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Commentary: Being a hawker is tough. Is it unfair to criticise their food online?

In leaving an online review for a hawker, diners should be aware of the power they wield over a struggling industry, says food writer Pamelia Chia.

Commentary: Being a hawker is tough. Is it unfair to criticise their food online?
FILE PHOTO: The hawker industry is widely understood to be hanging by a thread, sustained by long hours, gruelling labour and razor-thin profit margins. (Photo: Roslan Rahman / AFP)
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SINGAPORE: At a coffee shop in Toa Payoh, a yong tau foo stall is counting down its final days. Soon, the metal shutters will come down and the broth pots drained for the last time.

What should have been a quiet, bittersweet farewell for Hup Chong Yong Tau Foo, however, became a public skirmish over words. Stomp published a critical review of the stall, finding fault in the pricing, ingredients and portion sizes. The review prompted online backlash and the family who runs the business wrote on Facebook that they were “deeply hurt”.

Had the review been of a restaurant or cafe, it might have passed with little notice. Instead, it struck a nerve precisely because it involved a hawker-run business – and one that has been operating for decades.

In Singapore, hawkers are not just food vendors. They are custodians of an everyday culture that cuts across class and generations, formally recognised by UNESCO as intangible cultural heritage.

The hawker industry is also widely understood to be hanging by a thread, sustained by long hours, gruelling labour and razor-thin profit margins. So when a review lands with the force of a takedown, it no longer reads as merely ungenerous – to some, it may feel unethical. 

The debate sparked by the Stomp article raises uncomfortable but necessary questions: Are hawkers being shielded from scrutiny that applies to every other business? Or are Singaporeans so protective of hawkers that any form of criticism feels like betrayal? Should hawker food be fair game for negative reviews – and if so, under what principles?

 

THE HAWKER ENTREPRENEUR PARADOX

Last year, food vlogger Lucas Neo drew criticism for a TikTok series in which he “exposed” Michelin-rated hawker stalls, questioning whether the accolades were deserved. Neo has described his approach as a corrective to a review culture where “everything is good”.

“I wanted to post something more raw, but not at the expense of the hawker going out of business,” he said in an interview.

Amid a backdrop of rising living costs, that argument has force. If people are spending hard-earned money, why shouldn’t they want frank assessments? Why should hawker stalls be exempt from the critique that applies to restaurants?

Yet, treating hawkers as ordinary entrepreneurs sits uneasily with how Singaporean society regards hawker food.

In a 2012 interview, Ravi Menon, then managing director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, described hawker centres as offering “good quality meals at almost Third World prices”, a form of broad-based subsidy that benefits rich and poor alike. Hawkers are expected to function simultaneously as entrepreneurs and as providers of affordable social infrastructure, and those who keep prices low even as costs rise are celebrated. 

This contradiction matters. If hawkers function purely as businesses, like a typical restaurant, then criticism should be dispassionate and transactional. However, if they are also part of a shared cultural legacy, then critique carries a different weight.

This tension is keenly felt by those behind the stalls; after all, in such a fragile ecosystem, a negative review can feel less like constructive feedback and more like a hammer blow to an already weakened structure.

Reacting to Neo’s videos on Facebook, Jean Lim of Ah Hua Teochew Fishball Noodle captured the sentiment shared by many hawkers: “One careless post, one ‘honest review’ with our signboard shown, can easily crush the heart and effort we pour into this business… We hawkers don’t need pity. We just ask for fairness, respect and a little empathy.”

THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT

None of this is to argue that hawkers should be immune from criticism. Bad hawker food exists. Corners are sometimes cut. Accolades are sometimes undeserved.

Honest feedback can be valuable, especially as rising costs push prices upward and expectations follow. Even a 20-cent increase can feel “exorbitant” relative to the low prices Singaporeans have long associated with hawker food. Any price hike, however modest, naturally raises expectations for quality, portion size and consistency.

But the question is not whether criticism should be allowed. It is how it is exercised and through what channels.

If feedback is genuinely offered in the spirit of improvement, the most constructive place for it may be the hawker stall itself. As with restaurants, respectfully raising an issue in the moment gives hawkers the opportunity to explain or correct a lapse without the stigma of public shaming. A disappointing meal may simply be the product of a bad day, rushed service or circumstances invisible to the diner.

Public criticism, by contrast, is often less about resolution than record. A one-star Google review or viral negative reel fixes a fleeting experience into a lasting public record that may be disproportionate to the lapse itself.

To be clear, online reviews are not without value. For hawkers operating in a competitive environment, positive reviews on platforms such as Google Maps or social media can be crucial, helping new customers discover stalls and sustaining businesses that might otherwise struggle. In that sense, reviews can, and often do, serve a public good.

