Crown, Crescent, Pitchfork

El Inglés

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

I'm Thinking I'm Back

The scribe had paced the boards fourteen long years,
As all his fears broke up through earth to air.
Remained there to be said not much, he mused
Yet forced aloneness drew his quill to page.

The coming war, like clamp, had come to press,
'Pon brow and chest. Like mailed hand it bore
Down on his form, and though his bones were weary,
Inside his bosom, flame of thought yet flickered

Axe, hammer, plane and saw—for every tool,
A task no fool could fail to see was found.
Thus did the scribe return to task primeval,
Yea, burden, blessing—two halves in one whole

'Twas clear as day that, when quill was laid down,
'Twould likely drown in cold neglect, unwanted.
This matters not, for text lives on, they say
When scribe and quill have drifted out to sea.

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When I wrote *Our Muslim Troubles* (*OMT*) in 2011, it was not yet so obvious that the path the United Kingdom was on would lead to some sort of general, widespread, violent conflict between the state, Muslims, and natives. To foresee that conflict and sketch out its contours was to make a bold and analytically complex projection of recent events into the future.

Today, no such boldness is required. A growing number of commentators, analysts, and officials across Europe have publicly acknowledged the serious long-term consequences of continued, large-scale Muslim immigration. Among them are academics, senior military figures, and

political thinkers of various persuasions. Patterns of rising communal tension, terrorism, and violent disorder in countries such as Sweden, Germany, and France suggest that the UK will not be spared if underlying dynamics are left unaddressed.

The trajectory towards war now being so obvious, this document will make no attempt to convince its readers that war, in some shape or form, is on the way. My objective here is rather different—to sketch out in more detail how this conflict will likely unfold. In other words, I seek to produce *the definitive analytical and predictive pre-conflict document*, however immodest that goal may seem. Let the reader be clear on this point—this document is not a work of advocacy, suggestion, or recommendation, much less a work of incitement or glorification. Rather, it presents the ruminations of a free citizen trying to unveil what would otherwise remain hidden.

The content of this document will strike some as being rather alarming. In an attempt to preempt criticism, let me point out that, if we list British government and government-adjacent organisations that engage in strategic forecasting, wargaming, and red-teaming, we have at least the following:

- Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)—Cabinet Office (later split into the COBRA Unit and the Resilience Directorate)
- Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO)
- Defence Intelligence (DI)—Ministry of Defence
- UK Strategic Command (UK STRATCOM)
- British Army—Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR)
- Home Office—Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT)
- MI5 (Security Service)
- GCHQ, National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
- Futures, Foresight and Emerging Technology (FFET)—Government Office for Science
- Ministry of Defence—Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC)

- Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
- Cranfield University—Defence and Security School
- Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL)
- King's College London—Department of War Studies
- The University of Oxford—Changing Character of War Centre

If so many august institutions are involved, or have the potential to be involved, in the modelling of future conflict in the UK, what could possibly be the point of an amateur like me throwing his hat in the ring? The answer to this question comes in two parts:

1) Literally none of the above-mentioned institutions will *ever* make any of their wargaming results open to the public in any useful fashion, *under any circumstances*. If the UK does indeed face a serious internal conflict of the type herein described, the government does not want the public to know about it.

2) The people modelling future conflict in the above-mentioned institutions are *radically constrained in what they can model*, due to institutional blindness and political caution.

If you are a British man or woman, with a family, living in or close to a part of Birmingham, or London, or Bradford, that is likely to be caught up in communal violence, *you deserve to know what might be heading your way*. Making a hard decision in advance might allow you to save your family, your wealth, your health, your sanity. The government and its various satellites will always insist everything is under control. Do you trust them?

I do not want British people to end up in this situation. Forewarned is forearmed, and it is in this spirit that I offer the only publicly-available, open-source analysis of this subject matter that is ever likely to be made available to them. And who knows—by openly analysing that which cannot be mentioned in polite circles, this document may yet compel official institutions to quietly model those same unspeakable futures.

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Initially, I considered the possibility of updating *OMT* directly, but decided that it should stand alone as a direct reflection of the moment it was written in. Accordingly, this new document is an entirely separate work, but one that should be understood to build on the arguments and analysis laid down in *OMT*. Those who are new to this debate should start there and then return here to gain a full appreciation of my arguments.

There is a great deal to be said about the conflict we are being dragged down into in the UK—so much, in fact, that it was not immediately clear how best to organise the material I wanted to present. Given that all dynamics in a conflict of this sort are linked, directly or indirectly, to all others, any order of presentation will necessarily dislocate elements that would perhaps be better placed in proximity. In the end, I decided to organise the material into this introduction, five thematic sections, and a brief epilogue.

The five thematic sections are as follows:

- *Weapons*—a consideration of the weapons that will be available to irregular actors during the conflict
- *Zones*—a detailed examination and application of the concept of Zones A, B, and C, as introduced in *OMT*
- *Hinterland*—a new concept, and a strategically significant development of zone-based thinking
- *Crown*—a systems analysis of the British police and army
- *Pitchfork*—a systems analysis of native irregular elements

The terms *Crown* and *Pitchfork* are rather special. To be clear, *Crown* refers to the military, intelligence, and law enforcement apparatus of the British state, whereas *Pitchfork* refers to native British paramilitary and sub-paramilitary actors, as we shall see later on. To these two terms we must add a third, *Crescent*, to refer to militant Muslim actors generally. I have adopted these terms because the frequency with which these actor

classes are referred to makes it tedious to constantly repeat longer, clumsier terms. I will use more specific terms as and when it proves necessary. A further terminological point should be added here: *OMT* (italicised) refers to my 2011 document, and is singular, whereas OMT (in normal font) refers to the conflict I predict lies ahead of us, and is plural.

It is important to bear in mind that the framing assumption of all the analysis that follows is that of a relatively inert, confused, and timorous state, largely incapable of taking decisive action. This assumption is predicated on two considerations: first, the observable brainlessness and cluelessness of the British establishment, and second, the need to reduce an exceptionally complex problem to something that can actually be analysed in some meaningful fashion. Allowing the response of the state to vary arbitrarily will complicate the analysis to breaking point. Those with long memories will recall that exactly the same framing assumption was made in *OMT*.

I therefore ask for the patience of those who think the analysis understates the capabilities of the state—set that objection aside and try to see the argument from the perspective I adopted whilst writing it. The British state cannot secure the border, cannot deport illegal immigrants, cannot stop the industrial-scale sexual exploitation of native girls by Pakistani gangs, cannot explain why British cities are turning into third-world slums, cannot balance the books, cannot stop Muslim sectarianism, cannot stop funding the colonisation of our country, and cannot explain how it will save us from being dragged into a maelstrom of violence, but is, supposedly, a powerful and determined actor that will take definitive action when necessary.

In the same vein, I cannot make toast without burning it, cannot chop a potato in half, cannot make fried eggs without them sticking to the pan, cannot boil water without ruining it, cannot peel an orange to save my life, cannot recognise a cucumber from two feet away, cannot spread butter on a crumpet, and cannot make a bacon sandwich even when provided with four rashers of bacon and two bits of bread, but am nonetheless the greatest living chef and the only true authority on the culinary arts. Those

who would not accept the second set of claims surely have no business accepting the first.

Readers who wish to support the writer or follow his future work will find the relevant details in the epilogue at the end of the document.

And now, onwards and upwards!

WEAPONS

Crown, Crescent, Pitchfork

The Crown no lack of iron knows, yet watch it cannot slacken
In yonder gloom does native prowl—close-thick the heady haze!
Aye, tinder-dry, to back of guard, a mound of beam and bracken,
And furtive native out with torch to set it all ablaze

The Crescent rests within a cage, of which it is most proud,
Yet day may come when worried minds cast glance from other side,
Look back on pride and marvel then, when sky does seem to cloud,
With lead and stone and fire and drone—and scarce a place to hide!

The Pitchfork is the quiet one, just now emerged from slumber
Firm tactics yet to form in mind, though options fair abound.
In setting sun, a vision now, of weapons without number,
If native wit and native will take root in native ground!

All parties are assembling now, and gathering on the field—
Crescent, Crown, they eye each other—'twill be a fearful fight!
The Pitchfork's form—take heed!—unclear, its strength still unrevealed,
But men have killed with many a thing, when day turned into night.

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Fighting, in general, requires weapons, and OMT will prove no exception in this regard—as Mao said, a revolution is not a dinner party, and ethno-religious communal violence is not a TikTok slapfight. Crown will have at its disposal the weapons one would expect of such institutions in a country like the UK, and will be covered in the Crown section. What concerns us here is the selection of weapons that will be available for deployment by Crescent and Pitchfork.

Needless to say, there is great uncertainty here that will only be resolved in due course, and then by events—not by idle scribblers. Nonetheless, certain probabilities can be sketched out, and we will sketch them in four main categories: a) personal ranged weapons, b) explosives, c) military hardware, and d) the old and the new. In each section, as and when necessary, we will look at Crescent first, then Pitchfork.

1) Personal Ranged Weapons

Crescent

In this area, the Crescent disadvantage is stark. Hardly any Muslims will own firearms legally at all, for reasons that are straightforward but that will be discussed below. Of course, occasional Crescent involvement in organised crime will mean that small quantities of various sorts of firearms (pistols, revolvers, shotguns, sub-machine guns, etc.) will already be held by certain members of these communities. Crescent access to these weapons may well be of significance during attempted zone consolidation in Zone B (where likely outcomes are less unclear) and on the fringes of Zone A (where zone contours *are* relatively clear but some areas are still in play). However, ammunition supplies will be in short supply, and the likelihood of more being obtained will fall with every passing day.

Intriguingly, far-sighted Crescent actors may conclude that the most pressing use of firearms in the medium to long term will be to establish and maintain *internal dominance with respect to other Crescent elements*, not to shoot at Pitchfork. Because Crescent will overwhelmingly not have rifles, engaging in sniper battles with adjacent Pitchfork-dominated territory will not be an option anyway—a horrendous strategic disadvantage that will be considered in other sections. The hodgepodge of firearms that Crescent will have is not the sort of equipment that can be used offensively in a systematic manner—it will be short-range, in different calibers, short of ammunition, and difficult to maintain if used intensively or inexpertly.

Will Crescent be able to bring weapons into the UK once OMT have commenced? Scrutiny at customs will certainly heighten in the case of

hostilities, and any weapons that came in would have to come in through zone boundaries and the accompanying security apparatus. Unusually clear-sighted Crescent elements could make efforts to preempt the situation by organising greater weapon shipments before the outbreak of OMT. That said, the combination of foresight, funding, connections, and risk tolerance required would rule out all but the most exceptional actors.

Pitchfork

Legally Acquired Weapons—Rifles

Moving onto Pitchfork, we can see that the strategic imbalance is profound. There are hundreds of thousands of rifles legally owned by the public in the UK, and hundreds of thousands of shotguns as well. These weapons are geographically and legally dispersed, and could not be recovered quickly or easily even if legislation were passed allowing the state to seize them. Moreover, it seems probable that many of them would be illegally stashed if the state were to start acting in this fashion.

Politically, seizing these weapons would be very hard, as many of them are held for legitimate professional purposes (pest control, deer stalking, etc.) and cannot obviously be substituted by any other type of device. Note that an attempt on the part of the state to seize these weapons would be an admission that it feared civil war, and wanted to preemptively disarm Pitchfork. Conspiratorially-minded folk would argue that the seizures were motivated by pro-Crescent elements in government, even if this were false.

Even if we assume the state could seize 75% of the rifles and shotguns in the UK, that would still leave tens of thousands of rifles and hundreds of thousands of shotguns in England and Wales alone. What this means is that, when OMT commence, there will certainly be tens of thousands of rifles, large-bore and small-bore, and hundreds of thousands of shotguns in Pitchfork hands. Ammunition stocks might not be huge, but OMT will not feature many large, pitched gun battles between Pitchfork and Crescent. Rather, it is likely that even when these firearms are used in anti-Crescent activity, they will be used predominantly as: a) force multipliers in

close-quarter battle (shotguns), b) as tools for targeted killings (shotguns and rifles), and c) as tools for applying psychological and strategic pressure on enemy zones (rifles). These applications would not be ammunition-intensive, and would allow Pitchfork to continue to operate for an extended period without concerns pertaining to resupply.

We should make a technical point here before proceeding. Readers may be inclined to think that small-bore rifles are not serious weapons. That would be true from the perspective of a stormtrooper on the Western Front in 1917, but it is certainly *not* true when one is only armed with a baseball bat and the foe is 30 yards away with said small-bore rifle aimed right at you. Small-bore rifles should not be confused with air rifles—they are very serious tools, and some pest controllers happily use them to shoot foxes, which are not small animals.

Some calibres have effective range out to 200 yards, and are highly accurate. A shot to the vitals could be instantly fatal, and a shot to a non-vital part of the torso or to a limb dangerous or debilitating. These weapons should be taken very seriously in the context of low-intensity irregular urban warfare—especially if only one side has them. In defensive contexts, they would be highly effective against a foe without similar capabilities.

Legally Acquired Weapons—Shotguns
Readers will presumably understand that shotguns are not long-range weapons. It should be understood that they can also fire different loads (birdshot, buckshot, solid slugs, etc.) and that their effectiveness varies wildly as a function of the load fired. In the UK, only birdshot can be purchased under normal circumstances—hunting deer with a shotgun is illegal so there are no legitimate reasons for owning buckshot in the eyes of the law. Buckshot is extremely dangerous, consisting of several large lead pellets rather than the scores of smaller pellets in birdshot. This increases its effective range and penetration markedly, and makes it the standard law enforcement/home defence load in countries like the US where buckshot is legal.

Birdshot is a peculiar beast, very dangerous at close ranges while the pellet packet is still cohesive enough to act more or less as a single mass, with effectiveness diminishing rapidly thereafter. Out to five metres, it may well prove lethal, from five to twelve, it is damaging, but beyond fifteen, it is largely ineffective.

Illicitly Acquired Weapons—Handguns
Handguns are to all intents and purposes not legally obtainable in the UK, and this reality will impose a peculiar constraint on Pitchfork elements. It is ironic that the smallest and least powerful firearms should be the hardest to acquire, but it should be noted that handguns have certain characteristics that terrify law enforcement—concealability, portability, and, by default, relatively large capacities (standard revolvers take six rounds, an automatic pistol up to 15+ rounds depending on calibre and magazine type).

Given that, from the perspective of the UK government, they have no real function other than the sporting, handguns were essentially banned after the 1996 Dunblane massacre. As noted, the much greater functional importance of shotguns and rifles makes them, though heavily regulated, essentially impossible to ban. Privately-owned handguns in the UK, on the other hand, are virtually illegal by definition for most actors.

How would handguns be used in OMT? One handgun is not going to make that much difference if two mobs of people confront each other with bricks and bats on the mean streets of Tunbridge Wells. However, handguns are literally the only viable way of conducting targeted killings up close. If these (or any handguns) make their way to motivated parties, they could exercise a decided strategic influence.

Post-Dunblane Handguns
During the handgun amnesty implemented after the 1997 post-Dunblane legislation, there was a discrepancy somewhere in the low tens of thousands between the number of legal handguns believed to be in circulation and the number handed in. Some of these would have been

exported, some deactivated, some destroyed—and some, one imagines, quietly put in storage, in a cupboard, or in a sock drawer.

However, now that nearly 30 years have passed, it appears unlikely that any significant number of these firearms could remain accessible and in working order, given the likelihood of loss, disposal, and poor or non-existent maintenance. We can speculate that somewhere in the hundreds might come gradually into circulation in the event of hostilities.

Handguns from Abroad
Of course, criminal networks of various sorts do smuggle handguns into the UK. The avenues they use to do this can be investigated by interested parties, but it would be unwise for us to share any of our own research here. The best way to highlight the difficulty of acquiring handguns illegally is to observe that many illegal handguns in the UK are converted starter pistols, blank-firers, and the like—in plain language, garbage.

This says something about how hard it is to smuggle quality handguns into the UK, as there is no doubt a great deal of demand amongst the criminal population thereof. During OMT, one must imagine that smuggling small numbers of real handguns into the UK from Europe would be considered a worthwhile activity, if handguns could not be obtained from amongst the illegal weapons already in circulation. Motivated actors will therefore have access to handguns, but only in small quantities, and they will likely be greatly prized and jealously guarded, as they were during the Troubles.

Illicitly Acquired Weapons—Shotguns
It is difficult to see why irregular paramilitaries would make efforts to illicitly acquire shotguns other than those redirected from (originally) legal supplies in the UK. Undoubtedly the idea of having a pump-action shotgun would appeal to certain types. However, the idea that one would make a great effort to try and acquire, for example, pump-action shotguns with a 5+1 or 6+1 capacity, seems to make little sense if such effort were to be accompanied by significant legal risk.

A standard shotgun licence in the UK allows the acquisition of shotguns with a 2+1 capacity, which, though feeble compared to what our cousins across the pond would expect, would be a formidable weapon in the hands of a skilled user. This makes it overwhelmingly unlikely that any natives would invest resources in trying to acquire anything with a larger capacity.

Illicitly Acquired Weapons—Rifles

Illicitly acquiring rifles from outside the UK would be almost entirely pointless for Pitchfork elements *if they think and act as I predict they will in this document*. The only obvious incentive to do so would be to obtain military-style, semi-automatic or automatic rifles with high magazine capacities. However, if one is not planning on fighting the army (a topic we shall return to later), then the only context in which these weapons offer utility commensurate with the difficulty of obtaining them would be a context in which one was planning mass-casualty attacks against Crescent elements, Crescent-adjacent communities, or Crown elements seen as ideologically hostile.

In the predictive analysis I engage in in this document, this sort of attack is considered improbable for both logistical and strategic reasons—especially in the later stages of OMT. Once zone borders have hardened, attacks like this will come to be much harder, have less obvious strategic utility, and almost certainly result in the death or capture of the attackers. If such attacks are indeed carried out, they will probably use purloined UK military hardware, which we will discuss in another section.

2) Explosives

Improvised Explosives

It stands to reason that paramilitaries on both sides will seek to employ explosives in their kinetic efforts. That said, for the reasons we laid down in *OMT*, it is highly unlikely that Crescent will manage to a) design a robust, replicable detonation train, b) synthesise the necessary materials, and c) combine these materials into a functional system. These problems will also

be substantial from the Pitchfork perspective, though Pitchfork will presumably have greater options in this regard on net balance.

Crescent
The relative absence of bomb-based terrorist attacks and the great proliferation of stabbings, shootings, and vehicle-based attacks amongst Crescent elements in recent years makes it clear that, for them, this seesaw has swung in the wrong direction. Whether or not the new tendency of Muslims to simply drive vehicles at crowds of people represents a tactical regression or a tactical evolution is a question that can be left to the security services. From our point of view, it suffices to observe that the meaningful use of explosives by Crescent will be a rare event indeed in OMT.

Though zone consolidation (explored in the Zones section) will create a situation in which Crescent elements will be able to work on explosive devices without any great chance of being immediately interrupted[1], it will radically reduce the ability of Crescent to procure the necessary materials. As OMT progress, this lack of access to useful materials will come to be clearer and clearer across the board for Crescent.

One might imagine that peroxide-based explosives will indeed be available to some Crescent elements to some extent early in the conflict, especially given their successful use in past Crescent attacks in the UK. However, if large deposits of the relevant chemicals look likely to fall under Crescent control as the conflict unfolds, one must imagine that Crown will immediately move to secure them or destroy them. There is no conceivable escalation ladder in which Crown reconciles itself to Crescent zones being able to produce peroxide-based explosives in appreciable quantities.

Realistically speaking, it is highly unlikely that Crescent will ever be able to produce viable explosive devices in any quantity. Moreover, it is not clear that there would be any obvious way of deploying them. Readers are

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[1] Of course, a desperate Crown could use drone strikes or helicopter incursions to disrupt preparations, even in Zone A.

reminded that the key concept undergirding our entire analysis is that of the *zone*, which leads ineluctably to that of *zone consolidation*. Crescent and Pitchfork will separate out like oil and water, driven not by thermodynamics but by the desire to minimise contact with the alien and the dangerous. The greater the extent to which this takes place, the less opportunities there will be for explosive-based attacks, and the less obvious utility they would possess.

One can imagine that Crescent zone-consolidation efforts might make use of explosives with the objective of encouraging the exit of recalcitrant natives (or, for that matter, blacks, Hindus, etc.), but it is very hard to imagine that such a difficult and time-consuming course of action would make sense in a situation of great fluidity, and one that would require improvisation and real-time response.

Pitchfork
The picture looks rather different when we move our focus to Pitchfork, though it remains murky. As I outlined in *OMT,* the fundamental difficulty of devising and building a detonation train remains the same for both sides. However, Pitchfork will have certain advantages in this regard that deserve discussion here.

Lest readers think this is going to be a reprise of the 'bomb-building manual' that supposedly featured in *OMT*, let me state up front that explosive preparation and bomb-building are now, if anything, *more* technically and logistically demanding activities than they were in 2011, at least in the UK. Only exceptional actors and stupid actors seem likely to try, and those who try and fail will be lucky to suffer no worse an injury than wounded pride. Those who try and succeed will not have done so on the basis of anything written here, which is all public domain information used to conduct a strategic and tactical analysis of a kinetic modality—no more than that.

Though there is no obvious limit to the range of ways in which one could try to produce an explosive device, we will predicate our analysis on three

types of devices that seem to fit three archetypal operational profiles: the portable 10kg device, the portable 2kg device, and the vehicle-bound 500kg device. This framing, as will be seen, in no way implies feasibility or actionability—it simply serves as a useful conceptual anchor in a discussion that might otherwise tend towards the hopelessly abstract.

Portable Device A—10kg-Device
The first kind of device would be a 10kg-device, small enough to fit in a backpack or box or reasonable size, thereby fitting the same sort of operational profile as the bomb of a Crescent suicide bomber. Note that the bomb could weigh less—we take 10 kg as being the practical upper limit. If Pitchfork wanted to create an IED weighing 10kg in total, without access to high-grade explosives, would this be viable?

In principle, Pitchfork could use certain propellant substances available to those in the UK with the appropriate explosives certificates. These substances, though not purchasable in bulk, could, in principle, be incorporated into an explosive device. Such a device would not constitute a military-style high explosive, but would be capable of inflicting great damage on unshielded targets.

Because the detonation train problem still exists, hazardous experimentation would be required to produce a device that detonated reliably, and that did *not* detonate prematurely. One imagines that devices of this sort might be produced by committed Pitchfork elements, especially if their members included people with relevant backgrounds in quarrying, demolitions, or the military.

Strategic/tactical utility to Pitchfork: Experienced Pitchfork elements could produce, and then coordinate with less technically gifted elements to conduct attacks—though this would create *very profound* OPSEC issues (see Pitchfork section). The likelihood of large-scale adoption is low—the cost-benefit analysis will probably point elsewhere for most actors. However, serious damage could be inflicted with a single device, especially anti-personnel damage in confined spaces.

Portable Device B—2kg-Device

The second improvised avenue, yielding a 2kg-device, would be an *improvised high-explosive*, based on individual synthesis of military-style nitrogen-containing compounds. The relevant chemistry is generations old and reaction schemes are in the public domain. However, certain crucial materials not generally available to the public would be required, which would create a major logistical hurdle. In addition, actually conducting reactions and obtaining a reasonably pure product would require serious lab skills, with material failure likely to result in premature detonation.

Furthermore, as noted above, Pitchfork elements would still need to solve the detonation-chain problem to produce a functioning device. Chemical knowledge would not be enough—one would also need electrical skills and very strong workshop skills to even attempt to produce a functioning device. This would be a very hard set of problems to solve, and would therefore only rarely be soluble by a single actor.

Bringing together different strands of expertise would boost the viability of this kinetic modality but simultaneously create *profound* OPSEC problems (see Pitchfork section). Assuming such devices could be produced, I assume an arbitrary upper limit of 2kg due to the dangers of premature detonation in larger masses. To reiterate—*this is an arbitrary upper limit, not technical guidance*.

