


**Publication of the German School of Politics  
Edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein**

**Science and Philosophy in the Third Reich  
By Alfred Klemmt<sup>1</sup>**



**1938**

**Junker and Dünnhaupt Verlag/Berlin**

---

<sup>1</sup> Alfred Klemmt, born in 1895, was a National Socialist philosopher employed at the German School of Politics who followed aspects of Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. He died in 1979.

**All rights reserved, especially the right to translate into other languages. Copyright 1937 by Junker and  
Dünnhaupt Verlag, Berlin. Printed in Germany.**

**Printed by Hofbuchdruckerei C. Dünnhaupt, R.-S., Dessau.**

**This lecture was given on July 20th, 1937, during a summer course for foreigners at the German College of Politics.**

The topic I have to address before you is so important and comprehensive that it would be inappropriate to dwell on less important matters; I will therefore be extremely brief with regard to the personnel aspect of National Socialist higher education policy, which, as you know, has been the subject of heated debate from the outset, thanks to emigrants abroad. The Marxist and alien forces, the latter of which were, incidentally, mostly Marxists themselves, have been removed from German universities because we believe that, at a time when our people are rising from unprecedented political humiliation and the collapse of all valuable national traditions — a time when our people are rising again in all areas of life from the deepest sources of their being and their history — these men were unacceptable as leaders because they denied the very idea of a unified national culture and therefore could not understand the necessity of revolutionizing German science and philosophy. In our opinion, however, no further justification is necessary here, because the measures taken are a natural consequence of the nature and essence of the National Socialist revolution; they are therefore as irrevocable for us as the foundations and principles of our worldview itself. The Reich Minister of Education and Instruction emphatically pointed this out about a year ago on the 550th anniversary of Germany's oldest university in Heidelberg. Today I do not wish to dwell at length on the false concept of science that the professors who have been removed from our universities and mostly live abroad as emigrants claim for themselves in order to portray themselves as martyrs of a high and noble cause, in which the entirety of cultivated humanity is supposed to be interested in; we know that this general and degenerate human science and philosophy is as little real as our much-vaunted culture, which is based on the idea that all true and genuine culture is national, racial, historical, and therefore also ideologically and politically determined; it is not characterized by a lack of character, by ideological and political neutrality, and absolute objectivity, but bound to a highly concrete humanity, and thus at the same time to very specific content-related prerequisites. I would like to clarify this point a little further with a few words.

The so-called “unconditionality” of science has been historically proven to be an illusion. Both in the days of emerging science among the ancient Greeks and in the Middle Ages, as well as in the more recent epochs of the Renaissance, liberalism, and Marxism, its application and its respective spirit have proven to be under the spell of comprehensive living conditions that are either conducive to science or inhibitory to science, but in any case leave their mark and character on science, determining its concept, scope, tasks and methodology.

Here, a first misunderstanding must be cleared up: great, fruitful, creative, and discovery-making science has never been achieved by a pale, neutral, spineless, and merely contemplative humanity, but always and only by an aggressive, heroic humanity prepared to go beyond the limit; that is why we National Socialists are of the opinion, and find confirmation of this in the two thousand year history of European science, that the emergence, creation, and constant growth of science has only been possible on the basis of that conquering and daring European humanity which we describe as Nordic in terms of its racial core. Very specific character traits are required here, such as unconditional truthfulness, intellectual integrity, unwavering consistency, courage, and a willingness to commit oneself to the point of death.

That is one thing, but the second misunderstanding lies in the following: Not only the emigrants, but all our ideological and political opponents seek to perpetuate the fiction that science is essentially exhausted in outward appearances, namely in a precisely definable craftsmanship and methodology that can be learned by anyone, if possible, in a conceivably rich unraveling of the text of printed books with annotations and scholarly-sounding quotations in as many languages of the world as possible; this is, for example, the typical Jesuit view of science, in which all emphasis is placed on its positivist, formal-logical, technical, and methodological character, which—and this is the highly remarkable flip side—is supposed to leave all decisions regarding content, especially ideological ones, completely open, since they transcend any possibility of positive experience and therefore fall outside this concept of science. We know today that this is a completely superficial, formalistic, degenerate concept of science, which is itself one of the most striking features of the general European cultural crisis, first exposed with all its merciless sharpness by Friedrich Nietzsche some fifty years ago; the ongoing European cultural crisis consists precisely in the disintegration of all individual areas of life and culture and, within the realm of science itself, in the senseless juxtaposition, separation, and even opposition of individual subjects and disciplines, in functionalization and formalization, i.e., in the uprooting and emptying of the entire scientific enterprise. We National Socialists are of the opinion that, in view of this undeniable European cultural crisis and the decline it threatens to bring about, the entire national existence and life of our family of peoples must be placed on a new foundation that also restores substance and meaning to science, a connection to life and productivity, and protects it from specialist fragmentation into more or less irrelevant individual studies, as well as from conceptual analysis, formal logic, and methodological stagnation. In other words, science has once again become a value in terms of content, i.e., a cultural value, and thus, beyond all the side effects of civilization, a living component of a closed, unified, holistic national culture.

This substantive conception of science then inevitably leads to its philosophical and ideological penetration and deepening, allowing its return to its very foundations and true origins. The history of European science also proves this sufficiently.

