Skip to main content
Advertisement
Advertisement

Commentary

Commentary: What we can learn from how Iran and US have used cheap ‘disposable’ drones differently

While the Iran war has not spilled out of the Middle East, defence planners from Asia will look closely at how it is being fought, says defence writer Mike Yeo.

Commentary: What we can learn from how Iran and US have used cheap ‘disposable’ drones differently

A plume of smoke rises following a US-Israeli military strike in Tehran, Iran on Mar 3, 2026. (Photo: AP/Vahid Salemi)

Listen
6 min
New: You can now listen to articles.

This audio is generated by an AI tool.

12 Mar 2026 05:59AM
Read a summary of this article on FAST.
FAST

SINGAPORE: Smaller, cheaper and effectively disposable aircraft are rewriting the rules of modern warfare – and its latest battlefield are the skies over Iran. 

Since Israel and the United States launched their attacks on Iran on Feb 28, both sides have used low-cost kamikaze drones extensively. But how they have used these so far has differed sharply. 

The Ukraine war is widely recognised as the first full-out drone war, due to the immense usage. 

Ukraine has said it deploys about 9,000 different types of drones a day, while one think tank found that Russia launched more than 4,400 one-way drones in January alone. Drones were reportedly responsible for up to 80 per cent of those killed or injured on both sides. In a somewhat ironic turn, the US has asked Ukraine for help to fight Iranian drones. 

Lessons from these early drone wars will be important in developing countries’ own military playbooks.

A GAME OF DRONES

Iran’s drone objective is to deplete the air defence stocks of Israel, the US and the Gulf countries hosting US military facilities that Iran has targeted in its retaliation.

Its drone of choice is the Shahed-136. It is essentially a guided bomb that is flown into a target and detonated. It is slow and simple, and quick and cheap to manufacture.

And that is precisely the point. Iran does not need every drone to get through enemy air defences, just enough to saturate and overwhelm air defences or force the use of expensive, limited interceptor missiles. This was Iran’s play in the 12-day war last June that managed to pierce Israel’s sophisticated air defence system, as well as Russia’s approach to attacking Ukrainian infrastructure.

This time, Iran deployed waves of drones interspaced with missiles and scored some successes. Geolocated videos from social media of the ongoing conflict in Iran has shown that these drones have struck at least two military targets, including the base of the US Navy’s 5th Fleet in Manama, Bahrain and a US Army facility in Kuwait. 

These massed attacks appear to be having an effect, with the UAE’s defence ministry revealing that it intercepted 26 out of 35 (or 74 per cent) of Iranian drones launched at it on Tuesday (Mar 10). This was a significant drop from previous days of the conflict, having downed about 90 per cent to 95 per cent of larger numbers of drones in earlier waves.

This suggests that the US – the world’s most powerful military – still has gaps in its ability to defend itself against such new tactics. It is something that US defence officials have reportedly acknowledged, with Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine admitting that the drones have posed a bigger challenge than expected.

US HAS ITS OWN CHEAP DRONE

It is perhaps a testament to how effective the Shahed has been that the US has reverse engineered and is employing its own version. The Low-cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) made its first combat appearance in Iran.

But where the Shahed is a tool of asymmetric warfare for Iran to bleed a technologically superior adversary, the LUCAS is about cost-effectiveness. From intercepting enemy missiles and drones to striking infrastructure, the US$35,000 drone holds its own against a US$2.4 Tomahawk cruise missile or a US$13 million THAAD interceptor missile.

A key factor in the current conflict is that the US and Israel rapidly established air superiority by degrading Iran’s air defence network that had already been severely weakened last June. 

This has meant that Israeli and American aircraft and drones have managed to operate over Iran with little opposition as they worked through a list of targets which included Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iranian missile and drone launchers. These strikes are primarily being carried out with manned aircraft but also with larger drones that are built to provide near-constant surveillance and launch munitions, not as kamikaze weapons.

Videos posted on social media purportedly taken from inside Iran show Israeli Hermes 900 and US MQ-9 Reapers in the air. 

These have long endurance – the Reaper can stay in the air for up to 27 hours and the Hermes 900 up to 36 hours. They can maintain constant surveillance over Iran for much longer than manned aircraft, which need to refuel and are limited by the need for their pilots and crews to rest between missions.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIA

While the Iran war has not spilled out of the Middle East, defence planners from Asia will have registered the sharp implications of how it is being fought.

First, LUCAS shows that the US is complementing its arsenal of high-end missiles with significantly cheaper and expendable assets. The US is already changing the way it will operate in the event of conflict in the Indo-Pacific, shifting away from operating large force grouping out of fixed bases in favour of smaller, more agile forces fighting from dispersed locations and the LUCAS could fit into this strategy.