Strategic/tactical utility to native paramilitaries: The production process would be taxing even for those with relevant technical backgrounds. The likelihood of premature detonation makes it relatively unlikely that one Pitchfork cell would produce and other utilise.

That said, the deployment of 2kg-devices could be very significant, especially if they were used in confined spaces or against structural elements in buildings. The likelihood of such devices emerging during protracted, nationwide conflict might be relatively high if conventional

explosives were unavailable. Nonetheless, only a small subset of Pitchfork elements would ever have access to them even if they did emerge.

Vehicle-Borne Device, 500kg

The third type of device would be a car or truck bomb, which we shall take, somewhat arbitrarily, as consisting of 500kg of ANFO (ammonium nitrate fuel oil). Readers should note that the detonation chain problem still needs to be solved to make such a device viable. This will require device design and production similar to that outlined in the preceding two devices. ANFO is not a sensitive explosive, and detonation will be a core issue. This is in addition to the substantial problems we will now describe.

As I explained in *OMT*, if they wish to build large bombs, Pitchfork elements will have no choice but to turn to ammonium nitrate, as nothing else will be available in the quantities required. However, across the Western world, the availability of relatively pure, unadulterated ammonium nitrate has plummeted over the last few decades. During the Troubles, the IRA was able to procure relatively large quantities of high-grade ammonium nitrate in a way that would be *utterly impossible today*. Ammonium nitrate is now contaminated with a variety of additives that reduce its ease of detonation. Special licenses are required to purchase high-grade ammonium nitrate fertiliser in the UK today.

In a major strategic alteration to the irregular battlespace, this radical tightening of relevant legislation will probably make ANFO-based IEDs *largely non-viable* for Pitchfork. Producing high-purity ammonium nitrate would require a sophisticated grasp of inorganic chemistry and high technical proficiency, not to mention exposure to catastrophic premature detonation and very serious legal risk.

It seems intuitively clear that only exceptional actors working in highly disciplined groups would even consider doing this. However, it is not clear that the effort, time, physical risk, legal risk, and possible low quality of the resulting ammonium nitrate would justify the effort other than for high-value, strategically significant attacks. Furthermore, the level of organisation

required and the complexity of the process might require the establishment of substantial hinterland zones (see Hinterland section).

This might point towards medium or late-stage emergence of this modality, and away from early surprises. To rephrase, if OMT commence with a massive car bombing of a London mosque, one would immediately have to suspect state involvement, illegal military collusion, or paramilitaries operating *at the highest technical levels*. No one else would be likely to navigate the web of difficulties sketched out here.

I note in passing that when I wrote *OMT* in 2011, high-grade ammonium nitrate fertilisers were in the final stages of being phased out. It is no great surprise that this avenue to real explosive power has effectively been shut down. I would have shut it down too, if I had been in government—the surprise is that it existed for so long in the first place. IRA-style spectaculars will be *very low-probability events* in OMT if paramilitaries cannot find other routes to explosives on the scale of hundreds of kilograms.

Strategic/tactical utility to native paramilitaries: The utility of these devices would be enormous if they could be built. However, the level-headed analyst must assume they will not feature in the conflict.

3) Commercial Explosives

Large amounts of explosives are used in various legitimate commercial spheres in the UK, most obviously construction, quarrying, and demolitions. It would be natural for Pitchfork[2] to imagine that it might be able to source explosive systems (including boosters and detonators) via these routes. This will certainly be a possibility, but the devil is in the details. The same security-conscious mentality that has made relatively pure ammonium nitrate so difficult to acquire has radically changed the nature of explosive use in commercial applications.

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[2] Crescent would also like to source these systems via these avenues, but this hardly seems viable, especially under conflict conditions.

In mining and quarrying applications in the UK, explosives are overwhelmingly emulsions (sludges, for the uninitiated) that are pumped out of truck-borne mobile mixing units (MMUs). They consist of fuel-oxidiser mixtures held together with emulsifiers and sensitised with chemical infusions. The MMUs hold all of these components separately and mix them in real-time to pump them out into boreholes for blasting. The sensitisation process can take up to 30 minutes, after which, boosters and detonators can be added and the mixture detonated.

The days of paramilitary actors simply stealing explosives from quarries seem to be well behind us. A paramilitary with inside knowledge and technical ability could undoubtedly steal or hijack an MMU and attempt to deploy it in an attempt to destroy roads and other infrastructure. However, this entire blasting infrastructure is *very tightly controlled*, with growing use of user-login protocols for security reasons. GPS-tracked trucks are standard, with GPS devices linked to the emulsion pumps. In a crisis, one imagines the relevant companies could remotely shut down the entire system remotely.

Note that these systems still require detonators and boosters, generally held on-site in small quantities under heavy security, but stored separately from each other. These items are much more likely to be targeted by paramilitaries than the MMUs, which have been engineered to be largely useless if they fall into the wrong hands.

This segues with the last topic to be considered here—the chances of paramilitaries targeting the more conventional explosives still often used in construction and demolitions. These are, if one can use the expression, 'proper' explosives. The observant reader will have noted that the above-mentioned emulsion explosives sound rather clumsy and inconvenient. Having a big truck squirt explosive into holes in the ground will not be ideal for complex, demanding blasting work done to tighter schedules. Hence the continued use of conventional high explosives in more technically demanding work.

There are also demolition-related contexts in which high-explosives of greater brissance (shattering power) are required. This is another reason why such materials are still in circulation in these industries. Again, they are very tightly controlled and any theft or 'loss' of such materials will result in a very serious response by the authorities. Logging systems are exhaustive and there are serious penalties for those who have not abided by the necessary guidelines.

One can see that, over the last few decades, the British state has systematically reengineered the availability and use of conventional explosives, to the point where even motivated Pitchfork elements might have no meaningful degree of access in pre-conflict conditions. Technological development is at the core of this set of changes, it seems—the emulsion explosives are very sophisticated systems that have only become widespread in the last few decades, and the monitoring systems that accompany explosives in the UK are also very tech-heavy.

None of the foregoing should be taken as meaning that irregular actors will not be able to access conventional explosives at all. Rather, it means that in pre-conflict or early-conflict conditions, access will be radically restricted. If political order continues to fray and Pitchfork ranks swell over time, the degree of Pitchfork access to these substances will start to creep up. Even limited access to detonators and boosters could alter the strategic picture, so the significance of leakage here should not be understated.

3) Military Hardware

Military hardware, by definition, cannot be acquired legally by civilians, and cannot be improvised in the shed—no matter how well-equipped the shed. That means that military hardware would only be acquired by paramilitaries in one of two ways: a) through theft, or b) through the collusion of figures in the military.

It would be unwise for me to try and discuss in detail how one might try and steal weapons from the army, partly because this is not an instruction

manual, but also because I have no direct knowledge of the security protocols employed. Suffice it to say that they are clearly rather stringent, which means that pre-conflict and early-conflict (and perhaps even mid-conflict) theft by outside parties is exceptionally unlikely.

What is far more important is the possibility of *collusion*, which is to say the cooperation of those in the army in leaking weapons and ordnance. Again, this is not that probable pre-conflict or early-conflict, but will probably tend towards the fairly probable by the mid-conflict stage, especially for small quantities of small arms (rifles, ammo, grenades, etc.). Any substantial collusion at all with respect to small arms provision will have a radical, qualitative effect on Pitchfork capabilities in certain regards (handguns for targeted killings, grenades for drones, military rifles for sustained infantry-style combat, etc.). Whether or not the army maintains discipline or starts to fray and unravel will be a crucial factor in the conflict.

Is the leaking of heavy weaponry likely? I imagine that it is highly unlikely, if only because heavy weapons will be very hard to transport and conceal. However, a single mortar and twenty mortar rounds in the hands of Pitchfork elements who knew how to use them would allow the indiscriminate bombardment of Zone A from miles away in a fashion that would potentially cause severe casualties and also place the credibility of the state in grave and immediate peril. To rephrase, an attack of this sort would be strategically and psychologically similar to a large car or truck-bomb attack in Zone A. Pitchfork elements of the necessary ruthlessness will presumably seek to acquire this capability if they can.

4) The Old and the New

Drones
Since I wrote OMT in 2011, an entirely new and strategically unprecedented attack modality has entered the planning arena—the civilian drone. We note that an understanding of the significance of drones in regular warfare is still only emerging, despite the tremendous incentives conventional militaries have to solve, analytically, the puzzles created by

these systems. We will exhibit a certain caution as we consider these systems here, partly due to our own lack of expertise, partly due to the intrinsic complexities of the subject matter.

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Drones can obviously be used for the purposes of surveillance, but we will not discuss that here. We are examining the possibility of drones being deployed as weapon systems in a) zone consolidation, and b) subsequent zone warfare. This means we need to examine drone use in three regards:

- Kinetic payloads—destroying property, attacking people
- Incendiary payloads—attacking vehicles, dwellings, communal buildings
- Explosive payloads—attacking individuals, groups, vehicles, buildings

Note that I do not claim here that all of these payload types are viable—I simply point out that each of them needs to be analysed for us to have at least a rudimentary notion as to how drones might be used by Pitchfork actors in OMT. Why Pitchfork elements and not Crescent elements? Because zone consolidation will quickly create a situation in which Crescent either has no access to drones or no way of weaponising them, or both. Meaningful drone use will be limited to Crown and Pitchfork during OMT, and these two actors will certainly use them quite differently.

Kinetic Payloads
The notion that a drone could simply drop objects on people's heads only occurred to me when I was relatively well into my cogitations on the subject[3]. Apparently this dastardly kinetic modality has already been tried out in Ukraine. Payloads from bricks through to clusters of metal rods have been trialled there, and though no data is available, one can easily imagine the terrible effects of an accurate strike on a human target.

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[3] This fact alone should forever put paid to the notion of El Ingles's strategic genius.

Incendiary Payloads

Of course, arson attacks do not have to be conducted by drone—burly men with torches and molotov cocktails have been misbehaving in this fashion for centuries. My readers are sophisticated people though, and do not need to have this pointed out to them. The question here is—could drones be weaponised in this fashion?

One must imagine the answer is yes, though whether the ignition systems would be contact-based, timed, or remote is a question that cannot be answered here. It is conceivable that devising a reliable ignition system for a small flammable payload might be within the reach of some paramilitaries. As such, the early-conflict emergence of this kinetic modality is not inconceivable.

What would be targeted in these incendiary attacks? Certain exterior building surfaces are more flammable than one might expect in structures that appear to the untrained eye to consist essentially of brick and slate. I had assumed that building targeting would have a small, restricted target window, but this will not necessarily be the case, and will vary as a function of the building type considered. Secondarily, one might imagine that vehicles and even bins would be targeted, especially if in proximity to buildings.

Explosive Payloads

This would be very close to the technical zenith of paramilitary organisation in the conflict we describe here. Anyone who has watched drone footage from Ukraine has doubtless been awestruck by the sight of drones dropping ordnance on enemy soldiers there. Is it probable that we will see these technologies in use in OMT?

We have already discussed improvised and commercial explosives in detail, and the careful reader will now have an understanding of the extreme technical difficulty of improvising any type of useful explosive at all. The idea that Pitchfork would be able to solve this problem and then usefully weaponise these explosive charges in drone attacks seems

vanishingly unlikely. However, it is more than likely that we will see serious attempts to weaponise drones in this fashion *if native irregulars can gain access to military ordnance*—grenades in particular.

Here, we are on firmer ground. The war in Ukraine has done much to clarify what is likely to be doable for motivated actors with access to real military ordnance. Indeed, one can watch YouTube videos where members of the Ukrainian army display the kit they use to drop grenades on the Russians. The difficulty clearly lies predominantly in reengineering the detonation mechanism, but it is hard to imagine that this would create a difficulty for technically adept actors. It must also be noted that grenades are not heavy, which reduces the size and cost of the drone needed to carry them.

Access to grenades will therefore become the only serious chokepoint in an attempt to weaponise these systems. Again, the low probability of Pitchfork access to military ordnance in pre- or early-conflict conditions makes it probable that this kinetic modality will emerge relatively late if it emerges at all. However, its use would have a very profound psychological and strategic effect on targeted parties (mainly Crescent) and those required to formulate responses (Crown).

Crossbows

From the newest technology to one of the oldest, we must mention the crossbow in the interests of completeness, and also as a nod to the marginal tactical utility it may yet display. Crossbows are entirely legal in the UK, and though they are not particularly effective weapons in this day and age, one supposes they could be quite effective in defensive contexts in which it was necessary to ward off intruders. Maybe they will stage a revival.

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Name: Sir Jonathan Barrington
Role: Deputy National Security Adviser (Domestic Stabilisation)

Name: Detective Chief Inspector Jeremy Bates
Role: Special Branch (Liaison—Domestic Stabilisation)

SJ: Bates! Always a pleasure. Come to brighten up my day?

B: Just the usual, Sir Jonathan, a status report.

SJ: And just what *is* the current status of our rapidly collapsing realm, Bates? Please, spare me the usual sniper attacks and Muslim-on-Muslim necklacings—all of that ghastly stuff really does just blur after a while. Anything qualitatively new in the last 48 hours?

B: Yes sir, I'm afraid so. We've had a bombing at a Muslim bookshop in Bristol, just a couple of hours ago, CCTV indicates a white man dressed in Muslim garb, sir, left twenty seconds before the blast. Presumably a Pitchfork op, sir, probable propellant charge, that's something that's spreading down from the Midlands. Crescent-on-Crescent can't be ruled out at this stage, but looks improbable.

SJ: Yes, I watch the news, Bates, I saw it. Pitchfork, Bates? Crescent-on-Crescent? Is this how you people talk now?

B: Begging your pardon, Sir Jonathan, it slips out sometimes. Bristol had been considered a stable Zone B sir, but obviously that's all gone now. Fifteen dead, mainly adult males, dozens injured. It's a bit wild there at the moment, sir. Those charges are nasty, the tech's close to standardised now, we're not seeing detonation failures any more. You remember Reading, sir?

SJ: That fellow who was lynched when his bomb failed?

B: Yes sir, looks like they've ironed out the kinks.

SJ: Understood. Anything else?

B: Further developments in arson-by-drone, sir. An entire row of houses burnt out in Huddersfield, no casualties, but the northern paramilitaries are refining their drone tactics, swarming a single street at a time, middle of the night.

SJ: Wait, I think I remember—the fire spreads through the attic space, four or five houses in flames at the same time. That about it?

B: Yes sir, you just do that along the entire street. You've got a bright future ahead of you if the paramilitaries come knocking on your door, sir.

SJ: Quite, Bates. And no casualties?

B: No sir, once someone sees the first fire, the entire street's up and about, and the fires are in the attic space, anyway. But the fire engine can't deal with sixteen houses burning at the same time, and will refuse to operate in the centre of Muslim zones anyway.

SJ: They let it burn, did they?

B: They did, Sir Jonathan.

SJ: Good God alive, Bates, what have we come to?

B: Hard to say, sir.

SJ: Anything else?

B: Carla Henshaw's been shot dead, sir.

SJ: What?! But her security—

B: Not much good when you get hit in the head at 300 yards, sir. We found the shooter's position, rooftop, must've had good intel, knew she'd be there picking up her kids. That's the second MP this month sir, but then you know that.

SJ: And the shooter?

B: Got some wonderful footage of a white guy in a hoodie and a surgical mask, sir. We'll chuck it in with the rest and pretend we're closing in on him.

SJ: But what sort of person are we talking about?

B: Has to be ex-military, sir. That narrows it down, MI5 is looking at a list of twenty names. If he's not on there, we're buggered, sir, pardon my French.

SJ: Alright Bates, can I assume that's it for today? My wife has tickets to the ballet, I need to get to my barber before he closes.

B: That's it, sir, yes.

ZONES

'Twas Ours

'Twas ours, not theirs, the valley low, my grandad worked its fields,
Not just a place, but part entrenched of who and what we were.
'Twas ours, not theirs, the village near, out that way, 'twards the wealds,
When life was mild and native heart had not yet thought to stir.

'Twas ours, not theirs, the market town, that stinks now with corruption,
The rubbing out of English trace 'neath England's very skies.
'Twas ours, not theirs, the terraced street—all see that dread eruption
Must soon drain wound, and barnacle from rock of England prise.

'Twas ours, not theirs, the city block, through sunshine, rain and riot,
In contrast drawn 'gainst lake and fen, the glove upon the hand.
'Twas ours, not theirs, the blessed park, which granted shade and quiet,
No thought there was of glowering foe, or rot upon the land.

'Twas ours, not theirs, the whole, wide land, and none would beg to differ
Who gave it up is hard to say, but far now have we strayed.
'Twas ours, not theirs, earth, rock, and sand, when our resolve was stiffer,
'Twas ours and will again ours be—when every debt is paid!

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The single most important concept in any analysis of OMT is that of the *zone*. In *OMT*, I conceptualised the UK as being split into three distinct, often non-contiguous zones: Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C. These zones can be summarised as follows:

1) Zone A consists of those urban spaces that are Muslim-dominated, out of which Muslims cannot be driven unless they were to be driven out of the country itself.

2) Zone B consists of areas in which Muslims are by no means dominant, but are present in relatively large numbers and reasonable densities. Zone B is the most unpredictable zone-type, and the hardest to describe or identify. Zone B will start out quite mixed but will be liable to rapid demographic change.

3) Zone C consists of everywhere else, which is to say those areas in which Muslims are either non-existent, or a minor, scattered presence of the sort that makes group defence unviable. Note that the overwhelming majority of the country consists of Zone C, geographically speaking, whatever population sizes may indicate, and as such, this zone will differ from the other two in that it will be overwhelmingly contiguous.

As I explained in *OMT*, Pitchfork objectives are likely to include a) turning Zone C into a completely Muslim-free zone through violence and intimidation (which is unlikely to present great difficulty), and b) attempting to do the same to Zone B (which is likely to present substantial difficulty). Muslims[4] driven out of Zone C will have two options short of leaving the country: a) go to Zone B, and b) go to Zone A. Muslims driven out of Zone B will have one option: go to Zone A, as going to Zone C under the conditions that will prevail in OMT would be absurd.

Though the basic underlying characteristics of each zone are easy to understand, actually splitting the UK up into a three-zone patchwork (that is, conceptually, on a map) would require a great many subjective judgements.That said, we can see that, at the outset of OMT, Zone A will be concentrated in and around Greater London, in and around Greater Birmingham, and in the Leeds-to-Liverpool Corridor in the north of England, where large Muslim populations are well-established, and substantial Muslim-dominated areas already exist.

Zone B in particular is very difficult to outline accurately, but will certainly include those parts of many smaller and/or more isolated cities with

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[4] I refer to *Muslims* here rather than *Crescent*, because we are talking about the Muslim population as a whole, not just militant Muslim actors.

relatively large Muslim populations interspersed with non-Muslim populations. Obvious candidates for these cities would be Sheffield, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Bristol, Cardiff, Leicester, Coventry, Reading, Peterborough, Nottingham, and Derby. Zone C is everything outside Zones A and B. Broadly speaking, it is that part of the UK where British people can still feel like they are in Britain.

In *OMT*, there was no discussion of zone size, structure, or depth. Here, I will attempt to rectify this weakness by considering what form, exactly, Zones A and B will actually take. This is a very difficult exercise indeed, but failing to attempt it would render the single most important element in our analysis uselessly vague. Some readers will doubtless be disturbed the level of specificity we display in the following discussion. I would point out to them that it is *absolutely necessary* to enter into such granular, real-world detail to generate a genuine understanding of what we face. Refusing to do so would be dereliction of duty—for this analyst or any other.

Here, we will sketch out a Zone A fragment[5] in Birmingham and a Zone B fragment in Hull. This is our first attempt to describe what OMT will really look like on the ground. It is highly speculative, but strongly grounded in real demographic, geographical, and infrastructural considerations.

1) Zone A—Birmingham

Readers will understand that Zone A areas, though already clearly discernible in the urban UK, will take on a final size and form that cannot be predicted in detail. As such, the following description of a consolidated Zone A area should be taken as an exploratory exercise that allows us to consider how Zone A will crystallise out.

Readers should bear in mind that, as native paramilitaries gradually drive Muslims out of Zones B and C, said Muslims will initially tend to flee to

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[5] I use the terms *Zone A fragment* and *Zone A area* to remind the reader that *Zone A* technically refers to all such areas throughout the country. *Zone A* is therefore a more abstract term.

Zone A rather than simply leave the country. Over time, this will tend to put an intolerable pressure on Zone A areas. Once OMT commence, zone boundaries will start to harden and ongoing geographic expansion of Zone A is highly improbable even if the Zone A population grows. Pressure on accommodation, food supply, and other key logistical and structural elements will increase and the ethnic and religious tensions that Muslims are so noted for will reach a dangerous pitch, as different groups are forced together under radically sub-optimal conditions.

That said, expansion of Zone A is perfectly conceivable in the early stages of the conflict. As Crown acts to cordon Zone A off from surrounding areas, it will naturally seek to do so along a perimeter that is intuitive, psychologically real, and controllable with a minimum of personnel and force, as Crown resources will be severely stretched (see Crown section). This may well require the abandonment to Muslims of certain areas that are predominantly non-Muslim when OMT commence. Their residents may well be keen to leave anyway, and Muslims leaving Zones B and C will themselves be attempting to reestablish themselves in Zone A. Under such circumstances, the state will presumably try to organise a soft transfer of populations. Failing to do so will simply ensure that zone boundaries remain muddy, confused and impossible to police, which makes the situation harder for everybody.

Crescent strategists will not be blind to the fact that this is the time to take territory and thereby relieve population pressure. However, possessing no organised military force capable of acting in a concerted fashion, these efforts would have to be conducted by impromptu groups of Crescent elements with little weaponry worthy of the name. Such Crescent activity might be relatively easy for Crown to contain by force on a short-term basis, if it takes place in a single Zone A area. However, if OMT spread rapidly in their early stages, Crown will be hard-pressed to prevent the ethnic cleansing of non-Muslims (of whatever ethnicity) by Crescent in and around all Zone A areas simultaneously.

Allowing Crescent to drive natives (and others) from these areas would have an electrifying effect on the Pitchfork response, but this probably cannot be avoided irrespective of what Crown does. Crown attempts to enforce strict zone boundaries will be feasible *after* an initial period of consolidation, not *before* it, as it is only after initial consolidation that relatively short, coherent, and manageable zone boundaries will exist.

How exactly can the geography of a Zone A area be predicted? This may strike the reader as being an impossible task, but much is actually fairly clear. Zone boundaries will be decided by two main sets of factors: the demographic and the geographic/infrastructural. The demographic factor is obvious—it is precisely this that allowed us, earlier in this section, to sketch out broadly where Zone A will emerge. It is the geographical and infrastructural factors that now demand our attention.

The most important zone boundaries will be major roads that create a) physical boundaries, b) psychological boundaries, and c) natural access routes for Crown forces tasked with zone boundary enforcement. Clusters of railway lines around railway stations, in similar fashion, form physical and psychological boundaries. Rivers, canals, and, in principle substantial features, such as hills and bluffs, would serve the same function. Crown will be forced to sacrifice non-Muslim residential areas that are on the wrong side of these various features when zone consolidation takes place, as failing to do so will create an unstable, contested boundary between Zone A and everything else.

We could imagine that in Birmingham, which is approximately 29% Muslim, (giving it a Muslim population of over 300,000), the most obvious and largest piece of Zone A (post-consolidation) would form around the largest extant Muslim concentrations. This would be a zone substantially bounded by the M6 in the north, the A4040 in the east, the A38 and A4540 in the west, and the A45 in the south. Closing the loop would prove rather awkward. Following the A45 back up to the A4540 (Middleway) would chop off Sparkhill and Sparkbrook. These major Muslim population zones would be stranded not only on the other side of the major arterial route, but also

on the other side of the train tracks coming west out of Tyseley Station. The perimeter could be extended down through Tyseley Station to the A41, then west in some complex fashion to the A435, which we take as being the westernmost conceivable demarcation line of the Zone[6].

Here in the South, there is no obvious geographical or manmade structure that could act as a zone boundary. If Crown decides to erect a Northern-Ireland style separation barrier anywhere, it makes sense for it to erect it here, somewhere between Sparkhill and Moseley. Again, the lack of clear geographical features or substantial manmade infrastructure here make the area difficult to divide organically.

