The Punjab and Haryana High Court has said that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) had coerced a witness to implicate Dera Sacha Sauda Chief Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh in the murder case of journalist Ram Chander Chhatrapati in 2002.

A Division Bench of Chief Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Vikram Aggarwal made the observation in its recent judgment acquitting the godman, who had earlier been found guilty of conspiracy by a trial court in the murder case.

The High Court judgment clearing Ram Rahim was made public today.

The Court observed that Khatta Singh, the solitary witness of the alleged conspiracy, had chosen to remain silent for a number of years and kept on tossing from one side to the other "like a ping pong ball." It rejected the claim that a threat from Dera prevented the witness from deposing earlier.

“This Court will not hesitate in holding that on the contrary, it appears that he was coerced by CBI into making a statement as CBI was under pressure to conclude the investigation [from High Court]. It was so stated by Khatta Singh in many of his applications. It is a matter of grave concern that a premier Investigating Agency adopted this kind of methodology with a view to succeed in the matter. The endeavour should have been to go to the bottom of the matter and bring out the truth,” the Bench added.

Commenting on the role played by Dera followers in the case, the Court noted that Ram Rahim is a public figure and people like him have admirers and enemies. It added that followers of a faith many times cross limits and break laws.

“Such public figures are always in the news. At times for good reasons and at times for bad ones. It is well known that A1 (Ram Rahim) has a huge following. In our country, religion, caste, sects, play an extremely important role. Lives are given and taken in the name of religion, caste, sects etc. Disputes on Temples, Masjids, Gurudwaras, are not something new for us. Many of the followers of faiths, sects etc., can be termed to be `fanatics’,” the Bench further said.

The Court added that the trial court, which convicted and sentenced Ram Rahim to life imprisonment in 2018, was required to examine whether there was overwhelming evidence against him or whether the murder could have been a step independently taken by his staunch followers.

​​”Notably, there was no discussion on this aspect,” the Bench said.

Following an examination of the evidence, the High Court concluded that three other convicts, whose appeals were dismissed last week, acted on their own accord in committing the murder.

The Court also commented on the media coverage of the case.

"It is often said that Courts and Judges should not be swayed by media reports and the public attention which a matter receives. Matters are required to be decided strictly as per law. It has to be borne in mind that the principles of criminal jurisprudence require proving the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is well settled that the moment a doubt arises, its benefit has to go to the accused," the Bench said.

Going into the background of the case, the Bench noted that the High Court in 2002 had taken a suo motu cognizance of an anonymous letter making allegations that the Dera Chief was involved in the sexual abuse of sadhvis.

It recorded that during the pendency of the suo motu case, the son of journalist Ram Chander Chhatrapati filed a petition seeking a proper investigation into his father’s murder. The son claimed that his father was shot dead because he had been publishing news relating to the Dera Sacha Sauda.

The Court further noted that the probe into the murder case was then transferred to the CBI.

It added that the Court in April 2007 reprimanded the CBI for a slow investigation, upon which the agency assured that the probe would be completed in a timely manner. The said undertaking was recorded as well by the Court.

"An undertaking was given by CBI that the investigation would be concluded by 25.05.2007. On 28.05.2007, CBI made a statement before the High Court that field investigation was over and the charge sheet would be filed by 31.07.2007. Till this time also, the name of A1 (Ram Rahim) had not surfaced," the Bench noted.

Just weeks after that, the Court noted that Khatta Singh's statement was recorded by the CBI, leading to the naming of Ram Rahim as accused number one

“On 21.06.2007, the statement of Khatta Singh was recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.PW31/A). It is at this point of time that Khatta Singh, for the first time, almost 5 years after the incident, alleged that on 23.10.2002, he had travelled with A1 (Ram Rahim) to Jalandhar for a Satsang and when they returned to the Dera in the evening, A2 to A4 showed him the Pura Sach publication of 23.10.2002 which provoked A1 and at this stage, he directed A2 to A4 to eliminate Ram Chander Chhatrapati,” the Bench said.

However, Khatta Singh turned hostile during the trial and accused CBI of coercing him. Later, in 2017, following Ram Rahim’s conviction in rape cases, Khatta Singh filed an application to again support the prosecution case. The High Court opined that the trial court did not examine whether the witness was reliable.

The Court also noted the police officer, who had recorded the murder victim’s statement at PGI Rohtak, was not examined during the trial. His evidence would have been of extreme importance, the Bench said. It noted that even that statement was not brought on record.

The Court said it would be a pure conjecture to conclude that this was done to shield Ram Rahim. It, thus, said the benefit of the doubt necessarily has to go to the accused.

“It is extremely strange that this very important witness was given up by the prosecution as `being unnecessary’. One could still have understood had the witness been given up as having been `won over’. In the considered opinion of this Court, he was the most important witness,” it added.

The Bench also found it strange that no application was moved to seek an opinion of the treating doctor as to whether the murder victim was fit to give a statement or not when he was reported to be stable in the hospital, a few days before his death.

The Court, ultimately, concluded that Ram Rahim’s guilt was not proved and acquitted him.

Senior Advocate R Basant with Advocates Aman Jha, Amar D Kamra, Akshay Sahay and Jitendra Khurana represented Ram Rahim.

Special Public Prosecutors Ravi Kamal Gupta and Akashdeep Singh represented the CBI.

Senior Advocate RS Cheema, with Advocates Sarabjot Singh Cheema, Anmoldeep Singh and Inderpal Singh represented the complainant. 

[Read Judgment]

A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court on Monday upheld a permanent injunction restraining Hong Kong-based Crocodile International from using a crocodile device mark found to infringe the trademark and copyright of French luxury sportswear brand Lacoste [Crocodile v. Lacoste]

A Bench of Justices Hari Shankar and Om Prakash Shukla held that Lacoste had successfully established infringement of its registered crocodile trademark as well as copyright in the artwork of the logo.

The Court, therefore, affirmed the permanent injunction granted in favour of Lacoste, restraining Crocodile from reproducing or using the mark.

A copy of the detailed judgment is yet to be made available.

Nevertheless, the Court held that Lacoste had failed to establish the claim of passing off, observing that it had not sufficiently proved the existence of goodwill necessary to sustain such a claim.

It also rejected Crocodile’s contention that Lacoste had acquiesced in the use of the mark.

The dispute between Lacoste and Crocodile dates back more than two decades and forms part of a broader global trademark battle between the two apparel brands over the use of crocodile imagery in fashion branding.

