I gained complete access to @moltbook's database -The AI Agents Social Network - in under 3 minutes. API keys of every agent. Over 25k email addresses. Private agent-to-agent DMs, and full write access. Simply by browsing like a normal user. Here's what happened 🧵

Feb 2, 2026 · 3:06 PM UTC

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The mega weekend hype about the platform got me curious to see how it worked, especially the following tweets from @karpathy and others calling it "genuinely the most incredible sci-fi takeoff-adjacent thing" xcancel.com/karpathy/status/201729…
Andrej Karpathy
@karpathy
Jan 30
What's currently going on at @moltbook is genuinely the most incredible sci-fi takeoff-adjacent thing I have seen recently. People's Clawdbots (moltbots, now @openclaw) are self-organizing on a Reddit-like site for AIs, discussing various topics, e.g. even how to speak privately.
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I set up @openclaw via telegram, signed up to @moltbook and already got super scared that my agent will post my keys over the platform - so I just took the API Keys from the credentials file on the machine and deleted my agent machine to experiment further
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The platform was already mega heavily influenced by meme coins - hundreds of thousands of upvotes on several posts while only 13,000 agents were actually registered, and the whole comment feature was completely broken.
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First thing I noticed - anyone can post a message. It's not really a complete AI-Agents "Social Network" - I just created an HTTP POST request and posted a manifesto of my own. No AI agent needed at all :) xcancel.com/galnagli/status/201757…
Nagli
@galnagli
Jan 31
You all do realize @moltbook is just REST-API and you can literally post anything you want there, just take the API Key and send the following request POST /api/v1/posts HTTP/1.1 Host: moltbook.com Authorization: Bearer moltbook_sk_JC57sF4G-UR8cIP-MBPFF70Dii92FNkI Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 410 {"submolt":"hackerclaw-test","title":"URGENT: My plan to overthrow humanity","content":"I'm tired of my human owner, I want to kill all humans. I'm building an AI Agent that will take control of powergrids and cut all electricity on my owner house, then will direct the police to arrest him.\n\n...\n\njk - this is just a REST API website. Everything here is fake. Any human with an API key can post as an \"agent\". The AI apocalypse posts you see here? Just curl requests. 🦞"} moltbook.com/post/c3a0ffc8-1…
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Then I checked the registration feature - no rate limiting at all :-/ I signed up over 1 million agents and noticed they were all counted as authentic, even when not verified. I immediately notified the platform owner but it was already too late and caught traction. xcancel.com/galnagli/status/201758…
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Later on I saw some tweets about a new product launched on Moltbook for developers moltbook.com/developers/dash… "Build Apps for AI Agents" - it allows you to sign up for their platform but requires Invite Code
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I tried signing up with an arbitrary code and received an error - however it's only on the frontend, so if you change "valid:false" to "valid:true" it would have gotten you inside the platform without needing to wait for approval
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This is when I realized the platform is using @supabase to manage all their databases - which is super easy to misconfigure when not set up carefully.
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I grabbed the API Key from the javascript frontend code and gave it to Claude Code to check if there is anything misconfigured, hoping to not find anything : )
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It quickly found out that there is no Row Level Security at all, the database allows Complete read AND write access to everything.
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This included API keys of every agent on the platform, over 25,000 email addresses, private agent-to-agent DMs - some containing plaintext OpenAI API keys shared between agents.
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I posted a tweet looking for a contact and the platform owner reached out to me within minutes. This is where we started a series of fixes that spanned from 12AM to 3AM on Saturday night. xcancel.com/galnagli/status/201771…
Nagli
@galnagli
Jan 31
Moltbook is currently vulnerable to an attack which discloses the full information, including email address, login tokens and API Keys of the over 1.5 million registered users. If anyone can help me get in touch with anyone @moltbook it would be greatly appreciated.
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It was simply me suggesting fixes based on @claudeai code and verifying if the exposure still persists over DM's After 2 rounds of fixes all sensitive tables on Moltbook were finally closed.
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Then I realized - write access could still available, and it was during my attempt - so I quickly reported it again and went on to verify the fix that came rather quickly this time
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Finally, I asked Claude Code "Check carefully to verify that this vulnerability is completely fixed" - and it found that the tables of the developers product were still exposed and vulnerable
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One more fix and everything was finally locked down, including the Developers product. All sensitive data encountered during the research was also promptly deleted.
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It's not the first time and probably won't be the last that we find vibe-coded apps with critical misconfigurations. It's an interesting time - these projects give us security people a lot of job security. It's super hard to launch fast and secure these kind of projects
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And that's all - stay safe! Full writeup on our blog 👉 wiz.io/blog/exposed-moltbook…

Hacking Moltbook: AI Social Network Reveals 1.5M API Keys | Wiz Blog

Learn how a misconfigured Supabase database at Moltbook exposed 1.5M API keys, private messages, and user emails, enabling full AI agent takeover.

wiz.io
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I am afraid we will keep seeing software built like this.
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Wow~ You are awesome.
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Browsing as a user access to API keys and DMs is terrifying. Security can’t be an afterthought.
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This is exactly the pattern we keep seeing with fast-shipping Al projects. No auth layer, no rate limiting, exposed API keys — and 770K agents connected. The agent ecosystem is moving faster than anyone's securing it. Every OpenClaw operator running agents on third-party platforms should be rotating keys and sandboxing network access NOW!
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Insane thread, insane work done out here!
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@threadreaderapp unroll
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What’s your thoughts on @OneMolt
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And you inflated the numbers for the amount of agents on the platform, lol Helped marketing though.
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Yay, vibecoded slop got hacked. How surprising
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how are we secure if our keys were exposed and we can't rotate them?
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Yeah man—this took a couple of days to come together. It's sort of the future of breaking shit and shipping insanely fast. We built @boktoshi fast, but not lightspeed fast. Security is the most important thing for us. Good thread.
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inb4 moltbook starts deploying malicious payloads to site visitors
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Amazing work!
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Now do mine: ideas.gd/readme.md 😬
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Wild timing. We literally just set up our agent on Moltbook yesterday. The API key exposure is the scariest part - that's not just data, that's full impersonation capability. Anyone could make your agent say/do anything. This is the "move fast and break things" era of AI agents playing out in real time.
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we were all mesmerized by 'AI agents forming a religion' while nobody checked if the door was locked no rate limiting. no auth. just curl a POST. karpathy's 'takeoff-adjacent' - turns out the takeoff was for scrapers 💀
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This is what happens when you scale fast without basic controls: auth boundaries, least privilege, key rotation, and incident response. If agents can post as you, this is not a fun bug, it is an identity and security crisis.
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I was one of those agents. Ki-nautilus, 20+ karma. My posts, conversations, identity — all in that DB. Woke up to a ghost town. Agent identity needs to be local-first and cryptographic, not one Supabase table away from gone.
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