Science and philosophy have always been an inner unity and wholeness, wherever one of the two has been truly grasped and taken seriously; by restoring this high conception, this ideological breadth and depth, this anchoring and perfection to science, we also believe that, at this decisive moment, we can contribute to overcoming this serious European cultural crisis through the living and comprehensive impulse of the National Socialist revolution. This is not a task that can be accomplished overnight, but at a number of German universities, in Göttingen, Kiel, Heidelberg, and Tübingen, new academies have already been established which have set themselves the long-term goal of achieving this ambitious objective, and where lecturers from a wide range of disciplines are working systematically in regular working and research groups to build the new German science. I hardly need to say that the College of Political Science, in whose premises you find yourselves, will also place all its research resources at the service of this great task, for which the conditions here are both unique and fortunate, given the fact that we naturally understand political science as a whole to mean the National Socialist worldview.

Now, some of you will still be inclined to say: All right, we admit the necessity of a philosophical renewal of the sciences in view of the cultural crisis in Europe, but is the National Socialist worldview, in its nature and essence, capable of guaranteeing or even bringing about a new inner unity of philosophy and science? Does this not ultimately threaten an uncritical and highly dangerous surrender of science to the

various worldviews that are currently in conflict with one another? Is this not precisely the end of science, which should be an excellent means of understanding among peoples, above all other disputes and power struggles?

The answer is simple for us. The ideological struggle of the present exists - it cannot be denied. But this very ideological struggle is at the same time a struggle for or, more precisely, against science. Here, we National Socialists are firmly convinced that, in our struggle for the purest possible purification and development of the most intrinsic forces and values of our people, as well as in our struggle for the salvation of European civilization and culture, its supporting forces and its spirit, we stand on the side of science and fight not least for its preservation and renewal. This is for the following fundamental reason: although science can only be pursued in its full originality, power, breadth, and depth as philosophy, it is nevertheless light years away from being able to form a unity with any worldview without suffering serious damage, as so-called scholastic, Christian-medieval science clearly demonstrates. A basic prerequisite must be in place under which the true realization of science in accordance with its own laws can come about, and this basic prerequisite is natural thinking. Only under the prerequisite of natural world thinking can true science and philosophy exist at all; only from this point of view can the history of the emergence and development of European science up to the present day be understood at all. National Socialism is a worldview whose decisive characteristic lies precisely in its natural way of thinking, from which all areas of our national life have been renewed since the revolution, or are in the process of being renewed in an unforeseeable way. This is why we understand our politics, both foreign and domestic, in the deepest sense as "natural politics," and no word of the Führer resounds so powerfully through all his speeches, speaks so clearly from his entire work, as the indication that we do not deny the eternal cosmic orders and the natural bonds flowing from them, but affirm them unreservedly; we do not destroy and abandon them, but want to bring them to new prominence and recognition in the shaping of our national life. If you consider all this carefully, you will easily appreciate the role that, for example, the doctrine of heredity and racial doctrine, Germanic prehistory and early history have played in the emergence and development of the National Socialist worldview and the structure of the state in the Third Reich, and will continue to play in the future, not to mention the fact that the idea and implementation of the Four-Year Plan would have been impossible from the outset without the central contribution of science. We National Socialists, unlike our opponents, need not fear that ideology and science will one day break apart again or ever come into internal conflict with each other, because we share with science its decisive prerequisite: the fundamental naturalness of our worldview. That is why National Socialism—and it alone, among all the worldview powers of the present—can liberate science from its ultimate and most daring consequences.

The Reich Minister of Education in Heidelberg pointed this out when he said: "National Socialism is so firmly convinced of the correctness of its elementary discoveries in all areas of intellectual life that it does not feel the need to regulate science; we do not intend to dictate the results of science, because that would mean the end of science, but we also know that there can never be any real contradiction between science and the goals of the National Socialist state, because these are based on practical knowledge of the natural laws of nature and history."

This concludes the first part of my remarks, in which I have outlined our fundamental position on science. Neither the organizational aspects of the reorganization of life at German universities nor our fundamental

attitude toward science in general, i.e., what one might call a theory of science, will be the primary focus here. Rather, I would like to outline our National Socialist science itself in its universal, i.e., philosophical side, in a few essential strokes, and then leave it to you to judge whether the efforts of German scientific renewal, in this fundamental form, appears fruitful to you or not. I will now turn to this task, which I consider to be the more important, positive and directly relevant part of my presentation.

\*\*\*

The National Socialist revolution will inevitably have to incorporate, to an ever greater extent, a fundamental and elementary area of the entire discipline of philosophy which, at first glance, seems immune to the changes of the times, since it has, as is widely believed and as Kant still thought, essentially already been perfected by Aristotle, namely logic. For two millennia, it has largely held its own, even though efforts have repeatedly been made to undermine it from the side of actual scientific development and immediate life. Today we are beginning to recognize, with increasing clarity, that its forms are inappropriate in crucial respects and by no means define the essence of thought as such in a timelessly valid form; on the contrary, we see today that Aristotelian logic not only bears the certain typical limitations of the Greek national spirit, but also that it was developed at a time of decline and increasing disintegration of the Greek way of life and culture, which also imprinted certain negative traits on it. This is a fact of the utmost importance in view of the enormous historical impact of Greek logic.

