect intentional control, such as waking up at midnight. Normative reasons are considerations that one

p.21: could take account in deciding what to do,[16] advising somebody on what to do, and appraising the conduct of oneself and others. That's what makes them normative. ... no valid pro could be good or sufficient reason... A normative reason is a consideration that favors doing something, however slightly. ... very limited force, which could be outweighed, attenuated, or undercut by countervailing considerations, and which are not strong enough to qualify as significant, sufficient, good, justifying, or compelling reasons even if they contribute towards such reasons.[17] ... ultimate goal of normative thinking is to determine what acts and attitudes are worthwhile, justified, required, or in some other way good.

p.22 : describing real reasons as 'good reasons', where 'good' means well-founded or true. But this does not imply that real reasons are good reasons in the sense that they are strong reasons.

Dancy observes that people mean with good reasons = normative reasons = justifying reasons.

p.23: "terms 'pro tanto reasons' and 'prima facie reasons' are often applied to weaker or unconfirmed reasons"..."not normative reasons.", Stampe made a similar point... (1987, p. 345) "This certainly implies to me, for I often catch myself saying that there is no reason at all for doing something I consider inappropriate even through I am aware of considerations that count, however slightly, in favor of doing it.","Setiya, because he" instead she. Footnote:20 "For a pragmatic account of the inclination to deny that there are reasons for an agent to do something when insignificant reasons are available."

interesting-definition: archive.fo/2024.10.13/https://philpapers.org/archive/PENOVR.pdf : p.4: "First, realism cannot be a very substantial or interesting position if it can be brought so cheap.", f. 16: "interesting and suggestive paper", p.17: f.83: "interesting account of "how to devise a 'critical experiment' test to test whether to accept whether a given proposition is natural'", p.19: "along with many other interesting and worthwhile philosophical proposals, it is, I think, best understood as an antirealist, antiobjectivist recommendation"

Connection with sure and interesting-definition: archive.fo/2024.10.15/https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/09/05/the-dream-of-enlightenment-by-anthony-gottlieb : "Spinoza made God so crucial to the world that the distinction between the two collapsed."..."It follows that God and Nature are just two names for the same thing", "human knowledge had been cast into doubt, the idea of mathematical certainty was seductive.", "Spinoza's definition of "blessedness" was "the intellectual love of God," in which the mind sees the necessity of everything in the world as simply as indubitably as Plato's slave perceived the necessity of the Pythagorean theorem." < "indubitably"

"sure"-mention: p.17: f.83: "not, however, sure about this, because"..."assumptions, which I am skeptical."

"matter"-mentions: p.17: "no easy matter. It requires a careful examination of all aspects", p.18: "correctness is always a matter of truth.", p.19: "standard for any particular subject matter.", "fairly unitary subject matter", "correctness as a matter of their being"

"subject"-mention:

p.21: "if the subject is also the speaker"

Michael Pendlebury-notes 2 : archive.fo/2024.10.13/https://philpapers.org/archive/PENOVR.pdf : (Explaining degrees of objectivism: p.4: footnote 16: "degrees of objectivity responding roughly to the relative size of the class of the nontrivial affirmation in the field of discourse that could be known to be correct"... "However, in this paper, I write as if that there is an absolute divide between objectivism and antiobjectivism, and assume"..."can be known to be correct"..."significant but otherwise indeterminate size"..."degrees of realism corresponding to degrees of agreement in response"...

p.5: f. 16: "I do not think"..."good case for realism.")

p.5: "roughly equivalent to my saying that they are governed by nonarbitrary standards of correctness." f.22: Wright: "discourse exhibits Cognitive Command"

(About Realism being a certain affirmation: p.9: "I hasten to add that since realism requires the possibility of truth, it can never be justified with respect to affirmations other than assertions unless they can be reconstructed as assertions."), p.16: "it is, I think, best understood as an antirealist, antiobjectivist recommendation that is not open to knock-down, drag-out proof or disproof—unless it can be undermined on grounds of internal consistency or logical incompatibility with undeniable truths."..."it should be judged on the basis of the fruitfulness of its application.", p.21: p.21: f.91: "This Output Requirement"..."broader "output requirement" of Pendlebury (2007): 540, which incorporates the Independence and Effectiveness Requirements, and is treated as if it incorporates"..."Grounding Requirement", p.24: "As I see it, greatest challenge for an objectivist is to show that the relevant field of discourse is governed by standards of correctness that satisfy the Grounding Requirement.", "The fundamental realist might satisfy or fail"..."Effectiveness Requirement; sets of standards might or might not derive from the fundamental realist standard"

Related to Sense : Defensive Account:

http://web.archive.org/web/20240623171953/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276101921_Sensibility_and_understanding_in_perceptual_judgments (September 2014). (Critic: http://web.archive.org/web/20240623172739/https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100220488 : "Sellars for the now widely-rejected view that sense experience gives us peculiar points of certainty, suitable to serve as foundations for the whole of empirical knowledge and science.") ; http://web.archive.org/web/20240623174141/https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-abstract/110/2/199/2396/Intentionalism-Defended?redirectedFrom=fulltext ;

Evidence-transcendence: https://archive.ph/F5JH6 : When Evidence-transcendence is not malign , https://archive.ph/MW9UY doesn't agree with Dummett's evidence-transcendence being malign., https://archive.ph/XZeaC : Acceptance of a semantic theory. Rejecting principle of bivalence makes that person an anti-realist.

Uniting simple and ordinary: archive.fo/2024.10.30/https://www.difference.wiki/common-vs-shared/ : "Common

Simple, ordinary or vulgar"; archive.fo/2024.10.30/https://whatisbeautifulremains.com/2014/06/05/simple-ordinary/ : Picture; archive.fo/2024.10.30/https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/4632910/on-the-definition-of-a-simple-normal-crossing-divisor : "Let

k

k

be a field (one may assume

k=C

k

C

) and

X/k

X

k

a smooth variety. Let

D⊂X

D

X

be a divisor, we say it is a simple normal crossing one if

D

D

is smooth and every of its irreducible components is smooth and all intersections are transverse." 4 votes: "definition of a simple-normal-crossing (snc) divisor

D=

∑

i

a

i

D

i

≥0

D

i

a

i

D

i

0

are the following. (i) each component

D

i

D

i

is smooth, (ii) at each point

P∈D

P

D

, the local defining equation of

D

D

is of the form

x

b

1

1

⋯

x

b

m

m

=0

x

1

b

1

x

m

b

m

0

for suitable local coordinates

x

1

,…,

x

m

,…,

x

n

x

1

x

m

x

n

at

P

P

where

n=dimX

n

dim

X

and suitable positive integers

b

i

b

i

."; archive.fo/2024.10.30/https://wiki.mafiascum.net/index.php?title=Simple_Normal > archive.fo/2024.10.30/https://forum.mafiascum.net/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=93044 : "These games are designed to provide a newbie-friendly and traditional mafia experience, with little focus on setup speculation.";