Can Russia and China turn the Iran War into a long war Washington can’t win?

Three weeks into the U.S.-Israeli air and missile campaign against Iran, the limits of American power are already visible. Thousands of interceptors, joint direct attack munitions and cruise missiles have been fired. Stockpiles are under strain. And while the administration is searching for a decisive “victory moment,” the battlefield reality is more complicated: Washington can degrade Iran’s capabilities, but airpower alone cannot deliver a clean end state. 

So the real question becomes something far more uncomfortable: can Russia and China stretch this conflict into a long, grinding war that Washington can’t win on its own terms? Neither Moscow nor Beijing can save Iran outright. But both can make the war longer, costlier, and strategically exhausting.

Russia has quietly become Iran’s most consequential external partner. Public reporting shows Moscow feeding Tehran real time satellite imagery of U.S. and Israeli positions — a simple but powerful boost to Iranian targeting and battle damage assessment. Russia has also helped upgrade Iran’s Shahed drones with better navigation and communications systems. These aren’t glamorous contributions, but they matter: they force the United States to burn multimillion dollar interceptors on cheap, disposable threats.

None of this changes the balance of power. But it absolutely changes the tempo of the war. By sharpening Iran’s situational awareness and extending the life of its asymmetric arsenal, Russia helps Tehran impose a steady operational cost on U.S. forces — all without risking any of its own high value assets.

And Moscow’s constraints are real. The war in Ukraine limits what it can ship to Iran. But Russia doesn’t need to send tanks or missiles to influence this conflict. A steady drip of intelligence and technical support is enough to complicate U.S. operations and keep Iran in the fight.

China’s support looks different — quieter, but just as important. Beijing buys the overwhelming majority of Iran’s oil, giving Tehran the revenue it needs to keep functioning despite the pounding its infrastructure has taken. China also provides BeiDou3 navigation signals that improve the accuracy of Iranian missiles and drones.

But China is cautious. It wants stability in global energy markets, not a regional meltdown that sends oil prices into the stratosphere. Beijing will buy Iranian oil and provide navigation support, but it won’t take steps that risk a direct confrontation with Washington. Its priority is protecting its own economic interests, not rescuing Iran from the consequences of the war.

That creates a strange paradox: China is essential to Iran’s financial survival, yet deeply vulnerable to prolonged instability in the Gulf. Beijing helps Iran endure — but it also quietly pushes for deescalation.

The biggest challenge for Washington isn’t Iran’s capability. It’s the cost of sustaining the campaign.

Public estimates suggest the U.S. has already burned through roughly 319 Tomahawk cruise missiles — about 10 percent of the stockpile; around 25 percent of THAAD interceptors defending Israel; and large quantities of Patriot and SM3 interceptors

Tomahawk production remains under 500 units a year. THAAD and Patriot interceptors are expensive and take time to replace. And every Iranian drone or missile launch forces the U.S. into a painful choice between expending high value munitions and accepting greater risk to regional assets.

This is where Russian and Chinese support becomes strategically meaningful. By helping Iran launch sporadic, low-cost attacks, they force the U.S. into a terrible cost exchange ratio. Iran fires a $20,000 drone; the U.S. fires a $2 million interceptor. Over time, that math becomes unsustainable — especially when Washington is trying to support Ukraine and maintain readiness in the IndoPacific.

Iran has taken heavy losses — missile factories, naval assets, command nodes — but it still retains the ability to wage asymmetric war. Drones, mines, fast attack craft: These require limited infrastructure and can be regenerated with outside help. Russia and China don’t need to rebuild Iran’s military. They only need to keep it functional enough to deny Washington a clean victory.

And that’s the heart of the problem. The U.S. can keep striking Iranian targets. It can degrade Iran’s capabilities. It can maintain air superiority. But none of that produces a clear end-state. Iran can absorb punishment, adapt, and keep imposing costs.

A prolonged conflict wouldn’t look like Iraq or Afghanistan. It would look like a slow, grinding contest defined by intermittent Iranian drone and missile launches and continued U.S. and Israeli strikes. It would drag on with elevated global oil prices and pressure on U.S. munitions stockpiles, even as Iran enjoys Russian intelligence support and Chinese economic lifelines.

Iran’s desired end-state is a regime battered but still standing. This isn’t a war the U.S. loses militarily. It’s a war it risks losing strategically by being pulled into a conflict that drains resources, divides attention and offers no clean exit.

Russia and China can’t save Iran. They can’t replace U.S. airpower or rebuild Iran’s shattered infrastructure. But they don’t need to. Their goal isn’t to help Iran win — it’s to make sure the U.S. can’t win quickly.

By providing intelligence, navigation technology and economic support, Moscow and Beijing can stretch this conflict into a long war that drains U.S. munitions, complicates global commitments and denies Washington the decisive outcome it wants. 

The U.S. must avoid that trap or else risk inheriting a war designed to exhaust it. 

Charbel A. Antoun is a Washington-based journalist and writer specializing in U.S. foreign policy, with a focus on the Middle East and North Africa.