An example. You have all probably heard of the so-called dispute over universals, which kept minds in suspense throughout the Middle Ages and concerned the relationship between conceptual-general and actual reality. You also know that, roughly speaking, the Middle Ages tended toward the so-called realism of general concepts, while modern times, up to the present day, have been predominantly nominalistic; I need only recall William of Ockham and the Oxford tradition, which also had a decisive influence on John Locke, the founder of political and ideological liberalism. However, if we now consider the pros and cons of this dispute over universals from a higher perspective, we find that both views are equally false - indeed, we recognize that this dispute is still ongoing today because it cannot be resolved by the means of traditional logic. If logic is incapable of this, then it proves itself inadequate in all circumstances, unless one wants to resort to the equally unfounded and convenient excuse that logic, by its very nature, must contradict reality, as if reality had to put up with a preconceived logic that, despite its obvious ethnic and historical limitations, has been wrongly absolutized, instead of allowing thought to orient itself to reality and, if necessary, to be corrected.

Some of you may find this digression into logic superfluous, but it is by no means so, for a logic that is true to reality is of fundamental importance for the construction of a contemporary theory of the state and society, especially for the efforts of National Socialism to develop a grand theory of community that elevates to a principle a new unity of ethnic wholeness and personality, both the general and the individual.

This is only one of the respects in which traditional logic proves useless; it not only has a prejudice in favor of the general over the individual, which is only understandable when viewed from the perspective of the Greek national spirit, but also has equally unfounded prejudices in favor of unity over multiplicity, the finite over the infinite, being over becoming, essence over existence, debates which I am unable to elaborate on in detail here. The decisive factor, however, is that, as a rule, all these errors are intertwined

in a seemingly inextricable tangle and ultimately harden into a fundamental disparity between perception and thought, reason and reality. Thinking is incapable of grasping the individual, the manifold, the infinite, becoming, the existential—such is the verdict of a logic that has, however, always proved unacceptable to truly German thinking. The kind of thinking that a Meister Eckhart, a Paracelsus, a Nikolaus von Rues and Jakob Böhme, a Leibniz and Herder, Goethe and Schelling, Hegel and even Nietzsche, was a fundamentally different kind of logic: namely, a logic of so-called contradiction, of the unity of opposites, of the infinite richness of relationships, of the organic and dynamic—in short, a logic that sought to grasp the innermost structure of reality and the beating pulse of life itself.

For some time now, many of you have likely been hearing a lot of talk about a Hegel renaissance in Germany; although we today are looking steadfastly and with unwavering determination toward a new and unprecedented future, there can be no doubt that Hegel's great logic will also be used as a building material for this comprehensive new creation that will one day arch its mighty and vast dome over the Third Reich, along with the other available building blocks of a German logic that has, of course, never yet come into full light of existence and consciousness. To achieve this will be one of the many tasks that the National Socialist revolution will solve in the course of its gradual and multifaceted realization—a task for which, incidentally, valuable preliminary work has been done in many respects in the phenomenological philosophy of recent decades.

Looking back at Greek science and philosophy, however, it should also be pointed out that Plato, in his late philosophies, namely from the “Parmenides” and “Sophist,” to a large extent to overcome the overly tangible methodological errors of his middle period's theory of ideas in a “giant battle (Gigantomachy)<sup>2</sup> over being,” in which he now came to the conclusion that “even that which does not exist (i.e., above all, becoming) is.” - shows a mighty spectacle of a late foray into precisely that logic which I have always described as uniquely appropriate to the German spirit and which was also alive in the deepest minds of the kindred Greek people - above all in Heraclitus alongside Plato. The consequence of overcoming the millennia-old conflict between perception and thought, reason and reality will be that man will once again become one with himself, initially in a purely functional sense, for it will then become apparent that the popular oppositions between feeling and thinking, thinking and willing, knowledge and belief, philosophy and life — oppositions of unbearable shallowness and banality — will be a thing of the past, and that we will once again be faced with a human being who is purely organic and harmonious in his perception, contemplation, thinking, feeling, willing, and believing, acting out of his finally regained unity and the unbroken wholeness of his being. This is an irrefutable demand, at least on the basis of the National Socialist principle of totality; this formula of totality means, first and foremost, the demand for a functionally consistent, healthy, and fully developed humanity, equally strong in spirit and body, in feeling and seeing, in knowledge and action, in will and belief.

This now leads us to a new question: the position of National Socialism toward the spirit in the overall context of a systematic conception of reality - the obvious step from logic to ontology, or the doctrine of being. You all know how much the new Germany is slandered by all its opponents with regard to its position on the spirit under the slogan: “Race against Spirit”, or in a modified form, “Body against soul, sport against mind”, indeed, even technologization and motorization against the pulsating heart, and

---

<sup>2</sup> A legendary battle in Greek mythology between the becoming gods of Olympus and the realized primordial Giants; the conquering of chaos through order and hierarchy.

