Despite close ties with Tehran, China has refrained from coming out in strong support of its partner as the US continues its military build-up in the Gulf.
Amid US threats to attack Iran, Beijing has focused on encouraging diplomacy and regional security. On 24 February, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson reiterated this position, saying that ‘We hope various parties will exercise restraint and resolve differences through dialogue.’
For some, China’s ostensibly neutral emphasis on restraint and dialogue in the face of US military threats may seem like it has abandoned Tehran, reinforcing the view that it is an unreliable partner. This follows China’s inaction after the US kidnapped its close partner Nicolás Maduro and established control over Venezuela’s oil sector, in which Beijing had invested billions.
However, this is not new. China has always avoided backing Iran militarily. Beijing criticized the US and Israel’s strikes on Iran during the 12-day war in 2025 but did not provide material support to Tehran. Despite being a comprehensive strategic partner to Iran, Beijing also supported UN-led economic sanctions against Iran before the 2015 nuclear deal and has since procrastinated on injecting investment into the Iranian economy.
Instead, China sees Iran as a long game, which the US’s maximum pressure campaign may inadvertently help it win.
Nowhere to be seen?
Beijing’s restrained statements have raised questions about China’s reliability in supporting its allies in their hour of need.
For many Western observers, China’s reserved stance on Iran is surprising given close ties. After all, Beijing and Tehran are comprehensive strategic partners, having signed a 25-year strategic agreement in 2021.
China remains a lifeline for the Iranian economy, which has been hit by international sanctions. In 2025, China bought more than 80 per cent of Iran’s shipped oil, at a significant discount, accounting for 13.5 per cent of all the oil China imported by sea.
Beijing also sought to lessen Iran’s international political isolation in recent years by granting it membership in BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
China’s lack of action can also be seen as undermining its advocacy for a multipolar world order and challenge to US world hegemony. Beijing has enshrined this view in the Global Security Initiative and encapsulated it in its slogan, ‘the East is rising and the West is declining.’ Yet, in practice, Beijing seems to be showing little initiative to assert itself in the Middle East or seriously push for a decline in US influence there.
Beijing’s limited response to both the 12-day war and the Trump administration’s current pressure on Tehran undermines previous narratives that China’s influence in the Middle East was rising. Indeed, since October 7, China has largely taken a backseat in the region, taking little concrete action beyond criticizing Israel over Gaza and calling out the US for threatening and using unilateral force against Iran.
The nuclear issue
This assessment, however, is hasty. It misses the long-term lessons that the 12-day war revealed about China’s position on the nuclear negotiations. It also overlooks Beijing’s main objectives for its future relations with Tehran.
First, Chinese officials publicly oppose Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. This is not at odds with Beijing’s position of respecting ‘Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.’ Although China is still officially a member of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal, it supports a new agreement on the issue.
Beijing is concerned that a nuclear Iran may trigger a regional war. Such a war would risk the blocking of vital shipping lanes and obstruct China’s oil imports from the Gulf. It could also lead to Iran targeting the Gulf states, where China’s commercial interests far outweigh its ties with Tehran.
By obtaining nuclear weapons, Iran would shift the balance of power in its favour and set a new deterrence mechanism that may restrain any future US or Israeli military actions. This may destabilize the Middle East for generations by triggering a race towards nuclear weapons. More broadly, it could also encourage China’s regional rivals, such as Japan, South Korea and Australia, to also seek to become nuclear powers as a means of deterring Beijing’s assertiveness.
US diplomatic efforts to stop Iran’s nuclear breakout potential in exchange for removing sanctions therefore align with China’s preference for a peaceful solution. Beijing has publicly voiced its opposition to any strikes on Iran or infringement of its sovereignty.
However, Beijing’s has also long been opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran. Given this, it may even be fair to assume that Beijing would tolerate limited US-Israeli strikes on Iran as a negotiating tactic if they could secure a diplomatic breakthrough that resolved the Iranian nuclear issue without triggering an all-out regional war.
A weakened Iran
Second, China sees a weakened Iranian regime as both a risk and an opportunity. Beijing doesn’t want to see a total regime collapse that would be replaced by a Western-aligned government. At the same time, Beijing can capitalize on Iran’s weakness to increase the regime’s dependence on China.
The importance of relations with China has been strongly emphasized by both supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. During his August visit to Beijing, the president underscored Tehran’s commitment to implement its 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with China.
Specifically, China may intensify its exports of dual-use technology to Iran, which may help rebuild parts of Tehran’s missile and drone strategy. However, reports about Chinese air defence systems, fighter jets or supersonic anti-ship missiles potentially being sold to Iran should be considered with caution. China has not confirmed the sales, and Iran has a vested interest in exaggerating the depths of bilateral relations to establish deterrence.
