The Position of the Ukrainian Language in Ukraine

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

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A note about transcription:
There are a number of acceptable means of transcribing or transliterating Ukrainian words into Latin letters, each with certain problems. The system used is generally the British Library system with a few modifications: to distinguish the jotated [i] from the non-jotated [i], a 'y' is used to represent the jot (as in *Ukrayina*), and a 'y' also appears where there is an 'i kratkoe'. Otherwise, the soft vowels are spelled with an 'i' before the vowel letter, as in *ideia*. Soft consonants are designated with an apostrophe, and original apostrophes are preserved.

Additionally, the names of state organisations and academic bodies have been translated for clarity. Thus, the *Akademiia Nauk* is referred to as the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and the *Instytut Movoznavstva imeni O O Potebni* is referred to as the O O Potebnia Institute of Language Studies.

The transliterated version of Ukrainian which appears was chosen in place of Cyrillic to facilitate easier reading for those unfamiliar with Ukrainian, or the Ukrainian alphabet.

The Position of Ukrainian Language in Ukraine
Jennifer Pickurel Taylor, PhD Thesis

Before one even begins to discuss language in Ukraine, one basic premise must be understood: there are no easy answers. One may succeed best in identifying relevant, objective questions instead.

This research offers few solutions or predictions concerning the competition between Ukrainian and Russian languages in Ukraine, and the national consciousness of Ukrainians with relation to their language and world view. At this stage in Ukraine's development, it is more useful to bring all the disparate trends of government language planning policy, social trends and politics into one cohesive body of work for analysis.

Socio-linguistics provides an appropriate and objective methodological framework to discuss both the internal linguistic problems of the language and external social and political problems. This means the analytical viewpoints generally adopted by political science or theoretical linguistics may feature, but are not handled in any depth. Rather, the inter-relationship of language and society is examined in detail using a variety of reference points. These include education in Ukraine, Ukrainian media and the internal and external attempts to regulate the use and content of Ukrainian language.

This research is unique in that most of the material here presented has not appeared together in any language, nor separately in English. Furthermore, the approach is a departure from traditional methods of either linguistic or historical study, and does not reflect the political science framework adopted by contemporary scholars. It is thus an attempt to collect subjective diagnostic and corrective work on the language situation in Ukraine, to combine this research with statistical data and to present an objective analysis of the status of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and its prospects for the future.

Chapter 1: Language Planning and State Languages

Introduction:

Contemporary Ukraine is a heterogeneous language community. Its population uses several different languages which reflect ethnic, regional or political loyalties, or all three. Current government policy states that Ukrainian is the sole official language of Ukraine, but after centuries of foreign rule, not everyone speaks enough Ukrainian to use that language in every situation. In order to ensure the undisputed supremacy of Ukrainian language within the boundaries of the Ukrainian state, measures are in force to promote its usage and to discontinue the usage of competing languages in official situations. This policy and its processes can be referred to as language planning.

This work intends to investigate the status and usage of Ukrainian language in Ukraine, and evaluate the effectiveness of proposed and already enacted means of improving the perception of Ukrainian and its feasibility for usage in every function necessary in daily life. In Ukraine, despite statistics and studies which show the that number of speakers of Ukrainian has increased, and other indicators of linguistic stability or improvement, many if not most native speakers remain pessimistic, convinced of the impending demise of their mother tongue.

Is the situation as bad as one is led to believe? Is Ukraine totally Russified, the Ukrainian language relegated to archaic textbooks and the conversation of ageing dissidents? Is there a political consequence of the demise of Ukrainian that means regional identities will become separatist tendencies, creating a domino effect that brings down the entire country? As the numbers will show, those quick to leap to the defence of political

demands made by ethnic Russians, or to support Ukrainians themselves who believe their language is on the verge of extinction, may in fact wish to rethink their position. Though the position of Ukrainian language in Ukraine is far from established as comfortably as English in Britain or French in France, with Ukrainian independence a political fact and the continued presence of international support, one can hardly describe the situation as critical, grim or precarious. As Magocsi asserts,

> Urbanization, moreover, did not lead, as many Soviet and Western social scientists predicted, to national assimilation. It turned out that the multicultural urban environment was more likely to produce a sharpening than a lessening of ethnocultural awareness. Thus in the same period when Soviet Ukraine's population grew more urban, the number of persons claiming Ukrainian as their mother tongue continued to increase, from 30 million in 1959 to 37.4 million in 1989. It is also true that among persons who declared Ukrainian to be their nationality, there was a slight decrease in the percentage who claimed Ukrainian as their mother tongue (from 94 to 88 percent between 1959 and 1989). But such trends did not necessarily mean that either the Ukrainian language or he Ukrainian identity was seriously threatened, as the dire predictions of dissident writers and Ukrainian commentators in the West were suggesting.[1]

Magocsi's assertion that the Ukrainian nation remains unassimilated and Ukrainian-speaking is demonstrated in recent population statistics and borne out by research. The important question addressed by this work is not, therefore, exactly how bad the situation is. One must ask instead, where are the language planning successes, how do they affect Ukrainian society, and what remains to be done?

The approach taken is therefore a sociolinguistic one, in as much that this research examines language behaviour and attitudes as an indicator and a reflection of social behaviour in general. Changes in one cause or reflect changes in the other, and mark Ukraine's progress towards a more established national identity on the world stage. While

[1] Magocsi, (1996), p. 664.

one cannot discuss language or society without some mention of linguistics or politics, the emphasis in this research is on the connections between these areas and state-building, all within the framework of language planning. For this reason, neither issues pertaining to political science nor theoretical linguistics are covered in depth.

The results of the investigation presented here were obtained both by a survey of available sources on the region and field work conducted in Kyiv. Emphasis is placed on interviews and observations, as the question concerns a subjective area--speaker attitudes--and answers are less readily discernible from statistics or demographic surveys alone[2]. Materials include relevant articles from recent journals and newspapers, ensuring older material from textbooks is adequately supplemented. Where disagreements occur in source materials, both opinions are offered for consideration. Although ample subjective material exists, especially in Ukrainian, no work was discovered which addressed these topics in English, nor which examined the inter-relationship of language and culture in a developing country in a non-political light. This work therefore combines the most recent available materials on the subject with a different approach in an attempt to introduce new information and research not previously brought together.

One might ask, why Ukraine? It is possible to cite several reasons, both objective and subjective. First, any case in which a new state attempts to establish itself outside the influence of its former conqueror merits study. Language competition and language promotion can be expected, which presents an opportunity to study these phenomena in a

[2] The author would like to note that the interviews, conducted as part of field work in summer 1996 and autumn 1997, were conducted mostly in Ukrainian. Those interviewed

contemporary setting. Lessons learned from Ukraine may later be applied to the situation in Southern United States, where Spanish is gaining popularity as a second language, or in French-speaking areas of Canada.

For those interested in the former Soviet Union, Ukraine, as one of the largest successor states, represents all that is contradictory in these countries. Communist and pre-communist history complicate already fraught ethnic and religious differences in this region. The desire to be perceived as European motivates Ukraine and other states to cast Russia as 'Asia', something foreign and undesirable, but at the same time the closeness of the two cultures and languages, and the presence of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine prevents Russia from becoming entirely 'other'.

Strategically and economically, Ukraine matters on the world stage. It is the fifth largest European country by population and the largest by area. Even with the decay of Ukrainian (ex-Soviet) industry and industrial structures which remain, the country has rich natural resources and agricultural potential. The population is literate and educated, with internationally reputed scholars and other theorists. Furthermore, Ukraine straddles an important geo-political line between the West and Russia, so that any future relations with Russia will likely also include Ukraine. Just as Ukraine compares itself with Russia, so too Russia must re-shape itself without a significant portion of its industry, resources and human capital.

Ukraine's relations with Russia have a long history of tension and conflict, stretching back before the Soviet era, through the time of the Russian empire and beyond. Because of this frailty, as with other former Soviet republics, Ukraine cannot attempt reforms too quickly. There is no

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formally are listed in the bibliography.

reliable infrastructure, politically, industrially or financially to support a fully democratic state with a free market. For this reason, the situation in Ukraine may appear bleak and unpromising, in language politics as in other areas. Rapid and revolutionary changes cannot help but create 'chaos and instability' in Ukraine, and one can only hope for prudence in the government and in the West when contemplating the nature and pace of reform.[3]

That said, history has shown one can never bet against Ukraine. Despite years of hegemony by its neighbours and partitions, Ukraine is now one unified state. Despite ethnic, political and linguistic tension this state has survived nearly seven years at the time of writing. Additionally, this state has ratified an admirably tolerant constitution, and maintains a good record on human rights. Though the economy is bad, it is improving slowly, and while Russia will not allow itself to be lightly dismissed, Ukraine has begun to forge healthy relationships with Western states. As one of many problems, language competition and the low status and relative usage of Ukrainian language remains on the agenda of matters to address, though in comparison with pressing economic and political issues language may seem less of a priority. One must not assume, however, that the slow pace and relative lack of emphasis on linguistic issues spell failure for language planning in Ukraine. On the contrary, as other more urgent problems are addressed and remedied, such as the poor economy, and as time allows the fostering of Ukrainian national identity, the slow pace of language planning and its non-radical nature may prevent discontent and indeed ensure a smooth, peaceful transition to the

[3] A summary of relevant demographic and geographic information on Ukraine can be found in Motyl, A., *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism*,New York,

exclusive usage of Ukrainian as state language within Ukraine.

The propaganda version of Slavic history presenting Ukraine as one-third of an East Slavic family tree, with Russia and Belarus' representing the other two branches, combined with geographic, religious, cultural and linguistic similarity have served to maintain a national inferiority complex which is now beginning to improve. To forge a national identity that ethnic Ukrainians and all Ukraine's minorities will accept requires political loyalty, and to a certain extent, linguistic loyalty to the Ukrainian independent state. The relevant legislation in support of Ukrainian is in place; it remains to see what the government and the general public do about enforcing it.

At what stage is Ukraine, demographically and linguistically at time of writing? Sources containing this information show that a clear majority of ethnic Ukrainians exists in every region except Crimea, which has been granted special autonomous status for this reason. Ukrainian speakers (those who are able to speak Ukrainian, not native speakers) also constitute a majority in every region but Crimea, though much of the population is bilingual. Usage of Ukrainian has increased since independence in all areas except arguably the media.[4]

Russian speakers of both Russian and Ukrainian ethnic background, and minorities who communicate in Russian represent groups which may be targeted by language planners, though many who do speak Ukrainian could also benefit from planning to improve the quality of their knowledge. One must not assume that language and political or national loyalty are unavoidably interconnected. After all, Ukrainian

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Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. xi-xv;1-3.
[4] Kuzio, (1997), p. 339.

independence was ratified by Russians in Ukraine and Russian-speaking Ukrainians as well as ethnic Ukrainians who speak the state language.

Data from the 1989 census shows language usage as follows[5]:

Nationality	language of nationality (%)	language of other nationality (%)
Ukrainian	87.8 (Ukrainian)	12.2 (Russian)
Russian	98.4 (Russian)	1.6 (Ukrainian)
Jews	7.1	2.1 (Ukrainian), 90.6 (Russian)
Belarusian	35.4	9.3 (Ukrainian), 55.2 (Russian)
Bulgarian	69.5	6.1 (U), 15.5 (R)
Pole	12.5	66.6 (U), 20.3 (R)
Hungarian	95.6	26 (U), 1.6 (R)
Romanian	62.3	9.8 (U), 3.4 (R)
Greek	18.5	2.3 (U), 78.9 (R)
Tatar	49.0	2.9 (U), 47.5 (R)
Gypsy	58.6	12.3 (U), 10.3 (R)
Crimean Tatar	92.3	.2 (U), 4.0 (R)
German	23.2	9.2 (U), 67.2 (R)
Azerbaijanis	72.4	2.6 (U), 24.4 (R)
Gagauz	79.5	1.4 (U), 17.1 (R)[6]

A change in attitude is required if language planning is to succeed in Ukraine in support of the Ukrainian language. Both ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians residing in Ukraine must learn to think of these Russians as a national minority, similar in status to Poles, Jews or Tatars. This shift in thinking will allow citizens of Ukraine to support the state language, while speaking the language of their choice at home, or allowing their children to be educated in their national language up to university level.

The Ukrainian government has made this transition as easy as it could possibly be, due to Ukraine's liberal minorities policy and favourable human rights record. Russian children may choose to attend Russian schools, and in Crimea all Russians have the right to use Russian as an official language since they are compactly settled. The October 1989

[5] Minorities other than Russians represent 4.6% of the population.
[6] Chart taken from Shamsur, but figures have been widely quoted and used in other

Language Law did not intend to force a sudden transition to full usage of Ukrainian and a total rejection of Russian; rather policymakers envisioned a slow and evolutionary process over five or ten years for this to occur.[7]

Ukraine's record shows tolerance for Russians and other national minorities in a number of ways, including tolerance for languages other than Ukrainian (while promoting use of the state language among these peoples). First, everyone residing in Ukraine was granted citizenship regardless of ethnicity when the state became independent. The government supports resident minorities by maintaining good relations with neighbours including Hungary and Poland, and by allowing for cultural developments previously suppressed under Soviet rule.[8] Kuzio asserts that affirmative action in Ukraine can only be expected, and should not be seen as discrimination against Russian and other minorities (indeed, special status for Russian would discriminate against the other minorities in Ukraine), but rather as an attempt to undo the damage of years of foreign rule and promote Ukrainian as the state language.[9]

Ukraine as the object of language planning attempts could be seen as fertile ground upon which such suggestions could fall. The population is highly literate and educated. Most households own at least some means of receiving Ukrainian language media. Furthermore, there is a great deal of pride in Ukrainian independence, a strong sense of connection with Ukraine's past and a developing sense of national identity. Already the majority of the population uses Ukrainian at home, while almost all of the population at least understands the state language. This means that the

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sources such as Arel, Kuzio, and Solchanyk.
[7] Deychakiwsky, (1994), p. 374.
[8] Deychakiwsky, (1994), p. 377.
[9] Kuzio, (1997), pp. 337-38.

population of Ukraine is equipped to receive language planning messages via the education system and the media, the two most convenient means of social support for government policy. Furthermore, the people living in Ukraine for the most part need only improve their knowledge of Ukrainian, and do not need to acquire an entirely foreign language. A survey conducted in 1995 shows this information numerically[10]:

Homes have:	
Radio	60%
Radiotochka	66%
Television	90%
Satellite or cable television	7%
VCR	5%

Education level	**All**	**Urban**	**Rural**
none/informal	10	9	13
primary	28	26	33
secondary	50	51	48
graduate	10	13	6*

*in percentages

Home Language	**All**	**Urban**	**Rural**
Ukrainian	55	41	81
Russian	43	57	17
Other	1	1	2*
Spoken or understood:			
Ukrainian	84	79	94
Russian	88	93	80
English	8	11	3
German	6	5	7
Polish	4	5	4
French	1	1	1
Other	5	5	5*

*in percentages

[10] Statistics from BBC survey taken in March and April 1995. Copyright 1996, BBC International Broadcasting Audience Research.

Previous studies of Ukraine, especially of the relationship between Russia or the West and Ukraine on any level, whether political or social, tend to fit into one of three categories. Many Western observers are Ukrainian by origin, (usually referred to as Ukrainians in diaspora or simply diaspora Ukrainians), whose opinions, while obviously valid, must necessarily be affected by their lineage. Some of the more extreme views presented are in fact espoused by diaspora Ukrainian scholars. The second category, most usually witnessed in political science but found in nearly every discipline is an inclination by other Western scholars to favour Russia, sometimes only by predicting the imminent collapse of the Ukrainian state or its eventual assimilation, linguistic or otherwise, back into a union with its 'Big Brother'. Within Ukraine itself, one finds a third viewpoint, from Ukrainians themselves who are also less objective as participants in, rather than observers of the process of change in Ukraine. Of course these opinions vary enormously across the spectrum, from the Pragmatists to the Neo-Romanticists, as discussed in Chapter Three. Most Ukrainian scholars, whether Russian or Ukrainian by ethnicity share a pessimistic outlook which is not necessarily supported by recent numerical data. This research, then, attempts to bring together a variety of opinions and assessments, many of which are not previously discussed in English, and conduct a comparison of disparate voices to analyse and attempt to make sense of the language picture in Ukraine.

An examination of language and language planning requires an attitude something like that of an art critic. One begins by taking in the gallery as a whole, attaining a sense of atmosphere and the overall mood. Progressing to the painting itself, one stands back--what is the overall

impression? Is the artist a master, or an apprentice who shows great talent? Closer examination, from a closer range, reveals both faults and praiseworthy traits: despite vivid colours and a clarity of theme, our artist may have lacked technique in his brush strokes, or proved incapable of transmitting the grandeur of his original vision to the canvas. The art critic and the linguist share the task of performing a multi-layered critique of external and internal factors to produce a final review. And as with the art world, one may hope this final analysis is not negative, although one can be sure it will be mixed.

Chapter Outline:

The remainder of Chapter One serves as an introduction to the concept of language planning, and includes several case studies from various areas in an attempt to give the broadest and most complete possible understanding to the reader of what can be accomplished by language planning and what kinds of behaviours are involved. Further details are presented on page 19; using the Cooper rubric to compare various cases. This rubric serves as a skeleton for analysis, revealing the basic elements of any situation where language planning has been used or is in the process of implementation.

Chapter Two focuses on Ukraine, including Soviet Language Planning and the policy of Russification, and describes the nature of the society which allowed the form of language control that occurred under Soviet rule. More examples are given before concentrating on Ukraine, its linguistic history, and the measures which have led up to the current situation. The remainder of this chapter portrays Ukraine as one would find

it today: language policy, the emerging trends, their cultural consequence, concerns of language experts and areas for linguistic work. Observations based on field work in Ukraine appear together with the observations and prognoses of native Ukrainian professionals in the language field, as well as their goals for their language. To balance the subjective viewpoint, recent laws detailing policy aims, which may or may not be reflected in the behaviour of the general public, are given to show the government perspective on language in Ukraine.

Chapter Three adopts a more political viewpoint to address language planning and its relation to nation-building in post-Soviet Ukraine. This includes ideas about ethnicity, the history of the Ukrainian state and the importance of language in national identity. A survey of works on the subject will demonstrate that this topic is a highly emotional one, eliciting both provocative challenges to the Soviet picture of the Slavic legacy and some rather far-fetched 'delusions of grandeur'. Sources of policy close to the government are classified according to their approach to language planning and their attitudes towards enforcing language policy.

Chapter Four opens a new section, in which specific areas will be studied to show the particulars of planning where it applies to specific fields. First, education in both Russian and Ukrainian will be examined, in an attempt to see if progress has been made in this 'socialiser par excellence' to increase the use of Ukrainian in both Russian and Ukrainian schools. Areas of particular concern include schooling in multi-lingual areas of Ukraine and teacher training (a more far-sighted policy indicator than changes in curriculum itself). The teaching of Ukrainian as a subject

(history, literature and language) in otherwise Russian-language schools, the use of Ukrainian as a medium of instruction and problems faced by reformers in the field of education are all examined.

Chapter Five continues along this vein, examining the media for similar trends. Television, radio, and newspaper/journal publishing are profiled. Data from an interview with a media company in Kyiv are included to provide a useful subjective perspective from local experts. The overall question must be answered: what problems do Ukrainian media face in the struggle to compete with *in situ* Russian-language media?

Chapter Six will pick up on an earlier thread—terminology, lexical development and slang. The development of new terms--from old, discarded Ukrainian terms purged by the Soviets, from international vocabulary--reveals a debate on acceptable sources for enrichment of the language. Trends away from anything resembling Russian to a reluctant acceptance of a less-than-perfect word which is already in wide usage, along with data about new Ukrainian slang show in more detail the progress of Ukrainian from a Romanticised literary language to a more popularised, useful conversational tool. Other issues affecting a changing language are also profiled, including controversies over spelling of several contentious phonemes as well as syntactic, lexical and morphological elements. Furthermore, the cultural weight of importing terms from languages which do not have taboos against the concepts they express, and the motives for making changes in the language against perceived Russification will be treated, as such attitudes express important self-perception and perceptions about Ukrainians' security as a nation and a culture. This section shows most clearly the image of Ukrainian language

as a work in progress, an entity which recreates itself every time an individual speaker opens his or her mouth and has to make a host of decisions about what kind of Ukrainian will come out.

The concluding chapter will then tie together these threads and present a cohesive picture of Ukrainian society, regionally divided, linguistically disparate--with a prediction for the future. The effectiveness of policies designed to influence language behaviour will be addressed, and suggestions for further language planning will be promulgated. One must then end with a survey of the implications of language planning, the potential effects of interference (culturally and in relations with Russia and the West) to formulate what amounts to a checklist of trouble spots for Ukraine, both those dealt with and those which remain.

What is Language planning and what does it do?

To place Ukrainian attempts at programming language behaviour, the generalities of language planning should first be explained. It should be remembered that language planning, while it includes political, historical, and psychological elements, is a social process which seeks to influence one particular social behaviour, that of language choice, knowledge, and usage.

Haugen's early definition of language planning included four steps: selection of code, standardisation, implementation, and elaboration.[11] Other researchers expand this basic framework to focus on a particular aspect of planning. In what seems to be one of the more complete definitions encountered, Cooper defines language planning as 'deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with respect to the

acquisition, structure, or functional allocation of their language codes.'[12] This encompasses several important issues relevant to language planning as an area of policy.

First, several questions must be answered. Who is attempting to influence language policy? Who is the target of this influence, and for what ends? The motive of language planners is particularly noteworthy as often linguistic means are used to accomplish other, non-linguistic objectives, such as political hegemony or modernisation. Next, one must outline the ways this action is implemented, such as via education or an official government policy. This allows for a basic framework of analysis which defines all the key players and their respective agendas.

Language planning can be further broken down to flesh out the basic outline established above. Status planning implies a change in the attitude and probably usage of a language by a given population, such as raising the number of speakers or attempting to discourage the usage of a language by referring to it as a dialect. Corpus planning involves changes to the basic structure of the language itself. This type of planning may have several functions, such as purification, revival of an archaic language, reform, standardisation, or lexical modernisation.[13] Acquisition planning affects the number of speakers and the scope of a language. Naturally, these policies may influence each other, and could be expected to occur interdependently.

Cooper's rubric of important questions provides a useful checklist of elements:

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[11] Haugen, quoted in Cobarrubias, Fishman, eds. (1983), p. 34.
[12] Cooper, (1989), pp. 30-1. Cooper compiles a list of twelve definitions which appear in other works on the subject and seeks to include all the relevant elements in his final definition.

An accounting scheme for the study of Language planning:

I. what actors (e.g. formal elites, influentials,)
II attempt to influence what behaviours
  A. structural (linguistic) properties of planned behaviour
  B. purposes/functions for which planned behaviour is to be used
  C. desired level of adoption (awareness, proficiency, usage)
  D. Incentives of target to reject planned behaviour
III of which people
  A. type of target (individuals, organisation)
  B. opportunity of target to learn planned behaviour
  C. incentives of target to learn/use planned behaviour.
  D. incentives of target to reject planned behaviour
IV for what ends?
  A. overt (language-related behaviour)
  B. latent (non-language related behaviours,)
V under what conditions?
  A situational (events, transient conditions)
  B. structural
    1. political
    2. economic
    3. social/demographic/ecological
  C. cultural
    1. regime norms
    2. cultural norms
  D. environmental (influences from outside system)
  E. informational (data required for a good decision)
VI by what means?
  A. authority
  B. force
  C. promotion
  D. persuasion
VII through what decision-making process
  A formulation of problem/goal
  B formulation of means
VIII with what effect?[14]

Still other questions arise as a result. A change in status or expanding the scope of a language implies both a starting place and a goal. Here previous work presents the problem of terminology, with perhaps too many options available. Kloss outlines one way of classifying languages:

- only official language
- joint national language
- regional official language

[13] Nahir, quoted in Eastman, (1983), p. 43
[14] Cooper, (1989) p. 98. This chart is adapted from the basic outline given by Cooper as a framework of analysis.

- promoted language
- tolerated language
- proscribed language[15]

These categories reflect the official stance towards the language. The level of development of the language itself must be considered, for which Kloss creates an additional rubric. Using the criteria of origin with respect to speech community, developmental status, juridical status, and ratio of users to general population, Kloss subdivides languages into the following types:

- modern mature standard, characterised by up-to-date terms, which can be used for university-level instruction
- a small group standard, which displays limited interaction
- an archaic standard, which flourished before the development of modern technology
- a young standard, recently standardised for a purpose
- non-standardised language
- pre-literate language

Stewart suggests several other means of classification for languages. First, in a multilingual society, each language may fit into a particular category. He uses criteria such as the degree of standardisation, the degree of autonomy, the presence of a language tradition, and the vitality to label languages as standard, Creole, classical, or artificial. He suggests that the function of a language may help to further categorise it, listing the possible usages as official, provincial, wider communication (LWC), international, capital city, troupe, educational, school subject, literary, or religious.[16]

Besides the language itself, the status of the speech community, and the status of the group attempting to enforce language change should

[15] Kloss, quoted in Eastman, (1983), pp. 44-5. These categories fall under what he refers to as the juridical status of a language.

be taken into account. Those in a position to influence language policy have several options, ranging from a negative approach which seeks to wipe out or neglect a language, to a benevolent one that hopes to preserve or expand the language.[17] For much of Ukraine's history, linguistic change came from an outside source which was not always friendly towards the language, in contrast to the attitude of many in present Ukraine who would like to preserve, promote, and expand the usage of Ukrainian language in Ukraine.

For the purposes of this research, the preferred term for the current status of Ukrainian language will be official language, one which is endorsed by government policy, for use inside the boundaries of that government's jurisdiction. This avoids the ambiguity which can occur using state language, defined as that language which is spoken by a political entity, which ignores the possibility of multilingualism; or by choosing national language, the means of communication for an ethnic group, which discounts Ukrainian nationals or ethnic Ukrainians who may be bilingual, or speak only Russian fluently.

Diglossia or Multilingualism?

This distinction in terms addresses another topic for consideration when examining the position of Ukrainian, especially compared to the position of Russian in Ukraine. Diglossia refers to a scenario where "two varieties of a language exist side by side throughout the community, with each having a definite role to play"[18]; multilingualism, in contrast, is understood as the co-existence, in whatever pattern, of two languages in a speech community. Which term more accurately defines the language

[16] Stewart, quoted in Eastman, (1983), pp. 44-7.
[17] Lewis, (1983), p. 314.

situation in Ukraine? This may seem obvious, as Ukrainian and Russian are generally held to be distinct languages, but several factors must be considered. The example presented by Greek illustrates what may be a possibility for Ukrainian. In Greek, written and formal communication were carried out in the *katharevousa,* which is a distinct variety of the language, and differs from the less formal *demotic*, used for other purposes.[19] Diglossia could exist between written and spoken Ukrainian, encouraged by the influence of regional dialects, Russification, the incorporation of Galicia, or the influx of international vocabulary. However, it may be that diglossia does exist between Russian and Ukrainian.

Ferguson describes diglossia in terms of the relationship between a low variety of a language, which could be less standardised than the high variety. He makes the point that in the low variety, choosing which dialect to use as the standard is often a problem. Diglossia is usually characterised by a functional specialisation between the two varieties, so that either one or the other is felt to be appropriate, not both. The high variety has more prestige in the minds of speakers, which affects the choice of occasion. The high usually has a literary heritage, while the low may not, and the low variety may be either less standardised or standardised more recently. Speakers learn the low variety orally at home, and have to be taught to use the high variety. Usually the situation is stable, but there may be some borrowing from the high into the low. Grammatically, the high usually has structures the low lacks. In the lexicon, since there is specialisation, each has words the other does not need, but phonetically, some sharing may occur as speakers will have

[18] Ferguson, (1959), p. 325.
[19] Browning, (1969), pp. 103-33.

command of all the phonemes which are required to pronounce both the low and the high varieties. [20]

This distinction between high and low varieties is different from the opposition of standard language to a dialect in that there are generally no regular users of the high variety for all occasions, and diglossia is not limited by geography or social status. [21]

Diglossia is likely to appear when the high and low are closely related languages, especially if the low version does not have its own literature, and with the passage of time. This situation creates problems when literacy becomes more widespread, or there is wider communication, so that the speakers of the low variety want a unique literature and more autonomy.[22] When this happens, usually those promoting the high version will cite its beauty or perfection, and its appropriateness for certain functions, while advocates of the low variety will insist it is closer to the people and more effective for communication.[23]

Another possible label for the language situation of Ukraine is multi- or bilingualism. This term incorporates diglossia as one form of bilingualism, but also includes as potential pairings: oral vs. literary language, elitist vs. mass, and vehicular (communication) vs. cultural (literary or religious).[24] Bilingualism may be temporal in nature, such as when a child learns his ethnic language at home and acquires a new language in school, or a worker or student who uses one language at home, and another with his peers for communication.[25] Often, the use of

[20] Ferguson, (1959), pp. 327-336.
[21] Ferguson, (1959), pp. 336-7.
[22] Ferguson, (1959), , p. 338.
[23] Ferguson, (1959),, pp. 338-9.
[24] Haarman, (1985), pp. 318-9.
[25] Haarman, (1985), p. 328.

another kind of bilingualism, ethnic language paired with an administrative language, hides a discrepancy in status or power. This could occur where some segments of the population are mono-lingual and others speak two or more languages. Closer examination shows that the monolinguals are part of the language group which may enjoy dominance, so that other groups must learn their language to function in society. This type of bilingualism occurs in France (such as Bretons who must also speak French) and Finland (mono-lingual Finns and bi-lingual Swedes), and also occurs in many parts of the Former Soviet Union. [26]

Such situations are often quite complicated. Language and ethnic identity may pose a problem for those who operate with two languages, as Anderson notes:

> If the linguistic factor is *usually* important for most ethnic groups, it is not *always* important, much less the *only* component of ethnic identity. The variable significance of language, religion, and diverse customs as components of ethnicity can be very complex.[27]

If the language is felt to be essential in defining ethnicity for a group, [28] then loss or decline in usage will be seen as an erosion of identity, or as an indication that assimilation into the majority is taking place.[29] The other option for many functioning in societies such as those previously mentioned is accommodation: those not in power or not members of the majority can learn the language and become bilingual in order to function successfully. In order to prevent accommodation from progressing into assimilation, the minority or otherwise threatened group must have a solid sense of awareness of its identity. More importantly perhaps, some work suggests, the languages must not share the workload

[26] Haarman, (1985), p. 313, p. 324.
[27] Anderson, (1979), p. 67.
[28] Anderson, (1979), p. 68.

equally; that is, there must be functional differentiation.[30]

Ukrainians usually react to such suggestions with hostility. Though one can make a case for considering Ukrainian, or Belarusian, as a dialect of Russian encouraged to develop by nationalists, the key criteria for such an assertion are absent. Ukrainians themselves do not consider their language a Russian dialect, any more than they consider themselves Russian. Although much of the justification for such a division is rooted in Romantic ideas, it is justified by Ukrainians with a separate historical myth, territorial claims, differing customs, and most importantly, a developed national identity as something 'non-Russian'. In time, this may lead to a more positive formulation of what 'Ukrainian' means apart from comparisions with Russia. Most importantly, Ukrainians consider themselves a distinct nationality, and this self-awareness and consciousness alone is enough to merit classification as a separate entity.

The question of bilingualism and diglossia must be further explored in the field. What is the division of labour between Russian and Ukrainian, and has this changed significantly since 1991? What functions does each language fulfill? How does a speaker who can use either language choose, and what influences this choice? From these questions, an insight into the status of Ukrainian may be gained.

If ethnic identity can depend on one's native language, the next question must be how to define one's mother tongue. Furthermore, is it possible to have two equally native languages, and what does this mean?

Skuntabb-Kangas uses data from the Finnish language community where there is widespread bilingualism among Finnish Swedes. One can

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[29] Anderson, (1979), p.78.
[30] Skuntabb-Kangas, (1981), p. 30.

define a native language by several criteria, each related to a particular discipline, and then use this information to describe what would make a speaker bilingual according to each.

Discipline	Criterion	Definition
Sociology	origin	the language learnt first
Linguistics	competence	the language best known
Sociolinguistics	function	the language most often used
Social Psychology/ Sociology	attitudes	the language others identify one as a native speaker of[31]

If these criteria define a native speaker, then it is likewise possible to describe what characteristics would make some one bi-lingual. For example, by origin, a bi-lingual would have learnt two languages from an early age, and used these languages in communication from the beginning. By function, some one could be called bi-lingual who had near or complete mastery of two languages, or near-native control of both languages. Possibly, a bi-lingual can use either of two languages according to personal desire and the demands of the community, or according to what is felt to be appropriate in each situation. Another possibility is that one is a bilingual if others identify a speaker equally with two ethnic groups. Finally, a bi-lingual may be some one who identifies personally with both ethnic groups.[32]

Again, the situation in Ukraine must be analysed with the goal of describing the language situation in terms of bilingualism or diglossia, and

[31] Skuntabb-Kangas, (1981), p. 18
[32] Skuntabb-Kangas, (1981), p. 91.

discovering what prompts speakers to use either language. An analysis of the motives for using Russian or Ukrainian, and the functional load of each, will allow some conclusions to be drawn about the relative status of both languages in Ukraine. It will also indicate how successful promotion of Ukrainian language, and language planning attempts, have been. In order to understand what the main characteristics of language planning in Ukraine, it may be helpful to examine various aspects of similar attempts in other countries, both within and outside of the former Soviet Union.

Language planning cases occur in many languages under a variety of circumstances. Since the working definition of Ukrainian allows that this language is a literary language in a relatively standardised form, one need not dwell on the selection of an appropriate code (though lexicon is still an issue, as later chapters will show). In Ukraine, the main issues concern the later stages of planning: diagnosing the current level of usage and proficiency, identifying problems, devising a policy designed to solve these weaknesses, and implementing the plan. As is the case in many areas, the question of language is not only linguistic, but social, political, ethnic, and national as well. Those seeking to implement language planning in Ukraine have not only corpus and status changes in mind, but extra-linguistic goals of ethnic self-determination, political independence, social unity, and nationalism. Other societies have been in similar positions before, and have also used language planning to try to meet their linguistic and non-linguistic goals.

One case where a nation found itself in a position similar to that of Ukraine is the Welsh. In the early 1970s, the language seemed to be in a near-irreversible state of decline, in spite of attempts to maintain it among

the Welsh--though not out of lack of interest. However, earlier policies had dictated that English alone could be the language of official business, meaning the educated classes migrated literally or symbolically to London. There was a fear that Welsh would degenerate into dialects, as it is a rural area, but the new translation of the Bible created a standard for comparison. Starting in the Nineteenth Century, interest in preserving the language arose, but was thwarted by increasing industrialisation, intermarriage, increased television and radio broadcasting--many of the same factors which effected the decline of Ukrainian. The situations are similar in many other ways: Welsh is more commonly spoken that written, it is common in areas of compact settlement of Welsh people, it is most common among older people, and in rural areas.

The report which served as a source for the information about Wales provided an example of how demographic research can be used to profile language behaviour, and furthermore, to show areas of desired expansion of usage. In this case, the examiners wanted Welsh in legal proceedings, government meetings, administration, and government offices, some of the same areas under contention in Ukraine. Further areas for expansion included more educational facilities, church services, broadcasting and recording, and festival/folk events.

This report is particularly useful for defining what makes an official language, and therefore, what direction policy should take to elevate the status and usage of a language like Ukrainian. The following functions were listed as key:

- Court proceedings
- Public enquiries and tribunals
- Official documents (both English and Welsh)
- Public signs and notices

- Administration and business
- Elections
- Correspondence, especially with the government
- Local authority documents

Similar recommendations exist for other spheres of activity.[33] The overall result would mean in Wales, or in Ukraine, the language the state speaks to its citizens would be not only English or Russian, but also Welsh or Ukrainian.

French-Canadians also share a number of concerns with the Ukrainians and the Welsh. The language situation among French Canadians has been well-studied in other works.[34] This community shares Canadian citizenship with its English-speaking compatriots, but feels its culture, including language, is different and furthermore under threat by the majority. When speakers of a national minority such as the French Canadians are in a position where either assimilation into the majority, or accommodation by bilingualism seem to be the only alternatives, language planning may be used to bolster a threatened language. Here, planners took many of the same steps taken in Wales, including external signs, schooling, and administration, all in an attempt to ensure that French would not lose ground or status to English.

What characterises a language planning success story? For this, one could chose Swahili, especially as it is used in Tanzania and Zanzibar.[35] Like Ukraine, Tanzania, Zanzibar, and Kenya, as in other areas of Africa, were left with colonial languages as administrative

[33] The Council for Wales and Monmouthshire report on Welsh Language Today, (1963).
[34] One of many available sources is A.B. Anderson, 'The Survival of ethnolinguistic Minorities: Canada and comparative research', in *Language and Ethnic Relations*, (1979).
[35] Information cited is from an interview with C. Hanlin, freelance translator in Daar-es-Salaam, November 1996. Further information may be found in Nurse and Speere, ***The Swahili.***

languages. English had been the language of the colonisers, while Swahili had emerged as a lingua franca among traders, based on Bantu dialects, English, Persian, Arabic, and German. When these countries gained independence, a language had to be chosen which would unite speakers of different languages. For Tanzania and Zanzibar, Swahili was a natural choice: spoken as a common languages, yet not the language of the former colonisers. One dialect was chosen as the standard, which was then further 'cleaned up'. This standard now serves as the basic language, though there are higher varieties (those with more elements from Persian) and lower varieties. In Tanzania, it is the language of all official functions from court to government, as well as a common language learned as a first or second language (sometimes the tribal language is first) by all. As in Ukraine, there is bilingualism among older generations, who were educated under the old system. Young people study under a Swahili-based curriculum which is expanding to include more and more of the emergent Swahili literature. Language planning not only widened the sphere of usage, but also reformed the lexicon, which still allows some foreign borrowings (especially computer or technological vocabulary) but has replaced many of such terms with new coinages.

What are the components of the successful planning in Tanzania? First of all, efficient planning meant emphasis on changes in education, including a language requirement for entrance into university. Second, there is a great deal of national pride. Young people take pleasure in coining new slang terms, which are often colourful and imaginative. Though most of the educated classes are comfortable in English, it is viewed as a mark of respect if foreigners use some Swahili, and

knowledge of the local language helps greatly in business.

To examine another aspect of the language situation in Ukraine: what about other areas of Ukraine, where Russian is not the only minority language to contend with? Multi-lingual areas present problems of their own, as there is more than one or two possible languages of inter-ethnic communication from which to chose. One could look to the revival of Hebrew in Palestine for one possible solution. As mentioned before, a Soviet objective was to establish Russian as the only possible language of inter-ethnic communication, a prestigious function which enhances the language that serves this purpose. In Ukraine, this function is now desirable for Ukrainian. A similar situation existed in Palestine, where immigrants from all over moved there to form Jewish communities, each group speaking their own language. The only language they all shared was Hebrew, which had not been recently utilised in the vernacular sphere, but nonetheless inspired a movement to revive it as the language of everyday conversation. Led by Eliezer Ben Yehuda, from Russia, the language revival introduced Hebrew as a language of instruction in newly-founded Hebrew schools, so that with each generation Jews spoke more and more natural Hebrew, and finally knew only Hebrew. In this case, the motives were not only pragmatic, but strongly nationalistic, in that they were the result of a desire to use the language of their forefathers, a powerful symbol of the Hebrew nation. Though modernisation was required, Hebrew flourished as a common language for Jews from all over the world in Palestine.[36] This type of planning pragmatically enabled people of different nationalities to communicate, and also served to activate a potent symbol which could unite people of a common culture.

This kind of planning would be equally useful in Ukraine.

In the Soviet Union, language planning had an added dimension. The totalitarian government forced compliance with its policies on language and could actively promote Russian while seriously debilitating national languages, or promote national languages for the purposes of the regime. For the Soviets, change and planning constituted the basis of a modernisation drive, and involved not only policy and various agencies, but also economic and social movements. Lewis asserts that only in such a regime could language be part of the national plan, and that without centralised power the impetus for language change would come from political or social movements alone.[37] Her emphasis is on modernisation as a primary goal of the Soviets, which was in turn linked with the development and spread of socialism. While social and political changes need not necessarily bring about linguistic change, they can aid one another. Language planning could therefore provide a platform for the spread of socialism and modernisation, which had previously failed to take hold due to the relative backwardness of society in the Soviet Union as a whole.[38]

Language planning in the Soviet Union manifested the effects of a number of intenal factors. While policy-makers were aided by the perceived prestige of Russian as the language of the ruling elite, and the dominance of Russia politically, conflict occurred as a result of nationalism and ethnic self-esteem in non-Russian areas. Policy towards Russian in non-Russian republics, and towards national languages changed and

[36] Cooper, (1989), pp. 11-4.
[37] Lewis, (1983), p. 309.
[38] Lewis, (1983), p. 309-11.

evolved over the entire Soviet period.[39]

During the 1920s and 1930s, national languages were the primary focus of planning. Selection of dialect, alphabet reform, codification, and standardisation took place during this time, as part of the *Korenizatsiia* policy. This approach was instrumental, asserting that national languages represent a tool to be developed to make socialism accessible to all, and formed the basis for a mass literacy campaign.[40] Stalin's rule saw a reverse in policy which began the promotion of Russian and the effective attempts to purge national languages which characterise later governments. Though leaders varied from the pragmatic approach of Khrushchev to the sentimental, love-of-Great-Russia approach of Brezhnev, the policy of Russification had the same aims.[41]

Implementation of such policies occurred through direct and indirect means. Planners exerted indirect influence by encouraging migration of Russians into the non-Russian republics, or out-migration from these republics into Russia. Industrialisation and urbanisation supplemented this influence. Language planning for Soviets merely represented another aspect of social development promoting Russia and the technology, modernisation, and proletarisation they wished to associate with Russian.

More direct means also served the ends of the Soviets. Planning which involved a minority language would promote not only the minority language itself, but additionally would support the economic and political interests of its speakers. For a time this could be countenanced, as literacy in any language could help spread Marxism. But continued promotion would spread political power around in the population, instead of keeping it

[39] Kirkwood, (1989), pp. 2-6.
[40] Kirkwood, (1989), pp. 25-36.

squarely in the hands of the Russians. Therefore, Russian had to retain the most prestigious linguistic functions in society for itself.[42] This meant, for example, that speakers of other languages would have to access world culture and terminology through Russian. This transitional bilingualism, when most of the population spoke a native language and Russian, would be tolerated only as long as it evolved into Russian monolingualism. This would not only achieve the political aims of the regime, but would integrate the massive empire by means of a common language and culture, and assimilate the minority populations.[43]

Soviet language planning designed to spread the usage of Russian, at the expense of indigenous languages, succeeded to varying degrees. Russification in Ukraine and its effects, both on the actual lexicon, and on the usage and knowledge of Ukrainian, will be covered in detail later. Other examples may illustrate the action of Soviet Policy in the republics of the former Soviet Union.

The case of Uzbekistan can be used to demonstrate Soviet language planning. At the start of the twentieth century, the language of Uzbekistan had little modern vocabulary and no standard orthography. Conflicting influences of Cyrillic, Arabic, and Latin writing systems and cultures plus an assortment of dialects meant there was a wide scope of variety in the language. *Korenizatsiia* in Uzbekistan meant basic education for Uzbeks improved, by means of employment requirements for the number of natives in administration and other programs. In spite of language study requirements, many students managed to avoid courses in Uzbek, and the status of the language among the population at this time

[41] Kreindler, (1989), pp. 46-69.
[42] Lewis, G, (1983), pp. 311-24.

remained low.

Soviet policy had several main goals, mainly to make the population more literate and to minimise the influence of nearby Islamic cultures. Although originally in Arabic, in the twenties the language was written in latin script, which reduced the number of letters one had to learn. The writing system was changed again, this time to Cyrillic, to prevent what had was considered an unproductive influcence. As part of this campaign, borrowings were ferreted out and removed, though in the end some were entrenched enough to remain.

While Uzbek literacy did increase during this time, most members of the population failed to develop along the Russian model. Even with the benign neglect of the Stalinist regime, and the typical attempts at Russification in the lexicon and orthography, Soviet planning can not be called a total success. While Russian gained status in the eyes of the population, and became the most widespread second language, Uzbeks were also more educated and literate in their own language. As pride in the native language increases, the status of Uzbek will probably be raised as well. In this case, ironically, the literacy campaigns of the revolutionary communists laid the groundwork for a revival of the language of Uzbekistan.[44]

A more successful campaign from the Soviet viewpoint was waged in Belarus. Early attempts at planning under the new regime were similar to others in Soviet republics:

> Language-planning policy had been aimed at creating a language that could fulfil all communicative functions in a state that was technically independent. A literary language had been created that was by-and large accepted by all Belorussians both

[43] Haarman, (1985), pp. 324-53.
[44] Fierman, (1989), pp. 205-28.

in the Soviet republic and in Poland, and was clearly independent of Russian.'[45]

As in other areas, the language policy was one part of an overall nationalities policy which grew increasingly favourable towards Russian at the expense of other languages and nationalities.[46] By 1933, language policies were obviously aimed at bringing the language closer to Russian in orthography, grammar, and lexicon. Even after the death of Stalin, the fear remained that a linguistic tidy-up would be seen as nationalism and treated harshly. Instead, in contemporary Belarus, the language is in a shaky position with respect to Russian. One key indicator of strength would be exclusive use in particular functions, but only Russian enjoys this level of status and usage, though it is argued that neither language is well-known by speakers.[47]

While politically, such efforts may or may not have suppressed nationalist sentiment, the effect of the linguistic arm of Soviet policy has had some success. Russian enjoys greater status and usage, and Belarusian language has been weakened as a consequence. Furthermore, this case shows that functional differentiation and the perceived status of a language are important indicators of its strength and viability.