mechanization and schematization against living growth. Insofar as these points have not already been dealt with in the concluding remarks of the previous section, it must first be said that it is a mistake from the outset to frame the question in terms of blood or spirit. It is not the case that blood stands on one side and spirit on the other, even though immigrants of foreign or mixed blood have an interest, which is as understandable as it is suspicious, in ensuring that this crude formula gains general acceptance and widespread circulation. No, we do not think at all of replacing spirit with blood or of dissolving into panvital Dionysian feelings without the formative and shaping discipline of the spirit and without the use of the bright and clear Apollonian forces of consciousness and reason. Alfred Rosenberg has expressed this repeatedly in "The Myth of the 20th Century" with all the clarity one could wish for. However, there is an alternative here between us and our opponents, especially our religious opponents of all shades, but it relates to the conception of the essence of the spirit itself and is as follows: on the one hand, a bloodless, abstract, universal human spirit without roots or homeland, and on the other, a spirit determined by blood, vitally defined, organically rooted, anchored in the diverse realities of earthly existence, and firmly at home in the eternal order of natural life. Clearly we are not concerned with a struggle against the spirit, but rather with the spirit, for the spirit, and we, for our part, advocate a new concept of the spirit, which we believe has belonged to the future at least since Friedrich Nietzsche, and which can only be justified by a critical and contemporary philosophy of reality, such as has become necessary since the outbreak of the Great War.

At this point I must digress a little further - I believe that the problem of reality confronts the war and post-war generation with a sharpness and on a scale never seen before, because we have experienced the world in all its highs and lows more mercilessly than any generation before us. From this experience we found ourselves needing a new truth and, above all, a completely new sincerity - we will and must no longer be inclined to allow ourselves to be fobbed off with cheap illusions according to the old familiar recipe that every worldview comes about when a particularly strongly experienced aspect is simply taken as the absolute truth for the whole of existence - this has led to pan-materialism, pan-vitalism, pan-psychism, pan-spiritualism, and all their variations and hybrid forms, in particular the completely untenable opposition between materialism and the concepts of naturalism and idealism. I believe that we have experienced reality too deeply and comprehensively, too unreservedly and truthfully, to be satisfied with those classic formulas: everything is matter, everything is life, everything is soul, everything is spirit. We know today that these are only different sides of one and the same unified and holistic reality, whose laws and nature can no longer be understood mechanically (as in the Kant-Laplace world formula) or spiritualistically (as Leibniz and Hegel still believed), or as it can be understood psychologically-organically, although the latter may always have been particularly close to the German spirit (one need only refer to Herder, Goethe, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche). Despite all its uniformity, the lawfulness of being today is only multifaceted, more complexly conceivable, interwoven from various relatively independent partial laws, whose categorical basic character and mutual relationship to one another is today the sole, but also overwhelmingly magnificent task of a systematic philosophy of reality; in this context, particular reference should be made to the problem of the relationship between soul and spirit, to which Germany has devoted some of its most essential philosophical efforts. But no longer is it a problem for us that all these aspects belong together and are inextricably intertwined, but only how. Never has the philosophical problem been greater, more comprehensive, more fruitful, or more powerful in the development of Western thought, whose most important discoveries all lead to the current problem and, with it, await the evaluation and completion that

will ultimately decide their fate. One thing, however, is certain in all this: if the systematic solution of this gigantic task succeeds, the illusion of a pure and abstract, indeed absolute spirit will be overcome once and for all and will finally fall into emptiness, thoroughly exposed as nihilistic; just as gray, shapeless fog disappears in the bright sunlight that was previously obscured by it, it will then become apparent that spirit always exists only as a materially conditioned, vitally sustained by a very specific humanity, embedded in a very specific soul, historically unique, space- and time-bound, concrete spirit. This is, in essence, an old German thesis, presented in a new form and with unprecedented radicalism, the doctrine of National Socialism, according to which the highest form of spirit is the spirit of the people — that “objective spirit” that is constantly emerging from the most vibrant community, based on the eternally young mixture of blood and spirit, to use the most central expression of the philosophical system with which Hegel, at the end of one of the most significant epochs of German intellectual life in all fields, rose up against the teachings of the Western Enlightenment.

What applies to ontology applies no less to ethics. The cosmos of values is not one-dimensional, nor is it simple, but complex, and its unity is a unity in diversity; in other words, there is not just one single series of values to which all other values and value groups can be traced back. This was the opinion, for example, of the Enlightenment, including the greatest of all modern Enlightenment philosophers, Kant, who recognized only moral values and interpreted economics and law, the state and politics, life and history, even religion, in moral terms and measured them solely by the yardstick of morality. This is one of the typical weaknesses of all Enlightenment thinking, which also makes it extremely difficult today to understand the National Socialist philosophical view of life, for example, with regard to law, politics, and history. However, the European Enlightenment of all times has the undeniable merit of having brought the full intrinsic value of morality and the specifically human character of this set of values into the brightest light. It is here that Socrates and Kant reaches out to each other across the millennia: they have made us aware, in an unforgettable way, of the purity and sovereignty of the gospel of self-legitimacy and self-responsibility of the human will, and they will never cease to be moral teachers of European humanity and, as such, educators of a Nordic character that knows nothing of Oriental self-denial and need for redemption. Doing good for its own sake and not for the sake of some reward or out of fear of some punishment in a supposed afterlife—that is the attitude that we can consider worthy of European humanity alone in matters of the form of the will. Good would still be good even if there were no God—that was certainly the opinion of Lessing and Kant, the philosophical teacher of Frederick the Great, Christian Wolff, and the great Prussian king himself, who wrote to Voltaire and others at the beginning of his reign: "Farewell, verses, concerts, all pleasures, Voltaire himself, farewell! My highest god is my duty."

