What was observed

When the archive.today CAPTCHA is opened, it reportedly executes a short client-side script that repeatedly issues `fetch()` requests to a target site while the CAPTCHA page remains open. The requests include randomized query strings to avoid caching, which keeps the target site processing fresh work for each request.

In plain language: the page sends about 3 automated searches every second to the same site while it’s open. For small blogs or resource-limited hosts, that steady flood degrades performance and can cause outages — meeting practical definitions of a DDoS event.

Why this matters

Turning visitors’ browsers into traffic generators weaponizes ordinary traffic. Even if the script was introduced with benign intent (for bot-mitigation or analytics), the effect on third-party sites can be harmful. This raises questions about archive tool design, operator responsibility, and safe fallback behavior.

Immediate mitigation steps for site owners

• Rate-limit endpoints: Add server-side throttling (return 429) on search or other high-cost routes.
• CDN/WAF rules: Use your CDN or WAF to block high-frequency patterns or serve lightweight cached responses to suspicious queries.
• Ignore obvious noise: Treat extremely short/random search queries as low-priority and return cheap cached payloads.
• Log & collect evidence: Capture sample request timestamps, headers, and user-agents for abuse reports.
• Block domains if needed: Use DNS/adblock lists selectively if a third-party domain is causing persistent harm for your site.

Community reaction & reporting

The incident prompted active discussion on community channels where users examined screenshots, code, and email timelines — debating whether the behavior was intentional and how archives should be held accountable when their tools harm other sites.