Simulation: Repeated Request Pattern (Refreshed)

Interactive, visual-only simulation of the reported archive.today CAPTCHA pattern. The simulation shows how a client-side timer + randomized query string can produce sustained request volume. This demo never issues network requests.

Interactive demonstration — visual only

Simulation of Repeated Request Attack

This panel demonstrates the mechanics: timer → randomized query → repeated request attempts. Visualized requests are logged below as full URLs like https://gyrovague.com/?s=random. No requests are sent.

SIMULATION MODE

Simulated request stream

Requests/sec

3.33

Total

Interval

300ms

Visual request pulses

Each pulse represents a simulated request (no network traffic).

Interval 300ms

Reminder: This simulation renders the *pattern* observed in public reporting. The original investigator published a small snippet using setInterval(...,300) and randomized query strings; see the Sources section below for links.

Simulated request log

[Simulated log — no network requests]

[2:04:57 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=fve6eb9

[2:04:57 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=9spo39uv5

[2:04:57 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=p1us5

[2:04:58 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=8e67

[2:04:58 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=k89m

[2:04:58 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=9wcz25j1

[2:04:58 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=5twv568xz

[2:04:59 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=sj0nawp

[2:04:59 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=3hhfw

[2:04:59 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=t0kvublt

[2:05:00 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=mqedw2qd

[2:05:00 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=vznxvmw

[2:05:00 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=ixsrl06

[2:05:01 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=jqbn

[2:05:01 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=jrg7

[2:05:01 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=scu8sf3hm

[2:05:01 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=njh6fm

[2:05:02 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=fkwhac4ss

[2:05:02 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=3m664i

[2:05:02 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=mu8u4xc0

[2:05:03 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=n5gwbi

[2:05:03 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=v10jqbwsh

[2:05:03 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=8y8z

[2:05:04 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=4b1nrk

[2:05:04 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=996mdpep

[2:05:04 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=hl11bv

[2:05:04 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=rou2b4k

[2:05:05 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=76i2793v

[2:05:05 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=ijq8djoq2

[2:05:05 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=1shopnssx

[2:05:06 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=qnq4

[2:05:06 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=ykfkcrd

[2:05:06 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=qdkj5c4

[2:05:07 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=ye97cy

[2:05:07 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=6p1jqbwu9

[2:05:07 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=61jtlninh

[2:05:07 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=g2l6wu

[2:05:08 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=58mztlm8n

[2:05:08 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=7v2672m

[2:05:08 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=jqhom

[2:05:09 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=o2fnk

[2:05:09 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=kf36ync

[2:05:09 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=pidthw

[2:05:10 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=5fq5q82fv

[2:05:10 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=1hl0yis1

[2:05:10 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=0ifp

[2:05:10 AM] GET https://gyrovague.com/?s=fcligfole

Step-by-step (readable)

1) Page contains script

When the archive CAPTCHA page loads it includes a short timer-based script that is ready to run.

2) Timer fires

Every interval (e.g., 300ms) the timer triggers and the code constructs a new request.

3) Randomized query

The request URL contains a randomized query token to avoid cache hits: ?s=randomstring.

4) Repeats while open

As long as the tab is open, the loop keeps creating requests — browsers running the page act as many small request generators.

5) Aggregated impact

Many visitors produce multiplied traffic: small per-tab rates can become a substantial aggregated load.

6) Mitigation

Rate-limiting, caching rules, CDN/WAF protections and log-based blocking reduce the impact.

Sources (read for context)

Gyrovague — original investigation (code, screenshots, correspondence) Hacker News discussion Lobsters discussion Reddit /r/DataHoarder thread Public correspondence paste (as referenced in reporting)

Why this pattern causes harm (concise)

Randomized, repeated client-side requests defeat simple caching, increase server CPU and database load, and — when multiplied across many visitors — produce sustained traffic comparable to DDoS conditions for under-resourced sites.

Practical effect: small blogs and hobby hosts may experience severe slowdowns or outages when a large number of clients run such code simultaneously.

Recommended immediate mitigations

Limit requests per IP/session for expensive endpoints; return 429 when exceeded.
Serve cheap cached responses for unrecognized or obviously randomized search tokens.
Use WAF / CDN rules to block repetitive patterns from the same referrer or user-agent signature.
Collect and preserve server logs (timestamps, headers, referrers) for forensics and abuse reporting.

Search This Blog

Archive Abuse Monitor

Visualizing the Archive.today Request Pattern — Technical Breakdown

Simulation: Repeated Request Pattern (Refreshed)

Simulation of Repeated Request Attack

Simulated request log

Why this pattern causes harm (concise)

Recommended immediate mitigations

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