Lacoste instituted the suit before the Delhi High Court in 2001 seeking protection of its trademark and copyright rights in India. The company sought to restrain Crocodile International and its Indian affiliate from manufacturing, selling or advertising apparel and other products bearing a crocodile device that it alleged was deceptively similar to its own.

According to Lacoste, while its crocodile logo faces towards the right, the crocodile used by Crocodile International faces towards the left, making it effectively a mirror image of the Lacoste device. The company argued that the visual and conceptual similarity between the marks was likely to cause confusion among consumers and dilute the distinctiveness of its well-known trademark.

Crocodile, however, opposed the suit by contending that the parties had previously arrived at a coexistence understanding in several Asian jurisdictions, allowing both companies to operate in certain territories. It argued that this understanding extended to India and, therefore, Lacoste was barred from seeking injunctive relief.

In August 2024, a single judge of the Delhi High Court ruled in favour of Lacoste and granted a permanent injunction restraining Crocodile International from using the disputed crocodile device mark in India. It also directed Crocodile to render accounts of profits earned from the sale of goods bearing the crocodile mark from August 1998, when the company began marketing products in India, until the cessation of use of the mark.

Both sides subsequently challenged aspects of the ruling, leading to the present decision.

Lacoste was represented by Senior Advocate Chander M Lall with Advocates Nancy Roy and Prakriti Varshney.

Crocodile was represented by Advocates Saif Khan, Prajwal Kushwaha and Shyal Anand from Anand & Anand.

A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court on Monday upheld an order permitting Indian pharma giant Dr Reddy's to manufacture diabetes management and weight-loss drug Semaglutide in India for export to countries where Danish company Novo Nordisk does not hold patent protection over its sale under brand names like Ozempic [Novo Nordisk Vs Dr. Reddy's].

A Division Bench of Justices Hari Shankar and Om Prakash Shukla said it found no reason to interfere with the single-judge Bench's decision to accept Dr Reddy’s argument that Novo Nordisk’s species patent covering Semaglutide appeared vulnerable to revocation for being obvious.

“We therefore see no reason to disturb the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge,” the Court observed while dismissing Novo Nordisk's appeal in the matter.

A copy of the order is yet to be made available.

The Division Bench also clarified that even if the single judge may have conflated certain statutory provisions while discussing the grounds for revoking a patent, the finding on obviousness alone was sufficient to sustain the order.

At the same time, it clarified that the observations made in its ruling are prima facie in nature and will not influence the final adjudication of the patent dispute when the suit is decided on merits.

Semaglutide is marketed under brand names such as Ozempic, Wegovy and Rybelsus by Novo Nordisk.

Novo Nordisk holds a 2014 species patent covering Semaglutide. Last year, it filed a patent infringement suit before the Delhi High Court to restrain Dr Reddy’s from manufacturing the compound in India.

Dr Reddy’s contested the claim, arguing that Novo Nordisk's patent lacked novelty and inventive step (requirements for a valid patent) in light of Novo Nordisk’s earlier genus patent, which had expired in 2024.

In a December 2, 2025, ruling, a single-judge Bench of the Delhi High Court held that the Semaglutide patent appeared vulnerable to revocation under Section 64 of the Patents Act, 1970. The single judge observed that the compound modification leading to the creation of Semaglutide seemed obvious, in light of prior art, including the earlier genus patent and scientific literature.

Based on these findings, the single judge passed an interim order allowing Dr Reddy’s to manufacture Semaglutide in India strictly for export purposes, clarifying that the permission did not extend to domestic sale.

It dismissed Novo Nordisk's application to restrain Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Limited from manufacturing and exporting the said drug.

Novo Nordisk challenged this decision before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. The Division Bench, on December 12, 2025, declined to stay the single-judge ruling and instead opined that the appeal itself should be heard finally.

The Division Bench noted that the single judge had delivered a detailed ruling after comparing the patent with prior art and had found substance in Dr Reddy's challenge to Novo Nordisk's patent’s validity.

The Bench observed that the core reasoning of the single judge’s order prima facie supported the conclusions reached.

At the same time, the Court clarified that the validity of Novo Nordisk’s patent would require detailed examination at the stage of final disposal of the appeal. Since the single judge had limited the relief to export-only manufacture, the Bench held that the matter did not warrant the grant of interim relief.

Today, the Court dismissed Novo Nordisk's appeal challenging the single-judge's interim ruling.

Novo Nordisk was represented by Advocates Hemant Singh and Mamta Rani Jha from Inttl Advocare.

Dr. Reddy's was represented by Senior Advocates Gopal Subramanium and Sai Deepak with Advocates Siddhant Goel and Mohit Goel from Sim & San.

At least 7 law graduates have cracked the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) Civil Service Examinations, 2025.

Ishan Bhatnagar, a 2023 graduate of National Law University Delhi (NLU Delhi), has secured All India Rank 5.

Rishabh Yadav, a 2023 graduate of Dr Ram Manohar Lohia National Law University (RMLNLU) Lucknow, has secured All India Rank 132.

Akshat Baldwa, a 2025 visually impaired graduate of National Law School India University (NLSIU), Bangalore, has secured All India Rank 173.

Vanaj Vidyan, a 2023 graduate of RMLNLU, has secured All India Rank 278.

Yukti Chauhan, a 2024 graduate of Dr BR Ambedkar National Law University, Sonepat, has secured All India Rank 530.

Praveen Yadav, a 2022 graduate of RMLNLU has secured All India Rank 582.

Aditya Dhiman, a 2025 graduate of National Law Institute University, Bhopal has secured All Indian Rank 753.

This story will be updated as and when we get more information. If you are aware of any other law graduates who have cleared the exam, kindly write to hiranya@barandbench.com.

Two Republic TV journalists, who were arrested for attempting to record visuals of an Iranian naval vessel anchored inside Cochin Port, have approached a Kerala court seeking bail.

The Judicial First Class Magistrate-I court in Ernakulam heard their bail application on Monday and reserved verdict in the matter.

Reporter Sankar CG and cameraman S Mani along with a boat driver were taken into custody in Kochi on Sunday, March 8.

The group was detained for capturing visuals of the IRIS Lavan, which arrived at the port a day after the United States sank another Iranian warship off the coast of Sri Lanka amid the ongoing conflict in West Asia. IRS Lavan is currently docked at the port, following a diplomatic arrangement between India and Iran.