One-way attack drones, with a relatively small and flexible deployment footprint, will likely figure prominently in the US force posture in the Indo-Pacific alongside a smaller number of more capable but more expensive weapon systems. This is the kind of asymmetric capability that the US is seeking, while China has been making advances in military capability.

Next, the US is burning through a prodigious amount of ballistic missile defence interceptors against Iranian ballistic missiles.

Even before the Iran war, experts had warned that the US and its Indo-Pacific allies do not have, and is producing nowhere near enough, the number of interceptors it needs should a conflict break out against China. This could call into question a vital aspect of the ability of the US military to conduct operations in the Indo-Pacific. 

It is perhaps a salutary lesson to defence planners about over reliance on smaller numbers of high-tech, expensive weapons, and that it might be worth investing in a large quantity of cheaper, less-sophisticated systems to work alongside them for maximum effect. 

Mike Yeo is the Indo-Pacific Bureau Chief for defence media outlet Breaking Defense. He has more than a decade of experience as a defence journalist, specialising in regional defence and security matters.

Source: CNA/ch

Sign up for our newsletters

Get our pick of top stories and thought-provoking articles in your inbox

Subscribe here
Inbox
FAST
Advertisement

East Asia

'Intelligent economy', 'investing in people': How Beijing is reshaping its 2026 economic agenda

The language of China's 2026 government work report reveals the tensions shaping its economic strategy, say experts.

'Intelligent economy', 'investing in people': How Beijing is reshaping its 2026 economic agenda

Delegates enter the Great Hall of the People for the opening ceremony of China’s National People’s Congress in Beijing on Mar 5, 2026. (Photo: CNA/Hu Chushi)

Listen
8 min
New: You can now listen to articles.

This audio is generated by an AI tool.

12 Mar 2026 06:00AM (Updated: 12 Mar 2026 06:55AM)
Read a summary of this article on FAST.
FAST

BEIJING: Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s annual government work report has long been viewed as the country's economic scorecard.

But it is also a coded statement of intent - a carefully calibrated signal of policy direction in which the prominence, sequencing and framing of key terms can matter as much as the headline targets.

From “intelligent economy” and “unified national market” to curbing “involution” and “investing in people”, this year’s vocabulary points to a recalibration: less emphasis on speed and scale, and greater focus on reform, resilience and the quality of growth.

“The most notable shift this year is arguably renewed emphasis on reform,” said Guo Shan, a research economist and partner at Hutong Research.

CNA Games
Show More
Show Less

Five key phrases from this year's report capture where that agenda is headed - and what Beijing thinks it will take to get there.

INTELLIGENT ECONOMY

Among the standout phrases in this year's government work report was the introduction, for the first time, of a "new form of intelligent economy".

Chen Changsheng, deputy director of the State Council Research Office and a member of the work report drafting group, told reporters on Mar 5 that it was "a brand-new concept" aimed at "expanding the breadth and depth of AI empowerment of all industries, opening up new space for economic growth, cultivating new models, and strengthening new driving forces".

The idea builds on China’s AI-Plus initiative, which includes a target of achieving over 90 per cent penetration of AI agent applications by 2030, the final year of the 15th Five-Year Plan.

This year’s report also named AI agents for the first time and referenced open-source development thrice.

An AI (Artificial Intelligence) sign is seen at the World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) in Shanghai, China July 6, 2023. (Photo: REUTERS/Aly Song)

Brian Wong, a fellow at the Centre on Contemporary China and the World at the University of Hong Kong (HKU), said it signals that AI is now meant to be treated as core infrastructure and fully integrated into all aspects of the economy.

This, he added, requires genuine public-private partnership and points to Chinese companies like DeepSeek as proof that state-led efforts alone cannot deliver on the promise.

At the same time, the document called for employment protection measures in response to China’s rapid AI development.

“I think the Chinese leadership has yet to find an answer to this serious dilemma,” Wong noted, even as Beijing recognises the destabilising effects AI automation could have on entry-level jobs - and the political risks that follow.

UNIFIED NATIONAL MARKET

Another phrase that featured prominently in this year’s report was “unified national market” - referring to Beijing’s long-standing ambition to eliminate the patchwork of local regulations, protectionist policies and market barriers fragmenting the domestic economy.

Lin Han-Shen, China director at The Asia Group advisory firm, described it as “the basic foundation of the entire domestic policy agenda this year”.

The term appeared prominently in the Chinese text of this year’s report and, unlike previous years when it was framed as guidance, was paired with binding legislation - signalling that Beijing may be moving from principle to enforcement, experts said. 
 

A person walks past the headquarters of the People's Bank of China, in Beijing, China May 7, 2025. (Photo: REUTERS/Tingshu Wang)

Guo flagged the commitment to consumption tax reform and described it as “far more expansive than anticipated”.