Diagram 1—Hypothetical East Birmingham Zone A Fragment

Readers may be shocked to see such a large, contiguous area designated as being one that will be lost to Crown and Pitchfork both, but it is actually

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[6] I have done my best to acquaint myself with the human geography of Birmingham. My readers from Birmingham will forgive me if parts of this presentation seem less-than-completely accurate to them.

only a small fraction of Birmingham by area—probably not more than about 7-8%. For the time being, let skeptics ask themselves—if this is not what Zone A looks like, what *does* it look like?

One final observation is crucial here—if even two thirds of the Muslim population of Birmingham end up in this hypothetical Zone A-fragment (i.e. roughly 200,000 people), the fragment would a) be severely stressed in terms of population density and resources, b) contain disparate Muslim groups with their own mutual hostilities, and c) be utterly vulnerable to the techniques of zone warfare outlined later in this section. Nowhere do I suggest that this Zone A-fragment is possessed of long-term stability—that has yet to be seen.

2) Zone B—Hull

Zone B is the most conceptually slippery zone type. In Zone A, we know which way the pendulum will swing, at least in the short term. In Zone C, we can predict that the pendulum will swing the other way, once and for all. In Zone B, we have the following complicating factors:

1) It is not clear how large a Muslim population has to be to have at least short-term, Zone B-type viability in the case of conflict. Ten Muslims cannot be viable. Can a thousand? Can ten thousand?

2) Also unclear is the relationship between Muslim population density and zone consolidation. If a given neighbourhood is 90% Muslim, it will surely be able to consolidate quite easily during conflict, at least in the short term. But what if said neighbourhood is 75% Muslim? Or 50% Muslim? Which Muslim populations are too dispersed to even attempt consolidation? Smaller, Zone B-type Muslim populations tend to be more interspersed with non-Muslims than larger, Zone A-type populations.

3) A further source of uncertainty is the significance of geographical isolation. A Zone B-type Muslim area in Huddersfield might feel emboldened by its proximity to other Muslim areas nearby. Hull, on the

other hand, is much more isolated, and the likelihood of any sort of direct support is close to zero.

Concrete predictions as to which pieces of Zone B can survive in the short to medium term would be foolish. Let readers recall—Muslim areas of Zone B are intrinsically hard to describe. If your mental map of what Zone B actually looks like is rather fuzzy, you are imagining it perfectly accurately—it will look (and feel) fuzzy to its inhabitants as well.

Here, we will limit ourselves here to making a number of relevant observations:

1) Muslims in Zone A can either stay where they are or leave the country. Muslims in Zone B have an additional fallback—Zone A. This will create a constant pressure on Muslims to leave Zone B that will be hard to resist.

2) Muslim parts of Zone B will almost certainly be *very shallow*. In a hypothetical, idealised Zone B Muslim fragment, 400m x 400m, no Muslim dwelling will be more than 200m from some part of the zone boundary. In reality, any real Muslim zone in Zone B is highly unlikely to have an idealised, square configuration. Rather, it will tend to be a jumble of terraced housing, semi-terraced housing, detached houses, and perhaps a few large multi-storey buildings. There will be few genuinely large buildings in the smaller, provincial cities where Zone B tends to lie.

There would also be parks, squares, schools, shopping centres, and commercial/industrial parks around many of the zone fragments in Zone B, making the zone more geographically complex, and *much harder for the state to put a perimeter around*. This is another reason to doubt the long-term viability of Zone B fragments.

3) Connecting and penetrating roads are small and easy to cross quickly and inconspicuously, and there will be few natural boundaries (geographical or manmade) to use as intuitive or defensible boundaries when zone consolidation occurs. How exactly this situation will stabilise is

radically unclear, though one imagines that certain streets might have to be abandoned—on both sides of the divide.

4) Zone B fragments are highly vulnerable to rifle fire. A competent shooter with a scoped, large-bore rifle, shooting prone, can hit a stationary human target at a range of 300 yards relatively easily. This renders Zone B fragments transparent to rifle fire as long as line-of-sight can be established. Ruthless Pitchfork elements would presumably make use of this strategic advantage to harass Muslim holdouts in Zone B. Note that, even if the frequency of rifle attacks was low, the psychological effects of even occasional attacks would probably render the Zone B-fragment close-to-unviable for Muslims.

5) The periphery of Zone B, if not hardened in some fashion, could be subjected to constant attack and harassment: low-intensity rioting, arson attacks, and firearm attack. But if the periphery collapses, the boundary closes in on itself, and the cycle repeats.

Crescent will need a hard boundary more than Pitchfork will—how can it create one? One can imagine a no-man's-zone of a street or two of abandoned houses separating zones, but it would not function in a defensive role unless patrolled. We will see later on (see Crown section) that the likelihood of Crown being able to patrol Zone B to any meaningful extent is low.

6) The strategic shallowness described above probably makes Zone B psychologically unsustainable for all but the hardiest Muslims. If Crown prioritises London and other major cities to maintain civil order there, it may eventually be observed that Zone B was not conceptually necessary. To rephrase, we may come to see that Zone B was not qualitatively different to Zone C all along.

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If Zone B were to consolidate in Hull, where would it do so[7]? Hull has a population of about 267,000 people (2021), with the Muslim population put at 3.5%, or 9,500 people (2021). This smaller Muslim population (lower than the Muslim population of other provincial cities, usually about 10%), has nothing like the advanced degree of consolidation that we see in parts of Birmingham. Indeed, the Muslim population (judged by the prevalence of halal butchers and mosques), is interspersed throughout a roughly triangular zone west of the Beverley Road (A1079), stretching from the A63 up towards the Cottingham Road further north, with the greatest density being along Spring Bank, which bisects said zone east to west.

Diagram 2—Hypothetical Hull Zone B Fragment

This entire zone, probably about 3km², would accommodate approximately the whole Muslim population if that population consolidated at typical population densities. However, this process of consolidation would be

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[7] Again, my many readers from Hull will forgive me if this description of the Hull Zone B seems geographically ill-informed.

shockingly brutal and traumatic for all concerned, as going from low consolidation to high consolidation in a short period of time would require substantial ethnic cleansing *in both directions*. The sheer degree of chaos and violence involved would so utterly poison the city that there would be no obvious point trying to stay there as a Muslim at all, especially given a) the low probability of genuine state protection, b) the high probability of ongoing attacks from natives, c) the high probability of logistical interdiction directed against a tiny, defenceless zone. Again—Zone B might just be a version of Zone C that lasts, on average, a bit longer.

3) The Asymmetric Interface

OMT will be a conflict of many asymmetries. Pitchfork will have objectives that are not paralleled by Crescent. Collapsing Zone B into Zone A (i.e. driving its population into Zone A) has no mirror image in Crescent strategic thinking, as, for brute demographic and geographical reasons, Zone A cannot collapse Zone B back into Zone C. Similarly, attacking Zone A from adjacent areas might convince Zone A-Muslims to simply leave the country and go home, but the converse is unlikely to be true. The natives are *already* home.

Let us assume for a moment that Pitchfork will be substantially successful in driving Muslims out of Zone B into Zone A, thereby creating a country in which nearly all Muslims live in Zone A. Will this create a certain stability, with conflict subsiding in the short term? Perhaps, but given that Pitchfork's long-term objective will probably be the removal of virtually all Muslims from the UK, we should not expect an extended lull in hostilities. Zone A is large, embedded in major cities, and the only obvious target left. We must imagine that it will be attacked by Pitchfork even when day-to-day contact between natives and Muslims has substantially disappeared.

We need to think here in terms of the *interface* between native and Muslim areas in and around Zones A and B (Zone A in particular). Because the depth and nature of this interface will vary as a function of many variables, some under immediate human control (presence of Crown patrols,

separation barriers, evacuated areas, etc.) some not (geographical features, long-established residential zoning patterns, etc.), it is very hard for us to provide a coherent view of what exactly these interfaces will look like, especially given that they will vary wildly between large cities, smaller cities, and towns. That said, we can still identify certain important principles that will serve to undergird our discussion here.

The most important principle here is the idea of an *asymmetric interface*, in which the two sides are radically unequal in terms of their ability to strike at each other across the interface. This idea is not at all novel—it can be seen in a boxing match in which one fighter has a longer reach, or an artillery duel in which one set of guns has a longer range. However, these conceptually simple examples do not give us an adequate grasp of the significance of an asymmetric interface in OMT.

If *zone consolidation* refers to the way natives and Muslims separate out from each other, aided by the activity of their respective militant elements (Pitchfork and Crescent), then *zone warfare* refers to the way the two sides fight each other after zone consolidation has taken place. We see immediately that both sides will, in principle, seek to reach as deeply and accurately as possible into opposing zones of control to cause damage, death, and mayhem. There may be periods of relative calm, but Pitchfork and Crescent will be looking to atrit and demoralise the enemy at all times.

We need to distinguish between *thick and thin interfaces*. If the border between a hypothetical piece of Zone A and its surrounding zones consists of a B-road and a police checkpoint at major roundabouts and crossing points, then that is a thin interface. If rioting and property destruction have resulted in a no-man's land of two or three streets' worth of burnt-out buildings with every major access point guarded by a jeepful of soldiers, then that is quite a thick interface. The question that faces Pitchfork and Crescent is '*how do we cross the interface and atrit the enemy?*'. There are four obvious options: rifles, raids, drones, and mortars.

Raids (Valid across thin interfaces)

Raids are fairly self-explanatory, though how they would be conducted is a complex matter and one likely to be heavily influenced by the degree of Crown control of the relevant access points. Access points guarded by lightly-armed police patrols might be stormed, though access points guarded by the army would probably be avoided, for ideological and operational[8] reasons on the part of Pitchfork, and operational reasons on the part of Crescent.

Pitchfork and Crescent would presumably decide on a case-by-case basis whether raids made strategic sense or not. If Crown comes under real pressure, manning all important access points might prove impossible, in which case Crown could be forced to use drone surveillance to direct less numerous mobile units to try and plug any breach that emerged. Notice that the likelihood of death or capture would be relatively high for Pitchfork and Crescent elements staging raids, which will reduce the likelihood of them occurring.

Either way, we should ask what the objectives of raids would be. There are only two obvious main objectives: a) residential arson attacks, and b) attacks on important supplies and/or infrastructure, most obviously food supplies. A raid that sought to torch 30 houses, fifteen on either side of a terraced street, would be a predictable objective for either side, as would a Pitchfork raid that sought to destroy a supermarket or food depot[9].

Rifles (Valid across thick and thin interfaces)

Rifles are, obviously, line-of-sight weapons, their lack of ability to shoot round corners a fossilised design flaw that even 21st-century technology has failed to overcome. However, if line-of-sight can be established, they are tremendously powerful tools, and, in OMT, are likely to prove strategically decisive. It needs to be understood that, shooting from a well-supported position, a large-bore rifle with a properly-sighted telescopic

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[8] The army has guns too, and theirs are bigger than yours.
[9] We will explore food denial in greater detail later on.

sight can be expected to hit stationary human-sized targets fairly easily at 300 yards, and somewhat easily at 400 yards, *even if the shooter is only an average shot*. Small-bore rifles are, of course, much more limited in this regard, but will still be extremely dangerous out to 100 yards, or even further, depending on the calibre.

Readers should bear in mind that much of the effect of rifle fire will be *psychological*, as the willingness of anyone to expose themself to this fire will be low after casualties start to mount. Even in regular warfare, snipers are hated and feared by enemy troops, and can paralyse entire enemy units in a way out of all proportion to their numbers on their field. The effect even a small number of Pitchfork shooters could have on Muslim populations in Zones A and B might be very severe indeed. Note the specificity of the claim—*this is a one-way kinetic modality, Pitchfork on Muslim, not Crescent on native*. This is where the 'rifle gap' outlined in the Weapons section starts to make itself felt.

Drones (Valid across thick and thin interfaces)

We touched on drones in the Weapons section. Here, it will suffice to make a few more general observations. Drones will only be available in large numbers to Crescent, especially once zone consolidation has progressed. This further reinforces the asymmetric interface already mentioned.

The question is: what exactly are drones likely to be good for in this conflict? Of course, drones could be used to harass people in any number of horrible ways, but we focus here on the uses that could turn out to be strategic, not purely malicious. As noted, deploying any sort of explosive payload from a drone is likely to be virtually impossible for even the most advanced paramilitaries. This being the case, the only obvious way of turning drones into strategic, zone-warfare weapons would be to use them to conduct arson attacks.

This seems like a feasible attack modality for Pitchfork. A number of drones with small, flammable payloads could launch multiple payloads at a single

target, or single payloads at multiple targets in close proximity. Drones could, in principle, enter buildings through windows to set fires directly in rooms, although difficulty of access and the low utility of contact incendiaries inside buildings would probably create additional operational complexities for this kinetic vector.

Mortars and Mortar-Equivalents (Valid across thick and thin interfaces)

The IRA put a great deal of time and energy into developing usable mortar systems during the Troubles, with a degree of success that was largely symbolic and psychological but occasionally fatal.

Early IRA mortars were improvised and largely ineffective, but as the conflict progressed, the IRA moved in the direction of building its own versions of military mortars on the basis of official blueprints. The most noteworthy attacks were:

- the 1991 Downing Street attack, no casualties, great symbolic value
- the 1985 Newry attack, hit an RUC station, killed nine, wounded dozens

Army bases in Northern Ireland had to be hardened to allow them to withstand a direct mortar strike. The startling 1985 Newry attack was as successful as it was because the shells came down through the roof of the station, which had not been hardened.

It is not entirely clear that the substantial R&D efforts the IRA put into mortars enjoyed a commensurate payoff throughout the conflict as a whole in purely physical terms. However, the psychological effects would have been very substantial indeed. By the end of the conflict, the IRA was deploying mortars with explosive warheads of approximately 30 kg, and the Newry attack made it abundantly clear what *could* happen when conditions, planning, and tactical *nous* all came together.

There is no obvious reason that Pitchfork would not be able to mimic this sort of success with their own mortars, but it would be a *very hard problem indeed*, and not obviously an efficient use of resources. The IRA was at war with a modern military and a heavily armed police force that it needed to physically atrit. Pitchfork will be facing a very different task—the harassment and intimidation of Zone A inhabitants. Achieving this would not even require explosive payloads—purely kinetic payloads would also constitute a serious threat.

Kinetic mortars of this sort would be more a psychological weapon than anything else, but with reliable propellant supplies, they would constitute an intimidating tool indeed. In terms of targeting and intelligence, Pitchfork's task here would be much less challenging than that of the IRA—one would not even need specific targets, one could simply target residential areas indiscriminately.

The most obvious way of improvising a kinetic mortar would be to use commercially available powders, though this would create substantial logistical and technical challenges. If the goal were pure harassment, then pneumatic mortars could be improvised without great technical difficulty, though it must be understood that shooting chunks of iron over the zone boundary to harass people would be more the work of bored, sub-paramilitary Pitchfork elements than of anyone else.

We note in closing the possibility of Pitchfork elements actually obtaining military mortars and rounds through theft or army collusion. This would constitute a major strategic rupture, but we will delay discussion thereof until the Crown section.

Crescent Options

Observant readers will note that nearly everything said so far focuses on Pitchfork-on-Muslim violence. Should this be taken to imply that Crescent will not be able to retaliate? Not at all, but its options will be severely limited, for the following reasons:

- Crescent will not have rifles and will not be able to acquire them.
- Raiding is a comprehensible attack form moving from a larger, looser, zone into a surrounded, compacted one, not *vice versa*—natives cannot be geographically pressured like this, and their food supplies are not at risk. Moreover, Pitchfork is more heavily armed and will likely have shooters ready to respond to incursions.
- Drones could be deployed by Crescent in the early stages of zone warfare, but will quickly be destroyed or degraded, with replacements hard to acquire.
- Pneumatic mortars might be available, but will simply be firing rocks into native-dominated territory—out into merrie England—at random. The bombing of Dresden this is not.

Accordingly, it is not clear that Crescent will have any viable options in this regard. Even the gathering of a Crescent mob near zone boundaries will probably result in suppressive sniper fire. Rifles alone create an unbridgeable strategic difference, a point that will not be lost on careful analysts.

4) Outside vs. Inside—Food Denial

The foregoing has presumably sufficed to establish that Zone A will be exposed to a wide range of stress vectors. However, we must now address the single biggest problem Zone A fragments face—*they are surrounded and unproductive*. They produce no food, no medical supplies or technologies, have no control over the water supply, produce and distribute no electrical power, and have no internal fuel supplies to speak of.

Early on during my research, I investigated all these different logistical pillars as they would apply to Zone A areas. In the end, however, I decided to focus the analysis on a single one of these pillars—food. This decision was made for the following reasons:

- Food is immediately critical—even a moderate shortfall will cause panic.
- Food is a bulk physical good that is intuitively comprehensible, and is delivered via physical systems that can also be understood without great conceptual difficulty. This is in contrast to the water or electricity supply, where it is not at all obvious how the relevant systems work, or how they could be disrupted.
- Food, unlike water, does not fall out of the sky—under conditions of food denial, it is absolutely unprocurable inside the zones if not airdropped in.

This being the case, food denial is not only the *easiest* denial tactic to deal with conceptually, it could turn out to be the *only one Pitchfork actually employs*. My considerations of this matter were the single most surprising research area for me whilst I was working on this essay. It would be foolish to speak with great confidence here, but it appears to be the case that the food supply into Zone A areas could be substantially degraded by Pitchfork without either a) great technical difficulty, or b) large numbers of Pitchfork operatives. It goes without saying that this sort of logistical interdiction would have severe consequences for the internal coherence of Zone A.

What about Crown? It is actually far from obvious that Crown has the means to guarantee pre-conflict levels of food delivery into Zone A once OMT commences. The layman might imagine that it is obviously true that the Crown can guarantee food delivery to all parts of the country under all circumstances. But it is not.

I should add a disclaimer before we continue. It is intuitively obvious that, in an armed conflict, people will endeavour to use physical weapons against the enemy. In contrast, *it is not at all intuitively obvious* that food denial might prove to be an effective tool against hypothetical Zone A areas during OMT. Because this is an analytical document—not a training manual, and not propaganda—I have taken the decision to omit certain operational details that I have myself speculated upon, to ensure that this document

does not contain a single, coherent picture of how Pitchfork would endeavour to engage in food denial.

The above-mentioned considerations notwithstanding, the potentially huge strategic consequences of food denial make it imperative that I explain to readers: a) what it is, b) how it would work *conceptually* (not operationally), and c) what its consequences would likely be. This necessitates a bare minimum level of operational detail, without which no reader will have any incentive to take the analysis seriously in the first place. I reiterate—*the level of operational detail pertaining to food denial, in this analytical section and in the fictional insert at the end of the section, has been calibrated to clarify the feasibility of the underlying concept, whilst providing as little operational detail as possible.*

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Food distribution in the UK occurs in much the same fashion as it occurs in any modern, urbanised country—food is produced domestically or imported, then delivered around by truck. Because finished, consumable food is not produced in Zone A, it must be transported in from warehouses and delivery depots, via a system that has not been built to survive disruption at the hands of men in balaclavas.

If a truck has to be driven 25 miles from a depot in Zone B or C to a retail point in Zone A, then it will have to pass through an area along the way that is overwhelmingly Zone B or C. Along the way, the truck must (under normal circumstances) negotiate any number of largely predictable, high-volume traffic junctions (roundabouts, T junctions, motorway slip roads, etc.), slowing down and coming to a halt fairly regularly, *especially during the final approach to Zone A*.

The fragility of the system does not impress itself upon us during peacetime. A food truck can be damaged in any number of ways, and any severe damage will either dissuade the driver from trying to continue, or make it outright impossible for him to do so. A truck that has been brought

to a halt is obviously vulnerable, and its load could be further compromised on the spot, via techniques that are obvious but that need not be spelt out here.

Operationally, the main problem for Pitchfork would consist of knowing which trucks were going where. This is a hard problem, and one that we will not explore here for the reasons outlined in the disclaimer above. Rather, we will restrict ourselves to making certain observations about the likely effects of attacks on food trucks. These attacks are *anti-materiel*, not *anti-personnel*, but the shock to the system would be colossal nonetheless. We can posit the following as probable first-order effects of Pitchfork food denial operations:

- Some drivers refusing to work
- Some trucking companies refusing to drive into Zone A, or perhaps even approach it
- Some insurers refusing coverage to companies trying to supply Zone A
- Rapid falls in the food supply into Zone A, to an extent that is not obviously predictable

To what extent would (more or less coordinated) Pitchfork elements be able to deny food access to a hypothetical Zone A fragment like the one we have sketched out in east Birmingham? The uncertainties here threaten to overwhelm the analysis, but it is surprising what starts to appear when real data are pumped into simple conceptual models.

Let us imagine that Pitchfork elements decide to interdict lorries coming from the south, into the southern part of Zone A (which includes Small Heath, Sparkhill, and Sparkbrook). We will postulate that our consolidated East Birmingham Zone A contains 200,000 people, half of whom (100,000) live in the southern half of the zone and are therefore directly affected by food denial in this scenario. Each person needs 2kg of food a day (taking into account wastage and spoilage).

It follows that this southern part of the zone needs 200 tonnes of food a day, and we will assume that, by default, all of it comes in from the south, predominantly along the A41 and A34—from the distribution centres around the M42/A34 junction, and the M42/A41 junction. Large, articulated lorries deliver to distribution centres in the suburbs, not to the inner cities. Deliveries into inner cities are made by medium trucks (we will take five tonnes as the standard load, delivering to supermarkets etc.), and light vans (we will take one tonne as the standard load, delivering to smaller retailers). If 150 tonnes are delivered by medium truck and 50 tonnes by light van every day, we have 30 medium trucks and 50 light vans a day that are targets for Pitchfork interdiction, *though these trucks are mixed up with all the other vans and trucks that are delivering food to the southern suburbs of Birmingham too*.

If this analysis is reasonably accurate, then we can conclude that Pitchfork needs to prevent three medium trucks and five light vans getting into the southern half of Zone A every day to produce a shortfall (relative to pre-OMT conditions) of 10%. How significant a 10% drop would actually be is a topic we will return to later.

Because a food delivery can, in principle, be compromised anywhere along its route, there will be different sorts of vulnerabilities, ambush points, and escape routes for Pitchfork to employ. Trying to analyse this in detail here would be both irresponsible and futile. If this attack vector actually emerges during OMT, Pitchfork, Crown and distributors will be caught in a wild, confused struggle the details of which cannot be predicted in advance. However, there is one point that cannot be ignored if the analysis is to be intellectually serious—Pitchfork will presumably consider the possibility of attacking not just trucks *but roads, too*.

What does it mean for Pitchfork to attack a road? Pitchfork can be considered to have attacked a major access route successfully if it can shut down traffic into/towards Zone A along an A-road (most obviously a radial

road coming in from the suburbs) for at least 24 hours[10]. The question then becomes—can Pitchfork shut down an A-road for this period of time using operational methodologies available to relatively disciplined but not especially high-tech actors? The answer is yes—there is at least one methodology that would allow this, clearly available to actors possessed of certain tools the Weapons section tells us Pitchfork will certainly have.

I understand that this attack vector will not be taken seriously by analysts unless its feasibility is properly established. As stated, I will allude to it in the fictional insert at the end of this section without providing substantive operational detail. For the time being, we will simply assume that Pitchfork can indeed block A-roads for a period of 24 hours (and possibly substantially longer).

Assuming then, that my hypothetical road-blocking method is sound (or that some other, equally accessible method exists), we must move onto the next question in the analysis—so what? Who cares if a 10% drop in the food supply can be engineered for 24 hours? A 10% drop in the calorific intake of a human being could simply be equivalent to them missing their daily frappuccino. Why is this significant?

Second-Order Effects of Food Denial

Let us imagine that all of the food retail in Birmingham East Zone A can be represented by ten shops of identical size[11]. Each store will sell out in three days without resupply, though obviously some things will sell out more quickly than others. British food retail is predicated on a complex, just-in-time delivery system, so constant resupply is standard. So far, so normal. Let us now imagine what a sudden food denial campaign looks like *in an apolitical context in which the only direct system stressor is food denial itself*.

