The formidable Operation 1027 launched by the Brotherhood Alliance in northern Myanmar was not the only significant resistance offensive to follow the 2021 coup. Others included Operation 1111 in Karenni (Kayah) State, the Arakan Army (AA)’s offensive in Rakhine State, and the Shan–Mandalay offensive. This last stood out for its significant deployment of heartland People’s Defense Forces (PDF).
PDF officially take their orders from the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), whose Defense Ministry announced the launch of Shan–Mandalay operations on June 27, 2024. Spearheaded by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)—a core member of the Brotherhood Alliance—the offensive mobilized a broad coalition of resistance groups including Mandalay PDF, Mogoke-based battalions 1221, 1222, 1223, and 1224, Battalion 513, the Kyaukme District Special Attack Force, and regional PDF from Pyin Oo Lwin, Mogoke and Madaya.
This coalition successfully captured towns and villages across Singu, Thabeikkyin, and Madaya townships, overrunning key junta battalion headquarters and bases. Thei rapid momentum unnerved the military’s Central Command Headquarters in Mandalay, prompting observers to speculate that urban combat within Mandalay city was imminent.
But that momentum waned when the TNLA, under heavy pressure from China, halted its operations and left the ragtag crew stranded. On Aug. 25, roughly two months into the operation, the junta launched a concerted counteroffensive. It came shortly after Chinese top diplomat Wang Yi paid a visit to Naypyitaw.
Geopolitical pressure
In pressing the ground offensive, then, the junta was able to take advantage of Beijing’s diplomatic pressure on the TNLA, advancing with its bombs and manpower while letting China do the coercion at the negotiating table.
It still took nearly another year for the junta to chalk up its first major success in this counteroffensive, the recapture of Mobye on July 7, 2025—but this happened before Chinese mediation had fully reshaped the broader battlefield dynamics. The first significant territorial shift directly linked to Beijing’s intervention was the fall of Nawnghkio a week later, on July 16. Capitalizing on this shift, the junta also seized Kyaukme, Hsipaw, and other northern Shan State towns previously held by the TNLA.
Despite its propaganda on social media, the junta did not have to fight very hard to get back those towns. The “battles” were nothing more than the regime occupying positions the TNLA had just vacated as it made its phased withdrawal under Chinese pressure. But the regime made the most of the PR opportunity, publishing plentiful photos of its “victorious” troops, Chinese-and Russian-made drones, and signal jammers.
The TNLA’s reliance on its bases along the Chinese border left it with little choice but to follow Beijing’s orders. Its capitulation severely impacted resistance operations across northern Shan State—and directly undermined the Mandalay PDF and allied forces fighting in the Shan-Mandalay theater.
Following the TNLA’s withdrawal from Nawnghkio, the junta pivoted to recapturing Thabeikkyin from the Mandalay PDF. Its momentum continued through late 2025, retaking Madaya in late November and Singu on Dec. 19. More recently, on March 10 this year, junta columns advancing from the No. 13 Advanced Training School seized the resistance’s last stand in Mandalay, Tagaung.
The counteroffensive
The campaign relied on two distinct troop deployments.
Northern Madaya: Advancing from northern Madaya toward Singu, this grouping consisted of units redeployed from Nawnghkio and Kyaukme following operations in northern Shan State. They regrouped and gathered in Pyin Oo Lwin and Mandalay.
Thabeikkyin: In a stroke of luck for the regime, No. 13 Advanced Training School and the Mineral Research and Technology Development Unit did not fall to the resistance offensive, allowing the junta to strike back from those positions. The Central Command in Mandalay sustained these units with critical air support, reinforcements and munitions.
Both groups were heavily augmented with drone technology, advanced weaponry, and persistent artillery and aerial bombardments to facilitate their advance.
Strategic imperatives
The military prioritized the reclamation of the Shan–Mandalay operational theater due to its critical logistical value as a vital supply corridor linking northern Mandalay, northern Sagaing, northern Shan State, and Kachin State. By securing navigable river and road networks to resupply Bhamo and upper Sagaing, the junta can drastically reduce its reliance on costly air transport.
Currently, the junta has re-established control over the Mandalay–Madaya–Singu–Thabeikkyin corridor and the Mandalay–Thabeikkyin–Mogoke road. Following the recent fall of Tagaung, some analysts speculated that it is poised to consolidate total control of Mandalay Region.
Why the Shan–Mandalay offensive is not over
But such speculation misreads the tactical reality on the ground. Even in northern Shan towns the junta has “recaptured,” its administrative and military control rarely extends beyond urban centers. When faced with large-scale offensives, resistance forces melted away to reduce civilian and troop casualties. But they still retain control over the rural peripheries surrounding key towns like Lashio, Mogoke and Mongmit.
In the broader Mandalay Region, the operational environment—encompassing Myingyan, Nyaung-U, Mahlaing, Taungtha, Natogyi and Nganzun—remains highly volatile. For instance, on March 1 this year, resistance fighters executed a devastating ambush against two junta columns near Nyaung-U Township, resulting in heavy junta casualties and the seizure of weapons.
In short, anti-junta forces continue to dominate the rural areas and secondary supply routes across these townships. They maintain a potent campaign of guerrilla warfare, intelligence-driven strikes, and hit-and-run ambushes throughout Mandalay Region. While the fall of Tagaung represents a tactical setback, it certainly does not signal the end.
Swe Taw is a Myanmar military defector.
