The appellant was convicted by the High Court of the offence of importing into Singapore not less than 4,096g of diamorphine under s 7 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185) (the Act), and was sentenced to suffer death. Against her conviction, she appealed and we dismissed the appeal. We now give our reasons.

The facts

On 29 August 1991, the appellant arrived at terminal one of Changi Airport on board Thai Airways Flight TG 403 from Bangkok. While awaiting her luggage at belt 17 of the arrival hall, the appellant was observed to be acting suspiciously by Customs Officers Suriarti bte Mohamed (CO Suriarti) and Rosli bin Brahim (CO Rosli); the appellant looked nervous and turned around several times to look at the area where the customs officers were stationed. There are two customs inspection points just beyond luggage belt 17 and just before the exit: one at the green channel, and another a short distance away at the red channel for passengers with goods to declare. In between the red and green channels is the glass exit door. Some distance before the exit door is a customs green channel sign suspended from the roof.

At the material time, CO Rosli was standing behind the green channel customs counter while CO Suriarti was standing diagonally at a 45[deg ] angle to his right at a distance of about 5-6 feet away. According to CO Suriarti, she was standing below the green channel sign. Both customs officers testified that they had noticed the appellant looking at the customs officers at the red channel more than twice and alternately at the red and green channels. They testified that it appeared to them that the appellant was observing the manner in which the customs officers were operating. They then saw the appellant taking a duffle bag from belt 17. That further aroused their suspicion because there had been a drug case about a month earlier involving a similar bag. After collecting the duffle bag from the baggage belt, the appellant pushed her trolley in the direction of the exit, when she was directed by CO Suriarti to the customs inspection counter where CO Rosli was stationed.

The appellant then unlocked her duffle bag before CO Suriarti and CO Rosli with a key from her handbag. Both officers testified that they could not remember if the appellant had uttered the words `I open, you check` to them. According to CO Rosli, it was he who had asked the appellant to open her duffle bag. When CO Suriarti and CO Rosli examined the appellant`s duffle bag, they suspected that it contained a false bottom and escorted her to the customs office where a more thorough examination of the bag was carried out. At the customs office, CO Rosli cut open the bottom of the duffle bag in the presence of the appellant and recovered 20 blocks of a hard substance which, on subsequent analysis, were found to contain not less than 4,096g of diamorphine.

On the same day, the appellant made the following statement under s 122(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code (s 122(6) statement):

I bought the travelling bag at a roadside stall in Bangkok. At that time, I was carrying a jacket, a pair of jeans, a sweater and a pair of shoes and also my handbag. The salesgirl saw me carrying so many things, she offered to send the travelling bag to the hotel where I stayed. When I returned to the hotel after a while, she sent the travelling bag to my room. I gave her 10 Thai Baht as tips and she asked whether she could stay in my room because she was tired. As she could speak Cantonese, so I allowed her to stay in my room. While I was packing my things she also helped me to get my things and put them in the travelling bag. I do not know that there were heroin in the travelling bag. That is all.

At the trial, the voluntariness of the above statement was not disputed. There was no suggestion that there had been any threat, inducement or promise made to the appellant when she gave her statement. Counsel for the appellant, however, sought to expunge the statement on the basis that when the appellant made it:

(a) there was insufficient time given to her to comprehend the charge that she was facing;

(b) the charge was wrongly interpreted to the appellant; and

(c) her statement was not fully recorded.

None of these objections were sustained before the trial judge. In so far as the first objection was concerned, the trial judge held that he was satisfied on the evidence that sufficient time had been given to the appellant to enable her to comprehend fully the charge that she faced. He said that counsel`s argument was clearly at variance with the uncontroverted evidence of the investigating officer and the interpreter that they had taken time to go through the full process of reading, explaining and interpreting the charge and its nature and consequence to the appellant.

As for the second objection, the trial judge found that the interpreter had clearly testified that he had interpreted the word `import` as `bringing heroin into Singapore`, without any reference to the word `traffic` and held that he was satisfied that the charge was properly interpreted to the appellant and what was interpreted was sufficient to enable her to understand the charge that she faced before she gave her statement.

On the third objection, the trial judge held that he was not persuaded by counsel`s argument that the appellant`s s 122(6) statement did not fully reflect all that she had said to the police. The trial judge accepted the evidence of both the investigating officer and the interpreter that the statement was read back and interpreted to the appellant after it had been recorded and that the appellant was invited to make alterations or additions to it, which she declined. The appellant signed the statement after it had been read back and interpreted to her.

The appellant`s s 122(6) statement was accordingly admitted into evidence.