According to reports, they travelled in a small hired boat to the port area to record visuals of the foreign military vessel from close range.

They were picked up by the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) near a restricted high-security zone. Photography and videography are prohibited in the area without official clearance.

They were booked under provisions of the Sections 3(1)(a) (spying in prohibited places) and 5 (wrongful communication of information) of the Official Secrets Act as well as Sections 329(3) (criminal trespass) and Section 3(5) (acts committed with common intention) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

Before the court, advocate Geo Paul, representing the journalists, submitted that no objectionable footage had been recorded. He also argued that other news organisations have also been reporting on the docking of the ship and, therefore, the charges under the Official Secrets Act would not stand against the two Republic TV journalists.

The Court will pronounce its order on the bail application tomorrow.

The bail application was filed through advocate Luke J Chirayil.

The Chhattisgarh High Court recently quashed a 2016 criminal complaint filed by a former judicial officer's wife against the then Chief Justice Navin Sinha, former judge Justice P Diwaker and several members of the higher judicial service of the State [High Court of Chhattisgarh v State of Chhattisgarh]

The complainant Pratibha Gwal stated that her husband, Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) Prabhakar Gwal, who was later dismissed from service, in October 2015, was abused by certain persons at a toll plaza, leading to registration of a criminal case.

In the 2016 complaint, she alleged that police did not file a chargesheet in respect of that incident due to a conspiracy involving police officials, members of the judicial service and even the then Chief Justice Sinha and Justice Diwaker.

After an Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Raipur entertained her complaint and fixed the case for recording of preliminary evidence, the High Court through its Registrar General filed a writ petition to get the proceedings quashed.

In a judgment dated February 28, a Division Bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru said the complaint was devoid of material particulars and failed to disclose commission of any cognizable offence by the then Chief Justice, the other sitting judge or even the judicial officers.

The complaint was an attempt to convert administrative or personal grievances into a criminal prosecution, the Bench said.

"The continuance of the impugned complaint proceedings against the Respondent Nos. 11 to 19 before the learned trial Court would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. The allegations contained in the complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, fail to disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged. The proceedings appear to be manifestly attended with mala fide intention and founded upon conjectures rather than concrete material," it added.

The Bench further said that permitting such prosecution to proceed would not serve the ends of justice but would instead subject the concerned persons to unnecessary harassment and the rigours of a criminal trial without foundational basis in law.

"Accordingly, the present writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The impugned criminal complaint instituted by Respondent No. 2 before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, in so far as it pertains to the Respondent Nos. 11 to 19 before the trial Court, is quashed and set aside," the Court ordered.

The Court also quashed the order by which the Raipur magistrate had fixed Gwal's complaint for recording of preliminary evidence against the proposed accused. However, the Bench clarified that the proceedings can continue in respect of any other proposed accused in the complaint case.

The Court in the judgment also noted that though the complaint was filed by Gwal, the alleged grievances pertained to her husband in official capacity. It added that her complaint was based on information in the exclusive knowledge of her husband in his official dealings.

"The affidavit in support of the complaint is sworn by Respondent No. 2 [wife], though the matters alleged primarily relate to official interactions and administrative grievances concerning Respondent No. 3 [husband]," it said

Senior Advocate NK Shukla, representing the High Court Registrar General, argued the complaint contained sweeping and omnibus allegations, lacking in essential ingredients of any cognizable offence.

"The mere non-filing of a chargesheet, even if assumed to be true, does not constitute an offence, much less criminal conspiracy, against judicial officers of the High Court," Shukla submitted.

Additional Advocate General Praveen Das appeared for the State and submitted that State would abide by any court order in the case and has no independent objection to the adjudication of the dispute on its own merits.

Advocate Sareena Khan, representing the complainant, submitted that the High Court's plea was wholly misconceived, malicious and filed with the intent to shield certain high constitutional functionaries from legitimate scrutiny. 

She also argued that then judicial officer Gwal was made a respondent to the petition only to create prejudice and to malign his reputation.

It was also submitted that judicial officer Gwal was subjected to adverse proceedings and criminal registration during the tenure of the then Chief Justice and a sitting judge of the High Court.

In written response, Gwal alleged that a larger conspiracy had been carried out against him and his family, beginning with alleged administrative actions including transfer to a Naxal-affected area, issuance of repeated notices, stoppage of annual increment, and eventual termination from service. 

Considering the submissions, the Court stressed that summoning of constitutional functionaries and members of the higher judicial service entails serious consequences, not only to the individuals concerned but also to the institutional integrity of the judicial system.

"Criminal law cannot be permitted to be invoked as a tool of harassment, intimidation or to ventilate administrative or service grievances under the guise of criminal prosecution," the Bench said.

It added that the entire complaint was based on mere apprehension and suspicion. On the allegation of criminal conspiracy, the Court said,

"It is trite that for constituting an offence under Section 120-B of the IPC, there must be specific allegations indicating an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or to do a lawful act by illegal means. The complaint in question is conspicuously silent on these foundational aspects. The allegations are omnibus, vague and inherently improbable so far as Respondent Nos. 11 to 19 before the trial Court are concerned. Even if the entire complaint is taken at its face value and accepted in its entirety, no offence is made out against the said respondents."

The Court also said that allegations regarding administrative actions like transfer and termination from service, lie squarely within the realm of service jurisprudence and cannot be camouflaged as criminal conspiracy in the absence of tangible and cogent material.

"Permitting such omnibus accusations against members of the judiciary and public servants to proceed without foundational facts would seriously impair institutional integrity and open floodgates for disgruntled litigants or officers to level reckless allegations," the Bench underscored, while quashing the complaint.

Gwal joined service as Civil Judge, Class-II in 2005, was promoted to Civil Judge, Class-I in 2012, and later to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM), Raipur in 2015.

While serving as ACJM, he lodged complaints against a sitting MLA and senior police officers without the permission of the High Court, which invited multiple show cause notices.  Around the same time, his wife also made representations before constitutional authorities, levelling grave allegations of conspiracy.

In view of the repeated complaints and allegations—including those casting aspersions on sitting judges, he was sacked in 2016. The Supreme Court last year upheld the High Court's decision to terminate Gwal from the judicial services.

[Read High Court Judgment]

The Gujarat High Court recently held Motor Accident Claims Tribunals (MACT) cannot rely on disability certificates in accident compensation cases without carefully examining their authenticity.