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[10] Note that traffic will still be flowing freely in the other direction all the while in this scenario, which means the state might try to set up a contraflow system on the other side of the highway. This would be extremely difficult and dangerous, and still result in greatly restricted traffic flow.
[11] For those about to shout out that there are more than ten food shops in the area—this is an *abstraction*.

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Day 1: Shelves are full in Zone A, all is well. However, food denial begins along relevant access routes, and 10% of all trucks are stopped, their loads undelivered. 90% of trucks get through, but there is a 10% shortfall. Store 7 has no resupply that evening—one shelf in three lies empty.

Day 2: The manager of Store 7 complains to his distributor, but only hears excuses about trucks breaking down. Food denial continues, 90% of trucks get through. Store 7 receives one day's resupply, but sells one day's produce—one third of its shelves still lie empty at the end of the day. Store 8 receives no resupply—one third of its shelves now lie empty.

Day 3: Food denial continues, 10% of trucks are stopped. Customers at Store 7 notice that something is going wrong, some leave to shop elsewhere. Customers at Store 8 complain about the lack of fresh food. Both stores have one shelf in three empty—the lost day cannot be compensated for as supply chains are only at 90% of initial capacity, and delivery would need to *exceed* 100% of initial capacity for the shortfalls to be made up. Meanwhile, Store 3 has no resupply—one shelf in three lies empty at the end of the day.

Day 4: Food denial continues, 10% of trucks are stopped. Store 7 finds that it goes without resupply *again*. Stores 3 and 8 have one shelf out of three empty, Store 7 has two out of three empty by the end of the day. Everyone in the zone understands that something is going badly wrong, but no one is quite sure *what*.

Day 5: Panic-buying commences early in the morning. Queues form, stores are overwhelmed, some try to ration purchases. Food delivery is at 90%, but by the end of the day Stores 3, 4, and 8 have one shelf in three empty, Store 7 has two in three empty. There is virtually no fresh food, no milk, no fresh baked goods, and little fresh fruit or vegetables. Most food stores only have staples and preserved goods left.

Day 6: Chaos starts to overwhelm the system. Food delivery is at 90%, but every day there is less food on the shelves. Looting starts at Store 1, which is overwhelmed and destroyed within 20 minutes. It ceases to be a retail node—now there are nine. As 90% of trucks still get through, the food that would have gone to Store 1 is delivered to a mosque in a Pakistani district. It is supposed to act as an emergency food distribution point, though it is not clear that the expected amount of food is available there. Social media is abuzz with talk of a spiralling black market. Stores 3, and 8 have one shelf in three empty, Stores 4 and 7 have two in three empty.

Day 7: Food delivery continues at 90%, but the situation descends into anarchy. Store 7 shuts down permanently at the end of the day, citing lack of merchandise and security concerns—two out of ten nodes have shut down, Store 7's supply is rerouted to another local mosque. The mosque is quickly surrounded by a crowd of panicking people—two people are killed in the chaos. Stores 3 and 6 are looted, only six retail nodes remain. A number of food delivery trucks are hijacked or waylaid, their food disappears. Prices soar on the black market, mutual suspicion and fear take over.

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There are two things that are unrealistic about this scenario:

1) It is unrealistic to think that it would take a full week for the system to collapse. Even in stable, non-stressed societies, food retail nodes will start to sell out very quickly at the merest hint of a disruption to the food supply. This was seen in the early days of the COVID pandemic (even for decidedly non-essential items such as toilet paper) and in the 2025 blackout in Spain, where, at least in supermarkets, the shelves were stripped clean within hours. My extending the scenario to seven days was based on a desire to walk readers through the scenario more carefully, not on a belief that it would actually take seven days for social order and food retail to disintegrate.

2) Food denial will not take place in an informational vacuum. It will take place in an information-rich environment in which conventional news media, social media, and word-of-mouth will make it clear, broadly speaking, what is happening. Paranoid rumours will make up an important subcurrent in the growing panic.

Let us now construct a more realistic scenario to see how food denial will degrade social order and food retail in a scenario with three direct system stressors: a) direct food denial, b) free information flow, and c) a lack of ability to exit Zone A[12].

<p style="text-align:center">_____</p>

Day 1: Shelves are full in Zone A, all is well. Food denial starts, and will hit 10% over the course of the day.

In the zone, no food shortages are yet visible, but worrying news items and social media posts start to provide a glimpse into severe disturbances and logistical interdiction to the east, south and north of the zone. There is much footage of burning trucks, masked men with shotguns, and even blocked arterial routes. Helicopters can be seen buzzing over the blockages, with heavy police and light army presence visible in some media. No one really has any clear idea what's going on. Government spokesmen of different sorts talk about how everything is under control.

The population in the zone is unsettled, but during the day, it is radically unclear what is happening or why. However, by late afternoon, twin streams on Pitchfork and Crescent social media make it clear, from gloating and disturbed perspectives respectively, that Pitchfork elements are engaged in semi-systematic logistical interdiction aimed at the zone. In plain English, Pitchfork seems to be attacking the food supply.

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[12] Food denial will be part of a larger conflict, in which zone consolidation and inter-group hostility are rife.

Tensions heighten towards evening, as it is seen that the food supply has indeed been degraded, with all food stores showing small shortfalls. Better-connected Muslims on social media share insider info from state sources talking about a bewildered government, a geographically dispersed attack on vulnerable logistic routes, and a major delivery company standing its operations down until the situation clarifies.

Day 2: Social media storms gather pace. Hopes in the zone that the situation would have calmed down overnight are dashed. Indeed, the situation seems more chaotic than ever. Government figures and community authorities in the zone assure the population that 90% of food is getting through—but this has little effect on morale or social order.

Pitchfork social media is running wild, suggesting halal diet plans, asking why Allah doesn't just airdrop food in, and offering to ship in a tonne of pork chops a day to feed Pitchfork's Muslim brothers and sisters. Crescent social media has figured out what is happening—this is a Pitchfork-Zionist-Illuminati plot aimed at wiping Muslims out, converting them to Christianity, and starving them out of the country, all at the same time.

Queues form at all food retail outlets early in the morning. Some outlets impose quotas, others are overwhelmed, others are simply looted. Logistical interdiction continues, though distinguishing between yesterday's footage, today's footage, fake footage, and random warzone footage is difficult in real-time.

Fully 90% of food continues to be delivered, but by the end of the day, food generally moves in convoy, with army escorts, and is delivered to certain hastily improvised central distribution centres for purchase. The idea of travelling out of the zone to purchase food in Zones B or even C does, of course, occur to many Muslims. However, few of them own cars, and the situation is unravelling so rapidly that it is radically unclear what response Muslims can expect outside Zone A. Few leave, and of those who do, some return hours later without food or car. Others do not return at all.

Day 3: On Day 3, things *really* start to go downhill.

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Though it is difficult to say much of anything here with confidence, intuition suggests the window of opportunity Crown has to reestablish normality (insofar as it *can* be established) will be 48 hours. After 48 hours, the zone will have collapsed. This highlights the single most important point to be made about food denial, and one that the reader *must* understand. Food denial is a *psyop— Pitchfork doesn't care how many calories get into the zone.* It wants to destroy social order, group solidarity, and psychological stability inside the zone. More specifically, food denial-induced structural collapse will:

- Make it impossible for Crown to pretend that OMT are no more than a few localised disturbances (which is *precisely* what it will want to do)
- Create a tremendous set of incentives for Muslims to accept voluntary repatriation
- Allow Pitchfork to make Muslims out to be irredeemably uncivilised and incompatible with modern society ('they loot their own supermarkets!')
- Constitute a colossal morale boost for Pitchfork, and a stunning setback for both Crescent and Crown
- Force Crown to parlay with Pitchfork to allow reliable food delivery, thereby legitimising Pitchfork and further establishing its credibility

Of course, more stringent food denial conducted over longer periods could result in *real* calorie deficits, but that is beyond the scope of this essay, and almost certainly beyond the reach of any conceivable Pitchfork actors. Crown *will* militarise food supply into Zone A over time if necessary, the terrible costs it will have to pay (financial costs, degraded military readiness, international humiliation) notwithstanding. Implicit acknowledgement of the utter destruction of the post-War multicultural paradigm will also be unavoidable—but that is just a matter of time anyway.

The Irreversibility of Food-Denial-Induced Collapse in Zone A

I touched on this in the second scenario above, but it should be explored in a bit more detail here. If food denial can induce social collapse in Zone A, bringing the food-denial operations to an end *will not allow that collapse to be reversed*. This is another counterintuitive point that needs to be explained.

If Crown militarises food supply to the point where 90% of pre-conflict food delivery can be guaranteed, the food so delivered will have to be delivered to novel actors in Zone A who have not traditionally been involved in food retail or distribution. One imagines that mosque associations, other religious organisations, and indistinct community organisations (including organised crime groups) will step into the void. Crown will attach different degrees of legitimacy to these Crescent actors, but will have no choice but to work through them once the legacy food retail system has been obliterated through looting and general chaos.

These Crescent actors will not willingly relinquish the power this food-distribution status grants them. Why should they? '*Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven*', as a certain fictional character of dubious moral standing once said. Zone A is not the Danish countryside, nor is it an Alpine meadow. It is a massively stressed set of heavily urban zones, surrounded by hostile actors, and wracked with internal divisions: ethnic, sectarian, tribal, national, and linguistic. Further, it is populated by pre-modern actors who have no time for the post-racial, post-ethnic, post-religious fantasies of left-wing thinkers in the West.

The burnt-out supermarkets of Zone A will stay that way, even if the good folk of Tesco, Morrisons and Aldi are willing to rebuild them. Zone A-dwellers who attempt to reconstitute the pre-conflict social and economic order will have to go head-to-head with the new power structure, in a part of town where the police refuse to tread. Their likely degree of success is

entirely predictable, as is a long-term political and social reorganisation in Zone A that will cement the control of the most violent Crescent actors.

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To conclude, the pressure on Crescent/Muslims to pursue zone consolidation during OMT will be colossal[13], but the consequent food-denial vulnerabilities terrifying. Indeed, Pitchfork may come to realise that food denial is likely to be its most effective weapon. This being the case, it is overwhelmingly probable that Pitchfork elements will indeed engage in logistical interdiction.

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Name: Detective Chief Inspector Jeremy Bates
Role: Special Branch (Liaison—Domestic Stabilisation)

Name: Colonel Roderick Vale
Role: CO, 2nd Battalion, The Royal Welsh, Acting Joint Commander, West Midlands Containment Sector

B: He was here, was he, Colonel?
V: Yes, probably. I mean, this is where *we'd* have been, and it's the right angle and range. Good cover, comfortable prone position. Easy pedestrian access, but hardly anyone ever comes by, apparently. The odd dog-walker under normal circumstances, I suppose, but there's always *some* risk of compromise.
B: Any shell casings?
V: No, Detective Chief Inspector, nothing. Your boys have been picking up a bit of garbage for forensic analysis, but I'd be very surprised if any of it comes back to him. He wouldn't have been here long. Might've got here 30 minutes in advance, waited for his moment, then left.
B: Ex-Army?

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[13] They have effectively been doing it for decades anyway.

V: You don't need to be in the military to do this sort of shooting. Really, it's just like shooting at a barn door, even at 400 yards. Do you shoot?

B: Just a bit of clay-pigeon shooting here and there, but I take your point. Hunter?

V: Yes, in all likelihood. Bang, bang, bang, three shots, I think they said, then up you get, off you go. Even if someone comes by, what are they going to do? Challenge a man with a gun? Citizen's arrest? I don't see it. If you can't sweep him up electronically, he's gone, I think.

B: We're looking into that, but I don't think they can be that stupid. They had it planned out pretty well. Hard to see them bringing their phones.

V: Yes, well, about that bus, what's going on? We've been here all night establishing a perimeter, there's not much more we can do for you, I don't think. Are they going to shift it or not?

B: I'm just about to go down and have a quiet word.

V: Well, I hope so. This is over—you know what's happening as well as I do. For Pitchfork, it's a quick, low-tech op, but our response is killing us. Are we going to do this every week?

B: We understand what's happening, Colonel, but there's no doctrine for this yet.

V: Very well, Detective Chief Inspector. We'll be here as long as you need us, but from one professional to another—our response isn't deflecting their attack. It's *part* of their attack.

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Name: Detective Chief Inspector Jeremy Bates
Role: Special Branch (Liaison—Domestic Stabilisation)

Name: Nicola Shenfield
Role: Deputy Director, National Recovery Logistics (NRL)
On-site Recovery Liaison, West Midlands Zone Access Taskforce

Name: Terry Markham
Role: Senior Recovery Operator, West Midlands Roads Service; Regional Lead, Strategic Debris Clearance and Corridor Reopening

B: It's been eighteen fucking hours and you haven't even fucking touched it!

M: You've got no authority over me, Mr. Bates, and that bus will get moved when I feel comfortable moving my men into position. We're civvies, we're not supposed to be getting shot at.

B: The Army's saying the shooter's gone. All he did was shoot up the fucking fire engine! He's Pitchfork, he's not gonna shoot you lot!

S: DCI Bates, I know you've been here a long time, but if we could take the temperature down a notch—

B: Get him and his men to work on that bus, Nicola. Or are we gonna stand here all week waiting for Mr. Ninja Sniper to gun us all down? The Army can't move out until the road's clear. If the sniper's still here, why isn't he shooting at us right now, Terry?

M: It's Mr. Markham to you, Mr. Bates, and—

B: Oh, for God's sake!

S: Mr. Markham, Colonel Vale has indicated that the sniper has gone and that the area has been secured. If you don't doubt his professionalism, then I think we really have to proceed now.

M: No one's casting aspersions on the Colonel or his men, but my people were shot at yesterday and that's not part of the job. You want us to clear a bus, fine. You want us to clear a bus that's burnt all the way down into the tarmac, fine. But we're the one doing the dirty, dangerous job here, you lot just wander around shouting into your phones. Snipers weren't part of the deal.

S: Are you refusing to clear the road, Terry? Shall we call another crew in?

M: No, no, we don't want to endanger anyone else. We were called, we'll do it. It's not right that people talk to us that way, that's all. This situation, it's all down to the politicians, but I bet Mr. Bates doesn't eff and blind at his posh boss in his posh suit.

S: Well, we've all been under a lot of stress, including the Inspector.

B: Look, Mr. Markham, I apologise for losing my temper. You're right, I don't talk to my boss like that, and I shouldn't have spoken to you like that. This is a Pitchfork test run, alright? The more effective this stuff is, the more

we'll see of it. The road's already been out eighteen hours. If you start now, how long'll it take you to get the bus out of the way and patch the road up?

M: Eight hours, give or take.

S: Alright, can we crack on, then, Mr Markham?

M: If the Colonel's happy, then we'll make a start.

B: Thank you Mr. Markham, I'm sorry I got a bit sweary.

HINTERLAND

The Space Within

It's not the countryside per se,
It's o'er hill and down the way,
It's getting bigger every day—
The farmers rise

They watch you as you pass on through,
They don't have much else there to do,
They know the foot's on other shoe—
Avert your eyes

Where rifle spits out cunning round,
Where tractor blocks your access ground,
Where copper jumps at unseen sound—
We don't belong

No hedgerow stands devoid of threat,
No boy in blue can intel get,
No way back into town just yet—
So sad our song

A bit on fen, a bit on dale,
A bit on hill with winding trail,
A bit too spacious to surveil—
The peasants leer

Still hate it, though I'm not a griper,
Still see the natives here as viper
Still looks like home, despite the sniper—
A presence near

———————————————

This section could, in principle, have been incorporated into the Zone section. However, its analytical weight, operational implications and intrinsically speculative nature justify its treatment as a stand-alone section. Careful readers will hopefully continue to appreciate the way in which all five analytical sections of this document are tightly interwoven.

The trajectory a country follows in an OMT-style conflict will be shaped by the nature of its geography—particularly the availability and character of what we refer to here as *hinterland*. Put simply, the presence, quality, and accessibility of such territory will exert a determining influence on how conflict emerges and develops. Where the hinterland is abundant, strategic options expand; where it is absent, actors operate under severe constraints.

This analysis will focus on England, though the general framework may be adapted to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, or indeed some entirely foreign country with appropriate modifications.

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1) Zone A vs. Hinterland—A Brief Comparison

To define the hinterland and fully understand its strategic utility, it is useful to begin by considering its polar opposite: the heavily urbanised, high-density, Muslim-dominated environments we have referred to as Zone A. Even within these areas of relative demographic strength, Crescent elements face a fundamental and persistent geographic vulnerability: a lack of strategic depth.

In most Zone A environments, Muslim-populated districts will be spatially constrained and lack meaningful geographic depth. Even the largest such consolidated areas will rarely exhibit more than two kilometres of internal depth from periphery to centre[14]. This means that no part of these zones

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[14] Our hypothetical East Birmingham Zone A would be an example of an unusually large Zone A fragment.

will ever be far removed from an area with a different, and possibly hostile, population. This absence of territorial contiguity and strategic buffering will create substantial problems for Muslim populations and Crescent elements within them.

In contrast, a consolidated Zone C—i.e., an area with effectively zero Muslim presence—would constitute a large, contiguous, and demographically coherent region, disrupted only by a sprinkling of a) Zone-A urban clusters and b) Zone B settlements where Muslim populations continue to hold out. This configuration offers a powerful psychological safety valve to native populations, grounded in real geographic and demographic separation. The natives, and only the natives, can withdraw to the countryside. Such relocation may involve financial and emotional costs, but it remains a viable option. Muslims, on the other hand, can either hunker down or leave—there are no other options.

Extending the asymmetry between Brits and Muslims, we arrive at the hinterland, figuratively and literally. Though the hinterland is found within Zone C[15], it represents a distinct and more strategically significant subset thereof. The hinterland is not simply an area with no Muslim population to speak of; it is that part of the national territory most likely to be incorporated into a range of operational functions by Pitchfork. These will likely include: a) logistical base areas, b) training environments, c) sites for technological experimentation, and d) safe zones for personnel in retreat or rotation.

It is reasonable to assume that, subsequent to zone consolidation, Pitchfork will perceive the continued presence of Zone A areas within England[16] to be unacceptable. Their continued irregular efforts will therefore likely include various sorts of violence and privation directed at Zone A populations. In parallel, pressure may be applied to elements of the political, legal, and media establishment that continue to advocate policies that fail to meet with Pitchfork approval.

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[15] Technically, it might include bits of Zone B, but that is a subtlety that will not detain us here.
[16] Again, we ignore Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland only in an attempt to simplify what is already a complex analysis. Fundamentally, the same considerations apply to them too.

Such Pitchfork activity would presumably benefit greatly from access to unmonitored territory for the purposes outlined above. While it is plausible that some Crown elements may tacitly permit or even support such activity, it is certain that other elements will seek to detect and interdict it. It is in this context that efforts to reduce or obstruct state surveillance within the hinterland may arise.

2) Where is the Hinterland?

Approximately 70–75% of the Muslim population in England is concentrated in three major areas: Greater London; the Birmingham conurbation; and a dense, uneven band of towns and cities stretching from Leeds in the east to Liverpool in the west. This northern corridor includes Manchester and its satellite towns, Bradford, Blackburn, and several additional urban concentrations. Every Zone A area in the UK falls within one of these three clusters[17].

All areas outside Zone A fall, by definition, into either Zone B or Zone C. However, the hinterland is not simply a combination of these two. It is a distinct subset in which the following three conditions are simultaneously present: a) low population density, b) weak or underdeveloped transport infrastructure, whether due to upland terrain or rural isolation, c) proximity to one or more Zone A areas.

Rather than presenting an abstract model of what such areas might offer strategically, it is more useful to examine each of the three primary hinterland zones in turn. Each one corresponds geographically to one of the three major Zone A areas noted above: London, Birmingham, and the Leeds–Liverpool corridor. The configuration of each hinterland is shaped by the geography and infrastructure surrounding these regions, and their relative utility derives from this adjacency.

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[17] Cities such as Glasgow and Sheffield might be considered to have Zone A or proto-Zone A fragments in them. For the purposes of this essay, we will consider such cities to be Zone B.

London Hinterland

- **Proximity**—Adjacent to Zone A and Zone B areas of Greater London
- **Component Counties**—Surrey, West Sussex, East Sussex, parts of Kent, Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, and parts of Cambridgeshire
- **Physical Geography**—Varied terrain, with substantial hilly regions south of London and extended flatland in Essex, Suffolk, and Norfolk
- **Human Geography**—Relatively dense settlement south of London; much lower population densities in East Anglia
- **Observations**—This region may be conceptualised as two loosely connected zones: one to the south of London, the other extending through East Anglia. These areas are partially divided by major eastbound transport corridors (M2, M20, A2, A13, A127). Due to differences in geography and population density, operational independence between the two sub-regions is plausible. Nonetheless, the area functions as a single unit for the purposes of this framework. Notably, this is the only hinterland with large expanses of flat terrain, introducing a mixed set of considerations in any future irregular context.

Birmingham Hinterland

- **Proximity**—Adjacent to Birmingham's Zone A and Zone B areas, with potential adjacency to Stoke-on-Trent, Liverpool, and—at greater remove—Bristol
- **Component Counties** — Shropshire, Herefordshire, and Powys
- **Physical Geography** — The terrain rises from lowland England into the more mountainous regions of mid-Wales. Transport infrastructure is limited and often indirect, with travel between settlements being time-intensive
- **Human Geography** — The eastern portion of the zone contains a moderate number of towns and small cities. These taper off into sparsely populated uplands, with scattered settlements in Powys. This zone offers only one principal axis of approach into its defining

Zone A areas (those in Birmingham). Some of the hinterland population resides in Wales, which may introduce political or institutional complexity depending on the relationships between Pitchfork elements, the Welsh devolved government, and UK national authorities

Leeds–Liverpool Corridor Hinterland

- **Proximity** — Adjacent to Zone A areas distributed along the urban axis from Leeds to Liverpool
- **Component Regions** — Best understood regionally rather than by county. The zone includes major portions of the Pennine uplands: the Peak District, Forest of Bowland, Yorkshire Dales, and potentially the Lake District and North Pennines. Portions of North Wales may also fall within this area. While the North York Moors are geographically suitable, they are separated from the urban corridor by distance and arterial road networks.
- **Physical Geography** — Predominantly hilly to mountainous terrain with considerable complexity. Unlike the London and Birmingham hinterlands, which encounter urban centres after passing through flat or gently rolling country, this zone is composed almost entirely of rugged highlands with low population density and difficult access
- **Human Geography** — This is the only hinterland that physically intersects the Zone A band it is paired with. This creates a particularly complex landscape—geographically, demographically, and operationally. The area between Huddersfield in the east and Oldham/Rochdale in the west is especially fragmented, and while the region contains several major transport corridors running east–west, movement north–south remains limited. Zone A areas in this corridor are fragmented, and have the extended perimeters that inevitably accompany such fragmentation. This will create significant challenges for consistent territorial monitoring or control—for all parties.

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Careful readers will note that each hinterland zone described above is not a generic rural environment, but rather a specific type of territory defined by its physical defensibility, demographic insulation, and proximity to high-density urban areas. These are not merely remote regions—they are, in practical terms, zones of limited state penetration and, under certain conditions, zones of nearly nonexistent access for Crescent elements and Muslim populations more generally. Their position near Zone A areas makes them particularly significant as potential areas of staging, refuge, and logistical preparation for Pitchfork elements seeking to operate along the urban periphery while maintaining distance from routine surveillance or enforcement.

3) General Characteristics of the Hinterland

The operational characteristics of the hinterland derive from a consistent set of demographic, infrastructural, and cultural features found across England's rural periphery. These features are as follows:

- **Low population density and infrastructural dispersion**: Isolated properties, outbuildings, and working farms are widespread, and unusual activity—sights, sounds, or smells—often goes unreported due to sparse settlement and high individual autonomy.

- **High local cohesion and insider-outsider differentiation**: Rural communities often exhibit strong internal trust networks and a high degree of cultural coherence. Outsiders are quickly identified, and suspicion of urban governance, media, and ideological frameworks is widespread.