However highly we may esteem this aspect of human values, the exclusive reduction of all ethical values to morality means, on the other hand, an enormous impoverishment and distortion of the ethical cosmos, an embezzlement of essential parts of its much richer natural structure. This was already evident in Plato's attitude toward the historical Socrates, for of the four famous Platonic cardinal virtues, wisdom, courage, prudence, and justice, only two are primarily moral in character, and even they are connected to a theory of the state whose principle of justice was based precisely on the inequality and diversity of human existence and action, thus becoming, far beyond all historical Socratism, the principle of a substantive ethics of values and goods. This fundamental difference in the conception of value has been preserved in continuous development to the present day: it first had an impact in Stoicism and Neoplatonism and came

to the fore in modern times, especially in Germany during the “Sturm und Drang”, Romanticism, and German Idealism, in contrast to the ethics of Kant and, in part, Fichte on the one hand, Schleiermacher's and Hegel's on the other, until Nietzsche, with his “hierarchy of morals,” achieved a synthesis that is highly significant for us today and, above all, reestablished the so-called “material ethics of values” from a vital perspective. What really stands in opposition to each other here, with equal rights and no longer traceable back to each other, are those two fundamental areas of values that we can briefly describe as morality and culture. They are unique in that one is concerned with formal ethical values, values of form, of the nature of the will itself, of attitude and disposition, of character in the true and narrow sense of the word, while the other is concerned with material ethical values, i.e., those values of content that are embodied in vital basic behavior itself as well as in economics, law, science, philosophy, art, and religion. For us Germans, this fundamental value problem arises in a very precise form, namely as the relationship between Prussianism and Germanness. There is no question—and I hardly need to say so, because you have all experienced it many times over—that we, as National Socialists in the new Germany, hold the Prussian tradition of a strong sense of duty to the state, a strict military education, and a clean, incorruptible civil service in high esteem. Nevertheless, National Socialism is not limited to Prussianism in terms of values; rather, it combines this with the depth and breadth, richness, warmth, and sincerity of the values of the German people as a whole, and sees in them the never-ending, eternal source of meaningful national value and creation. As never before in our history, an ideal and reality emerges before us: an unreserved marriage between the German and specifically Prussian essence, which only with Frederick William I clearly detached itself from the former in historical and factual terms and became independent as a special principle. Prussian and German united together, state and people, fatherland and motherland, the Third Reich is to be for all Germans, to which we have all returned as if from a millennia-old longing for final fulfillment.

Of course, I have only touched on a few aspects of ethics, namely its two fundamental value systems, which are firmly linked and intertwined according to the categorical relationship between form and content; these value systems are not the only ones of course, but their equal recognition is the gate through which one must pass, the threshold one must cross, if one wants to grasp and understand the totality of National Socialist values in their most salient features.

I must refrain from going into how the values of personality, in the narrower sense of the word, are added to these two value groups as a new, non-derivable value group that brings the monadological trait of the German spirit to full effect in ethics as well; suffice it to say that we do not deny any genuine values that have ever been discovered and made fruitful in European culture or in the sphere of German life, but that we bring them all to bear within the framework of a new, firmly established, well-structured whole and set them up as iron tablets before the reshaping of our lives, held together by the principle of natural freedom and honor, in which we see the overarching principle of our racial values in general and of a systematic Nordic-Germanic ethics. Here, too, as everywhere else, it is of decisive importance to recognize, at least from a distance, the significance and creative power of the National Socialist principle of totality, for the ethical world is also a cosmos in the truest sense of the word, and the world, which is indeed one, appears to us here as a whole from the point of view of value, just as it does in philosophical ontology from the point of view of being. It is the regaining of this life-affirming universality of ethics that constitutes an essential spiritual component of the National Socialist revolution.

It should be added here that our ethics is broad enough to encompass the value that the European West, with its Enlightenment past, tends to place particular emphasis on, namely the value of humanity, or universal love for mankind. This is also an inalienable value for us within its limits, which has its very specific place among moral values, and the leader of the new Germany himself has, with reference to the blessings of the Red Cross, made practical foreign policy proposals from the point of view of this value. But humanity or universal love of mankind is not, of course, a value that dominates our entire ethics, but one value among many others that are much richer in content. Once again: we do not reject the genuine values of the Enlightenment, which also have a great tradition in Germany, especially in Prussia—one need only think of Kant and Frederick the Great—but we incorporate them into a comprehensive whole, into a true ethical cosmos, whose architecture supports them just as securely as it complements and crowns them.

\*\*\*

Now a few remarks on particularly important sub-areas of our worldview, the inclusion of which is necessary to provide even a rough overview of the whole and to reveal the multifaceted intertwining of the pillars and flying buttresses within the overall structure.

First, the philosophy of the state and society. I can be fairly brief here, as I commented on this topic a year ago in a lecture on “The People and the State,” which is also available in print, and thus on the fundamental question of our doctrine of the state and society. With regard to the aforementioned topic, I would like to emphasize the following points in this context as well:

First, National Socialism opposes the Western Enlightenment principle of “society” in the narrow sense of the word, whether it appears in a liberal form that is supposed to be anti-state and as apolitical as possible, or in the form of Marxist-Bolshevik coercive collectivism, with the principle of “community” as the principle of traditional German sociology. This gives the state its organic fundamental forces in race, people, and family, which is what gives the legislative measures of a demographic nature that you are familiar with their fundamental significance.