The move, she said, would mainly involve redistributing tax revenues to local governments through transfer payments.

Wong said the bigger obstacle lies in how provincial officials are judged. Their performance metrics reward them for boosting their own region, not for working with others - and may even encourage competition.

Bloated state-owned enterprises at provincial and local levels have entrenched patterns of territorial competition that resist coordination from the top, he added.

“Short of any drastic changes to the accountability mechanisms and the metrics by which cadres and officials are assessed, I do not see room for the kind of harmonisation that will be required,” Wong said.

INVOLUTION

Involution - or “neijuan” in Chinese - began as campus slang describing the futility of working harder without getting further ahead. Over time, it evolved into shorthand for destructive competition.

The 2025 government work report acknowledged it. This year’s report attached an enforcement toolkit.
 

At last year’s National People’s Congress (NPC) in March, President Xi Jinping called for taking “initiative to address issues such as local protectionism, market division and 'rat race' competitions”.  

By December’s Central Economic Work Conference, the unified national market legislation and the rectification of “involution-style competition” were paired as a single reform priority - a deliberate linkage, analysts said.

This year’s report goes further. It called for strengthening anti-monopoly and anti-unfair competition enforcement, tightening fair competition review mechanisms and deploying four instruments simultaneously - production capacity controls, standards guidance, price enforcement and quality supervision - to foster “a healthy market ecology”.

“Rat-race competition has genuinely moved from diagnosis to enforcement language - that’s the real story,” said Lin from The Asia Group.

Wong identified three reasons why Beijing is acting - fear of a deflationary spiral, concern about trade backlash from European and Southeast Asian markets and wage suppression that involution produces for frontline workers. 

Workers work on a production line manufacturing smart automotive central control navigation products at a factory in Suqian, Jiangsu Province, China April 9, 2025. (Photo: China Daily via REUTERS)

SERVICE CONSUMPTION

Another term elevated in this year’s government work report was “service consumption” - appearing four times as a standalone policy category, with its own action programme, budget line and delivery mechanisms. 

Lin from The Asia Group said that the creation of a formal action programme confirms that service consumption has moved beyond rhetoric and crossed over into official policy territory.

Guo argued that services employ 60 per cent of China's workforce, and that job insecurity - not lack of desire to spend - is the real constraint on household consumption.

Creating stable service-sector jobs is therefore the key, not just issuing vouchers, she added.

Analysts said this shift suggests that Beijing sees supply-side reform in China’s service sector, rather than demand stimulus, as the intended lever.

“Chinese society - organically, but also with encouragement from the government - is shifting away from merely consuming for the sake of necessity to consuming for the sake of experience,” said Wong from HKU, pointing to emotional value as an emerging driver. 

It reflects a deeper ambition, he said.

Beijing’s goal is not just to generate more spending but also to cultivate “a middle-class ethos”, Wong said. 

“Comfort is not enough,” he said. “The Chinese government is set on ensuring that citizens lead not just comfortable but moderately prosperous lives.”

“You can't rebalance the economy if you don't create alternative conduits for people to spend their disposable incomes,” he added. 

Deliverymen wait outside Kemao Electronic City, a major electronic market, in Beijing on Jul 14, 2025. (Photo: CNA/Hu Chushi)

INVESTING IN PEOPLE

Two phrases were paired throughout the report - investing in “physical things” and “people”.

Lin described “investing in people” as “the counter-narrative to pure infrastructure spend”.

It comes with a concrete new mechanism: the Urban and Rural Residents Income Growth Plan, first called for at December's Central Economic Work Conference.

HKU’s Wong traced the concept to the early years of Xi’s administration but said COVID and the first Trump trade war delayed its full articulation.

“Investment in people, whilst having been an important principle for a decade, was only able to gain proper policy salience after China emerged from that double whammy,” he said.

On what would actually shift household behaviour, Wong pointed to the safety net.

Short of revitalising the real estate sector, he said, improving social security and instilling confidence in long-term economic prospects is the only viable path to unlocking consumption.

“You don't need to worry as much about saving for a rainy day” if the safety net holds, he said - and that, in his view, is the precondition for everything else.

Taken together, the language in this year’s report suggests a leadership preparing for a more calibrated phase of development, as Beijing sets the lowest GDP growth target in decades at 4.5 to 5 percent. 

Amid external shocks, analysts said the emphasis is on self-sufficiency and resilience, with a pivot from quantity to quality.

In that sense, the report reads less like a rallying cry for rapid growth and more like a blueprint for durability. 

Source: CNA/xy(ht)

Sign up for our newsletters

Get our pick of top stories and thought-provoking articles in your inbox

Subscribe here
Inbox
FAST