- **Limited and vulnerable road infrastructure**: Access into and out of hinterland areas is typically constrained to a small number of narrow roads, many of them single-lane, some of them poorly maintained. These roads are easily disrupted, monitored, or obstructed, reducing the ability of external actors to enter or operate freely.

- **Topographical and navigational complexity**: In many areas, especially upland zones, road layouts are non-intuitive and roads themselves vary significantly in quality, width, and forward visibility. Local familiarity gives a decisive advantage, while unfamiliar actors—especially in low-visibility or high-pressure situations—are more likely to become disoriented or misdirected.

- **Terrain-based defensibility**: Much of the hinterland, particularly in hilly or mountainous areas, is difficult to access without specialised vehicles or local knowledge. In flatter regions such as East Anglia, the lack of cover is offset by the sheer size and continuity of open ground, which presents its own set of complications for would-be interdicting forces.

- **Strategic proximity to urban concentrations**: No part of any designated hinterland zone lies more than 90 minutes by vehicle from its respective Zone A cluster. This geographic fact positions the hinterland as a plausible base area for Pitchfork elements seeking proximity to urban theatres while maintaining distance from surveillance or enforcement.

- **Impermeable barrier for Crescent actors**: During OMT, hinterland areas will become functionally inaccessible to Crescent elements due to cultural, geographic, and tactical factors[18].

- **Institutional fragility under pressure**: Traditional policing models are poorly suited to low-trust, low-visibility, low-access environments. In the event of a full breakdown in public order in the cities, police presence may be met with opposition, such as road obstructions, passive non-cooperation, vehicle damage, verbal confrontation, or more kinetic activities. Under such conditions, ordinary policing

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[18] Entering hinterland areas may come to pose a threat to all non-white ethnic minorities in the UK. Neither the accurate identification of different ethnic groups nor an interest in the distinctions amongst them can be guaranteed during OMT.

activity becomes high-cost, low-payoff. Military intervention remains theoretically available but will carry significant operational and political risks, and will be considered only under exceptional circumstances. Helicopter-based operations are technically feasible but would constitute a high-risk escalation unlikely to be pursued unless Crown feels desperate.

4) Policing the Hinterland

Some readers may view the claim—that police access to the hinterland could be significantly constrained—as overstated. But it is important to recall that the police are, structurally, a risk-averse and heavily bureaucratic institution, governed by rigid procedures and financial limitations. Even relatively low-level disruption, accompanied by little risk of serious injury to Pitchfork *or* Crown—such as recurring property/vehicle damage—could generate an unsupportable administrative, financial, and PR burden. The idea that the police would willingly accept sustained attritional harassment in remote territory, especially where outcomes are uncertain and public support limited, is difficult to credit.

Consider the following hypothetical: a two-person patrol unit, idling at a rural junction in Suffolk, suddenly experiences a ballistic impact to the rear windscreen of its vehicle. The round appears to have been small in calibre and does not result in injury. The officers respond in accordance with protocol, immediately withdrawing from the area and reporting the incident to their command structure. A support unit is dispatched, arriving 27 minutes later. By this time, the assailant—who was positioned somewhere in the surrounding fields—is long gone, and no electronic trail exists to facilitate identification.

The follow-up investigation yields little. Local residents are superficially cooperative but unhelpful. Door-to-door questioning dissolves into long digressions about pigfeed mixtures and tractor engine tolerances. A question arises: should investigators attempt to locate the projectile for forensic analysis? Said projectile likely came down in a large, uneven field,

and there is no way to determine whether the threat has truly passed. Could another Pitchfork actor be present nearby? Might they be equipped more formidably? Should the support vehicles be repositioned? Are further shots possible? The theoretical risk quickly outpaces the investigative value. The probability of retrieving useful forensic material is low. A decision is made to withdraw.

None of this requires ideological hostility to the police *per se*. It simply reflects a structural reality: rural terrain, when actively unwelcoming, generates costs—psychological, financial, administrative, and reputational—that exceed the capacity of conventional policing models to absorb.

In all likelihood, no police force can maintain a presence in hinterland areas under sustained pressure. The small-bore rifle-based scenario discussed earlier is extreme by design: it forces a disproportionate and resource-intensive institutional response to what is, in practice, a form of targeted disruption rather than attempted bodily harm, and one with *a very low entry barrier for Pitchfork*. The alternative—to ignore such incidents and continue patrolling as if nothing had happened—would hollow out the patrol's entire purpose. If the police have to ignore having their patrol car shot up, then Crown is in serious trouble.

It is theoretically possible that plainclothes or undercover officers could be deployed into the hinterland in unmarked vehicles for surveillance purposes. But this, too, would present challenges. First, it would represent an implicit admission of having lost operational control. Second, without specific targets, such patrols would have little strategic value. Third, local knowledge networks and community cohesion would make detection and exposure highly probable, rendering any surveillance effort short-lived and ineffective.

Readers should understand that the British countryside is not the apolitical idyll many imagine it to be. Even in peacetime, it features a complex and

occasionally tense security landscape. Gamekeepers monitor for poachers and unauthorised trespassers. Disputes over shooting rights are common. Agricultural equipment is frequently targeted for theft. Farmers organise informal patrols, block field entrances with boulders or machinery, and take a dim view of unfamiliar vehicles left in laybys. Inappropriately parked campervans are often encouraged to move along. The countryside may be safer than urban areas in general, but it is far from passive. It already operates as a lightly defended domain. Strengthening and redirecting that informal architecture would not be difficult.

Finally, it is important to point out that, while the hinterland provides terrain-based protection and operational breathing space, it is not intended to function in isolation. On the contrary, the effectiveness of future Pitchfork activity will rely to a significant extent on *structured cooperation between hinterland-based elements and actors embedded in urban areas*. Communication channels of whatever sort will enable planning, targeting, and logistical coordination. The hinterland will offer strategic depth, but its value lies in its integration with a broader network[19]. Urban elements supply intelligence, provoke response, and anchor confrontation; rural elements help a) absorb pressure, b) prepare force, and c) reintroduce pressure.

5) The Dutch Predicament

To conclude, it is worth contrasting the Pitchfork strategic environment with that which obtains in another Western European state. The Netherlands, by virtue of its geographical and demographic character, possesses virtually no viable hinterland whatsoever.

The population density of the Netherlands is similar to that of England, but is distributed throughout the country more evenly. There is no rural depth in the conventional sense, no hinterland where geography, population distribution, or poor physical infrastructure meaningfully impede state observation or intervention. Almost all territory lies within one hour of a major population centre. The road network is extensive, efficient, and highly

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[19] See Pitchfork section for further discussion of paramilitary coordination.

connected. In such a setting, any irregular actors will be painfully exposed to surveillance and interdiction.

However, these same demographic and infrastructural factors permit rapid ingress into any part of the country by all actors. There are no meaningful barriers to Muslim populations in major cities projecting themselves into overwhelmingly native areas. Muslim areas are themselves, of course, jammed in cheek-by-jowl amongst native and other areas that will be hostile towards them in the event of conflict. The terrain does not obstruct; it facilitates. The absence of natural chokepoints means that no community can insulate itself, even temporarily, from the pressures of proximity or the effects of conflict spillover.

In the event of civil unrest or communal violence, the Netherlands has no space for gradual escalation, no possibility of retreat and regrouping, and no distributed fallback system. Action cannot be layered, deferred, or masked. There is no territorial depth, and thus no buffer against failure. In this respect, the Dutch model may serve as a cautionary example: a highly integrated state apparatus with no tolerance for disruption, and no capacity to survive it if the centre fails. To rephrase, the entire system could fall quite quickly once the contagion of conflict starts to spread.

By contrast, England—larger and more topographically complex—possesses precisely the kind of strategic depth where slower adaptation can occur, and large, relatively unaffected zones endure. In times of fracture, this characteristic may prove to be of critical importance—in more ways than one.

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Name: Detective Chief Inspector Jeremy Bates
Role: Special Branch (Liaison—Domestic Stabilisation)

Name: Chief Superintendent Gareth Till
Role: Gold Commander, West Yorkshire Police, Bradford Division

T: Come on now Jezza, you knew we'd have a few issues eventually.

B: Yeah, true, but London's a bit surprised that you've lost control of it so quickly up here. Their emerging threat analysis has always focused on Islamic radicals and the Russians—not the People's Republic of the Yorkshire Dales.

T: Ah, calm down now, it's not as bad as that. I mean, it's not good, but no one's getting butchered out there. It's the locals playing up a bit, that's all.

B: There's a heavy and vicious Pitchfork presence shooting anyone it can get its eyes on round both your Crescent areas in Bradford and Leeds—nearly all of that is growing out of your hinterland. There's also sporadic food denial around the zones that's embarrassing the government internationally. You must've heard that they actually airdropped food into Oldham last week.

T: We're east of the Pennines here—Oldham might as well be Mogadishu. Things aren't that bad over here yet.

B: But they're getting there, aren't they?

T: Have you looked at a map recently? London gets the money and is a nice big flat circle. Birmingham's broke but is geographically straightforward and much smaller than London. Up here, you're never more than about 20 minutes away from isolated roads passing through broken territory—territory which is itself, I'll remind you, inhabited by trigger-happy peasants who'll talk your ear off about who exactly stole their prize pig 37 years ago. These people are a pain in the arse, Jezza, they get the bit between their teeth and stop listening. But they're not shooting anyone out there and Pitchfork's recruiting from town, from city, across the country.

B: I thought they'd shot two of yours.

T: Yes, sure, one got a bit of birdshot in the arse and the other had his collarbone fractured with a .22. It's not exactly the Battle of the Somme —they're not shooting anyone dead.

B: How would you know? Word is you're not going out any more, hence my visit here. MI5 are convinced you've got at least two high-value fugitives in the Dales alone: the Carla Henshaw shooter, and that guy who's been

shooting parliamentary aides in London. Any leads, Gazza? Or are they just going to retire out there and play farmer?

T: We can't go out in patrol cars, you have to understand how trivial it is for them. You drive down a single road with no other exit and it's blocked behind you—tractor, boulder, tree trunk, whatever. The bigger roads are all at least lightly surveilled, and there are so many small-bore rifles out there, they just pepper you, they don't give a shit. You could send a bunch of guys out with a firearms unit, but what's your target? Without intel, you don't have a target—you *are* the target! As for the fugitives, these guys will be armed. You think they're going to come quietly? I'll send the firearms squad out in a fucking bulldozer to make sure they can clear the road on the way back, shall I? They can have a quick cuppa under sniper fire, is that the idea? If you know where these guys are, tell the Army and get them to send a chopper in—let the SAS do it.

B: Forget about the chopper, London doesn't like the optics and there's no telling what the Pitchfork response would be. Besides, the Army would shit a brick if we told them to deploy out there, they'd fight us all the way on it. The SAS would probably do what they were told, but the squaddies wouldn't like it one bit. If they start to turn, zone boundaries, infrastructure patrols, sabotage response—it'll all fall to bits.

T: OK, so you're fucked, and we're fucked too. London runs the country, not Bradford—this is bigger than us, up here. They should've thought about this decades ago.

B: Is that a helpful response now?

T: I don't have a helpful response. All we can do is send out the odd drone when we get the chance, see what we can pick up—unusual movement patterns, too many people living in one farmhouse, thermal showing us weird stuff happening at night. The ANPR's all gone in the hinterland, but we have a semi-accurate macro-picture of vehicles entering and exiting. Apart from that, we're not seeing much of anything. They don't use phones, you told me that yourself.

B: Yeah, GCHQ is largely blind in there.

T: They're not the only ones.

CROWN

Uneasy Still

On paper strong—on street the cracks do show
Badge counts for less from one day to the next
Its duty clear—to police the bucking town

Round rifle brave do Pitchfork forces flow
Tank, shell and mortar count for naught—perplexed,
The strongest hand in marshland fears to drown

The king hard-paces boards in candle-glow
His realm, once sound, by voodoo loathsome hexed
No message borne by pigeon soothes his frown

Now rifle, badge, their weakness does but grow
And sov'reign, aid he seeks from counsellor vexed
Uneasy still the head that wears a crown

<div align="center">————————————</div>

Crown consists of various different capabilities and institutions. In this section, we will only concern ourselves with those two institutions that are obviously capable of taking kinetic action against Crescent and Pitchfork: the army and the police. The security services will be referred to more generically and less directly in the next section, Pitchfork.

1) Police

One could be forgiven for thinking that, in the event of a collapse into three-way conflict between Crown, Crescent, and Pitchfork, that piece of Crown presenting the greatest direct danger to the Pitchfork would be the army. However, this is not obviously the case, and I would personally argue that the greatest threat to native paramilitaries would be the police. It may indeed be the case that the police are the *only real threat* to Pitchfork at a

strategic level. This will have to be considered later on—for the moment, let us focus on the police and their ability to continue to function as a meaningful force if they come into conflict with the native population.

First, a brief digression. We must understand that, if it comes to be believed that the UK police are taking the side of Crescent in our emergent conflict, two conceptually distinct (though not clearly organisationally distinct) forces will take issue with them: a) Pitchfork elements, and b) the British public. Though the first group has the option of being more focused in its kinetic operations, the second, upon reflection, is probably more than capable of bringing about the disintegration of the police under conflict conditions. This brings us back to a very important concept that we have neglected somewhat up until now—there will be crucially important *sub-paramilitary actors* whose behaviour will likely play a vital role in degrading government institutions.

A sub-paramilitary actor is an actor who is not a paramilitary member, but whose attitudes are broadly aligned with those of native paramilitaries and who engages in behaviour that buttresses and reinforces paramilitary activity. This activity is either a) not obviously legally actionable, or b) legally actionable, but at a level that makes it hard for the state to try to respond to it all.

The state cannot immediately arrest a group of women blocking a truck trying to deliver food to Zone A, because such behaviour, though illegal, is not obviously actionable unless it persists for a certain period of time. Similarly, public disorder is illegal to some extent, but it strains credulity to imagine that literally everyone present at a given outbreak of public disorder can be pursued by Crown. In contrast, targeted killings are *always and everywhere* behaviour that Crown will attempt to respond to, even if, in the end, it cannot identify the perpetrators. Anyone conducting a targeted killing is always, by definition, a paramilitary actor regardless of formal organisational affiliation.

The Containment-Pursuit Loop

The August 2024 riots provide great insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the UK police as a force, at least in contexts relevant to this discussion. When significant public disorder erupts, the police cycle through the following procedures:

- Contain the disorder and minimise the damage caused to people and infrastructure
- Film the disorder to identify rioters/criminals and gather evidence for subsequent prosecutions
- Pursue the rioters around the country and drag the relevant perpetrators off to jail, where the courts will deal with them as appropriate

Why don't the police just arrest rioters while they're rioting? Wouldn't that be simpler? Simpler yes, but not easier. The police are not so numerous or powerful as to be able to arrest rioters in this fashion.

It is a simple matter to go online and see video of real arrests, in the UK or anywhere else—staunch resistance, even from women of average size, can necessitate multiple officers at an arrest, if beating people unconscious and *then* arresting them is not permitted. When the rioters are men throwing bricks at you, *very few arrests can be made in real-time*. However, the police excel at concentrating strength (twelve policemen in a van) against weakness (rioter being dragged out of bed at four in the morning by twelve policemen) at the pursuit level. If rioting is the drinking session, subsequent Crown pursuit is the hangover.

During times of relative civil order and state legitimacy, this system works very well in containing outbreaks of civil disorder. Contain, pursue, contain, pursue—the system is a very strong one when disorder is brief and is followed by, so to speak, a resumption of normal service. Because the modern surveillance state is so good at identifying rioters, even a containment failure which overwhelms the police on a local basis will not

defang the subsequent pursuit process. However, no great analytical prowess is required to see the great systemic weakness lurking within this paradigm—it will only function properly when the police pursue *but are not themselves pursued*.

RECAP (Responsive Equilibrium—Civilian Against Police)

When their shift ends, the police can go home, put their feet up and watch the telly, safe in the knowledge that no one is going to kick their door in at four in the morning and drag them off in a van. But the police are normal people, drawn from the communities they police. They do not live in barracks like the Army; they live in normal homes and are as exposed to the hostility of the public as anyone else would be, assuming they can be identified as being police officers. Public shaming, property attacks, physical attacks—fundamentally, the police have no more defense against these forms of assault than anyone else.

The police have other massive disadvantages that come to light upon examination. Doctrinally, they are required to take action *against specific criminals*—they cannot just grab someone at random from Street A because they know that a criminal lives there. In contrast, anyone who wishes to take action against the police can target *any police officer* to attack the police as an institution. The importance of this wild asymmetry is hard to overstate, though whether or not Pitchfork actors will be ruthless enough to act on it is an open question.

Extreme physical violence against the police is unlikely during OMT[20], for both moral and strategic reasons. To this must be added the observation that such violence would not obviously seem rational to paramilitary or sub-paramilitary actors *even at a tactical level*. Here, we predict the emergence of an equilibrium-seeking system of mutual deterrence that we have dubbed *Responsive Equilibrium—Civilian Against Police* (RECAP).

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[20] Unlikely, though not unimaginable. Senior police officers, who are quasi-political figures, may be particularly at risk.

The key insight here is that, as stated, the police are actually *normal people embedded in normal fashion amongst the British public*, not intergalactic stormtroopers living on a Death Star orbiting planet Earth. They live where we live, shop where we shop, drink where we drink. There is no degree of insulation between them and the public at all, and they will be likely to rapidly lose their organisational coherence if placed under sustained psychological pressure.

It is interesting to stop and think about how, exactly, Catholic members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) functioned throughout the Troubles. The RUC was an overwhelmingly Protestant force, but did contain small numbers of Catholic officers. How did these people continue to function? Protestant officers would, of course, live in Protestant areas. But where did the Catholics live?

Here we enter a strange, twilight world so entirely unfamiliar to most Brits it is hard to believe it ever existed. Catholic officers would often live in mixed or Protestant areas, which greatly lowered the likelihood of being attacked by republican paramilitaries. However, their security precautions were often far more elaborate than that. Many lived a long way away from where the stations they worked at, and would travel to work via long, complex routes, sometimes changing vehicles on the way. Protestant officers were also under threat, but the threat came from republican paramilitaries, not from both the republican paramilitaries *and* their own communities.

Compare this with the army. The squaddies lived in barracks, which were heavily armed and guarded. Additionally, regiments *recruited* from Northern Ireland didn't *serve* in Northern Ireland—only English, Scottish, and Welsh regiments served there[21]. This meant that their homes and communities were a long way away across the water, and that the likelihood of individuals being targeted at home was extremely low, if we ignore the general attacks on the Army (Guildford, Birmingham, etc.) that any given

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[21] The Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), recruited after the Troubles commenced to support the RUC, is an important exception to this rule. Unfortunately, we cannot talk about it in detail here.

soldier was extremely unlikely to be caught up in. In this specific sense, soldiers were safe, but the police (i.e. the RUC) were not.

The influence of modern technology here cannot be overstated. In the 1970s, there were no mobile phones, no Internet, no Twitter, and no chance of being turned into a humiliating meme that everyone on your street had seen by the end of the day. There was no crowd-sleuthing, no '*does anyone recognise this copper?*'. Today, literally any police officer without a face covering will be identified within hours under conflict conditions, when the desire to identify, doxx, humiliate, and harass remains high for extended periods of time. In many smaller communities (readers should think here of Zones B and C), identifying individual officers will be easier, if not downright trivial.

Social media is a never-ending generator of material that is used to embarrass and humiliate the police. The huge amount of good, important, competent work done by the police is something that we generally never see. We only see the uselessness, the humiliating incompetence, the ideologically-motivated madness. And this is in *pre-conflict conditions*, in which systematic attempts to degrade police morale and structural integrity have not emerged.

The general phenomenon of filming people in public and shaming them on social media is already well-established around the globe—as anyone spending more than ten seconds on Twitter will quickly learn. If this is ever weaponised by determined actors against the police, and combined with doxxing and targeted harassment, it is not clear how, if at all, they will be able counter it. Being in the police is ultimately *just a job* for the overwhelmingly majority of officers. The average police officer is not an ideologically hardened street fighter or political cadre. The average police officer is *a civil servant with a radio and a special hat*, and their ability to resist a sliding scale of targeted harassment may well turn out to be rather limited.

White British police officers, who are fundamentally the only people of importance in the police (the brown, black and occasional Eastern European officers being window dressing) will, of course, live overwhelmingly amongst the same white British people who form the paramilitary and sub-paramilitary Pitchfork strata that they are pitted against. Moreover, they have no Plan B, unlike the Catholic officers we mentioned above who were free to move out of Catholic areas. White police officers are not going to take their families to live in Third-World slum parts of British towns and cities just to get away from their fellow Brits. As a consequence, *they have nowhere to go*. As noted above, the impossibility of avoiding social media identification will put most officers within a single encounter of being exposed to brutal harassment. Even this assumes that unusually ruthless Pitchfork elements (paramilitary or sub-paramilitary) are not harassing them anyway simply for being in the police.

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We are now in a position to sketch out, in speculative fashion, the feedback loops upon which RECAP will be based. Readers should recollect that RECAP is not a plan, and that nothing is being advocated here. Rather, RECAP is a *prediction about the emergence of a certain type of anti-police activity*. Some Pitchfork elements will have a conscious understanding of what RECAP is, even if they do not call it that. Others will act more viscerally, less analytically.

- Step 1: The police refrain from oppressing Pitchfork actors, and these actors refrain from oppressing the police.

- Step 2: The police start targeting Pitchfork actors via standard police procedures. Note that this activity a) must be targeted at specific individuals, b) is legally demanding (high evidentiary standards, etc.), c) requires intelligence-led concentration of force in pursuit, as explained above.

- Step 3: Pitchfork starts targeting the police. Note that this targeting a) can be aimed at specific officers *or any officer at all in a broader institutional attack*, b) has no legal demands at all, though it *will* be accompanied by legal risk, c) requires no logistically-demanding concentration of force or resources, and d) ranges from filming, verbal abuse, and online memes to doxxing, off-duty harassment, and attacks on property. Paramilitary and sub-paramilitary actors will both participate in their different ways.

- Step 4: A vicious tit-for-tat spiral of unpleasantness continues for an unknown period of time.

- Step 5: The police decide that discretion is the better part of valour, and reduce their targeting of Pitchfork actors. Pitchfork actors reciprocate.

We know how the police will act against Pitchfork—their rules of engagement are well-established. How will Pitchfork act against the police? One imagines that Pitchfork, even under conditions of growing tit-for-tat retaliation, will nonetheless largely refrain from inter-personal kinetic activity and focus instead on psychological pressure and property attacks. Under conflict conditions, strict adherence to this moral and strategic calculus cannot be guaranteed though, especially on the part of low-discipline actors.

In the five-step presentation above, we have moved from one equilibrium to another and back again, as if we were considering a pure cycle. However, in the real world, things have a tendency to get rather messy. It is conceivable that severe Pitchfork activity could start to push individual officers out of the force entirely. Even those officers who stayed in the force would perhaps feel the desire to take their foot off the pedal a bit when anti-Pitchfork activity was ordered by their superiors. Radios malfunction, cars break down, GPS can mislead, and suspects can disappear into thin air—police work is not a simple matter, and many things can go wrong at any moment.

Closing Thoughts

In closing, we will note that the police are substantially a *reactive* organisation—they go where they need to go when they are needed there. To the extent that they fail or refuse to do this, they effectively cease to exist. This characteristic of the police may be used by Pitchfork actors to create an impossible Catch-22 for the police. Respond to a call-out and walk into a native ambush, or fail to respond and accept that you can no longer function in certain areas at all. It is not clear that the police will be able to square this circle, yet failing to square it will make clear just how degraded their capabilities have become in the hypothetical conflict we imagine here.

2) Army

I suggested earlier that, despite its lethality, the army will probably not be the greatest threat to Pitchfork. This counterintuitive claim needs to be justified, and justify it we shall attempt to do, whilst also acknowledging that little here can be said with complete confidence.