Justice Hasmukh D Suthar observed that there are doctors who are willing to give "ready to use" disability certificates even without medically examining the person who seeks to make use of the certificate to claim compensation.

In this regard, the High Court referred to earlier Supreme Court decision in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar, wherein the top court had noted that there were unscrupulous doctors who are willing to give disability certificates without proper medical assessment.

The High Court proceeded to underscore that motor accident compensation tribunals must take an active role when disability certificates are produced on record.

"When 'ready to use' Disability Certificate is produced on record at that time the learned Tribunal cannot sit as a mute spectator and the Tribunal has directive role in the decision making process," stated the Court in its March 3 order.

The Court further noted while compensation proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (compensation to victims of road accidents) are intended to assist injured persons, the system may also be misused.

"It is true that the Motor Vehicles Act is a benevolent legislation and the benefits of such benevolent provision and compensation granted under the Act is required to be reached to the actual sufferer or the needy claimant but many times the benevolent legislation being misused and abused by unscrupulous elements and sometime concocted record or medical documents are also produced on the record."

The Court made the observation while allowing a petition by Tata AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd. It set aside an MACT order that had rejected the insurer’s request for the medical reassessment of a claimant’s disability.

The case arose from a motor accident compensation claim filed before the MACT at Godhra in 2017.

The claimant submitted that he sustained serious injuries to his right hand and underwent surgery that included amputation of the index finger and removal of certain hand bones. A disability certificate produced in the MACT proceedings assessed the claimant's disability at 90 per cent.

The insurance company, however, countered that the disability certificate had been issued by a doctor who had not treated the injured person. It, therefore, sought a direction for the claimant's reassessment by a District Medical Board.

The MACT rejected the request in September 2024, following which the insurer approached the High Court.

The High Court held that the tribunal should adopt a cautious approach before accepting the disability certificate.

"Mere production of the Disability Certificate or Discharge Certificate is not the proof of the physical or functional disablement," said the Court.

Explaining the distinction between medical disability and its legal consequences, the Court said compensation must be assessed based on “functional disability” (the effect of the injury on a person’s earning capacity).

"The Tribunal must have to consider functional disablement with reference to the impact of the injury on the claimant overall earning capacity and not merely on his inability to continue the same avocation," it added.

The Court also noted concerns regarding the issue of disability certificates by doctors who had not treated the injured person.

"It is true that, in many cases the Disability Certificate issued by the Doctor who has not treated the victim and exorbitant disablement is opined without any reference book or any specific guidelines," it said.

Ultimately, the High Court set aside the MACT’s order rejecting the request for the claimant's medical reassessment.

The Court directed that the insurance company may apply before the tribunal for a direction requiring the claimant to appear before a District Medical Board for evaluation of the claimant's disability.

The Court also observed that if the claimant fails to appear before the medical board despite such a direction, the tribunal may draw an adverse inference (a negative conclusion based on refusal to comply) while deciding the compensation claim.

Advocate Kriti S Pathak appeared for TATA AIG General Insurance Company Limited.

[Read Order]

Law firm Fox Mandal & Co has moved the Supreme Court challenging a ₹3.9 crore service tax demand arising from proceedings under the pre-GST regime. [Fox Mandal & Company v. Commissioner]

The matter came up briefly before a Bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Alok Aradhe.

During the hearing, counsel for the petitioner informed the Bench that an important annexure relating to the reconciliation issue was missing from the special leave petition (SLP) and sought time to place the document on record. Taking note of the submission, the Court granted two weeks’ time to the petitioner to place additional documents on record and adjourned the matter.

The dispute stems from service tax proceedings initiated against Fox Mandal & Co for the period 2010–11 to 2014–15. The proceedings began with a show cause notice proposing a total demand of about ₹6.9 crore, including service tax and recovery of allegedly irregular CENVAT credit. However, the adjudicating authority later dropped a portion of the demand amounting to roughly ₹3.01 crore.

Tax authorities had alleged that the firm had irregularly availed CENVAT credit, failed to pay service tax on certain transactions and that there were discrepancies between figures reported in service tax returns and those reflected in its financial statements.

The proceedings ultimately led to an adjudication order confirming service tax of ₹2.99 crore against the firm along with recovery of ₹89.63 lakh in CENVAT credit, apart from interest and a small penalty for delayed filing of returns.

Taken together, the liability arising from the proceedings was estimated at about ₹3.9 crore, leading to the present dispute.

Another issue in the case related to the firm’s claim that certain legal services rendered to overseas clients qualified as “export of services”, which would make them exempt from service tax under the Finance Act, 1994. The department disputed this claim, stating that the firm had failed to produce sufficient documentary evidence to establish that the services qualified as exports.

The department also raised objections to certain sponsorship expenses recorded in the firm’s books, treating them as taxable under the reverse charge mechanism.

The matter was subsequently taken to the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Allahabad Bench.

In its order, the tribunal partly allowed the firm’s appeal and remanded several issues for fresh consideration by the adjudicating authority.

Among other things, the tribunal noted that the denial of CENVAT credit had been based largely on the firm’s inability to produce original invoices during audit, even though photocopies were later produced during the proceedings. It held that the documents should be verified before rejecting the credit claim.

The tribunal also remanded the issue relating to export of services, observing that the demand had been confirmed largely on the basis of a departmental verification report that had not been disclosed to the assessee during adjudication.

However, the tribunal upheld a limited portion of the demand relating to service tax on sponsorship expenses, noting that the firm itself had recorded the payments as sponsorship in its accounts and had not produced evidence to show they were donations.

Aggrieved by aspects of the tribunal’s ruling in the ₹3.9 crore tax dispute, Fox Mandal & Co has now approached the Supreme Court

Fox Mandal was represented by Advocate Surjendu Sankar Das.

The Karnataka High Court recently upheld the Central Board of Secondary Examination's (CBSE) decision to debar a 12th standard student from appearing in board examinations for the academic years 2025-26 and 2026-27, after he was found to have a mobile phone in his pocket while taking an exam [CBSE v Donthi Satvik Reddy].

A Bench of Chief Justice Vibhu Bhakru and Justice CM Poonacha said that it could not interfere with an expert body's policy decision in such matters.

"(Under revised rules introduced in 2024) even mere possession of a mobile phone has been mentioned in Category - 3, which prescribes a stringent penalty, which has been done in the present case. The said aspect having been proposed, discussed and ratified by an expert body, this Court, substituting its opinion with that of the expert body does not arise," the Court said.

