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Guest Essay

5 Places Where the Iran War Could Get Worse

Last month’s attack on Iran by Israel and the United States quickly escalated into a regional war. Over 2,000 people have been killed so far, mostly under U.S. and Israeli bombardment in Iran and Lebanon, and millions of people have been displaced. Iran has retaliated by attacking neighboring countries, hitting U.S. facilities and oil infrastructure in particular, and by closing the Strait of Hormuz, menacing the global economy.

The war threatens to destabilize nearby countries, many of which are already fragile as a result of internal tensions and recent conflict. Here are five places to watch:

1. Saudi Arabia
Where things stand

Saudi Arabia wants to clean up its grim reputation and attract investors to diversify the kingdom’s oil-dependent economy. As part of this makeover, the kingdom agreed to a détente with its longtime gulf rival, Iran, in 2023.

Its government has also been trying to coax a stronger security guarantee out of the Trump administration, which, for its part, has been trying to induce Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel. On the eve of the war, the United States had about 2,700 troops in Saudi Arabia, and has since launched refueling operations from Prince Sultan Air Base.

What might happen

Daily attacks serve as a reminder that U.S. friendship is no guarantee of safety. Saudi Arabia may well conclude that a nuclear bomb is its only effective security guarantee. The kingdom is already planning a civilian nuclear program and wants the right to enrich uranium, which is necessary for a bomb. This war may end up expanding nuclear ambitions in the Persian Gulf, the exact opposite of its intended consequence. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman could also refuse to normalize ties with Israel — he was already reluctant, pointing to Israel’s destruction of Gaza and the lack of progress toward Palestinian statehood — or renege on his promised investment of nearly $1 trillion in the United States.

If Saudi Arabia joins the fighting, the kingdom could call on nuclear-armed Pakistan; the two countries have a defense pact.

2. Iraq
Where things stand

Iran enjoys substantial popular support in Iraq, particularly among the majority Shiite Muslim population, and Tehran funds Iraqi political parties and paramilitaries. The Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella group of mostly Iran-backed militias with roots in guerrilla warfare, has more than 200,000 fighters, and has largely been incorporated into the Iraqi Armed Forces.

The United States has financial leverage here, largely from managing Iraq’s oil revenues through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. President Trump has already sought to influence Iraq’s efforts to choose a new prime minister by threatening to withhold Iraqi oil revenues if Nuri al-Maliki, closely linked to Iran, gets another stint.

Iraq is home to millions of Kurds, a historically oppressed group concentrated in a semiautonomous region in the north. Thousands of Iranian Kurds also live in Iraq’s Kurdish region. They include exiled dissidents and armed groups hostile to the Iranian government.

What might happen

The war has already spilled into Iraq: Both the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Iran-backed Iraqi paramilitaries attacked U.S. troops with drones and missiles, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad has come under repeated attack and Iraqi lawmakers have chanted anti-American slogans in Parliament. Meanwhile, conflicting reports suggest that Israel, the United States or both could support Iranian Kurds who cross the border in Iraq’s north to attack the besieged government from within. Iraq, with its history of sectarian and ethnic infighting, could see its own people get pulled into the war on opposite sides.

3. Turkey
Where things stand

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey has tried to position his country as a mediator and an oasis of restraint. But Turkey has also asserted itself in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Azerbaijan, and built up a powerful new domestic weapons industry. The Turkish military is now the second largest in NATO, behind the United States. Turkey hosts a stockpile of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and more than 1,000 U.S. military personnel.

Turkey’s rising profile has rattled Israel, whose officials accuse it of neo-Ottoman imperial ambitions and have sought to keep Turkish military bases out of Syria. Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel, but the mass deaths in Gaza led it to sever diplomatic ties and join South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at The Hague. Nevertheless, Turkey remains a key transit point for oil and gas bound for Israel.

Along with Iran, Iraq and Syria, Turkey has a significant Kurdish population. But relations between the government and the Kurdish minority are particularly uneasy in Turkey, where a 40-year Kurdish insurgency ended last year.

What might happen

Suggestions that the United States or Israel might deploy Kurds to fight Iran led Turkish officials to warn against sparking civil war there. Any Kurdish move to stage a separatist uprising against the Iranian government could trigger a preemptive crackdown on Kurds in Turkey, undermine the ongoing Turkish-Kurdish peace process or spark a new round of violence. Turkish officials also fear that an exodus of Iranian refugees could strain the country, which struggled to absorb millions of refugees from the Syrian civil war. Turkey also has to navigate rising tensions with Israel, which stand to worsen amid regional tumult.

4. United Arab Emirates
Where things stand

Beyond its glitzy facade of a tourist-happy international crossroads, the United Arab Emirates remains a hub for washing dirty money and evading sanctions. Iran has weathered harsh sanctions in part by selling oil and other goods through shell companies in Dubai’s free zones. The Emirates is also home to hundreds of thousands of Iranians, several Iranian banks, and currency houses that have helped Iranians move and store their assets. At the same time, the Emirates has normalized ties to Israel. It is a major U.S. defense partner, hosting some 3,500 U.S. military personnel and serving as a key refueling stop.

