Hacking the #EU #AgeVerification app in under 2 minutes.
During setup, the app asks you to create a PIN. After entry, the app *encrypts* it and saves it in the shared_prefs directory.
1. It shouldn't be encrypted at all - that's a really poor design.
2. It's not cryptographically tied to the vault which contains the identity data.
So, an attacker can simply remove the PinEnc/PinIV values from the shared_prefs file and restart the app.
After choosing a different PIN, the app presents credentials created under the old profile and let's the attacker present them as valid.
Other issues:
1. Rate limiting is an incrementing number in the same config file. Just reset it to 0 and keep trying.
2. "UseBiometricAuth" is a boolean, also in the same file. Set it to false and it just skips that step.
Seriously - this product will be the catalyst for an enormous breach at some point. It's just a matter of time.
The media could not be played.
Quote
Paul Moore - Security Consultant
@Paul_Reviews
.@vonderleyen "The European #AgeVerification app is technically ready. It respects the highest privacy standards in the world. It's open-source, so anyone can check the code..."
I did. It didn't take long to find what looks like a serious #privacy issue.
The app goes to great