In her defence, the appellant testified that she was born in Macau but was raised in Hong Kong. She said that she had been a prostitute since the age of 18 and worked mainly in Hong Kong, earning about HK$20,000-30,000 per month. Her pimp was a man called Hor Fei. In the middle of 1991, she was introduced by Hor Fei to one Ah Hung, a pimp from Thailand, and received a proposal to travel to Thailand to entertain clients there. The appellant testified that she accepted the offer to be a prostitute in Thailand and left Hong Kong for Bangkok on 24 August 1991. A day after her arrival, she was introduced to a client by Ah Hung and entertained that client in a hotel for three days. Thereafter, she switched hotels and went out shopping with Ah Hung. It was during this shopping trip that she bought the duffle bag. At this juncture, it is best to reproduce, in so far as relevant, what the appellant said:

I saw a duffle bag. I was interested in it. Ah Hung asked if I was really interested in it. I said so long as it was given as a gift by him, I would like it. He then paid for the bag. At that moment, Ah Hung saw a friend, so he told the salesgirl to bring the bag together with me back to the hotel. Ah Hung said he would meet up with me later. So I went back to the hotel with the salesgirl. After I was back in my hotel room, about ten minutes later, Ah Hung came. I then went into the toilet. After I came out from the toilet, Ah Hung told me to take a bath. He said he would pack the things for me. I asked for the reason. Ah Hung said my bag was broken. He would help me to pack all my things into the new bag. I did as he said. When I came out from the bathroom, I didn`t see the salesgirl in the room. Ah Hung then went out with me for dinner. Ah Hung gave me an air ticket for Singapore. He told me that there was a customer waiting for me at Singapore. ... I told him I did not know the way and asked him whether he would accompany me there. He said he would. We then went back to the hotel. ... The next morning at about 6am, Ah Hung telephoned me. He asked me to get ready as he would come over in 10 to 15 minutes time. Ah Hung came with his hand holding a bottle of liquor. ... He told me that he could not accompany me to Singapore as he had got some urgent matter to attend to. He would catch a later flight to meet up with me. While I was doing my make-up, Ah Hung told me to bring along the bottle of liquor ... He said he would put the bottle of liquor into my bag. He also asked whether I had any more things to put inside the bag. I told him there was no more. He then padlocked the bag. He then gave me two keys to the padlock. ... When I arrived at the Singapore Airport, I went to the money changer to buy some Singapore dollars with Hong Kong currency. I shopped for a while at the airport before I went to collect my luggage. After I collected my bag, I put it on a trolley and pushed it towards the customs officers for checking. I told the customs officers by using the language, `I open, you check`. The customs officers had a short conversation - a female customs officer then told me to go to a room. When we went into the room I helped her to take out all the items in my bag. There were many people in the room. They took my bag to weigh it. I felt surprised as to why they should do it. They then cut open the bottom of my bag. A customs officer spoke to me in Cantonese by saying, `You die this time`. That customs officer asked me whether I knew what it was. He said it was `white powder`. I then asked him, if it was `white powder` why were they not in powder form, instead they were in blocks ...

The appellant was adamant in her testimony that she did not herself pack any item into the duffle bag either on the morning of her departure or on the previous evening. She said that she had assumed that all her belongings had been packed into the duffle bag by Ah Hung since she saw nothing lying around in the hotel room. She further testified that Ah Hung had handled the duffle bag all the way to the airport and checked it in on her behalf.

The appellant further said that at the Singapore airport terminal she voluntarily wheeled her trolley to the customs inspection counter where CO Rosli was stationed. She said that she saw only a male customs officer and not a female officer and that she was pushing her trolley diagonally towards him. If she had wanted to go towards the exit, she would not have pushed her trolley diagonally towards CO Rosli. Further, if she had known that there were illegal substances in her bag, she would not have gone to the customs officers to have her luggage checked. When she reached the customs inspection counter, she voluntarily said to CO Rosli, `I open, you check`, and denied that it was CO Rosli who had asked her to open her bag.

The decision below

The trial judge held that the actus reus of the offence, ie bringing the drugs into Singapore, was clearly established in this case and that there was also no doubt that the appellant knew and indeed intended to come to Singapore. The only issue in dispute was whether the appellant knew that there were drugs hidden in her duffle bag. In deciding this issue, the trial judge held that the presumptions under ss 18(1) and (2) of the Act were triggered and the burden lay on the appellant to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that she did not know that there were drugs hidden in her bag.

The trial judge then went on to consider the evidence. Having examined the appellant`s evidence, he disbelieved her testimony. In particular, he disbelieved that she had left it entirely to Ah Hung to pack her belongings into the duffle bag and that she did not handle the bag at all until she arrived in Singapore; that at the Singapore airport she wheeled her trolley diagonally towards the customs inspection counter where CO Rosli was stationed and not towards the exit; that she had come to Singapore to be a prostitute; that her s 122(6) statement did not contain all that she had said to the investigating officer and the interpreter. The trial judge held that she knowingly carried the drugs in question to Singapore. The trial judge accepted the testimony of CO Suriarti and CO Rosli that the appellant was pushing her trolley to the right of CO Suriarti towards the exit when she was stopped by CO Suriarti; that it was CO Rosli who had asked the appellant to open the duffle bag; that they had observed the appellant behaving suspiciously at luggage belt 17. The trial judge was satisfied that the appellant`s various observations of the surrounding area and the customs officers went beyond the innocent observations of a first time traveller and instead suggested a general uneasiness on her part, which in turn pointed somewhat to a realization that she was carrying illegal substances.

