The Iran conflict is teaching the wrong lessons for the Pacific

Washington risks drawing the wrong lessons from the conflict with Iran.

The U.S. has demonstrated impressive operational capability — striking targets at range, degrading missile systems and projecting power across the region. But those successes risk reinforcing a dangerous assumption: that future conflicts will look the same.

They won’t.

In the conflict with Iran, the U.S. has relied heavily on carrier strike groups and maritime operations. Geography works in America’s favor. Forces can operate from the sea without depending heavily on vulnerable land-based infrastructure.

In the Indo-Pacific, that model breaks down.

Distances are greater. Targets are more dispersed. And the scale of any conflict would require sustained operations from land. Aircraft cannot operate at scale indefinitely from carriers alone. They will depend on a network of bases across the region — many exposed and not yet prepared.

The second lesson is even more important.

Modern wars are not short.

Even successful operations place enormous strain on munitions, logistics and infrastructure. Sustaining combat power quickly becomes decisive. Iran’s use of large volumes of low-cost drones underscores this reality, forcing continuous defensive responses and placing sustained pressure on supply chains.

That is where the U.S. remains underprepared in the Pacific.

Washington has been clear about its priorities. The Indo-Pacific is the decisive theater. Deterring China is the pacing challenge.

What Washington is still getting wrong is what actually makes that power effective.

Recent agreements between the U.S. and Japan — co-producing advanced air-to-air missiles, expanding interceptor production and developing a secure, interoperable cloud — signal a meaningful shift. The U.S. is beginning to extend the foundation of deterrence into allied systems.

But a critical gap remains.

The U.S. continues to underinvest in the infrastructure that determines whether airpower works after the first strike.

Airpower is not defined by platforms alone. It is defined by whether those platforms can continue to operate under attack.

A fighter is only effective if it can take off, survive, land, refuel, rearm and launch again. A bomber’s range matters only if its base remains functional.

Airpower, in other words, is a system.

And that system depends on elements that receive far less attention in budget debates: runway repair, fuel storage, resilient communications, prepositioned equipment and logistics networks.

On Tinian, where engineers are rebuilding a historic World War II runway, the lesson is clear: infrastructure alone does not generate sustained combat power. Like many remote operating locations, it will only be effective if fuel, munitions, communications and repair equipment are prepositioned before a crisis.

For decades, U.S. strategy assumed time — time to surge forces and reinforce bases after a crisis began. That assumption is eroding. China’s missile forces are designed not only to strike platforms, but to disrupt the infrastructure that makes them effective.

At the same time, advances in surveillance and artificial intelligence are compressing decision timelines. What once took days may now take hours.

In this environment, deterrence depends on the ability to operate through the opening phase of conflict — not to assemble forces after it begins.

The U.S. military has begun to adapt, dispersing aircraft across a wider network of locations.

But dispersal is not just a concept. It is an infrastructure requirement.

Aircraft do not disperse into empty space. They disperse into locations already equipped to operate under pressure. If those elements are not ready before a crisis, they will not arrive in time.

Closing this gap does not require a new strategy. It requires funding the one we already have.

First, accelerate investments in base resilience. Key hubs such as Guam and bases in Japan remain central — and vulnerable. In places like Guam, timelines still lag the pace of the threat. Hardened infrastructure, integrated air and missile defense, counter-drone capabilities and rapid runway repair must match the scale of attack China can generate.

Second, expand and enable a wider network of operating locations. Access agreements are valuable only if supported by runway improvements, maintenance capacity, resilient communications and base defense systems.

Third, expand and protect prepositioned stocks. Even well-prepared locations will fail quickly if they cannot be sustained. Runway repair kits, fuel, spare parts and expeditionary equipment must be available in theater — not shipped after a crisis begins.

These investments are modest compared to major weapons programs. But they determine whether those programs translate into combat capability.

The U.S. is beginning to address years of underinvestment in airpower. But it is still underfunding the foundation that makes those capabilities usable under real conditions.

The lesson from Iran is not that the U.S. can project power effectively.

It is that future conflicts will demand far more of our forces and our infrastructure.

In the Indo-Pacific, the decisive question will not be how quickly the U.S. can strike.

It will be whether its forces — and its alliances — can sustain operations after the first blow lands.

Mark R. Kennedy served as a member of Congress from Minnesota from 2001-2007. He a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.