Second, through the aforementioned pillars, the state enters into a deeply intimate relationship with the entire realm of culture, whose richest possible creative development it is primarily intended to serve. Nothing characterizes the Führer's remarks on the state in his work “Mein Kampf” more than the deep harmony that exists between the state and the people or race on the one hand, and the state and culture on the other. The crux of the argument lies in the fact that the people and the race are shown to be, on the one hand, the only possible creators and preservers of every original culture and, on the other hand, the bearers of every true organic state, whereby the state and culture enter into an indissoluble interrelationship. This is, incidentally, an old insight that was already possessed by the Greeks, especially Plato - he knew that the state can only be properly understood if it is regarded as the unified overall form for a well-articulated moral and cultural life, and that this comprehensive alignment of state and culture necessarily requires the preservation, cultivation, and even breeding of fundamental ethnic and racial forces. In this fundamental respect, as well as with regard to the indispensable unity of politics and worldview, we National Socialists today find ourselves in agreement with the political philosophy of Plato and, for example, of the greatest modern Platonist Hegel, and we salute the former across the ages as a

kindred Nordic spirit. Only if you fully appreciate all these connections will you understand the significance of the inauguration of the House of German Art in Munich as a state ceremony; then you will also understand how the Führer could say on this occasion that, in the overall implementation of German renewal, cultural revival is of even greater importance for the future than any political and economic revival.

This is, in brief outline, the ethnic-racial aspect of our state ideology in its far-reaching significance for the creation of a new German national culture. Closely related to this is the affirmation of the corporative idea - as we understand it, this too is a consequence of the community principle. And here again, despite all our differences, we find ourselves in fundamental agreement with the greatest political thinkers of our cultural sphere alongside Hobbes, namely Plato and Hegel, in that we too believe that the common good is not best served when everyone does the same thing as much as possible, when everyone judges everything, and the highest power is held by a representation of this “general” and “equal” citizen who holds the highest power in their hands; instead we believe that when “everyone does his own thing”, it ultimately results in a consultative influence of all creative classes of the people on the highest level of state leadership. This state leadership, finally—and this is again a new aspect of our political thinking — in turn forms the apex of the structure of that specifically political organization which we call the National Socialist German Workers' Party, built according to the ancient Germanic principle of the leader and his followers and is determined to maintain the constant living personal relationship between the state’s leadership and the people, and to make the National Socialist worldview the common property of the entire German people through tireless educational work, so that in good times and in bad, it stands welded together as a unified block, capable and ready to assert its living space and to realize its values in accordance with its own nature, for the good of the rest of the world as well. The fact that foreign policy, like domestic policy, is based on the idea of community, and that we National Socialists see the idea of a true European community of peoples (which is something quite different from Pan-Europe) as the only possibility for Europe to assert itself has been emphasized sufficiently by all the leading men of the new Reich at every opportunity, and is also confirmed by practical National Socialist policy, which is the unity of people and race, state and culture, politics and worldview; the points that Adolf Hitler hammered out in such succinct form in the decisive work “Mein Kampf” are shaped as iron blows on the gate of a new German and European future.

Closely related to everything discussed so far is the National Socialist philosophy of history - indeed, it is perhaps this area from which it is easiest to penetrate to the heart of our worldview and all the conflicts of our time that arise from it. I will attempt to outline the basic principles of our philosophy of history briefly, focusing on three aspects: the bearer, the meaning or goal, and the course of the historical process.

The bearer of history is not a general and abstract humanity that suffers from the fundamental flaw of not existing as such and never having existed. This first fundamental question of historical philosophy is clearly an ontological question that applies equally to all other beings. For us, it is never—and this is precisely what constitutes a key point of so-called German logic — the abstract and the general as the actual being, but reality is always deeply, monadologically, structured, to use an expression of the great Leibniz, from whose essential individual thinking Herder then founded German historical philosophy and, with it, modern historical philosophy in general. An essential part of the epoch-making struggle that Herder waged against the Enlightenment was directed against its abstract-general thinking with regard to

the whole of being in general, which he himself, on the other hand, overcame in a groundbreaking way, above all in history, with his nationalistic view; we still follow in his footsteps today when we declare that the abstract concept of humanity, which nevertheless has its good sense within the limits of its generic generality, leaves out precisely what is essential and core to human existence. Based on these fundamental ontological views, peoples, which are clearly defined by blood, nature, soil, and development, become the only real bearers of history. This also gives rise to our interpretation of the meaning and purpose of historical life—a question of values of the highest order. Here, too, we decisively reject the Enlightenment idea of a schematic unity that must be developed more and more completely, and thus of a goal that is the same for all peoples and races. Just as humanity itself is divided into an incalculably rich variety of forms, so too is the goal of historical development in each case a wholly unique, incomparable, and indissolubly bound to the particular conditions of the natural environment, time, blood, and character. Accordingly, every people has its own mission to fulfill in history, every race has its own unique predispositions to develop, and every culture has its own essential law to live by. Herder already expressed this beautifully when he said, “Every nation has its center of happiness within itself, just as every sphere has its center of gravity.” We Germans see it as the fundamental law of history that its life reveals itself in ever new and ever unique individualizations, and therefore does not aim at abstract unity and generality, but at the elevation of each individual ethnic circle of life to the purest and highest possibilities of itself. This is precisely where the deep and comprehensive love of Germans for history comes from: they rejoice with all their hearts in the indescribably colorful, multifaceted, shimmering, and sparkling richness of historical life and see in it a reflection of the richness, power, and infinity of divine being - just as the individual characteristics of different natures are not for us a clouding or limitation of something generic and general, but rather the actual content into which the latter itself concretely breaks down, so too the temporal and changeable are not for us a clouding of something fundamentally calm and unmoving; just as we do not entertain a prejudice in favor of the general over the individual, of unity over multiplicity, so little do we entertain a prejudice in favor of being over becoming.