We stated above that the police were essentially civilians disguised as something rather more impressive. The army (and the military in general, though the RAF and the Navy are of minor relevance to this document) are, by definition, *not* civilians. We have, perhaps, grown too accustomed to thinking of the army as the people who drive trucks and distribute supplies when the chips are down, but that is not what the army *really* is.

In reality, the army is a large industrialised killing machine that operates on land whilst its sister services operate at sea or in the skies. Under normal circumstances, the idea of having to confront such a force in irregular conflict would put one on the back foot rather. Nonetheless, Pitchfork elements will probably not feel too intimidated by the army during OMT.

What is the army for?

The army has three main functions:

1) To defend the UK and its people against foreign adversaries
2) To support the civil authorities during times of crisis or natural disaster
3) To build diplomatic capital through sub-lethal international engagement

Readers will note that 'suppressing domestic revolt' is not one of the army's functions—neither politicians nor the army see it that way. The UK enjoys a long history of essentially unchallenged political continuity since the Glorious Revolution in 1688[22]—no revolutions, no invasions, no heads on pikes, no great political discontinuities, no civil wars. Very few countries can boast anything like this record.

The Peterloo Massacre (1819) and the Newport Rising (1839), whilst grisly, fall very far short of the terrible internal violence that has wracked so many other European countries. It is simply not the case that the army is seen as being an important mechanism for maintaining political order within the UK, nor is it generally held to be the case that such a force is needed. This is both the blessing and the curse of a very long period of virtually unparalleled civil order.

Why could the army deploy in Northern Ireland? The army deployment in Northern Ireland (Operation Banner, 1969-2007) started as a response to substantial, widespread rioting and intercommunal violence between a) unionist communities and the police on one hand, and b) nationalist communities on the other. When the army was finally deployed, many people in affected nationalist communities displayed a surprisingly welcoming attitude at first, as they saw the army as protectors of their besieged communities. However, the triple disaster of the Falls Curfew (1970), internment (1971) and Bloody Sunday (1972) transformed the situation into a much more serious and violent conflict.

It is important to understand how alien Northern Ireland seemed in the 1970s, amongst squaddie and politician both. Linguistically, politically,

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[22] The Glorious Revolution itself was not a 'proper' revolution.

geographically, religiously, culturally—Northern Ireland was a land apart, and the Catholic population would have seemed a people apart, both from the perspective of the British politicians and British squaddies. The army could operate there in a way it simply cannot in Britain (the island, that is) itself. Ulster regiments never served under Operation Banner as that would have destroyed the ostensible neutrality of the army[23]. English, Scottish and Welsh regiments were rotated through the province, in which they were strangers in a strange land, Northern Ireland's status as part of the UK notwithstanding. This reality allowed the UK government in London to operate in ways that fell somewhere between the two extremes of a) what would be permissible in Hampshire and b) what would have been permissible in Kenya during the dying days of empire.

When OMT commence, this entire logic breaks down with it. The conflict will be overwhelmingly concentrated in England, with localised flare-ups in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Cardiff and Swansea. England would have to be patrolled and pacified with predominantly English troops operating in, or close to, the communities those troops had grown up in. If ordered to kinetically engage Pitchfork elements, it is not at all clear that the troops at the sharp end would do so, nor is it obvious that their officers would pass those orders down the chain of command.

What are the capabilities of the army?

The army is substantially smaller than it was in 1969 when Operation Banner commenced. Full-time troops currently number just over 70,000, compared with the 159,000 of 1969, with the Army Reserve (previously known as the Territorial Army) consisting of about 26,000 personnel. About 30% of the Army are in the Combat Arms (infantry, armour, special forces), another 30% are in Combat Support (signals, engineers, artillery, intelligence), and another 40% are in Combat Service Support (logistics, medical, admin, jugglers, mime artists, etc.). All soldiers must complete basic training and are familiar with weapon handling, so they are all nominally functional on the field of battle. Nonetheless, one must imagine

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[23] As noted above, the UDR was a partial exception, and was both hated by the Catholic population and implicated in much collusion with loyalist paramilitaries.

that many troops ostensibly capable of engaging in combat are nothing of the sort.

The observant reader will already have calculated that the regular army has no more than about 25,000 combat troops, by which we mean troops whose primary purpose is combat. Not more than about 35% of these troops are available for deployment in the UK at any time. With foreign postings, training schedules, troop rotation, leave, and sickness, only 8,000-10,000 would be available to be deployed at any time, supported by 12,000-16,000 support troops. How these troops would be rotated is radically unpredictable, as is the duration of time they could function for without rotation.

Most of the army's heavy equipment will be completely unusable during OMT for political reasons. There will be no artillery, no mortars, no tactical airstrikes, no cruise missiles, no area bombardment, no anti-armour ordnance, no aircraft strafing enemy columns, and no helicopter gunships. The army will basically be down to a) small arms and b) the occasional machine gun if it can stage an intel-led SAS-style ambush. Additional resources will include jeeps, high-quality drones, the odd helicopter and a very-high level communications and intelligence infrastructure. This materiel and support, though impressive, will not allow high-intensity combat, and it is not obvious who the foe would be in such combat anyway, amongst Pitchfork *or* Crescent.

What can the army realistically do in this conflict?
The core, everyday responsibilities of the army during OMT will include:

- Crowd control
- Infrastructure protection
- Zone boundary enforcement
- Patrols
- Counter-sniper overwatch
- Depot security

- Convoy escorts
- Refugee processing

There will be very little chance of real military engagements for the average squaddie on the average day, as was true during (most of) the Troubles. The regular army will act substantially as a *stabilising force*, with real kinetic engagement being left to special forces, a pattern that, again, was fairly well developed in Northern Ireland. In plain English, Crown will deploy the regular army where it needs to keep things quiet, steady, and functioning, and the SAS when it knows in advance who needs to be shot and where they are.

Let us now make a number of bold predictions. I acknowledge in advance that I cannot provide strict numerical justifications for everything that follows—I will leave such matters to those who are better informed. This is a semi-intuitive interpretation of what the army will and will not be able to do. Readers can make of it what they will.

1) A substantial fraction of the available troops will be used to secure London. If London as a whole is radically degraded, the symbolic, economic, administrative and psychological damage to the UK will be catastrophic. Parts of the city will indeed be lost (i.e. become Zone A), and others radically degraded, but zone consolidation and zone enforcement by the army will allow the retention of a critical mass in the financial, commercial and (white/mixed) residential core.

2) Birmingham will be largely abandoned, though a bare minimum number of troops might be put in to enforce a substantial Zone A fragment as sketched out in the Zones section of this essay. Birmingham is a bankrupt, semi-colonised city that is already notorious for being a dysfunctional, substantially third-world failure. A government under pressure will not attempt to save it, though Pitchfork elements will have their own ideas as to how Birmingham should progress.

3) The Leeds-to-Liverpool-corridor will burn. It is the most geographically diffuse Zone A-containing area, the most geographically complex, and is cut through by a complex, expansive hinterland that will bedevil efforts to patrol it or interdict Pitchfork activity. Further, most of it is economically moribund and an overwhelmed government will rank it as being the lowest priority of any Zone-A containing area. If London has already been secured, then Manchester will likely prove a partial exception to this rule due to a) its stronger economy and b) its status as the main city of the North of England.

4) It goes without saying that the government cannot help the Muslim population of Zone C. What we can see now is that the Muslim populations of Zone B are also extremely unlikely to be viable. No adequate concentrations of force can be created given the other demands on the army, and local police forces will be overwhelmed by Pitchfork activity, paramilitary and sub-paramilitary. Even if Zone B-Muslims manage to achieve temporary zone consolidation, food denial and kinetic assault will almost certainly force them out regardless. Only large, consolidated Zone-A areas will allow the army to have even a chance of a) maintaining a perimeter, and b) getting food in efficiently.

Of course, there is nothing in principle to stop the government pulling troops out of foreign theatres and bringing them back to the UK to aid in managing the conflict. This, however, would require the army to be reconceptualised as an organisation overwhelmingly dedicated to suppressing native insurgency and internal collapse. This would be an astonishing admission of a failure so multi-faceted that no government would make it unless faced with utter collapse.

Even if additional forces were to be brought back to the UK, thereby transforming the military and diplomatic significance of the UK on the international stage, the trajectory of the conflict would perhaps not be radically altered. I imagine the following could be achieved:

- London could be held more securely

- The Zone A fragments of Birmingham could be perimetered and guarded more effectively
- Glasgow, Edinburgh and Cardiff could be stabilised to some extent, perhaps resulting in greater longevity for Zone B-type Muslim fragments there
- The Leeds-to-Liverpool-corridor would still be largely beyond hope, but Manchester could be better secured and retain greater viability

What will the army make of this conflict?

Bear in mind that, as in the Troubles, OMT, from the army's perspective, will not be a 'real' war against a peer or near-peer opponent. Nor will it be a war fought on foreign ground against insurgents, where different rules apply. Rather, it will be a vicious, complex, dirty, ideological, ethnic, religious, logistical, turf-based, sectarian, bomb-throwing, gun-stealing, truck-burning, throat-slitting war, fought on home ground, in which, most of the time, it will not be obvious what to do, how to do it, or how anyone else will respond to it. The relationship between input and output will be radically non-linear for Crown and Crescent during the conflict, whereas Pitchfork's strategic course is likely to be much clearer.

Unlike the police, the army is a highly respected institution in British life. Somewhat like the Royal Family, there is a strong default regard for the military in the UK that is consistent and heartfelt, certainly across those who are right-of-centre, centrist, and working-class left-of centre. Ideological opposition to these two institutions will generally be located predominantly amongst the middle-class and toff left.

That said, any substantial domestic deployment of the army that is not largely limited to logistical matters and zone enforcement will quickly bring it into conflict with the very communities that it is drawn from. Any and all military activity of note on the part of the army will immediately open it up to reputational risk and political hazard. If it is required to clamp down on Muslim zones, that will create one type of hazard. If it is required to clamp

down on native areas, that will create a different, potentially existential hazard.

Readers should note once more that it will be *military* activity that will open the army up to these hazards, not domestic deployment *per se*. It is for this reason that the regular army will be deployed to a) enforce zone boundaries, b) patrol, and c) guard infrastructure, major road junctions, railway stations and airports. If the civilian authorities order the army to engage in actions that the native population considers directly oppressive, the danger posed to the army as an institution will be very great, as will the chance of radically escalating the conflict.

Young British lads do not join the army to shoot white British people in the Midlands, nor do they see their *raison d'être* as being the defence of Muslims, in the UK or anywhere else. They are just as aware of the Muslim-induced disintegration of their towns, cities and society as anyone else—probably more so. They know all about Pakistani rape gangs, they have not forgotten the murder of Lee Rigby, and all of the hard fighting done by the army in the last few decades has been against Muslim adversaries, even if not strictly on religious grounds. If the army is pushed too far in what *it sees as being* a pro-Muslim, anti-Pitchfork direction, it will start to disintegrate.

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If Crown decides that serious kinetic activity against Pitchfork is required, then the Army will follow the same pattern it followed in Ulster, with special forces (most obviously the SAS, the SBS, and the SRR[24]) being deployed against strategically significant targets on the basis of strong intelligence. If such deployment is required in the hinterland, one imagines it will be made via helicopter, though standard subterfuge and infiltration might function well in urban, suburban, or non-hinterland rural areas.

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[24] The SAS needs no introduction. The SBS is the Special Boat Service. The SRR is the modern incarnation of the Det, or 14 Intelligence Company. Created during the Troubles for plainclothes operations.

If such action is required against Crescent, it will be more sudden and destructive, as Crescent populations are ethnically alien and not so open to infiltration or surveillance via standard HUMINT avenues (though SIGINT will continue to function well against them). Acting in such a fashion against Crescent will not threaten crucial British institutions in the same way as acting against Pitchfork. This makes high-intensity anti-Crescent army operations more probable than similar activity against Pitchfork, all other things being equal.

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Name: Detective Chief Inspector Jeremy Bates
Role: Special Branch (Liaison—Domestic Stabilisation)

Name: Lieutenant-Colonel Peregrine de Montfort-Hall
Role: Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, The Royal Anglian Regiment

Name: Deputy Assistant Commissioner Elaine Stow
Role: Metropolitan Police Service—Territorial Policing Command

B: I know we're all under pressure here, but civility is always important, I feel.

ES: I'm prepared to be civil, Jeremy, but the Army clearly has no interest in pulling its weight and I'm starting to wonder where its sympathies really lie.

PM: Elaine, my allegiance is to the Crown and my sympathies lie with the nation—this you know. That said, the Army is not under police command—nor will it ever be.

B: I don't think Elaine's trying to assert command, Colonel, I think she's looking for a bit of help.

ES: If the Army would help us go through key trouble spots, it would send a powerful signal to the city as a whole. We'd pick up weapons, seize phones for forensic analysis and evidence gathering, we'd—

PM: My dear Elaine, my troops are trained to fight the enemy on the field of battle, not rummage through Aunt Jemima's underwear drawer. You will find a rifle or two at most, and perhaps the odd video of someone slashing someone's tyres. For this, my men should do what—kick in 200 doors?

ES: We've got Pitchfork elements shooting Muslims, men, women and children, and every weekend, we're getting a couple of mortar rounds coming in from God-knows-where. Food denial is sporadic but damaging, and the Zone population is threatening to swarm checkpoints on the boundary, checkpoints manned by *your* men, let me remind you. If you end up in a Black Hawk Down-type situation, you'll want police back-up, I imagine.

PM: My understanding is that 137 Zone-dwellers—

ES: Zone-dwellers! Just call them wogs if you want, Perry, save yourself the euphemisms!

PM: —that 137 Zone-dwellers have been shot since the beginning of the year: 84 men, 39 women, and 14 children, and all but two of the children were teenagers. The targeting criteria are obvious—this ghastly sniping is aimed at adults, not children. We're in early October, so that's one victim every two days, perfectly acceptable given the extremely trying circumstances we currently navigate. We believe that about half of the victims have survived, which means one death every four days—not bad at all. This is a war, you know, of sorts.

B: And the mortar?

PM: As I have explained, Detective Chief Inspector, there is no evidence that the mortar in question ever belonged to my battalion.

B: No one else is reporting a mortar missing.

PM: There is no missing mortar, Jeremy. That was a simple clerical error that was discovered when we were asked to check inventory after the first strike.

ES: Your missing mortar is making us all look like morons, and for once the Muslim conspiracy theories actually sound reasonable. Whoever's firing those rounds is an awfully good shot and they're always one step ahead of us.

PM: The incompetence of your men is your own affair, Elaine.

ES: It would be if it were actually incompetence. This RECAP nonsense is degrading the entire force. I had two quit yesterday—one said his wife was going to leave after their tyres got slashed, and the other got jumped and stripped naked.

B: Is that the one that got painted blue?

ES: They tipped a bucket of blue paint over his head, if that's what you mean, yeah. Now he's all over TikTok, for ever. Do you think that's what they get paid to do? We need help from the army—when a police officer gets home and takes his uniform off, he's a civilian. No one's trained for this.

PM: Elaine, there is presently one thing, and one thing only, that we have in our favour—there is currently no conflict between Pitchfork and army. Yes, they harass our convoys, but within strict limits. London still functions because the army, including my battalion, keeps Pitchfork and Crescent from each other's throats, the odd sniper and drone attack notwithstanding. We guard infrastructure, key buildings, key road junctions, and electricity sub-stations. Morale is not good, but is stable for now. If I send my men off to kick in doors across London, suddenly we're the enemy too. I don't know where that leads, but it doesn't lead anywhere good, rest assured of that. Think of the Falls Curfew, Elaine—did the Troubles end in 1970? I forget now, but I seem to recall they dragged on a bit longer than that.

B: The Cabinet Office is very concerned about that sort of escalation. GCHQ says there's chatter out in the hinterlands about big, ANFO-style car bombs, but apparently that line of attack is being held in reserve. Pitchfork thinks it's winning—Crescent's eating itself, at least in London. Pitchfork doesn't want the heat car bombs would bring down but does want an ace up its sleeve.

ES: So we just let them walk all over us? Is that it?

PM: Elaine, a peace offering—I'll assign three or four squads to patrol some of the native trouble spots with your boys. No weapons, just police-style gear. Pitchfork won't move against our lads in the absence of serious escalation, they'll back off for a while. That should buoy your chaps up a bit, give them a bit of breathing space. We'll give it a month, see how it pans out. Best I can offer for now. Deal?

ES: Deal. Thank you Perry, it's a start.

B: We'll have to run it up the flagpole first, but I think they'll go for it. Colonel, Elaine, a pleasure. Must fly—it's shepherd's pie and darts on the telly tonight.

PM: Good God, man, the simple pleasures of home, how wonderful! I've got some atrocious bloody dinner party to go to, Cynthia was most insistent.

ES: I'll just hope I don't get jumped by a Pitchfork hit squad in the car park.

PM: Well, uneasy lies the head, and all that rot.

PITCHFORK

The Likely Boys of Brum

Swift they were, the rebel band, fleet-footed over cobble!
Supply into the cumin zone it was their goal to hobble
Evade them now the trucks could not, though moon supplied no light—
Not man, nor maid, not rich, nor poor would on those vittles bite

The drivers fled at sight of Billy's shotgun in their faces—
One tripped on jumping from his cab, enfouled in his own laces
'Careful now' laughed out our Ben, quite undisturbed by murk—
While darting band of grim-faced Brums did set about their work

Diesel in, then spark—the night retreats as flame spurts high—
Flour burns and spices pop, the sight evokes a sigh
Grain and oil lantern rouge by hundredweight and ton—
The likely boys of Brum will show those Scousers how it's done!

The morn was grey, the colonel scowled, and spat a curse most foul—
So well did rebel fight in dark, he might as well be owl
In paint it said, upon a wall: "Now let there be no doubt—
No food gets in until we've thrown the dirty buggers out!"

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This section, long and complex though it is, is dedicated to establishing one single point of overwhelming importance—that Pitchfork will not, indeed cannot, cohere into a single organisation that could have a political agenda put forward by a single, coherent political wing. This is a crucial asymmetry between the Troubles and OMT—*once OMT start, there will never emerge any single political interlocutor with Crown whom might, in principle, negotiate*. Negotiation may take place between Pitchfork and Crown, but it will be local, piecemeal, and non-binding on Pitchfork more generally. *There will never be a Pitchfork political party*. Individual Pitchfork elements

or organisations might issue statements of whatever sort on TikTok or social media, but they will communicate overwhelmingly through action, and only on their own behalf. Pitchfork, taken as a whole, will be mute—savage and implacable, but mute.

This section has nine sub-sections, which will be dedicated to laying the groundwork for this argument. The subsections are as follows:

1) OPSEC—Cell Structures
2) OPSEC—Miscellaneous Elements
3) OPSEC—Geographical Considerations
4) OPSEC—Emergence, Recruitment, Training
5) OPSEC—Hinterland
6) OPSEC—Non-Hinterland Coordination
7) OPSEC—Psychological Considerations
8) Anti-Political Activities—Subsidiary Targets
9) Anti-Political Activities—Dark Propaganda

Once this preliminary discussion is out of the way, we will pull all of these threads together to explain why, as stated earlier, Pitchfork will never politically cohere to the point where Crown would be able to negotiate with it.

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Readers may ask themselves why there is no parallel consideration of the internal organisation or doctrine of Crescent actors, be they street gangs or religious groupings. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, Muslim forms of paramilitary or paramilitary-adjacent organisation have substantial precedent in the UK, be it in the form of ethnic or sectarian street organisation, criminal street gangs, or Al-Qaida-inspired cells. I focus my attention on what has not yet emerged, which means Pitchfork paramilitary action.

Secondly, during OMT, Crescent elements will be geographically, materially, and logistically constrained actors, whose tactical options will be reduced to a relatively small and analytically tractable set. Pitchfork emergence, doctrine, and tactics have the potential to be much more varied and therefore warrant greater analytical effort. Lastly, I have more powerful cultural and psychological intuitions about my own people than about alien groups, and intuition plays a role in even the most careful analysis.

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1) OPSEC—Cell Structures

First, a word of warning. Some readers might think that the information presented in this subsection seems rather sensitive. It is therefore important to stress that cell structures are very well-established anti-infiltration mechanisms that have been used by a wide variety of organisations, including various paramilitaries, organised crime groups, the French Resistance, and Jewish resistance groups in the Warsaw Ghetto. The information I present here is my own synthesis of the public domain research I have conducted on these matters. My discussion may contain original ways of framing the relevant problems, but there is nothing qualitatively new here, and certainly nothing that would transform the paramilitary efforts of determined actors.

Before we enter the main discussion, readers should understand one important point. All of the following factors will be powerfully influenced by the web of interpersonal relationships that already exists in relevant areas and relevant institutions when OMT starts. One cannot algorithmically specify these things in advance in any way that would be likely to map onto real networks that emerge in a real conflict. It is this inevitable combination of high-level, abstract reasoning and desperate, seat-of-the-pants improvisation that make this arguably the most conceptually thorny part of the entire essay.

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The fundamental problem faced by paramilitary organisations is as follows: they wish to build a network (which we can think of a number of nodes, each node representing a member) that satisfies two characteristics:

- Nodes need high connectivity with each other, so that they can coordinate and cooperate
- Nodes need low connectivity with each other, so the compromise of one node leads to less network contagion rather than more

Observant readers will notice that these two objectives seem to contradict each other. At one extreme, we have an organisation in which no node is connected to any other node. No node-to-node compromise is now possible, because this is not actually an organisation at all—it is merely a group of people who do not know each other and are not connected in any fashion, an organisation in name only. At the other extreme, we have a paramilitary organisation where everybody knows everybody else—all nodes are in contact with all other nodes. This is indeed an organisation, but one that will only last until a node is compromised, as that will allow the security services to identify all other nodes.

The fundamental goal of paramilitary organisers is to devise a goldilocks structure—with high enough network connectivity for the organisation to actually *be* an organisation in a meaningful sense, but low enough network connectivity for the organisation to survive and function even when the security services try to destroy it. This is a complex problem, and worse—it is an analytical problem that has to a) be solved by paramilitaries in real-time, and b) take account of extant relationships and organisational seams. Failing to come up with a strong solution will result in otherwise unnecessary network contagion, and potentially the destruction of the organisation.

The fundamental concept in any analysis of this problem is that of the *cell*—a unit whose members are connected nodes, and that can therefore engage in coordinated action, but whose connectivity to the larger network

passes through a chokepoint that slows down or prevents network contagion. This basic principle, applied throughout the network as a whole, *is the key structural principle of organisations attempting to resist network contagion*.

We have now introduced several terms that need to be defined more carefully before we progress to looking at real network diagrams. They are as follows:

- Network contagion—A generic term for an increase in security service knowledge of the internal structure of a paramilitary organisation
- Network connectivity—The extent to which a node is connected to other nodes in the network
- Node identification—The realisation by the security services that a given individual is indeed a node in the network under investigation
- Node compromise—The process whereby a node starts to give the security services information about nodes to which it itself is connected, thereby enabling their identification

In our network diagrams, nodes are colour-coded as follows:

- A non-identified node is green
- An identified but non-compromised node is amber
- A compromised node is red

Network connectivity is indicated by a black line between nodes. This indicates that the nodes in question know each other and form a line of potential communication and coordination within the organisation.

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Now that we have defined some key concepts and explained how they are depicted in our network diagrams, we can introduce the diagrams themselves.

Diagram 3—Paramilitary Network, 1st Generation

Diagram 3 depicts an early-conflict paramilitary that has not yet been infiltrated at all. Readers should note the units clustered around the outside—these are four-man operational cells, only one member of which is linked to the next level up. This member can be considered the cell-leader. There is an intermediate tier, which is not operational, but serves to provide an additional level of insulation between operational cells and the leadership cell at the centre. Each leadership node is linked to one and only one intermediate node, and each intermediate node is linked to one and only one cell leader. One would have to imagine that the leadership nodes each recruit one intermediate node, who recruits an operational cell leader, who recruits three operational cell members[25].

[25] We will have more to say about recruitment later on.

