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By La Hora de Venezuela
The government of Nicolás Maduro insists that platforms such as WhatsApp are used for conspiracies and information leaks, while at the same time promoting the use of Chinese instant messaging applications such as WeChat. However, these accusations against the world’s most popular messaging app follow a pattern common to authoritarian regimes like Russia and China, which have fully or partially blocked WhatsApp in their territories. In these contexts—where citizen surveillance becomes state policy—end-to-end encryption is seen as an obstacle to controlling what citizens communicate.
Despite the Venezuelan government’s accusations against WhatsApp, the reality is that no state can directly access the content of communications protected by this type of encryption. Precisely for this reason, in authoritarian countries these platforms are attacked or blocked, while alternative surveillance methods are developed as part of a sophisticated, systematic, and in many cases illegal strategy.
Organizations such as IPYS Venezuela, VeSinFiltro, and Freedom House have documented how Nicolás Maduro has built a digital control apparatus that includes mass interception of calls, official applications that collect data without consent, constant monitoring of social media, and forced access to mobile devices.
This surveillance ecosystem not only compromises individual privacy but also fuels a climate of intimidation and self-censorship that severely undermines digital freedom in the country.
A Pattern of Censorship and Surveillance Imported from China and Russia
Nicolás Maduro did not suddenly come up with the idea that WhatsApp is bad for Venezuelans. The influence of Russia and China has played a key role in how the Venezuelan government has restructured its communication strategy to impose highly disinformative narratives, while blocking independent media and messaging platforms or social networks and deploying digital surveillance methods against citizens.
“Shared interests between Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the Venezuela of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro have driven an alliance that goes beyond economic, military, political, and social agreements. The dissemination of propaganda is a novel field of binational integration… In the digital sphere, the use of cyber troops (bots) in Venezuela has been evident in imposing trends favorable to Russian rhetoric. Likewise, in Russian media, references to Venezuela promote a favorable image of Nicolás Maduro’s regime,” states a report by Transparencia Venezuela.
Disdain for WhatsApp is also shared by authoritarian governments. Just days ago, Russia announced restrictions on calls made through messaging apps WhatsApp and Telegram, arguing that the measure is necessary to combat crime, as confirmed by state media.
“In order to combat criminals, measures are being taken to partially restrict calls on these foreign messaging applications,” reported the communications watchdog Roskomnadzor, cited by the RIA and TASS news agencies.
China, for its part, blocked WhatsApp many years ago. In 2017, the messaging app joined Instagram and Facebook among the blocked platforms as part of China’s internet control policy known as the “Great Firewall.” In fact, China has virtually no access to most globally relevant platforms. TikTok, Snapchat, Reddit, Pinterest, Tumblr, YouTube, Google services, and streaming platforms such as Netflix, Spotify, and Amazon Prime are all blocked.
China is not only an example for Venezuela in terms of blocking applications; its influence is also intertwined with mechanisms for imposing narratives, censorship, and citizen surveillance. In a report by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), researcher Iria Puyosa points to Beijing as an actor collaborating in the consolidation of power by authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments in Latin America through the provision of technologies that facilitate surveillance and repression.
The report highlights Venezuela’s Patria System platform as an example of population surveillance and control. This platform was developed by the Chinese telecommunications company ZTE and stores large amounts of data on Venezuelan citizens. But Chinese influence goes further. Chinese companies have installed video surveillance systems in public spaces in Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia, and have provided technologies to monitor internet users.
As early as 2019, a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace warned that Chinese technology companies such as Huawei were working directly with state authorities to export “authoritarian technology” to allied governments, with the aim of expanding their influence and promoting alternative governance models. A more recent report by Stanford University’s CDDRL confirms that these practices persist and details how this technology has been adopted by regimes seeking to strengthen control over information and citizens.
“A growing consensus points to China as a global driver of ‘authoritarian technology’… a subset of Chinese exports goes directly to countries such as Zimbabwe and Venezuela, which are serious human rights violators and would otherwise not be able to access such technology,” one of these reports states.
The Venezuelan government’s affinity with Chinese technology and the government in Beijing is not hidden. Recently, Nicolás Maduro showcased at a teachers’ event a new Huawei cellphone which, according to him, had been gifted by Chinese President Xi Jinping. The pro-government outlet’s post on X not only referenced the gift but also attacked WhatsApp.
“Chinese President Xi Jinping gifted Nicolás Maduro the latest Huawei phone to maintain permanent contact. Note: zero WhatsApp 😉 They’re crazy, we’re calm ✅ together we will win!” reads the tweet accompanying the video.
INSERT: https://x.com/ElCuartoRoj0/status/1956126979008139480
How Does the Maduro Government Spy?
In Venezuela, state espionage is not carried out directly through platforms like WhatsApp, but through other equally invasive means. These include:
1. Large-scale phone tapping
A report published in 2021 by Telefónica (parent company of Movistar Venezuela) confirmed the scale of state surveillance by the Venezuelan government. According to the report, more than 1.5 million phone lines were intercepted that year, equivalent to nearly 20% of all Movistar users in the country. These interceptions included call tapping, monitoring of SMS messages, geolocation of individuals through their mobile phones, and monitoring of internet traffic.
To grasp the magnitude of these figures, it is enough to look at the comparative analysis included in the report: Venezuela accounted for 81% of all legal interceptions reported by Telefónica across the 12 countries where it operates—far surpassing all other nations combined.
The Movistar Venezuela report also noted that authorities authorized to request communication interceptions included the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the CICPC, police forces empowered to conduct criminal investigations, and the National Experimental University of Security (UNES).