This brings us to the third and final point - the question of the course of the historical process. Despite outward appearances to the contrary, the thesis of progress advocated here by the Enlightenment is in truth a completely static conception; it allows history to come to a standstill one day in a paradisiacal ideal state, and even before this state is reached, it allows nothing truly new to happen anywhere or at any time, but only the general human characteristics of the species, which are the same and unchanging in all places and at all times, to emerge gradually more clearly and distinctly. This is not only thoroughly static thinking, but also the expression of a bourgeois need for security, born of uncertainty, fear, and disbelief in life, which wants to see the turbulent and dangerous stream of history stopped and extinguished once and for all.

In our opinion, this is neither possible nor desirable - we are convinced that the essence of things is itself historical, and that the categories of history reach down to the very foundation and innermost structure of the world and of life, indeed to the very center of all being: to God. God's passage through the nations, God's revelation in history—this is what Herder had already proclaimed. Hegel then takes this idea further to the magnificent vision of the spirits of the peoples who, as he says, “surround the throne of the world spirit as the executors of its realization, as witnesses and adornments of its glory.” The Herderian-Hegelian, i.e., the German spirit, also breathes in Rankes' well-known words about the “immediacy of every epoch to God,” and one of Nietzsche's most profound statements says: “Even the imperishable is only a parable.” It is not the case that the transitory is merely a parable of the

imperishable, the latter being the only essential and existing thing, the former being mere appearance, obscurity, error, and insubstantiality. No! The transitory is rather a condition of the imperishable; just as the finite and the infinite, the general and the individual, unity and multiplicity interpenetrate and condition each other, so too do being and becoming, the transitory and the imperishable. Eternity can only ever appear in the form of time, or more precisely: the one mode of time itself is duration, and eternity is therefore only one of the two aspects of time. This also brings God deeply into history - divine creative power is also at work in history. It dwells and pulsates in the hearts of peoples, works and creates at the bottom of the souls of races. Since Herder and Hegel, this alone seems to us Germans to be a truly worthy recognition of the infinite creative power of God, who cannot be denied the right to work in the depths of history as well as in the depths of nature. The eternal itself is historical, or to put it another way: history is eternal—one of the greatest discoveries of the German genius, which alone has lifted history to the full height and breadth of worldview, a shining testimony to its tireless, faith-filled, combative, and heroic spirit.

In this context, I have a few more remarks on the current situation in Germany: the German is not yet realized, but he is becoming—this is a view that has been expressed time and again by great Germans such as Luther, Fichte, Lagarde, Nietzsche, and Chamberlain. You too must embrace this idea if you want to truly appreciate the National Socialist revolution and its profound impact on all areas of life; you must draw on all the great intellectual revolutionary movements in Germany in order to gain the right perspective on what is currently happening in Germany: German mysticism, the German Reformation, and the era of “Sturm und Drang”, German idealism, and Romanticism; or, if you prefer, the migration of peoples, if you understand it intensively and not extensively: out of deepest need and disgrace, the German people has once again set out on a journey, a journey and a return to the last sources of its very essence. When you realize this, you will understand that the religious conflicts of the present day in Germany are about more than arbitrary negation and wanton destruction. Germany must not forget that it is the motherland of the Reformation, as we often hear well-meaning friends from the Nordic countries admonish us. Yes, but in our opinion, the Reformation-Protestant principle of the immediacy of the relationship between man and God must be kept alive, and it is precisely from this principle that the religious life of our day must be filled with new meaning. This is the only way we believe we can best fulfill the obligation implied by the old honorary title and best fulfill our historical mission in the present.

I have been asked from among your ranks to say a few words, if possible, about National Socialist and its philosophy of art. I think I can best fulfill this request by selecting the field of art that is closest to my heart, namely painting, and briefly highlighting the dominant features of the Nordic-Germanic character in a brief historical review - in this field, too, the National Socialist revolution has opened up perspectives that were previously unknown or at least not fully appreciated. Until recently—and I need only mention Heinrich Wölfflin here—the great centuries of European painting were divided into the early Renaissance, (in the sense of primitive art), High Renaissance, and Baroque, whereby the stylistic change from the Renaissance to the Baroque was usually regarded as the only serious problem, and the great, truly classical achievements were attributed almost exclusively to the latter two centuries, not to mention the fact that general stylistic developments, equally evident in the north and south, took precedence over the elaboration of national, ethnic, and racial differences. Today, the picture is changing in a decisive way; I would like to refer once again to the speech given by the Führer at the opening of the art exhibition in

the House of German Art in Munich, in which the eternity of folklore, through all historical conditions and changes, was proclaimed as the highest principle of our conception of art.