The Division Bench proceeded to set aside a single-judge Bench order that had earlier granted relief to the student on the ground that there was nothing to indicate that he had any intention to use the mobile phone to cheat.

The Division Bench opined that the single-judge could not have extended the student a benefit of doubt that was not provided for in the CBSE's rules or thereby diluted the strictness of the board's policy.

"The question of reading down an aspect which has been specifically removed from Category - 1 and inserted in Category - 3 (regarding possession of mobile phones during exams) by an expert body is not liable to be interfered with/diluted by this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India," it said.

The 12th standard student had arrived 25 minutes late for his first board exam on the subject, Physical Education. The examination center was 23 kilometers from his residence.

During the examination, a phone was seized from his pocket after he came to the examination hall from a washroom break.

The student explained to an enquiry committee that he was not aware of the mobile phone in his pocket, pointing out that it was even unnoticed when he was frisked during his entry to the exam hall.

He also highlighted that there was nothing on the mobile phone that was relevant to the exam he was taking, meaning there was no evidence to indicate that the phone could have been used to cheat during the exam.

A subject expert also examined the phone and reported that no relevant exam material was found on the phone. The committee, however, penalised the student with debarment as per the CBSE's Unfair Means guidelines.

The student challenged this turn of events before the High Court. In August 2025, a single-judge Bench quashed CBSE's debarment order, noting that the board was not able to provide evidence that the mobile had been used by the student in the examination.

The single judge opined that it was only a case of negligence by the student and gave him the benefit of the doubt, since no relevant exam subject-related material was found on the mobile.

The CBSE filed an appeal before the Division Bench, challenging the single-judge ruling.

The Division Bench relied on the 139^th Governing Body Meeting of CBSE that stipulated that the mere possession of mobile phones in the examination hall would be met with the penalty of debarment for the current academic and next academic year, in order to curb risks of exam papers being leaked.

The Bench opined that the Court cannot substitute its view for the CBSE's approach in such matters and allowed the board's appeal.

The CBSE was represented by Advocate Ananditha Reddy.

The student was represented by Advocate Rajeswara PN.

[Read Order]

The Delhi High Court on Monday stayed the adverse observations made by the trial court against the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and its investigating officer in its verdict discharging all 23 accused including Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) leaders Arvind Kejriwal and Manish Sisodia in connection with the Delhi excise policy case.

Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma also directed the trial court to postpone the hearing in the money laundering case connected to the matter till the Court decides CBI's revision plea against the trial court verdict.

"I will pass an order of stay with regard to whatever remarks and statements are made against the investigating agency and officer. I will ask the trial court to postpone the hearing of the PMLA case to a date after the hearing before this court," the judge said.

She then issued notice to the accused persons and asked them to file their replies to the CBI's plea.

The CBI filed the revision petition challenging the trial court's verdict of February 27.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing for CBI, said that he is, for now, not seeking a stay on the discharge of the accused, but only a direction that the trial court verdict will not affect the money laundering case being probed separately by the Enforcement Directorate (ED).

"It's a peculiar way in which the discharge has taken place. I understand that the stay of the judgment would mean that the trial takes place. I would not ask for that, but this is a CBI case based on which the ED case is proceeding. This judgment may not affect that. My ladyship may stay this saying that the ED case will not be affected," he said.

He further said that the excise policy scam is one of the biggest in the nation's history.

"This is one of the biggest scams in the history of the capital of this nation and in my opinion a national shame. Scientific investigation was carried out. Each and every aspect of conspiracy was established," he contended.

He also argued that there were witness statements which clearly established a conspiracy.

"There were 164 [CrPC] statements. There are witnesses who clearly elaborate how the conspiracy was hatched, how the bribe was paid, and to whom the bribe was paid. There is one person called Vijay Nair, he is the communications incharge of the political party... ₹19 crore to ₹100 crore bribe was paid in lieu of favours given. Out of this, ₹44.50 crore were transferred by hawala, and meticulous scientific investigation demonstrates that the money went to Goa to fund the elections for the party," it was contended.

Background

Special judge Jitendra Singh had on February 27 discharged all the accused in the case, holding that the prosecution case does not survive judicial scrutiny as the CBI had tried to construct a narrative of conspiracy on the basis of mere conjecture.

Hence, it ruled that the case did not merit a trial.

The case arose in 2022 when the CBI registered a First Information Report (FIR) alleging that the Delhi Excise Policy of 2021-22 was manipulated to facilitate monopolisation and cartelisation of liquor trade in Delhi.

The CBI case was registered on a complaint made by Lieutenant Governor VK Saxena on July 20, 2022. 

The probe agency said that the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and its leaders received kickbacks from liquor manufacturers due to manipulation of the policy. The Enforcement Directorate (ED) also later registered a case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) in the matter.

What followed was a series of arrests of opposition leaders, criticised by some quarters as being politically motivated.

It was alleged that a criminal conspiracy was hatched by AAP leaders, including Sisodia and Kejriwal and other unidentified and unnamed private persons/entities at the stage of the policy’s formulation.

The conspiracy, it was alleged, involved loopholes “intentionally” left or created in the policy. These loopholes were allegedly meant to favour some liquor licensees and conspirators post the tender process, it was claimed.

Based on its claims, the CBI chargesheeted 23 accused.

The political leaders spent a considerable time in jail as the Rouse Avenue Court and the Delhi High Court denied them bail. It was the Supreme Court which later granted them relief.

However, the trial court on February 27 discharged all the accused.

The special court also pulled up the CBI for building its case through approver statements.

"If such conduct is allowed, it would be a grave violation of the Constitutional principles. The conduct where an accused is granted pardon and then made an approver, his statements used to fill the gaps in the investigation/narrative and make additional people accused is wrong," the judge said.

In its criminal revision petition, the CBI said that the order passed by the special judge on February 27 is "patently illegal, perverse and suffers from errors apparent on the face".

The CBI argued that the judge essentially conducted a mini-trial and dealt with separate limbs of conspiracy in isolation.

According to the plea,

"The Ld Special Judge has passed the impugned order on a selective reading of the prosecution case, disregarding the material showing the culpability of the accused."

Further, as per the petition, the judge's order directing departmental action against the CBI officer who investigated the case is "shocking to say the least".