Soviet language planning in Ukraine followed a similar pattern to those described for Uzbekistan and Belarus. However, Russian was not

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[45] Dingley, (1989), p. 183.
[46] Dingley, (1989), p 174.
[47] Dingley, (1989), " Given the amount of scholarly attention currently being paid to both languages in the USSR, together with the publication of books, journals, and newspapers, it may seem as if their status is assured. In actual fact there is hard evidence...that this is far from the case. Both languages are weak, and Belorussian dangerously so. (cited here Miknevich, in Biryla and Suprin, 1982, pp. 50-75.) In no case is exclusive use made of Belorussian, whereas there are several areas in which only Russian is used...These concerns should not be seen as purely nationalistic; the practical application of policies intended to promote Russian/national language bilingualism have led to a situation in which neither language is known properly; people speak a Ukrainian-Russian *surzhyk*, or a Belorussian-Russian *trasianka*.' pp. 185-86.

the first language to be promoted in Ukraine, nor were the Soviets the first to practice language planning on Ukrainian lands. Soviet policy in Ukraine should be considered as part of a history of language controversy.

Chapter 2: Language Planning in Ukraine

Soviet language planning in Ukraine followed a pattern similar to the kind of planning policies that had been instituted in other republics. If anything, efforts may have been more concentrated, due to the anti-Russian feeling that generally went along with Ukrainian nationalism in Ukraine. While the Soviets were practicing Russification[1], or at least attempting to ensure Russian/Ukrainian bilingualism in Ukraine, a segment of the population also practised language planning in attempts to preserve and maintain the purity of Ukrainian.

Language planning had taken place on the territory of Ukraine before the Soviet period, however. Therefore, before analysing the effects of Soviet efforts, both at status and corpus planning, attempts by previous regimes should also be examined. This includes not only early language planning, comprising standardisation and codification of Ukrainian language, but policy after the incorporation of Galicia and the early years of Soviet rule, when Ukrainian was encouraged as a vehicle of socialism.

Although the focus of this research is on modern, twentieth century Ukraine, it is important to briefly review these early influences on the direction of the Ukrainian language. A survey of the emergence of a literary language, and the subsequent strengthening of a linguistic, political and national identity on the territory of Ukraine will demonstrate the historical basis for conflict, both linguistic and political, with surrounding powers.

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[1] Russification is defined as the deliberate practice by Soviet authorities (though effective policies of a similar nature had been enacted under earlier regimes) designed to discourage or forbid the use of Ukrainian, and encourage the use of Russian. Tactics included punishment of Ukrainian officials and scholars, relocation of Russians into Ukraine and Ukrainians into Russia and the production of dictionaries which listed forms similar to Russian, in place of or in preference to native Ukrainian words. Bilingualism

Before the Soviets:

The date of the emergence of a literary language in Ukraine can be conveniently stated as 988 AD, the year of Christianization and therefore, the introduction of Church Slavonic. Despite attempts to keep this language pure and intact, local variations were introduced either by error or by clergy attempting to be more intelligible to the masses. [2] Shevelov explains, "Every Knizhnik tried to be as Church Slavonic in his language as his education, his ability and the thematic key of the text permitted; but the extent of the actual fulfillment of this goal varied widely."[3]

The development of the language in this period was not encouraged by surrounding political events. Kiev fell to the Tatars in 1240, which caused mass flights into Galicia and Polissia, or towards the north and north-east. While attempts were made to maintain standards in these areas, by 1387 Ukraine found itself partitioned and governed by the administrations of Hungary, Moldavia, The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and, after 1569, Poland. Ruling governments supported or were hostile to Ukrainians under their jurisdiction and the Ukrainian language to varying degrees during this time. With Ukraine thus divided, and speakers separated from one another, it would have been difficult for a unified, unique literary language to arise.

Diglossia compounded this problem. At this point, it is difficult to speak of 'Ukrainian' as a unified language on the lands which form present-day Ukraine, as it would be misleading to suggest that local dialects at this time should be considered 'Ukrainian language'. Over the next two centuries a pattern of diglossia emerged in which certain,

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throughout Ukraine is both a consequence and an encouraged middle state in this policy.
[2] Shevelov, G., (1980), p. 144.

generally prestigious, functions were allotted to the 'high' language, which was a mixture of Church Slavonic (for status) and the language of the ruling classes (such as Euthymian Church Slavonic, or Meletian Church Slavonic, named after one of the codifiers, Meletyi Smotryts'kyi). These Church-Slavonic based literary languages were used for poetry, literature or drama. The vernacular covered the remaining genres, such as tales and chronicles; as the language of the uneducated masses, it was not considered suitable as a basis for a literary language. This separation existed in varying forms through the eighteenth century. As Polish power spread in the west, and Russian influence expanded in the East, Church Slavonic forms began to fade as the languages of these ruling powers gained prominence in the upper classes.[4]

These two co-existing 'layers' failed to merge into a common language in both East and West in the manner Anglo-Saxon and Norman French had combined. This may be partly due to the class system in place at that time. Nobles in Ukraine felt more kinship and loyalty to other nobles in nearby countries because of their common background and social position, and felt less attached to peasants in their own country with whom they shared very little culturally or socially.[5] Similarly, the peasants did not identify with anyone outside their own milieu, nor did the townspeople. The concept of ethnicity as a binding factor and national awareness had not yet influenced Ukrainian society.

Romanticism spread to Ukraine in the nineteenth century, bringing with it radical new concepts. Shevelov comments, 'the road to national consciousness was paved with books.' At this time, members of the

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[3] Shevelov, G., (1980), p. 145
[4] Shevelov, (1993), p. 96, also Shevelov, (1980), pp. 146-47.

developing intelligentsia began to take an interest in local culture and to document what they observed, producing volumes of amateur folklore research. In Ukraine, these intelligentsia represented a new trend themselves: most of the nobility were thoroughly subsumed by imperial culture while members of the old Cossack nobility remained 'Ukrainian'.[6] These intelligentsia attended universities and acquired higher education, which originally served as their most distinguishing feature. Shevelov highlights another important distinction, that the intelligentsia were the first to perceive society as a cohesive whole, with its classes necessarily linked by interdependent interests. In the West, the intelligentsia class was developing as well, but in a slightly different manner. Here, most members were educated clergy, meaning that a secular intelligentsia appeared much later than in the Russian-ruled part of Ukraine.

From this understanding of society as a whole, and the resultant awareness of unique national traits, it could not be long before an interest in language would likewise develop. To the Romantics, language embodied national soul and contained all the history and culture of a people. Furthermore, it could unite all the social classes into one nationality.[7]

Despite assertions to the contrary, nineteenth century writers began to demonstrate how the local vernacular could serve as a literary language. One early attempt, penned in 1798 by Ivan Kotliarevs'kyi was 'Eneida'[8]. Inspired by the literary merit of this work, other writers began to produce works in the spoken language. The Kharkiv Romantics, a circle of

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[5] Subtelny, (1988), p. 222.
[6] Subtelny, (1988), pp. 223-34.
[7] Shevelov, (1980), pp. 149-51.
[8] Subtelny, (1988), p. 230.

writers based around Kharkiv university, produced stories which tended to be folksy in tone, and full of melancholy nostalgia for the lost great past of Ukraine.[9] These writers not only developed and refined the language, but aided in creating a sense of national consciousness and a desire for political self-determination, which manifested itself in the desire for a unique literary language for Ukraine.[10] By this time, as poets and writers began to see themselves, and by viewed by their public, as national spokespersons, language in Ukraine was becoming a national and social issue as Ukrainians developed the beginnings of national awareness and identity. Interestingly, Ukraine and things Ukrainian acquired a certain 'trendiness' in Russia around this time. Ukraine was not, however, perceived as a separate entity but rather as an exotic and wild part of Russia itself.[11]

The efforts of the Romantics culminated in the works of Shevchenko. His *Kobzar* departed somewhat from earlier literature in the vernacular in its lack of folksiness, and in its unquestionable literary merit. His use of the Ukrainian spoken language demonstrated conclusively that arguments against the vernacular as a basis for literary language were no longer accurate. His genius inspired the younger generation of intelligentsia, in Galicia and Russian-ruled Ukraine, to promote the spoken language. This brought the young Galicians into conflict with the older generation of scholars, who preferred to use the 'iazychie', an unwieldy mix of Church Slavonic, Polish, Russian and Ukrainian, for literature while speaking Polish. The older generation was disenchanted with the Hapsburg Empire, and thus looked to the Polish aristocracy or to Moscow

[9] Subtelny, (1988), pp. 230-1.
[10] Dobriansky, L., (1979), p. 230.

for leadership.[12] In contrast, the new generation began to draw closer to Kyiv and figures like Shevchenko and Drahmanov. While the Western intelligentsia, who until very late in the century drew their membership mostly from clergy, found some of the decidely secular ideas of their Kyiv influences too radical, they nonetheless embraced ideas of national consciousness, ethnic identity and the place of their spoken language as a trait common to all Ukrainians.[13]

Prohibitions on the use on Ukrainian in the area controlled by Russia led to a shift in publication to Galicia, where the Austrian government was less prohibitive.[14] Wexler explains,

> During the period of 1876-1905, when Ukrainian cultural life was curtailed in the Eastern Ukraine, there was no chance for Easterners to discuss problems of standardization and compilation of terminologies. Many Eastern Ukrainian writers were obliged to publish their works in Western Ukrainian publications....Galicia, a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire became the center of Ukrainian scholarly and literary activity.[15]

The emancipation of the serfs, the establishment of Ukrainian schools in Galicia, and the resultant literacy contributed to the advancement of Ukrainian culture in Galicia. Theatres, newspapers and journals, publishing houses, societies, and political parties were among the

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[11] Subtelny, (1988), p. 231.

[12] Magocsi explains the three factions of Austria-Hungary's Ukrainian intelligentsia, the Old Ruthenians, Russophiles and Ukrainophiles in terms of their beliefs about the history of the Ukrainian *narod,* and the relationship of the Ukraine to Russia and Belarus'. Russophiles essentially considered themselves 'Russians from Galicia' and advocated the use of Russian as both a literary and spoken language. Old Ruthenians also believed the three ethnic groups shared a common source. Ukrainophiles treated this idea as 'ideological fantasy' and felt that all of Ukraine was a separate entity. Later, one could add the 'Populists', who disagreed with the Ukrainophiles of the previous generation on linguistic grounds. Magocsi is careful to point out that these distinctions are far from rigid, on both ideological and historical grounds. Magocsi, (1996), pp.438-41.

[13] Subtelny, (1988), pp. 318-19.

[14] By this is meant the Decree of Ems in 1876, which banned the import and publication of Ukrainian books, a prohibition of use of Ukrainian on stage, the closing of Ukrainian newspapers, and a ban on teaching in Ukrainian or about Ukrainain subjects. This rather stringent decree was the result of accusations by a former Ukrainophile, Mikhail Iuzefovych, that Ukrainophiles were becoming subversive and antagonising the peasantry, and that they were in fact engaged in a German plot against the Russians. To get around this decree and others previous to it, publication had to move out of Russian Ukraine into Galicia, where the ruling government was not as harsh. Subtelny, (1988), p. 283.

fruits of awakening Ukrainian consciousness. Because of some concessions allowed this minority within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Galician Ukrainians were able to make sufficient progress in political and cultural spheres to make Galicia the leading centre of Ukrainian national revival in the second half of the nineteenth century, amazing visitors from Russian-ruled Ukraine with their progress.[16]

During the nineteenth century, this shift in publication and literature, and the influence Western Ukraine had on the literary language would cause another of the major discussions surrounding Ukrainian as a literary language: the admissibility of 'Galicianisms' into the standard.[17] In Galicia, similar debates raged. Two factions had long disagreed over the course of Galician Ukrainian, arguing either for a common Slavic heritage, or a unique and distinct Ukrainian nationality. (There were Polonised intelligentsia as well, but they were in the minority.) As mentioned above, by the 1890s, the Ukrainophiles had won the debate, but another argument remained between generations over the substance of the accepted language, whether the literary language should remain the religious language which already had a degree of prestige, or be based on the language of the common people. In the end, the vernacular base won out, and became widespread enough for the administrations of Galicia and Bukovina to use it; this language was further endorsed by the publication of several dictionaries, grammars, and magazines.

Ironically, when Galicians and Dniepr Ukrainians came into contact, the Galicians found their language disparaged by other Ukrainians, much as Russians treated Ukrainian. Galicians pushed for a wide range of

[15] Wexler, (1974), pp. 39-40.
[16] Magosci, (1983), pp. 116-17.

acceptable dialect words, but found they were looked down upon since their dialect of Ukrainian contained what were felt to be foreign and folk elements. Ultimately, Galician speech and writing came to resemble Dniepr Ukrainian with some Galician elements, which meant the Galicians sacrificed the representative quality of a true vernacular for access to the prestige of a larger population of speakers.[18]

Developments during this century had a number of important consequences for the language. Linguistic discussions at this time remained rather naive and rarely included professional linguists, a trend that would continue into twentieth century regulation and standardisation. Instead, language planning, particularly code selection and standardisation efforts were carried out by writers, scholars, lawyers or journalists.[19] The use of Russian (in Russian-ruled Ukraine) or Polish (in Austria-Hungarian-ruled Ukraine) for official purposes and in urban areas adversely affected the status of Ukrainian at this time, especially as the nobility aligned themselves with one or the other of these official languages. This predictably meant widespread bi-lingualism and a lack of perceived status for Ukrainian language, as most of the prestigious functions in society were carried out in Polish or Russian. As for the masses, many lost interest in speaking Ukrainian because of the perceived stigma, or were ignorant of the standard. Proponents of a unique Ukrainian literary language found such developments worrisome. An independent language would prevent cultural submersion into Russian or Polish, maintain cultural integrity, and gain the respect of outsiders for Ukraine.[20] Such advocates

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[17] Shevelov, (1980), p. 153.
[18] Magosci, (1978), pp. 1-17.
[19] Wexler, (1974), p. 40.
[20] Wexler, (1974), p. 42-3.

fell into two camps: proponents of uniquely Ukrainian features (the 'ethnographic' approach), versus supporters of Ukrainian with foreign admissions, usually Russian, Polish, or internationalisms.

Those against foreign borrowings preferred using archaic forms to create neologisms, or to introduce dialect words.[21] Such additions would prevent the widening of the gulf between the intelligentsia and the masses that the use of foreign loans could cause. Others feared the development of Ukrainian would be stifled if it relied upon outside words. Furthermore, with different influences acting upon the East and the West, a unified Ukrainian language would be difficult to maintain if foreign words were allowed in from both areas. This problem hindered those advocating dialect additions as well, since the area of Ukrainian speech was vast and dialects from one side to the other varied immensely[22]. This active interest in the state and development of a literary language led to a call for regulators and an interest in normalisation during this time.

The presence of such arguments and the degree of interest in the Ukrainian language highlights its prominent place in the minds of the intelligentsia. Language connected social classes who previously had little to bind them together. Furthermore, it embodied, in the minds of these Romantics, all that 'Ukrainian' meant: culture, history and national identity. Shevchenko and others proved that the speech of the peasants could indeed serve as the basis for a literary language. The precedent had been set which established Ukrainian as a separate entity, a unique culture thereby justifying the support and development of their own language. This the newly aware Ukrainian intelligentsia found themselves in conflict with

[21] Wexler, (1974), pp. 42, 47-65.
[22] Wexler, (1974), p. 69-79.

Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in their desire for political and national self-determination.[23] A sufficiently strong foundation had been laid in Ukraine, so that by the time the Soviets consolidated their power, they were keenly aware of Ukrainian nationalism and felt this force must be controlled, and if possible channelled for their use.

Early Soviet rule, Ukrainisation and Stalin:

The first half of the Twentieth Century was characterised by the same debates as in previous years, with varying benefit to the Ukrainian language as a result of several shifts in policy. Socially, native speakers continued to hold the language in low esteem. This may be partly blamed on 'Little Russianism', the idea that Ukrainians form part of the total *ruskiy narod,* and cannot have a history separate from Russia (or indeed, Belarus'). Ukrainians were perceived by Russians, and to some extent by Ukrainians themselves as less progressive and unable to create an independent state. Their language, therefore, was unsuited to modernity, technology or world culture.[24] This hindered the spread of Ukrainian language into business and industry, or into science and technology. Greater success was enjoyed in the areas of agriculture, musicology, poetry, and economics. This meant that the functions appropriated by Russian continued to hold more prestige than those carried out in Ukrainian, thus guaranteeing a higher status for Russian language in the eyes of speakers. Even after demonstrating its ability to serve as a high language, Ukrainian was not widely accepted due to this lack of status, since ambitious Ukrainians realised they would have to speak Russian or

[23] Dobriansky, L., (1979), p. 230.
[24] Kuzio. (1997), pp. 305-08.

Polish in order to advance socially, politically, or in their careers.[25]

This time period also brought a crisis in motive, as the Romantic notion of national soul, and its expression in the native language, was no longer felt to be convincing for native speakers who were becoming increasingly accustomed to technology and science. Because it became desirable to emphasise the presence of an independent Ukrainian language and state, politics found its way into the linguistic discussions of the time. Such interest may also account for the unprecedented level of normalisation which took place in the first half of this century, and the almost universal agreement that language planning, particularly regulation, was needed.[26]

The policy of the ruling governments of this time period changed several times. In the 1920s, the Communist Party realised that any attempts to stifle the native language of Ukraine could lead to an upsurge of nationalism. Furthermore, in order to better propagandize in Soviet Ukraine, and encourage unity through the appearance of tolerance, the party felt its doctrines should be taught in Ukrainian. New interest in expanding Ukrainian into all areas of life followed from these motives, and in these discussions for the first time professional linguists joined literary enthusiasts to shape the standard language.

As part of a Union-wide *korenizatsiia* policy, the Soviet government initiated a nationalising project in Ukraine. Ukrainianization, 'national in form, socialist in content', had the appearance of genuine tolerance and interest, but was inwardly Marxist in its motive. This meant that policy had

[25] Shevelov, (1989), pp. 216-7.
[26] Shevelov, (1989), pp. 216-220.

as its overriding consideration the building of a strong state.[27] The use of Ukrainian language reflected the intention to harness national forces in efforts to create a socialist state in Ukraine.[28] National feelings were encouraged as a result of such efforts, and the desire for an independent state also grew, especially among the intelligentsia, whose aims, both linguistic and political, were not necessarily to support the Soviet regime. Indeed, by the end of the 1920s, only four Russian newspapers remained, and there was widespread translation into Ukrainian of foreign materials. Furthermore, orthography and lexicon had been reformed and standardised. The pro-Ukrainian policies of this era culminated with the decree of 6 July, 1927 by the All Ukrainian Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of UkSSR which declared all languages equal within the state, and introduced methods of encouraging education in Ukrainian (as part of a drive to educate children in the language of their nationality in Ukraine), as well as other favourable language policies. By the end of the twenties, not only had education and publishing in Ukrainian grown, but also the use of Ukrainian spread to the administration and party organs. This growth did not escape the watchful eye of the Soviet government which constantly feared nationalism in Ukraine would interfere with its long-term plans for unity and incorporation, and indeed the creation of a Russian-based culture for the Soviet Union.[29]

One result of Ukrainisation was new interest in the content of the

[27] Solchanyk, , (1985), pp. 67-8.
[28] Dobriansky, L., (1979), p. 230.
[29] For more information on this era and others, see Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine*, (1985). This book breaks the century down into decades, from the Revolution to the fall of Shelest', and examines various components of society as Ukraine develops national consciousness, the awareness of its position as a separate nation. The focus on language issues is minimal, but Krawchenko's political perspective is very useful in establishing the background against which language development occurred, and describing the cultural and social

language. The overall tendency, therefore, in language regulation until the 1930s was to favour the colloquial lexicon, with archaic forms introduced to enrich the vocabulary of Ukrainian. The presence of a literary language intelligible to all of the population, from intelligentsia to the peasantry, enabled Ukrainians to become a more literate and more educated population, with a growing civic awareness of themselves as a Ukrainian nation. These developments received mixed reactions: while some speakers were pleased to speak Ukrainian, others still showed apathy towards their native language.[30] In addition, as many of these ideals and aspirations as well as a literary tradition had previously been established in Galicia, the two rival standards for literary Ukrainian would have to compete for dominance: Galician Ukrainians felt their language was fully able to serve as the literary standard while Ukrainians in the East (Russian-ruled Ukraine) were reluctant to accept what sounded Polonised, overly colloquial and non-standard to them.

In the 1930s politics took precedence over linguistics in Ukraine. Crowned by the incorporation of the Western half of Ukraine into the Soviet Union in 1939, this time period marked a strong inclination towards the incorporation of Russian borrowings and calques into the language.[31] The purists of the 1920s were rebuked in linguistic circles, and often suffered political persecution or deportation for favouring what were felt to be Polish forms over Russian ones. Dialect and archaic words were replaced with Russianisms, except for stylistic purposes in literature, thus

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trends which interacted with linguistic ones.

[30] Wexler, (1974), pp. 110-37.

[31] The terms used throughout should be understood as follows: a **borrowing** or **loan** refers to the incorporation of a foreign term as it is into the host language. **Calques** are loan translations, meaning each part of the foreign word is translated. **Russianisms** and **Internationalisms**, quite obviously, therefore refer to loans or calques from Russian or from what is considered international vocabulary. See also Chapter Six.

minimising or even eliminating the Western dialect influence. Instead, 'dialect' came to mean forms shared with Polish but not Russian. Furthermore, Russification permeated the language to the extent that compounds existing in Russian were copied using Ukrainian roots, so that where direct borrowing did not occur, calquing did, replacing native Ukrainian terms. These trends became quickly apparent in terminology manuals which reflected the new emphasis on similarities in Ukrainian to Russian.[32] This drive was reflected in society, as intellectuals and Ukrainian clergy were brought to trial, and ethnic Ukrainians suffered forced collectivisation and famine.[33] Russian became a required subject in 1938, and ethnic schools outside of their own republics were closed.[34] Stalin's policy marked a sharp turn away from Lenin's tolerance of national languages and cultures: the new leader was more interested in modernisation and industrialisation, and needed an efficient, monolingual work force to accomplish his goals.

Soviet language planning of this time can be classified in two ways: direct and oblique. On the one hand, regulators were actively seeking to influence terminology and lexicon by adding Russian words, and keeping functions with high status for Russian language. Education, publishing, and administration all reflected this bias. Oblique planning also had its effect when migration, spreading of industrialisation, and mono-lingual higher education and career opportunities meant that Russian became necessary as a skill to survive and advance.[35] These measures ensured not only the start of Russification in earnest in Ukraine, but also of

[32] Wexler, (1974), 157-64.
[33] Dobriansky, L., (1979), p. 232.
[34] Haarman, (1985), p 314.
[35] Lewis, (1983), pp. 309-24.

persecution of the intelligentsia as the vanguard not only of the Ukrainian language, but also of Ukrainian culture and national identity, and therefore potentially of Ukrainian dissent. Indeed, though Stalin had been thorough in his weeding out of potentially subversive institutions and individuals, a new intelligentsia had arisen like a phoenix out of the remains of the old one, and many republican structures remained. Krawchenko summarises this decade by saying, "it is no exaggeration to say that Ukrainians' greatest achievement during that decade was that they outlasted it."[36]

During German occupation of Ukraine, there was a brief hiatus when Soviet proscription of the use of Ukrainian was somewhat relaxed. Some Ukrainians welcomed the German invasion as they felt their rule might be an improvement on the Soviet regime. As Magocsi outlines, German policy was quite contradictory towards Ukraine, so that while schools, churches and publishers were allowed to function with some freedom, and in Ukrainian, at the same time Ukrainians were to be kept submissive and under the control of the German occupying authorities.[37] However, as soon as the war was comfortably over, and the Germans had been driven out, Stalin quickly clamped down on Ukraine. The principles which had dominated in the 1930s were once again espoused, and those who had supported a return to ideals popular in the 1920s were criticised. This meant the Kyiv/Poltava dialect was affirmed as the basis of the literary language, and Western Ukrainian features once more were singled out as unacceptable variants. The ethnographic approach to enrichment again fell from favour as regulators opened the language to Russian borrowings and calques by orienting away from rural speech and towards

[36] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 152.
[37] Magocsi, (1996), pp. 625-29.

urban.[38] Those familiar with Ukrainian history will recall certain concessions, such as the use of names of Ukrainian heroes (Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi medal), and the incorporation of Galicia into the territory of Ukraine, but behind such superficial allowances Stalin's government advanced Russification full speed ahead on both the ideological and linguistic fronts.[39]

Until 1950, Stalin advocated the Marr theory, which called for unification of ethnic minorities into a Soviet Man as part of the process envisioned by Marx and Lenin towards a class-less and nation-less society. Under this ideal, philologists and linguists were brought to trial with other alleged nationalists amidst public discussions of the merging of all the languages of the Soviet Union. The aim of wiping out ethnic distinctions would continue to find support until this theory fell from favour.[40]

Even when the Marr theory no longer had the support of Stalin's regime, the idea of a Soviet man did not vanish entirely, and would re-surface in the seventies in an attempt to encourage political, if not ethnic, unity.This naturally caused a great deal of concern among ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union, as Chopyk relates,

> The recent publications from Soviet Ukraine are reflecting the trends and struggles of other non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. The drive of Soviet leadership to produce the "new Soviet Man" has frightened many Soviet nationalities mainly by its unrelenting pressure of Russification, by which Russian culture projects itself as superior and all other purely national cultures, languages, and social peculiarities as inferior. It is baffling that the Soviet ideological leadership, in putting Russian achievements as models to follow and to look up to, should not realise that looking up to someone implies looking down at someone, thus providing grounds for dissatisfaction, frustration, and hostility. The inception of the Soviet Union originated, we are told, to solve deep-seated national problems, yet to this day they have not been solved. [41]

[38] Wexler, (1974), p. 183.
[39] Magocsi, (1996), pp. 645-49.
[40] Dobriansky, L., (1979), p. 232.
[41] Chopyk, (1975), p. 59.

In this climate, Russian crept into the language in two important ways. First, children learned it in school from a very early age, and then grew up surrounded by Russian in media, literature, and public life. Secondly, because of earlier policies, bi-lingualism was already widespread. International vocabulary entered Ukrainian via Russian, and Russian neologisms were used instead of Ukrainian ones.[42] This debate continues to involve language enthusiasts in Ukraine, as discussed in Chapter Six. With Russification aided by intermarriage, re-location into and out of Ukraine, Russian schools in Ukraine, and career ambitions of minorities within the Soviet Union who saw Russian as the language of advancement and progress, some writers and linguists began to fear that Ukrainian would soon be reduced to a dialect of Russian.

As the presence of Russianisms increased, and with the continued support of the policy of Russification even after the death of Stalin, concern for the purity of the language re-entered linguistic discussion in Ukraine among linguists who were not 'Soviet' in their thinking. Often linguists found themselves in opposition to writers of the time as to *whose* responsibility it was to ensure the purity of the language.[43] Again, this argument continues in contemporary Ukraine with scholars, writers and politicians involved in varying proportions, as discussed in Chapter Three.

Thus, at the time of Stalin's death in 1953, the position of Ukrainian may be described as precarious. Russianisms and Russification were taking their toll on the language of Ukraine, replacing native words with borrowings and calques aided by government policy and ignorance, and

[42] Wexler, (1974), pp. 184-5.
[43] Wexler, (1974), pp. 190-91.

even necessity for Ukrainians to function in a bi-lingual society.The Soviets were not always even-handed in the application of their language policy, which meant that the relative tolerance in areas felt to be more loyal did not apply in Ukraine, long a hot-bed of 'nationalism' and potential rebellious thinking. Even where policy on paper seemed to advocate speaking one's own language as a civil right, such was not always the case in practice.

Despite the presence of repression to a discouraging extent throughout the period after Stalin's death until glasnost', in the 1960s, some trends emerged which looked encouraging. The group of writers and dissidents later known as the 'Shestydesiatnyky' appeared in Kyiv around 1962, heralding attempts to try to write and publish literature in Ukrainian. R. Shelest, a known advocate of national rights became the First Secretary of the Communist Party in Ukraine in 1963, and remained in power until 1972, his efforts tolerated and even encouraged by Khrushchev's thaw policies. Language rights were perceived as a high priority at this time, as evidenced by the demands of the Writers' Congress of 1962 to use Ukrainian in instruction at all levels, in business, in scholarship and publishing, and in arts and media.[44] The journal *Movoznavstvo* (literally 'Language Studies') appeared in 1967, which was dedicated to language questions. The driving question of this time concerned what actually **was** Ukrainian, and what needed to be pruned from the dictionaries and written language as foreign.[45] During the 1950s and 1960s, demands to declare Ukrainian the national language of Ukraine emerged for the first time (most notably at a conference on

[44] Solchanyk, (1989), pp. 80-3.
[45] Dingley, (1989), p 185.

language in Kyiv, in February of 1963, which produced a resolution appealing to the party leadership to declare Ukrainian the official language of Ukraine), as the intelligentsia mobilised in defence of their language often supported by the local party leaders.[46] In Moscow, policies to counteract this upsurge in dissidence and national awareness continued to be made until the era of glasnost.

As Holowinsky indicates, Soviet policy had taken a severe toll on the number of speakers of Ukrainian in Ukraine. The effects of Russification can be measured in population statistics: In Ukraine in 1979, the total population measured 49, 757 million. 85.5% of this population claimed their language of nationality as their native language, which showed a decline from 1979's percentage of 89.9%. Within this figure, 66.3% considered Ukrainian their native language, down from 69.4% in 1970. The percentage of those claiming Russian increased from 28.1% to 31.2% in the same two censuses. In addition, those considering Russian their second language rose from 28.6% to 40%. The percentage of Ukrainians in Ukraine suffered a decline as well. The drop in the number of people who considered their native language the language of their nationality shows that a number of Ukrainians had come to consider Russian their primary language. While these statistics could be erroneous due to flaws in polling procedure, or the uncertainty of those polled as to their nationality or native language, it nonetheless becomes apparent that Ukrainian language over the decade 1970-1980 declined in position, especially with reference to Russian.[47] Statistics from 1993 still show the large percentage of ethnic Russians (11.3 million, or 22.1%), and

[46] Krawchenko, (1985), chapter 5.
[47] Solchanyk, (1980), pp. 272-73. Statistics are taken from the 1970 and 1979 Soviet

Ukrainians who feel Russian is their first language (4.6 million, 12.3% of Ukrainians).[48]

In spite of Soviet efforts to the contrary, Ukrainian language still existed and was still spoken by many Ukrainians. How had the language survived such consistent and heavy-handed attempts to wipe it out? One theory suggests ancient nations tend to be more stable, and therefore more resistant to such attempts to assimilate them.[49] Another suggestion included the presence of the Institute of the Ukrainian Language in the Academy of Sciences as a positive force in preserving the standard, even though the long-time director Bilodid has been accused of Russification.[50] It has been suggested that self-identity is often enough, when language, culture, and a separate political state are not available to form national self -perception. In any case, there were enough nationally-conscious Ukrainians to preserve the language, and the culture around it, until such time as it could be freely used again.

In the years immediately previous to and after independence, Ukraine faced two major problems, both of which were reflected in the lively linguistic debates of the time. Arel explains, 'Language politics can be so intense, at times, because they play on the symbolism of unequal group standing, make people fear for their jobs or careers, and affect the institution of cultural socialisation *par excellence*, the school. To pronounce a single langauge 'official' implies that the people speaking that language have greater political rights than others.'[51]

Censuses.
[48] Solchanyk, (1993) p. 2.
[49] Nepyvoda, interview, August, 1996, Kyiv. This viewpoint was echoed by P. Dobriansky (1995).
[50] Ermolenko, interview, August 1996, Kyiv.
[51] Arel, (1995b), p. 1.

First, the new nation suffered an identity crisis, especially in relation to Russia, which challenged its self-image and sense of unity: could Ukraine define itself, or its language, except in contrast or comparison to Russia? This could have important linguistic consequences, if forms perceived to be Russian in origin were suddenly very unwelcome in the language, or if Russian speakers found themselves socially second-class citizens. If Russian indeed became adopted as a second official language, the reverse might be true: Russian forms could go nearly unnoticed except by a few linguists, and Ukrainian could lose status as a language only regularly used by part of the population. This relates in turn to the second major cause for concern.

Decades of Russification meant heavy linguistic casualties in a number of areas, which affected not only the use of Ukrainian, but its purity as well. Particularly in the South and East of Ukraine, a number of 'necessary' conditions have been met which produce linguistic assimilation, causing the number of Ukrainian speakers to drop. These include exposure, urbanisation, migration and the linguistic closeness of Ukrainian and Russian.[52] Furthermore there have been problems of perception, both among Ukrainians and among Russians in Ukraine, which created the impression that Ukrainian language may not offer the same opportunities to speakers as Russian. Others feel, as Solchanyk explains, 'that Ukraine is really part of Russia and that the Ukrainian language was invented by 'separatists' in the nineteenth century,'[53] which justifies both to Russians in Ukraine and to Russian-speaking Ukrainians a policy of close integration with Russia. This topic is explored in more detail in Chapter

[52] Silver, (1974), pp. 45-66.
[53] Solchanyk, (1993), p. 2.

Three, which explores Ukrainian national identity. Suffice it to say that these past perceptions are beginning to change in favour of Ukrainian.

Contemporary policy: Independence and beyond

This struggle over the position of Ukrainian language has characterised the last forty years of this century in Ukraine, especially in relation to Russian language. Language policy on the law books of Soviet Ukraine and the reality of the language situation were two different things. This unfortunately could also be said for current, post-independence language policy. While legislators succeeded in declaring Ukrainian the sole official language in Ukraine, there is still discussion about the role of Russian. From the start of glasnost' through independence, policy has evolved in an effort to satisfactorily respond to the needs of the population, starting with the tenets of the 1989 Law on Languages. (Note the plural ending of 'languages', evidence that lawmakers were considering at least Russian and Ukrainian as potential official languages at that time). This law stated that Ukrainian would be the sole language of administration, that it would be mandatory in all Russian schools as a second language, that the higher education institutions would eventually have to instruct in Ukrainian, and that public signs would be in Ukrainian, or at least in both languages.[54]

In 1991, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the 'Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities' which allowed the development of all the languages and cultures present in Ukraine.[55] One of the biggest differences between these two documents, as Arel observes, is the criteria used. The first

[54] Arel, (1995a), p. 600.
[55] Arel, (1995b)p. 13.

document suggests basing the use of a second language on an ethnic criterion, i.e. where a nationality was 'compactly settled'. The second switches to a linguistic criterion, suggesting the use of whatever language is acceptable to the population of an area. The Law on National Minorities reverted to the ethnic criterion, although the Constitution uses the linguistic one in an attempt to remove ethnicity as a component of Ukrainian nationality. This distinction is particularly important given the number of Ukrainians who speak Russian as a first language, and as a means to encourage ethnic Russians to learn to speak Ukrainian. As Arel rightly observes, implementation of such a law could mean not only ethnic conflict between Russians and Ukrainians, but also language conflict between Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers, including ethnic Ukrainians.[56]

Other relevant laws focus on the sovereignty of Ukraine, and respect the rights of minorities who live there. The July 16 1990 Law on the Sovereignty of Ukraine allows cultural rights to all groups in Ukraine. The October 1991 Law on Ukrainian Citizenship guarantees that all residents of Ukraine at that date are considered citizens, regardless of ethnicity. The Law on National Minorities of June 25, 1992 guarantees instruction in one's native language.[57] The newly ratified Constitution grants only Ukrainian official status, but allows for educational and other rights in several of the prevalent minority languages, including Russian. This would mean, in some areas (particularly in the South and East, and in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea), that education and public business could be carried out legally in Russian, as the population density of

[56] Arel, (1993), p. 131.
[57] Dobriansky, P., (1995), p 38.

Russian speakers is higher than that of Ukrainian speakers.[58] If these laws can indeed be taken as evidence, there appears to be a large degree of tolerance for other languages in Ukraine, combined with a desire to see Ukrainian language preserved. The effectiveness of such policy will be examined later, as well as the cost-effectiveness and the ability to realistically implement even the best-designed incentives within a strained budget.

While Ukrainian has been declared the official State Language, difficulties arise in making the desire of nationalists and patriots meet the realities of contemporary Ukraine, especially given the legacy of decades of influence by Russia. The reversal of this trend will not occur immediately. Most likely to blame for the delay in the implementation of the new policy are inertia resulting from Russification and reluctance of party functionaries still in their positions of influence who do not see supporting these measures as advantageous.[59] Furthermore, policy concerning official usage of Ukrainian ratified pre-independence was sufficiently loosely worded to allow Russian to remain a de facto official language, as there were no penalties built in for those who do not comply with the requirement to learn Ukrainian on the job. An alternative is to emphasise the provision of incentives to learn and use Ukrainian, such as a tax on publications not in Ukrainian, the lack of advancement for those who do not speak Ukrainian, or requirements that exams for further education be given only in Ukrainian. Such ideas espouse the idea that the right to be educated in one's 'mother language' and the right to be served in that language are the two most central language rights. Enforcing this

[58] Article 53, paragraph five.
[59] Holowinsky, (1994), p. 17.

notion would mean that anyone wishing to participate fully in the new state, especially in the public sector, must have good command of its language.

However, such changes must be slow and not forced. Even with language and culture goals in mind, money and day-to-day necessities of administration, repairs to buildings and roads and the limits imposed by the budget mean that linguist changes, a low priority in a country suffering the economic and political growing pains Ukrainiane is experienceing, will take time. Despite the slow pace, however, changes are taking place. Kuzio cautions against several common errors in interpretation made by those interested in the Ukrainian situation:

- Language cannot be the only marker of ethnic identity, though it is important,
- Russian will be nearly impossible to eradicate or make entirely foreign in Ukraine, and
- Russian speakers do not necessarily have a 'little Russian' mentality or identity.[60]

He summarises, 'Debate will continue surrounding language proficiency, but disdain and hostility towards the Ukrainian language, which existed until the late Gorbachev era, have all but disappeared'.[61] Since Russia and Ukraine historically share similar cultures, language may continue to be an important distinguishing factor.

The reality of the situation seven years from independence is that difficulties remain in making the desire of nationalists and patriots meet the realities of contemporary Ukraine, especially given the historical and

[60] Kuzio, (1997), p. 262.
[61] Kuzio, (1997), p. 264.

continuing presence and influence by Russia. While it is in theory desirable for Ukrainians to speak Ukrainian, many members of the intelligentsia class were educated in Russian and still use it daily at work and in official capacities. However, to allow Russian to stand alongside Ukrainian as a State Language, while positively affecting relations with Russia, would be too great a concession to the influence of Russian under the Soviets, and could hinder the spread of Ukrainian. Too often demands for a second state language may be accompanied by other less palatable demands, for greater ties with Russia, dual citizenship, or a federated structure within Ukraine.[62] Nonetheless, a special reference to Russian occurs in the recently adopted Constitution:

> The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language.
>
> The State ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.
>
> In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and[63] other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed.[64]

One could interpret such a mention as a compromise to speed the already slowed process of ratification of the Constitution, but it also reflects competing sentiments about language politics in Ukraine. Assertions that Ukrainian should function undisputed as the language of Ukraine are often countered by equally vocal claims that this is penalising Russians or Russian-speakers in Ukraine. While an extensive review of such opinions would be out of place in this work, the political counterpart to linguistic

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[62] Solchanyk, (1993), p. 2. Arel supports this view, but Kuzio is reluctant to equate linguistic Russification with political sympathy. 'Little Russianism' is defined and discussed in Chapter Three.

[63] This 'and' was a matter of contention, and does not appear in the Ukrainian language version of the Constitution. Russian speakers did not like to include themselves in the category of national minority, and wished the Constitution to separate them from that group.

[64] The Constitution of Ukraine, official English translation, 1996, Article 10.

debate centres on social behaviour of the ex-majority, namely Russians, and the new national 'indigenous' or 'titular' group in Ukraine and represents one aspect of the problem. Arel describes this angle of the conflict as follows:

> The nationalizing intent of the Ukrainian state, however, is not directed at national minorities, but at the most important *linguistic* minority, (which, as we will see, may currently be a majority)--the group which, irrespective of ethnic background, primarily identifies with the Russian language and culture....This makes the national question in Ukraine as much a family squabble, or a case of *intra*-ethnic discord, as an *inter*-ethnic political struggle.[65]

In any case, steps towards total changeover to Ukrainian in all aspects of professional life cannot be immediate due to lack of knowledge on the part of the populace, and simple practical concerns including finance. This aspect of the position of Ukrainian, while it has been nearly resolved in policy, may take some time to become a tangible reality. The language people use, while certainly not the main issue, has become enough of an issue that one scholar remarks that Ukrainians are not Russian if they speak Russian, and that nationalist sentiment must not be confused with fact. Arel notes the opinion that Russian is viewed as an imperialistic language, and that Russia's ties with Ukraine are now being presented as historically imperialistic and given to encouraging Russification at the expense of Ukrainian culture.[66]

This kind of reaction is hardly surprising given the extent to which Russification was practiced in Ukraine. Several problems arose during that time which still vex policymakers and language enthusiasts alike. Overt terrorist threats to known intelligentsia are perhaps the best-known means

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[65] Arel, (1995b). Arel defines a nationalizing state as one which 'despite being ethnically heterogeneous, nonetheless see themselves as nation-states, i.e. as if their 'borders coincided or nearly coincided with the territorial distribution of the politicized ethnic community'. Arel is quoting Connor, W., *Ethnonationalism. The Quest for Understanding*, (1994), p. 96.

[66] Arel, (1995b), p. 19.

of 'encouraging' citizens of the USSR to follow linguistic and political unification goals, but often other tactics were as damaging. During the course of Soviet rule, stereotypes of Ukrainian as a language of the village, unfit for technological or scientific discussion, were aided by the literal and linguistic exodus of talent to Moscow[67]. Bilingualism, long touted as a positive influence for Ukraine, meant that Ukrainian words were replaced with Russian counterparts not only in dictionaries but also in the minds of speakers who could not keep the two linguistic codes separate. Russian was supported as the general lexical fund for all Soviet languages, and as a language of unity and Union-wide participation.[68] Gradually, using such policies, Russian came to replace Ukrainian in most social functions, including government and education. Since many people spoke Ukrainian at home, a *surzhyk* emerged--a mixture of the two languages, intelligible to speakers of both but lacking the status of either language.[69]

Goals set by those in power are ambitious. Ihor Ostash, academic and a member of the Verkhovna Rada, wrote in 1991 a list of areas for advancement. He includes elevating the prestige of Ukrainian, introducing Ukrainian studies departments in well-known world universities, research in and about Ukrainian, the 'computerisation' of the language (meaning the adaptation of programmes and fonts so that computers may be used in Ukrainian rather than English or Russian, which has since been accomplished), a renovation of the standard and the provision of good teaching materials including modern technology to students of Ukrainian.

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[67] Dziuba, (1992), p. 62.
[68] Ostash, (1995), pp. 132-36; and Masenko, (1995), pp. 69-72.
[69] For more information on formation of such mixture languages see Fontaine, S., *Pidgins and Creoles*, (1988).

Some of these goals are met, or on their way to completion, but others are very much a dream for the future.[70] As with other plans in the new state, economics prevent the realisation of such ambitions without first solving pressing political and financial issues.

Politics and linguistics cannot help but affect the choice which faces Ukraine today: a *nationalist* approach, which would place high value on Ukrainian language as a tenet of Ukrainian ethnicity, or *nationism*, which would again emphasise Ukrainian language, but as a practical tool necessary for surviving in a multi-ethnic society.[71] This dichotomy is reflected socially and culturally in other debates. Should the Constitution state 'Ukrainsk'iyi Narod' or 'Narod Ukrayiny' (Ukrainian people or people of Ukraine)? Furthermore, nationalism itself can serve either as a means to bind the newly-independent society together by emphasising common statehood, or it can create schisms by emphasising language, thus alienating Russian-speakers of whatever ethnicity, or by placing importance on ethnicity itself, thus alienating other groups in the population.[72] It must also be remembered that Russian living in Ukraine supported the independence referendum in large numbers, mostly for economic reasons: they believed their own interests would best be served in an independent Ukraine whose economy would improve once separated from Russia. Economic problems already stretch the loyalty of this group, and penalising language policy could only alienate them further.[73]

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[70] Ostash, (1991), pp.141-142.
[71] Eastman, (1983), p. 14. The choice can also be expressed according to UNESCO guidelines, as a decision to use an LWC (language of wider communication) for access to international materials, or to adopt a national language. (pp. 12-13). Furthermore, other considerations abound: Is developing the national language cost-effective; will linguistic homogeneity be helpful to society, for example to provide cohesiveness to a newly-independent country? (pp. 62-75)
[72] Dobriansky, P., (1995), p 36.
[73] Dobriansky, P., (1995), p. 39-40.