Diagram 4—Paramilitary Network, 2nd Generation

Diagram 4 is the same paramilitary as in Diagram 3, moved forward one increment of time. Now, a certain amount of identification has taken place, represented by three amber nodes—the nodes have not been compromised, so adjacent nodes are still green. However, the identified nodes are now being 'worked' in some fashion by the security services. Note that amber nodes might still believe that they are green, which has implications for their behaviour. High-tradecraft identified nodes might not allow adjacent nodes to be identified easily, whereas low-tradecraft identified nodes will make this much more likely. Identification can spread without compromise, as we will see in the next scenario.

Diagram 5—Paramilitary Network, 3rd Generation

Diagram 5 depicts the same paramilitary as Diagram 4, advanced one increment of time. Now two of the previously amber nodes have been compromised (and are now red). Compromised nodes switch all adjacent nodes to identified (amber) immediately. Note that red nodes might still believe they're green or amber, depending on the nature of the compromise. Note also that the third amber node remains amber, but has allowed the identification of one adjacent node through weak tradecraft.

### Diagram 6—Paramilitary Network, 4th Generation

Diagram 6 time depicts the same paramilitary as Diagram 5, one increment of time further on. The paramilitary discovered that the operational cell in the bottom left had a compromised member and removed him from the organisation. Maybe the node was an informer who was shot, maybe it was someone with less-than-optimal electronic discipline who has now been expelled. From the perspective of the system diagram as currently understood, it makes no difference. The adjacent amber nodes continue to be part of the organisation, but reduce their activity for now, and the operational-cell leader takes great care not to allow upwards contagion.

The compromised intermediate-tier operative towards the top-right of the diagram has been killed by the security services whilst attempting escape, which maroons the operational cell he was attached to. This cell can now act independently, try to re-establish contact with leadership, or wait for

leadership to attempt to reinitiate contact in some as-yet-unknown fashion. Lastly, another operational cell has been added under a different intermediate-tier node, which makes his identification or compromise a bigger threat than the identification of one of his fellows.

<center>————————————</center>

This is a very primitive sketch of how these organisations would be degraded and attempt repair over time. To this we must now add a brief discussion of a network consideration whose importance will be seen to be *very significant* by the end of the section.

Diagram 7—Paramilitary Network with Technical Cell

Here, we see a paramilitary network fundamentally similar to the one we saw above, but that has a qualitatively different element in it—a non-hierarchical, technical unit (the hexagonal, six-node unit on the right of the diagram) that has two special characteristics:

- A very high level of technical ability (bomb-building, electronics, digital OPSEC, firearms). The unit is capable of instructing operational cells as and when that proves necessary
- Access to certain non-standard materials that lower cells will not have easy access to (explosives, detonators, handguns, automatic

weapons, bomb-related paraphernalia such as timers, contact switches, etc.)

One can immediately see that this is a very special unit, possessed of unusual tradecraft and entrusted with a vital quartermaster role that will allow operational cells to supplement the shotguns and rifles they already have access to[26]. Any paramilitary organisation would be very fortunate to have such a unit within it, all other things being equal. But all other things never *are* equal.

To coordinate with operational cells, this technical unit must be in contact with them. But when this single unit is in contact with otherwise widely-separated units, the OPSEC issues created are very serious indeed. Because this point has such massive significance—both operational (for individual paramilitaries) and strategic (for OMT as a whole)—we will need to spend some time thinking about it here.

Readers should not think there is anything special about the structure I have given to this new, more complex network, which I could have created in many different ways. The crucial point is that the shortest path between certain pairs of previously widely-separated nodes has now collapsed.

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[26] This categorisation of equipment as being standard or restricted grows directly out of the discussions in the Weapons section.

Diagram 8—Paramilitary Unit with Technical Cell, Operational Cell SPCPs

In the diagram above, we can see that previously widely-separated operational nodes (pink nodes) only have one intervening node now (blue nodes in technical cell). We can call this *one degree of separation*. Compromise of a blue node now gives the security services access to (amongst other things) two out of four operational cells. The diagram does not imply identification or compromise—it simply uses colour-coding to depict the *Shortest Possible Contagion Path* (SPCP) between the pink operational nodes.

Diagram 9—Paramilitary Unit without Technical Cell, Operational Cell SPCPs

Here, we see the original network diagram, colour-coded to show the SPCPs between the same operational nodes when the technical unit has been taken back out of the network. The upper pair of pink operational nodes (top-left and top-right) has six degrees of separation (purple nodes), whilst the lower pair of operational nodes (bottom-left and bottom-right) has four degrees of separation. Network contagion in this original network will be much slower and (from the perspective of the security services) harder than in the network with the technical cell added.

Those who have some familiarity with the IRA will see parallels[27] between this non-hierarchical unit and the IRA's GHQ (General Headquarters). GHQ was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the IRA, and therefore needed to be in contact with virtually every part of the organisation: from the Army Council, down to active service units (ASUs). It also provided weapons and explosives, engineering expertise, and other types of support. This meant that technically sophisticated operations could be conducted, but created its own operational risks.

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[27] These parallels are abstract, not strict structural parallels.

Diagram 10—Side-by-Side Comparison of Selected SPCPs

Is there a moral to this story? Yes. The original strict cell structure in Diagram 3 is more resistant to network contagion, as SPCPs are generally long. That said, larger, more complex operations will require a coordination of materiel and expertise that will inevitably make the organisation as a whole more susceptible to network contagion, with lower mean SPCPs. This illustrates the trade-off that will confront Pitchfork (and in principle, Crescent) elements.

Neither of the two structures in Diagram 10 is objectively superior to the other—they simply have different strengths and weaknesses. Different organisations will have different priorities and structure themselves accordingly. There are many foolish ways of structuring an organisation that needs to resist network contagion, but no single correct way of doing it. That said, it may yet turn out to be the case that some structures will generally be superior to others *in specific types of conflict*.

2) OPSEC—Miscellaneous Elements

The cell structure of an organisation is itself the single greatest component in the OPSEC structure of that organisation. However, there are many

other things to be said on the subject, many of which I am not insightful enough to say. We will content ourselves here with a few observations.

Counter-interrogation

A paramilitary organisation will naturally want to equip its members with the ability to reduce node-to-node contagion under interrogation. How exactly counter-interrogation training would work is something interested parties can research for themselves. I will not talk about it here for ethical and legal reasons. Rather, I will stress that it was only due to a radical increase in OPSEC awareness and counter-interrogation training in the late 1970s that the IRA survived the very substantial successes British intelligence enjoyed against it in the middle years of that decade.

Communication

Connected nodes in a network will, naturally, need to communicate with each other. Because communication always risks network contagion, doing so in a safe fashion comes to be a key concern. Again, I recognise my own limitations in this specialist area, so I will restrict myself to a few observations here.

Electronic and digital technology and communication will be a severe trouble spot for any Pitchfork network trying to resistant network contagion, in that a) the technical capabilities of the state are orders of magnitude greater than those of any conceivable irregular network, and b) it is not obvious *how* exactly the abilities of the state exceed those of the irregular network. With the army, much is known—they have helicopters, Pitchfork doesn't; they have assault rifles, Pitchfork doesn't; they have mortars, Pitchfork doesn't. When the conversation turns to electronic/digital communication, who knows exactly what Crown can do and what it can't?

A known asymmetry can be planned for, but Pitchfork elements may well conclude that an unknown asymmetry must be circumvented entirely. This makes it likely that the default mode of communication amongst paramilitary and serious sub-paramilitary Pitchfork elements will quickly

come to be *face-to-face communication in environments where electronic surveillance is challenging*. Certain messaging apps (Signal, etc.) might be used for certain types of high-value communication between sophisticated actors. Nonetheless, relying too much on any such technology will probably lead to rapid network contagion and the collapse of the network in question.

If face-to-face communication in surveillance-impervious environments comes to be the main avenue for Pitchfork communication and coordination, then communication across large distances comes to be a low-frequency event. This has major implications for the geographic scope and coordination of any Pitchfork organisation. An organisation cannot extend control over elements that it is not in communication with. It can issue them with tasks (even using open channels, such as social media), and hope those tasks will be conducted successfully without further guidance. However, it will understand that the elements in question cannot be controlled and will tend to drift or break away over time. Note that this assumes these geographically-stretched Pitchfork organisations can form in the first place, but this too is radically unclear.

This is an important theme that we will return to later. Readers should note for now that we are seeing reasons here to believe that *viable Pitchfork organisations will tend to be tightly geographically clustered, not geographically dispersed*. Travelling long distances for face-to-face communication will be possible, but will also be slow and inefficient, and will create obvious behavioural patterns for Crown to observe and analyse.

Compartmentalisation

Compartmentalisation seems, intuitively, to be related to cell structures, but is actually conceptually distinct. A cell structure, as noted, is a structure that systematically reduces node connectivity to reduce the likelihood and extent of network contagion. Compartmentalisation is a principle that operates *within groups of connected nodes*, whereby different members of the same cell have access to different information.

Let us illustrate this point with an example. A hypothetical Pitchfork cell currently planning an op has four members: Stewart (the leader), Bill, Jim, and Harold. We can describe them as follows:

- Bill sources a clean car and stores it in a garage. Knowledge of the car (location, number plate, make, colour) is represented by light blue in the diagram below.
- Jim scopes out the target and figures out their daily schedule. Knowledge of the identity of the target is represented by purple in the diagram below.
- Harold makes sure the guns are in working order. Knowledge of where the guns are stored is represented by red in the diagram below.
- Stewart makes sure everything runs smoothly and confers with Tom (the intermediate node between the operational cell and the leadership cell) as to the timing of the attack. Stewart is purple in the diagram below because the identity of the target is all he knows.

Stewart does not know where the guns are, or where the car is hidden—*because he does not need to know*. The fact that he is the cell leader is immaterial. However, it is true that only he knows everybody else. Tom only knows Stewart (due to the cell structure), Bill, Jim and Harold all know each other but only know one piece of information about the attack (transport, guns, target). Stewart doesn't OK the attack—that comes down from leadership through Tom.

Diagram 11—Knowledge Distribution, A) During Op Prep b) and Pre-Attack

Diagram 11 should serve to clarify this confusing situation rather. Target identity is known to three people: Jim, Stewart, and Tom. Gun-related info is only known to Harold, and car-related info is only known to Bill. If information leaks before the op is launched, Stewart will have a good chance of figuring out who leaked it[28]. If the car is seized, Bill is in hot water. If the guns are seized, Harold is in hot water. If the target moves house suddenly, then suspicion falls on Jim, Stewart, and Tom, though the possibility that the sudden move was a coincidence also has to be considered.

Readers will be asking themselves what the diagram on the right is. This second diagram is the knowledge distribution diagram that represents Bill and Harold in the car on the way to the op. Stewart has given them the green light and told them who and where the target is, and Bill and Harold are now heading over to make his acquaintance. This means that both of them now a) know where the car is because they are sitting in it, b) know where the guns are because they just picked them up, and c) know who and where the target is.

This is the moment of greatest uncertainty with respect to who can leak what information, which is why those cell members with this information are effectively under mutual surveillance from this point on—no one gets to nip

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[28] Of course, Stewart might have leaked the information himself.

out for a quick bite to eat. In the days when there were no mobile communications, this mutual surveillance was relatively straightforward. Now that mobile technology has progressed so far, Pitchfork planners will presumably have to make greater efforts to ensure that nothing leaks at the last minute.

If Bill, Jim, Harold, or Stewart are compromised during planning, the security services only obtain one piece of information about the attack, and *acting on that piece of information risks conveying to the paramilitary the existence and identity of that compromise*. If, on the other hand, everybody in the cell knows everything about an upcoming operation, then the security services acting on a compromise (e.g. ambushing a Pitchfork element at a gun stash) does not allow the cell to determine who leaked the relevant information, *because all members had it*.

To summarise, under compartmentalisation:

- Leaks contain less information
- Leaks that do occur make the identification of the leaker much easier
- It is much harder for the security services to act on a leak, because doing so could burn their informant
- Even compromised nodes cooperating with the security services are less likely to leak crucial information in the first place *because they know it could lead to their cooperation being discovered by others in the network*. Informers are not mindless drones, and their self-preservation instincts are generally quite strong.

Electronic Hygiene

It is quite astonishing to note how often modern technologies simply deliver perpetrators of serious crimes into the waiting hands of the police. One can easily read about people committing serious crimes *and taking their mobile phones with them when they do so*, not understanding that this is a fairly serious OPSEC breach. Very few of us are experts in modern electronics or communications, but if a Pitchfork element can refrain from carrying a

government-visible tracking device with him everywhere he goes, his operational lifespan can only improve.

One can also think in terms of the financial infrastructure of a modern surveillance state: credit cards, debit cards, any payment mechanism that produces an electronic trace. Much of what we do unthinkingly in everyday life will be very dangerous for Pitchfork (and indeed Crescent) actors during OMT. Relearning the habits of many decades will be difficult, and a single slip-up could be disastrous.

Vehicles/Transport

Over the last few decades, the British government has constructed a complex ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Recognition) system that spans the entire country and records all (or nearly all) the number plates of the vehicles that pass any of its cameras. This is, of course, a very complex system, evolving in real-time, with its own strengths and weaknesses. It would be futile to try and describe its function in detail here, so we will restrict ourselves to some general observations.

Operationally, the ANPR system has massive implications. Since most Pitchfork operations will require getting into and out of an area in a timely fashion, vehicles will be required, but those vehicles will provide Crown with actionable information if great care is not taken by Pitchfork elements. Securing single-use vehicles that do not subsequently lead investigators to operational actors will likely emerge as a key concern for those actors. It would be ethically unwise to discuss this in greater detail here, but dealing with these matters will doubtless occupy a good portion of the brainpower of selected Pitchfork operatives.

The ANPR system makes long-range travel for the purpose of discussion or coordination something that can be seen very easily by Crown if that travel repeatedly relies on a single vehicle or a small number of vehicles. Using public transport or a new vehicle every time will be slow and difficult, and OPSEC is likely to fray rather quickly if operators are required to move

around the country like this. This further reduces the likelihood of long-distance Pitchfork organisation and coordination—an important point already hinted at above, and one we shall return to later.

3) OPSEC—Geographical Considerations

We can hit the ground running with this subsection because we have already mentioned certain structural limitations on Pitchfork groupings.

- Cell structure is fundamental, and the ultimate expression of cell structure throughout Pitchfork as a whole is for Pitchfork organisations *to be entirely distinct* (i.e. separate organizations with no shared nodes).
- Long-distance communication by electronic means will expose Pitchfork to network contagion.
- Long-distance communication through personal travel and face-to-face meetings will be expensive, slow, and will allow Crown pattern extraction (vehicle tracking, etc.)

To this list we can now add certain operational considerations. One's presence in the area one lives in *is never intrinsically suspicious*. But one's presence far from home is always, if not suspicious, something that can be queried by Crown. Faced with the question '*Why were you in Manchester around the time of the shooting?*', responding with stony silence will not prevent Crown from drawing its own circumstantial conclusions. But if one can legitimately say '*Because I live in Manchester, you pillock*', then Crown will find itself stymied.

One does not simply say to a Liverpudlian '*we can place you in Liverpool on the night of the murder, Colonel Mustard.*' This is *low-quality investigative work*, tantamount to investigating a shooting and saying to a suspect '*come clean, my son, we know you have index fingers.*'

The closer a Pitchfork element is to his geographic base, the greater the degree of plausible deniability he possesses *with respect to all of the*

Pitchfork activities he engages in. Nothing ever looks more suspicious as a consequence of being done closer to home.

Crown: *Why did you drive down that road on the afternoon of the murder?*
Pitchfork: *It was a nice day, fancied going for a spin.*

Crown: *Why were you caught on that ring camera the day of the shooting?*
Pitchfork: *Must've been going to the corner shop for some milk.*

Crown: *Why were you in that pub at the same time as the Grand Pitchfork?*
Pitchfork: *It's my local, I've been going there for 30 years.*

Crown: *Why were you in the vicinity of that weapons storage garage the day before the murders?*
Pitchfork: *Was picking the kids up from school, that's a short-cut.*

We must imagine that analytical Pitchfork elements will eventually realise that local action is often likely to be favorable not only for the OPSEC and recruitment-related reasons described above, but also for reasons of maintaining maximum possible plausible deniability. To this we must add the following:

- Local trust networks will provide anti-surveillance intel that would be lost operating far from home
- Local trust networks will likely result in locals refusing to cooperate with police investigations
- Local knowledge of operationally-sensitive information will sharpen operational efficacy

If an operation is technically demanding and requires highly-trained individuals and/or sensitive materiel to move across the country, then long-distance movement must be expected to take place. Otherwise, I predict it will be avoided by sophisticated actors. Rural actors who wish to go operational in more urban areas will presumably have to relocate to

those areas for a substantial period of time. Peripatetic Pitchfork activity will likely result in long prison sentences.

4) OPSEC—Emergence, Recruitment, Training

This is a very large topic, and the relative absence of paramilitary activity on my own CV makes it difficult to talk through with confidence. Here, I must remind readers that, however much theory one might write or absorb, the emergence of Pitchfork groupings will fundamentally be an *organic phenomenon* that will only map onto what we present here insofar as the content here is compatible with that organic emergence.

Emergence

Emergence will occur amongst small numbers of actors with longstanding relationships of trust between them. They will generally be smart and informed, and have institutional, technical, and/or financial advantages that allow them to conceive of meaningful Pitchfork activity. Less capable individuals may act as disorganised paramilitary or sub-paramilitary actors, but their shelf-life will be short and their strategic thinking weak.

This founding core will, by definition, act as some sort of leadership stratum in the Pitchfork organisation being formed. How grandiose the ambitions of any grouping turn out to be cannot be predicted. Far-sighted actors will presumably start to think about the cell structures we have already outlined in this document.

Recruitment

Recruitment into formal, cell-structured Pitchfork organisations will presumably take place in a soft, deniable fashion. Here, we will see the strengths of local organising, which will come up time and time again in this section. Local knowledge networks will make it fairly clear to Pitchfork who might turn out to be a useful addition to Pitchfork ranks, whether due to institutional access, relevant kinetic experience, technical skills, commitment to the cause, or some combination of these factors.

It should be understood that any contact with a potential recruit brings with it the risk of identification by the security services, if the person approached decides to pass information about the approach on. Only a very indirect, deniable approach might make this identification process uncertain for Crown, as Crown will not want to identify people falsely and corrupt its own map of the Pitchfork network.

Recruits would presumably be given minor responsibilities to begin with, to test for competence and reliability. Only quite slowly would they come to be trusted Pitchfork members, presumably after accepting a significant degree of legal exposure. Of course, infiltrators can be granted legal immunity in advance by Crown for the crimes they commit to infiltrate an organisation, and it is for this reason that very many criminal organisations require a new recruit to kill someone to be fully accepted. How far exactly Pitchfork will evolve in this direction is radically unpredictable, but it is clear that trust and access will not be granted lightly.

Training

Much Pitchfork activity will be technically undemanding, but there are certain things that all new recruits will presumably have to be trained in or educated about: electronic/digital hygiene, counter-interrogation, cell-structures, compartmentalisation, ANPR, strategic objectives (which will vary by region), and police investigation techniques.

Given that Pitchfork activity will almost always possess some sort of kinetic character at the sharp end, there will be a bifurcation in the recruits entering a Pitchfork organisation. Those who already have kinetic experience will be highly valued, as they will be both technically sound and psychologically capable of conducting an operation without losing operational discipline (i.e. without freaking out) halfway through. Pitchfork elements who do not have this experience will not be trusted with kinetic matters until such time as their operational and technical abilities have been sharpened.

Note that much Pitchfork activity will not be kinetic, so the preceding observation should not be taken as implying that kinetically-inexperienced members will not be valued. Rather, it means that a Pitchfork organisation without some sort of tactical core will struggle in its early phase to conduct kinetic operations without unacceptable failure and attrition rates. This will likely make the recruitment of this tactical core a priority for Pitchfork leadership. Once acquired, however, this core will be able to select and train inexperienced members of the group with the objective of slowly expanding the circle of tactically-useful actors. Carrying out this training without compromising the cell-structure of the organisation will be an important consideration, as already noted.

5) OPSEC—Hinterland

Readers will recall that, in the Hinterland section, I argued that certain parts of the rural UK would come to constitute a strategic hinterland from which Crown would come to be largely excluded. I further suggested that said hinterland would be used for the purposes of training, planning, technical experimentation and refuge. However, this seems to pose a serious OPSEC problem. If elements from outside the hinterland wish to enter it for these various reasons, will that not require them to come into contact with nodes in the hinterland networks? Does that not constitute terrible exposure to network contagion? This is a serious problem that requires careful analysis.

It may be that the hinterland turns out to be, at a very abstract level of analysis, Pitchfork's GHQ. By this, I do not mean that it will be responsible for coordinating the activities of Pitchfork as a whole, or adopting a leadership role. I mean that hinterland access and coordination is the one thing that might make larger scale coordination between Pitchfork elements worthwhile, despite the OPSEC risks it would create. Indeed, Pitchfork coordination is necessary for hinterland operations by definition if one understands that the hinterland itself contains Pitchfork networks of its own.

6) OPSEC—Non-Hinterland Coordination

Outside of the hinterland, to what extent, if any, will Pitchfork organisations seek to contact and coordinate with each other? I refer here to occasional tactical cooperation and loose strategic organisation—the formation of larger, unified organisations is something we largely ruled out as impossible (or at least extremely hazardous) in the sub-sections above.

Even if distinct Pitchfork organisations want to coordinate with each other directly, the most obvious stumbling block is the fact that the nodes in hypothetical Pitchfork organisation A are not, by default, connected to the nodes in hypothetical Pitchfork organisation B[29]. This is precisely the point of the structural considerations we outlined above (cell-structures, etc.). One could argue that the ultimate expression of cell-based thinking is not the cell-structure within a single organisation, but the all-encompassing cell-structure that derives from the Pitchfork ecosystem consisting of many completely separate organisations with no node connectivity between them.


Diagram 12—Pitchfork Ecosystem without Coordination

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[29] It is, of course, highly unlikely that Pitchfork elements in one part of the UK will have literally no idea who is involved in Pitchfork activity in other parts of the country. Long-standing, pre-OMT social networks, especially in military and ex-military circles, would create a means whereby feelers would likely be put out between different regions in deniable fashion if contact was deemed desirable. However, this is not the focus of our analysis here.

Diagram 12 shows a Pitchfork ecosystem in which no coordination exists, as the Pitchfork organisations have no network connectivity. Coordinated action is now impossible[30], as is network contagion. This is cell structure applied strictly to the entire ecosystem—viable Pitchfork groups are entirely cut off from each other.

Diagram 13—Pitchfork Ecosystem with Coordination

Diagram 13 shows the same ecosystem as in Diagram 12, but with one difference—certain leadership nodes in the four component paramilitaries are now in contact with each other (marked with black/red lines) and coordinated action can now take place. However, network contagion is also a greater threat than before.

It is crucial to ask: would paramilitaries actually stand to benefit from coordination? The IRA conducted exceptionally sophisticated operations, such as the Grand Hotel bombing in Brighton, the mortar attack on Downing Street, and huge truck bombings in central London. A certain combination of expertise had to be brought together to pull off attacks of this nature: bomb-building, electronics, surveillance, mortar prep, engineering, attack planning/timing, drivers, smugglers—even interior decorating (the Grand Hotel bomb was hidden inside a wall that the IRA redecorated after placing the bomb).

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[30] This refers to explicitly coordinated activity, not activity coordinated openly over TikTok.

In short, these were not attacks that could be put together by a 'standard' five-man cell. Coordinating disparate resources (human and material) across an entire organisation through GHQ (as noted above) was crucial to the IRA's ability to conduct these complex attacks. Only exceptional actors within a hypothetical splintered UK Pitchfork ecosystem would be able to match them, generally those with military and/or unusual technical backgrounds.

The question here is—would Pitchfork actually need to match the IRA in a technical sense? The IRA was fighting a state, and a wealthy, sophisticated state at that. Hypothetical UK paramilitaries will not be fighting a state. At a system level, they will presumably be attempting to accomplish three goals: a) zone consolidation b) zone warfare, and c) secondary targeting[31]. What are the benefits of connecting otherwise separate nodes in the Pitchfork ecosystem if complex, iconic, attacks are not required? Slashing the tyres of a food truck does not require coordination between Pitchfork elements in London and Cumbria—it requires a sharp object.