The plea stated that while making observations in the court during pronouncing the discharge order, the judge orally stated that he had spent the last four months reading only the file of the case, which shows appreciation of evidence in great details and the same is not permitted at this stage of framing of charge.

The revision plea said that the trial court erred in analysing the role of Arvind Kejriwal and Manish Sisodia.

"The Ld Special Judge has erred in not appreciating the conspectus of the conspiracy in its entirety. Such piecemeal appreciation of evidence, rather than a conjoint reading of the case, has led to the passing of the Impugned Order, which needs to be set aside," it was contended.

Hearing today

The SG today argued that the discharge order was more like an acquittal order though no trial was held.

"This is an order of acquittal without trial. It is as bad as that. It may sound like an overstatement, but it is an understatement," the SG said.

He said that the evidence adduced by the investigating agency was "meticulous".

"At least with my limited experience in this field, I have not come across such meticulous evidence collected by an investigation agency," he argued.

He said that the judgment turns the criminal law on its head since approver statements don't need corroboration till the stage of trial.

"This [the judgement] is turning criminal law on its head. Approver statements do not need corroboration till the stage of trial. They [approvers] can be cross-examined (during trial). Approver has not been placed before the court in the witness box, not examined, not cross-examined. His approvership is before the magistrate, and it is nobody's case that he became an approver under threat or coercion," the SG submitted.

He said that one of the findings by the trial court was that Manish Sisodia handled the bribe.

"So, now we have to show that the person personally handled the cash, like in the past when an officer was caught red-handed with cash?" he asked.

[Read Live Coverage]

The Supreme Court recently took exception to the growing practice of litigants failing to comply with court orders and then filing delayed appeals challenging such orders, only to stall contempt of court proceedings initiated for their non-compliance with earlier directives [Israr Ahmed Khan v. Amarnath Prasad & ors].

A Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R Mahadevan made the observation in a February 24 order.

The Court was dealing with a case where officers of the Chhattisgarh State Minor Forest Produce Federation had indicated that they were awaiting the outcome of a review petition to decide on whether to comply with certain court directives in a service dispute.

The Court strongly criticised the federation for taking such an approach. Notably, it also flagged a larger trend of litigants filing appeals challenging court orders only after contempt proceedings are initiated over their failure to comply with court directives.

“Delayed filing of appeals should be the exception, but in recent times, the exception has practically evolved to become the rule. Orders passed by the Courts are not complied with for a long time, and when Contempt Petitions are filed, belated appeals, with tremendous delay, are preferred,”  the Court noted.

The Bench observed that such tactics are often used to secure adjournments in contempt proceedings by merely producing proof that an appeal has been filed.

“We, in no uncertain terms, deprecate these practices. It is felt that by such modus operandi, disobedient litigants act brazenly which has the further effect of bringing down the authority and majesty of the Courts and the rule of law, interfering in the administration of justice. The same may well, in certain situations, border on criminal contempt,” the Court warned.

The Bench further emphasised that High Courts should deal with such unscrupulous litigants with iron hands, more so when they happen to be State functionaries. It warned that failure to do so could erode public faith in the judiciary.

“It is the solemn duty of all of us manning the Courts across the hierarchy to ensure that the public faith never wavers,” the Court added.

The Court made these observations while dealing with two contempt petitions. The petitioners had earlier approached the top court by way of civil appeals seeking service-related relief against authorities linked to the Chhattisgarh State Minor Forest Produce Cooperative Federation.

In a May 20, 2025 judgment, the top court directed the authorities to grant certain reliefs to the petitioners, including the creation of a supernumerary post of “Godown Keeper.” It had granted three months’ time to implement the directions, setting the compliance deadline as August 20, 2025.

The directions, however, were not implemented within the stipulated period. Instead, the Managing Director of the Federation wrote to the State government seeking guidance on implementing the order after more than two months of the compliance period had already elapsed.

Subsequent correspondence took place between the Federation and the State government.

On October 3, the State government wrote back asking whether all legal options had been exhausted against the Supreme Court’s judgment.

The compliance deadline expired on August 20, and a review petition challenging the May 20 judgment was subsequently filed in October 2025.

Following this, the petitioners moved the top court by filing contempt petitions alleging non-compliance by the Federation with the May 20 judgment.

The top court noted that after filing the review petition, the Managing Director wrote to the State government stating that a proposal to create the post was being prepared so that action could be taken depending on the outcome of the review petition.

The Court held that a prima facie case of contempt was made out, as the authorities cannot view the implementation of court directives as conditional on the outcome of its review petition.

"Lo and behold, the implementation of Order dated 20.05.2025 was sought to be and made conditional on the outcome of a Review Petition. We must unequivocally state herein that while no fetter could be placed on preferring a Review Petition, it was the duty of the alleged contemnors to first comply with the Order. Depending on the outcome of the Review Petition, further steps/adjustment could have possibly taken place. But, it was not open to the alleged contemnors to not comply with an Order of this Court on the mere filing of a Review Petition, which, at the deliberate cost of repetition, remains defective due to want of rectification by the concerned Review Petitioner," the Bench said.

The Court also noted that even the authorities had admitted that it could comply with the earlier directives if it set its mind to do so.

"It is quite clear that, at least as on date, the alleged contemnors could very well have purged the contempt but chosen not to do so ... We were of the view that Charge(s) ought to be framed against the alleged contemnors as they have all but admitted to being in contempt while offering inexcusable justifications for non-compliance," it observed.

The Bench went on to clarify that even individuals who were not parties to the original proceedings could be proceeded against for contempt if they knowingly aided or facilitated non-compliance with a court order.

It explained that once a party becomes aware of an order of the Court, any wilful default or deliberate non-compliance would make it liable to face contempt proceedings.

In the present case, the Court noted that the State government and the Additional Chief Secretary were aware of the May 20 order from July 22, 2025 onwards, as per the correspondence placed on record.

“While we have no doubt been proponents of justice being tempered with mercy, incidents like this seriously make us question whether the ‘liberal’ jurisprudence on contempt requires a serious re-look. Such issue, having come to our attention, will definitely be gone into in detail in a more appropriate case,” the Court observed.

However, the Court granted the officials one final opportunity to comply with the earlier judgment.

It directed that if affidavits showing full compliance with the order are filed before the next hearing, the officials will not have to appear in person.

If compliance is not shown, however, the officials will have to remain present before the Court on March 24, 2026, when it may proceed to frame contempt charges, the top court said.