The Cultural Interpretation: Imported ideas, imported words?

Several conclusions from the past history of language planning in Ukraine may be helpful in the assessment of current regulatory and language promotion policies. First, in Ukraine, language at the lawmaking level at least, has always been a political and a national, issue. Speaking the language is not only a matter of communication, but a statement of ethnicity and an indicator of political alignment for some. Second, the perceived status of Ukrainian by speakers can either aid or hinder attempts to create a Ukrainian-speaking state. Foreign rule and influence has long elevated the status of Russian, and more recently European languages and English, above that of Ukrainian in the eyes of the general public, who may now be unwilling to believe that speaking their national language will not lower their clout with others. Finally, while debates rage in linguistic circles, and between devout nationalists, over what is good Ukrainian, and how much other languages should be tolerated, the average citizen of Ukraine conducts daily business and speaks whatever language is available and intelligible to others. The average person has other things to worry about in this young nation than what language to speak.

The following research attempts to analyse the relative status of Ukrainian and Russian in Independent Ukraine. One key indicator of this is usage: is Ukrainian used exclusively anywhere, and if so, for what functions? In addition, what functions are still primarily carried out in Russian? By examining which functions are associated with each language, one can assess whether the status of these functions relates to

the language used, for example the home language versus the language of important government documents. In addition, it must be clarified what incentives have been offered to encourage the use of Ukrainian, and what might motivate a speaker of whatever ethnicity to choose Ukrainian, be it career advancement, nationalism, or national cohesiveness. Further evidence can be supplied by publishing figures for material in each language, and the subjects covered in each; education in both languages and the quality of schools, materials, and instruction in each; and media and broadcasting in both languages. Government policy and the priority given to linguistic concerns, coupled with attention and success in their implementation serve as further indicators of progress. These areas are the major means of language planning implementation, which measure the level of the success of policies designed to support Ukrainian as the official language.

Not all of these factors can be quantified satisfactorily. For example, ethnicity, as previously discussed, may or may not be related to language in the mind of the speaker, so that even Ukrainians who speak only Russian may not feel culturally assimilated. Additionally, some ethnic Russians may feel their loyalty is to their home in Ukraine and not to their ethnic culture.

A given citizen of Ukraine may feel Ukrainian when talking to his grandparents, part of the Slavic tradition while at church on Sunday, but ex-Soviet or even Russian when at work during the week when he must speak Russian with co-workers. He may want his children to speak his native language, but may feel their university careers are better advanced by a Russian-speaking education. Or he may observe the improving

quality of published materials, the increased availability of Ukrainian press, and see the more modern television programs and feel he will have to use Ukrainian to function in society in the near future, but may not know his language well enough to use it everywhere. These are the conflicts usual to bi-lingual culture, and to bi-lingual speakers, and are difficult to measure with statistics. What the average citizen thinks may be only subjectively assessed, but what this citizen does that is measureable will provide valuable clues, and enable an accurate description of language behaviour, the success of language planning, and the status of both languages in Ukrainian society.

Sociolinguistic methods allow the study of linguistic behaviour as a barometer of society, so that an understanding of the former serves to illustrate and illuminate aspects of the latter. One would therefore expect a post-totalitarian society to display linguistic democratisation parallel to related social and political processes. Ukraine is suffering what has been called 'post-soviet puberty', where old beliefs about the Ukrainian language must be challenged to aid the country in becoming a stable and mature world player.

One current is the de-ritualisation of Ukrainian, that is, the move from an idealised view of Ukrainian as the language of Shevchenko and a symbol of defiance to a more democratic, everyday perception of the language as a means of varied types of expression (a trend which is explored in detail in Chapter Three). New challenges face the langauge, but a call for pragmatism and common sense, for patriotism rather than chauvinistic nationalism, is emerging to compete with radical viewpoints. The years since Ukrainian Independence, or even since the 1989

Language Law have witnessed changes in thinking and a pronounced rejection of Russian, although economics and inertia continue to be obstacles to the development of Ukraine as an independent state with its own language.

What else affects language behaviour? Policy can influence or even attempt to coerce, but in the end it represents ideal behaviours which may not reflect reality. One factor which certainly influences usage of Ukrainian is the perceived status of the language, or rather, the lack of it. As previously mentioned, this issue weighs on the minds of many. Ukrainian is often regarded as a village language, which if spoken in public, would elicit ridicule or even chastisement for the speaker. Such attitudes have long existed in Ukraine, and certainly were not alleviated by Soviet policy of keeping the most prestigious functions of official business and interethnic communication for Russian in the republics. Even without a specific policy demanding the use of Russian, and indeed in spite of the laws guaranteeing the usage of Ukrainian, there are social factors which may hinder wide acceptance of Ukrainian as a language without stigma, which may be neutrally used in every situation.

Some of this is an obvious 'hangover' from the Soviet era in which nationalism was strongly discouraged. Academic journals and learned works appeared in Russian, which helped cement the association of Russian language with modernity, progress, technology, and urbanity. More subtle threads in society regulated language usage, which may be harder to counteract or erase.

Social class in Ukrainian is based largely on one's profession and education. Reasons for the lack of an indigenous aristocracy are no doubt

obvious, leaving the industrial and academic elite on the top of the class pyramid. Loyalties in these strata depend on many things, but the nationally conscious academic elite tend to be aligned with Ukrainian. As one would imagine, the industrial elite may not necessarily follow this example. The working classes, which were so glorified by the Soviets, make up the next sector. Last are the peasants, in spite of rather nostalgic romanticisation in literature and folklore

Clearly, those who set language policy envisage a future where communication occurs in Ukrainian, where the effects of Russification have been reversed to a sufficient degree to allow Ukrainians to automatically, and without prompting or feeling self-conscious, address one another in Ukrainian. Putting this in the framework language planning for analysis, one must assess the success of these policies as language planning, and surmise what remains to be addressed.

One continuing problem, both social and linguistic, is the lingering inferiority complex concerning Russia. As a rather tongue-in-cheek Kiev Post article expressed it:

> Nationalists are permanently on the defensive, ready to lash out at Rusia's every slip--schoolyard behaviour which only undermines their legitimacy...Ask a Ukrainian to describe his culture, and the response is invariably formed as a comparison to Russia: Ukrainians are warmer, keep tidier houses, sing purer melodies. Enough with the comparatives.[74]

However, some comparatives and even a little envy are understandable. Russia sports many modern and flashy accoutrements which Ukraine has not yet managed to acquire. As the inheritor of Soviet structures, Russia maintains the lead in publishing and television, for example, because it has taken advantage of its inheritance and has not

[74] Callaway, (1996), p. 16.

been forced to start from the ground up. These problems for Ukraine can and will take time to solve, and will only improve when money can be poured into developing Ukrainian language television programming, or into printing all types of reading materials in Ukrainian.

Where is Ukraine on its road to linguistic and social stability? Opinions vary, as one would expect. After spending more than enough time in the company of a hopeless Moscophile, one would be tempted to despair for progress in Ukraine: the endless nostalgia for the order of Stalin's rule, the construction and road repairs of Soviet times, and ceaseless compliments for Moscow's underground, its theatre, its television, and even Yeltsin. Thankfully, such opinions represent only one end of the spectrum, and other more optimistic voices can also be heard.

Outsiders are often more optimistic than natives. Sergeant First Class Max Duke, serving at the time of interview in the Defense Attaché's department of the American Embassy in Kyiv, observed that already Russian-only speaking military were losing promotions to their bi-lingual contemporaries. While he admits that the lack of agreement in terminology has forced the American Embassy to use Russian interpreters, he could also describe the new attitude of the U.S government to Ukraine as a valuable potential partner.[75] Such affiliations can be welcomed as a way to prevent Ukraine renewing its affiliation with Russia should Russian/U.S. relations ever sour. Others observed a sudden change in language of conversation at work from Russian to Ukrainian in the wake of the ratification of the Constitution. This could be explained as national pride, or perhaps a lessening of anxiety about the potential consequences for speaking Ukrainian on the job.

Several of those interviewed mentioned another trend, or even fashion replacing Russian as the main influence. English is becoming widespread enough to have a significant impact on Ukrainian culture, perhaps as a result of re-alignment away from Russia and a desire to join in European culture.[76] On any street book-vendors sell English language course materials, books in English, as well as other foreign languages. Stalls which sell (illegally copied) cassettes usually have one set of Russian music, and one of English-language rock, both modern and classic pop music. Though foreign newspapers are somewhat difficult to find, many newsagents carry the local version of Vogue, Harper's Bazaar, or Playboy. Though these are available in Russian and not Ukrainian, the cultural influence is almost more interesting than the language used. Disney, Pepsi, and Coke have recently been joined by McDonald's, which is predictably popular. Most young people study English in school, and seem to have no trouble incorporating Western imports into their culture.

Since many of those trading in Ukraine have made an effort to translate their advertising campaigns into the local language (*zawzhdy Koka Kola* comes to mind), the linguistic effects of such new products may only reinforce the new orientation to the West. The social effects of Western imports, including not only American fast food, but French and German food and goods as well, should not be underestimated. The acceptance of foreign culture will mean a more ready acceptance of words from these donor cultures, and could therefore have significant linguistic consequences.

This is most readily observed already in computing vocabulary. No

[75] Interview, July, 1996, SFC Max Duke, Kyiv.
[76] This viewpoint, expressed by Professor Ermolenko in both interviews, is also analysed

one really says *drukhovka*, but uses *printer*, as well as *faks, kompiuter, vord* (Word for Windows usually comes out as '*vord for vindoz*') and others. This demonstrates the problem linguists face when trying to coin new terminology for Ukrainian, and find that foreign forms are already widely accepted and used.

Other areas manifest foreign influence as well: Ukrainians discuss *seks*, or refer to people as *homoseksualnyi* which are obvious borrowings. Such topics highlight another problem area, the open reference to sex and similar matters has always been taboo. With a more open culture gradually emerging, Ukraine is struggling to develop not only slang (a sure sign of democracy) but the mental attitude which accepts such things as part of an open society. In fact, when questioned, often Ukrainians will deny the presence of 'rude' or 'vulgar' slang, consigning sexual slang to the realm of the bedroom (where generally researchers are not welcome), or to the vocabulary of undesirables. Women are especially reluctant to supply words any stronger than the equivalent of English 'darn' but when pressed will admit that Ukrainian men have a rather extensive lexicon of curses at their disposal. Swearing in Ukrainian apparently tends to reflect a Russian influence most obviously in the young, who often simply swear in Russian, or to consist of folk sayings and expressions among older Ukrainians--which range from mild exclamations or nicknames to truly rude words.

This topic really must be addressed in further research, which could characterise emerging slang, if there is any, especially that which may be different from the Russian slang used by most young people. The willingness to discuss issues such as homosexuality, birth control, pre-marital sex, or even disability or mental illness becomes less common with

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in the article by Ihor Ostash in *Quo Vadis Ukraino*, previously cited.

each successive age group. Here again, sociolinguistic methods would allow the parallel development of comfort dealing with these topics and new linguistic terms for them to be studied.

Particular areas of lexicon and language development are treated elsewhere, including media, publishing, education, and internal language issues (spelling, morphology, and terminology). The general language climate, and new questions and problems can be addressed more briefly. Recent work has shown that while many of the same concerns exist, social processes have opened the mythological box of Pandora for speakers of Ukrainian, and attitudes will have to change if they intend to discuss what they see in their own language.

Within the scope of this research, however, are general attitudes to terminology and the changing language, including a call from nearly everyone for a clean-up. Terminology has been set in every area, and a new dictionary is available, so it remains for the proper Ukrainian words to be used and adopted to replace Russianisms. Criteria for new words in Ukrainian seem widely shared among linguists and others concerned, including common-sense attitudes towards the lexicon and a widely-shared desire to eliminate or at least minimise Russian influence.

Everyone admits that language is, out of sheer necessity, a peripheral issue, a symbol of the national struggle. The economy is struggling to improve, and there are still many people below the poverty line. The language situation, therefore, is not only a reflection of other battles, but is also directly related inasmuch as it cannot improve until social problems are resolved.

With that in mind, significant progress has been made. Several

years ago, many people were not aware that Ukraine was not part of Russia. Now Ukraine is able to compete on a world stage, as at the Olympics. As national morale improves with achievements internationally, the language problem can also improve.

At this stage, it is crucial that children begin to hear and speak Ukrainian so their ear and sense of the language can be restored. For older people, the 'codes' which are confused can be distinguished with teaching, so that people can be aware of what is Ukrainian and what is Russian. Furthermore, Ukrainians will follow the example of their leaders, in government and at work. If 'bosses' and MPs make an effort, as the President did, to speak Ukrainian, people will notice and use the language themselves. Finance exerts an influence on progress in all areas, as people need a motive, some kind of incentive to speak Ukrainian when many find speaking Russian easier. Such initiatives could be, as Arel admits, the threat of losing one's career without the ability to speak the state language, or the possibility of failing an exam to enter university without competency in Ukrainian.[77]

These disparate threads of the current situation can be woven together to describe what is very much a work in progress. Some of the legislation is ambiguous, or gives attention to Russian when such references only highlight the divide that is present culturally, politically, regionally, and linguistically. While language is on one hand a mirror of problems present in other areas of society, it could, if adequate encouragement, planning, and initiative were present, be a powerful tool to bind the peoples of the new nation of Ukraine together.

[77] Arel, (1995b), pp. 20-23.

Chapter Three: Language and State-building in Ukraine

Six years after independence, Ukraine is still fighting a two-front war on its territory. The nagging problems of bilingualism, and the lack of total acceptance of Ukrainian as the state language linger, lurking behind every election campaign, education policy and media profits report. On the other side, the still-new Ukrainian state must find a way to bind its diverse population together into a cohesive and self-aware body, state-minded in its interests and reliably Ukrainian in its mentality. The second obviously compounds the first, exaggerating the linguistic divide between ethnic Ukrainians of different language orientations into a cultural divide, and potentially alienating ethnic Russians on Ukrainian soil who are citizens of the new republic. Language in Ukraine as one facet of nation-building could fulfil one of two contradictory functions: it may serve as a potential cement to bind together a multi-ethnic state, or conversely, the language issue may be the wedge that forces the nation apart. Thus, while language in education or in the media may not be as pressing an issue as actually funding either of these cultural institutions, the importance of language as a tenet of national identity, and further, national loyalty cannot be underestimated. Language is unavoidably a key player in the process of state-building in Ukraine, with potentially mixed consequences surrounding linguistic activity.

Language and National Identity:

The natural question arises, what makes up national identity? What makes citizens of Ukraine feel 'Ukrainian'? First, one must distinguish between an ethnos and a nation. 'Nation' for the purposes of this discussion extends the definition of ethnos (effectively a group of related

peoples with shared characteristics) to include self-consciousness and according to Arel, politicization[1]. This is an important distinction, as there need not be any dependence on territory: After all, there are many Ukrainians who do not live in Ukraine itself, and for many years the Ukrainian people did not have a state at all. This also preserves the distinction between nation and 'state', which is a political body and may be mono- or multi-ethnic. Secondly, one may identify various components which make up the identity of an ethnos, and consequently, the nation this group may form.[2] These need not be universal, as some peoples place greater emphasis on religion, or homogeneous bloodlines or the presence (or absence) of a monarch. One problem with this idea in Ukraine is the persistent use of comparatives, and negatives in self-definition: one finds Ukrainians are 'more' this or that than the Russians, or that they are 'not' Russians and 'not' Poles.[3] Walker Conner emphasises the importance of self-definition in classifying nations.

> The state is the major political subdivision of the globe. And as such, it is readily defined, and...it is easily conceptualized in quantitative terms...Defining and conceptualizing the nation is much more difficult bcause the essence of a nation is intangible. This essence is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members..Even when one restricts nation to its proper, non-political meaning of a human collectivity, the ambiguity surrounding its nature is not thereby evaporated...Since the nation is a self-defined rather than an other-defined grouping, the broadly held conviction concerning the group's singular origin need not and seldom will accord with factual data.[4]

Ukrainoznavstvo would seek to establish what Ukrainians are, only in reference to themselves. According to the definition of 'Ukrainoznavstvo' (literally, study of Ukraine) the national identity of Ukraine includes

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[1] Arel, (1995b), p. 1.
[2] For a more complete discussion of ethnos as this concept relates to language, a good source is 'Mova i Etnos', by Svitlana Ermolenko, (1996).
[3] See further discussion of this use of comparatives in Chapter 2.
[4] Connor, (1994a), pp. 36-7.

language, literature, religion, history, culture (material culture, folklore, and fine arts) and education[5]. Motyl suggests 'shared belief in certain defining myths may be the best way of coming to terms with what a "Ukrainian" is or is likely to be'.[6] Language directly influences areas such as literature and education, but also has an affect on history, politics and the image of Ukraine abroad that may in turn resonate in other areas of culture. In the wake of Communism, there is ample ideological space for a new identity, but first terms must be re-defined in the language of democracy, and not in Soviet speak. However, this space means the Ukrainian 'elites' may forge whatever identity they chose, using whatever historical and culture symbols appeal.[7]

The task will not be easy. Motyl states, 'Post-Soviet elites must therefore not only refashion neglected ethnic identities, but also forge thoroughly new national ones involving popular allegiance to myths and symbols that are neither narrowly ethnic nor conceptually vapid'.[8] Instead of two sides to the argument, there are at least four. First, there are ethnic Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian, whose position in favour of promoting their language is predictable, though the extent and nature of their support is not as is later explained. Second, there are Ukrainians who speak Russian as their native language, with some knowledge of Ukrainian either passively or as a second, foreign language. These citizens of Ukraine would fit any ethnic criteria had such been established by the Constitution, but may not be reliably pro-Ukrainian language, or anti-Russian for a

[5] Taken from a poster on the wall of Petro Petrovich Kononenko's office, located in the Taras Shevchenko University in Kyiv. *Ukrainoznavstvo* is viewed as a tree with branches in all of these areas.
[6] Motyl, (1993), p. 7
[7] Motyl, (1993), p. 76.
[8] Motyl, (1993), p. 79.

number of reasons. Although many of these people voted for independence, their current voting behaviour and political/national loyalty is not predictable, especially if they begin to feel discrimination in the face of pro-Ukrainian language planning.[9] Third, one must count ethnic Russians who were relocated to Ukraine, or in some areas, whose families may have lived in Ukraine since the steppes were colonised. This group also may begin to feel alienated by pro-Ukrainian policy, which may in turn be compounded by loyalty to their 'fatherland'. Finally, one must include Ukrainians in diaspora, who while not wielding any obvious political power, have certainly exercised financial and linguistic power in recent debates. Certain areas of Ukraine have high concentrations of other minorities, including Jews, Turks, Poles or Gypsies who will decide to use whichever language grants them the greatest opportunities in Ukraine. This further mixed group may eventually figure in the debate as both Russian and Ukrainian vie for dominance as the language of inter-ethnic communication in Ukraine. With such a disparate group of citizens in the new state, creating a national identity to suit them all must necessarily rely on linguistic or political/national criteria and not ethnicity, though language as an issue may prove difficult as long as Russian remains prevalent.

History and historiography may be profoundly affected by language policy, as language beliefs may in turn affect the view taken concerning one's national history. Many historians, including Riasanovsky and Zenkovsky, refer to the early state centred in Kyiv as 'Kievan Russia', when Ukrainian historians refer to this state and time period as 'Kyivan Rus''. Here language highlights a deeper issue, since Russia would like to

[9] March 1998 election results as available.

claim an ancient origin, and has in the past co-opted Kyiv as the birthplace of the Russian state. One scarcely need remind historians that Kyiv was, and continues to be, in Ukraine. Ukrainian historians continue to assert that Muscovy had its origins in the thirteenth century, and cannot be counted as a nation before that time, while Russian historians assert that the Slavic peoples began as one group that branched into three nations, the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Belarusians. One could argue that the historical origins of each nation are not directly relevant, but with age comes legitimacy in the eyes of the Ukrainians, and ancient origins help justify the existence of Ukraine as an independent state, with its own separate language and culture. Connor adds that the belief in a separate origin and evolution forms an important aspect of national psychology.[10] Ukrainian historiography, separate from Russian, Polish, or Soviet assertions can be traced to Kostomarov, author of 'Dve Russkie narodnosti', and the serious challenges presented by Hrushevs'kyi's major work, and also the work of earlier nineteenth-century historians such as Antonovych, Vladimirskii-Budanov, Bantysh-Kamenskii and Markevych. Their work began to erode the belief that the more ancient Russian population had migrated out of its Ukrainian homeland, or that the Poles had exerted a civilising influence on the otherwise barbaric 'Ukrainian' tribes.[11] Without dwelling at length on the treatment of Ukrainian history, and indeed archaeology and political history, suffice it to say that the Ukrainian version of events places distinctly Slavic, even proto-Ukrainian peoples as the settlers of the territory of Ukraine, and as successful state-builders capable of interacting with the various tribes and states which

[10] Connor, (1994a), pp. 36-7.
[11] Historical assumptions encouraged by the Soviets, and previously the Poles and the

surrounded and invaded this land throughout its prehistory and early history.[12]

This disagreement leads to another in foreign relations. Arel asserts that the perception of Ukraine's history as 'exclusive and victimized' means that any relations with Russia will cast Ukraine as a victim: if one assumes the Ukrainian state is older, this must mean the Russian state conquered and exploited it and would continue to do so. Those of this opinion believe Russia will never view Ukraine as independent and equal.[13] Part of this is due to Russification, which encouraged Ukrainian language and Ukrainians themselves to become more Russian; additionally, Soviet policy furthered 'denationalisation', the loss of peculiarly national traits while encouraging this merger with Russian. One could trace the sense of victimisation by Russia back as far as the Zaporozhian Sich, and its leader Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. At the time of the Sich, Khmel'nyts'kyi first gained victory by defeating Poland, but was then made a vassal of Moscow. This provides enough evidence for some that union with Russia had been forced upon Ukraine before, and that no relationship was possible that did not involve force and defeat of Ukraine.[14]

For Ukrainians, the loss of 'Ukrainianness' is as damaging and demoralising to the new state as Russification had been to the old Soviet republic. Writing in the late 1960s, Dziuba describes the effects of Stalin's policies on the Ukrainian national consciousness:

> A taboo has weighed upon them [Ukrainians, JEPT] for some thirty-five

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Russian Empire are explored in depth in Magosci's *A History of Ukraine*, (1996).
[12] Magosci, (1996), especially Chapters 1-4.
[13] Arel, (1995b), pp. 25-6. This is Arel's interpretation of the relevance of this dispute over the origins of Russia and Ukraine.
[14] Armstrong, (1990), p. 4.

> years, so it is not at all surprising that they [nationalist sentiments] are so little developed among a considerable mass of the Ukrainian population, to the point that some Ukrainians, just as in pre-revolutionary days, know nothing of their national membership, and for a fair number, the concept of 'the Ukraine' is nothing but an administrative-geographical term....a good number of Ukrainians are ashamed of their nationality and their language, and consider it rustic, 'uncultured', and third-rate...Even worse, how many Ukrainians have given up their native language and their national self-knowledge as proof of their 'loyalty' so as 'not to stand out', 'not to be different'?[15]

Ukrainian national policy, as supported by Ukrainian nationalists and patriots, would not only attempt to prevent further Russification, and undo the effects of the past, but must also attempt to encourage national characteristics and unique aspects of Ukrainian culture as they re-emerge and are reaffirmed by the public. The Russian government could be seen to support bilingualism or even Russification in Ukraine even at present by its policy of protecting not only ethnic Russians living in other countries and republics, but also Russian speakers.[16] From the Russian side, this doubtless appears as concern for civil rights. For Ukrainians, this may arguably be seen as interference in their state affairs.

As both a national and nationalist issue, language policy has an unlimited ripple effect in Ukrainian society. Therefore, any measures adopted to increase the use and to spread the functional load of Ukrainian will eventually influence all aspects of daily life. Language laws and policies may start in the Institute of Ukrainian Language at the Academy of Sciences, or in the Verkhovna Rada. Newspapers and journals may independently undertake the use of Ukrainian, or may have to be nudged in that direction by laws and other incentives. Schools can choose their language of instruction based on both government dictates and the population of the area in which they are located. At any or all of these

[15] Dziuba, (1968), pp. 53-54.

levels, a number of outside forces act on public opinion and the resultant policy and legislation which in turn shape the linguistic climate in Ukraine.

One may summarise the overall effect of language choice as one of cultural loyalty. In theory, speakers may be expected to display some degree of loyalty to the culture of their native language. As discussed below, reasons for pressuring or encouraging Ukrainian citizens indicate that this belief holds among most supporters of Ukrainian language. For speakers of Russian, not only is local news about their own state available, but channels on television, and newspapers from Moscow. These Russian speakers may easily keep abreast of current events in neighbouring Russia, and become involved in political and social issues there as a result. Obviously this makes sense for ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, who may have family and friends on the other side of the border, (although given the extent of Soviet relocation practices, this is true for many nationalities including Ukrainians). For ethnic Ukrainians who speak Russian, only a subjective assessment is possible. One may look at their voting behaviour, or interview them about their cultural ties and identity. Further work could show that their Russian language loyalty may indeed translate into cultural or even political loyalty to Russia, but this remains an assumption. Given the proximity and shared history, those who wish to embrace European culture and politics may find any loyalty to Russia distressing. Thus, on a social and psychological level, language relates to more pragmatic concerns in foreign policy and ultimately to the success of Ukrainian independence.

In this as in other areas of language policy, interpretation of the

[16] Taranenko, (1996b), p. 24.

threat , posed by Russia and Russian language is entirely subjective. Arel, for example, believes the Ukrainian language is in less danger than Ukrainians imagine. Besides the 'exclusive and victimized' theory, he also suggests Ukrainians use this imminent threat as one defence of stringent language policy and so-called Ukrainisation. He characterises language politics as the 'politics of threatened identity'.[17] Karavansky, in contrast, comments 'The language question in Ukraine is a question of its independence'.[18] From this, it is apparent that those who feel a greater sense of encroachment and danger will be more adamant in their support of the promotion of Ukrainian, while others, most likely including Russian speakers, would not see the need to pass laws protecting Ukrainian or against the use of Russian.

Once one assumes language promotion is needed or desired, then further divisions in opinion occur as language policy may be guided by different approaches. In Ukraine, these are characterised by differing motives for the promotion of Ukrainian, and different bases for these motives. Among those bodies which may influence future language policy, and the enforcement of those laws already passed, two definite trends can be observed. First, a neo-Romantic movement is gaining momentum which places equal emphasis on the 'mentalitet' of the people, and the uniqueness of Ukrainian culture in the world. This viewpoint suggests that Ukrainian history, poetry, literature and indeed, the entire 'destiny' of Ukraine as a nation are inaccessible to those who do not speak Ukrainian. Believers in this ideology campaign for Ukrainian studies in foreign universities, and have as one goal the creation of Ukrainian schools in

[17] Arel, (1995a), p. 597.
[18] Arel, (1993), pp. 176-79.

Russia.[19]

In the neo-Romantic approach, one finds the concept of ethnos somewhat mythologised. Language is related to soul or spirit, or as Lyzanchuk states, the single greatest source of national spirit (*dukhovnost'*) is the native language[20]. This outlook suggests speaking one's language is a patriotic duty, as is knowledge of history and literature, and a fervent patriotism or even nationalism. Language is also a mystical connection to one's ancestors and their accomplishments in state-building, literature and culture. The mainstream of this movement comprises literary and historical scholars who consider themselves patriots first and foremost. Prokopiv, one scholar who falls under this category, writes that parents should enculturate their children with Ukrainian national soul by teaching them their language, and that 'real' Ukrainians speak Ukrainian.[21] Scholars holding the same ideas as Prokopiv have devoted a great deal of effort to researching the origins of Ukrainian (and proving that it is older than Russian) and to finding ways the languages are not only different, but that Ukrainian is superior, either in its beauty or in its inherent morality (Russians *zhenits'ia* ***na*** *nei,* Ukrainians *odruzhytysia* ***z*** *neiu,* proving for these linguists that Russians do not respect their women as equal partners while Ukrainians do.)[22] This group enjoys both high-level support and popular appeal, as it quite rightly generates support and enthusiasm for national symbols including language and presses to create a national perception to apply both in Ukraine and abroad. At the time of writing, the

[19] This relates to the notion of language rights, which minorities enjoy in Ukraine. In an area of compact settlement, a minority group may ask for schools in their language. Russians in Ukraine have this right; Ukrainians in Russia do not. (Ukrainain constitution, article 53).

[20] Lyzanchuk, (1992).

[21] Prokopiv, (1996).

scholar Petro Petrovich Kononenko, the *de facto* leader of the *Ukrainoznavstvo* movement which encourages this kind of idealistic thinking, is an advisor to the President.

There is a small faction who also espouse more extreme views. Their ideas include Ukrainian origins for the ancient Aryan tribe, or that Ukrainians first domesticated the horse, or a unique view on the origin and antiquity of the Ukrainian language. One could mention Krasuskii, who theorises Ukrainian is older than Sanskrit,[23] or Zaharychuk, the author of the pamphlet, 'The Ukrainian Alphabet' which suggests divine origins for the Ukrainian language[24]. Their works and others sharing their opinions influenced the radical elements of the Neo-Romantics. The presence of such opinions is tolerated by the mainstream, but only their patriotic zeal is ever praised. In fact, other scholars, both Neo-Romantic and Pragmatic in thought, express great concern if a foreigner begins to look interested in these radicals. Some of the more extreme members of this radical group are former dissidents, and have been detained for their activities so one cannot doubt the seriousness of their beliefs nor the extent to which they will support their ideology.

Some of what has been absorbed into Neo-Romantic doctrine in the past typified these dissident Ukrainians. Farmer notes 'Ukrainian nationalist dissenters have articulated the belief that the Ukrainian

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[22] This example is given by O. Taranenko (1996b), p. 28.
[23] Krasuskii's discussion was originally printed in 1880 in Odessa and entitled 'Drevnost' Malorossiskogo iazyka', reprinted in *Indo-Evropa*, No. 1, 1991. Krasuskii is not alone in these assertions, as one interviewee suggested English had arisen from ancient Ukrainian, and that words could be found to support this theory such as 'umbrella' from '*brillia*' (overhanging rock), or that 'the same' arose from Ukrainian *te same.* There is a canon of similar examples used by these linguists, most of which do not survive closer examination and are easily discredited with a knowledge of Indo-European or Latin.
[24] Zaharychuk, (1961). Zaharychuk believes attempts to unite Russian and Ukrainian by origin are a vicious plot on the part of Russian speakers to deprive Ukraine of its heritage and history.

language is an integral part of the Ukrainian national moral patrimony.'[25] By 'moral patrimony' one may assume Farmer means dissidents consider the language a vital sign of 'Ukrainianness', and as such, guaranteed by moral right to ethnic Ukrainians to be guarded and passed onto their children as an inheritance. Oddly, Stalin's theories partially supported this 'moral' claim by supporting Lenin's national determinism policies on paper. His theories suggested national languages could serve as vehicles for communication, and as such merited language planning efforts in their support. The other element of Stalin's minority language policy was not as conducive to the survival of national languages, as he predicted that national languages would give way to, rather than merge with, Russian. This controversy formed the basis for much of the protest and dissent surrounding his language policies in practice, as what he granted with one hand, he took away with the other.[26]

While the proponents of Neo-Romanticism support an emotional and moral justification for their policy, which is formulated essentially on ethnic and cultural grounds, a second approach guides other scholars of Ukrainian language and culture and policy-makers, which can be called simply 'Pragmatism'. These scholars concern themselves with the statistical balance of Ukrainian and Russian newspapers or schools, or with the content of dictionaries, or how correct the Ukrainian is that one hears on the street. This emphasises language as a political or sociological (and potentially expedient) means to unite a diverse and fractious country into a nation, as well as preserve the heritage of an ancient ethnos. Russian on the streets of Kyiv is not considered an anti-

[25] Farmer, (1978), p. 125.
[26] Farmer, (1978) p. 125.

Ukrainian infraction as much as an aesthetic wound or a refusal or inability to participate fully in the new state. In this camp one finds campaigns for wider use of Ukrainian, and for an increase in the number of speakers who have an intimate grammatical knowledge of their language. This attitude incorporates much of the patriotism or nationalism one finds among neo-Romantics, but has its basis in political aims and ambitions for the new state, with sociological and nationally-minded justifications for the programme. Rather than adopt the view that Ukrainian is an ethnic marker, a necessary criteria for anyone who wishes to be considered 'Ukrainian', Pragmatists consider the language a national trait, a political and social rather than ethnic criterion to mark who is 'Ukrainian', supported by language laws and the new Constitution.

Professor S. Ermolenko of the Ukrainian Faculty, Academy of Sciences comments that for a long time the view of Ukrainian held by native speakers was romanticised and idealised, with the beauty and purity of the language emphasised most. She feels such a non-objective view of the language disagrees with the social and sociological functions of Ukrainian, and that respect for the language should be built on what she considers the more solid grounds of common understanding and practice and the social prestige of a state language.[27] She continues by saying the strength of a state is in its national idea which is in turn bound to the status of its state language and an increase of civic awareness of this relationship. Her thoughts on Ukrainian folk songs and the history of Ukraine are less romanticised than those of the neo-Romantic school of thought. Ukrainians should hear these songs and know their history, in

[27] Ermolenko. (1997b), pp. 1-2.

order to feel at home in the Ukrainian state: 'Dim ioho Ukrayina, i mova ioho derzhavy—ukrayins'ka'.[28]

Scholars espousing a pragmatic approach target areas which suffered particularly under Russification and plan practical ways to introduce more Ukrainian, or develop language policies which will redress the imbalance between Russian and Ukrainian schools and newspapers, which are out of proportion with the ethnic composition of the population. Above all, these Ukrainians wish to avoid what has been termed the 'Irish variant', when an independent state still speaks the language of its former conquerors and has no widely accepted language of its own.[29]

Pragmatists are realistic concerning the global climate and international relations. Ermolenko comments that integration need not mean denationalisation. Ukrainian culture has a place among world cultures, and Ukrainian technical and scientific contributions may add to world knowledge. She asserts that individuals may speak as many languages as they choose, but whole societies must remain officially monolingual. This allows for individualism within integration, participation on the world stage without sacrificing national identity and integrity.[30] One journalist adds to this idea by saying that the United States remains a cosmopolitan and international culture, but began as an Anglo-Irish culture which remains the basis for modern American culture. In Ukraine, a base culture is needed as well, allowing for this kind of internationalism and cosmopolitanism without incorporation.[31] Although the Canadian or Belgian model could serve for Ukrainian language planners, allowing two

[28] 'His home is Ukraine, and the language of his state is Ukrainian' (translation mine.) From Ermolenko, (1997b), pp. 1-2
[29] Taranenko, (1996b), p. 36.
[30] Ermolenko, (1997b), p. 5.

state languages, such an approach would not promote Ukrainian as a state language. Especially as bi-lingualism in Ukraine is not totally regional in distribution, this could mean speakers would adopt the path of least resistance, or choose the language understood by all rather than part of the population. By following a British, or American or French model and supporting only one national language (official monolingualism), Ukrainian planners can support Ukrainian in a climate conducive to its spread and to the improvement of its status in the minds of speakers.

One finds scholars following a practical approach in the Academy of Sciences Ukrainian Language department. Among their recent writings, Department Head Professor Oleksandr Taranenko, the department head, and Professor Svitlana Ermolenko have analysed the new edition of the orthographical dictionary (the *pravopys*) and examined the changes made in the dictionary. Here the pragmatic approach is particularly useful: the new edition of the dictionary contains many compromises, and is overall an attempt to further correct earlier, Russified versions while not reverting to the archaic (but still popular in the diaspora) 1928 edition. Controversial spellings and forms are quantifiable, definite problems which require careful consideration to produce a work that is both accurate in its reflection of modern Ukrainian, and also user-friendly, simple and stable. These scholars are no less patriotic than their more vocal counterparts; rather their ambitions for the language lead them to produce examples of good Ukrainian for the public to read and hear and to promote Ukrainian while highlighting areas which still need improvement.

One can also surmise from reading a number of papers by

[31] *Vecherny Kyiv.*, online, 3 May 1997.

members of both camps that much of the 'radical' writing occurs around the time of Ukraine's independence, when patriotic zeal ceased to be controlled by Soviet censorship. Karavansky, whose diagnostic work can be called Pragmatic, at this time writes poetry and civic-minded discussions about the Ukrainian state with a more radical tone than his later works. Writing in 1991, I.B. Usenko connects language problems with related issues of national rebirth and civil rights. Opinions and writings of earlier scholars are presented in light of independence as guides for those seeking to improve the status of Ukrainian at this time.[32] Another article from the same year adopts a very serious and religious tone, calling for linguistic patriotism and freedom of speech. He laments the '*padinnia kul'tury* (dumbing down) in Ukraine, encouraged by post-Soviet inertia and a lack of knowledge of Ukrainian. While this article does contain Biblical references and a nod to Shevchenko (*Traditsii Shevchenko—traditsii zdorovoho opozytsiinoho dukhu)*, it would be difficult to determine if the author indeed belongs to the neo-Romantic ideology, or if his interest remained in linguistic problems rather than keeping the words of Shevchenko alive in Ukraine.[33]

[32] Usenko, (1991), pp. 51-5. It is interesting that the following article in the same issue of the Visnyk is entitled 'Returning to the Source', a profile of the Academy of Sciences in Ukraine and its task concerning the Ukrainian language. Perhaps the editor feared the readership had forgotten the existence of the Academy as a regulatory or linguistic advisory body in Ukraine.

[33] 'The tradition of Shevchenko is a tradition of healthy opposition', from Sverstiuk, (1991), pp. 456-63.

Key traits of Pragmatism and Neo-Romanticism:

Pragmatism:	Neo-Romanticism
Found in the National Academy of Sciences	Associated with Taras Shevchenko University
Political and social criteria determine who is Ukrainian	Ethnic and linguistic criteria determine who is Ukrainian
Evoke national identity, survival of the state, official status of the Ukrainian language as justification	Evoke the unique history and spirit of the Ukrainian nation, the 'dusha narodu' and 'dolia narodu' as justification
Most prominent member: Professor O. Taranenko, Ukrainian Language department of National Academy of Sciences	Most prominent member: Petro Petrovich Kononenko, head of Ukrainoznvstvo movement
Main goal: to promote Ukrainian language as the state language of Ukraine	Main goal: to promote Ukrainoznavstvo at home and abroad, to 'win back' Russian-speaking Ukrainians

Although the preceding discussion highlights the contrast between Neo-Romanticism and Pragmatism, these distinctions between ideologies/theories are not absolute, by any means. Iaremiichuk, writing in 1996 when one expects more moderate comments from Pragmatic authors nevertheless makes several statements which could place him in the Neo-Romantic camp. He says, 'Raise onto the highest pedestal the NATIONAL IDEA', and 'We must cease to fear the expression UKRAINE IS FOR UKRAINIANS'. Read out of context, these remarks and others suggesting a department of Ukrainian ideology, Mr. Iaremiichuk sounds like many of those writing under the auspices of *Ukrainoznavstvo*. Yet he adds that love for one's nation (*narod*) is no longer the stuff of negative Soviet propaganda, and that 'Ukrainian' should mean all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their ethnic origins. Here, he establishes himself as

a pragmatist of liberal ideals.[34] Radicals still exist, of course, in both sectors but time has tempered the Pragmatists for the most part so that most of the writings one finds after 1992-3 are less oratory in nature, and more factual or descriptive/prescriptive. Those writing in connection with *Ukrayinoznavstvo*, however, often include the potted histories and references to Shevchenko, Franko and the Cossacks in their more recent publications.

Another author suggests that Russian language need not be a one-way 'bridge', leading Ukrainians away from Ukrainian culture. Instead it may also act as a means of bringing Ukrainians who speak Russian back into Ukrainian culture. The author goes on to lament the presence of atheists in Ukraine and suggests religion as a means of support for the language, along with following national traditions. One would expect to find romantic musings in an article entitled '*Movne samostverdzhennia ukraintsiv na tli istorychnoho dosvidy narodiv svity*', but the author includes several pragmatic points in his discussion. He ends the article by encouraging both ethnic Ukrainians and non-ethnic Ukrainians to embrace and strengthen national traditions and culture, especially the language, for the sake of unity and cooperation,[35] further evidence that the distinction between Neo-Romanticism and Pragmatism is not absolute. More investigation may establish regional, age-related or other criteria which may predict the viewpoint a given author would most likely espouse. It is more reasonable to suppose that as in every field and ideology, there are extremes at both ends and a great many people in the middle.

Both of these trends influence language and social policy in Ukraine

[34] Iaremiichuk, (1996,) pp. 15-19. Translation mine.
[35] Tkachenko, (1993), pp. 56-64.

and shape the perception other countries have of Ukraine as a state. It is difficult to trace this influence, however, as both schools are connected with institutions which are officially consulted by the President and the Verkhovna Rada on language policy, but it is impossible to discern which, if either, are able to push their policies forward. Both camps must be mindful of the picture their policies and recommendations generate. Internally, there is the danger of alienating Russian-speakers of either Ukrainian or Russian ethnicity, instead of convincing these people to 'buy into' the state. Abroad, enthusiasts of the Neo-Romantic approach may find their policies coolly received by foreign scholars and politicians who distrust what may be interpreted as extremism or nationalism. However, the Ukrainian language may well serve as a useful banner to fly as a rallying point for those who wish to express support for their nation, when later it may simply be another mark of uniqueness for a more secure and nationally self-aware state. For this reason, foreign observers must not be too quick to ridicule or criticise those writings which seek to enshrine the 'dusha naroda' or the 'mentalitet i dolia' of Ukraine; rather one must remember that new states need this kind of fervour to generate enthusiasm in the populace. It is possible to praise the practical, solution-oriented approach of the pragmatists without wholly decrying the excesses of the Neo-Romantics in their nationalist enthusiasm.

As stated above, both camps display support for the new Ukrainian state and what they refer to as 'nationalism'. Before discussing nationalism in Ukraine, and its relationship to language policy, the term must be clarified. Armstrong adopts a political definition of the term: the doctrine that persons of a distinctive culture should constitute an independent

state.[36] He dates Ukrainian nationalism from the eighteenth century, culminating with Taras Shevchenko as the main spokesman by the middle of the nineteenth century. Political nationalism in the form of political groups appeared later, at the start of the twentieth century. Though the politics of nationalism are best left to political scientists, Armstrong's analysis does merit some comment, as he writes in 1990 when these aspirations had not yet reached fruition.

He seeks to discover what stimulates nationalism in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is not a reasonable source, since it was founded as the result of Ukrainian nationalism. Another possibility is the distinctiveness of folk customs in Ukraine, including differences in village organisation compared to Russia. In Ukraine, repartition (the periodic re-distribution of land belonging to a village amongst the peasants, commonly practiced in Russia) was not practised, so one could theorise stronger ties to the land, and a more developed sense of individual ownership could qualify as distinguishing traits in Ukraine. Armstrong dismisses language as a factor, mostly because Russian was familiar to educated Ukrainians even though Ukrainian existed as a literary language and was also used exclusively in villages.

Armstrong settles on historical tradition as the banner of Ukrainian nationalism. Shevchenko remains torch-bearer, assisted by other poets and writers including Kostomarov and Franko, though title of 'Father of Ukrainian Nationalism' goes to Mikhail Hrushevs'kyi. Historical tradition emphasises Ukrainians' heritage from Kyivan Rus', which is now lost or co-opted by Russia. Perhaps even more important is the Zaporozhian

[36] Armstrong, (1990),p. 1.