Upon reflection, it seems that coordination amongst distinct paramilitary groupings is likely to be of a different sort. If we go back to the hypothetical food denial operations in Birmingham, it is certainly easy to imagine that disparate paramilitary and sub-paramilitary groupings in and around Birmingham will decide to participate once food denial commences. This however, requires nothing other than access to social media—'*Monday morning, it starts! Be on the streets, or tell your kids you stayed in bed!*', or something along those lines.

This, we can be sure, is what Crown fears most—a scattered, fragmented Pitchfork ecosystem in which actors unknown to each other but with tight local OPSEC burn down curry houses, firebomb minicab offices, and shoot people on their doorsteps. A large, technically proficient Pitchfork organisation with no understanding of OPSEC is a temporary problem. For

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[31] We will touch on this later in this section.

Crown, operationally canny Pitchfork organisations with no network connectivity but shared objectives are the nightmare that will never end.

7) OPSEC—Psychological Considerations

Lest my more excitable readers ever get the impression that Pitchfork activity will be a bit of a laugh, a jolly caper, or a touch of cloak-and-dagger to fill out the CV, let us consider in more detail what it would really entail.

Surprising though it may sound, being involved in a bitter, three-way dirty war in which failure, stupidity and plain bad luck can all result in capture, disfigurement or death, is not a great deal of fun[32]. The careful reader will have realised that trying, in real-time, to solve the serious conceptual problems intrinsic to paramilitary organisation will be difficult, draining, and accompanied by tremendous pressure. Anybody labouring under such conditions may well come to think that the two highest priorities, both on organisational and psychological grounds, are: a) network simplicity and b) low levels of network connectivity.

Anyone who spends time reading memoirs of informants inside the IRA during the Troubles will note the terrible paranoia, stress, suspicion and despair that often afflicts the members of such organisations. We must bear in mind, too, that the IRA was one of the most competent, successful, and strategic organisations of its type. Reading about its internal function means reading about paramilitary activity at something like its operational best. Yet the sense of dread and fear, even on the part of the reader, can be overwhelming at times. The desire to minimise the chances of network contagion will be very strong amongst intelligent actors, especially those who wish to maximise the commitment, effectiveness, and longevity of their people.

It will come to be seen that OPSEC must be baked into Pitchfork, not sprinkled over it like icing sugar after it comes out of the oven. Pitchfork, to survive, will have to be built out of pieces of infiltration-proof material,

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[32] The author extrapolates here from his extensive reading, not from his own experiences.

assembled only up to the point where the benefits of assembly outweigh the dangers of undermining OPSEC.

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An anti-political activity is one that will tend to disqualify the people who engage in it from subsequently engaging in conventional political activity. Readers will understand that the bar for being excluded in this fashion may actually be rather high. Senior IRA figures such as Martin McGuinness rose to extremely high political positions in Northern Ireland despite their well-attested paramilitary backgrounds. However, some activities will be very hard to square with taking off the balaclava and putting on a suit instead. We will examine two such activities here, though readers will understand that others may emerge over time.

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8) Anti-Political Activities—Subsidiary Targets

We can split Pitchfork targets into two categories: Muslims (the primary targets) and non-Muslims (the subsidiary targets). Anti-Muslim activity can be considered a component in zone consolidation and zone warfare and has already been discussed, most obviously in the Zones section. Here, we will briefly discuss the subsidiary targets most likely to be selected by Pitchfork during OMT.

With all apologies to those who would have appreciated a more detailed analysis of this matter, there are ethical concerns that prevent me from saying too much in this document. For what it is worth, I consider the remainder of this subsection to be fairly predictable anyway, and include it simply in the interests of clarifying that subsidiary targets will, indeed, exist. No one should think that OMT will consist only of zone consolidation and zone warfare. Nonetheless, spelling things out here in too much detail, even when the observations in question are rather banal, might provoke an unhelpful degree of concern on the part of some readers.

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Subsidiary targets for Pitchfork will be those who are seen as being enablers for the Muslim population of the UK, not just everybody who is anti-Pitchfork. Someone working for MI5 and engaged in anti-Pitchfork investigations will just be doing his job, and is not likely to be targeted even if he can be identified. Pitchfork will presumably focus its attention on the *ideologically pro-Muslim elements* in British society.

Broadly speaking, we can split the potential targets up into the following categories:

- **Journalists/writers**—People who put pro-Muslim work out into the public sphere will likely be targeted.
- **NGO members/activist lawyers**—Those engaged in pro-Muslim advocacy and/or legal cases are highly likely to be targeted. It will be recalled that, during the August 2024 riots, the details of various such law firms were circulated online. This move in the direction of targeting these firms and their staff must be expected to continue.
- **Judges**—A peculiar category, judges are of very great significance in the system but largely anonymous to the public. Nonetheless, judges who are seen as being pro-Muslim (in whatever sense) may become targets.
- **Politicians/ancillary staff**—Politicians and their staff are likely to be considered high-value targets. Ancillary staff will take on a special significance due to the high levels of personal security Crown will try to provide for politicians themselves. Here, 'politician' means, most obviously, MPs and Lords, though former politicians would also be at risk.

What sort of behaviour is likely to be directed at subsidiary targets? Again, readers should understand that both paramilitary and sub-paramilitary elements will likely be involved in this targeting, which means that a very wide range of behaviours can be expected, from close-range harassment

to longer-range kinetic intervention. This latter would produce secondary effects that will be hard for Crown to contain.

One observation is worth making here, sensitive though it may prove to be. When I wrote *OMT* in 2011, it seemed plausible that Pitchfork targeting of politicians and associated figures would focus on the Labour Party and avoid the Conservative Party, as the Labour Party was more obviously implicated in Muslim immigration into the UK. However, times have changed, and the behaviour of the Conservative Party during its years in power might push key figures within the party into the ranks of the targeted. Even if Reform UK succeeds in overwhelming and destroying the Conservatives, Conservative figures whose behaviour in government was considered particularly egregious might end up being long-term targets.

9) Anti-Political Activities—Dark Propaganda

Of course, we live in a world in which information flows in ways very different to those of the 1970s and 1980s. We must imagine that the propaganda battles engaged in by paramilitaries yet-to-emerge will largely be online affairs, fought via TikTok videos and meme wars. What I want to focus on here, however, is something rather more disturbing.

Here, we will consider *dark propaganda*, a term I use to refer to the creation and online propagation of material designed to force Muslim communities into conflict *with additional ethnic groups that they live in proximity to*. It is not clear that this propaganda would need to be produced by paramilitaries. Indeed, anyone equipped with the necessary skills could, in principle, produce it, so it is obviously an area where sub-paramilitary actors could make their presence felt.

British readers may remember the Lozells Riots in Birmingham in 2005, in which blacks and Pakistanis in Lozells, an impoverished neighbourhood in Birmingham with large third-world-origin populations, rioted and fought each other. The trigger was a report that a young black girl had been

gang-raped by a large group of Pakistani men in a Pakistani-owned shop. To this day, it is not clear whether this claim was true or not[33].

To pose a rather grim question two decades after the fact—does it really matter, from the perspective of the resulting communal violence, whether the rumours were true or false? There was (and undoubtedly still is) substantial inter-ethnic hostility between these third-world populations, and presumably not only in Lozells. In the days of TikTok, AI voice synthesis, and AI video, it would probably not be a great technical challenge for Pitchfork elements to fabricate and then propagate online false claims about intercommunal attacks.

For ethical and legal reasons, I do not wish to spell out in detail how this sort of propaganda would be created or propagated. I myself can only speculate as to the basic dynamics—most of the technical details would be quite beyond me. However, there are two obvious ways in which these new technologies could be used with malign intent by malicious actors to sow communal discord. The first would be shockingly cynical and malevolent, the second even more so. Because of the novelty of these social media attack vectors, I have coined two acronyms to allow them to be referred to unambiguously: VICE and TRICE.

VICE (Virtual Infiltration and Communal Escalation)
In a VICE operation, video (real or AI-generated) would be overlaid with AI-generated audio contrived to convincingly mimic local ethnic speech patterns. The objective would be to create a video in which ethnic group A would accuse members of ethnic group B of perpetrating some crime or attack against it. This video would then go online via TikTok, Telegram, and other channels.

Note that, from the perspective of Pitchfork elements cynical enough to engage in it, this attack vector has certain obvious advantages. It would be cheap, relatively easy, accompanied by no direct kinetic risk, and relatively

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[33] My own online research suggests that the claim was almost certainly false.

hard for Crown to track, counteract, or even comprehend in real-time. The only obvious weakness is that the likelihood of any particular VICE operation generating the desired upswell of mutual ethnic hostility is not clear, and could turn out to be rather low. This makes VICE a low-cost, (relatively) low-risk, yet highly-speculative attempt to whip up tensions.

TRICE (Tactical Reaction-Inducing Communal Escalation)

In a TRICE operation (which would be considered a paramilitary operation, though it might be aided by sub-paramilitary actors), a real attack on a real target would be combined with AI-generated media to stir up intercommunal violence. For ethical and legal reasons, and due to the novelty of this attack vector, I will refrain from adducing additional operational details here. Instead, I will use the fictional insert at the end of this section to hint rather obliquely at how a TRICE operation would work.

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What, from the Pitchfork perspective, are the advantages and disadvantages of a TRICE operation relative to those of a VICE operation? The disadvantages are the much greater operational and legal risk for those involved in the kinetic part of the operation, and the additional (though perhaps minor) logistical difficulty of passing the video footage onto the video production team. The advantage, clearly, is that the kinetic attack makes it impossible for the targeted community to dismiss the online video as some sort of empty provocation. TRICE would *force* a response in a way that VICE cannot.

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If a VICE op or a TRICE op managed to succeed in stirring up inter-communal violence, what would the strategic utility of this violence be from the Pitchfork perspective?

- It would radically increase the total kinetic load on stressed Muslim Zone A and Zone B fragments
- It would increase the perimeter length across which these fragments must defend themselves
- It would allow Pitchfork elements to depict Crescent elements as irredeemably violent and incompatible with the UK
- It would radically increase the law enforcement/urban stabilisation demands on the state, reducing its ability to deploy elsewhere
- Perhaps in combination with other Pitchfork operations, it will create *at least some chance* of an irreversible urban rupture whereby the city in question, or some substantial part of it, is seen to have permanently spun out of control

I gave above the example of black/Pakistani tensions in Birmingham. Are there any other ethnic faultlines likely to be targeted in this fashion? Of course. Lozells provided a strong historical precedent for thinking about dark propaganda, but Pitchfork elements will probably attempt to act predominantly on *intra-Muslim tensions* in this regard. Pakistani on Bangladeshi, Somali on everybody, Arab on Kurd, Turk on Kurd—these are all likely to be seen as options, geography and demographics permitting. If dark propaganda ops occur to Pitchfork at all, the Pakistani/Bangladeshi faultline will be one of the first to be targeted. These are the two largest Muslim groups in the UK, often live in proximity to each other, and have substantial inter-group hostilities that grow out of the 1971 Indo-Pak War.

Are there any other candidates? Probably not. Hindus and Sikhs are the only obvious candidates, and Pitchfork elements will generally hold these groups in high enough regard that they would not seek to involve them in dark propaganda ops. Further, one imagines there might be a higher level of communal discipline and control in these communities, a level that would allow community elders to ride the tiger of TikTok paranoia spirals and keep their people out of such conflicts.

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It should be borne in mind that dark propaganda operations, whether VICE or TRICE, do not stand apart from other Pitchfork operation types. Timing a VICE or TRICE attack to inflame Black-on-Pakistani tensions in Lozells, whilst also engaging in food denial efforts in the southern approaches to Birmingham would create a perfect storm of civil disorder for the affected communities *and* the apparatus of state. Could the city go back to normal after such a dual-pronged attack, or would it be launched on a qualitatively new trajectory? This question cannot be answered.

10) The Structural Impossibility of Pitchfork Political Activity

In light of the foregoing considerations, we can now return to the question of whether or not Pitchfork will evolve in the direction of becoming a force that can express itself with a single voice through a single, unified political organisation. The answer, of course, is no, but now we can see why exactly this is the case and spell the implications out more fully.

Let us briefly summarise the foregoing points here:

1) Pitchfork elements will evolve towards having small, tightly-controlled cell-based networks with limited network connectivity.
2) Pitchfork elements will have to grapple with a number of crucial OPSEC concerns on an ongoing basis.
3) Pitchfork will be much more secure and effective when it operates in a geographically-restricted fashion.
4) Pitchfork will have to deal with recruitment and training-related matters that require strong local knowledge.
5) Pitchfork will probably take hinterland coordination as the upper limit of its geographically/structurally-extended exposure.
6) To reinforce the previous point, Pitchfork will steer away from non-hinterland coordination.

7) Pitchfork elements will generally be under severe psychological pressure during OMT, and their desire to reduce this pressure by reducing unnecessary vulnerabilities will be strong.

8) Pitchfork will have powerful incentives to attack secondary targets in ways that will be difficult to reconcile with subsequent political activity.

9) Pitchfork may also be exposed as having engaged in dark propaganda activities that will be hard to reconcile with subsequent political activity.

All of this being the case, it is simply not conceivable that there will be a gathering together of Pitchfork into any sort of coherent whole, which means it cannot have coherent political representation. Nor is it obvious that it would want or need any. Pitchfork is by definition a reactionary actor, not a revolutionary actor, and it will likely seek only the restoration of the pre-multicultural order. Pitchfork elements are not Bolsheviks, or Jacobins—they will not be likely to have a political program *per se*, and their message is likely to be implicit in their behaviour, but fairly easy to comprehend nonetheless.

There will be no British Sinn Fein. The emergence of such an organisation would require a degree of paramilitary unity that would be impossible to achieve, and of doubtful utility anyway. A political party acting as the political wing of a scattered grab-bag of unrelated Pitchfork organisations would not be able to offer anything at the negotiating table, as offering concessions would require control over the paramilitaries in question. The Pitchfork ecosystem will be splintered, resistant to consolidation, and lacking in actors who are willing to even *attempt* consolidation.

I may have given the impression that Pitchfork, being fragmented, will be weak. Those readers who have arrived at this conclusion should consider matters from the perspective of Crown, which will make the following structural observations about Pitchfork and their efforts to fight it:

- All anti-Pitchfork successes are local, and therefore limited.
- Massive, sudden network contagion amongst Pitchfork as a whole is impossible.

- No conceivable interdiction of Pitchfork material or technical resources can substantially hamper its activities across the country as a whole.
- Pitchfork nearly always acts close to home, on home ground.
- Pitchfork attacks civilians and civilian infrastructure, not hardened military infrastructure guarded by soldiers.
- Pitchfork need not engage in the horrible internecine violence that often sweeps up *competing paramilitaries on the same side* in irregular conflict (UVF vs. UFF, PIRA vs. OIRA, etc.). Ideological disputes do not arise when actors are largely devoid of ideology, do not seek political power, and do not overlap geographically.
- Pitchfork cannot be negotiated with.

This last point is so important it needs to be explored further. To paraphrase Kissinger—who does Crown call when it wants to speak to Pitchfork? The irony here is that the considerable strengths of the state make Pitchfork fragmentation inevitable and the emergence of central Pitchfork authority impossible. This in turn removes the option of negotiating with Pitchfork. The PIRA was a meaningful negotiating partner during the Troubles because it maintained a high degree of unity during negotiations, and a near-dominance of the republican paramilitary ecosystem. The Continuity IRA and Real IRA did split away from the Provisional IRA, but remained small, ineffective splinter groups. If they had been large, effective groups, it is not clear how the conflict could have ended.

Similarly, Crown will have no good options for bringing OMT to an end on its own terms. Pitchfork will not be able to lay its weapons down, as it is not a single actor. But Crown *will* be able to meet Pitchfork's demands, as Crown *is* a single, unified actor, and Pitchfork's demands will be substantially coherent and comprehensible, despite its fractured nature. The lack of interest Pitchfork will have in political negotiation or building a public profile will allow it to display a level of ruthlessness that would be untoward in a more politically motivated organisation that had to defend and justify its behaviour. This important point will occupy the minds of analysts of both sides of the line.

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Name: Sir Jonathan Barrington
Role: Deputy National Security Adviser (Domestic Stabilisation)

Name: Detective Chief Inspector Jeremy Bates
Role: Special Branch (Liaison—Domestic Stabilisation)

SJ: More bodies, Bates, more firebombings, more beatings? What have you for me today?

B: Nothing good, Sir Jonathan. Aasim Rahman, a lawyer at Gallowglass and Dean LLP, had his house firebombed in the middle of the night. Suspect is in custody, denies everything, Rahman is badly burnt but in stable condition. Gallowglass and Dean are shut until further notice. Most relevant recent case is R (Al-Nur) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.

SJ: Yes, that Somali preacher they're trying to deport. Anything else?

B: Rowena Trigg, hard-left freelance journalist, shot dead in broad daylight 50 yards from her parents' home. We've got some CCTV, we're going door to door, asking for eyewitnesses and ring camera footage. Doesn't look good at the moment, sir. Two shots to the head, small-calibre handgun, probably a revolver, no shell casings.

SJ: Sounds like that shooting about two weeks ago, what was the name of that parliamentary aide?

B: Eliot Travers, sir, parliamentary aide to Nadia Waseem. Shot twice in the head leaving home to go to work.

SJ: Same MO?

B: Very similar, sir. We'll know soon enough if it's the same gun, but that shooter was a ghost, no leads at all, sir.

SJ: Ex-military?

B: Quite likely sir, though the firearms handling is less important than the infil and exfil. Gotta know exactly where you're going and where the cameras are.

SJ: Speaking from experience, Bates?

B: You know me, sir, thirty years walking the streets and working leads. Not much kinetic experience.

SJ: Very good. Is that it for today?

B: No, sir. We think Tower Hamlets is being hit by a TRICE op. It's just come in in the last couple of hours.

SJ: Hit by a what?

B: A TRICE op, sir.

SJ: What the hell is a TRICE op?

B: It's new, sir, it stands for *Tactical Reaction-Inducing Communal Escalation*.

SJ: Bates, spare me the ridiculous acronyms and tell me what's going on.

B: Cheltenham's still piecing it together, sir. MI5 is skeptical, says the Doughnut's off its rocker. Assuming it's not, Pitchfork is staging attacks on Banglatown and filming them—shootings, beatings, arson attacks, serious stuff like that. Then they stitch the attacks together with AI-generated audio and claim to be a different Bangla faction. The current mess is based on a Barelvi youth worker who got stabbed, supposedly by a Deobandi. It's all over social media and both sides are out on the streets with cricket bats.

SJ: A terrible way to use a cricket bat, it completely ruins it. As for this TRICE stuff, it sounds a bit like those riots that happened in Lozells last month.

B: Yes, sir. Again, GCHQ is convinced it's a new Pitchfork op, but MI5 is pushing back on that. It's clear the audio is AI-generated, but that doesn't prove much. Could be Bangla actors worried about later forensic identification.

SJ: Is it spiraling out of control?

B: The Met's cordoned off the area, sir, but they don't have the manpower to squash it. Things are getting a bit vicious in there, but we don't have any good options. We know we've got a handful of dead already, but it's not spilling out into other neighbourhoods yet. The scattered food denial's raising the temperature, too.

SJ: Well, we'll wait for it to burn out, and GCHQ will eventually tell us what's going on. Meanwhile, we'll issue some statements about community outreach, extra money for the police, and Ramadan celebrations in Westminster Abbey. Of course, the King is about to convert to Islam, but

that's hush-hush.

B:	Just the ticket, sir.

SJ:	Carry on Bates, you're doing important work.

B:	As are you, Sir Jonathan.

EPILOGUE

I'm Thinking I'm Gone
A noble effort, yea, it did require,
In heart, a fire that would not yield to doubt
To take this squirming sack of rumination
And lay down that which other mind would shun

For quill on desk does lie, its ink all spent
And scribe, now bent with weary, drooping lid
Does dream of pasture new and meadow gay
Where petal dazzles eye—red, lilac, gold

'Twards pond of thought I cast my humble pebble
Whose lines dare dabble in matters most vexatious
A splash—the sound of water!—ripples crease
Off on their way and flatness reigns once more

The scribe, he dreams of land where, under sun,
Our work, once done, must soon but lie forgotten,
Forgotten now, it dares to live forever
When scribe and quill have drifted out to sea

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There were other topics that I could have discussed in this document: the likelihood of natives developing a tradition of suicide attacks; the involvement of other ethnic groups (Hindus, Sikhs, etc.); the diplomatic and economic consequences of the conflict we envisage; and so on and so forth. However, in writing, as in so many things, less is generally more. I feel the five foregoing analytical sections provide a coherent, interlocking analytical view of the characteristics OMT are likely to display. Introducing peripheral topics would expand the analysis, but dilute it, too—hence my decision to keep things short but sweet.

Readers will understand that writing a document of this sort is not a trivial undertaking. If anyone wants to make a contribution to the El Inglés welfare fund, they can use any of the following crypto addresses:

Bitcoin: bc1qjkhwqylfk2tmkgc3lnmc92mq9fq9279x2am9jj

Solana: 6SCu91xUcLN7ygGAjrxJzMC6yjJNhvYAPeF1KUepCvBC

Monero:
87vckP4JaCMUMreZR5BocgBWqxeVeaaEGfbMo3awRtsv6EmedBMxjmAX2pJGyUWysFjkDYXRpYPzo4j9VZj1E5cPCYA1crA

If readers want clean addresses for crypto donations, they can email me directly at <u>elingles.warpoetry@gmail.com</u>. They can also subscribe to my Substack profile, <u>el9ingles9.substack.com</u>, where I will be launching a new career as a future war poet.

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B: Heading off, are we sir?
SJ: Indeed, Bates. The government is decamping, we're heading to the High Weald. This is a temporary setback, no more than that.
B: Of course, sir. Let the Muslim tide break over the city. Give 'em a couple of weeks, the food'll start to run out, then we'll head back in and mop 'em up.
SJ: You won't, Bates, you're staying in London to fight alongside the rearguard.
B: But I told the missus—
SJ: What you told your wife is neither here nor there, Bates. We must be seen to make at least a token defence of the city. Blood must be spilt, Bates, on both sides.
B: Will you be spilling any, sir?
SJ: Really, Bates, you must understand that every part of the system has its own role to play. The nation has an intellectual and administrative core that must be protected at all costs.

B: This would be the same core that lost the capital, sir?

SJ: Your current conduct verges on insubordination, Bates. Now, pass me my zombie knife. I have been told to ensure that I have a melee weapon with me at all times.

B: Do you mean this zombie knife, Sir Jonathan?

SJ: That's the one, Bates. I've yet to be instructed in its use, but apparently it can be devastatingly effective.

B: Oh, I should say so, Sir Jonathan. In the right hands, they can be lethal.

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As Bates drove over to Downing Street to join in the last-ditch defence there, submachine gun on the passenger seat next to him, his thoughts went to his wife and daughter. They were safe in the mid-Wales hinterland—and they'd understand why he hadn't come back to them.

Bates didn't object in principle to dying for king and country. He did object, however, to the rats leaving the sinking ship—just didn't seem proper. Sir Jonathan had always overestimated his understanding of the situation he found himself in. A common failing, to be sure, but Barrington had taken it to new heights. Toffs were always like that—wealth and privilege created the illusion that the world was fundamentally knowable and tractable.

Bates parked in Downing Street, and got out of his car. He checked his weapon, and opened his last packet of Scampi Fries. Savouring them for the first time ever, he realised that the sound of battle was drawing closer—smoke rose into the sky, and voices rang out in alarm and pain. *Never a dull moment*, he thought to himself, as he waved a greeting at the squaddies standing behind the Number 10 barricade. The army would laugh at him for turning up in a bloodstained shirt, but they'd understand.

Striding off to his Alamo, Bates threw the empty Scampi Fries bag into a nearby bin. If there was one thing he couldn't abide, it was littering.