On a review of all the evidence, the trial judge came to the conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that she did not know that she was carrying drugs in her bag.

The appeal

Before us, counsel accepted that the presumptions under ss 18(1) and (2) applied, but contended that on the evidence the appellant had rebutted the presumptions. Counsel argued that the trial judge had failed to appreciate the appellant`s evidence that she had independently offered her bag to be checked by wheeling her trolley to the customs inspection counter where CO Rosli was stationed and uttering the words, `I open, you check` to the customs officers. If the appellant had known that the bag contained the drugs she would not have offered the bag for checking, and that showed that the appellant had no knowledge that the drugs were hidden in the bag.

Counsel further went on to argue that the trial judge erred in accepting the evidence of CO Suriarti as her evidence was contradictory and unsatisfactory. As counsel`s criticism of CO Suriarti`s evidence formed the main plank of his arguments before us, it is necessary to recount briefly the relevant part of the evidence of CO Suriarti. CO Suriarti testified that the appellant after collecting the duffle bag from the luggage belt, pushed her trolley in the direction of the green channel. She stopped the appellant just below the green channel sign with her right hand and directed the appellant to the customs inspection counter where CO Rosli was stationed. CO Suriarti was subject to intense cross-examination, in the course of which counsel for the appellant suggested to her that the appellant had, in fact, pushed her trolley towards the gap between her and the customs inspection counter where CO Rosli was stationed. CO Suriarti appeared to have agreed. At that point, the trial judge asked CO Suriarti the following question:

Was [the appellant] pushing the trolley between you and Rosli? Was it on your left that she was pushing the trolley?

CO Suriarti answered this question in the affirmative. At this point, the hearing was adjourned for the day. At the resumed hearing the following morning, CO Suriarti explained that her evidence on the previous day to the effect that the appellant had pushed the trolley towards the point between herself and CO Rosli was incorrect. She testified that she was nervous the day before and that she had misunderstood the question from the trial judge; she thought the question was whether the appellant had pushed the trolley towards the area between herself and the red channel and not whether the appellant had pushed the trolley towards the area between herself and CO Rosli. CO Suriarti further clarified that when she testified that the appellant had pushed the trolley to her left side, she was confused because she was thinking of it from the appellant`s direction. From the appellant`s direction, the trolley was being pushed to CO Suriarti`s left, but from CO Suriarti`s direction, the trolley was being pushed to her right.

The evidence of CO Suriarti was corroborated by the evidence of CO Rosli. He said that the appellant had not wheeled her trolley diagonally in the direction of the customs inspection counter where he was stationed but instead was wheeling it in the general direction of the exit. There was therefore evidence from both the customs officers that the appellant was stopped by CO Suriarti when she attempted to wheel her trolley past CO Suriarti`s right towards the exit.

The trial judge had carefully considered the contradiction in CO Suriarti`s evidence and accepted her explanation and found this evidence consistent with the evidence given subsequently by CO Rosli and also consistent with the evidence given by CO Suriarti that she had stopped the appellant using her right hand.

In our judgment, the trial judge was justified in accepting CO Suriarti`s evidence. It seemed to us immaterial whether the appellant wheeled the trolley to the left or right of CO Suriarti. What was material was that the appellant was stopped when she was about to pass CO Suriarti and was directed by the latter to the customs inspection counter where CO Rosli was.

The second argument of counsel was directed to the s 122(6) statement made by the appellant. Counsel submitted that the charge had been wrongly interpreted to the appellant; that there was insufficient time given to the appellant to comprehend the charge that she faced, and that the s 122(6) statement did not contain the full content of her statement to the police.

This argument had no merit, and we rejected it. The trial judge had carefully weighed the evidence in respect of each of the objections raised and found the objections to be without merit. We were not able to find any basis to say that the trial judge`s assessment of the evidence was faulty or that he erred in refusing to allow any of these objections. The trial judge was fully entitled on the evidence to accept the evidence of the investigating officer and the interpreter that they had taken time to go through the full process of reading, explaining and interpreting the charge to the appellant, that in explaining the charge to the appellant, they had interpreted the word `import` as `bringing heroin into Singapore` without any reference to the word `traffic`, and that the evidence did not support the appellant`s contention that her s 122(6) statement did not fully record all that she had said to the police. In any event, even if this statement was excluded, on basis of the evidence before the trial judge and his evaluation therefore, the appellant had not rebutted the presumptions under ss 18(1) and (2) of the Act.

For all the foregoing reasons, we dismissed the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.