Sich, previously mentioned as a source of resentment towards Russia, but also a significant example of Ukrainian independence and early attempts at state-building.[37]

For an English speaker, the term 'patriotism' might better express what Ukrainians would term 'nationalism', since the English word 'nationalism' has inherited a negative semantic connotation in this century, particularly after World War II. Nationalism in the Ukrainian sense would be better defined as loyalty to and support of one's nation. This includes an ethnic component that one would not necessarily associate with patriotism, which implies loyalty to and support of one's state regardless of the ethnic origin of its citizens. Dobriansky comments on Nationalism in Ukraine as follows:

> That is, after being subjected to decades of the sameness—with all creativity being suppressed by the state—many felt the need to manifest in both positive and negative ways, their own uniqueness and differences. This is one of the fundamental reasons for the blossoming of ethnicity and many versions of nationalism on the continent.[38]

Dobriansky distinguishes between 'good' nationalism, 'a unifying force which can reinforce a country's sovereignty and identity, as well as instil a strong sense of community and patriotism' or 'bad' nationalism, which is

> inherently ethnocentric and, consequently, threatens ongoing democratic consolidation...can cause "extreme" or "malignant" social and political consequences, suppressing, often brutally, other cultures for the sole purpose of strengthening its own.[39]

Nationalism in Ukraine has many faces. Rukh, the 'Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring', means to encourage solid

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[37] Armstrong, (1990), pp. 3-5.
[38] Dobriansky, P., (1995), p. 36.
[39] Dobriansky, P., (1995), p. 36.

national identity while promoting tolerance of minorities and democratic growth. There are political extremists among Ukrainian nationalists, such as the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) and its military arm, the Ukrainian People's Self-Defence Organisation, UNSO, who believe that Ukraine is for ethnic Ukrainians alone.[40]

Ukrainian nationalism can be looked at from a variety of viewpoints. Obviously, Ukrainians, particularly Ukrainian-speaking ones, will not feel threatened by policies which encourage the use of their native language as a state language, and which promote it over other languages. For Russian-speakers of any ethnic origin, such policies may appear discriminatory. Some Russian speakers feel alienated by the hostile tone in some of the Ukrainian press towards Russia (though this is generally hostility towards the Russian state, and only veiled hostility towards ethnic Russians, if any at all is present), and consider themselves members of both cultures. Arel comments on the view taken by some Ukrainian nationalists of Russian-speaking Ukrainians:

> Ukrainian nationalists, who, by definition, identify with the Ukrainian language and culture, treat Russophone Ukrainians as "victims" of Russian-Soviet policy at best. Increasingly, however, the Russophone Ukrainians are being referred to as "denationalized" beings who do not know who they are, or as "Little Russians"...who like to defer to and be dominated by the "elder brother" the Great Russians. Nationalists are convinced that their "Russified" brethren will "re-acquire their national conscicusness only through the Ukrainian language, i.e. only if they begin to "re-identify" with Ukrainian.[41]

Russian speakers who are ethnic Ukrainians must not be assumed to hold this opinion of themselves. They may resent Ukrainian speakers referring to Russian as a foreign language in Ukraine, and would prefer a

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[40] Dobriansky, P., (1995), pp. 39-41. Additional information on the subject of Ukrainian nationalist organisations may be found in Motyl, *Dilemmas for Ukraine* (as previously cited) chapter 3, or in writings by the groups or personalities themselves, such as *Krestom i Mechem*. by Dmitry Dontsov, or *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground, 1943-1951* (OUN), eds Potichnyi and Shtendera,(1986).

political or territorial interpretation of the term 'Ukraine', with a national but not ethnic criteria for membership in 'Ukrainian' citizenry. The language issue has appeared in elections as a plank in the platform of most Eastern and Southern candidates for Parliament, not necessarily because Russian speakers wish to gain political influence for themselves or Moscow, but because many of them have expressed 'not feeling at home' in Ukraine.[42] For these people, Ukrainian nationalism is interpreted as pro-Ukrainian, anti-Russian.

The Russian-speaking population influences policy and the linguistic climate by merely being present. Most universities and schools have staff who have taught for many years and are talented teachers, but who are Russian-speaking. This puts directors of educational institutions in the tricky position of deciding whether to allow a teacher to continue to lecture in Russian, or to remove a teacher for not speaking Ukrainian when there may be no acceptable replacement. There are special classes which for retraining which re-educate personnel and increase their knowledge of Ukrainian, and some pedagogical institutes now operate solely in Ukrainian, but this problem will take at least a generation to solve. In the classroom itself, teachers are faced with students who have Russian-speaking parents and may not feel comfortable reciting in Ukrainian, or who are baffled by Ukrainian translations after years of reading in Russian. Therefore, in lessons one may hear Russian from students or teachers even in Ukrainian schools purely by necessity and not as the result of any Moscophile or anti-Ukrainian leanings.

Because of such ethnic and linguistic differences, controversy still

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[41] Arel, (1995b), p. 3.
[42] Arel, (1995b), pp. 11-12.

plagues language law in Ukraine, including the Constitution. It is expected that language policy will once again play a key role in the upcoming elections, though at present the Russian population is too thoroughly scattered in Ukraine to unite and present a collective voting bloc. Russian speakers do make up a dense segment of the population in the South and East, and as such, are able to get their opinions heard and their demands noted. Even with Article 10 hammered out in the Constitution, the Ukrainian language may not be safe in its position as the single state language. Already two drafts of the language development policy sent to the Parliament by linguistic advisors have been rejected, with the rejection of the third draft looming as it does not make many concessions to Russian-speakers.[43] There is still room for the acceptance of Russian as the second state language, or as an 'official' language which would be essentially the same, and would allow teachers, media personnel and state workers to continue their use of Russian with no incentive to change. In Kharkiv, for example, a resolution was passed allowing the city administration, media, businesses (in their offices and advertisements) to use Russian along with Ukrainian. Current statistics show 69.9% of the inhabitants of this city consider their native language Russian, while 28.96% consider their native language Ukrainian. This refusal to uphold the Constitution and use Ukrainian in all the functions associated with a state language shows why it is difficult to enforce even the best language policies in Ukraine.[44] By not taking decisive action in support of Ukrainian,

[43] Although the author has not seen this third draft (nor has it appeared in print as of the time of writing), Professor Taranenko was in possession of the document in October 1997 and although he was reluctant to discuss the text of the draft law, he was very clear that he did not expect it to be approved by the Verkhovna Rada.

[44] The linguistic situation in Kharkiv is discussed at length in Murometseva and Murometsev, (1996). It is also discussed with reference to the city council's decision to

the president has left the floor open for such liberal interpretations of the law. In short, the Kharkiv city council has been allowed to ignore language laws and the constitution and instead endorse the status quo.[45] Indeed, the lack of a response by the Verkhovna Rada may be taken as tacit approval for what appears to be an attempt to force a re-think of the language policy enshrined in the Constitution. Part of the blame for the mixed situation in Kkharkiv thus lies with the Verknovna Rada, who have passed legislation on language without also instituting a means of enforcing their policy.[46]

The presence of Russian occurs in a largely predictable pattern, so much so that one can almost quantify its influence in a number of spheres, and therefore predict where changes in language policy may cause greatest tension or generate greatest resistance. For example, linguistically the South and East were more Russified than either the West or the Centre under the Soviets.[47] One also expects more Russian-speakers in cities than in the countryside in all of these areas. Politically, there are more Russian speakers in the Communist party (which is almost exclusively mono-lingually Russian speaking) regardless of region.[48]

The Catholic Church, the Ukrainian Auto-Cephalous Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow patriarchy) all use

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allow Russian to function as a de facto official language in 'Syndrom menshovartosty, abo Iak Kharkivs'ka mis'ka rada zrosiishchue Ukrainy', in *Shliax Peremohy*, 3(229), 16 January, 1997.

[45] Some positive changes have occurred in schools, with more Ukrainian schools opening. At the city administration level, the authors express concern and dismay at the support for Russian over Ukrainian as the language of business and city governance.

[46] Muromtseva and Murometsev, (1996), pp. 19-22.

[47] There is sometimes disagreement about this area of Ukraine, as originally the steppes were colonised by a variety of ethnic groups. In such cases, one usually finds an international community will communicate using the most prestigious language available to them. In this area, this language was Russian. This does not mean these areas were exempt from the same Russification efforts practised elsewhere.

[48] Taranenko, (1996b), pp. 36-46.

Ukrainian (though the Russian Church may use some Russian, particularly in Russian-speaking areas), and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv patriarchy) uses either Russian or Ukrainian, depending on the region.[49] This division is more substantial than it may appear. The Uniate Catholic church in Western Ukraine served for two centuries as an important aspect of Ukrainian identity, as it is preserves orthodox rite, and therefore distinguishes Ukrainians from Catholic Poles in that area. It further separated Ukrainians in Western Ukraine from Russians, since the Uniate church is subordinate to the Pope. In the East, the Uniate church has not had a historical presence, mostly due the powerful influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian Orthodox church was absorbed into the Russian Orthodox church in the eighteenth century, though a Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church was founded in 1920. After its liquidation in the USSR by the Soviets, it was re-established in 1990. Additionally, the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine re-named itself the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and in Kyiv merged with the Autocephalous Church. At present, this means that the West is largely Uniate, while the East remains Ukrainian Orthodox.[50]

Theoretically, all universities are Ukrainian, and all dissertations must be submitted in Ukrainian, though this is not universally true. Lower schooling is conducted in the language of the area, which means that Western schools are predominantly Ukrainian, while Southern and Eastern areas have fewer than half of their schools operating with instruction in

[49] One should note that the use of Ukrainian by the Russian Orthodox Church may not be as generous as it first appears. This church obviously feels the influence of Moscow-based policies, and may be of the opinion that its interests will be better served by using the local language rather than Russian to get its message heard and received as non-hostile.
[50] Motyl, (1993), pp. 8-9.

Ukrainian.[51]

Language usage in the media is more complex in its distribution, though one can assume state stations on radio and television broadcast mainly in Ukrainian--and have vastly improved in quality even in the last twelve months. Private stations generally broadcast in Russian. Some stations are multi-lingual, particularly in multi-ethnic areas where one may find Hungarian or Polish for several hours a day in addition to Russian or Ukrainian broadcasts. The picture becomes even more complex when one examines the total hours broadcast in Russian or Ukrainian, when it becomes clear that Russian is still dominant especially on the radio. ORT is no longer the first channel, and Ukrainian television presents a number of popular imports translated into Ukrainian which may help to increase the number of hours of Ukrainian-language television. Journals do not demonstrate such a poor record in adopting the state language, though there are still more Russian-language journals available per capita for Russian speakers that Ukrainian ones. Advertisements in public places tend to be in Ukrainian, as are product labels, though there are some Russian signs and plenty of English logos.[52] While one could surmise Ukrainian is gaining ground in some areas, Russian remains prevalent in all areas of life.

The Autonomous Republic of Crimea merits examination, as it represents a thumbnail sketch of linguistic problems nation-wide for Ukraine. Although this area originally was the home of the Crimean Tatars, it was conquered by Russia in the eighteenth century. Consequently, the Tatar population dropped sharply from 83% in 1793 to only one-quarter by

[51] Education is covered at length in Chapter Five.
[52] Most of this information is readily apparent to the casual observer, though for more in-

the 1920s. This area was granted the status of an autonomous republic under Soviet rule, but suffered deportation of the native population for allegedly collaborating with the invading Nazis. Then, in 1954 Krushchev gave Ukraine the Crimea as a gift, marking the anniversary of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'ky's 'surrender to' or 'union with' (depending on whose version) Tsar Aleksei and Russia. This area remains a linguistic hotspot for a number of reasons. Post-war settlement patterns mean that the current population of Crimea is two-thirds Russian and one-fourth Ukrainian, while Tatars themselves have only recently begun to return.[53] With such a mixed history and a mixed pedigree, and given its special status within Ukraine, this territory cannot help but complicate any attempts to forge a national identity, and to institute Ukrainian as the language of daily life and official business alike.

The effectiveness of Soviet language planning policy, and subsequent reluctance on the part of Ukrainian policy-makers to 'de-colonise' (ie, deport or absorb the Russian population) after provides another reason for the continued prominence of Russian. Sorokowsky's profile of discrimination in Ukraine shows that more Russians were promoted to high positions in their jobs and in the government, more Russians received higher education and more Russians entered the 'non-productive' sector of employment (health, education, science and art). Ukrainians who did complete their higher education degrees tended to work outside Ukraine, including over a third of Ukrainian scientists.[54] In 1997, this pattern appears to have continued. Vecherny Kyiv cites figures as follows: In the army, 90% of top officer positions and 60% of senior and

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depth information one could consult Taranenko, (1996b).

[53] Motyl, (1993), pp. 10-1.

middle officers are ethnic Russians. Only one of every seven directors of Ukrainian companies is Ukrainian. Even the Academy of Sciences has only seventy-six Ukrainians employed as academics, out of a total of over two hundred academics. These recent figures show that out of every one thousand people in national groups in Ukraine who have received higher education, eighty-five are Ukrainian and one hundred fifty-eight are Russian. Among Jews, this figure reaches over three-hundred fifty.[55] These figures show that the Soviets were thorough in their 'weeding out' of alleged Ukrainian nationalists, while the government of independent Ukraine has thus far been very tolerant of Russians present in Ukraine, thus preserving these imbalances. The success of Russians in Ukraine in business and education indicates that the higher social status of many Russians may lead to their influence. Even if they remain an ethnic minority, or become a decisive linguistic minority (which Arel feels they are not[56]) ethnic Russians have managed to keep positions of relative authority in Ukraine and may dictate to their subordinates more directly than the President or his linguistic commission may ever hope to.

When listing influences and trends in Ukrainian social and linguistic thinking and policy-making, one must not forget the Ukrainians who live in other countries but continue to wield considerable financial power in Ukraine itself. One must consider when forming a definition of 'Ukrainian' whether these members of the diaspora community qualify as 'Ukrainian' , and if so, what their input into the building of a new identity and new state should be despite their absence from the country itself (ie, should there be a political weight given to the ethnic heritage of the diaspora). This raises

[54] Sorokowsky, (1985), pp. 184-95.
[55] Babyichuk, (1997).

the important question of residence as a component of national identity, and with the size and collective influence of the Ukrainian diaspora to consider, it is likely that this problem will not be immediately resolved.

Tension remains between diaspora Ukrainians and indigenous Ukrainians, as many Ukrainians in Ukraine feel the diaspora deserted their country, and have failed to return, bringing their profits and businesses with them. In contrast, some diaspora Ukrainians consider those who remained in Ukraine heavily Russified, their language tainted by association with Russian during the Soviet period. Others are shocked and upset that Ukraine has changed during their absence, while indigenous Ukrainians are baffled that the diaspora appear to expect to be greeted in peasant dress with traditional bread and salt.[57] The cultural consequences of this difference of opinion are obvious, though the linguistic effect of the diaspora is complex and not as straightforward.[58] Many of those who left Ukraine, especially before World War II in the earlier wave of immigration, originated in Western Ukraine, which means that their spoken Ukrainian differs from the Kyiv-Poltava standard in a number of features. Compound this with many years in a foreign country, and one finds two fairly distinct versions of Ukrainian. However, one must contrast problems differences create with the usefulness of Ukrainian language press and printing in Europe, Canada and America during the Soviet era, when Ukrainian language printed matter was very hard to find indeed in Ukraine itself. Furthermore, Ukrainian language press and printing still receive a great deal of financial and technical support from the diaspora, where over the

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[56] Arel, (1993), pp. 600-02.
[57] Interview with S. Ermolenko, October 1997. She voiced common complaints heard among Ukrainains in Ukraine.
[58] Linguistic traits of diaspora speech, which is usually assumed to be based up on

years scholars developed textbooks and dictionaries far from Stalin's anti-Ukrainian activities.[59]

This introduces another influence on language policy that carries over into other areas of state policy as well--the whole-hearted rejection of all things Russian. Politically, one may observe Ukraine's interest in NATO, the Council of Europe (of which it is now a member), and the European Union, while at home this trend manifests itself in the lexicon, as anything that suggests Russian is susceptible to pruning by linguists working on dictionaries.[60]

In previous years, the greatest foreign influence indisputably came from Russia and the Russian language. With Russia still a close neighbour, and still noteworthy as a political influence (particularly on the Left), Russia's influence on Ukrainian culture and society has hardly faded. Even so, European and America culture has a substantial impact due to its increasing popularity. Ukraine imports goods from France, Germany, and English-speaking countries and often imports vocabulary along with the products. Though Russian still looms large in the media and in politics, English is gaining strength as a donor language, with a relatively weak purist reaction (or at least an ineffective one) against these imports. For one thing, signs on public buildings which used to be in Ukrainian and Russian now appear in Ukrainian and English. McDonald's,

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Galician Ukrainian, are discussed in Chapter Six.

[59] One could mention here a study discussed in Bohdan Azhniuk's 'Dvomovnist' u diaspori: konflikt chy symbioz loial'nostei?' in *Movoznavstvo : Tretii Mizhnarodnyi Kongres Ukrainistiv*, Kharkiv, (1996), pp. 3-13, concerning the attitudes of the diaspora and their dual identity. An interesting contrast occurs in a 1914 issue of Svoboda, reprinted in the Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. L, no. 1 Spring 1994. Guidelines for Ukrainian parents are listed, including 'The Ukrainian child should associate exclusively with Ukrainian children and speak only Ukrainian when in their company', Every family should try to bring back those members who have fallen away from Ukrainian traditions', and 'The family should read Ukrainian books in unison during the long winter evenings'.

[60] A discussion of purism, the trend against Russian and other internal language issues

Coca-Cola, Pepsi and Levi's have decorated the capital with their advertisements and logos (though content labels appear in Ukrainian). Probably 50% of popular music played on the radio is English or American, with the rest being mostly Russian and some Ukrainian, French and Italian. Even foreign products from Germany or Turkey such as chocolates use English on their labels. What may eventually translate into an advantage over Russian is the fashionable lure of English, coupled with a desire to seem more European and less Slavic on the part of the younger generation[61].

Here stereotypes and perceptions play a large role in attracting young people towards foreign imports and away from Russian. Nearly all of the interviewees comment that one expects the babushka and didushka generation to speak Russian in cities, as they have probably been relocated to work there by the Soviets and are now too old to learn Ukrainian. One frequently hears the complaint that everyone can understand Ukrainian but simply cannot speak it. Those who have not benefited from higher education often converse in Russian or in the *surzhyk*, as they associate Ukrainian with the peasants who flock to the markets, and with village life and wish to distance themselves by sounding as Russian as their knowledge will allow, or using only as much Ukrainian as they need to do business. Their refusal to use Ukrainian in turn angers or offends the educated, who consider their fluency in Ukrainian a mark of patriotism, refinement and loyalty-- and a sign of their willingness to support their new state. For the educated and the young, English is seen

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occurs in Chapter Six.

[61] This occurs not only in terms of fashion or new vocabulary. Politically and in the eyes of the world community, one hears rhetoric firmly planting Ukraine in Europe juxtaposed against the threat of Russia and the East.

as a passport to the world community, led by America on the financial and industrial fronts and Europe on the cultural front. There are more textbooks of business English than Russian, German and Ukrainian textbooks combined on the streets of Kyiv, which testifies to the importance learning this foreign language has for ambitious Ukrainians.[62]

Another facet of this apparent susceptibility to foreign influence is the desire on the part of those creating Ukraine's foreign policy to participate fully in the world community as a respected member. Generally, this means Ukraine would like to be associated with Europe, and not with Russia or the East. Rhetoric on this topic often concerns the strategic importance of Ukraine for nuclear powers like the United States, but it can also include Neo-Romantic historiography on the common origins of Ukrainian and European languages.[63]

Does this acceptance of foreign words and slang indicate that a trend towards the de-ritualisation of Ukrainian may manifest itself? While there is a great deal of emphasis on the purity of Ukrainian (hence the anti-Russian sentiment) and its integrity as the language of Shevchenko and Franko, the younger generation will hardly be induced to embrace a language that will not allow the discussion of homosexuality, sexual liberation, contraception, disability and modern culture[64]. Although as previously stated, it is next to impossible to convince a Ukrainian to divulge such ripe language, an observant researcher may notice in addition to Russian words, Ukrainian and imported 'slang' adorns public

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[62] Ermolenko, (1997b), and (1997a).
[63] Dobriansky, P., (1995) pp. 34-43; or Holowinsky, (1994), pp. 13-20. Both show this kind of thinking. Dobriansky in particular is quick to assert that Ukrainian nationalism poses no threat to the West and has been misunderstood and misrepresented in the past.
[64] This discussion appears in Chapter 2.

walls, suggesting Ukrainian may be employed in a variety of situations. Though some may bemoan the sullying of Ukrainian, slang and modern terminology both indicate the vibrancy and wide appeal of a language, and as such, are a positive sign. This process has consequences for society, when new concepts produce a demand for a new word, which in turn establishes the acceptability of new ideas. The more modern and viable Ukrainian becomes, the more it is able to reinforce Ukrainians' perception of themselves as modern, cosmopolitan citizens of the European community, a dramatic shift in identity from the idealisation of Ukraine as a peasant-homeland full of beautiful folk melodies and waving fields of grain. It also means a shift away from the East, and Russia's influence. For now, the tension continues both culturally and linguistically between the 'folk' (*narod*) and international/European elements in Ukrainian.[65]

What role must the Ukrainian language play in a modern Ukrainian state? Clearly, there are issues yet to be resolved concerning the status of Russian and widespread bilingualism. This shows that some segments of the population remain to be convinced that their future success is inherently linked to their knowledge and active use of Ukrainian in every situation. Therefore, the first step to uniting the population on the linguistic front is the provision of incentives to speak Ukrainian, and only Ukrainian. Already students at Lyceum level are cautioned that their Russian will not be tolerated at university level, though the same students may be bemused to hear lectures in Russian once they enrol. Perhaps lecturers and teachers also need stronger incentives than Ukrainian-speaking headmasters and mistresses, though this also works well.

[65] Taranenko, (1996b), p. 32.

Given the enthusiasm young people show for English, a sensible incentive could be a financial one. If speaking Ukrainian were seen as a career asset, or if obtaining a good job were difficult without Ukrainian, then the youth of Ukraine might display a similarly keen attitude towards learning their state language. Already in the army promotions are linked to Ukrainian-language ability, and Russian monolingualism is looked down upon in some government circles. Particularly if industry and business heads show a willingness to speak Ukrainian, this trend could spread.

The media remains one of the most problematic areas, particularly in the South and East but not exclusively in those areas. One recent unofficial statistic suggests eight Russian language papers exist in the state for every ethnic Russian reader, compared to less than one Ukrainian paper per ethnic Ukrainian. Although this statistic ignores Russian speakers of Ukrainian ethnicity, it still shows the balance is hardly proportional. Again, finance might be an effective incentive. If there were a tax for publishing in Russian, more papers might discover they preferred to print in Ukrainian.

The suggestion of financial incentives annoys many Ukrainians of both camps, and quite understandably so. Funds are low enough that scholars in the Academy of Sciences cannot always count on their government employers to pay them regularly. Teachers who would perhaps willingly re-learn methodology to be able to teach in Ukrainian may not be able to pay for the re-qualification course, or do not have one available for financial reasons. Newspapers and private television and radio have to rely on sales to remain solvent and therefore have to print in the language that will sell the most copies. Though government policy

could be a powerful tool in influencing language usage, the government itself is democratic and as such accepts representatives from many fractions, not all of which are friendly to Ukrainian statehood and independence.

Even among alleged allies, disagreements occur over the reason to support Ukrainian as a state language, or the extent to which enforcement of language laws must be taken. Ukrainian law, however, appears less strict in comparison to the language policy in effect in Estonia, for example, with the rights of any significant minority enshrined in the Constitution. This means that any programme accepted by the Verkhovna Rada must not ignore or infringe on the rights Russian speakers claim for themselves, no matter how detrimental such appeasement policies may be for Ukrainian identity and national cohesiveness in the long-term. Any suggestion offered by the Academy of Sciences to expand Ukrainian's functional load or to develop the language's potential and educate more of the populace seems to be met with suspicion or reluctance on the part of Deputies who wish to keep their seats representing Russian-dominated constituencies.

This resistance on the part of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers may not look like fair play to an objective observer. Motyl offers a reasonable approach, which may or may not appeal to non-Ukrainian speakers:

> Ukrainian elites surely are not being extreme in requesting that passport Russians (ethnic Russians) and passport Ukrainians learn and, perhaps, even use Ukrainian in public activities and at the workplace—all the more so since these two Eastern Slavic tongues are sufficiently similar as to make each language comprehensible to speakers of the other. Learning Ukrainian cannot be any harder for Russians than learning Russian is for Ukrainians, which is to say, not hard at all. And just as linguistic similarity encouraged the

> Russification of Ukrainians, it must surely facilitate the use of Ukrainian by Russians.[66]

Professor Taranenko of the Academy of Sciences summarises the language picture in Ukraine on a rather bleak note. Firstly, the use and knowledge of Ukrainian in not mandatory at present for state workers. Secondly, Ukrainian is rarely heard in larger cities in Ukraine. Thirdly, literary, standard Ukrainian is used freely and competently by only a small portion of the population of Ukraine.[67]

What can one conclude with such a mixed picture submitted for analysis? Essentially, the future of Ukrainian does not depend on laws passed for its protection or development, or on academics who may provide excellent examples and teaching materials. Nor does it entirely depend on schools and teaching personnel, no matter how effective their use and encouragement of Ukrainian. One cannot count on the media, whether encouraged by a sense of duty or the possibility of severe penalties for broadcasting or printing in a non-state language. This leaves only the public.

For Ukrainian language to not only thrive and expand, but even to survive in Ukraine the population must recognise its importance. Enduring Ukrainian statehood requires a sense of national consciousness in its citizens, who must identify themselves as Ukrainian and see their interests linked to the success of the state. The population must agree on one language to use to communicate privately and publicly, and if that language should eventually be Russian the very real threat exists of increased influence from Moscow on the new state. At the same time, a

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[66] Motyl, (1993), p. 13.
[67] Taranenko, (1996b), pp. 24-34, assesses a the total picture in Ukraine in a variety of areas, using two main points of reference: the general traits of the language situation and

new bilingualism espousing English may align Ukraine with Europe but will not help to create a national identity accepted by Ukrainian citizens. Language is an unavoidable tenet of state-building, a requirement for national unity and one of the most controversial issues in Ukraine today. As such, the question of language and of state-building in Ukraine must necessarily remain unanswered for the present.

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the overall tendencies for development the language appears to be following.

Chapter Four: Media in Ukraine: The Language Indicator

Nowhere is the language problem more clearly illustrated than in the media in Ukraine. For every 100 citizens in Ukraine, there are 7 Ukrainian and 54 Russian-language publications in Ukraine.[1] Furthermore, the presence of Russian media (not just Russian language, but Russian in origin) can cause other problems. For one, Russian companies have employed predatory marketing practices by forming fake joint ventures with Ukrainian media companies to avoid tax, thus denying the Ukrainian media sector this revenue. There is also some evidence that the Russian press used its influence during Kuchma's election and the development of the Crimean situation to sway public opinion. The newspaper Den' is rumoured to receive money from Gazprom, and therefore will be influenced in its coverage of candidates during elections.[2] The other substantial effect this Russian presence has is simple competition. Not only must the media and publishing[3] industries compete against the stereotype of provincialsm with limited funds and un-helpful or un-enforced government policies to aid them; but the most direct competition comes from Russia, where Soviet-era resources are already in place and do not have to be generated from the start. New issues such as the place of private media and publishing alongside old state-owned bodies only add to the complexity of the situation.

Linguistically, this means efforts to rejuvenate Ukrainian-language media have mixed results. The problem is not simply a language issue or

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[1] *Holos Ukrainy*, 6 May 1997.
[2] Kuzio, (1997), p. 370-71.
[3] Publishing should be taken to include predominantly books other than dictionaries, grammars, and textbooks unless special mention is made by a particular source. These items are better dealt with in a discussion on language development and standardisation of terminology.

even a language purity issue, though this too is under discussion; rather the funds needed to support a viable local media, covering television, radio, and printed matter are not always available. Beyond finance, journalists and press organisations in Ukraine must strive to prevent censorship, and to guarantee free access to information.[4] Futherthermore, even products generated in Ukraine are not necessarily in Ukrainian, though there are measures being suggested which would encourage more Ukrainian-language materials. The public cannot agree on what it wants to read, hear, or see any more than policymakers seem able to agree on what should be available.[5]

Most of the issues facing media and publishing in Ukraine are not new. Tension with Russian-language press began almost as soon as Ukrainian-language press appeared in Ukraine, and the large percentage of Russians in Ukraine only keeps the debate alive. In order to analyse the language debate as it is played out in the arena of the media and publishing, it is helpful to examine the roots of contemporary problems where they began, and to follow developments under the Soviets and under glasnost' as both sides address the question of what language should dominate in this aspect of public life.

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[4] This is still a concern for many. Articles offering the press viewpoint on free speech include 'Kontseptsiia zakonodartel'stva o SMI v post-totalitarnyx gosudarstvax', November 1996 *Ukrainian Media Bulletin* (hereafter referred to as UMB), pp. 12-4, and 'Zakonodavstvo pro presy ta inshi zasoby masovoyi informatsiyi v SSSR i Ukrayini', *Suchasnist'*, May 1991 pp. 81-4.

[5] Tax measures suggested by Ihor Ostash in a conversation in Kyiv in July 1996 are echoed in UMB of September 1995, p. 11, calling for tax on Russian language media products. A quick glance at the current media laws involving registration of periodicals, papers, television channels and the like shows ample opportunity for such measures to be enacted as part of this process. Ivanenko, (1991), pp. 81-4. Kuchma again mentioned

Brief Historical Overview:

The development of media and publishing in Ukraine has been treated elsewhere thoroughly enough to merit only a brief summary of events and the issues which continue to face these industries in independent Ukraine. The fullest treatments consulted for this research were Shevelov (1989), Krawchenko (1985) and Wexler (1974). With the amount of work already available on the subject, it is only necessary to trace key developments to find that the problems which confronted Ukraine under the Bolsheviks have not disappeared with their regime.

Shevelov states that 'there was no Ukrainian periodical press in the Russian Ukraine' in 1900.[6] The part of Ukraine governed by the Austro-Hungarian empire fared somewhat better. Here there was a Ukrainian-language press, though Shevelov considers it to be insignificant when compared to the Russian or Polish press of the same area. He counts a total of 25 Galician and 6 Bukovinian periodicals, the latter of which were sometimes Muscophile and aimed at producing language closer to Russian.[7] Krawchenko adds that the lack of Ukrainian press cannot be blamed entirely on government policy preventing the use of Ukrainian in (Russian) Ukraine. He notes that the social structure of Ukraine did not encourage publishing or press, as Ukrainians were under-represented in the educated, upper classes and those who did belong to this stratum were often Russified. This meant that when journals did occur, they were

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the need to adapt the language law in a speech mentioned by OMRI on 9 December 1996.

[6] Shevelov, (1989), p. 8.

[7] Shevelov, (1989), pp. 12-13.

financially unstable, or unable to reach the illiterate and mistrustful peasantry.[8]

By 1914, Shevelov notes the press at least in Galicia had begun to diversify, not only along political lines as before, but along the lines of speciality. Periodicals could be found which specialised in economics, agriculture, trade, sport, humour, or the church, as well as periodicals targeted for children and women.[9] Even with this development, the press remained largely targeted at peasants or intelligentsia who worked with peasantry; working class press and technical journals remained proportionately under-represented. This reflected not only the composition of society at that time and the state of the intelligentsia, but also the absence of scholarly or very technical terminology in this part of Ukraine. Shevelov explains,

> Rudimentary technical terms were used in everyday life, but the use of specialized terms in periodicals was very limited; their low representation in the press, in turn, did not foster their development, creating a vicious circle.[10]

In Russian Ukraine, where the language was prohibited, by this time pamphlets appeared in Ukrainian which were able to get around the censors. These were written in good literary Ukrainian, and were intended mainly for peasant readership. Such brochures marked the start of publishing and press in this part of Ukraine.[11]

Belles lettres were one of the few forms of literature not prohibited under the Tsarist regime, so many debates about the usage of Ukrainian, and about what kind of Ukrainian should be used were carried out in this form. During this time the intelligentsia was taking shape in Ukraine, and

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[8] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 27.
[9] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 22.
[10] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 22.
[11] Ibid, pp. 29-30.

with its development into a self-conscious class came a crisis in motive: if Ukrainian could justify itself as a language understandable to the peasants which made up the majority of the population, what would justify the language as it evolved, became more modern, and consequently better suited to the developing intelligentsia than the peasants they idealized?[12]

1905 brought about the repeal of draconian censorship and prohibitions on Ukrainian language publications in Russian Ukraine. This meant a 'rebirth of Ukrainian periodical press' which had been dormant earlier in the century, and the appearance of legal political papers. Though the repeal was followed shortly by heavy-handed press regulations, closing many of the periodicals which had sprung up, a total wipe-out was not achieved. During this time, Shevelov describes the appearance and flourishing of the periodical press even under difficult circumstances--but problems which continue to linger appeared at the same time. First, these publications appeared in small circulations. Second, they were rarely published at a profit and were continually in poor financial condition.

Here language would already be a problem. Not everyone possessed sufficient skill in Ukrainian, through Russification or plain illiteracy, to read the new periodicals. Furthermore, those publications which appealed to the intelligentsia would not be popular among peasants, and vice-versa. Though Galicia and Bukovina escaped this particular problem since there had long been a Ukrainian education system and intelligentsia in place, Ukrainians there used a written language that was sufficiently different from Russian Ukraine-Ukrainian to cause problems of mutual unintelligibility.[13]

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[12] Shevelov, (1989), p. 33, see also Krawchenko, (1985), pp. 27-8.
[13] Shevelov, (1989), p. 40.

Krawchenko and Shevelov both detail the parallell growth of the periodical press and publishing industries at this time. In 1914, however, compared with Russian publication (25,526 books total) Ukrainian lagged behind at only 242 publications, many of which were pamphlets and popular editions. Second in population, Ukrainians were only a distant eighth in publications.[14] Some of these editions were grammars and lexicons, published throughout the twenties, though the publication of these books is better dealt with as part of a discussion on terminology and standardisation.[15]

Press in Ukraine assumed an important additional function after World War I. The concern for, and efforts aimed at the development of the Ukrainian language in one or the other Ukrainian territories expanded to include the development of a unified language after Galicia and Bukovina were occupied by Ukrainians from Russia. The press, and indeed, any literate Ukrainian, began to assess new terms which appeared, accepting some and rejecting others. While the acceptance of Galician terms was favoured at this time as a step away from the language of the peasant, and a step towards the language of the intelligentsia (and as a result, a positive assessment of Ukrainian as a potential intellectual vehicle for thought) this precedent of opening the language to outside, even, as in this case, to Galician-Ukrainain enrichment, continues to be a source of dissension among those who desire to update, enrich, and expand the lexicon.[16]

Despite difficult political changes at the start of the Twenties and into the Thirties, press and publishing in Ukraine flourished. New

[14] Shevelov, (1989), p. 41.
[15] Shevelov, (1989), pp. 40-43, Krawchenko, (1985), pp. 94--8.

periodicals appeared, marked by both diversity in area of interest and regionalisation, two traits which continue to characterise the industry in Ukraine. A new trend was the publication of bulletins by political parties, Ministries, branches of the service, cooperatives, professional organisations, and even individuals. Book publishing increased substantially over previous figures during this time, up to 747 titles in 1917, 1084 in 1918, and 665 in 1919 (Shevelov's figures). Substantial numbers of these were textbooks or books about Ukrainian language. Publishing had become lucrative enough to interest some who would publish just about anything, meaning these publications were not all of a high quality or long-lasting; furthermore, many of them were insufficiently well written to counterbalance the positive effect of others in the acceptance of the language.[17] Krawchenko states in contrast, that the works of this time, before Ukrainisation, represent a high period in quality due to the lack of censorship in the relatively liberal climate. He notes books were purchased (from any of the new Ukrainian bookstores springing up all over the republic) not out of a sense of duty but 'because of their artistic merit or orininality of research', which gave the language and culture a new sense of prestige.[18]

Consolidation of Soviet power in Ukraine over the next decade brought first tolerance of Ukrainian, and then Ukrainisation as a distinct policy. Shevelov profiles the effect of this change on press and publishing in Ukraine. Newspapers in Ukrainian over the years 1918-1924 hovered between 1/2 and 1/5 the number of Russian language papers (Shevelov gives several sets of data which do not always agree with each other).

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[16] Shevelov, (1989), pp. 58-61.See also Wexler, (1974).
[17] Shevelov, (1989), p. 78.

Journals in Ukrainian, including almanacs, showed little growth before Ukrainisation. Book publishing in Ukrainian even dropped during this time in relation to publication in Russian, for a number of reasons (low status of Ukrainian and financial problems in the private publishing sector for example).[19]

On the eve of Ukrainisation, Shevelov assesses the state of Ukrainian printed matter as follows:

> By the end of the Soviet pre-Ukrainisation preiod, in the press, in periodicals, in publications, in scholarship and in literature, a new, Soviet-minded intelligentsia had begun to press against the locks which were intended to confine the Ukrainian language to the countryside.[20]

Ukrainisation, launched as a specific policy to increase literacy and education (not any longer as a means to placate restless peasant elements), meant the sharp decline of Russian in the press, in publishing, in theatre--and the growth not only in percentage but in quantity of Ukrainian language varieties of all of these, not only in titles but in circulation. By 1930, for example, there were only three major Russian-language papers remaining.[21] Krawchenko notes that while in 1925 there were 116 papers published in Ukraine, 31 in Ukrainian (21% of 3.1 million copies), by 1929, there were 54 Ukrainian papers and only 20 Russian language editions. This time period witnessed a corresponding growth in national consciousness among the intelligentsia, who used the press to reach peasant masses with these ideas. Consequently, those involved in developing the press wished to prevent their local newspapers from

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[18] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 96.
[19] Shevelov, (1989), pp. 99-100.
[20] Shevelov, (1989), p. 106.
[21] Shevelov, (1989), pp. 117-18.

becoming second-rate versions of Russian papers, and instead hoped to direct local press along uniquely Ukrainian lines.[22]

The next decade, however, would be a time of famine and forced collectivisation, causing the destruction of peasant culture and creating peasant unrest especially in Ukraine, where the efforts of the agricultural sector were intended to finance most of Stalin's industrializaion elsewhere. Starting in 1930 Ukrainian nationalism, as the Soviets saw it, was a threat. The persecution of scholars and academics who had supported Ukrainisation (and the liberation movement the decade before) was mirrored in a similar purge of the printed word.[23] These show trials and subsequent censorship of Ukrainian books brought on an immediate drop in their production. Books were found to contain major ideological errors, or to be of poor quality by those suspicious of the authors' intentions. Moscow decided to further centralise the publishing industry to remedy this and other perceived ills. So thorough was the purge of Ukrainian language materials that by 1940 newspapers in Ukrainian lost 20% of their share of the market to Russian, from 89% to 69%; the number of journals fell from 85% (261) to 45% (144).[24]

Book publishing peaked in 1930, with Ukrainian works appearing in significantly greater quantities than Russian ones, especially technical books and textbooks. This was due to the success of Ukrainisation, and also to the need for a literate, technically educated workforce. From 25% of all technical titles in Ukrainian, the percentage rose to 61% in 1929, as well as 80% of textbooks used at technical schools. Overall, Ukrainian

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[22] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 98.
[23] For a detailed account of who felt the brunt of these attacks see Shevelov, (1989), pp. 122-71, and Krawchenko, (1985), pp. 135-51.
[24] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 139.

language titles commanded 79% of total printed works by 1929.[25] Krawchenko states

> Industrialization itself, however, greatly contributed to this development. A large number of Ukrainians were entering industrial employment. To deny them the right to learn in their own language how best to use modern equipment connected with industrialisation would have meant slowing the tempo of industrialisation.[26]

A change in policy in the early thirties shifted emphasis away from Ukrainisation and towards an emphasis on Russian language and culture all over the USSR. These policies caused a drop not only in the production of Ukrainian books, but of books in general. Ukrainian titles totalled 6,394 in 1930; by 1939 this had dropped to 1,895, or from 79% to 43%.[27] As publishing was still centrally managed, this represents not a decay but a specific policy. The lack of material published in Ukrainian meant that this language could not be the source of up-to-date information, and that knowledge from abroad would have to be accessed via Russian.[28] Once again the status of Ukrainian fell, re-acquiring the stigma of provincialism and backwardness.[29]

Stalin and those around him clearly felt that Ukraine had to be taught that it could only achieve with the help of Russia, and that any achievements would be trumpeted as Soviet accomplishments, and not Ukrainian ones. Krawchenko notes, 'It is no exaggeration to say that Ukrainians' greatest achievement during that decade was that they outlasted it.'[30]

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[25] Krawchenko, (1985), pp. 139-40.
[26] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 139.
[27] Shevelov, (1989), p. 152.
[28] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 140-41.
[29] Developments in Western Ukraine during the late thirties and the war varied slightly from those in Russian Ukraine. Shevelov (1989) details those processes in Chapter 7, pp. 170-213.
[30] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 218.

After a brief wartime respite, the decline of Ukrainian language in Ukraine continued after World War II[31]. The effects of heavy Russification, slipping status in the eyes of Ukrainians, and 'the strength of the Russian apparatus' all combined to reduce the amount of printed matter and media in Ukraine over the decades preceding glasnost'. Krawchenko profiles this decline: in 1945, Ukrainian books and brochures made up 61% of the total published in Ukraine. In 1950, this number had dropped to 45%; with a brief respite after Stalin's death the figure reached 60%. Khrushchev's policy change caused a further drop to 49%. By 1975, after Shelest was removed from his post as head of the Communist Party of Ukraine, books and pamphlets in Ukrainian made up only 30% of all works published. As before, Russian dominated in scientific and technical works, while Ukrainian held its own only in belles lettres and social sciences.[32]

Newspapers fared slightly better over this time period. Krawchenko cites figures claiming that in 1971, 70% of all titles and 68% of total circulation in newspapers were in Ukrainian.[33] He also mentions the complaints made by the reading public, not only of the lack of sufficient Ukrainian press and other media, but also against the quality of the work produced.[34]

In the 1970s, only two scientific or technical journals appeared in Ukrainian--*Dopovidi Akademiyi Nauk Ukrayins'koyi RSR and Ukrayins'kyi Botanichnyi Zhurnal.* The Ministry of Health published three monthlies in Ukrainian, which were the only medical journals in that language during

[31] It should be noted, however, that the efforts of Ukrainian publishing in Lviv, then part of Poland, aided in creating an intellectual climate favourable for the growth of national awareness and consciousness when this part of Ukraine was united with Russian Ukraine after the war (Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol 4, pp. 200-13).
[32] Krawchenko, (1985), pp. 237-38.
[33] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 240 quoting Presa Ukrains'koi RSR, tables 83-4.

that time. Attempts were made to show Ukrainian language could handle scientific discourse, and thus justify a shift from Russian as the language of science and technology. *Kibernetychni Systemy z Kombinovanym Keruvanniam* (1963) and *Entsyklopediia Kibernetyky* (1973) appeared in Ukrainian demonstrating the versatility of that language and its viability as a medium of discussion even of complex scientific research.[35]

Glasnost' in Ukraine meant a lessening of Party control on the press and publishing. Besides well-known information releases during this time, old editors resigned and a union of journalists was formed in 1990. New publications with new, previously forbidden viewpoints, opened up in the relaxed climate of free speech and free press. Most of the new publicatons were short monthly newspapers with press-runs of 1000 to 10,000, including over 50 works generated by Rukh, the Popular Movement of Ukraine, and over 25 by the Ukrainian Republican party. In addition, over 30 new youth publications appeared.[36]

Figures given by the Encyclopedia of Ukraine show a gradual increase in the number of newspapers, journals, and periodicals over the period from the death of Stalin to 1990, five years into glasnost. The ratio of newspapers in Russian to newspapers in Ukrainian (by circulation, not title) decreased from 3 to 1, to closer to 2 to 1 by 1990, showing that free press has not necessarily meant more press appears in Ukrainian. In journals and other periodicals, the figures show that while in titles, Russian and Ukrainian works appear nearly even, the annual circulation figures for

[34] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 241.
[35] Krawchenko, (1985), p. 240.
[36] Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 4, p. 209.

Ukrainian are higher, though publication in both languages has increased even given a drop in overall circulation after 1975.[37]

Radio and Television in Soviet Ukraine:

The Encyclopedia of Ukraine states bluntly, 'Radio broadcasting in Soviet Ukraine and in the USSR as a whole served the interests of the Communist state and Party.'[38] As with written press and media, radio was subject to central control and monitoring. The first high-powered stations were constructed in 1925, and by the end of the 20s there were stations for Kyiv, Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and others. A radio network formed in 1928, and grew in the 1930s as the Soviets became more adept at jamming foreign frequencies by a number of methods (including constructing radios which only picked up certain frequencies).

Early radio in Ukraine was dominated by Moscow, with only limited transmission in Ukrainian--and even this was mostly political, agitational matter which devoted only a few hours to culture or literature. The next substantial increase in radio broadcasting occurred after World War II, with a corresponding leap in Ukrainian-language programming. In the 1980s, there were three state networks, broadcasting news, Party issues, economy, literature, culture and one weekly Ukrainian radio journal.[39]

The first television broadcast in Ukraine was in 1939. Television began to develop and spread as a medium in the 1950s, with one channel from Kyiv and a second (added in 1962) from Moscow. A Ukrainian programme began in 1965, which covered 200 hours weekly. Ukrainian television could not really figure as an impacting factor until after

[37] Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 4, pp. 207-09.
[38] Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 4, p. 301.

independence, as earlier broadcasts either originated in Moscow or were produced in Kyiv with central approval--and then mostly in Russian. Programming included typically music or entertainment programmes, film, as well as propaganda or informative programmes. The Encyclopedia characterises Ukrainian television as 'insignificant', and indeed it is this very lack of development that continues to plague Ukrainian television, and continues to ensure that a significant quantity of Russian or foreign material goes out on Ukrainian airwaves.[40]

Contemporary Press Climate: an Overview

As in previous years, the importance of the media in Ukraine cannot be overstated. Where once the press was a tool for Soviet propaganda, it now serves as a means to increase linguistic awareness, shape national consciousness, and support nation-building. One journal stated,

> Let us note that in postcommunist Ukraine governmental support of the national press is one of the pre-requisites for shaping national awareness and information security of the state as such. Otherwise the prospects of the Ukrainian national statehood look doubtful.[41]

The subject matter covered in print in Ukraine continues to vary. In 1990, the most popular subjects for periodicals (excluding newspapers) were culture/ education/ scholarship, technology, politics/ society/ economics, and natural sciences/ maths, in order of popularity (Encyclopedia of Ukraine figures). The Ukrainian Media Bulletin listed figures for 1995 showing general politics gained the lead as the most popular subject for periodicals, followed by science/ technology, economics, and art/ literature. The total number of registered publications

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[39] Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 4, pp. 301-02.

as of June 1996 totalled 5,325: 3,953 newspapers, 1,025 magazines, 148 newsletters, 116 collections and 49 almanacs[42].