The fact that only Telefónica published a report detailing phone line interceptions does not mean that other operators, such as Digitel or Movilnet, are not subject to similar practices. The difference is that these companies have never disclosed such data. Even in Telefónica’s case, this information was reported only once, suggesting a widespread lack of transparency in the sector.
2. State applications used for control
Applications such as VenApp, developed under the Maduro government’s umbrella, collect personal and geolocation data. Although initially presented as a “Venezuelan social network” created by entrepreneurs, its true purpose has become clearer over time.
Originally designed to report failures in public services, VenApp was used after the July 28, 2024 elections to centralize reports on social protests and alleged “Fascist Guarimbas,” effectively serving as a tool for denouncing citizens critical of the government.
Under state control, this platform has become a tool for citizen monitoring.
3. Systematic monitoring of social media
Since the creation of the Strategic Center for the Security and Protection of the Homeland (CESPPA) in 2013 and the training of security forces—such as the National Guard—in the use of social networks for “early warnings,” digital monitoring has been institutionalized in Venezuela.
A clear example is the case of Nelson Piñero, a member of Encuentro Ciudadano, who was arrested on November 21, 2023, for posting critical comments about the government on X. He was charged with “incitement to hatred” after his posts were detected through “cyber-patrolling” by the Bolivarian Intelligence Service.
Following the 2024 presidential elections, a report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights denounced that officials carried out arbitrary searches of mobile phones to look for links to the opposition. In addition, citizens reported their neighbors through VenApp for expressing discontent on social media or WhatsApp groups, leading to operations known as Operación Tuntún. This strategy saturated Venezuela’s digital ecosystem with threats of arrest for posting content deemed “coup-plotting” or “violent” by the regime, employing doxxing, publishing personal information of the accused, and conducting live arrests of protesters to intimidate, persecute, and detain thousands of Venezuelans.
4. Use of fake cell towers (IMSI Catchers)
An investigation by Armando.info revealed the existence of at least 80 suspicious antennas in Venezuela, many of them located in strategic areas of Caracas, airports, and along the border with Colombia.
These devices, known as IMSI Catchers (or Stingrays/Triggerfish), impersonate mobile phone towers to intercept communications within a radius of up to one kilometer. They are portable, difficult to detect with the naked eye, and can be hidden in places as discreet as a car trunk or a closet.
Once activated, they can capture calls, read text messages, and track a phone’s exact location, exposing sensitive personal data.
5. Forced access to phones using forensic tools
Although this is not remote surveillance, tools such as Cellebrite represent another method through which authorities can access phone data. Cellebrite is a forensic analysis device that allows the full contents of a mobile phone to be copied, even if it is password-protected. However, it can only be used if security forces physically possess the device, usually after an arrest or seizure.
This tool exploits vulnerabilities in operating systems or weak passwords to unlock devices. Once inside, Cellebrite automatically extracts photos, call logs, location histories, stored Wi-Fi networks, and in many cases the contents of messaging apps or social networks.
Even so, the most frequent danger to citizens is not these forensic tools, but spyware applications installed without consent, often disguised as “parental control” or “personal security” software. These apps allow third parties to monitor calls, messages, location, and even activate a phone’s camera or microphone without the user noticing.
6. Arbitrary inspection of mobile phones
Although Venezuelan law protects the privacy of communications—meaning an officer cannot inspect a phone without a court order—and despite a joint resolution on checkpoints (2022) that allows procedures to be recorded and does not authorize forcing individuals to hand over their phones, and that in theory restricts SEBIN and the CICPC from installing random checkpoints and inspections—
In practice, after July 28, 2024, arbitrary phone inspections at checkpoints set up by security forces in different cities became frequent, triggering arbitrary detentions and serving as a source of extortion by police and military personnel.
Organizations such as Provea, Laboratorio de Paz and Freedom House warn of the intensification of phone checks as a “soft” repression mechanism. Victims report that officers force them to hand over their phones to review photos, social media, and chats.
For example, Provea reported that in August 2024, at a Bolivarian National Police checkpoint, a young man was removed from public transportation after officers inspected his phone and found posts critical of Maduro. He was detained for several hours without a court order.
It should be noted that both SEBIN and the CICPC have been identified by the UN and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as responsible for serious human rights violations, and their leadership is under investigation for crimes against humanity.
Sowing Fear as a Strategy of Censorship
Beyond technical or legal considerations, the Maduro government’s accusations against WhatsApp must be understood within a broader context of political control over information. In Venezuela, the free circulation of messages through channels not controlled by the state represents a direct threat to a government that bases part of its power on dominating the public narrative.
In this sense, spreading rumors and disinformation about alleged spying, leaked databases, or foreign conspiracies serves a strategic purpose: instilling fear and discouraging the use of a platform the government cannot continuously monitor.
But the campaign to discredit WhatsApp does not only seek to silence a free communication channel. It also prepares the ground to justify the creation of a national messaging application with similar functions but under government control, as has already happened in allied countries such as Russia (with its Gosuslugi platform) or China (with platforms like WeChat, which are heavily monitored). Maduro’s mention of a “secure, proprietary messaging system,” combined with experiences such as VenApp—which already enables location tracking and personal data cross-referencing—points clearly in that direction.
Beyond official rhetoric, the Maduro government’s actions do not appear aimed solely at protecting the population from alleged “foreign espionage,” but rather at centralizing digital communications through a system of state-controlled tools that would allow access to conversations, locations, social networks, and potential patterns of citizens’ social and political behavior.
It is a strategy that combines fear, defamation, propaganda, and technological substitution for surveillance purposes, and it represents a new front in the struggle for freedom of expression in Venezuela.
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