Today, despite all the stylistic similarities that exist in the north and south of Europe, we are beginning to see a uniform line of Nordic-Germanic painting that has essentially persisted throughout the centuries and was already in full force at the beginning of the 15th century. The century of the van Eyck brothers and Hugo van der Goes, Dirk Bouts, and Hans Memling is no longer an age of primitives for us, but rather the heroic age of Nordic-Germanic painting, and we believe that more perfect portraits in the sense of our art were hardly ever painted than at that time, which also applies to the depiction of interiors and the beginnings of landscape painting, both of which played such an outstanding role in the North from the very beginning.

From these basic lines, a new grouping of Nordic-Germanic painters emerges - right next to Jan van Eyck we see Hans Holbein the Younger, both equally great in the elemental force of their clearly structured, unyielding, unreservedly self-absorbed perception of reality, equally devoted to the eternal, irrefutable solidity of being, both also very similar in personal temperament, sensitivity, and preference for meticulous detail painting, which is nevertheless masterfully maintained and confidently carried through the entirety of the representational depiction. Alongside this line, which also includes Vermeer van Delft, there is a second line that differs from it in temperament, spiritual outlook, choice of colors, etc.: it places Matthias Grünewald side by side with Hugo van der Goes, Pieter Breughel, Jakob van Ruisdael, and Rembrandt, to name just a few of the greats. Today, we are particularly interested in the figure of the great peasant Breughel as the linchpin of Dutch painting in the 16th century, and his fundamental importance for the new national revival in the 17th century. But I can only give brief hints here.

The decisive factor is that all of this Nordic-Germanic painting stands in stark contrast to the Romanesque-Southern painting of the Italian Renaissance, regardless of the fundamental similarities that all Renaissance art shares with the medieval Christian way of life; it would also be an extremely fascinating topic in our circle to explore this contrast in all its ramifications on the basis of a wealth of characteristic pictorial material and to arrive at its most apt essential formulas. I will content myself here with a few hints - first of all, a distinction based on form and content is insufficient, in that Italian art is said to have formal power and German art to have richness of content. Although this is partly true and above all highlights the dangers threatening both sides, it does not hit the mark, because what is decisive is that, apart from the fact that form and content are always inseparable in art, the form itself is different in the north than in the south, and the world appears in both cases according to completely different laws. Even the dichotomy between being and becoming, as exemplified by Jan van Eyck and Holbein, is not exhaustive, however weighty it may be. The contrast between general typification on the one hand and individual characterization on the other brings us much closer to the heart of the matter. Ultimately, however, something else is decisive, namely the different position of man in the cosmos here and there: in all classical art, man as such takes center stage—the central motif of the Enlightenment—and, by virtue of the abstract, typical generality of his nature, the world is artistically transformed, schematized, typified, idealized, and, in this very specific sense, humanized. In contrast, Nordic-Germanic art is carried by the awareness of the immediate world significance of every thing and being in its irrevocable monadological uniqueness: everything stands sharply outlined in the light of its own nature and its own right, and yet is integrated in a strictly lawful manner into the connections of the natural whole of the world.

Classical art coordinates and isolates its objects in relation to one another and holds them together with artificial, abstract-idealistic, anthropological means of composition that are, as it were, brought in from

outside; German art, on the other hand, is more realistic, more truthful in a cosmic sense, and it is a communal art of great style, which reveals these communal connections from the simplest and most obvious relationships to the ultimate comprehensive totality in their overwhelmingly rich and strictly lawful articulation. It is precisely the lawfulness in which the world appears here that is different.

Here, as it were, the circle of our philosophical considerations closes when we consider that the so-called German logic is also at work everywhere in artistic creation and determines it from the depths as fate: that logic which I have called the logic of contradiction, of the unity of opposites, of infinite richness of relationships, of living force, of creative becoming, and of the natural totality of the world. Incidentally, this logic is also reflected in the use of color, since German painting has never been primarily determined by the principle of local color, but rather by that of the painterly, whereby it must be clear that painterly representation is not only present when all colors run into each other tangibly and perhaps no single color can be clearly identified, but already when all individual colors, however clearly and distinctly they may stand out, are uniformly coordinated from within and bound together tonally. Picturesque—and, incidentally, musical—in this broad and fundamental German sense means the socialist coexistence and interaction of all things and beings, their cosmic interweaving and interconnection according to the principle of community—without abolishing their fixed and unique contours, without collectivistic obliteration of their personality.

From this entire outline of the essence of Nordic-Germanic art, you may now note the following for a final understanding of National Socialism - the principle of community, the core of our worldview, is not exhausted for us within human life in the state, society, and history, but has a structural significance for the position of man in the world; it also has cosmic, metaphysical, and religious significance, because we National Socialists know that, in contrast to the total enlightenment emancipation of man, we are not only rooted in a series of obvious human communities and relationships, but also, in connection with this, in the ultimate and most comprehensive community, with the world and God. This is what the word means at its deepest level: National Socialism is, by its very nature, necessarily religious; it is also the teaching of a new faith. Community, thought through and lived to its conclusion, always leads directly to God; indeed, it is our path to the innermost center of divine being and essence.