As during glasnost', other bodies besides the state issue periodicals and papers which compete for a share of the market. The Ukrainian Media Bulletin lists fifteen categories of 'founders' for periodicals and papers, some of which can be further divided (as in state or non-state publishing companies): The Council of Peoples' Deputies, State Executive bodies, Industrial enterprises, collective and state farms, commercial bodies, educational institutions, trade unions, creative unions, political parties, public organisations, religious organisations, labour collectives, private persons, research institutions, and publishing houses.[43]

Two further areas of press and publishing should be mentioned. First are the various bodies, state, professional and other, which regulate Ukrainian printed media, and second, the laws which exist or are in the pipeline to govern language usage. The situation with television and radio is infinitely more complicated, as the industry is run on a number of levels by channels/stations, broadcasting companies, production companies, advertising agencies, state companies, private companies and translators--which means language decisions are taken at a number of levels and not as part of a coherent policy for many companies. And as with so many other things, finance is a great concern, making pragmatic concerns outweigh nationalist, linguistic, or even legal issues.

Now that the state apparatus has legal competition in Ukraine, other bodies have formed which participate in the media as a whole. The

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[40] Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 5, pp. 183-4.
[41] Kostenko, (1994), p. 154.
[42] UMB, September 1996 citing figures from June 1996 Ministry of Press and Information.
[43] UMB, January 1995, p. 14.

government has organs such as the National Council on TV and Radio Broadcasting, the Ministry of Information and Press, the State Committee on Television and Radio, and the Permanant Committee of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on Legislative Protection of Freedom of Speech and the Mass Media.[44] Non-state bodies include the Journalists' Union, the National Press Club, and the Ukrainian Association of Non-State Publishers.[45] These committees concern themselves mainly with the development of the press and the protection of journalists' rights in the free speech climate.

The language issue concerns all areas of media, both broadcast and print. Sources do not agree on the overall strength of Russian-language media versus Ukrainain-language media in Ukraine. The February 1995 issue of the Ukrainian Media Bulletin stated, '...yet people's interest in Ukrainian-and Russian-language publications as well as in material published in Russia, does not break down along lines of nationality. The language of a publication does not affect its popularity.'[46] More recent commentary in the Ukrainian Media Bulletin suggests that the Ukrainian readership is more interested with making a living than politics or other subjects, as magazines and advertisement/information press are increasing and developing more than other kinds of printed press. This article states that at the time of writing, 50% of all publications are in Russian, 18% in Ukrainian, and 16% in Russian and Ukrainian.[47]

However, in a media survey published in Political Theory, it was stated, 'In real terms, a tendency of linguistic de-Ukrainisation of the

[44] UMB, January 1995, pp. 10-11.
[45] Data on specific television or radio stations and companies may be found in the section of this chapter on those media.
[46] UMB, p. 6, February, 1995.

Ukrainian national press has been outlined in the period since the proclamation of Ukraine's independence...Therefore, the thesis about a language related pressure on Russians in Ukraine is totally groundless, and the position of state institutions obliged to enforce the Law on Languages is irresponsible, to put it mildly.'[48] In the same issue of the Ukrainian Media Bulletin differing opinions appear:

- The suggestion that the Ukrainian-only language policies of national TV channels have a negative effect on their ratings has been confirmed. With the exception of the Eastern region and the Crimea which favour Russian-language broadcasting, the majority of respondants approve of broadcasts in both Russian and Ukrainian. In addition, in all but three of the eleven regions, those who favour exclusively Russian-language as opposed to exclusively Ukrainian-language broadcasts are in the majority.

- As is the case with telelvision, the most popular publications among Ukrainian readers are Russian-language, such as Komsomolskaya Pravda.

- Subscription results also confirm the trend of a diminishing market share for the Russian publications. Three years ago they controlled up to 62% of the newspaper market in Ukraine--presently their share does not exceed 5%.[49]

Clearly, the truth is out there. But, as with any sensitive issue, speakers of each language are likely to feel a threat against their own language and therefore downplay its successes in the media. This touches upon not just Russian-language media which originates in Ukraine, but also on Russian imports, such as ORT or Komsomolskaya Pravda, which enjoy significant popularity amongst Ukrainians.

Legal measures are in place, not only to govern the behaviour of media companies, but to promote use of Ukrainian in the media. In Kyiv, the city administration has developed a plan to encourage the

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[47] Budko, (1997), pp. 16-8.
[48] Kostenko, (1994), p. 154.
[49] UMB; first two quotes from Yurii Kogutyak, 'Growth amidst decline--the Ukrainian media in 1994', p. 4-5. The third from 'Subscriptions in 1995 give grounds for optimism' by Oleg Krouk, p. 6.

development of Ukrainian and its functioning in all spheres of life in the city. This plan includes media, calling for a means of regulating the use of the state language and an examination of problems relating to this. Cooperation with civic organisations to this end is encouraged.[50]

The language issue and minority rights issues cannot help but be played out in the media, not only in printed media but also in television and radio. Though television and radio do not yet serve a similar function to that of the BBC in twentieth century England as language regulators, as with printed matter what is heard and seen cannot help but influence what is spoken and written by Ukrainians--both in lexicon and in *kul'tura movy.*

Media falls under the requirement that minorities in compactly settled areas have a right to use their own language. Article 9 of the Television and Radio act states that programmes should be in the state language, though again allowances are made for minorities compactly settled. A 'problem' area like Crimea, which is heavily settled by Russians and other minorities of Ukraine, shows figures like the following for air time for 1995:

Crimean-Tatar language	Television 208 hours	Radio 234 hours
Armenian	Television 39 hours	Radio 52 hours
German	Television 13 hours	
Bulgarian	Television 13 hours	

Zarkapattia, another area populated by a variety of ethnic groups, has figures like these for the same year:

Hungarian language	Television 73 hours	Radio 364 hours
Romanian language	Television 37 hours	Radio 37 hours
German language	Television 18 hours	

[50] Vecherniy Kyiv, 5 February, 1997, p. 2.

Other areas, such as Chernivtsy, Mariopol', and Zhytomir show substantial allowances made for minority languages in air time on radio and television as well.[51]

The Ministry of Statistics offers the following data for State television and radio in 1995, in percentages of hours of broadcasting time:

	Television		Radio	
Area	**Ukrainian**	**Russian**	**Ukrainian**	**Russian**
Ukraine	66	33	83	13
Crimea	2	84	4	80
Vinnitsia	100	–	100	–
Volyn	100	–	100	–
Dnipropetrovs'k	70	30	65	10
Donets'k	30	70	50	10
Zhytomyr	98	–	82	–
Zakarpattia	83	–	50	–
Zaporizhzhia	26	74	71	29
Ivano-Frankivs'k	–	–	–	–
Kirovohrad	83	17	91	9
Luhans'k	48	52	45	55
L'viv oblast'	100	–	100	–
Mykolaiiv	69	31	58	42
Odesa	25	71	56	40
Poltava	100	–	100	–
Rivne	100	–	100	–
Sumy	100	–	100	–
Ternopil'	100	–	100	–
Kharkiv	100	–	100	–
Kherson	87	13	85	15
Khmel'nytskyi	78	22	100	–
Cherkassy	100	–	100	–
Chernivtsy	82	–	94	–
Chernihiv	–	–	100	–

(percentages not equal to 100 indicate the presence of other national languages in Ukraine)[52]

Judging from these numbers, state radio and television better represent the ethnic make-up of their listening and viewing public than private stations thus far have managed to do.

[51] Khomenok, (1996), pp. 1-3.
[52] Chart 'Obsiahy mictsevoho teleradiomovlennia derzhavnykh teleradioorhanizatsii u 1995r' in Statystychyni Shchorichnyk Ukrainy, 1995, Kyiv: Tekhnika, 1996. p. 477.

Post-Independence Trends: Newspapers

The Ukrainian Media Bulletin cited in 1995 several trends in Ukrainian print media. For one, the overall number of subscriptions is up, indicating the bottom of the press recession has been reached and the upward climb has begun.(This is debated by some sources, who suggest that the majority of newspaper and periodical purchases are now made not via subscription, but at kiosks, and that furthermore copies pass through several sets of hands making popularity difficult to measure.) As the economy improves, so too should the press industry. Second, even though old Russian favourites linger, the Ukrainian market is overwhelmingly once again Ukrainian. This does not necessarily mean Ukrainian language, but Russian papers receive less attention as the Ukrainian readership concentrates on its own problems and news.

However, since independence it should be noted that Russian-language papers have not suffered in popularity, nor can it be shown that the language of a publication affects its popularity. N. Kostenko et al cite that as of 1994, the number of Russian language national papers has increased (5.7% to 12.7%), while the number of Ukrainian national papers has dropped (59.8% to 27.4%). Other papers are available in both, or in a local minority language. Locally, Ukrainian papers dropped from 55.7% in 1992 to 46.8% in 1994; Russian local papers remained at approximately the same level, roughly 30%.[53] These figures would not support the case advanced by some Russians in Ukraine that forced Ukraininization is occurring in the press.

[53] N. Kostenko, O. Kryvenko, I. Slisarenko, Y. Shkarlat, V. Bebyk., and M. Tomenko, (1994), p. 154.

Another reason for the increase in Ukrainian press is the corresponding increase in its quality. Commercial non-state publications are cited as the best, with access to the best quality staff and information. This is partially because good reporters do not necessarily go to Moscow any longer.

Press in Ukraine is shifting to the local level, with two of every three publications in Ukraine serving a local or regional area. Local papers have improved in quality, and have access to recent quality news and information.

The following table shows figures for 1994 and 1995 for highest circulations. This can be compared to the profile presented in the chart below it. It should be noted that Ukrainian Media Bulletin considers the Russian-language *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* the most read paper of 1994, but exact figures were unavailable.

Title:	**1995:**	**From 1994:**
Holos Ukrainy	506300	up 143800
Silski Visti	337200	up 97500
Robitnycha Hazeta	207000	up 162400
Uriadovyi Kur'ier	195800	up 40000
Argumenty i Fakty	164400	up 48000
Kiyevskiye Vedomosti	146000	up 16500
Trud	99800	down 400
Pravda Ukrainy	70000	up 11700
Hovoryt' I Pokazuye	49800	down 15000
Izvestiya	46800	down 11400
Osvita	45900	down 6100
Molod' Ukrayiny	45700	up 5500
Nezavisimost'	44800	up 1660
Ukrayina Moloda	36900	down 2300

Figures for 1996 appeared as follows:

Title	Language	Circulation
KievskiyeVedomosti	Ukrainian, Russian	400,000
Holos Ukrainy	Ukrainian	312,070
Silski Visti	Ukrainian	300,000
Uradovyi Kur'ier	Ukrainian	163,200
Rabochaya Gazeta Ukraina	Russian	150,889
Ukraina Molodaya	Ukrainian	150,000
Robitnycha Gazeta	Ukrainian, Russian	140,000
Vecherny Kiev	Russian	130,000
Donbass	Russian	107,000
Vysockyi Zamok	Ukrainian, Russian	100,000
Za Vil'nu Ukrainu	Ukrainian	100,000
Zakon i Bizness	Ukrainian	100,000
Zaporozhskaya Pravda	Ukrainian	98,000
Nezavisimost	Ukrainian	79,000
Selo Poltavsko	Ukrainian	75,000[54]

A 1997 profile of Western Ukraine shows regional differences which reflect linguistic ones:

Most Popular papers in Western Ukraine:		
Paper:	Area:	Circulation:
Express-Weekly	L'viv	215,000
Vysokyi Zamok	Western Ukraine	60,0000, Saturday, 215,000
Volyn'	Volynska oblast'	44,500(3x/week)
Tyzhden'	Western Ukraine, centre	100,000(weekly)
Sribna zemlia	Zakarpattia	21,850 (weekly)
Vilne zhyttia	Ternopilska oblast'	45,096(3x/week)
Moloda Halychyna	L'viv, Western Ukraine	33,000(3x/week)
Novyny Zakarpattia	Zakarpattia	23,000(3x/week)
Svoboda	Ternopils'ka oblast'	35,000 Saturday,98,000[55]

Contrast these to the list of popular publications in Crimea, with the large number of Russian titles: (in percentages of those polled who read the paper)

[54] These figures are compiled from a variety of sources including UMB, January 1995 p. 6, the Internet, and from The Media Guide, CIS Information Publishing, 1996.
[55] Natalchenko, (1997), pp. 6-7.

Popular Newspapers in Crimea:	
Krymskaia Pravda	61.6%
Krymskie Izvestiia	50.1%
Krymskoe Vremia	32.7%
Krymskaya Gazeta	30.6%
Flag Rodiny	25.3%
Kommunist Kryma	15.4%
Narodnaya Tribuna	14.6%
Business Express	9.7%
Respublika Krym	7.1%
Flot Ukrainy	3.5%
Krymska Svitlytsia	3.3%[56]

The discrepancy in various figures can be accounted for in a number of ways. The chart does not allow for frequency in either case, so dailies and weeklies are counted the same. The second chart is for overall circulation , which takes into account the trend towards buying papers from a kiosk, and not just subscription figures, as in the first chart. Furthermore, as previously explained, papers are often shared by several readers. Still, relative popularity of both Ukrainian and regional papers is evident, as evidenced by the list of popular papers in Western Ukraine which differ considerable from national figures.

Using data from several 'Press Guides' as well as an online list of Ukrainian publications, 271 titles could be documented for this survey. This is well below the Ministry of Press's figures, (The Ministry of Press showed in 1994 a total of 2,368 publications registered, of these 1,986 are newspapers, 126 magazines, 221 bulletins, 13 almanacs, 4 collections, and 18 supplements.[57] The more recent 1996 data shows the number has increased to 5,325, with 3,953 newspapers, 1,025 magazines, 148

[56] Lakashyna and Khomenko, (1997), pp. 14-16. chart p. 15. The poll questioned a sample of Crimean residents, all members of the intelligentsia in various positions.
[57] Cited in UMB, January, 1995.

newsletters, 116 collections and 490 almanacs.[58]) But for the most recent data taken in 1996 from these sources, which provides at least a fair sample of the overall press picture in Ukraine, the following figures apply:

Ukrainian Only	149
Ukrainian and Russian	47
Russian Only	51
Other	8
Total Newspaper	271

The data also indicates that expectations of region-language distribution hold out for the most part[59]. In addition, the distribution of weeklies, dailies and others indicates the following pattern:

Frequency	Language	Number	Percentage
Monthly	U	7	4.69
	R	1	1.96
	UR	5	9.80
2/Month	U	7	4.69
	R	1	1.96
	UR	3	6.38
Weekly	U	70	46.97
	R	27	52.94
	UR	22	46.80
2/Week	U	13	8.72
	R	3	5.88
	UR	4	8.51
3/Week	U	21	14.09
	R	4	7.84
	UR	2	4.25
4/Week	U	2	1.34
	R	11	21.56
	UR	4	8.5
Daily	U	8	5.36
	R	8	15.68
	UR	5	10.63

According to these figures, even though there are more Ukrainian newspapers in Ukraine than in any other language, over half of these appear once a week or less. In contrast, over 35% of Russian papers

[58] UMB, September 1996 citing figures from June 1996.

appear at least four times a week (Ukrainian papers in that bracket make up only 6.7%).

A variety of subjects are covered in both languages. Russian papers addressed topics including news, politics, gossip, youth culture, business and economy. Ukrainian papers covered the same topics, and nationalist platforms as well. Regional papers tend to appear in Ukrainian, except for the industrialised, and therefore Russified, regions of the Southeast. The Crimean papers also appear more often in Russian. Kyiv has a number of papers in both languages on a variety of topics.

It can therefore be surmised, both from the topics covered and the popularity of papers in both languages that Ukrainian has made some headway in the newspaper industry. Readers will take news read in Ukrainian seriously, and cover 'serious' topics such as politics, economy, and social commentary in both languages. However, because the number of daily papers in Ukrainian is significantly lower than the number of daily Russian-language papers, this is an area for improvement. Still, the Ukrainian-language media has experienced a great deal of growth. Figures again vary, but despite claims from several sources that overall production has suffered from financial problems, the Ukrainian Media Bulletin cites a drop from 62% of the market to only 5% cornered by Russian-language publications--and the same article forecasts an improvement in subscription and circulation figures as the market improves from its present 'bottomed out' state.[60]

The lines between journal, periodical, magazine and newspaper are somewhat blurred in Ukraine due to the infrequency of some papers'

[59] Complete database charts by language and by region for all forms of mass media appear at the end of the chapter.

appearance and the variety of subjects covered by some publications. For example, it is difficult to categorize a publication like *Perets'*, which is a satire magazine, in the same genre as *Lel'*, an erotic magazine or *Suchasnist'*, a reputable academic journal. Yet all of these fall under the heading of 'journal' in the Ukrainian Internet digest used as a source for newspapers. Even from the somewhat erratic sampling included there, one can observe a real majority of Ukrainian-language publications over their Russian competition, even in the scientific/technical sphere so long dominated by Russian. Western imports, such as the fashion magazine Vogue appear in Russian, as they are imported directly from Russia and not produced in Ukraine.

Publishing in Ukraine:

Publishing in Ukraine has dramatically changed since Ukrainian independence. Where only state publishing houses, regularly funded by the government, existed before, a number of private publishers have appeared as competition. The number of books published in Ukraine overall, and the number published in Ukrainian, has dropped over recent years.[61]

The following comparison of the last year of state control in publishing in Ukraine, and 1993 shows the drop in publishing in Ukrainian:

- 1989 8,449 total titles 50% in Ukrainian
- 1993 5,013 total titles 27% in Ukrainian

[60] UMB, January 1995, p. 6.
[61] Koval, (1995), pp. 3-8.

Koval estimates that the presses in Ukraine operated at only 39.1% of capacity for 1993. There are a number of reasons for the decline of publishing, including a generally poor economy, poverty of the populace, a state policy which does not encourage culture and several structural problems in the industry itself.

For one thing, most printing houses are still state owned. These serve not only Ukrainian clients, but other CIS and Russian clients as well, making the Russian-language market more profitable at five times the size of the Ukrainian market. Publishing houses themselves have other problems. Currently there are 750 total, with 24 of these are book publishers owned by the state (the number of state publishers before 1989 numbered 23, with 4 private), 23 state publishers which are run at the oblast' level, 17 newspaper and magazine publishers which are under the Ministry of Press and Information, 128 run by scientific organisations, educational bodies, or museums, 60 owned by public organisations and 16 religious publishers. There are a total of 4000 private publishers which are limited and joint ventures. Yet despite the growth of the number of publishing houses, the total output has declined.

Another problem that concerns Ukrainian publishing is the quality of materials generated.

> Intent only on quick profits, they (private publishing houses) must be censured for a lack of social responsibility. Intent only on quick profits, they have flooded the book market with pirated Russian translations of detective novels, thrillers, provocative erotica and steamy fiction of certain Western writers.
>
> Those publishing houses which concentrate on books in the Ukrainain language mostly bring out old literary works which were banned under the Soviet regime. Contemporary writings, Ukrainian and other, are ill-served. The thorough vetting, careful editing and professional advertising aimed at educated readers escape the publishers' attention. The economics of

publishing in Ukraine today mean that publicity costs cannot exceed 2 per cent of the price of a book, without infringing on profits.[62]

The Ministry of Statistics offers statistics which compare the numbers for printed media from 1985 to 1995, thus showing changes not only in numbers of books, papers and journals but also the relative proportion of Ukrainian-language materials in this area.

	1985	1990	1991	1993	1994	1995
Books						
Quantity of titles	8362	7046	5857	5002	4752	6109
Number of copies	155	170	136	88	52	68
In Ukrainian	78	95	73	40	21	32
Journals						
Number (journals and periodicals)	206	185	194	522	461	604
Yearly circulation, (millions)	170	166	95	33	19	24
In Ukrainian	151	150	86	30	13	17
Newspapers						
Number of titles	1799	1787	1891	1757	1705	1877[63]
Yearly circulation	4438	4652	3779	2843	1593	1629
Number of copies	23	25	27	40	20	21
In Ukrainian	15	17	16	26	10	10[64]

Ukrainian Television and Radio: Tune in, Drop Dead?

Ukrainian media on television and radio is very much in the developmental stage. For those accustomed to giants such as the BBC or American networks like ABC, CBS or Fox, the picture that emerges of Ukrainian television and radio is quite confusing. Unlike these Western bodies where programmes begin and proceed through to broadcasting under the same umbrella organisation, Ukrainian media is splintered, fragmented, and rather difficult to assess.

[62] Koval, (1995), p 6.
[63] Number of copiesand yearly circulation numbers are in thousands.

Programmes undergo the usual stages of writing and developing, or are imported either from Russia or the West. They are sold and distributed to companies, which may be either broadcasting companies or channels/stations. Adverts are also bought and sold. Any or all of these functions may be filled by a different group, at every level. Though there are state television and radio stations/channels in Ukraine, a number of private organisations also compete for air time. This means that opportunities for language decisions occur at a number of levels, and that it is difficult to speak of an exclusively Ukrainian-language or Russian-language channel, station, network, company, or producer.[65]

Language choice often becomes a second priority after financial considerations. For example, a programme may be locally made, using one of the studios or production companies from Ukraine; or it may be imported either from Russia or another foreign country. Local programmes obviously will be cheaper to acquire for broadcasting companies, and will require no dubbing, though problems sometimes arise if programming is not translated into Russian for the south and east regions of Ukraine. Local programmes are not always of high quality, and fare badly in comparison with imports. Russian programmes may be dubbed into Ukrainian to please the Western Ukrainian viewership, or may be aired as they are. Western programmes, require dubbing into either language or both, and are usually more expensive to buy (which accounts for the age of some of the shows which are bought). In this way, Russian ends up on

[64] 'Vypusk Knyzhok, Zhurnaliv i hazet' in Statystychyni Shchorichnyk Ukrayiny, Kyiv: Tekhnika 1996, p. 475.
[65] This explanation, and a lengthy interview on language and cost problems was given by Vasyl Yatsuro and Dmitri Ridko of the Centre for Media Initiatives, in Kyiv 1996.

the air waves as dubbing is one of the few areas where money can be saved.

Problems occur again when companies try to make the budget necessary to purchase programming with advert sales. Those companies which have sufficient money to afford good advertising campaigns do not need to advertise much. Conversely, local Ukrainian goods which might benefit from advertising on television are produced by companies with smaller ad budgets who cannot afford air time. This reduces the amount of money a company can earn from ad sales and lowers the operations budget.[66]

Another related problem is in the area of administration and power distribution among regulatory bodies. Here, situations which would be believable under a Soviet regime still unbelievably occur--censorship, curtailing of privilege of independent stations in favour of state owned ones and mismanagement of state properties/incompetence in collecting state revenues from media structures. Yet these things occur in modern Ukraine and may add to the lack of incentives for foreign investment in the media which could help provide training and revenue for local companies.[67] However, the government is at least passing legislation which may improve the situation if observed. As of June 1996, the Rada passed laws declaring that at least 50% of total volume of every channel must be locally made, by the company which broadcasts or by a company based in Ukraine.[68]

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[66] Interview, Centre for Media Initiatives President Vasyl Yatsuro and Dmitri Ridko, Kyiv, July 1996.
[67] Tkachenko, (1995), pp. 7-8.
[68] UMB official information, p. 13-15, June 1996.

ORT long aired illegally in Ukraine, bringing even more Russian language programming to Ukrainian viewers. Ukrainian stations were not forced to pay for the rights to transmit ORT in return for free advertising of Russian products which aired with the broadcasts. Recently, the ad climate is changing so that ORT is no longer the easiest way to reach Ukrainian viewers, which may in time improve the television economy.[69] In addition, ORT lost some of its ad space, which went to other foreign companies (from Germany and other European countries) so that now 1/3 of Ukraine cannot receive ORT.[70] Decisions regarding broadcast time and channels in Ukraine are not exclusively linguistic measures, however. Politics and the economy dictate that a lessening of the influence of ORT could be viewed as advantageous for Ukrainian viewers regardless of which language Ukrainian channels chose to use for their programming.

A list of companies involved in whatever capacity with Ukrainian media follows, as does a list of the most popular programmes, channels, and stations. This too provides a mixed picture--*Dynasty*, a soap opera from America made in the 1980s, is dubbed into Ukrainian and the streets clear visibly for every episode. But *Novaya Zhertva*, a Brazilian Soap, and *Pole Chudes,* a Wheel of Fortune style game show, --both in Russian-- also command large audiences.

The general opinion of Ukrainian television remains rather low. The news broadcasts on Ukrainian channels lack the polish and professionalism of ORT news, for example, and ORT still carries items which interest the Ukrainian viewership such as Russian music and Ukrainian weather forecasts. Recent reports from Ukraine show that a new

[69] Krouk, (1996), pp. 5-7. See also Kuzio, (1997), pp. 370-372, concerning fake joint ventures set up by Russian companies to avoid paying tax.

chanel, Odyn plus Odyn, has started to improve this image slightly. It carries imported American and European films, all dubbed into Ukrainian. ORT has been moved to a lower channel, while UT1 has added popular programming including Santa Barbara five times a week instead of two, dubbed into Ukrainian rather than Russian. Kuzio comments,

> This rather astute form of Ukrainisation produced only muffled protests from a small number of Communist Party pensioners in Sevastopol, which again showed that only in this region of Ukraine was there hostility to the Ukrainian language per se.[71]

Radio seems to fare slightly better.Local radio offers a variety of programmes, including music from the West, Ukraine and Russia, news, and special interest reports. There are a large number of listeners for foreign radio as well, including Radio Liberty, Deutche Welle, and BBC World Service. Recent statistics show the breakdown of listeners as follows:

Station	Any Language	Russian	Ukrainian
Radio Liberty	11	7.4	7.7
VOA	8.9	4.7	4.7
BBC	5.1	3.2	3.4
Radio Vatican	1.4	1.4	---
Deutche Welle	1.2	0.8	1.0[72]

Ukrainians Online: Developing resources on the Internet

Any contemporary discussion of media must include what is available on the Internet. Here, Ukrainians are online more than one might expect given the lack of modern software and the host of other problems which thwart them. While many of the Ukrainian language sites are from

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[70] Kuzio, (1997), p. 371.
[71] Kuzio, (1997), p. 371.
[72] Statistics in percentages of persons polled, taken from BBC survey 'Media Survey in Ukraine', March/April 1995, BBC International Broadcasting Audience Research January 1996.

Canada or other areas of diaspora, these sites serve as a powerful resource in that they provide links and catalogs for other Ukraine-based addresses. These include newspapers which are updated on a regular basis, bulletins from the Rada, and Web pages from various institutions such as Taras Shevchenko University.

While it is difficult to make any list exhaustive, especially as sites appear and disappear almost daily, it can be noted that Ukrainian media is available from a number of good sources on the Web, in Ukrainian, and is but a simple download away from the computer-literate. Furthermore, many media organisations and others now have email accounts, making them accessible from yet another angle. This area is very much under development, and cannot be treated as totally reliable if only because some sites are irregularly updated or do not easily download. But armed with a basic list of Ukrainian sites which catalogue more recent developments, those seeking Ukrainian language can add their computers to the list of ways to interface with Ukraine.

Furthermore, a dictionary of basic terms in Ukrainian relating to the Internet and telecommunications has been produced. Though it is not a large volume, it contains not only relevant lexical items in English and Ukrainian, but also media information in the form of lists of calling codes, helpful addresses for Ukrainian users on the Net and basic information about the new technologies.[73]

Language in advertising and cinema:

Another area of concern is the language of advertisements appearing in the media in Ukraine. Should ads appear in the state

[73] Kossak and Kravec, (1996).

language exclusively, or in the language of the publication or broadcast? Or should the law of compact settlement be followed so that advertisiments appear or are broadcasted in the language acceptable to the local minority. The law approved by the Verkhovna Rada on 5 March leaves the question unanswered. This means that on the streets of Kyiv, for example, one finds a mixture of Russian, Ukrainian and English along with other foreign languages in posted advertisements, while both Russian and Ukrainian ads appear on television and radio.

Cinema deserves a brief mention as this medium served the Soviets well in their propaganda campaigns, and as Russian films remain popular in Ukraine. One source recently commented that there were few films being made or shown in Ukrainian, but that on a brighter note, a new television channel broadcasts American imports dubbed into Ukrainian and enjoys huge popularity.[74]

Language planning and Ukrainian language media:

No one would be wise to paint the Ukrainian language media of Ukraine as a total success story. Especially compared to language planning attempts in education, the media seems to be lagging behind, thwarted by an inability to enforce language policies and by bad finances.

Regionalism makes this area of study even more complex: in the West, one would find Russian-language press and broadcasting relatively low-profile, hardly a presence at all. In Crimea, however, Ukrainian programmes are not trusted and may even be resented by locals who do not speak the state language. Ukrainian-language programmes are

[74] Ermolenko, June 1998, comments as part of personal letter.

considered unprofessional, and that Ukrainian journalists are too nationalist, too prone to stirring up ethnic discord or are partisan. The rest of the country is a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian.

What could be learned from the positive experience in the field of education and possibly transferred to media? As in education, Soviet language planners enjoyed great success first nationalising the media under Ukrainisation, and again during the years of Russification when Ukrainian-language media decreased significantly. Similar reasons for the success of Soviet programmes apply in both areas. First of all, the element of compulsion and fear meant that reading or listening to Ukrainian-language output could be dangerous. Next, Russian-language papers, radio programmes and other types of media, especially cinema were both widely available and appealing to the audience for their professionalism, high quality and 'trendiness'. Russian films remain very popular, partly because of their high quality and partly because of their great influence during Soviet times, which meant no doubt that political influence transferred to linguistic influence via films which reached many, many people.

Obviously, the Soviets had better finances and resources at their disposal, and were not opposed to threats and coercion to increase the popularity of Russian-language media. Now in the democratic climate of Ukraine, when anything that looks like political influence or government bullying produces an outcry in the press, more moderate measures must be undertaken. A series of proposals forwarded by the Council on Language policy, (established in February 1997), which were later approved by the president include the following:

- Tax breaks on Ukrainian language publications
- Greater subsidies to Ukrainian language textbooks in literature and education
- Financial subsidies to the Tovarystvo's *Prosvita, Znannia* and *Ukraïna* to help implement these policies
- Evolutionary protectionist policies for the printing of Ukrainian language publications[75]

At the time of writing, the fate of this legislation remains unknown, but should it pass and be enforced, this could both generate revenue for an already strained industry and help limit the number and quantity of Russian language publications and programmes. Indeed, the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, the State Radio Company and Ministry of Information have threatened sanctions if more Ukrainian-language programming is not introduced, a move which could indicate how media language usage will be regulated in the future.

Already one can see a difference in the quality of Ukrainian programming and papers, but this must continue to improve to win viewers and readers away from slick Russian products. In summary, while Ukrainian media leaders may feel they cannot afford to stop producing large quantities of Russian-language material, the government would benefit from making it so they cannot afford to keep filling the market with Russian-language products.

As with education, these changes must be gradual and work in tandem with other social and linguistic processes. As education reforms begin to work, and more people become comfortable speakers of

[75] Kuzio, (1997), p. 367

Ukrainian, one would expect Ukrainian-language media to increase in popularity, provided the quality is sufficient. On the other side, the media must be encouraged to support state-building, unifying processes and education by making good Ukrainian-language programming and printed matter available. Although at present, the media appears not to have benefited as greatly as education from language planning attempts, it is also not as firmly under government control concerning language practices; furthermore, it is not considered as high a priority as education. Those who hope to pass good legislation to improve the situation must be prepared to enforce these laws evenly, without resorting to censorship and without allowing politics to invade the press except as news. Although it may not reach as many people as the school system of Ukraine, media should not be underestimated as a means to support and implement language changes, as Soviet experience has shown. Nor should those in the media be prepared to undermine both language planning and state-building, whatever their finances, by continuing to fall victim to pressure to produce Russian-language materials.

Supplement to Chapter Four: Media in Ukraine

Sample of available media

It should be noted that the data appearing below is presented in the format in which it originally appeared. Spellings of publications and media bodies reflect the language of the publication of origin, although place names are rendered uniformly.

Some abbreviations have been used for reasons of space. Languages have been abbreviated so that U appears for Ukrainian, R for Russian, G for German, E for English, H for Hungarian, P for Polish and Ro for Romanian.

Online media in Ukraine has grown substantially since the data below were assembled. Numerous sites now exist for Ukrainian papers and educational establishments as well as Ukrainian cultural information.

Online media:

Name	http	Email
Eastern Economist—Ukraine Publications	homepage.interaccess.com/~matlid/index.html.	Matlid@delphi.com
East View Publications Ukraine service	//www.eastview.com/ukrl.html	books@eastview.com
Express Chronicle Daily News	//www.gu.kiev.uk/News/ExpressChronicle/indes.html	--
Financial Ukraine Weekly	//www.finukr.kiev.ua/	--
Kharkiv party	//miso.wwa.com/~oleg/Kharkiv/index.html	oleg@mcs.com
Supreme Rada of Ukraine	//www.rada.kiev.ua/welcome.html	root@Alpha.rada.kiev.ua, webmaster@Alpha...
Ukraine, the	//world.std.com/~sabre/UKRAINE.html	--
Ukraine Home Page	//www.physics.mcgill.ca/WWW/oleh/ukr-info.html	oleh@physics.mcgill.ca
Ukraine TV Information	//www.webcom.com/~ninnet/ukraine.html	--
Ukrainian Legal Foundation	//world.std.com/~sabre/lacd/ulf.home.html	sabre@sabre.org (Rebecca Schneider)
Ukrainian Newspapers	//kolo.esc.kharkov.ua/Ukraine/newspapers.html	WebAdm@KOLO.Kharkov.Ua (Alex Koval)
Ukrainian Server	//www.osc.edu/ukraine.html	pyz@panix.com
UN Office in Ukraine	//www.un.kiev.ua/	commando@un.kiev.ua
Looks International Newspaper	//www.lucky.net/looks/	--
Office	//www.gu.net/officemag/	--
CHIP	//www.gu.net/CHIP/	--
Vseukrainskie Vedomosti	//www.inf.kiev.ua/vv/	--
Ekspres-Khronika	//www.gu.net.News/Express Chronicle/	--
Vechernyi Kharkiv	//www.kolo.esc.kharkov.ua	or //www.kolo.esk.kharkov.ua/ukraine/Kharkiv/VH/
Investitsionnaia Gazeta	//www.inf.kiev.ua/inf.paper/	--
Kievskie Novosti	//www.elvisti.kiev.ua	--
Ukrainian Press server	//www.ukraine.org/press.html	--

Novosti Radio Liuks	//www.gu.net/NEWS/Radio Lux/RLux.html	--
Novosti Radio Liuks 2	//www.Ukrainet.Lviv.UA	//www.rada.kiev ua/bjack/radio/html
KISS TV programme	//www.ukraine.org/press.html	--

Journals:

Name	Lang	City	Subject
Avzhezh	U	Zhytomyr	literature, art
Barvinok	UR	Kyiv	kids
Bezeril'	U	Kharkiv	literature, art, politics
Vavilon	U	Kyiv	cinema
Vidomosti Verkhovna Rady Ukrayiny	UR	Kyiv	newsletter
Viche	UR	Kyiv	politics
Viys'ko Ukrayiny	U	Kyiv	army
Vitchyzna	U	Kyiv	literature, art, politics
Vsesvit	U	Kyiv	foreign literature
Dzvin	U	L'viv	literature, art, politics
Dilovyi Visnyk	UR	Kyiv	trade, industry
Dnipro	U	Kyiv	literature, art, politics
Derzhavnist'	U	L'viv	Politics
Ekomonika Ukrayiny	U	Kyiv	Academy of Sciences and Ministry of Education
EVA (Vilnius, foreign)	UR	----	Women
Zhinka	U	Kyiv	Women
Zhurnalist Ukrayiny	U	Kyiv	Writers' Union
Zemlia i Liudy Ukrayiny	U	Kyiv	Technical practices, Ministry of Agriculture
Kyyiv	U	Kyiv	Politics, literature
Kyyivs'ka Starovina	U	Kyiv	Popular science and literature
Krynytsia	U	Poltava	Literature and art
Kur'ier IUNESKO	U	Kyiv	UN journal
Lel'	U	Kyiv	Erotic
Liudyna i Svit	U	Kyiv	popular science and religion
Maliatko	U	Kyiv	Children
Mizhnarodnyi Turyzm	U	Kyiv	travel and business
Nauka i Suspil'stvo	U	Kyiv	popular science, literature, and art
Nova Heneratsiia	U	Kyiv	youth
Novyny Kinoekrany	U	Kyiv	movie reviews
Odnoklasnyk	UR	Kyiv	Youth
Oikumena	U	Kyiv	Ecology
Pamiatky Ukrayiny	U	Kyiv	popular science
Polityka i Chas	U	Kyiv	Socio-political
Pravo Ukrayiny	U	Kyiv	legal
Raduha	R	Kyiv	literature, art, politics
Ranok	U	Kyiv	politics, art, literature for youth
Ridna Pryroda	U	Kyiv	Nature
Rozbudova derzhavy	U	Kyiv	Political
Svitovyd	U	Kyiv	literature, art
Svitlo i Tin'	U	Aviv	Photography
Sil's'kyi Obriy	U	Kyiv	politics, literature, art
Syhnal	U	Kyiv	Ministry of Interior
Slovo i Chas	U	Kyiv	Literature
Start	U	Kyiv	Sport
Soniashnyk	UE	Kyiv	youth writers
Suchasnist'	U	Kyiv	literature, art, social life

Trybuna	U	Kyiv	Politics
Ukrayina	U	Kyiv	politics, literature, art
Ukrayins'ka Kultura	U	Kyiv	culture and education
Kontrakt	R	Kyiv	business
Delovaia Ukraina	R	Kyiv	business
Dim Sad Ohorod	U	Kyiv	home interest
Eastern Economist	E	Kyiv	news
Hadashot	UR	Kyiv	news, Jewish
Halits'ki Kontrakty	U	Aviv	finance
Nash Chas	U	Kyiv	Agriculture
Nauka i Fantastyka	U	Kyiv	Medicine
Perets'	U	Kyiv	Satire
Stadion	U	Kyiv	Sport
Ukraine Business News	GE	Kyiv	Business
Ukrainian Business Journal	E	Kyiv	Business
Ukrayins'kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal	U	Kyiv	History
Window on Ukraine	E	Kyiv	economics, business
Zhurnalist Ukrayina	UR	Kyiv	journal of union

Television and Radio:

NAME	MEDIUM	LANGUAGE	CIRCULATION
3 Studio TV Broadcasting company	TV		0[1]
7x 7 ASKET	TV		0
+ 7 Studio	TV		0
Chernivtsi Regional TV	TV	U Ro	0
Cherkasy State TV and Radio	TV	none	0
Crimea TV-Radio Company	TV	none	0
Commercial TV Sistema Ltd	TV	none	0
Derzhavna Teleradiomovna Kompania Ukrayiny	radio	none	0
Halits'ka Regional TV	TV	U	1500000
Gravis TV	TV	U R	0
International Commercial Television and Radio	radio	U E R	0
International Commercial TV and Radion Company ICTV	TV	U R E	
International Media Centre	TV	U	0
IP Kiev	TV	U	0
Kiev City Radio	radio	none	0
Khmel'nyts'kyi TV and Radio Association	TV	U R	0
Kherson State TV and Radio	TV		0
Kiev Regional Radio	radio	none	
Kirovohrad State Regional Teleradio Company	radio	U R	800000
Kharkiv State TV and Radio	TV	none	0
Aviv State Teleradio Company	radio	U	0
Aviv State Teleradio Company	TV	U	5000000
Luhansk State TV and Radio Company	TV		0
Megapol Studio	TV	U R	0
Mist TV	TV	U	1000000
Nova Mova	TV	U	0
National Radio Company of Ukraine	radio	U	52000000
Nauka Studio	TV		0
Narodnoe Televidenie 'Galichina'	TV		0
National TV Company of Ukraine	TV	U	16000000
Provesin Radio Station	radio	none	0
Prime Time	TV	U R	0
Pravo TV and Radio	TV		0
Regional Radio	radio	Ro,R	0
Radio Ukraine World Service	radio	UEG	0
Radio Voskresinnya	radio	none	0
Skatev	TV	U R	0
Tet a Tet Commercial TV Company	TV	U R	0
TET TV Company	TV	R	10000
Teleradio Reklama	TV	U	0
Tabatchuk TV	TV	U	0
TV4	TV	U R	0
Uzhhorod-Contact Regional Radio	radio	U	0
Unika Independent TV Association	TV	U R	0
Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	TV		0
Ukraine Teleradiocompany	TV	U R	5500000
UTAR Ukrainian Television and Radio	radio	U	0

[1] The '0' in this column means figures were unavailable.