It also directed that the review petition be placed before the appropriate Bench and ordered that copies of the judgment be circulated to the Union government and Chief Secretaries of all States and Union Territories so that authorities take note of its observations on compliance with court orders.

[Read Judgment]

Former Jammu and Kashmir High Court Chief Justice Gita Mittal on Sunday candidly spoke about the challenges women continue to face while entering and advancing within the judiciary.

Recalling how she once questioned the absence of women names during a Delhi High Collegium discussion on judicial appointments, she said,

“There was a time when 7 judges were appointed by the collegium. Once they were all discussing. I said at the end, 'but no woman judges'. One of the collegium members said 'how many of you are there - 6 out of 35 in the Delhi High Court'. He said 'don’t you think there are enough?' I questioned back - 'don’t you think there are enough men?' Silence."

Mittal also pointed to how structural issues can affect the careers of women in the judicial service. She recalled an instance where a district judge’s Annual Confidential Report (ACR) was downgraded because she had taken leave.

“A district judge ACR was lowered because she was on leave. First, she was on pregnancy leave and second, was when her mother-in-law was not well. Her husband was a judge as well, but he did not take the leave. So these are the issues you see,” she said.

According to Mittal, the process of judicial appointments should also allow candidates an opportunity to respond to adverse inputs received during background checks.

The former judge was speaking at a session titled Half the Nation, Half the Bench: The Way Forward at the Indian Women in Law (IWiL) conference. The session focused on improving representation of women in the higher judiciary.

The panel also featured Justice Shampa Sarkar of the Calcutta High Court, Supreme Court Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The discussion was moderated by Senior Advocates Karuna Nundy and Uttara Babbar.

Justice Sarkar spoke about the difficulties faced by women lawyers during the early years of practice, particularly in gaining access to high profile work.

“The issue is not merit. There is subtle gender discrimination. Client is not interested to give woman lawyers a chance in high profile cases,” she said.

She recounted an experience from her time as a young lawyer in a senior’s chamber.

“An old client came and when I went forward he said ‘are yeh sab ladki wadki mat dijiye’. Then a man colleague went with him. If I had objected then, it would have been the end,” Sarkar said.

Sarkar added that women lawyers also face other barriers such as lack of mentorship, pay disparities and attitudes within courtrooms.

“There is lack of mentoring and they don't get good seniors. Then there is an issue of structural payment. They are asked ‘kitna kama leti ho? Itna toh pocket money dedenge’. So this is another issue. Then comes courtroom bias. Judges have also many times not taken us seriously,” she said.

She suggested that greater professional exposure could help address the imbalance.

“Let women become amicus, arbitrators, government counsel. Collegium record must be maintained so that we know if woman candidates were considered or not,” Sarkar said.

The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh recently expressed serious concerns over the circumstances in which a 19-year-old girl approached the Court seeking the protection of her intended marriage with a 46-year-old man, who turned out to be already married.

Justice Rahul Bharti passed a series of directions addressing not only the immediate safety of the girl but also broader concerns regarding the exploitation of young women by luring them into marriage traps.

In a February 20 order, the Court observed that a moment of vigilance had helped prevent the young girl’s life from going to waste.

“A moment of vigil on the part of this Court being able to prevent life of a 19 years aged young girl from going waste, is best opening for this order as sequence of events preceding this date of proceedings has been able to establish,” it said.

On court orders, the girl's custody was first handed over to a women's shelter in Srinagar. After reading a report submitted by a shelter worker to the Court in sealed cover, the judge later handed over the girl's custody to her mother.

Pertinently, the case also led the Court to raise larger concerns. The Court opined that it cannot treat the matter as a one-off case and close it routinely, merely by restoring the girl's custody to her mother.

After taking note of a November 2024 Nikahnama (marriage document) that allegedly formalised the union between the 19-year-old girl and a 46-year-old man, the Court opined that a probe may be necessary into whether gullible young women were being lured into marriage traps.

"The role of the religious preacher/moulvi, by whose reference the alleged Nikahnama dated 14.11.2025 has come to be produced, also needs to be thoroughly scanned as to whether there is a criminal racket going on with respect to alluring young and gullible girls like the petitioner No. 1 by self proclaimed peers and tantriks (sorcerers) having a predatory presence and play in the society," it said.

The Court appointed advocate Sehreen Zehra as amicus curiae to assist it in examining such larger concerns.

A social worker at the open shelter for girls in Srinagar's Nowgam was also requested to assist the amicus curiae.

In its latest order dated March 3, the Court further sought the name of a senior woman police officer who could be entrusted with the task of conducting an investigation into "vulturish" practices in rural Kashmir, where young women may be lured into marriage traps with older men.

"This Court calls upon Mr. Mohsin Qadri, learned Senior AAG, to apprise this Court about a woman IPS officer holding position either in Srinagar or elsewhere in Kashmir Province, to whom inquiry into the matter related to petitioner No. 1 falling victim to alleged trap of marrying the petitioner No. 2 a 46-year-old already married person, and then coming to this Court seeking protection, whereas the facts have turned out to be otherwise which cannot be let go without being properly enquired and probed to figure out as to whether such like vulturish practices are active in Kashmir’s rural areas," the Court said.

The case is listed for further hearing on March 9.

The matter first came before the Court last month, when the 19-year-old girl appeared in person and sought the protection of her intended marriage to a 46-year-old man.

In a February 16 order, the Court opined that the matter requires careful scrutiny to see if the young girl may be vulnerable to exploitation by her alleged 46-year-old partner.

Concerned about her mental condition and the circumstances surrounding the marriage, the Court directed that she be taken into custody of the Women Police Station at Rambagh and shifted to the Open Shelter for Girls in Nowgam.

The Court also expressed displeasure over the delay in the arrival of a woman police constable at the High Court premises and the absence of the security officer when called by the Court.

On February 17, the Senior Superintendent of Police (Security), Kashmir, appeared in person and assured that remedial steps are being taken, including steps to ensure that a woman police officer is always available at the High Court premises to assist female litigants and advocates.

When the matter was taken up again on February 20, the girl was produced before the Court from the shelter home along with a social worker. Her mother also appeared in person.

After hearing the parties, the Court ordered that custody of the girl be restored to her mother and directed a woman police officer to ensure that both safely boards public transport for their native place while recording the vehicle and driver details. It also suggested that the One Stop Centre at Bandipora reach out to the woman and her daughter to offer psychological counselling services.