What might happen

The Emirates is now getting hammered by more Iranian strikes than any other country, including Israel. Even if the Trump administration pulls out of the war unilaterally, the Emirates could face ongoing attacks from Iran. The Emirates blitz has dragged other countries into the fray. French fighter jets have been deployed over the Emirates to protect French military bases. Australia, too, said it would send the Emirates a warplane and missiles.

The Emirates is threatening to freeze billions in Iranian assets. That would greatly please its ally Israel. But Emirates leaders are quietly seething that the United States and Israel started the war. The Emirates trades heavily on its image as a safe haven, but that illusion has been shattered. Having learned that stability can’t necessarily be won by straddling alliances with Iran and Israel, the Emirates may end up looking for allies elsewhere or hardening its military strategy.

5. Lebanon
Where things stand

Bordering Israel to the north, Lebanon is enduring a separate but related conflict whose brutality has been overshadowed by the war.

Lebanon is home to Hezbollah, a domestic political party and formidable militia founded by Lebanese clerics in 1982. Hezbollah and Israel have been at war for decades, with Iran arming, training and funding the group. Grueling battles over the past few years are thought to have weakened Hezbollah, but the group has shown that it’s still capable of launching attacks.

Since Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of Iran was killed at the start of the war, Hezbollah and Israel have been attacking one another relentlessly, with Lebanese civilians bearing the brunt of Israel’s bombing campaign. Israel is threatening to seize control of Lebanese territory if the government can’t or won’t disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese Armed Forces have long been leery of challenging Hezbollah, which remains popular among a significant portion of Lebanon’s Shiites and has representatives in Parliament and government. The group has historically enjoyed some legitimacy because its fighters — and not the Lebanese military — have repeatedly fought back against Israeli attacks.

What might happen

Lebanon’s government has now banned Hezbollah’s military activities and vowed to take away its guns. But trying to disarm Hezbollah could splinter the army, which is roughly one-third Shiite, and risks sparking a civil war between the militia and its domestic foes.

Lebanon is desperate to end the punishing Israeli bombardments, which have caused mass displacement and death. But Israel so far seems to be rejecting peace talks, saying the Lebanese government’s window for disarming Hezbollah has closed. Israel has threatened to seize more Lebanese territory, and appears intent upon occupying at least enough land to create what Israel calls a buffer zone. This could lead, sooner or later, to an insurgency against Israel by Hezbollah and others, and internal fighting among Lebanese. The Lebanon war could continue long after the U.S.-Iranian war comes to an end.

When Mr. Trump returned to the White House last year, a region exhausted by war was eager for negotiations and fresh starts. Instead, the president ended promising nuclear talks with Iran and pressed ahead with an ill-articulated and economically perilous war — a conflict that seems almost designed to destabilize the region.

The United States has failed to define an endpoint for the attack on Iran. The war may or may not topple the current Iranian government (to be replaced with what?) and may or may not lead to U.S. forces seizing any remaining nuclear material (a job made more difficult since Mr. Trump’s bombing spree last summer is said to have left said material buried under rubble). The war may be almost over — or just getting started. Perhaps the United States will send ground troops. Or maybe Mr. Trump will decide it’s all too much trouble and try to walk away, only to discover he can’t. Certainly, whatever else happens, the reputation and power of the United States are being degraded in real time.

Here’s what I see: a war destined to become part of the regional trend of fragmentation (or the threat of it). Israeli and American leaders know they may not be able to purge the intricate leadership of the Islamic republic altogether, but their war may pull Iran apart, either ideologically or territorially or both, and thus make the threat smaller and more diffuse, opening new opportunities to meddle and subvert. They may calculate that the resulting chaos is an acceptable price to pay for a reduced threat from a vast, unified, opaque Iran.

That would be in line with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which wound up fragmenting that country politically, leaving its cohorts so busy vying among themselves and seeking foreign sponsors that they had little time to pester their foreign neighbors. Israelis benefited along similar lines in Syria, where the fall in 2024 of the dictatorial al-Assad dynasty, which exerted iron-fisted rule for half a century, left a sudden vacuum in the place of centralized power. The Kurds have an autonomous zone, Israel has seized yet another so-called buffer zone, the southern governorate of Sweida is jockeying for autonomy and Turkish and Russian bases remain. Lebanon, long divided by civil wars between its sects, now risks losing the southern part of the country to Israeli occupation. Turkey, meanwhile, is eyeing its own Kurdish population for signs of another armed separatist uprising inspired by the war in Iran. Even Palestinians are being divided: Gaza sliced into zones, Palestinians in the West Bank corralled and cut off from one another by ceaseless settlement expansion.

Israel and the United States seem to be going for broke in this war, seeking to expand in territory or influence, striving for unchallenged regional power. They may succeed, or they may not. In the meantime, nations in the region risk being pulled apart.

Methodology and sources

This map uses data from ACLED and news reports, as of March 16. It is not exhaustive. Interceptions of projectiles are included, mapped to where the interception occurred. Friendly fire, unconfirmed events and attacks where the responsible party was uncertain were excluded. Ethnic regions were drawn from the GeoEPR 2023 dataset and are approximations.