What’s New About This Wave of Protests in Iran

In the last few days of December 2025, during the month of Dey in the Persian calendar, and into the new year, Iran once again witnessed widespread protests. What began in Tehran’s bazaar quickly spread to other major cities and universities, marking the most significant unrest since the 2022 uprising following the death of Mahsa Amini. The immediate trigger is economic collapse. The Iranian currency fell to nearly 1.4 million rial per dollar, inflation surpassed 52 percent, and the cost of basic goods rose beyond the reach of ordinary citizens.

Can this wave of protests, like the 2022 movement, evolve into a sustained national challenge to the Islamic Republic? And what are the similarities and differences between the Woman, Life, Freedom movement and this moment?

A comparison between the two rounds of protests reveals both continuity and transformation in Iran’s protest dynamics. While their origins differ, both reflect deep structural grievances and an unbridgeable gap between state and society.

The 2022 protests emerged from a social and moral crisis. The death of Amini in the custody of the morality police became a symbol of systemic repression, particularly against women. What followed was a movement centered on dignity, bodily autonomy, and personal freedom. The slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom” captured a generational revolt against compulsory veiling and authoritarian control. Women and youth stood at the forefront, transforming everyday acts of resistance into a nationwide challenge to the regime’s legitimacy.

In contrast, the 2025 protests began with an economic shock. The collapse of the rial, accelerating inflation, and widespread unemployment ignited anger among shopkeepers, merchants, the urban middle class, and students. In Tehran’s Grand Bazaar and Lalehzar and Alaeddin markets, traders closed their shops and took to the streets. Their message was clear: Economic collapse and political misrule are inseparable.

Despite their different causes, both the 2022 and 2025 movements share important similarities. In each case, protests spread rapidly through social media platforms such as X and Instagram, allowing images of defiance to circulate across Iran and beyond. In 2022, the hashtag #MahsaAmini went viral globally. This time around, videos of bazaar strikes and student gatherings again captured international attention. In both moments, the state responded with force. In 2022, more than 500 people were killed and thousands arrested. In 2025 and 2026, reports of violent crackdowns including state killings, mass detentions, and intimidation have already emerged, signaling that repression remains the regime’s primary coercive tool.

Yet the differences between the two movements are equally important. The 2025-26 uprising is broader and deeper in its early phase. The protests have been more geographically widespread, encompassing major urban centers such as Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad, and Hamedan and extending into smaller cities and economically marginalized areas. In 2022, however, particularly during the initial phases, protests took place mainly in major cities. The 2025-26 cycle, in its early stages, has also mobilized students, laborers, women, and ethnic minorities, suggesting the potential for broader mobilization amid unbearable economic conditions.

Another major difference lies in the international context. In 2022, global attention centered on human rights violations, and Western governments expressed rhetorical support while imposing limited sanctions. The Biden administration avoided full-scale economic pressure, prioritizing diplomatic containment over confrontation. By contrast, these protests are unfolding under a very different geopolitical environment.

President Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the revival of the “maximum pressure” strategy have intensified economic isolation. His demonstrated track record of a willingness to use military force against Iran, coupled with his avowed support for future strikes on targets extending well beyond its nuclear program, has worsened the economic crisis in Iran and shaken the Islamic Republic’s political elite. On Truth Social, Trump invoked the prospect of American intervention to protect Iranian protesters. This would be an unprecedented step, and no doubt reinforces the Islamic Republic’s fear of Trump, his unpredictability and risk-readiness. The regime now frames the protests as the product of foreign psychological warfare, even as everyday Iranians struggle to survive.

Another difference between 2022 and now is the Iranian regime’s standing in the region. In 2022, the regime still maintained its proxy and partner network across the Middle East; its nuclear program, too, provided a protective shell. In 2025-26, the capabilities of its allies in the region have been eroded, and some former partners, like Bashar al-Assad, who provided a crucial bulwark for Tehran, are no longer in power. Additionally, Iran’s nuclear program has been severely damaged due to Israeli and U.S. military strikes in 2025.