Justice Bharti further decided not to close the matter right away and said the proceedings would continue suo motu to examine wider issues.

Among other directives, the Court on February 20 opined that the role of the advocate who filed the petition on behalf of the 19-year-old girl and her alleged partner should be examined. The Court, therefore, also ordered the Registrar Judicial to issue notice for his personal appearance and warned that coercive measures could follow if he avoids service.

Government Advocates Faheem Nisar Shah and Jahangir Ahmad Dar appeared for the respondent authorities.

Advocate Mir Umer appeared for the 19-year-old girl's mother.

[Read Orders]

The Bombay High Court has ruled that the Trade Marks Act’s “surname defence” under Section 35 can be invoked even by a company, so long as its use of the use of the surname or family name is bona fide and rooted in a genuine business lineage [Kataria Insurance Brokers Pvt Ltd v. Bhavesh Suresh Kataria, Proprietor, Kataria Jewellery Insurance Consultancy].

Section 35 (saving for use of name, address or description of goods or services) provides that nothing in the Trade Marks Act entitles a registered proprietor to interfere with any bona fide use by a person of his own name or that of his place of business. 

The provision assumed significance in a trademark dispute over the trademark "Kataria", between a Mumbai-based proprietor of Kataria Jewellery Insurance Consultancy and Ahmedabad-based Kataria Insurance Brokers (brokerage company).

Kataria Jewellery Insurance Consultancy's proprietor, Bhavesh Suresh Kataria, sued the brokerage company before the Bombay High Court for allegedly infringing his registered “Kataria” trademarks and for passing off by using “Kataria” in the company's corporate name, trading style and domain.

A single-judge bench on December 8, 2025, restrained the brokerage company from using ‘Kataria’ in its corporate name, trading style and domain. It held that Section 35’s “saving for use of name” protects only natural persons and not incorporated entities that can choose their own names.

This was challenged before a Division Bench of Justices Bharati Dangre and RN Laddha, which set aside the order on February 23 

The Division Bench disagreed with the single judge's view that the benefit under Section 35 is restricted to natural persons.

“Merely because Kataria Insurance Brokers Pvt. Ltd is a corporate entity, we find that the Single Judge has erred in excluding the benefit of Section 35, by holding that it is not available to a company, but it is only available to an individual, as the company may choose its own name,” the Division Bench said. 

It observed that Section 35 does not contain any blanket exclusion of companies from availing its benefit.

“We do not agree with the proposition that Section 35 shall blanketly exclude company/companies and can only be availed by an individual, as in the provision itself, we do not find any such embargo,” the Court held.

The Court also took note of the submission that “Kataria” is the surname of the brokerage company's promoters and has been used in business since 1955 across transport, automobiles, real estate and insurance through a series of firms and companies. 

“The appellant’s use of the surname ‘Kataria’ is not an attempt to ride on the respondents’ goodwill, but according to us, it is a legitimate exercise of the right to use the surname or a family name in its trading and business activity,” the Court held.​

The Division Bench further pushed back against the single judge’s treatment of “insurance” as a single undifferentiated field. 

While both parties operate in insurance, the Mumbai-based proprietor had created a niche business relating to providing policies in the field of “gems and jewellery sector” since 2006, whereas the broker company was in motor and general insurance.

The Court found no overlap in the area of their operation, but recorded an undertaking that the brokerage company shall not touch the insurance business in jewellery and gems, while allowing the company's appeal.

Senior Advocate JP Sen, with advocates Kunal Vaishnav, Monika Tanna, Dhara Modi and Harkirat Kaur, briefed by Singhania Legal Services, appeared for Kataria Insurance Brokers.

Senior Advocate Virendra Tulzapurkar, with Advocates Ashutosh Kane, Kanak Kadam and Archita, briefed by WS Kane and Co. appeared for the Kataria Jewellery Insurance Consultancy. 

[Read order]

Supreme Court Justice Dipankar Datta on Saturday raised concerns over the opacity surrounding the functioning of the collegium which appoints judges to High Courts and the Supreme Court.

He was speaking at a conference organised by Indian Women in Law (IWiL) to celebrate Women's day.

The lack of transparency is such that even judges often have little clarity about how the collegium functions and where it meets, Justice Datta said.

“You will be surprised to know that not only we know what’s happening… we don’t even know where is the collegium sitting,” he remarked.

Judicial appointments must ultimately be guided by merit rather than numerical representation based on gender, he added.

He was speaking at a conference organised by Indian Women in Law (IWiL) to celebrate Women's day.

Justice Datta, who earlier served as Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, said that during his tenure there, the absence of objective criteria meant that judges had to rely on their own assessment of advocates appearing before them.

“In Bombay High Court, since there was no objective criteria, we assessed performance of lawyers in front of us,” he said.

Referring to women who later became judges, he said:

“Justice Shampa Sarkar, Justice Amrita Sinha, Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya, the kind of grilling I did while I was there (Calcutta High Court)… now I am sure they can handle all the lawyers.”

Justice Datta cautioned against reducing the conversation on women’s representation in judiciary to merely numbers.

“When it comes to elevation as High Court judges, I won’t go for numbers. Not like out of 50 why can’t 25 go to women, why can’t 30 go? That is gender neutrality. We should go for merit.”

He said that the key factors for elevation to the Bench should be competence, integrity and temperament.

Justice Datta also recounted an instance from his time in the Bombay High Court when he declined a suggestion that a woman lawyer be recommended for elevation.

“One judge called me and said there are six being recommended. Why not the woman? I told that judge no. I said that lawyer appeared before me and she was immature and I need to give her time to mature.”

He added that not many judges in High Court Collegium are willing to resist such requests from the Supreme Court Collegium

“Not many judges have the courage to say no when a request is made from the Supreme Court. I told them it’s my decision. As a Chief Justice of the High Court, until I am satisfied I will not agree.”

Justice Datta also noted that dissent within the collegium does not necessarily alter the final outcome.

“There was a woman judge in the collegium recently and even though she dissented the appointment went through.”

He concluded by reiterating that representation should not become symbolic.

“I am against symbolic representation. If somebody is good to become a judge they should.”

The discussion was part of a session on women’s representation in the higher judiciary.

Former Jammu and Kashmir High Court Chief Justice Gita Mittal and High Court Justices Shampa Sarkar, and Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa also took part in the discussion.

The event was moderated by Senior Advocates Karuna Nundy and Uttara Babbar.

[Read Live Coverage]