EXERCISING RESTRAINT

The problem arises when the same mechanisms that amplify praise are used to broadcast disappointment with little regard for consequence. More troubling still is the erosion of accountability in today’s media landscape.

Food criticism was once the domain of professional reviewers, who brought experience, expertise, editorial oversight and journalistic integrity to their work. Today, beyond traditional media, criticism circulates across online platforms that may publish content with minimal fact-checking or editorial review.

Social media has further collapsed the distance between private opinion and public scrutiny. Anyone can broadcast their opinion – instantly, permanently and often without context.

This does not mean lowering standards or insisting that “everything is good”. It means recognising that not every disappointment requires amplification. After all, a bowl of overcooked wonton mee or a lacklustre plate of nasi lemak is rarely catastrophic. Restraint here is not cowardly withdrawal from criticism, but an awareness of one’s power over an industry already under strain.

Holding one’s pen – or tongue – is a responsibility and, in the case of hawkers, one that should be wielded with grace.

Pamelia Chia is the author of the cookbooks Wet Market to Table and PlantAsia, and writer of the Singapore Noodles newsletter.

Source: CNA/el

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Hyflux trial resumes: A reminder of what led to the court case

How did the Hyflux executives land in court and what are they charged with?

Hyflux trial resumes: A reminder of what led to the court case

A photo of the Hyflux logo and a file photo of former Hyflux chief executive officer Olivia Lum Ooi Lin. (Photos: CNA/Jeremy Long, TODAY)

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SINGAPORE: The criminal trial of Hyflux founder and former chief executive Olivia Lum and other leaders of the company resumes on Jan 13 with more witnesses from the prosecution taking the stand.

The trial, scheduled to run until Feb 5, began last August, nearly three years after Lum and her former colleagues were charged with violations of the Securities and Futures Act.

In total, seven individuals were charged over Hyflux’s intentional failure to disclose information relating to the Tuaspring Integrated Water and Power Project, among other things.

Hyflux’s eventual collapse resulted in significant losses to investors. This includes about 34,000 investors holding perpetual securities and preference shares, who were owed a total of S$900 million, the prosecution said at the opening of the trial in August.

How did a company that was once Singapore’s leading example for homegrown businesses land itself in court? Here’s what you need to know.

ABOUT HYFLUX

Hyflux was once a celebrated water treatment company in Singapore, backed by its founder’s rags-to-riches story. In 1989, Lum left a career in pharmaceuticals and sold her car and apartment to start a business to help solve the world’s water problems.

Lum – an orphan who grew up in a small Malaysian town – built Hyflux from the ground up with its proprietary membrane technology that can treat water through reverse osmosis.

The company went public in early 2001, and secured its first municipal water treatment project in Singapore to supply and install the process equipment for the country’s first NEWater plant in Bedok that same year.

It also developed Singapore’s third NEWater plant in Seletar and the country’s first seawater treatment facility. Eventually, it expanded to projects in northern China, India, Algeria and Oman, even briefly garnering state investment from Temasek Holdings from 2003 to 2005.

At its peak in 2010, Hyflux’s market capitalisation hit S$2.1 billion. Revenue and net profit also hit record highs of S$569.7 million and S$88.5 million respectively.

This is when Hyflux embarked on its most ambitious project.

WHAT IS TUASPRING?

In 2010, PUB called a tender for Singapore’s second and largest desalination plant to be built at Tuas.

When the tender closed in October that year, PUB received nine bids. Hyflux’s submission was way below its competitors, such as S$0.67 per cubic metre from Keppel Seghers and S$1.42 per cubic metre from Sembcorp Utilities.

It was also markedly lower than the first-year price of water for SingSpring Desalination Plant at S$0.78 per cubic metre.

Five months after it submitted the bid, Hyflux was named preferred bidder for Tuaspring. It would be the company’s largest contract to date.

In April 2011, Hyflux signed a 25-year water purchase agreement with PUB. To fund the Tuaspring project, the company geared up for the issue of its perpetual preference shares with a 6 per cent annual dividend.

When construction of the plant concluded in 2013, Hyflux’s net profit had dropped to nearly half of that in 2010. Operating cash flow, which indicates how much cash is generated from business activities, had been negative since 2010.

And more challenges were ahead. In May 2014, Hyflux reported its first delay in connecting Tuaspring to the national grid. It only managed to do so in the second half of the following year, and began selling electricity to the grid by Feb 2016.

The company also cautioned in its 2016 annual report that “persistently low electricity prices due to an oversupply are expected to continue impacting near-term profitability”.