Ukrainian Radio and Television Corporation	TV	U	0
Ukrainian TV	TV	U	0
Ukrainian TV channel	TV	U	0
Vynnitsiia State TV and Radio	TV		0
Zhytomyr State TVR Company	TV	U P	0
Zaporozhskoye State Regional Teleradio Company	radio	RU	2500000
Zakarpatskaya State Teleradio Company	radio	UGHSI	1500000
Zakarpatskaya State Teleradio Company	TV	UGSIH	1500000
Zhytomyr State TVR company	radio	U P	0

Newspapers:

Name	Lang.	No	City
1-07	URA	weekly	Kyiv
Ahrarni Visti	U	weekly	Ternopil'
Aksent	U	--	Donets'k
Al' Baian	R	monthly	Kyiv
ArgoTexServis	U	weekly	Kyiv
Armiia Ukrayiny	UR	4/week	Aviv
Avtomobil' Sevodnia	R	bi-weekly	Kyiv
Abdet	R	--	Simferopol'
Avizo Kiev	URE	weekly	Kyiv
Avto	UR	bi-weekly	Kyiv
Bankivs'ka Hazeta	UR	weekly	Kyiv
Vil'ne Zhittia	U	4/week	Ternopil'
Biznes	R	weekly	Kyiv
Biznes-Kontakt	UR	weekly	Vinnitsia
Biznes za Nedeliyu	UR	weekly	Kyiv
Boulevard	R	bi-weekly	Kyiv
Business RIO	URE	weekly	Kyiv
Bukovyna	U	2/week	Chernivtsi
Bukovyns'ke Viche	U	2/week	Chernivtsi
Bulava	U	weekly	Kherson
Chas	U	3/week	Chernivtsi
Chas	U	weekly	Khmel'nyts'kyi
Cherkas'kyi Krai	U	--	Cherkasy
Chervonyi Hirnyk	U	daily	Dniepropetrovs'k
Cherkasy	U	2/week	Cherkasy
Chernivtsi	U	weekly	Chernivtsi
Vestnik Chernobylia	UR	2/weekly	Chornobyl
Chernihivs'kyi Visnyk	U	weekly	Chernihiv
Chervonyi Promin'	U	weekly	Sumy
Chornomors'ki Novyny	U	weekly	Odesa
Delovye Novosti	R	3/week	Kyiv
Delovoi Iuzhanin	R	--	Mykolayiv
Den' u Den'	U	weekly	Kyiv
Desnians'ka Pravda	U	2/week	Chernihiv
Deutscher Kanal	UR	monthly	Kyiv
Dialoh	U	weekly	Rivne
Dilo	U	3/week	L'viv
Dilova Cherkashchyna	U	--	Cherkasy
Dilova Ukrayina	UR	2/week	Kyiv
Dilove Zakarpattia	U	weekly	Uzhhorod
Deloviye Novosti	R	weekly	Kyiv

Dnepropetrovskaia Panorama	R	4/week	Dnepropetrovs'k
Dobryi Den'	U	--	Sumy
Donechina	U	4/week	Donets'k
Konetskii Kriazh	R	weekly	Donets'k
Demokratichna Ukrayina	U	weekly	Kyiv
Dziennik Kijowski	P?	monthly	Kyiv
Edinstvo-Plius	R	weekly	Uzhhorod
Na Ekranakh Ukrayiny	U	weekly	Kyiv
Evreiskie Vesti	UR	bi-weekly	Kyiv
Ekho Chernobylia	R	weekly	Kyiv
Express-Ob'iava	URA	3/week	Kyiv
Fakt	UR	weekly	Kyiv
Finansovyi Kyyiv	UR	weekly	Kyiv
Flag Rodiny	R	daily	Sevastopol'
Flot Ukrayiny	U	--	Sevastopol'
Fortuna	R	weekly	Kyiv
Frankova Krinitsia	U	weekly	Aviv
Golos Donbassa	R	weekly	Luhans'k
Hovorit' i Pokazuie Ukrayina	U	weekly	Kyiv
Gubernila	UR	weekly	Kherson
Halichina	U	daily	Ivano-Frankivs'k
Halits'ki Kontrakty	U	weekly	Aviv
Hart	U	weekly	Kyiv
Nash Gorod	R	--	Zaporizhzhia
Holos Ukrayiny	UR	daily	Kyiv
Ia Ty My	U	monthly	Kyiv
Imenem Zakonu	U	weekly	Kyiv
Industrial'noe Zaporozh'e	R	4/week	Zaporozhye
Interes	UR	---	Zhytomyr
Industrial'noe Zaporozh'e	R	daily	Zaporizhzhia
Iug	R	4/week	Odesa
Kam'ianyi Brid	U	monthly	Luhans'k
Karpati Igaz Szo	-	-	Uzhhorod
Karpats'ka Ukrayina	U	weekly	Uzhhorod
Kievskyi Vestnik	R	3/week	Kyiv
Khadashot Novosti	UR	monthly	Kyiv
Khersons'kyi Visnyk	U	--	Kherson
Kievskiye Vedomosti	UR	daily	Kyiv
Kino Kyr'ier	UR	monthly	Kyiv
Kievskie Novosti	R	weekly	Kyiv
Kyyivs'ka Pravda	U	3/week	Kyiv
Kiev Reklamy	UR	weekly	Kyiv
Kirovohrads'ka Pravda	U	3/week	Kirovohrad
Krymskaia Gazeta	R	daily	Crimea
Komunist	U	--	Kyiv
Kommersant Ukrainy	R	weekly	Kyiv
Kommersant Iuga	R	weekly	Odesa
Kontrakt	R	weekly	Kyiv
Vedomosti Daily Kopeika	R	daily	Kyiv
Kiev Post	E	weekly	Kyiv
Krai	UR	weekly	Kyiv
Kreshchatyk	U	daily	Kyiv
Krimskaya Izvestiya	R	daily	Crimea
Krims'ka Svitlytsia	U	weekly	Simferopol'
Krylia Ukrainy	R	weekly	Kyiv
Krymskaia Pravda	R	daily	Simferopol'
Kryms'kyi Visnyk	U	bi-weekly	Crimea
Kul'tura i Zhyttia	U	weekly	Kyiv

Kyyivs'kii Telegraph	UR	weekly	Kyiv
Kyyivs'kii Patriarkhat	U	--	Kyiv
Liberal'na Hazeta	UR	weeklly	Kyiv
Literaturna Ukrayina	U	weekly	Kyiv
Logos	G	--	Donets'k
Luganskaia Pravda	R	3/week	Luhans'k
L'vivs'ki Oholoshennia	U	weekly	Aviv
Mahistral'	UR	weekly	Kyiv
Makeevskiy Rabochii	R	daily	Makivka, Donets'k
Mig	R	weekly	Zaporizhzhia
Mizhnarodnyi Reklamnyi Kur'ier	URA	monthly	Kyiv
Molodyi Bukovynets'	U	weekly	Chernivtsi
Moloda Halychyna	U	3/week	Aviv
Molod' Cherkashchyny	U	--	Cherkasy
Molodizhna Hazeta	U	weekly	Zhytomyr
Moloda Hromada	U	weekly	Poltava
Molod' Ukrayiny	U	3/week	Kyiv
Moloda Volyn'	U	--	Luts'k
My ta Knyha	U	2week	Kyiv
Nash Chas	U	weekly	Kyiv
Nasha Dytyna	U	monthly	Kyiv
Naddniprians'ka Pravda	U	3/week	Kherson
Nasha Respublika	R	weekly	Kyiv
Narodna Hazeta	U	weekly	Kyiv
Narodna Armiia	U	daily	Kyiv
Narodne Slovo	U	3/week	Kirovohrad
Narodna Trybuna	U	--	Luts'k
Narodoznavstvo	U	bi-weekly	Kyiv
Nasha Vira	U	bi-weekly	Kyiv
Neskorena Natsiia	U	bi-weekly	Kyiv
News from Ukraine	UE	weekly	Kyiv
Nezavisimost'	U	weekly	Kyiv
Noar	UR?	--	Kyiv
Novyi Den'	U	weekly	Kherson
Novyi Chas	U	weekly	Ivano-Frankivs'k
Novaia Ekonomicheskaia Politika	U	bi-weekly	Crimea
Novosti	R	weekly	Kyiv
Novyny Zarkapattia	U	weekly	Uzhhorod
Odesskyi Vestnik	R	daily	Odesa
Osvita	U	weekly	Kyiv
Panorama	U	2/week	Vinnitsia
Panorama	UR	weekly	Kharkiv
Peremena	R	weekly	Kyiv
Perets'	U	bi-weekly	Kyiv
PIO	U	weekly	Kyiv
Podillia	U	--	Khmel'nyts'kyi
Podillia	U	3/week	Vinnitsia
Podkarpats'ka Rus'	U	weekly	Uzhhorod
Poklyk Sumlinnia	U	weekly	L'viv
Poltavs'kyi Visnyk	U	weekly	Poltava
Porto-Franko	R	4/week	Odesa
Post Postup	U	weekly	L'viv
Posrednik	R	weekly	Kyiv
Pan + Pani	U	weekly	Ternopil'
Prapor Iunosti	UR	weekly	Dnepropetrovs'k
Pravda Ukrainy	R	daily	Kyiv
Predprinimatel'	R	weekly	Rivne

Priazovskii Rabochii	R	4/week	Mariypol', Donets'k
Prikordonnyk Ukrayiny	UR	2/week	Kyiv
Prikarpats'ka Pravda	U	2/wek	Ivano-Frankivs'k
Privatna Sprava	UR	weekly	Kyiv
Privat Review	R	weekly	Dnepropetrovs'k
Profspilkova Hazeta	U	---	Kyiv
Rabochaya Gazeta Ukrainy	R	daily	Kyiv
Rabochee Slovo	UR	weekly	Kyiv
Rada	U	weekly	Kyiv
Radians'ka Zhytomyrshchyna	U	3/week	Zhytomyr
Radians'ke Prybuzhzhia	UR	3/week	Mykolayiv
Ratusha	U	3/week	Aviv
Respublika	UR	weekly	Kyiv
RIA Vynnitsia	U	weekly	Vinnitsia
Ridna Zemlia	U	2/week	Ivano-Frankivs'k
Rivne Vechirni	U	--	Rivne
Robitnycha Hazeta	UR	daily	Kyiv
Roden Krai	B	weekly	Odesa
Rynochnaia Ploshad'	R	weekly	Kyiv
Rus' Kyyivs'ka	U	monthly	--
Samostiina Ukrayina	U	bi-weekly	Kyiv
Selians'ka Hazeta	UR	weekly	Kharkiv
Selo Poltavske	U	daily	Poltava
Sil's'ki Visti	U	daily	Kyiv
Slava Sevastopolia	R	daily	Sevastopol'
Shliakh Peremohy	U	weekly	Aviv
Slava i Chest'	UR	daily	Odesa
Slobids'kyi Krai	U	3/week	Kharkiv
Sloboda	UR	2/week	Kharkiv
Slovo	U	weekly	Kyiv
Sobytie	R	3/week	Kharkiv
Sobor	R	--	Dnepropetrovs'k
Sportyvna Hazeta	U	3/week	Kyiv
Vedomosti Sport	R	2/week	Kyiv
Sribna Zemlia	U	weekly	Uzhhorod
Stadion	UR	weekly	Kyiv
Starozhitnosti	UA	bi-weekly	Kyiv
Students'kyi Visnyk	U	monthly	Kyiv
Sumshchyna	U	3/week	Sumy
Sums'ka Novyna	U	weekly	Sumy
Svoboda	U	2/week	Ternopil'
Svoe Delo	R	weekly	Dnepropetrovs'k
Selo i Liudy	U	weekly	Cherkasy
Ternystyi Shliakh	U	weekly	Ternopil'
Tovarish	UR	weekly	Kyiv
Ukrainian Business News	R	weekly	Odesa
Ukrayina. Evropa. Svit	U	weekly	Kyiv
Ukrayins'ka Medychna Hazeta	U	weekly	Ternopil'
Ukrayins'kyi Futbol	U	weekly	Kyiv
Ukrayins'ka Hazeta	U	weekly	Kyiv
Ukrayina Molodaya	U	2/week	Kyiv
Ukrayins'kyi Ohliadach	UR	monthly	Kyiv
Ukrayins'ke Slovo	U	weekly	Kyiv
Vechernii Dnepr	R	4/week	Dnepropetrovs'k
Vechernii Donets'k	R	4/week	Donets'k
Vechernii Kiev	R	daily	Kyiv

Vechernii Nikolaev	R	--	Mykolayiv
Vecherniaia Odesa	R	4/week	Odesa
Vecherniaia Poltava	U	3/week	Poltava
Vechernii Sevastopol'	R	2/week	Sevastopol'
Vechirnii Kharkiv	UR	3/week	Kharkiv
Vechernii Zhytomyr	R	weekly	Zhytomyr
Vecherniaia Vynnitsia	R	weekly	Vinnitsia
Vidlunnia	U	2/week	Zhytomyr
Vil'ne Slovo	U	weekly	Zhytomyr
Za Vil'nu Ukrayinu	U	3/week	Aviv
Vil'ne Slovo	U	2/week	Rivne
Vinnits'ka Hazeta	U	3/week	Vinnitsia
Vinnichina	U	3/week	Vinnitsia
Virzha	UR	bi-weekly	Kyiv
Visti	U	weekly	Kyiv
Visti Rivnenshchyny	U	2/week	Rivne
Vodnyk	U	weekly	Kyiv
Volia	U	--	Kyiv
Volyn'	U	3/week	Luts'k
Volyn' (Rivne)	U	2/week	Rivne
Voskresnaia Panorama	R	weekly	Kharkiv
Vpered	U	weekly	Ivano-Frankivs'k
Vremia	R	4/week	Kharkiv
Vseukrainskie Vedomosti	R	4, daily	Kyiv
Khar'kovskie Gubernskie Vedomosti	R	weekly	Kharkiv
Khmel'nychchyna	U	weekly	Khmel'nyts'kyi
Khmel'nyts'ki Visti	U	--	Khmel'nyts'kyi
Yuzhny Kur'er	R		Simferopol
Zakon i Biznes	U	weekly	Kyiv
Zakarpats'ka Pravda	U	2/week	Uzhhorod
Zamkova Hora	U	monthly	Kyiv
Vysockyi Zamok	UR	daily	Aviv
Za Nezalezhnist'	U	weekly	Ivano-Frankivs'k
Zapovit	U	weekly	Ternopil'
Zaporozhskaya Pravda	U	daily	Zaporozhye
Zaporiz'ka Sich	UR	daily	Zaporizhzhia
Zakhidnyi Kur'ier	U	weekly	Ivano-Frankivs'k
Zakhidna Ukrayina	U	weekly	Ternopil'
Zdorov'ia Kyian	UR	monthly	Kyiv
Vashe Zdorov'ia	U	monthly	Kyiv
Zelenii Svit	U	bi-weekly	Kyiv
Zemlia Podil'ska	U	weekly	Vynnitsia
Zhytomyr	U	weekly	Zhytomyr
Zhizn'	R	--	Donets'k
Zhizn' Luganska	R	weekly	Luhans'k
Zirka	U	weekly	Kyiv
Zlahoda	U	weekly	Kyiv
Zmina	U	weekly	Rivne
Zoria	U	3/week	Dnepropetrovs'k
Zoria Poltavshchyny	U	3/week	Poltava
Zorile	Ro	2/week	Chernivtsi

Chapter Five: Education in Ukraine:

The first thing one must note about the education system in Ukraine is that numbers may not entirely be trusted. As a mass means of language instruction, enculturation and socialisation, schools play a vital role in Ukrainian language policy and practice. Yet a quantifiable analysis of the position of Ukrainian language in Ukrainian schools remains difficult. A brief outline of the history of Ukrainian education, combined with a survey of legislation under the Soviets, and since glasnost and independence may yield a rough framework for study. The real picture—which language is used for instruction and examination, the teaching of Ukrainian and Russian in both Ukrainian and Russian schools and the situation in a given classroom -- escapes description by numbers alone.

An example of the complexity of the language situation in Ukrainian schools are English lessons at School 51, in the most expensive neighbourhood in Kyiv. This school is attended by the children of diplomats and members of the government, and is generally considered advanced. In a group of fifteen and sixteen year olds, who have been educated partially under the Soviet system and partly under the Ukrainian system, an interesting phenomenon appears. Lessons were conducted by the teacher in English, and Russian when necessary, as she had travelled as a child and found Ukrainian difficult. Students responded and did their translations into Russian, unless prompted by the teacher with warnings of failure at university if Ukrainian was not completely mastered. Some students responded naturally in Ukrainian, especially the ethnic Ukrainians. Others found this difficult, including several Georgians and Russians. When a recent translation of 'Haiwatha' by Longfellow was read

to them in Ukrainian, most of the students laughed. They were used to the Russian version. Despite all of this, the school is considered a Ukrainian school.[1]

At first one is tempted to criticise such a situation as not at all conducive to the use and improvement of the Ukrainian of the school students. However, the English teacher has received a number of awards for pedagogy, and remains above reproach in her teaching methods if not in her use of Ukrainian. Should she be removed from her post since she does not use Ukrainian comfortably? Could a suitable replacement be found? Obviously, it is expected that these students will be forced to use Ukrainian at university, and indeed field work at Taras Shevchenko university proves this is very likely. For students who do not use Ukrainian at home, this transition may prove very difficult. Effort obviously has been made to incorporate the state language into education, but Russian remains prevalent. This situation is worrisome because if students do not learn to use Ukrainian in school and university, where will they receive adequate tuition in their state language?

This language situation in Ukrainian schools must be examined from two viewpoints. First, how many schools use Ukrainian as the language of instruction? Their situation is complicated by the lack of materials, the quality of materials they do possess, and the lack of trained teachers who can lecture in Ukrainian. Secondly, how much Ukrainian is taught in Russian and other minority schools? If Ukrainian is not the primary language in which lessons are conducted, the students still must receive enough Ukrainian language tuition to function in Ukrainian language universities or technical schools.

[1] From field work in Kyiv, October 1997.

The crucial question when profiling education in Ukraine remains how effective is the educational system, from pre-school to university, in supporting and enforcing language planning? It is important to decide if Ukrainian schools are not only educating Ukrainians in the Ukrainian language, but also in their native culture. As a tool for language planning, education should also prepare civic-minded citizens to be not only able but willing to support the state language, and maintain its literary standards.

The system:

Ukraine's education system is comprised of a network of pre-schools, elementary and high schools, technical schools and universities. Length of study depends on the qualification a student wishes to achieve.

Numbers vary as to the number of schools. For example, one source suggests there are 911 higher education establishments with four accreditation grades, while another source gives the totals at 255 higher education institutions, 68 of which are universities, 169 of which are institutes. In addition, 123 private institutions have been licensed by the Ministry of Education. It may be that the first source included higher vocational institutions as part of the 911 schools of higher education.[2]

The system may sound complicated to an outsider. One may become a junior specialist at either a vocational school (technical or practical degree) or an institution of higher learning after two years. After four or more years, one may become a specialist, receive a Bachelor's degree, or receive a Master's degree. A Bachelor's degree usually takes four years; an additional year studying a specific subject will earn a specialist diploma

[2] The first source is website www.asc.edu/ukraine.html the second source is from a background paper on Ukraine by Andrew Wilkens and Margrit Ostmann.

and a qualifications such as teacher or engineer. Master's degrees take an additional one to two years.

Postgraduate study is also divided by degrees. Three or four years of further study after the Master's degree will enable a student to obtain a Candidate of Sciences degree, roughly equivalent to a Western Doctor of Philosophy. This degree requires submission of a thesis and its defence before a specially convened board of examiners.

The doctor of sciences is a more advanced degree following the candidate of sciences and requires more extensive research. Ukrainian education personnel insist this qualification is actually higher than the PhD earned in the United States or Europe. After this degree is obtained, a student may become an associate professor. An academic career can then progress to a full professor, which is equal to the status of full professor in other countries.[3]

Teacher training is level-specific. This means that primary school teachers and below are trained at institutes to the level of junior specialists, educators or teachers. Secondary school teachers attend teacher training institutes up to degree grade III or IV (as opposed to I or II for primary school teachers). Teachers who wish to teach at university or higher-education institutions must complete a university or higher education degree. Those with higher degrees usually have preference in the workplace.

For professions which require special professional training or vocational instruction in a trade, shorter courses exits as well. Vocational institutions also offer qualifications to graduates of secondary schools which do not correspond to university degrees but do prepare them for

'high-level work in more than 800 professions.'[4]

There are presently 78,000 teachers in Ukrainian higher education facilities, with 880,000 students.[5]

Language policy and a brief history of Ukrainian schools:

From the viewpoint of language planning, a logical starting point for a survey of the history of education in Ukrainian as well as in Ukraine is the 1920s, under the policy of Ukrainization.[6] Although this policy began in the government, both with the hiring of more Ukrainians and increased use of the Ukrainian language in government work, 'its greatest impact was on education. Unlike the Tsarist regime, the Soviets placed a high value on education.'[7] The Soviets promoted education for a number of reasons. Their ideology demanded an educated society to serve as the model of a new order. This society would also be more productive, and therefore could increase the power of the state, if it were educated in science and technology. Furthermore, schools provided an excellent opportunity to indoctrinate the young with Soviet values.[8] Weinstein lists four goals of Soviet education policy as follows:

- To expand the school system to include all children
- To integrate communist doctrine into the curriculum
- To nationalise the educational system in each region so that minority children learn in their own language
- To provide a foundation for assimilation into the Russian

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[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Wilkens and Ostmann.
[6] Sources on pre-Soviet education include Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, pp. 300-01; also pp. 323-25 which includes treatment of the educational activities of the Prosvita learning society.

nation by including Russian language as a subject in every school[9]

The first two goals reflect social and political aims; the last two demonstrate Soviet concern with language planning and their savvy use of education as one method of implementation. Thus, education in Soviet Ukraine broke with earlier tradition and modernised along Soviet lines. Desiring in particular to replace old 'bourgeois' traditions, the Soviets encouraged new experimental educational theories and new types of schools. Communist values emphasised work, so work-study became an important part of education. Communal learning and technical courses also gained prominence, while the humanities and classics were de-emphasised, with the study of religion being banned altogether.[10]

Within this new system, nationalising schools was a top priority. Lenin felt minorities could not be forced to assimilate into the Russian nation. He planned instead to appease national groups by allowing and even encouraging education in their own language. Given this much-demanded right, minorities would be unlikely to reject Russian as a foreign language or a second language in local schools. Then, since business and industry, and in particular the political machine operated in Russian, minorities would voluntarily speak Russian as the language of advancement.[11]

These innovations may not have all been pedagogically viable, but education did become more accessible. As schools charged no fees at the elementary and secondary levels, children of poor peasants and workers

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[7] Subtelny, (1988), p. 388.
[8] Subtenly, (1988), p. 388.
[9] Weinstein, (1942), p. 125.
[10] Subtelny, (1988), p. 397.

could afford to attend classes and receive at least a basic education. Perhaps the most impressive progress the Soviets actualised was against illiteracy: Ukraine was 40% literate before the revolution but by 1927, this figures had increased to 70% overall. In the countryside, where literacy had only been at 15%, the Soviets could claim an increase to 50% during the same period.[12] Facilities destroyed during years of civil war were gradually rebuilt, providing first four year elementary schools, then seven year 'incomplete middle' schools and finally 'complete middle' ten year schools. Meanwhile institutes were established to offer professional training. As the system grew in number of schools and in facilities, it also became more and more Ukrainised.[13]

This process gained support from legislation passed in 1923 and 1924, which guaranteed education in Ukrainian by setting up practical guidelines—the placement of teachers, the production of materials, and the language of instruction were specified. These laws also provided other minorities, such as Germans, Poles, and Jews in Ukraine with national schooling, provided Ukrainian was also taught as part of the curriculum.[14]

Though Ukrainisation progressed steadily, there was resistance at all levels from parents and school personnel. To combat this reluctance, Ukrainisation was declared a high pressure campaign during 1925-26.[15] Skrypnyk, the head of the Commissariat of Education (1927-33) became the 'driving force' of the promotion of Ukrainian language. In 1927, the Commissariat issued a directive which stipulated students must pass exams testing their knowledge of Ukrainian to enter higher education, and

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[11] Weinstein, (1942), p. 127.
[12] Subtelny, (1988), p. 388.
[13] Weinstein, (1942), p. 130.
[14] Weinstein, (1942), p. 130.

furthermore, that faculty at these institutions must also demonstrate proficiency in Ukrainian equal to that required of government officials.[16] In 1929, this was supplemented by an additional Ukrainian language exam given to students hoping to graduate higher education institutions who could not receive their qualifications without passing.[17] By 1929, 80% of general educational institutions, 52% of vocational schools and 30% of universities conducted instruction in Ukrainian alone.[18] Secondary schools, which in 1922 had only been 1% Ukrainian rose to 66% by 1929, with a further 16% teaching in both Ukrainian and Russian. As these numbers show, higher education remained mostly in Russian, resulting mainly from reluctance on the part of faculty in Institutes of People's Education (former universities), technical colleges and worker's preparatory schools to change the language of instruction.[19] Adult literacy courses, traditionally taught only in Russian, were 81% Ukrainian by 1925. Further successes were reflected in the student body. Ukrainians made up 57% of the total student body by this period (30-40,000 students).[20] The remaining students were 20% Russian and 22% Jewish.[21]

By the peak of Ukrainisation in 1929, 97% of Ukrainian schoolchildren received instruction in Ukrainian. In addition, even in schools conducting lessons in another language, Ukrainian literature, language and history were required subjects.[22] Skrypnyk's achievements are even more impressive considering the obstacles he faced. Though he

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[15] Weinstein, (1942), p. 131.
[16] Weinstein, (1942), p. 134.
[17] Weinstein, (1942), p. 134.
[18] Subtelny, (1988), p. 389.
[19] Magosci, (1996), p. 543.
[20] Magosci, (1996), p. 543, cites 57%, and 35,000 students. These figures are from Subtelny (1988), p. 389.
[21] Subtelny, (1988), p. 389.
[22] Subtelny, (1988), p. 389.

estimated 100,000 teachers would be necessary, only 45,000 could be found, and the Soviets refused to allow 'imports' from Galicia, as these academics were not ideologically reliable. Some teachers plainly refused to teach in Ukrainian. There were few available materials in Ukrainian for use by teachers, and shortages hampered production of texts.[23]

Policy and the direction of Soviet language planning was about to shift.

> The years up to 1933 constituted the high pressure period of Ukrainization; after 1933 the government concentrated its attention chiefly upon suppressing the tendency to over-Ukrainize where such a tendency was discernible, and upon rectifying the results of this tendency which had already appeared. This was not a new policy; it was, rather, a change of emphasis from one part of the linguistic policy to another. Ukrainian schools for Ukrainian children remained, but now the stress was placed upon schools for the national minorities within the Ukrainian majority, and particularly for the Russian inhabitants of Ukraine.[24]

With the benefits of hindsight, a modern reader could consider Weinstein's comments remarkably sanguine. Writing during the time of Stalin's regime and largely unaware of the sinister undercurrents rippling beneath Soviet language planning, he could not have known what course this and related policies would take.

Accusations of over-Ukrainisation took two main forms. First, minorities wished to be able to move freely about the USSR, which required a knowledge of Russian, the language of inter-ethnic communication. In Ukrainian schools, one could graduate with a better knowledge of Ukrainian and one's native language and a less extensive knowledge of Russian. Secondly, since Ukrainisation really meant a

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[23] Subtelny, (1988), p. 389. Weinstein gives the following statistics for 1927, which show similar progress: In 1927, 75.8% of elementary pupils were instructed in Ukrainian, 6.9% in Ukrainian and one other language, 10.6% in Russian. In 1927, Ukrainians made up 80.15% of the total population, Russians 9.2% so this means schools in Ukraine were rapidly approaching their target balance.

[24] Weinstein, (1942), pp. 135-36.

Russian schools in Ukraine became Ukrainian schools, many Russians felt deprived of national schooling. However, *this* claim could be answered.

There were fewer Russian schools, but the number of Russian classes remained proportionally high with reference to the number of ethnic Russians.

In 1933, Ukrainisation came under review as part of a general assault on Ukrainian nationalism. Skrypnyk was dismissed and replaced with Zatonsky, who immediately confirmed that over-Ukrainisation had taken place. Figures released in 1937 show the number of schoolchildren had expanded, with 83.0% studying in Ukrainian. Similar growth was evidenced in minority schools as a result of emphasis on their expansion. Zatonsky set about remedying the mistakes of his predecessor: despite adamant claims to the contrary, Russification in Ukraine crept back into the policy of the ruling regime. Decreasing the number of children studying in Ukrainian was only one part of Soviet policy, however.[25] Education would assist the Soviets in the attainment of the second part of their language planning goals, total bilingualism and eventual assimilation.

Justification for these plans was not difficult. With Russian language thoroughly in place as a second language in schools all over the Soviet Union, it was a small matter to continue to promote it, even at the expense of other languages. Skrypnyk himself had allowed that Russian must be learned as a means to access Russian culture. Renewed vigilance against Ukrainian nationalism uncovered 'neglect' in the teaching of Russian: great works of Russian literature could only be found in Ukrainian translations, students failed their Russian courses at higher rates than other classes, and methodology had not been updated for years. Students

were deemed more than willing to study Russian, if only they were given an opportunity, and since most of them would encounter more Ukrainian in their daily lives than Russian, to attain equal fluency the time allotted to Russian classes was increased.[26]

Writing in the seventies, Farmer observed,

> The state policy effectively discriminates against the Ukrainian language. It does so directly, by requiring the study of the Russian language in primary schools (since 1972, also in kindergartens) and by conducting instruction in Russian, and indirectly through the structure of incentives: because the better institutes of higher education conduct much, if not most of their instruction in Russian, parents...do well to send their children to Russian schools.

From the standpoint of language planning, this process was encouraged in several ways. Students were not able to learn good Ukrainian at school. Negative stereotypes were insinuated in connection to Ukrainian, while educators made positive associations with Russian. The same motives which would compel parents to send their children to Russian schools also appealed to students' self interest: 'There is a material premium attached to the mastery of Russian, as well as a social stigma attached to speaking Ukrainian in some contexts.'[27]

As fluency in Ukrainian dropped among students, the Soviet administration further discouraged use of Ukrainian by passing a series of educational reforms in 1958-9 which removed compulsory education in both languages. The text of the law entitled 'Regarding the Strengthening of the Relationship of School and Life and for the Further development of the System of Public Education in the USSR', states as follows:

> In the Soviet schools instruction is conducted in the native language. This is one of the more important achievements of the Leninist national policy. At the same time in the union and autonomous republics is also studied the Russian language which is a great means of international communication, of strengthening of friendship among the peoples of the USSR and of

[25] Weinstein, (1942), pp. 140-42.
[26] Weinstein, (1942), pp. 144-47.
[27] Farmer, (1978), pp. 133-34.

introducing them to the treasures of Russian and world cultures.

Nevertheless, we must not fail to take into account that in connection with the language study in the union and autonomous republics there is a great overloading of children. As a matter of fact, in the national schools the children study three languages: their native tongue, Russian and a foreign one.

Consideration should be given to the question of delegating to parents the right of deciding to which school, with what language of instruction they wish to send their children.[28]

The result of this decree was for parents to send their children to better equipped, more modern Russian schools with an eye to improving their children's' career prospects.[29] Meanwhile, to minimise the discontent this policy could produce, the regime carefully avoided publishing comparative statistics which might show not only a decline in the number of Ukrainian schools, but a decline in the number of pupils in the number of students relative to Russian schools. As in the 1930s, Ukrainian schools tended o be smaller than their Russian counterparts and were concentrated in rural areas. Farmer cites rare statistics published for 1955-6 which prove this point.[30]

Language	No of schools	%	No. of pupils	%
Ukrainian	25,034	85.32	3,845,754	72.79
Russian	4,051	13.81	1,392,270	26.35
Moldovan	159	.54	27,102	.51
Hungarian	93	.32	16,622	.31
Polish	4	.01	1,875	.04

Kolasky details other means of Russification, or neglect of Ukrainian schools in favour of Russian ones. By the 1960s there was a severe lack of textbooks in Ukrainian, and many of these were present in two editions with the larger edition appearing in Russian. Where a lack of

[28] Kolasky, (1968), p. 27.
[29] Farmer, (1978), p. 134.
[30] Farmer's source is Cherkasyn, 'Zahal'ne navchannia v Ukrains'kyi RSR v 1917-1957, Kyiv 1958, p. 61. Kolasky also has statistics for the year 1953-4, which show that 25,192 Ukrainian schools were attended by an average of 177 pupils, while Russians schools averaged 351 pupils though there were only 4,027 of them. (p. 50).

textbooks appeared, the numbers were made up with Russian books imported for that purpose. The language planning process began long before students reached higher or technical education, however. Children's films, songs and television programmes all appear in Russian. At the level of higher education, Ukrainian students were confronted with handbooks and texts in Russian, or even outright discrimination. Russian schools remained better funded and received a disproportionate share of the education budget. By 1958-9, Soviet attacks on education in Ukrainian had taken their toll: in 12 major cities, at least 60% and sometimes over 90% of schools had adopted Russian as the language of instruction.[31]

Problems which were present at the time Farmer and Kolasky wrote their articles remain relevant. The quality of Ukrainian language instruction in both Ukrainian and Russian schools has been sharply criticised, then and now. Like dictionaries, textbooks contained Russified forms or examples of *surzhyk*, more apparent in Western Ukraine than in other areas. Teacher training bears the blame for some of these problems; Farmer explains that many teachers of Ukrainian were taught in Russian by people who did not speak Ukrainian at all. Higher education remained a problem as it had been in the earlier years of Soviet rule. Of the 56% of higher education staff who were ethnically Ukrainian, only 34% taught in Ukrainian even though 61% of their students were also ethnically Ukrainian.[32]

[31] Kolasky, (1968), p. 57.
[32] Farmer, (1978), pp. 137-8. Also citing report by Y. M. Dadenkov, Ukrainian Minister of Higher and Secondary Education 1960-73. His figures apply to the 50 schools under the direction of his office.

Education, State-building and language planning for the present and future:

From the standpoint of language planning, Ukrainian education is absolutely key not only in providing a place to learn good Ukrainian, but in the process of state-building. Shamsur observes,

> To enhance the status of the Ukrainian language through its role in social life is likely to be a most arduous task, due to the perverse linguistic environment still existing in the Republic. The latter is at variance with the growing ethnic self-awareness of the Ukrainian people, its striving for real sovereignty. Thus the field of education becomes the critical sphere, where the future of the new Ukraine is being shaped.[33]

A number of traits characterise the entire system, which will challenge policy makers until they are rectified. The educational system remains divided, not only linguistically between mono-lingual and multi-lingual schools of different types, but also in that the bulk of Ukrainian schools are rural, while Russian schools are overwhelmingly urban. The usual regional differences also apply, with Western schools at 90% Ukrainian while in Donets'k, Ukrainian schools make up only 8.9 percent of the total.[34] As observed by Farmer, Ukrainian schools are still decreasing in overall percentage of schools, but growing in pupils and number of schools. This is mainly due to the existence of multi-lingual Russian and Ukrainian schools, and schools for other minorities.[35]

The legislation to promote Ukrainian-language education is in place. The 1989 law on language specifically grants the right to education in one's national language, which led to the creation of new kindergartens and schools and allowed special language classes in otherwise mainstream schools. However, this law preserved compulsory Russian

[33] Shamsur, (1993), p. 162.
[34] Shamsur, (1993), pp. 159-167, p. 163.

classes along with Ukrainian language classes.[36] This law was supported by the Law on National Minorities in 1992 which also guaranteed the right to be educated in the language of one's nationality.[37]

Though incapable of showing all the complexities of Ukrainian education, statistics on language and schooling offer some basic ideas about the usage level of Ukrainian in schools as a means of instruction.

Instruction in one language:

1993 (in thousands and percentages)

language	**Ukrainian**	**Russian**
city	2197	1804
%	36.0	29.6
village	13464	1128
%	89.1	3.8
total	15661	2932
%	73.8	3.8

1994 (in thousands and percentages)

city	2289	1811
%	37.2	29.4
village	13534	1131
%	89.1	7.5
total	15823	2942
%	74.1	13.8

two languages:

city-34%, village-2.5%, overall, 11.5% (1993)
city-33%, village 2.4%, overall 11.3% (1994)

where one is Ukrainian:

city 33.8, village 2.4, overall 11.4 (1993)[38]

Another more recent chart shows a comparison of 1994 and 1995 by percentages of students studying in Ukrainian and Russian by region. This

[35] Shamsur, (1993), p. 163.
[36] Shamsur, (1993), pp. 161-62.
[37] Solchanyk, (1993), p. 4.
[38] Statystychyi dani, do zasidannia kolehiyi ministerstva aza pidsumkamy 1994 roku Kyyiv, 1995c., ministerstvo osvity ukrainy p. 45, 'rospodil dennxy serednix zahal'noosvitnix navchal'no-vyknovnykh zakaldiv za movamy navchannia'

highlights regional differences and shows areas which might still benefit greatly from Ukrainization policies. These figures are for kindergartens, which means 'graduates' of these will be prepared for further instruction in Ukrainian.

	Ukrainian Language		Russian Language	
	1994	**1995**	**1994**	**1995**
Ukraine	65	66	34	33
Crimea	0.3	0.2	99.1	99.5
Vinnitsia	99	99.9	1	0.1
Volhylnia	99	99	1	1
Dnipropetrovs'k	78	77	22	23
Donets'k	9	10	91	90
Zhytomyr	98	98	2	2
Zakarpattia	89	89	1	1
Zaporizhzhia	37	36	63	64
Ivano-Frankivs'k	99	99.8	1	0.2
Kyiv oblast	96	97	4	3
Kirovohrad	95	96	5	4
Luhans'k	13	14	87	86
L'viv	99.7	99.6	0.3	0.3
Mykolaiyiv	66	71	34	29
Odesa	32	33	66	65.5
Poltava	98	98	2	2
Rivne	99.6	99.4	0.4	0.4
Sumy	86	87	14	13
Ternopil'	100	100	--	--
Kharkiv	48	48	52	52
Kherson	83	82	17	18
Khmelnits'kyi	98	99	2	1
Cherkasy	98	99.6	2	0.4
Chernivtsi	91	92	1	0.5
Chernihiv	89	92	11	8
Kyiv city	99	99	1	1

Other languages included (where percentages do not equal 100) are Moldovan, Romanian, and Crimean Tatar.[39] Figures are for 1994, 1995 in %

This chart combines two given in a handbook of statistical information about Ukrainian schools. It shows both the number of institutions (zaklady) by language, and the number of students receiving instruction in each language.

[39] Chart and statistics taken from Statystychnyi Shchorichnyk Ukraiyiny, (1996), p. 441.

Region	Institutes /Students	U Schools/ Students	R Schools/ Students
Crimea	557/ 310109	0/ 214	536/ 308842
Vinnits'ia	1087/ 238455	1048/ 214365	3/ 24090
Volhylnia	845/ 163741	831/ 159293	1/ 4376
Dnipropetrovs'k	1026/ 503804	567/ 210626	102/ 293178
Donets'k	1231/ 644484	117/ 34949	832/ 609535
Zhytomyr	945/ 206860	894/ 175955	5/ 30905
Zakarpattia	710/ 204045	579/ 171001	4/ 8930
Zaporizhzhia	656/ 273761	311/ 81453	203/ 192308
Ivano-Frankivs'k	728/ 215258	717/ 210276	1/ 4965
Kyiv oblast	787/ 259865	740/ 236806	1/ 23059
Kirovohrad	633/ 159634	561/ 114982	20/ 44652
Luhans'k	814/ 368498	181/ 32219	490/ 336279
L'viv	1410/ 383484	1354/ 366002	8/ 16744
Mykolaiyiv	658/ 191726	514/ 102229	55/ 89497
Odesa	891/ 340127	462/ 102096	238/ 230944
Poltava	990/ 219823	932/ 177202	10/ 42621
Rivne	769/ 186876	756/ 183945	0/ 2931
Sumy	693/ 179799	510/ 107289	99/ 72510
Ternopil'	893/ 164924	886/ 162804	0/ 2120
Kharkiv	967/ 389047	573/ 137039	191/ 252008
Kherson	557/ 185543	418/ 111040	45/ 74503
Khmelnits'kyi	1074/ 209284	1025/ 187557	1/ 21611
Cherkassy	703/ 200504	656/ 167926	1/ 32758
Chernivtsi	441/ 132851	312/ 102790	4/ 8439
Chernihiv	864/ 170092	764/ 132580	6/ 37512
Kyiv city	349/ 334434	107/ 211979	23/ 122416
Sevastopol'	64/ 54276	0/ 11	63/ 54265
Overall	**21344/ 689214**	**15823/ 3895183**	**2942/ 2942106** [39]

The goals of the Ministry of Education for 1991-3 were ambitious but are indicative of the necessary direction of government policy:

- The first year of higher education should be in Ukrainian
- Nursery and elementary schools should be in Ukrainian in proportion to the population
- Departments for Ukrainian studies should be established in higher education, which focus on language, literature and culture
- Ukrainian history should be taught as a separate subject
- Higher education students must take language tests
- The Ukrainian system should be integrated into the international

system of education

- A nationally oriented education system should be developed which corresponds to historical traditions[40]
- Education should incorporate both Ukrainian and world trends
- Ukrainian history, culture and language must be compulsory
- All pupils should sit Ukrainian language exams from 1993

These policies have several goals, which relate both to state-building and to language planning in Ukraine. Essentially, the government hopes to create loyalty to Ukraine and unify the country, while supporting the state language and raising its popularity and status in the population. Partly, this must be accomplished by creating a distinct history and culture, and by supporting national traits and traditions. Most importantly, education is the process of creation of new elites, who must be avid supports and speakers of Ukrainian.[41]

Serious challenges must be faced by educational authorities in Ukraine before these goals can be met. Even with the elevated status of Ukraine brought on by independence and the increase in the number of Ukrainian schools, Russians living in Ukraine remain reluctant to adopt the state language in schools. In Crimea, for example, even though a quarter of the population is ethnically Ukrainian (half a million), not a single Ukrainian school has opened there. As the previous pages show, several of Ukraine's major cities also lack Ukrainian schools: In Donets'k less than 5% of students are taught in Ukrainian, and in the Donbass over 90% of children learn in Russian. In Luhans'k, only one Ukrainian school exists

[40] Ukrainian education for the Twenty-first century, pamphlet published by the Ministry of Education.

though there are 225,500 Ukrainians living there. Dnipropetrovsk has no Ukrainian schools at all. Odesa's population is nearly half Ukrainian, but only two schools had opened by 1990.[42]

Language planners clearly recognise the importance of education in Ukraine, as both a means to improve the usage and status of the state language and as a way of uniting the heterogeneous population, creating civically-aware citizens. Already the number of Ukrainian-language kindergartens and their enrolment is impressive. This means language planning can start from the bottom, training each year as it enters the school system and allowing Ukrainian-language education to develop as students progress. However, the language of universities, like the language used in business and government influences both parental and pupil choice. This means that universities and higher education facilities, which remain more Russified than other levels, must improve the availability and quality of instruction in Ukrainian.

Ukrainisation has worked as a policy in Ukraine before. However, a number of important changes have occurred since the inception of the first Ukrainisation policy in the Twenties. What Arel terms the 'rural reservoir' is depleted since more Ukrainians have moved into cities. More Ukrainians speak Russian, which may or may not qualify them for Russian-language education (depending on whether the criterion is an ethnic one or a linguistic one). Furthermore, in the current climate a lack of choice in language of instruction might cause outcry from both Russian and Ukrainian parents, who could see this kind of affirmative action as

[41] Kuzio, (1997), p. 117.
[42] Molod Ukrainy, 24 February, 1990. Quoted by Solchanyk, (1993).

undemocratic.[43]

A change to education primarily in Ukrainian may be a formidable task without affirmative action, as Kuzio observes[44]. One must risk outcry and claims of over-Ukrainisation to protect what is really the language of the majority if it is to function as a proper state language, widely used and fluently spoken. At the same time, the rights of national minorities must be protected including their linguistic and educational righgts. This must not exempt them from knowledge of the state language, however.

Why is language planning in education so crucial? Thus far it appears that the promotion of Ukrainian has enjoyed greater success in education than in media. What causes an ethnic Ukrainian to buy only Russian papers, yet insist on Ukrainian-language education for his or her children? Education is easily the greatest sphere of linguistic influence. Conceivably a person who does not buy newspapers, watch television or listen to the radio might feel very little influence from the media in Ukraine. By law, however, every person must attend school. Therefore, while too much Russian-language media in Ukraine is a problem, education is far more important and more urgently in need of de-Russification since it must necessarily be a part of the life of every citizen.

Language planning involves a goal, a plan or policy and the enforcement of that plan. In education that goal is ultimately the product: civic-minded, Ukrainian-speaking, educated citizens. In the interim, the aim is to create educational facilities able to do this. The aims of the language law of 1989, the Constitution and the government education plan (mentioned above) all must be enforced by educators starting from the

[43] Arel, (1993), pp. 196-200.
[44] Kuzio, (1997), p. 114-18.

Ministry of Education extending to kindergarten teachers.

Enforcement should take place outside the classroom, in teacher training, textbook publishing and the creation of Ukrainian schools and language classes. It must also be enforced within schools, so that all subjects are taught in Ukrainian, Ukrainian literature, history and culture are taught as specific, separate subjects in all schools and Ukrianian language classes are taught by qualified teachers with relevant, modern materials and resources. All of this should be supported and validated by a third level of enforcement, society as a whole. In the West and in the country little active promotion or language planning is needed. In the cities of other regions, however, the results of Russification remain in evidence.

Current policies have taken Ukrainisation to a certain level in education. The numbers show improvement especially in early education, but the number of children in Ukrainian schools is not yet equal to the number of ethnic Ukrainian children. It would therefore be useful to analyse the two previous attempts at languge planning this century which were successful (Ukrainisation in the 1920s-30s and Russification in the 1930s to Gorbachev), to discover what attributes they share which could be usefully applied to the current education programme in Ukraine.

I. Multi-front offensive. Both Ukrainisation and Russification were applied on several levels from different directions. This means that all aspects of education must also be systematically oriented or re-oriented towards the Ukrainian language.

Most obviously, textbooks should be available at every level. This is where finances remain the biggest problem. The ideal situation would

provide each child with a personal copy of the relevant texts. But in the meantime, some creativity on the part of teachers must fill the gap, both in language classrooms and in other subjects. It may appear more convenient to use Russian-language history or chemistry books and computer programmes, but the long-term influence may be fairly detrimental. After all, every classroom has a chalkboard, and most students can afford pencils and copybooks until appropriate Ukrainian-language books and software are available. Under Russification, all texts which were deemed 'inappropriate' or likely to have an adverse effect were banned; such an extreme measure is probably no longer necessary or advisable in a democratic society, but the laxity displayed in schools with regard to Russian materials is equally hazardous.

Teacher training would benefit from re-organisation. Institutes to re-train teachers do exist, but often classrooms contain pupils with differing levels of fluency in Ukrainian, which makes teaching difficult for the instructor. Because bi-lingualism is still prevalent, teachers who do not speak or do not use Ukrainian are tolerated, especially as filling their posts would be difficult. Most teachers would see language classes as a chore and expect to be paid to attend, or at least to have the cost of the classes or lessons met by their school. Under previous policies, teachers were given a deadline to learn the language being promoted or face redundancy. In addition, no new teachers would be appointed to a post without passing a language exam. If teachers could be persuaded to view Ukrainian lessons not as extra work, but as the means to keep their jobs (just as history, literature or science teachers usually attend refresher courses to keep their knowledge of the field current), especially if local

universities offered free or inexpensive courses, this sector might witness rapid improvement.

Within the classroom, changes are necessary as well. First, in Ukrainian schools instruction should be in Ukrainian in all subjects. If finances do not permit pay rises to reward those who do teach in Ukrainian, similar to the rises offered by the Soviets, teachers must be made to feel their job security in both the long and short term depends on their ability to instruct in Ukrainian.

Already pupils are told Russian will not be acceptable for entrance exams, although with so much instruction in Russian both during high school and at higher education institutes, this warning lacks bite. If students were graded on their Ukrainian usage in history or business classes too, they might feel more urgency to speak Ukrainian correctly. Self-interest motivated ambitious students and parents during Russification and Ukrainisation, since university and career success depended on language knowledge. Parents chose Russian schools when Krushchev's education legislation gave them the chance, as they were aware that mobility around the Soviet Union and the chance for a successful career depended on fluency in Russian.