Despite these differences, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is resorting to a familiar playbook for repressing protests, blending a passing acknowledgement of his system’s shortcomings with maximum deflection and defiance. In his first remarks since protests erupted last week, Khamenei—as he did in 2022 with the Mahsa Amini protests—recognized Iranian grievances.

In 2022, he said the killing of Mahsa Amini “deeply broke my heart.” In 2026, Khamenei similarly accepted the economic grievances of merchants. But in both instances he then segued into a conspiratorial message, arguing the demonstrations were part of the soft war of the West against the Islamic Republic. Despite Khamenei’s resolve, Iranians continued to defy him and poured into the streets the evening after his speech, just as they did in 2022-23.

A notable development in late 2025 was the ideological shift within the protest slogans themselves. While “Woman, Life, Freedom” remains symbolically powerful, new chants increasingly reflect monarchist sentiments. Calls such as “Javid Shah” (Long Live the King) and “This Is the Final Battle / Pahlavi Will Return” have echoed through the cities where the protests are concentrated. These slogans point to a renewed interest in the Pahlavi legacy and open calls for the return of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, representing a significant departure from the largely republican and rights-based framing of the 2022 movement. When combined with economic desperation, political exhaustion appears to be pushing parts of society toward alternative visions of order and stability.

This shift does not mean that the values of the 2022 movement have disappeared. Memorials, silent gatherings, and continued resistance by women show that the spirit of Woman, Life, Freedom remains alive. However, the center of gravity has moved toward regime change rather than social reform, creating a hybrid movement that is both reactive and ideological.

History suggests that economic protests alone rarely succeed unless they evolve into broader political movements. Iran’s own past supports this pattern. Bazaaris, the merchant class, played a decisive role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution and in earlier movements such as the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. If today’s economic protests expand to include workers, rural populations, and organized labor, they could develop into a more sustained challenge. The regime appears aware of this risk. The promises of dialogue and the resignation of the central bank governor reflect attempts to contain unrest before it spreads further.

These are cosmetic gimmicks, however. The government’s offers of dialogue with the protesters ring hollow as it is meant as a pressure valve internationally—for credulous Westerners who believe Iran’s political system is capable of reform—and domestically. President Masoud Pezeshkian has no real solutions as the country’s problems are well above his pay grade and lie with the supreme leader and the structure of the system. Iranian protesters know these dynamics very well, which is why they are calling for the Islamic Republic’s downfall.

Iranian diplomats such as Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi are already putting out feelers for dialogue to the Trump administration, looking for a diplomatic process with the United States that would insulate Tehran from more pressure. A protracted negotiations process itself could bolster Iran’s currency and protect the system from military strikes even without a deal. It is highly unlikely that Iran will agree to concessions the United States seeks—zero enrichment and limits on its missile capability—especially in the context of ongoing protests. Historically, the existence of protests in Iran has not moderated its positions. This could be seen in 2009—the year of the Green Movement over the disputed reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president—when Iran spurned a diplomatic offer involving the Tehran Research Reactor. Fast forward to 2022, Iran still rejected U.S. offers to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in the midst of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. This pattern is likely to repeat itself as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will be wary of giving into international demands for fear of appearing weak.

Likewise, the new central bank governor, Abdolnaser Hemmati, was removed from office as economy minister last March over inflation and currency woes. Afterward, the situation in Iran only got worse, and now Tehran seeks to stanch the bleeding by resurrecting him again. These superficial gestures amount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. His presence or absence from the scene will not change the fundamentals of what ails Iran.

Ultimately, both the 2022 and today’s movements reveal a deep, unresolved rupture between the Iranian state and society. The former shattered the regime’s moral authority. The latter threatens its economic foundations. Whether the protests become a continuation of 2022 or fade under repression will depend on unity across social classes; on protesters’ ability to translate economic pain into coherent political demands; and on the demonstrations’ ability to generate fissures within the security services and within the Islamic Republic’s political elite.

What remains clear is that the underlying forces driving dissent have not disappeared. They have only grown stronger. Accumulated anger, economic despair, and a persistent desire for dignity continue to shape Iran’s political landscape. The question is no longer whether change is possible but whether the conditions will finally allow it to endure.