It remained aggressive in borrowing and issued 6 per cent perpetual securities in May 2016. Again, it saw red hot demand from retail investors and had to upsize the issue from S$300 million to S$500 million.

The fall in electricity prices continued to take a toll on Hyflux’s finances. The company reported earnings of S$4.8 million for the full year ended Dec 31, 2016 – a steep drop of 91 per cent from the previous year.

The company said weaker-than-expected electricity prices had “substantially wiped out” its profits. Excluding losses from the Tuaspring plant, full year earnings would have been S$118 million.

In line with its asset light strategy, it decided that it would be seeking partial divestment of Tuaspring.

But finding a buyer amid these issues proved difficult. In February 2018, Hyflux announced its first full-year loss since going public, with the integrated plant itself chalking up losses of S$81.9 million.

It also said that it would not be redeeming its S$400 million tranche of preference shares until the partial divestment of Tuaspring was completed.

Just months later, news broke that Hyflux was eyeing court protection to facilitate negotiations with creditors. The company then confirmed that it had applied to the Singapore High Court to commence a court-supervised debt restructuring and an extended six-month moratorium.

A day earlier, it had suspended trading in its SGX-listed shares and related securities. At its last trade price of S$0.21 a share, the company’s market value of S$165 million was a far cry from its 2010 peak.

The news came as a huge shock for tens of thousands of Hyflux retail investors.

The company’s debt moratorium was granted by the High Court on June 19, 2018, and almost one year later, its Tuaspring plant was taken over by PUB at no cost.

On Nov 16, 2020, Hyflux was placed under judicial management, and on July 21, 2021, the High Court approved Hyflux’s winding up.

The collapse resulted in significant losses to investors, the prosecution said at the opening of the trial in August. 

THE COURT CASE

The Tuaspring Project was pitched to the market as Hyflux's second and largest seawater desalination plant in Tuas. Investors were led to believe that Tuaspring Project was primarily a desalination project, with Hyflux's announcement in March 2011 giving the impression that the power plant was to be built to supply power to the desalination plant. 

But in reality, the financial viability of the Tuaspring Project depended entirely on the sale of electricity, said the prosecutors when the trial opened.

This meant that the Tuaspring Project exposed Hyflux to electricity market risks in what was a brand-new business for the company, said the prosecution.

These material facts were allegedly not disclosed to the investing public, and the omission was purportedly repeated when the offer information statement was released to raise funds from the public.

The prosecution is pursuing charges under the Securities and Futures Act linked to two key public statements by Hyflux that contained material non-disclosures: The March 2011 announcement, forming the basis of certain charges against all six Hyflux ex-leaders, and the April 2011 offer information statement, which forms the basis of certain charges against five of them.

Both documents allegedly failed to disclose that the Tuaspring Project was Hyflux's expansion into a new business of selling electricity.

The prosecution also contends that Hyflux did not tell investors that revenue from the sale of electricity from Tuaspring Project's power plant was projected to make up the significant majority of the project's revenue, and that the profitability of the project was contingent on revenue from the sale of electricity from the power plant.

Seven individuals were charged over Hyflux’s intentional failure to disclose information relating to the Tuaspring Integrated Water and Power Project, among other things.

One of the defendants, former independent director Rajsekar Kuppuswami Mitta, pleaded guilty to a charge of neglect in relation to an announcement by the company to the SGX. He was fined S$90,000 in August.

The fine was handed down to him by a district court after he pleaded guilty to a charge of neglect in relation to an announcement by the company to the SGX on March 7 that year.

The six other defendants are Lum, former chief financial officer Cho Wee Peng, as well as former Hyflux independent directors Teo Kiang Kok, Christopher Murugasu, Gay Chee Cheong and Lee Joo Hai.

They contested their charges, which is why they have been on trial since August.

Of the six, ex-CEO Lum faces the most charges, with the prosecution proceeding on two charges under the Securities and Futures Act: For making an offer of S$200 million worth of securities to the public with omissions about the electricity sales, and for consenting, as CEO, to Hyflux's intentional failure to notify the securities exchange about information relating to the electricity sales.

Another four charges are stood down or set aside while the trial goes ahead.

Cho is on trial for one charge – for conniving in his capacity as the chief financial officer for Hyflux to intentionally fail to notify the securities exchange about the information related to the electricity sales.

The remaining four former independent directors face two similar charges each: For the same omission of information in an April 2011 offer information statement, and for their alleged neglect as directors, such that Hyflux intentionally failed to notify the securities exchange about the electricity sales.

The trial is expected to continue with the prosecution’s case on Jan 13.

Source: CNA/hw

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