Not all of the lack of use of Ukrainian can be blamed on inertia, laziness or simple reluctance to change. Students must have a good command of Ukrainian in order to use the language. For children whose parents speak Ukrainian at home, this may not be a problem. However, many children live in homes where only Russian or *surzhyk* is spoken. For them, Ukrainian must be learned at school. Vashulenko comments that to listen to a Ukrainian language course in many schools, one would think

every student intended to become a philologist.[45] Students are taught the literary language in such a formal manner that they do not learn how to be comfortable using Ukrainian in a variety of settings. Vashulenko argues that a methodology overhaul is needed so that students may learn a more user-firendly lexicon and grammar with a wider spectrum of spoken and written Ukrainian.[46] The Soviets reaped the benefits of trying new teaching strategies both during Ukrainisation and Russification; modern educators could do the same. At present the methods used to teach English are modern and interesting for students, so perhaps application of these tactics is all that is required.

II. Short and long term goals. Soviet planning had a range of immediate matters considered urgent, which were supported and made permanent by more extended plans. For example, in the short term teachers learned to instruct in the promoted language to keep their jobs. In the long term, teacher training was conducted to prepare suitably trained new teachers for their jobs, and no new teachers were hired without the required language. Students switched languages immediately to keep good marks or pass entrance exams, but were able to maintain the new language supported by higher education and society at large. Texts in the 'wrong' language were banned and removed in the short term, and replaced by those in the 'right' language as soon as possible. A 'transitional' moderately tolerant approach was quickly replaced with a less tolerant long term enforcement strategy: students did not enter university without

[45] Vashulenko, (1996), p. 40.
[46] Vashulenko, (1996), p. 40, For more information concerning methodology in teaching Ukrainian, particularly using more modern teaching methods, see *Movoznavstvo*,(1996), ed Taranenko, related articles.

exams, teachers were sacked, 'unqualified' teaching graduates were not hired. 'Making do' with Russian materials because they are modern and available may be convenient in the short term, but in the long term it will be much harder to convince students that Ukrainian is necessary if they have been allowed to 'make do.'

III.Appeal to Self-Interest. Although usually associated with the stick, Soviet policy made use of the carrot too. Herein lies the difference between media and education: education provides the tools to build a successful career, while most people gain or lose nothing by reading or viewing material in either language. At every stage, incentives were provided by the Soviets to appeal to self interest. Schools using the promoted language were newly-opened (during the time of the Ukrainisation policy) or thoroughly modern (during the time of Russification). Pupils who want to attend prestigious universities or institutes of higher education must maintain good marks and pass entrance exams. The Soviets made the task of internally converting schools to the desired language much easier for themselves by making it advantageous for students to pursue the promoted language. Educators must continue to present Ukrainian as the language of the future to help it gain badly needed social status.

The Soviets were able to promote Russian as an international language of cultural exchange and opportunity, a role many young people in Ukraine now attribute to English. The prominence of Ukrainian in Ukraine could be improved by de-emphasising Russian whilst promoting the continued and even increased presence of Ukrainian at all levels. If English provides access to the international market and cultural scene,

Russian is no longer necessary if Ukrainian can be used within Ukraine for communication and everyday interaction. Here, media could help by offering opportunities to use Ukrainian and by making the language more of a force in daily life.

Societal support must take two forms: example and peer pressure. By means of immigration and media measures, the Soviets were able to fill the airwaves and the streets with Russian. One had to leave the city to speak Ukrainian except in the West. Earlier, during Ukrainisation, the countryside spilled into the city, helping to promote the use of Ukrainian. Without the tactics of fear and threats used by the Soviets, Ukrainians must see speaking the state language as beneficial and necessary. Then society can reinforce what students learn both by example and by creating the perception of higher status for Ukrainian. Students must feel that without Ukrainian, cities would be a labyrinth of signs in a foreign language and unhelpful urbanites who do not wish to speak to them. Without Ukrainian, their education will end at a low level with no prospect of a well-paid job. Most of all, without Ukrainian, no one in the elite or working classes will have any interest in speaking to them. When this kind of social pressure exists, as it did during Russification, no one will have to beg young people to speak Ukrainian.

IV. Affirmative action. In the interest of democracy and fairness to all its citizens, coercion has not been applied in language planning by the Ukrainian government thus far. Ethnic Ukrainians protest if decisions about schooling are made for them, while many Russians are quick to accuse authorities of forced Ukrainisation. Arel alleges that Ukrainisation

is indeed taking place, but Kuzio rightly disputes this claim.[47] Ukraine's record concerning minority rights (and Russians are after all an ethnic if not linguistic minority) shows liberal and tolerant legislation. Where Russians form a majority, as in the Crimea, education occurs in Russian. The statistics presented above show that Russian schools elsewhere are larger and more numerous in comparison with the number of Russians. Until the percentage of students learning in Ukrainian is *higher* than the percentage of Ukrainian students, or even ethnic Ukrainians overall, Ukrainisation has not taken place.[48]

The only group who may feel disgruntled with any real justification are Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Many of these people speak Russian as a direct result of Russification policies; statistics from the thirties show ethnic Russians became Ukrainised under the Ukrainisation policy in a similar fashion.[49] Even if these so-called Russified Ukrainians do not consider themselves as victims, and indeed even if they choose to adopt a 'regional' identity as suggested by Kuzio, they are now citizens of a Ukrainian state with a state language that is not Russian. This means the issue is not their linguistic rights, but rather their linguistic *duties*.[50]

In education as in other areas, the affirmative action policy recommended by Kuzio seems necessary: 'Affirmative action in favour of a

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[47] Arel devotes an entire article, 'The temptation of the nationalizing state', to the theory that Ukraine is nationalising and practicing a policy of Ukrainisation. Kuzio refutes this claim repeatedly in his work, including pp. 143-47, p. 156, pp. 245-53.

[48] One should note here differing uses of the terms 'nationalising' and 'Ukrainising'. This can be interpreted to mean policies which seek to assimilate ethnic minorities by forcing them to give up their own culture, by persuasion or coercion. Ukraine's record with respect to the support of minority languages and cultures shows this is certainly not occurring. Ukrainisation in the sense of the creation of a politically and civically Ukrainian state may be happening slowly, but even then the goal is not to force all minorities into using Ukrainian or attending Ukrainian schools, but rather to have enough Ukrainian schools, newspapers and other cultural fixtures to be in proportion to the number of ethnic Ukrainians present.

[49] This is documented by Weinstein, (1942), cited previously.

[50] Kuzio, (1997), p. 143. The adoption of a regional identity should not be taken as a

formerly discriminated against language and culture is a perfectly reasonable policy'.[51] The short term goal of free choice may have to be replaced in favour of a long term policy aimed at the promotion of the state language and the improvement of education in Ukrainian schools. This would mean total Ukrainisation, as in the 1920s, of all Ukrainian schools and the institution of mandatory Ukrainian language classes in minority schools, including Russian schools. This policy worked for the Soviets, though in the case of Russification no real democratic choice was present. During Ukrainisation, Russians living in Ukraine were often displeased with the policy, as it meant that Russian schools became Ukrainian schools, an apparent loss for Russians. Similar dismay has been expressed in the present as Russian schools undergo language planning. What may seem unfair or undemocratic to some, particularly to Russians, truthfully represents the undoing of what really was an unfair policy, in favour of education that accurately represents the population.

V. 'P.R.' (Public Relations). Few would dispute the impressiveness of Soviet mastery of propaganda. The first stages of Russification were disguised as corrective measures against over-Ukrainisation. Russification itself was couched in terms of access to Russian culture and society, or to improve mobility for minorities within the Soviet Union. Ukrainisation served to promote the Soviet regime as a tolerant government, eager to grant autonomy and support the rights of national minorities.

The current language planning policies in education could benefit from more careful public relations. No one would suggest a return to the deceit and doublespeak that characterised Soviet propaganda, but better

tendency towards separatism, however, as explained by Motyl, (1993), p. 9.
[51] Kuzio, (1997), p. 336.

presentation of the aims and goals of the Ukrainian government could allay fears that democracy was slipping and arm the public with knowledge. Although the present campaign does seek to promote the Ukrainian language, and indeed some Russian schools may change over, the aim is not to discrominate against ethnic Russians but to rectify previous discrimination against Ukrainians. This means it is not Ukrainisation, but rather de-Russification.

Policies and laws are generally available for the public to read, whether in newspapers which specialise in legislation and politics (like Ukr'iadovyi Kur'ier) or as part of pamphlets about new programmes. Given the level of interest in the general population for poring over pages and pages of legal documents, presenting the information even with explanations and commentary is not the same as promoting these ideas. What will the results of new policy be? How long will it take to implement? How will students benefit? What about their prospects for the future? As long as parents can still choose Russian-language schools, some public relations statements made in favour of Ukrainian language establishments and education may not only be advantageous, it may be what is required.

One can imagine Iryna Bilyk, the popular singer, appearing in advertisements similar to the American 'Just Say NO' campaign urging young people to learn their state language, or Kuchma making an 'infomercial' similar to Ross Perot or a British party political broadcast to explain education policies and urge parents to support sending their children to Ukrainian schools. Even a campaign modelled on the British 'no one forgets a good teacher' drive to recruit new educators could enjoy huge success both in attracting university students to the teaching

profession, and attracting students to Ukrainian schools. Essentially, a good public relations campaign, with familiar and respected celebrities donating their time to present a good case for Ukrainian, could make a very real difference in the status of the state language. Young people everywhere are naturally drawn to what they perceive as fashionable, what they believe will give them access to the level of society they wish to enter. The current opinion that believes Ukrainian youth will naturally want to do their civic duty and speak Ukrainian does not take into account not only the mentality of the average teen, but also the thinking of the population at large, who will continue to do what they perceive is socially acceptable and convenient whether they feel patriotic or not.

Education in Ukraine is making progress, supported by good legislation and an appropriate level of emphasis. Still, for more progress to be made and for language planning goals to be realised, the programmes begun at independence must continue, and the regime must not shy away from affirmative action or measures they may feel are too extreme, too sudden, or even too populist to encourage change. Given the role of schools in preparing children and young people for society, no amount of emphasis and encouragement is too much in creating Ukrainian-speaking, state-minded adults to support and maintain Ukrainian independence and state-building.

Chapter Six: Beyond Politics – Internal problems of the Ukrainian language:

Along with other language planning issues facing the Ukrainian language, the debate over what is acceptable, correct or pure Ukrainian continues. This question concerns not external linguistic issues such as government policy, education or media usage of the state language, but rather internal questions of lexicon, spelling and style. After stating that Ukrainian must assert its functional differentiation, and develop a standard, neutral lexicon and spelling system, the question remains: whose Ukrainian?

This question is perhaps more complicated than it appears at first glance. A number of aspects must be examined. First, which words and phrases, or even spellings and gender endings, should be preserved? Which sources of enrichment are acceptable, and how should new words be changed to fit Ukrainian? Though translation of terms into Ukrainian itself is not directly relevant to internal language problems, coming up with terms for new concepts, especially those for which other languages already have a word clearly is, as well as the incorporation of international lexicon. How long does a word need to be part of the general lexical fund to be deemed acceptable, and how should new terms be popularised in order to weed out old Soviet words? How much variation is acceptable? Lastly, why interfere in the development of the language, why are some forms permissible when others are not, and why continue the struggle against Russian? The process by which Ukrainian underwent standardization and revision under the Soviets

to better reflect its similarities with Russian is well-documented elsewhere.[1] The process of adapting standard Ukrainian continues as part of post-independence language planning.

The debate amongst linguists, scholars in all areas and members of the general public with an interest in language remains lively. Though a great deal of thorough and useful scholarship on language has appeared in Ukraine, some writers appear heavily influenced by an ideological bias, their professionalism called into question by their obvious nationalism which interferes with objectivity. Others seem to state the obvious or re-hash long-standing arguments, or manufacture 'witch hunts' for insidious Polish (or Russian, or Church Slavonic) loan words which have been in the language for over a century. Some merely do not do their homework: one source suggested that Ukrainian independently expanded the semantic load of biological terms such as 'root' to espouse a linguistic terminological meaning, unaware that this expansion had taken place in other languages and was reflected in Ukrainian.[2]

Farmer somewhat problematically describes two different approaches to language planning and purification. First, he explains what he terms 'non-nationalist' planning, which ignored origins of words and dialect features. Instead, the language was encouraged to become more efficient and flowing--using aesthetic criteria alone. In contrast, so-called 'nationalist' language planning concerns itself 'with the pursuit of ethnic authenticity and differentiation through the effort to exclude external linguistic influences--the

[1] Shevelov, (1989), and Wexler, (1974); see also Chapter Two.

pursuit of linguistic purity'.[3] This approach may have been applicable at some stages in Ukraine's linguistic development, but with reference to the twentieth century, other distinctions better apply. Some modern linguists adopt a third approach, allowing pragmatism and a variety of sources to decide which forms for a variety of reasons are acceptable , and which should be encouraged out of the language. Still, Farmer's classification could be altered slightly so that 'nationalist' language planning might represent those who seek to actively promote Ukrainian, using the language's resources to the fullest, in order to increase both usage and the functional load of the language. Even this changed definition remains problematic, as Russian speakers may regard as 'nationalist' planning any attempt to promote Ukrainian at the expense of Russian. Ukrainian speakers, on the other hand, would perhaps argue the support and spread of Ukrainian need not have a negative effect on Russian usage, and in fact, that the two trends are not linked.

The key problems Ukrainian faces as a changing language are amply covered in Ukrainian academic and public writing, but there is little recent coverage of this subject in English. Certainly no work has been uncovered which assimilates relevant information from a number of approaches to establish a common 'to-do list' for Ukrainian, or traces trends present in the overall social and linguistic climate in Ukraine. Though a detailed historical discussion or even a lengthy pure linguistic analysis would be well beyond the scope of this work, it is possible to trace problems of standardisation and

[2] Budniak, (1993).

modernisation over the course of the twentieth century to the present, where work is still being done to universalize terms, print dictionaries purged of excessive Russification, and establish grammatical norms based on Ukrainian models.

A complete examination of every language issue would still present a formidable task for a researcher. The manageable option suggests extracting examples of types of issues, some of which directly result from Russification and others which remain from earlier decades. Spelling, particularly the letter for the phoneme [g] remains a problem[4]. Grammatical forms such as the present active participle (which is viewed as a Russian calque and not widely used otherwise) or certain syntactic questions of phraseology (including the preposition *po*) vex linguists, along with issues of style. The entire lexicon appears to be under discussion, but immediate relevance and the need for rapid standardisaion characterise some branches such as scientific terminology, military lexicon or the language of the Constitution. This widens into a discussion of which sources may contribute to the language out of the possible donors, including diaspora Ukrainian, Western Ukrainian, Russian, Russian calques and borrowings and international vocabulary. All of these have made contributions which must be evaluated. In this manner, a number of revealing profiles establish an overall image of flux and change in Ukrainian.

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[3] Farmer, (1978), p. 140.

[4] For the sake of clairty, it should be noted that phonemes appear in square brackets, while forms transcribed from Ukrainian, Russian or German (as noted in the text) appear in italics to represent the letters rather than the phonemes present.

In this discussion, examples will be cited only to illustrate the nature of the problems they represent, not to present every instance a given problem occurs. Extensive listings of problematic spellings, terms or phrases would be appropriate to a linguistic survey or analysis, but not within the frame of reference of sociolinguists and language planning. Instead, one must investigate the character of core problems to abstract common themes and trends, and to generalize the implications these issues have for Ukrainian language. Furthermore, *why* certain terms bother linguists is more significant than the fact that they are troublesome, particularly when suggestions are offered for improvement. This sheds light on what is acceptable as a corrective. Essentially, this means that a roll-call of Russianisms in Ukrainian is less valuable to this research than the fact that they exist, and on several levels; this then allows us to estimate the depth of their penetration into the language and further, to understand what kind of efforts must then be made either to accept and incorporate them, or to reject and replace them. By clarifying attitudes towards the problems Ukrainian faces, one can discern new directions language planning may take.

The overall attitude of language specialists can be assessed: is there a trend towards purism or some other system of regulation? The enrichment of the lexicon from the fund of international vocabulary receives a mixed reaction partly due to the concurrent and perhaps consequential importation of Western culture. Whether objectively true or not, the liberalising of society and the lifting of social taboos on certain subjects is perceived to demand imported terminology to cover the lack of indigenous vocabulary for these

long-forbidden areas of conversation. If the typical *movoznavets*[5] is not following a Purist approach in Wexler's sense of the word, what approach is used?[6] And most importantly, whose opinions matter most, those of linguists, policy-makers in the government or the general Ukrainian-speaking public? Some of these concerns have appeared in the general discussion of Ukrainian by such scholars as Karavansky, Taranenko, Yermolenko and Buriachok. Now they can be placed in the context of other questions of the changing language.

To tinker or not to tinker:

Any critic must decide whether to remain an observer or to become a participant in the subject he or she hopes to analyse. This is one of the most serious issues confronting linguists, whether it is acceptable to interfere or more accurately, to practice 'prescriptive intervention' in an effort to dictate the way their language will develop.[7] Those who believe it is acceptable or even productive to intervene may nevertheless disagree over what kind of interference is beneficial (as non-nationalist and nationalist planners disagree on the ultimate goal of intervention). Some linguists who consider themselves 'purists' (those who oppose nonnative forms) have been criticised for inconsistency and impracticality. Wexler gives the example of *Telefon* in German, which was criticised by German purists and the alternative

[5] This term remains difficult to translate while preserving the exact meaning. 'Linguist' does not convey the degree of expertise such scholars usually have concerning their language, and the terms 'enthusiast', 'specialist' and 'supporter' also fall short. Even the Russian '*iazykoved*' is not used in the same manner. Thus, the term '*movoznavets*' in the meaning of one who avidly researches and studies, and is an expert on the Ukrainian language, appears untranslated in the text.
[6] See the discussion of Purism in Chapter One which explains Wexler's approach.
[7] Wexler, (1974), p. 2

Fernsprecher, a neologism that was suggested to replace it. This form, however, did not carry over to the derivatives of *telefon*, such as the verb for 'to telephone', showing attention to lexical items but not syntactic ones.[8]

Motives for intervention can also affect the results linguists achieve. For example, the Soviet interpretation of Marxist ideology supported the heavy Russification practiced on Ukrainian language by suggesting languages and peoples should 'merge'. Most speakers of a language have their own ideas about what is correct, good or proper speech--though their ideas may not be in accordance with the standard form, or may have particular regional or social biases.[9] In all of this, it is important to remember that factors outside the language itself, such as culture, politics, social forces and attitudes may have an effect on what kind of intervention occurs and its success in implementation.

This tendency towards regulation in Ukrainian has spawned a curious idea for the transliteration of Ukrainian in English. The Ukrainian scholar M. Vakulenko, funded by the Czech government, has created a system of transliteration that allows a one-to-one correspondence of Ukrainian letters in English, which is usually a problem. While this system is unlikely to ever gain acceptance since most English speakers are satisfied with existing systems, and lack the funds or the time to re-write absolutely everything containing Ukrainian words, that a Ukrainian would feel justified in influencing the way other languages represent Ukrainian words suggests the extremes that

[8] Wexler, (1974), p.3
[9] Wexler, (1974), pp. 1-9.

regulatory tendencies may reach, although one must remember mainstream Ukrainian scholars have no such pretensions.[10]

Languages have a number of potential sources for new terms, which must then be evaluated as acceptable or otherwise. Ukrainian thus far has not taken advantage of all of these together, but at various times its developmental history used dialects, archaic vocabulary, related languages and 'international vocabulary' as donors.[11] Some or all of these have been rejected at one time or another. Soviet planners disliked using Galician forms or other dialect influences, while Ukrainian planners have rejected overt Polish imports in the past. The result is a modern language which has all the necessary terminology, laboriously produced and documented, but which has not always been widely accepted by speakers or spoken uniformly by everyone who uses it.

A glance back at language issues in 20th century Ukraine:

Normalisation and regulation have long concerned linguists in Ukraine. Since the language had the stigma of backwardness and provincialism, terminology associated with modernisation drew the attention at an early stage of those creating dictionaries and grammars. The first attempt at a real

[10] Vakulenko's work includes the following: A contribution to a dictionary of English, Ukrainian, Russian, German and transliterated Ukrainian words; an article entitled 'Pro skladni problemy Ukrayins'koho Pravopysu', Kyiv: Kurs publishers, (1997); and a final report of his research entitled 'Computerised simple correspondence system for the transliteration of Cyrillics (sic) into Latinics (sic), and vice versa in the Ukrajinian, Russian and Belorussian Languages'. Despite all of his attention to Ukrainian language issues, Vauklenko neglects to adopt the preferred spelling of 'Belarusian'.

[11] Wexler explains the problem with this term thoroughly. For Ukrainian, most international words are present as scientific or technical terms, which are indeed 'based on ancient Greek or Latin lexicon' or else words which fit the more loose definition of 'terms which appear in three non-related languages' such as *faks, student* and the like. For non-related languages, one may assume Wexler has in mind languages from different language 'families' such as Slavic languages, Romance languages or Asian languages.

system of terminology can be dated to the 1880s and 1890s, by Galicians Volodymyr Levyts'kyi and Ivan Verkhrats'kyi. Following the foundation of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, they began to print small terminological handbooks in its newsletter. This was followed by efforts in Kyiv on the part of the terminology commission associated with the Society. Activity surged in 1917, when the Central Rada and the Ukrainian People's Republic were established. During this time both public and private efforts were made to produce dictionaries and record the so-called 'folk' lexicon.[12] The Terminology Commission of the Kyiv branch of the Shevchenko Learned Society was responsible for the creation of dictionaries in a variety of subjects including botany, zoology, geology, meteorology, anthropology, chemistry, mathematics, physics, agriculture, medicine and veterinary science, produced by sub-committees working in each of these areas. Other committees were added in the fields of orthography, natural sciences and technology. In 1921, the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language of the Academy of Sciences was established, which became the centre of work in terminology.[13]

This institute had six sections, which covered a wide range of scientific, mathematical, linguistic and socio-economic topics. It employed a large staff, all working on the creation of thirty-four dictionaries (twenty-four of which were published). Although Ukrainian-Russian dictionaries were by far the most usual, work was also done on Ukrainian-German, -French, -Latin and -English dictionaries. These works contained not only the recommended

[12] Kochera and Kulyk, (1994), p. 55.

term, but also included dialect and other existing words along with each etymology. This Institute established a standard in terminology, which served as a widely used reference by those in a variety of fields.[14]

The thirties brought purge-associated re-shuffling here as in all other areas of life in Ukraine. Despite the repression which had begun in the Academy, four dictionaries were published between 1931 and 1933. Then, in 1933, things changed for the worse. The attacks on Ukrainian nationalism in linguistic began with an announcement by Andriy Khvylia, Ukraine's deputy commissar of education, that 'ideological verification' would be the new modus operandi of language specialists in Ukraine. During the next two years, a special team proof-read the dictionaries created by the Institute and prepared bulletins which dictated a new lexicon for the creation and production of terminologies more acceptable to the Moscow-centered frame of reference. Certain terms were forbidden, and replacements suggested. Usually the new word was Russian calqued into Ukrainian or introduced from international vocabulary via Russian. These new lexical items appeared in an (otherwise unspecified) 'pure' dictionary in 1936, while the offending dictionaries of previous years were confiscated or destroyed.[15] Overall, it is estimated that 50-80 per cent of terms were 'cleaned up', a total of around 14.5 thousand words.[16] Vovk lists calques which are obviously Russian derivatives such as *probirka, dvyzhok, burav, voronka, kliukva* and *parus,*

[13] Kochera and Kulyk, (1994), p. 55.
[14] Kochera and Kulyk, (1994), p. 56.
[15] Kochera and Kulyk, (1994), p.56. The article goes on to list those works which remain from the pre-Ukrainisation era and where they can be found.to be used for reference in restorative endeavors.
[16] Vovk, (1979), pp. 87-8

which replaced Ukrainian forms *probivka, bihunets', sverdel, liyka, zhuravlyna, vitrylo*[17]. He notes words which exist in both languages, but in different meanings, which in Ukrainian were changed to include the Russian meaning.[18] These include *horilka (pal'nyk*= Eng. burner), *maslo* (*oliia* = Eng. vegetable or mineral oil), or *trava*, which best corresponds to 'grass' but expanded to include 'herbs' as well, replacing the indigenous Ukrainian word *zillia*.[19] More on such changes appears later in the chapter.

The Soviets sought to justify these activities in several ways. The new, Russian-based terms were referred to as 'international', a word that suggested access to the world scientific community which was theoretically only possible through Russian midwifery. Enthusiasts of the new terms called old Ukrainian words antiquated and archaic, and impractical for use.[20] These claims would later be complemented by the Marr theory, and aggravated by assertions that Ukrainian nationalism manifested its treacherous presence in dialect words, folk lexicon and words of Polish origin.[21]

From the forties until the sixties, newly united Post-War Ukraine struggled under the influence of two predominant trends: first, the newly united lands of Ukraine permitted an expansion of the education system and the creation of an universal media throughout the country, which had a normalising effect on the language. This tendency towards a common

[17] These words mean test tube, anode,drill bit, funnel, cranberry, and sail.
[18] In my own comparisons, I found various confusions surrounding words such as *plattia* meaning either clothes or dress and *robyty/pratsiuvaty* meaning 'to do' and 'to work' though the meaning of the first was expanded to match Russian *rabotat'*.
[19] Vovk, (1979), pp. 92-3pp. 87-8.
[20] Vovk, (1979), pp. 87-8.

standard contrasted sharply with the inherent resistance to dialect words and Galician Ukrainian which was typical of Russophile linguists. This period represents two diametrically opposed processes in the Ukrainian language: the spread and development of Ukrainian contrasted with the overall assimilation and Russification of the language.[22]

When the glasnost' era began, Ukrainians were again able to turn their attention to their own language. Beginning around 1989, articles appeared which expressed concern and even anger at what had been done to the Ukrainian language, with lists of controversial words, cataloguing Russianisms, Sovietisms and older Ukrainian forms for comparison. Work from this period, before Ukrainian independence, begins to discuss the value of Ukrainian as a language and not as a dialect of Russian, and looks to past efforts at standardisation for guidance. While ideological arrows fly thick and fast, diagnostic work that is both observant and thorough fills newspapers and journals alike.[23]

With the establishment of an independent Ukraine, new problems confronted linguistic circles. These scholars knew that language is a strong indicator of national identification, and that many of the people in Ukraine speak Russian or the *surzhyk*; the task of first creating and then widely implementing a new (or at least rejuvenated) version of standard literary

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[21] The Marr Theory, as espoused by Stalin during part of his regime, suggested that all nations of the Soviet Union should gradually become one 'Soviet' nationality. See Chapter 2 of this work for details.

[22] Ermolenko, (1993), p. 200.

[23] For examples of diagnostic works, Karavansky is a good source. He comments on a number of problems with Soviet language planning and suggests guidelines for replacing obvious Russian words with Ukrainian ones.

Ukrainian must have seemed a formidable task. First, the *Pravopys*[24] had to be revised, or as some would argue, a new *Pravopys* had to be created. Then, this standard version of Ukrainian, which must reflect social and political changes and technology, had to be popularised--i.e., made accessible and useful to the general public. Before either of these processes could begin, the language required serious diagnostic and rehabilitative work. Soviet intrusive language policy, along with a rather lamentable apathy on the part of much of Ukraine's population, left the language in no condition to serve as the single, official and national vehicle for communication in every function a language should fulfill. This highlights the language's potential for creating and accepting interesting new words, but the linguist reminds readers that 'mova mozhe, a movoznavstvo ne opratsiuvalo usikh mozhlyvostei ukraïn'skykh slovotvorchykh birtsiv.' The language needs not only creation, but regulation.[25]

What ails the Ukrainian Language?

Russification. An allegory characterises the effect of years of Russification on the Ukrainian language: A King had a beautiful wife, whom he adored. He commissioned a portrait showing her high forehead, her long face, her dark eyes and hair. The beloved Queen died, and the King swore never to remarry unless he found a girl exactly like his deceased wife. One day he was out riding and saw a shepherd girl with a pleasant chubby face and blonde hair

[24] This word appears in Ukrainian in the meaning of 'orthographical dictionary'. It contains proper spellings of foreign words, difficult Ukrainian words and other questions of lexicon and style.

with blue eyes. Several days later, he went to look at the portrait of the Queen and thought her hair looked too dark, so he lightened it a little. After a few more days, he thought the picture's eyes were really not just the right colour and painted them light blue. Every day, he noticed little things about the portrait that did not please him and little by little, changed it. One day an advisor remarked to him that the portrait was exactly the likeness of the pretty shepherd girl, and thus the King could marry again.[26]

This viewpoint seems especially bleak: the reworking of Ukrainian so that it resembles Russian. Kachurovs'kyi, the author of the article containing this allegory, laments small changes--such as the stress shift in *bAt'kivshyna* to read *bat'kivshYna*—which, while not a Russified term, he perceives as symptomatic to the degradation of Ukrainian from the beautiful Queen into a lowly shepherdess. This, he feels, is the result of rarely hearing Ukrainian spoken aloud for six decades under the Soviets. While the word in question is not an example of a Russified term, Kachurovs'kyi appears to fear the degradation of Ukrainian from a lack of knowledge as much as from the Russification of the language.[27] Articles such as Kachurovs'kyi's, published around the time of Ukrainian independence provide valuable information concerning linguistic casualties of the Soviet era, the depth of Russian influence, and the deplorable state of Ukrainian as it appeared in Russified dictionaries at that time when so-called dialect or archaic words did not appear.

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[25]Karavansky, (1989), p. 694. 'The language *can*, but language studies *has not* used all the possible means of word creation.'
[26] Kachurovs'kyi, (1991), pp. 341-49.

The effects of Russification remains 'public enemy number one' for certain linguists and nationalists in Ukraine, though there are a host of equally complicated and potentially damaging problems to conquer. The damage inflicted by Soviet efforts to 'tidy up' Ukrainian remains evident in the contemporary language. Overall, Russification of terminology occurred on several levels: lexical, semantic, syntactic, morphological and orthographic. It may appear extreme to suggest that the Soviets launched a planned attack on every level of Ukrainian language, but it is certainly safe to interpret their policy as an attempt to sabotage the language, decrease its viability as a modern language and bring it closer to Russian. With these considerations in mind, one can examine areas where this Russification occurred.

[G] and [H]. Kachurovs'kyi states, 'One of the first victims of language policy was the letter *g*.' Perhaps the most heated spelling disagreement concerns the phoneme [g], and the inclusion of a new letter to distinguish this phoneme from [h]. In the 1989 *Pravopys*, the letter which spells the phoneme [g] had not been included, and foreign words were still spelled with a Russian influence, using [kh] instead of [h] (which Russian lacks)[28].This publication included heavily Russified vocabulary, calqued from Russian forms that did not reflect older or more accurate Ukrainian. This letter appears in numerous words in old and new sources alike. Yet it was removed from the language for two main reasons: since there was no letter like it in Russian, the [g] was removed from Ukrainian. Secondly, with the [g] and the [h], Ukrainian could

[27] Kachorovs'kyi, (1991)This also piece lists noted linguists who suffered repression under Soviet rule in Ukraine.

accurately reflect foreign spellings, especially European names such as Hegel, and this could contribute to an increase in the status of one's native language as one which could cope with international information and vocabulary. This change left a paradoxical effect, so that even a native Ukrainian word such as *hyrlyha* would be pronounced as written, though originally the words used [g], as *gyrlyga.* The average person would probably say *gyrlyga* anyway under the influence of Russian or the *surzhyk.* Without the letter for the phoneme [g], educated speakers have no way of guessing the correct pronunciation of such words. (The letter for the phoneme [g] has since been 'rehabilitated' and appears in the latest edition of the *Pravopys.*)

Lexical and morphological changes. Besides the banishment of [g] under Russian rule, Ukrainian began to metamorphose in other ways. Lexical changes could be blatant, as in the replacement of native words with a borrowing, or more subtle. Vovk's examples (as mentioned earlier) include *iashchyk, nasos* and *parus* for *skrynia, pompa* and *vitrylo.*[29] Morphological changes, which these examples illustrate, include the substitution of Russian endings or prefixes for the Ukrainian forms. Sometimes the number and gender might be affected at this level too, changing Ukrainian forms to resemble Russian ones. Syntactic changes include Russified forms such as *zhidno teoriyi, komunikatsiia po telefonu* or *kafedra po matematytsi* instead of *zhidno z teorieiu, komunikatsia telefonom,* or *katedra matematyky.*[30] Even

[28] Karavansky covers this [g], /kh/ vs [h] topic more than once. In 'Hanna chy "Khanna" he connects the use of the [h] to Ukrainian independence. (1993), p. 720.
[29] Chest, pump, and sail respectively.
[30] These mean 'According to the theory', 'communication by telephone' and 'department of mathmatics'. It should also be noted that the letters represent z + h, not zh.

common idioms enter the language from Russian, such as the non-Ukrainian adjective *nevmisnyi*, which copies *neumestnyi,* (from the phrase *ne u mesta*, meaning 'inappropriate' or 'out of place'.). Ukrainian has the idiom *ne do rechi*, so that an accurate adjectival form should read *nedorechnyi* instead.[31] This does not mean, however, that people will agree to say *nedorechnyi*, especially as the Russian calque is so well-established as not to sound peculiar to most speakers.

[I], [O] and [E]. Another topic under hot discussion is the phoneme [i] and its relationship to [o] and [e]. Because of regular sound changes, many words which appear with an [o] in Russian have an [i] in Ukrainian--*kon'/kin', dom/dim, rodnyi/ridnyi* (horse, house and native, respectively). However, as a consequence of language confusion, this phonemic difference in otherwise similar words means sometimes speakers overcompensate and pronounce [i] when it is actually [o] in Ukrainian, or leave out [i] and use the Russian word instead. Since there are words which have preserved the [o] phoneme through another set of linguistic changes and developments, this spelling challenge for Ukrainians is not an easy one. Nor do linguists agree on the use of [i].

An example of how heated such arguments may become appeared in the newspaper *Literaturna Ukrayina.* A certain Oleksiy Dmytrenko printed an article headed 'Sich--Zaporoz'ka!'[32] This sparked a volley of literary missiles arguing the point, appearing in the June 17 edition of the paper. Shevchenko writes *zaporoz'ka* according to the Dictionary of the Language of

[31] Karavansky, (1997), p. 98-101.

Shevchenko, as also suggested by the diaspora contributor, Levyts'kyi.[33] Ponomariv agrees the word is often written this way, and suggests this may be the result of Ukrainian speakers' confusion from writing a great deal in Russian. Those who know both languages realise the [i] in Ukrainian usually corresponds to [o] in Russian equivalents, and when a closed syllable becomes open in declension, the [o] replaces [i] in Ukrainian as in *porih– u poroha*. One would therefore expect *zaporiz'ka*, since the third syllable is closed. However, a variety of sources in addition to Shevchenko support the [o] spelling, despite some protest that this is really a calque from Russian. [34]

Another possibility is that the [o] form is not a Russianism at all, but a reflection of sound changes taking place around the time of Shevchenko's career, when rules of Ukrainian spelling were less firmly fixed. As with many languages, spelling does not always indicate pronunciation. Therefore, Shevchenko may have said *zaporiz'ka* while adhering to the existing orthographical rule calling for *-oz'ka.*

Why did the spelling of one word create such a furore? This case shows the affect of cultural and social issues, which add importance to spelling questions. First, this period in history is revered by Ukrainian patriots and nationalists for the independence it symbolises. It is interesting to note that Ponomariv supports his explanation of the problem with historical data and several dictionaries, in contrast to Levyts'kyi's complaints of linguistic

[32] Dmytrenko, (1997).
[33] Levytsk'yi, (1997).

'trendiness' and his call to defend the purity of the language. As seen in Chapter Three, these viewpoints place these two authors in the pragmatic viewpoint and the neo-Romantic school of thought respectively.

This issue touches another sensitive topic, the spelling of surnames. Ponomariv, for example, could be expected to decline his surname *u Ponomar'ova*, which some Ukrainians feel causes confusion as to the ethnicity of the person in question--in this instance, he could be the Ukrainian Ponomariv, or the Russian Ponomariov. Some Ukrainians have adopted an alternative spelling, *u Ponomariva*. It is curious that Levyts'kyi calls this arrangement artificial, especially as he writes from Montreal and likely does not have the heightened sensitivity of local Ukrainians to Russian-sounding forms.[35] This brings up another question: should Ukrainian names automatically undergo sound changes when they are under discussion in Russian, especially as most speakers are presently bilingual and can easily make this change? Ponomariv mentions Maksym Kryvonis, and Petro Kryvonos, Liudmyla Staryts'ka-Cherniakhivs'ka and Ivan Cherniakhovs'kyi as examples. But if Kryvonis and Staryts'ka-Cherniakhivs'ka were topics of conversation in Russian, would Ukrainians pronounce them the same as the others mentioned? A more accurate and also more nationally-conscious, nationally-aware 'transliteration' into Russian would involve the Russian phoneme [i] instead, and not an automatic change to [o].

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[34] Dictionaries consulted include L'viv, 1957 Ukrainian-Polish dictionary, Leipzig 1941 Ukrainian dictionary, and Rome 1941 Ukrainian dictionary. Only the L'viv dictionary has the form as *zaporiz'ka.*

[35] Olena Bekh, in a discussion of this problem offered the example *Stakhiv--u Stakhova*--vs *u Stakhiva* as an example. As a scholar of the language, she adopts the view that while this

Foreign names and places. Spelling of foreign names and places presents a different kind of problem. Russified forms use *kh* where English shows an *h*, for example, even though Ukrainian has the *h* sound already (Hegel, Helsinki). *Ai* versus *Ei*, as in Einstein, presents a similar problem.[36] In fact, spelling of foreign names and places encapsulates neatly the difficulty of this kind of spelling problem: usually variations in spelling arise when transliterations are made from Russian. The standard and a uniform *Pravopys* have not existed long enough, nor become widespread enough to fulfill their corrective function in such cases. Thus, differences in spelling may appear out of ignorance or insecurity about Ukrainian spelling, or even a desire to sound and write in a more 'Russian' manner.

This kind of problem, the non-correspondence with Ukrainian rules of style, emerges in other words calqued from Russian. The clash may result from the use of a participle when Ukrainian calls for an adjective, or represent a stylistically and aesthetically displeasing phrase. Examples of this include *temperaturiachyi khvoryi,* (more acceptable would be *khvoryi z temperaturoiu), halopuiucha infliatsiia* for *nestrymna* or *bezupynna infliatsiia, koordynuiuchyi tsentr* for *koordynatsiinyi tsentr* and *vyvuknovebezpechnyi* instead of the preferred *peredvybukhovyi.*[37] Confusion may emerge when similar forms based on a Ukrainian root become confused with a Russian word: *dukhovyi* (spiritual) is not the same as *dukhovNyi,* (ecclesiastical); the

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spelling is not in accordance with orthographical rules, it is a permissible variant to avoid confusion with Russian.

[36] Vovk, (1979), pp. 92-94.

[37] Karvanskyi, (1993a), p. 73. These terms mean 'cold' (referring to temperature), the idiom 'galloping inflation', and co-ordination centre.

two can be confused by those who equate the second form with Russian *dukhovnyi*.[38]

Another area of Russification was the derivation – beyond the words themselves -- of technical terms such as those used in chemistry. Ukrainian and Russian are among a number of languages which use a 'native' basis instead of the Latin roots familiar to English speakers. Here too, Ukrainian roots were deemed unacceptable and replaced with Russian ones. For example, the word for sodium chloride *khl'orak sody (khl'orak sodovyi)* as suggested by Levits'kyi (1903), or *khl'oryd* , as preferred by Horbachevs'kyi (1905) became *khl'orystyi natryi*, in Zenkevych (1928), a direct calque from Russian.[39] Sometimes, the new Russian word, transcribed into Ukrainian, would be given alongside a word based on the international Latin words.[40]

Terminology. International vocabulary and Russian terms have both invaded Ukrainian over the course of the twentieth century. This creates still another area for confusion, where advocates of international words cannot understand those using native Ukrainian creations, who in turn cannot talk with users of Russian-influenced terminology. Why is terminology given so much attention? One linguist offers the explanation:

> By the intellectualization of the standard language, which we could also call its rationalization, we understand its adaptation to the goal of making possible precise and rigorous, if necessary abstract, statements, capable of expressing the continuity and complexity of thought, that is, to reinforce the intellectual side of speech- This intellectualization culminates in scientific (theoretical) speech, determined by the attempts to be as precise in expression as possible, to make statements which reflect the rigor of objective (scientific) thinking in which terms approximate concepts and the sentences approximate logical judgements.[41]

[38]Karavansky, (1989), p. 694.
[39] Levits'kyi, Horbachevs'kyi and Zenkevych as cited by Vovk, (1979), pp. 90.
[40] Vovk, (1979), pp. 90-91.
[41] Nepyvoda, Interview August, 1996.

Another linguist, writing about multilingual dictionaries as a terminological base for the formation of standard Ukrainian terms, includes his thoughts on language as not only a reflection of reality, but the embodiment of all a given nation has learned in the world, and an influence on that nation's view, 'something more than blood'.[42]

As in science, both military and legal terms display a lack of uniformity. Karavansky criticises the Russian-Ukrainian dictionary for military servicemen on several grounds, which highlight terminology problems. First, he says subjectively that the dictionary suggests forms which are hard to say, rendering them inefficient as commands. He lists *vzutta zniaty ta sklasty* (better *zniaty_i klasty), Zakincheno rezhym 'tysha'*, but would prefer *Kinets' rezhymu 'Tysha'*. One expression is rendered *'Zbil'sh prosto!'* which he complains is lifted straight from Russian, though the more Ukrainian *'Dodai prosto'* is admittedly harder to pronounce. Second, some forms are not effective or unclear in the dictionary. He does not like *usi donyzu; tykh, khto kupavsia, pereviryty; zrobyty perervu* and offers *usi nanyz; khto kupavsia, na perevirku; pererva.* Third, commands listed in the dictionary do not have wide acceptance. He finds some divisions use what is suggested, while others have their own forms. This eliminates mutual understanding.[43]

If the common elements were to be emphasised, a more understandable, unifying lexicon could be established. Karavansky laments

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[42] Kyiak, (1996), pp. 250-56.

[43] These phrases, from Karavansky (1997b), are translated roughly as 1. Boots off and piled up; 2. Quiet time is over; 3. Straighten up!; 4. Everybody down; 5. Present for inspection after bathing; 6. Rest ('Take a break').

that the editors of the dictionary did not avail themselves of any 'helpful instruction books or handbooks'. Finally, commands need not be copied from Russian, but should follow Ukrainian language traits instead. In any case, a unified, universal lexicon for the military must eliminate ambiguity in commands, denomination of military units and vocabulary.[44] As mentioned in Chapter 2, this lack of agreement has the potential to make joint exercises difficult when translators are unfamiliar with terminology, or when the translator and Ukrainian military personnel use different words for the same concept. The more disastrous wartime implications of a lack in mutually-comprehensible commands are obvious.

Official terminology also changed under Soviet influence, leaving Ukraine with rather artificial bureaucratic jargon. Besides all of the political compromise and debate centering around Ukraine's new Constitution, some linguistic issues have created tensions. The best known example is perhaps the phrase 'people of Ukraine' which won over 'Ukrainian people' in the preamble. Legal language, along with military and academic terminology, remains a problem area. Karavansky takes up this cause comparing phrases which appear in the Constitution, which could have been phrased differently. His complaints include the lexicon, grammar, word usage and stylistics. For example, the constitution uses the phrase *prava liudyny*, although *liuds'ka prava* means the same thing. He complains this is a calque on Russian, which prefers forms of the pattern noun + noun, genitive case, such as *noga cheloveka*. Ukrainian favours adjective + noun in these cases, with the

[44] Karavansky, (1997b), pp. 238-42.

adjective derived from a noun. He dislikes the word *isnuiuchyi*, the objectionable present active participle used as an adjective, (*rakhuiuchyi, temperaturiachyi)* because this word is not Ukrainian. He prefers *teperishnii* for the meaning of 'at present, existing', and suggests other words such as *zafiksovani prava, naiavna merezha, chynyi poriadok areshtu* to cover other places where the offending *isnuiuchyi* appears. On the subject of stylistics, Karavansky notes problems with the active versus the passive (*zabezpechuye, zabezpechuyet'sia)*, impersonals (*pokladeno, pokladaiets'ia*), and *tsenzuru zaboroneno* or *tsenzura zaboronena* (he prefers the former).[45] He notes two grammatical errors and several word usage problems (*ne dopuskaets'ia* should have been *zaboroneno; virazhennia*, which is a borrowing, was used instead of *poshyrennia* and *vyiav.* He blames the occurrence of most of these errors on translation from Russian (whether in the heads of the authors or in actuality).[46]

Some of this may be resolved with the publication of the legal dictionary which is still in production. One reference does exist which serves as the first stage of standardisation, entitled *Russian-Ukrainian-English dictionary of terminology: difficulties of word usage.*

One potentially interesting area of terminology is currently under study in a new project, outlined in a paper by W. Moskovich.[47] He seeks to analyse the development of new Ukrainian political terminology since 1985. His work

[45] These terms mean 'is protected', 'to be placed', 'censorship is forbidden/not allowed'; the next three all mean 'manifestation, expression'.
[46] Karavansky, (1996), pp. 1411-16.
[47] The outline of Moskovich's talk appears in *Movoznavstvo*,the collected papers of the 1996 Kharkiv congress of Ukrainianists.

may well yield evidence of linguistic trends which, with further investigation, could also be applied to other areas of terminology. He suggests the following classification for new terms:

1. Soviet terminology with a changed connotation
2. New original Ukrainian terms
3. Revived Ukrainian terms
4. Terms which were previously used mainly in Galicia and the diaspora.[48]

One can see how these categories might lend themselves to wider application. He continues with hypotheses about sources for these terms. He suggests that Russian terminology serves as a pattern, but that time and increased status will diminish the number of borrowings and calques from Russian. Conversely, the number of foreign loans, especially American English words, is large. Perhaps most interestingly, Moskovich claims that language previously used in dissident circles has been transferred to offical usage, though he gives no examples of such words.[49]

There are linguists who seek to produce terms which conform to Ukrainian stylistic and lexical norms, and not merely adequately cover new phenomena with a hodge-podge of borrowings. One author notes a large number of new terms occur in pairs, one with a Ukrainian suffix and the other with a non-native suffix: *alhebraichnyi, alhebrychnyi; synusiodal'nyi, synusiodnyi; binominal'nyi, binomnyi.* The first term in each case reflects what the author calls Russified international vocabulary. The use of the second member in each pair would not only tidy up a confusing situation, but would

[48] Moskovich, (1996), pp. 260-62.

also support the assertion that Ukrainian has sufficient lexical means to express any scientific concept without resorting to Russian. Some dictionaries (such as the 1993 edition of the English-Ukrainian mathematics dictionary) use the form which follows Ukrainian word-formation rules. Others preserve the more Russified term (such as the Russian-Ukrainian dictionary of physics terms, 1994 edition.)

This shows two things about terminology in Ukraine. First, the effects of Russification still influence some areas of Ukrainian linguistic terminology. Secondly, that non-objectionable borrowings from international vocabulary may be adapted to fit standard Ukrainian rules, or in other words, rendered nearly native.[50] In addition to linguistic considerations, one must not forget the macrosystem within which terminology operates. Terminology must express not only the relationships between words, but also the relationships of concepts to one another, and of terms to the concepts they classify.[51]

These situations extend beyond merely stylistic concerns: orders must be understandable to soldiers, and legal documents must express in exact terms what they seek to enforce. These are separate but overlapping issues, concerning spelling, puristic leanings, value judgements on whose Ukrainian is best and the need to standardise all aspects of the language, particularly as it is now officially a state language which will have to be correctly and efficiently implemented, taught and learned everywhere in Ukraine. In every article and in every argument, linguists seem to agree on one thing:

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[49] Moskovich, (1996), p. 261.
[50] Boiarova, (1996), pp. 247-50..
[51] Kochan, (1996), pp. 256-60.

terminology must not impoverish Ukrainian by introducing borrowings, but rather enrich the lexicon by expanding the forms and meanings of existing native words.

Variety and productivity: A related argument appears in the pages of *Literaturna Ukrayina.* The author, Bohdan Kinash, discusses the creation of new nouns and adjectives from verbs.[52] He urges linguists to use the existing lexicon of Ukrainian, which he believes is not poor or scant, in creating new words. As an example, he lists words created from the verb 'stavyty' to demonstrate how the use of prefixes and suffixes can aid in forming new words (*vystava, vystavka, vystanova,* and *vystanovka; vidstava, vidstavka, vidstanova,* and *vidstanovka* for example.[53] The list uses a total of thirteen prefixes and creates fifty-two noun forms. He urges linguists to protect the purity of Ukrainian, and not to pollute the language with borrowings (he mentions American English words like *ofis, reitinh, bryfinh, seks)* at the expense of good Ukrainian words, and not to try to be 'trendy'. That this contributor to the debate is an engineer shows the level of participation some speakers feel in the health of their language.

Variation and linguistic choice represents viability and diversity in the functional load of a language, some linguists assert. Others feel the influence of diaspora Ukrainian, based on Galician dialects, ruins the 'pure' Ukrainian, such as Shevchenko's central dialect. Ermolenko and Dziubyshyna-Mel'nyk comment that the first view seems more objective and fact-based. They are quick to point out that too much variation can effectively dismember the

[52] Kinash, (1997).

system of the language, however. When several versions of a term exist, as they do in the military, it makes vital communication difficult. Companies from different regions may find working together difficult if they do not have the same orders. Similarly, lawyers who seek to draw up contracts and agreements may discover they cannot be as specific as they must if no one agrees upon terminology. This situation can become dangerous when medical vocabulary is not agreed upon, as is often the case with frequent re-writing and re-doing, potentially preventing effective communication between laboratories and doctors, doctors and pharmacists, and medical personnel and the public.

Their work documents a trend towards neutralisation within variation in Ukrainian. This occurs in a number of lexical areas, including words which may have been previously marked as dialectal, rarely used, or archaic in dictionaries (*fundatsiia, svitlyna, ofiruvaty, lektura, mapa, naklad, poetka,* or *zaky)*;[54] borrowed words from the colloquial or conversational vocabulary (*zavshe, perevodom, ruinatsiia, chyslo*-in the meaning of 'number'--, *zadlia, popervakh, shtyb;*[55] words which do not have corresponding qualification in the dictionary but are in fact stylistically marked (*provid, spil'nota, znosyny, filiia);*[56] or some words which are marked neutral but have a 'tone' or inferred colour when used in typically Ukrainian phrases (*na tereni, v tsaryni, dilianka,*

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[53] Levyts'kyi, (1997).
[54] These mean 'foundation' (the usual word is *fondatsiia*), 'photograph', 'to offer, consecrate', 'lecture', 'map', 'outlay', 'female poet' (at present, this has a negative connotation), and 'until'.
[55] *Zavshe* is defined as always. For *perevodom*, the dictionary only offered *perevid* in the meaning of passage. *Ruinatsiia* is defined as destruction or subversion. *Chyslo* usually means date or quantity. The remaining three mean 'for the sake of', 'in the first place' and 'form'.

chasopys, tlo);[57] and finally words which do not appear in many dictionaries at present (*zauvahy, rizhnyi, rizhnytsia, zasadnychyi, pozem)*[58]. In all of these areas, the process of neutralisation may be observed, so that while these lexical items could be deemed 'marked' or non-neutral at present, they are becoming more acceptable and losing their inferred semantic colour.

These linguists also caution against the phenomenon of 'hyperism', meaning an enthusiastic purism which roots out normal, historically Ukrainian words which happen also to appear in Russian. This same tendency towards exaggeration occurs with [g], when (especially under the influence of emigres, who also use another language regularly) it can be overused. Examples of 'abuse' of the phoneme and letter [g] include *pedahogyka, original, argument, gerb,*or *gazeta.* Newsreaders and others in the media receive some criticism for encouraging by their own careless speech the maintenance of poor Ukrainian. These authors assess such conflicts, and the presence of variation in the language as signs that Ukrainian is in transition.[59]

Lack of knowledge and the *surzhyk.* Russification carries the bulk of the burden for incorrect or historically inexplicable forms in Ukrainian, but it is not the sole culprit. International vocabulary has enriched the language, but has complicated the spelling system and the terminology lexicon. Diaspora Ukrainians helped keep the language alive, but also introduced spelling

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[56] Conductor (of electricity), leadership and aesophagus are all given for *provid.* The remaining words are defined as 'familiarity, commonness', 'relations', and 'affiliate, branch.'
[57] The first three are all defined in a figurative sense as 'domain, territory, field of knowledge'. The remaining words mean 'chronicle' and 'backdrop'.
[58] *Zauvahy* only appears in the singular, *zauvaha* and for this the alternate form *zavvaha* is given in the meaning of 'remark, notice, rebuke'. *Rizhn-* is an alternative spelling of the more usual form, *rizh,* hence the next two words mean 'different' and 'difference'. The remaining two words mean 'fundamental' and 'horizon'.

'errors' as their Ukrainian was both archaic and influenced by other languages. In addition, since diaspora Ukrainian is based on the Galician dialect, Russianisms appeared under the influence of 'Moscophile' intellectuals at the end of the 19th century. Emigre linguists, however, are some of the most vocal critics of 'Sovietisms' in Ukrainian. Social attitudes exacerbate these kinds of problems: diaspora Ukrainian may be rejected since some indigenous Ukrainians feel these emigres deserted the homeland, international vocabulary may be seen as the messenger of European or American influence and many speakers of the *surzhyk* are looked down upon, instead of receiving encouragement to develop their language skills.

Karavansky speaks out against the poor usage of Ukrainian in the press and in education. He notes that many speakers did not learn their Ukrainian at home, but at school and from newspapers. He notes that the press in Ukraine fulfills not only the role of *'orhanizator ta propagandyst'* , but also educator. Using examples from various articles, he highlights not only lexical or orthographic mistakes, such as *semydesiatelitnii* for *simdesiatylitnii* or *simdesiatlitnii,* (seventy-year old) but also stylistic problems like *po shkil'nym fondam* which should have been first of all *po shkil'nykh fondakh,* and secondly would have been better expressed as *metodysty shkil'nykh fondiv,* not the non-Ukrainian sounding *metodyst po shkil'nykh fondakh* (educational resources specialist).[60] Karavansky does not feel that the

[59] Ermolenko and Dziubyshyna-Mel'nyk, (1993), pp. 199-204.
[60] Karavansky, (1993c), pp. 993-97.

Ukrainian press serves as a good example, because if the of tolerance for the *surzhyk,* and also of rather sloppy attempts at purism.[61]

The response in the language community to the emergence of the *surzhyk* and the lack of knowledge of correct Ukrainian has varied. In *Ukrains'ka Mova v Shkoli*, for example, one author suggested a game of linguistic questions as a way to drill language knowledge. The questions show an acceptance of the variety present in Ukrainian (*alfavit, abetka,* and *azbuka* are all given as acceptable words for 'alphabet'), an interest in how international words enter the general lexical fund, and therefore Ukrainian (Captain Boycott inspired the 'international' word *boikot*; the Latin word *canis* in astronomy marked the time when the sun was in that constellation, corresponding to the summer months called *kanikuly* in Ukrainian), and an assumption that students in Ukraine will be familiar with both Russian and Ukrainian.[62]

Others criticise the use of the *surzhyk* instead of educated Russian or Ukrainian, as in Marharyta Zhuikova's 'Chy potribna Ukraintsiam Russkoiazychnaia Mova?' in *Literaturna Ukraiyna*, or her 'Iak hovorytymut' Nashi Nashchadky: Ukrains'koiu Movoiu chy Malorossyiskim Narechiem?'[63]. One author derisively lists 'kvitky' like *na rakhunok toho pytannia* (confusion with Russian *naschet.* Instead of 'on the subject of that question', the phrase then reads 'on the cheque of that question'.) or '*Iurii Meshkov ne vidbuvavsia iak presydent'* (confusion with Russian *ne sostoialsia*, so the expression

[61] Karavansky, (1993), p. 996.
[62] Ostapchenko, (1990), pp. 67-72.
[63] Zhuikova, (1993), pp. 123-28.

originally meant as 'does not look presidential' now reads 'has not frequented as a president'.) as examples of this mixture[64]. He blames both the *surzhyk* and the confused spelling of foreign names on an insecurity complex in Ukraine in relation to Russian.[65] Karavansky wryly notes 'Tsarstviiu ts'oho *surzhyk*u ne vydno kintsia.'[66]

Language regulation: The new *Pravopys*

Wexler categorises puristic tendencies as 'opening' or 'closure' to certain donor languages. Nowhere are such tendencies more apparent than in the latest work of the language regulators, published in the new *Pravopys*. This question is important as the rejection of linguistic elements result from, or mirror, a social and political rejection on a larger scale. Thus, one may expect greater sensitivity to what are perceived as Russian forms, a lack of awareness regarding words originally found in Polish (Ukraine's relations with Poland being less stressful than the relationship with Russia), and a willingness to adopt international vocabulary, with all its suggestion of cosmopolitanism, into the spoken language at least.

The *Pravopys* serves to regulate spoken and written Ukrainian by presenting a model for correct usage. Thus, spelling and grammar issues must be decided, along with syntax, style and lexicon. The new *Pravopys* attempts to correct a number of previous problems in orthography. This includes the spelling of geographical and foreign names and places. Recommendations include correcting [g] and [h] inconsistencies; only using

[64] 'The kingdom of the mixture language is never-ending.'
[65] Zadorozhnyi, (1995), pp. 10-1.
[66] Karavansky, (1993a), p. 74.

[kh] for velar fricatives (as in *Dachau* or *loch*). Careful use of the soft sign and apostrophe are also recommended, especially where confusion with Russian might occur. A more phonetic spelling of the problematic German *ei/ey* (Einstein) is suggested, using Ukrainian *ai* and not *ei*, and for German *eu*, Ukrainian *oi* should be used (Neuman). Greek letters for *th* and *eu* in words derived from Greek should be rendered *t* and *ev* in Ukrainian, as in *katedra* and *evforiia*. The transliteration using *u* for English [w] is rejected in favour of *v,* yeilding for 'know how' the form *nov hav* instead of the objectionable *nou khau*. (Even this form could elicit some protest as the word for a dog's bark is *hav*.) These suggestions take advantage of the phonemic system of Ukrainian which includes the bilabial [w] and the voiceless velar [h] which Russian lacks.[67] In general, a careful compromise must be attained which balances an accurate representation of the phonemes (not necessarily the *letters*) of the donor language, but is also realistic with respect to the Ukrainian phonemic system.

The most-argued aspects of the spelling system are as follows: [g] vs [h], *l'* versus *l* (as in *zalia/zala)*, the declension of type III nouns in the genitive, locative and dative (Holoskevitch uses *-i* in the locative and *-y* in the others; the 1997 edition uses *-i* for all of them), the declension of surnames ending in *-iv* (normal rules demand the *-iv* become *-ov* in oblique cases, but then the name resembles the Russian variant so many Ukrainians preserve the *-iv* even though this is against spelling rules), the use of jot between vowels in words such as *spetsial'nyi/spetsiialnyi* (with no jot between vowels

[67]Zadorozhnyi, (1995), pp. 10-11.

and with a jot, respectively); the doubling of consonants in words and names of foreign origin *(Hrimm* vs *Hrim*); the spelling of *–th* with either *–f* or *–t* in Ukrainian (controversial in Latin or Greek borrowings).[68] Some of these disagreements involve more than just orthography, however. In particular, the *I* versus *I'* not only indicates a difference in spelling but one in pronunciation: Ukrainians in Ukraine do not believe the diaspora who use the *I'* are speaking correctly, much less using correct Ukrainian spelling.

The discussion surrounding the most recent editions of the *Pravopys* remains complicated. Diaspora Ukrainians usually favour earlier editions of this reference, especially the 1928 edition by Holoskevych. In contrast, until recently the accepted (albeit heavily Russified) edition was the 1960 *Pravopys* and subsequent revisions. After glasnost', new editions began to appear which launched various debates including those mentioned above. Opinions of various linguists and scholars working on and around the new edition are discussed below. Judging from the response the newest version has elicited, the controversy is far from resolved. It is safe to say whichever side of the various linguistic issues one takes, the main problem remains consistency: once the rules are decided for good, they must then be applied universally, instead of including page after page of exceptions and variations. When compromise and uncertainty as to the correct form become less of an issue, the *Pravopys* will be much more 'user friendly'.[69]

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[68] These are gathered from a variety of sources which list most of the same problems. These sources are documented throughout this section of the chapter. The reference *Ukrayins'kyi Pravopys: tak i ni* contains several comprehensive listings, as does an article in *Den'* entitled 'Gramatychna anarkhiia skoro mae skinchytysia' by Mykola Siriuk. One could also consult the *Pravopys* itself to observe the rules for spelling contentious forms as they now stand.

[69] Interview, Olena Bekh, December, 1997.

The number of available sources discussing or arguing various points in connection with the *Pravopys* is substantial. Ermolenko, for example, discusses the function of the *Pravopys* as a universal guide, meant to be available to all speakers of Ukrainian and its contradictory nature as both a solid, stable reference and a dynamic reflection of the language as it changes. She explains her view that the earliest versions of the reference were not consistent since the language was not yet completely codified. The 1928 version cannot be considered totally reliable for the following reason:

> The 1928 edition, the so-called Skrypnykivs'ky *Pravopys*, which functioned in Western Ukraine until 1939 and is also used today, although not always closely followed, among Western diaspora. For the overwhelming majority of our contemporaries in Ukraine, this *Pravopys* is already history, even in its lexical practices which were published in the twenties and thirties in this century.[70]

The arguments surrounding the latest edition highlight larger cultural debates. There is no neat, tidy way to divide and classify the nature of the conflict. Essentially, disagreement occurs on a variety of levels. First, native Ukrainians support a standard language which reflects recent social and technological changes. Diaspora Ukrainians tend to prefer a radical overhaul and a return to Holoskevych and the 1928 *Pravopys.* In addition, Eastern and Southern Ukrainians tend to support only very limited, gradual changes, perhaps symptomatic of their support of Russian language, and therefore of the more Russified editions of the *Pravopys,* while the West and Centre would prefer more fundamental alterations which would reflect the modern language's *sui generis* path of development. This leaves the diaspora, the South/East and the West/Central regions of Ukraine in conflict with one

another. The varying degrees of conservatism, radicalism and positions on each particular issue (*-i* or doubling of consonants in foreign words, for example) complicate the picture even more.

Professor O.Taranenko, the head of the commission which made decisions concerning the latest edition, reflects the government view. He explains the problems highlighted above, and remarks that there is only one *Pravopys* which must serve Russophone Ukrainians, Ukrainian speakers, Westerners and Easterners. Although an ideal and perfect reference is impossible, he comments that some countries take a more theoretical stance towards their written standard, and preserve rules that no longer apply in the natural language, that of its speakers. He suggests that in Ukraine, the editors and compilers on the committee attempted to reflect real Ukrainian. Here, there are issues not only of the official Ukrainian enshrined in the *Pravopys,* but also of standard literary Ukrainian, which may or may not have stable, reliable norms to follow. Therefore, the controversy around the *Pravopys* assumes another dimension: it is no longer an argument whether the book correctly captures Ukrainian in the best and most suitable manner, but has also become an argument as to what actually is correct, standard literary Ukrainian, the language the *Pravopys* must attempt to characterise.[71]

Taranenko leaves aside the specifics of the Ukrainian situation and describes the role of grammatical and lexical normative works of any language. First, an orthograhipical dictionary should present the living language as accurately as possible. Second, it must be reasonably stable

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[70] Ermolenko, (1997c), p. 45.

and reliable. Third, in the writing of foreign words, a good compromise must be reached between correctly capturing the original word and the restrictions of the phonetic system of the recipient language. Fourth and finally, the *Pravopys* must be internally coherent and consistent, and embrace the maximum orthographic and stylistic potential of the language.[72] He adds that the commission working on the newest edition must be governed by realism and not romantic idealism. Taranenko concludes by saying the nation awaits their work, which will not only produce a *'vseukrayins'kyi Pravopys'* but also aid in consolidating the country.[73]

Those in the East view the purpose of the *Pravopys* in a slightly different way. For many of these Ukrainians, or Russians living in Ukraine, the more recent editions with Russified vocabulary may not be wholly objectionable, and a return to norms of 1928 would be undesirable. One writer from Luhans'k suggests that changes to the *Pravopys* must be gradual and realistic, 'evolutionary, not revolutionary.' Many of his sentiments do resemble others from different regions, such as the need for a single standard used uniformly throughout Ukraine.[74]

What is perhaps most astonishing about the debate surrounding the *Pravopys* is the number of participants and their combined contributions to the discussion.

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[71] Taranenko, (1997), pp. 12-8.
[72] Taranenko, (1997), p. 15.
[73] Taranenko, (1997) pp. 16-8.

Too many cooks? Professional and amateur linguists in Ukraine:

A great deal is still being written on these linguistic problems by Ukrainian and foreign linguists. Below, some of their work is discussed in an attempt to catalog and analyse any general trends in opinion, or the endorsement of a popular approach.

Experts don't exactly agree, one quickly discovers. For example, the foreword to the new English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Business states 'We draw your attention to the fact that we have avoided forms that are not characteristic of Ukrainian (e.g. active participles with the ending *-uchyi, iuchyi*, and others.)'[75] One finds as a lexical category in a new stylistic handbook, 'words, in the place of which often erroneously other lexemes are used, for example: *vyniatkovyi-vykliuchnyi, zavdiaky--diakuiuchy*' (meaning 'exceptional' and 'owing to' respectively; objectionable form underlined). Besides rejecting archaic and dialect words generally, this handbook also claims there is no difference in meaning or usage for *plattia--suknia, plyvty--plysty*, ('skirt' and 'to swim') though some would suggest a Russian influence in *plattia* and *plyvty*.[76] In this case, *plyvty* might actually be preferable according to Nepyivoda, because *plysty* can be confused with *plisty,* 'to braid'. Hlyts'kyi rejects all Russianisms, whether introduced by Galician Moscophiles or Soviets, while Karavansky somewhat reluctantly allows that Russian imports may be treated as any other borrowing, provided Ukrainian words are not displaced, and the new lexeme conforms to Ukrainian word-

[74] Uzhchenko, (1997), pp. 160-162.
[75] Krouglov, Kurylko, and Kostenko, (1997), preface, p. viii.
[76] Holovashchuk, (1995), p. 4.

formation rules.[77] This tension between different sources for new lexical items can be seen by contrasting the choices of dictionary editors O. Popovych (*vyzyvaty, zakliuchaty fakt, narushennia, nevmisnyi, nehoduvannia, typohrafiia, ushcherb)* and O. Bartoshchuk (*vyklykaty, ukladaty fakt, porushennia, nedorechnyi, oburennia, drukarnia, shkoda)* who used different pre-Soviet dictionaries as their sources[78].

One of the problems in such discussions is a certain lack of meticulousness on the part of those writing about linguistic problems. It is difficult to ascertain if this is academic hubris, or indicative of the damaging effects of Russification on even expert knowledge. For example, in discussing the carelessness of the press and other linguists, Karavansky quotes Popovych and Bartoshchuk as supporting certain words in the lexicon. Popovych claims his list is acceptable as those words appear in the Ukrainian-German dictionary published in Leipzig in 1943, when anti-Russian feeling would have been very prevalent indeed. His list includes *vyzyvaty, zakliuchaty pakt, narushennia, nevmisnyi*, previously mentioned as an acceptable alternative; *nehoduvannia, typohrafiia,* and *ushcherb.* Of these words, two of them are blatant Russianisms (*nehoduvannia* and *ushcherb)* and three of them do not actually appear in the 1943 dictionary at all. The 'rival' list furnished by Bartoshchuk contains the words *vyklykaty, ukladaty pakt, porushennia, nedorechnyi, oburennia, drukarnia,* and *shkoda.* Of these

[77] Karavansky, (1994b), p. 89.
[78] Karavansky explains Popovych's choices reflected his use of the Ukrainian-German dictionary of 1943, Kuzeli and Rudnyts'kyi, eds. The list from Bartoshchuk reflects loyalty to the 1930s dictionary of Paneika. Karavansky cites the 'Little Russian-German dictionary' or E. Zhelekhivs'ky, published in L'viv in 1884-6 as a source of both archaic and Russian introductions. (1997), p. 98.

words, six appear in the 1943 Liepzig dictionary as acceptable Ukrainian words. In addition, although the two lists are supposed to contain possible synonyms, or alternatives with the same meaning, this is not entirely true. *Nedorechnyi* and *nevmisnyi* are defined differently, as 'inopportune or unreasonable' and 'illicit, unbecoming' respectively. *Typohrafiia* is translated as 'typography', while *drukarnia* is taken to mean 'a print shop'. Essentially, a list of potential synonyms is offered, when the words do not actually correspond.

These mistakes or inaccuracies may be blamed on Popovych originally, though Karavansky is guilty of his own errors later. Karavansky explains the basis for using both sets of words but dislikes *nehoduvannia* in particular. This word is suggested as a translation of 'disapproval', calqued from Russian *'negodovanie'.* He would prefer the use of a similar building process as in English:

> prove--approve--approval--disapproval;
> *khvalyty--skhvalyty--skhvalennia--neskhvalennia.*[79]

He creates this 'chain' of words by adding prefixes and suffixes, linking the English words prove--approve--approval--disapproval. This is also problematic because he is mixing criteria, confusing semantic and morphological links to which he, and any average speaker, may not be sensitive. The same error applies to the Ukrainian chain, as the words mean 'to praise', 'to approve', 'approval', and 'lack of approval' (not disapproval, which is *oburennia).* Karavansky rightly claims that the Russianism *nehoduvannia* is objectionable as it does not mean 'disapproval' as Popovych

would like, and as it is a direct calque from Russian. He is also correct in asserting the word is a 'fifth wheel' since Ukrainian already has words to mean both 'disapproval' and 'indignation'.[80] These valid observations notwithstanding, Ukrainian linguists, even non-professional ones, should be more careful to check sources and seek verification. Clearly, some of them are not as familiar with their native language as they could be, and entering meticulous debates necessitates careful research and documentation.

Solutions and suggestions: What to do?

Two immediate problems confronting Ukrainian demand attention. First, whatever standard emerges must encompass forms understandable to all speakers of Ukrainian to allow easy communication and mutual intelligibility. Second, and perhaps more optimistic, the language enthusiasts would like this standard to be aesthetically pleasing, following rules of Ukrainian style and word-formation. This would then lead to functional differentiation, allowing Ukrainian to serve as the only means of communication needed for normal daily business, and elevate the language's status in the eyes of both its speakers and the world community.

How best to handle Russianisms and other questionable forms in the language? Here, opinions vary considerably. Vovk adopts a pragmatic view, that the speaker must differentiate between useful words borrowed from Russian, and those which obscure a good Ukrainian term and should

[79] Karavansky, (1997), pp. 98-9.
[80] Karavansky, (1997), pp. 98-9.

therefore not be used.[81] There is a definite trend away from words perceived to be Russian. One example is the preference for *shtampovannia* over *shtampovka*, reflecting the choice of a Ukrainian ending over the Russian -*ovka*. Some suggest avoiding obviously Polish words as well, but often words have been in the language so long they are no longer recognised as having foreign origin An example is *palyty*: it is worth mentioning that more than one native speaker used this example, and said the word had been imported from Polish, though it is arguably an older Slavonic word. This indicates the instincts of even linguists and *movoznavtsi* may not be totally reliable as filters for borrowed words.[82] There are Russian words which fit this category as well, such as *ploshcha*, *velosiped* or *sportsmen*.[83]

How do Ukrainians decide which words may stay in the language, and which are too obviously remnants of Russification? (Or unacceptable new creations from whatever source?) In 1994, Karavansky offered the following set of rules:

The lexicon should be understandable

Words should be pronounceable and not too long

Obvious Ukrainian words should be kept

Words should have Ukrainian roots

Rules of Ukrainian word formation should be followed

[81] Ermolenko, Interview, August, 1996.

[82] This also touches on a topic beyond the scope of this work but which might prove fruitful ground for further research, the process by which existing words expand their semantic load to cover new concepts. *Palyty* originially meant burning, or giving off smoke as did Russian *kurit'*, both of which were essentially intransitive verbs. The meaning expanded when tobacco entered the culture (originally the English verb primarily meant 'to give off smoke' as well, not 'to smoke' transitively). It would be interesting to explore whether Ukrainian pursued similar lines of incorporation with other new terminology.

Words should not have any 'undesirable undercurrents'[84]

Without sounding too critical (after all, Karavansky is taking an avid and active interest in the health of his native language), one could note that not all of his suggestions are helpful. 'Undesirable undercurrents' could be taken to mean words which are semantically marked ('Soviet' words, for example), but this is at best a subjective means of assessing vocabulary and therefore not totally reliable.

As far as the introduction of new words is concerned, he suggests a few additional criteria: the new words should not replace existing Ukrainian ones, and are particularly desirable if a word can replace a phrase.[85] Krouglov wrote on the same problem in 1995, suggesting the criteria of specificity, usage, self-descriptiveness and approval of authorities should apply.[86] Nepyivoda, who is an expert in stylistics, believes concern for readability must be taken into account. She chooses words which she feels are pleasant to read, and easy to understand.

Common sense will dictate which words are useful enough to keep, and which are archaic or unrecognizable for speakers. Ermolenko reflects this pragmatic attitude, and suggests leaving usage to individual taste and sense, as this is a policy in itself. She does not reject dialects of Ukrainian outright, but feels everyone should know the standard. Her other concern is to avoid extreme slang, or extreme high style. She rejects attempts to maintain an artificial language, neither democratic nor neutral, i.e. Soviet

[83] Karavansky, (1994b), pp. 85-8.
[84] Zadorozhnyi, (1995), pp. 10-11.
[85] Karavansky, (1994b), pp. 85-8.

coinages such as *Ukrderzhmiaskombinat* or *Komzavod.* Personal style and feeling for the language are universal criteria, although there is concern that many people's sense of what is good Ukrainian has been damaged by bilingualism and years of hearing 'bad' Ukrainian.

A rejection of Russification is not the only issue in determining what the ideal lexicon of Ukrainian should be. New words, both acceptable and unacceptable, enter from a variety of sources including Russian. The new lexicon of Ukrainian allows regulation using a set of criteria, or a combination of recommendations, to test individual words and phrases for feasibility. Borrowings must not be universally rejected, as they appear in most world languages. Here again, criteria are offered which would help regulate their inclusion in the lexicon. Essentially, borrowings must enhance and enrich the language, and they must not replace native Ukrainian words. According to Karavansky, *imidzh* fails the test, as it replaces *obraz* and does not cover any new concept. Here he has failed to perceive the expanded semantic load of this word, which now also includes the meaning 'reputation, public face' and as such may need to be retained in Ukrainian. Other words from English may perturb linguists, such as the overt borrowings *konsensus* and *prevaliuvaty.* Sometimes the problem relates not to the actual word, but its pronunciation. The adverb *tsilodoboho* (based on Russian *kruglotochno*) has vowels i-o-o-o-o, which do not flow in Ukrainian. The Russian word, in contrast, has a normal Russian vowel pattern of u-a-o-a, and therefore sounds pleasing to Russian ears. Karavansky remarks that in situations such as this, 'treba ne

[86] Krouglov, (1995).

copiuvaty, a tvoryty svoyi movni standarty i movni zrazky'.[87] Another unacceptable word is the calque *vytoky* which copies Russian *istoki*: the calque appears in place of the Ukrainian words *dzherela* and *korinnia*, the word is hard to say correctly and speakers who do not know Russian will not understand it. Such criticisms, which differ from expert to expert, obviously reflect subjective views and as such cannot be deemed absolute. A particularly good example of a new Ukrainian coinage is *letovyshche* which replaces foreign words *aerodrom* and *aeroport* (airport). It fills the other criteria: easily understandable, from Ukrainian roots, easily prounounceable and follows the model of other words already in the lexicon like *budovyshche, kladovyshche, rodovyshche* and *stanovyshche*.[88] The diaspora may be an acceptable source for new lexicon, as in the case of *dovkillia*. This word follows the structure of other Ukrainian words, such as *zillia, pidpillia* and *Podillia* and is instantly understandable. Even when words are not otherwise problematic, they may still be unacceptable for social or psychological reasons. For example, the expression *blyz'ke zarubizhzhia* (near abroad) entered Ukrainian via Russian. This term fulfills all of Karavansky's requirements even though it is Russian in origin. This alone, he says, is not reason to discount a term. He appears more uncomfortable with the ideological weight of the phrase, which was used to name the former Soviet republics. He suggests that this phrase reflects Russia's refusal to call the new entities 'countries', naming them instead the 'nearby abroad'. In any

[87] Karvansky, (1993a), p. 73. 'We must not copy, but create our own language standards and linguistc models'.
[88] Karavansky, (1994b), p. 87.

case, it is apparent that while new coinages, imports and international vocabulary may be welcome in theory, they must be assessed individually in order to justify their incorporation into standard (rather than colloquial) Ukrainian.

Conclusions:

Answers are not as satisfactory a means of summarising this area of work as a list of good, relevant questions. Overall the internal problems of Ukrainian represent a problem that is both aesthetic and symbolic. The linguistic war embodies the struggle of Ukraine to free itself from Russian influence and participate independently in the international community, and creates a thumbnail sketch of the bruised self-esteem of Ukraine as a state, its learning processes and development out of post-Soviet puberty into young nationhood. Were a critic to form an opinion based on only what has been achieved thus far, he could be forgiven for finding much of Ukrainian language either copied or retrospective, borrowed from neighbours or the past. Such as assessment would not be entirely fair to such a new state, which despite its present and ongoing troubles has made great strides in improving the language situation, and has recognised the importance of Ukrainian as a national symbol supporting and representing independence and bolstering national pride.

Any good critic must offer constructive suggestions for change, or characterise in a useable way, the main challenges facing a subject. Therefore, it is only sporting to produce a task list for Ukrainian language. First on the list, one must mention the lexicon. At present, a great deal of

variety exists which may add to the richness of the language but also cause confusion. Some variations retain non-objective 'colour' betraying dialect origins, Soviet-era borrowings and calques or international vocabulary borrowings. Many linguists argue that borrowings or 'trendy' international words replace easily-attainable Ukrainian words created using prefixes and suffixes, or by creating new nouns and adjectives from existing verbs and vice-versa. Time will show which variations lose this colour and become synonyms within the standard. Even terms and vocabulary items which are not archaic, obvious new introductions, or Russianisms, including the newly-set standard terminologies for scientific, legal and business fields, are not widely or universally accepted by the population. A universal standard must emerge, to avoid confusion and set a guide by which every one can operate. Karavansky reccommends a central linguistic committee to regulate this emerging standard, and keep the press, educational and academic spheres and government in line with one another.[89] It may be an idea to expand the role of the Ukrainian Institute of the Academy of Sciences to include a 'watchdog' function, which would allow for the regulation new forms and further ensure that good examples are available for new or reluctant speakers.

The grammar and syntax of the language might benefit from a touch-up in the same fashion. Phrases have entered colloquial Ukrainian and to a lesser extent, written Ukrainian, which draw the attention of linguists due to their resemblance to equivalent Russian phrases. Many of these linguists

[89] Karavansky, (1993c), p. 997.

dislike the Russian-sounding forms and offer archaic or Western Ukrainian alternatives. Here again, time will decide whose Ukrainian will gain the necessary status to prevail. A universal rejection of all things Russian, while natural and understandabe, may be counter-productive. Polish, English or French forms do not suffer this kind of purging from the language; and Ukrainian is related to Russian more so than to any of these. Some Russianisms serve a useful function in the language and could well be missed if they were to be forced out by excited purists.

Finally, one must turn an eye to the spelling system, already under as much corrective attention as the other two areas. Here again caution must be exercised. The return of [g] should not be an excuse to change good, Ukrainian pronunciation for diaspora Ukrainian with English or French influences. At the same time, Ukrainian has no need for Russian's compromise [kh] for the [h] sound, since it has both phonemes already. The same drive to weed out Russian could also lead to hyper-'i'-ification in words containing [o] or [e], though in some cases Russian influence has indeed changed Ukrainian spellings over time and corrections are necessary to accurately follow spelling rules and represent past sound changes.

There is also the matter of competing or at least co-occurring trends towards variation and standardisation within the normal literary language; neutralisation of previously marked forms and competing political trends of pragmatism and neo-Romanticism. All of this compounded by the relatively few speakers of standard literary Ukrainian, and the role of the press as a

primary language educator complicates the linguistic situation in Ukraine almost beyond comprehension.

What does this mean for Ukrainian? Essentially, speakers who wish to improve their language skills may find a dictionary handy until the process is complete. Schoolchildren may have to resign themselves to learning entirely different words for elements or new spellings of foreign countries and names. Military personnel and lawyers might have to put up with some confusion until one set of terms wins out over the others and gains wide acceptance. Government officials must seriously consider their policy options, and whether their support of a non-objective, nationalistically inclined language approach really presents the best picture of Ukraine and the Ukrainian language both at home and abroad. Those in the media, intelligentsia and educational spheres have a duty and responsibility to accurately reflect the standard, as it is at the moment, in every utterance and written work. Theirs is the arena where the language battle must eventually be won, where new terms must fight it out with old Russified words and coinages -- and will either sink or swim.

Conclusions:

What has been established in the preceding discussion of the language situation in Ukraine and language planning measures being undertaken at present?

First and foremost, language planning is taking place in tandem with state-building in Ukraine. While the immediate and pressing goal of these policies is to create a unified civil society in the newly-independent country, in the long term, the Ukrainian language must be supported as the state language, the language which all citizens use to communicate with the state and with one another. One part of state-building is to reverse the effects of Russification. This means standardising a cleaned-up version of Ukrainian purged of glaring Russianisms, and also a shift in the perception of Ukrainian as a peasant dialect.

A complementary aspect of language planning is the creation of a uniquely Ukrainian identity, for the country and for individuals that may or may not include Ukrainian ethnicity but must certainly eventually include the Ukrainian language. This means that the Ukrainian language must shift its meaning from a marker of ethnicity to a marker of nationality, as a component of Ukrainian identity. For some this means changing from a regional or ethnically Russian self-perception to an allegiance to the political and territorial unit that is Ukraine. Those who do not already identify themselves as possessing a Ukrainian national identity, and therefore who do not feel that it is necessary to speak Ukrainian as the state language must be made to view Ukrainian as a necessary tool for participation in the state in which they live.

This new Ukrainian social and political identity contains several components. First, the population must perceive Ukrainian history as separate from that of Russia, though common events and regimes have linked the two countries in the past. Secondly, both 'folk' culture and high culture must also be viewed as Ukrainian and separate, though again there are links. Politically the territory and statehood of Ukraine must be respected and the Constitution with its political, cultural and civic rights, should be upheld by citizens. Legally, Ukrainian law establishes the dominance of Ukrainian language and culture as that of the majority, but liberally protects and allows for the promotion of minority rights and cultures in Ukraine. It may be some time before Russians in Ukraine become accustomed to viewing themselves as a minority and consent to adopt at least the linguistic and political components of Ukrainian identity; thus far, they have not become politicised in their demands for a return to the Soviet Union or for dual citizenship. One may expect that in several generations they will assimilate into the majority culture.

As a component of civic identity, language cannot be underestimated. Symbolically, it represents Ukraine's independent status and serves as a link to the past, with its great heroes and poets. Pragmatically, as the state language, it must eventually become the normal and usual language of social contact. In this way, while minorities may keep their own language and culture they must also learn Ukrainian in order to participate. Ironically, as English gains wider popularity as an international language, the role of Russian may diminish leaving room for the growth of Ukrainian. Though Ukraine does not appear to be 'nationalising' in the ethnic sense, nor should it if peaceful relations

internally and externally are to be maintained, the country is nationalising linguistically and socially. Dual identities are perfectly reconcilable as long as Russian or another language is the marker of one's ethnic background, while Ukrainian is one's language of interaction within society and the state. Given the closeness, whether historical or forced, of Ukraine and Russia not only geographically but culturally and linguistically, some differentiation is necessary. The efforts of linguists are directed at the removal of any artificial closeness in the language; historians have gone about reclaiming a separate history for Ukraine. As a means to emphasise political independence, particularly as it is not universally recognised, language may serve as an important distinguishing feature between Ukraine and its neighbours. Language may also serve as a rallying point for the population, especially given the lack of a single state religion or unifying ideology. In its role as a symbol of the state, language can be as potent as the flat, the Constitution or any historical monument in capturing what it means to be Ukrainian.

Currently the Ukrainian language is undergoing both natural and engineered processes which better prepare it to serve as the only means of communication for citizens of Ukraine. Whereas in the past and in the diaspora, Ukrainian was often mythologised as the language of Shevchenko and the Cossacks, young people now are beginning to feel comfortable addressing previously taboo topics in their native language. Mass literature can now be written in Ukrainian without the view that this is somehow 'sullying' the 'great' Ukrainian language. Admittedly, most swearing seems to be in Russian, but there are words for socially

marginalised activities and groups which previously did not appear in the lexicon.

Kuzio notes several positive changes which support both the growth of Ukrainian as state language and the progress achieved in state-building partly as a result of language planning policies. These include

- Increase in the use of pure Ukrainian instead of Galician or surzhyk
- Removal of hostility and disdain towards the public use of Ukrainian
- Greater use of Ukrainian in higher education
- More Russian-speakers wishing for their children to learn Ukrainian as a career move
- Decline in the knowledge and use of Russian
- Increase in the use of English[1]

As stated above, English is rapidly replacing Russian as the language of international communication. This effectively removes justification for the presence of Russian in Ukrainian schools and institutions except as a foreign language like any other, and creates space for Ukrainian as the language used within the country.

This does not mean that Russian will vanish overnight, or even become a truly foreign language in the immediate future. In the media, Russian remains prominent and even more widespread than Ukrainian, largely for financial reasons but also due to lack of incentives to reverse the situation. In education great strides have been made in some areas, but the use of Ukrainian does not reflect the predominance of Ukrainians

in the population. These two cultural institutions provide necessary background training and support for using Ukrainian and as such, cannot be allowed to slip back into Russian. While finances do not allow monetary rewards for publication or instruction in Ukrainian, the implementation of penalties could provide just the right reverse incentive to encourage a change. Once this change has begun, social pressure and self-interest could keep up the momentum so that in one or two generations, Russian is indeed a foreign language for citizens of Ukraine.

From successful language planning attempts, both abroad in countries such as Tanzania, or in the recent past such as the policy instrumented by the Soviet government one can identify several factors which aid in the implementation of a coherent language planning policy. Some policies have the advantage of a charismatic leader or champion, liked and respected or at least noticed by the public to popularise the issues. One could cite feminists such as Gloria Steinem (who brought the attention of the public to sexist use of language in English) or Eliezer Ben Yehuda in Israel or even Joseph Stalin, who for all his tyranny and evil intent certainly displayed sufficient charisma to push his policies into effect. Equally, the legacy of a past hero or leader could serve as an icon of national pride along the lines of Pushkin in Russia, or even Shakespeare and Daniel Webster in England and the United States respectively. Ukraine seems to fit more into the latter category, with the nearly universal adulation of Shevchenko, than into the first. Although there are a number of colourful figures in both government and academic

[1] Kuzio, p. 356.

circles, no one seems to have become the standard-bearer for Ukrainian patriotism and linguistic development.

Timing plays a role in the success of a language planning policy. If appropriate social and political precedents have not taken place, it is unlikely that the public will see the need for language changes or even feel prepared to make them. Related to the time at which a policy is launched is the environment in which the targeted society functions. French society of several centuries ago felt sufficient pride in its premier place on the world stage to advocate the kind of purism put forward by Richelieu, and the government of that time could effectively engineer such active controls on the French language. Attempts to keep foreign borrowings out of contemporary French are not as successful (le walkman, le computer, le tee-shirt) probably due to a more relaxed attitude on the part of the French population, a globalising marketplace and a less strict style of government. Ukraine is at a crucial stage in terms of language planning at present. It has survived as an independent state long enough for many of the earlier political and linguistic demands of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers to have died down, while citizens are beginning to formulate a new national identity. Given its absolutely crucial position between the former Soviet Union and the West, a policy which seeks to remove Russian influence and promote indigenous features, especially language, would help to align Ukraine with Western democracies and away from the former Empire in the East. The economic and political benefits of language planning in this instance are obvious.

Status can also aid in the acceptance of a promoted language. In Wales and Ireland, such status appears to be somewhat lacking. Although

ethnic Irish and Welsh people verbalise a great deal of respect for the language of their ethnicity, they must communicate with the central British government in English, thus undermining the position of Welsh and Irish languages. Much of the Spanish-speaking population of the United States is made up of poor immigrants who have not acquired any political weight in local governments. This means that for the time being, English is fairly secure in its position as the national language due to the greater political and cultural status and influence of English speakers. In Ukraine, status has been something of an issue. Russian allied speakers with Moscow and urbanite society, while Ukrainian appeared provincial in comparison. This element of language planning still needs to be addressed, though independence and some measure of success in self-government and democracy have helped to undermine the notion that only peasants speak Ukrainian. As improving finances allow the media to present more glossy local products to compete with Russian imports, and as young people learn their own history and literature this discrepancy in perception should vanish. Here again the presence of English could be influential in providing another foreign language to link Ukrainians to the international community. Already there are some signs that language enthusiasts are reluctant to promote English as an alternative to Russian (thus in their minds trading one Big Brother for another). English, however, has none of the throwbacks to the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union and would be less likely to adversely affect the position of Ukrainian.

What may be truly lacking in Ukraine is the more elusive component of coherence in language planning. A good policy should have definite aims, both in the long and short term allied with a vision that is appropriate

to the culture one hopes to influence. This must be supported by careful and detailed schemes of implementation at every possible level, with realistic and sensible means at hand. Most of all, such a plan should be tailored to appeal to the masses as well as to academic and political leaders.

Reading the mission statements or plans of intelligentsia members – both politicians and academics – one is immediately tempted to ask how such general and far-flung ideas could be implemented. When journalists complain that they are struggling in a predatory environment, the government responds by banning ORT coverage of the Olympics. No one disputes that the population does not yet have sufficient affluence to support a media structure to rival that of other European countries. However, measures which would promote the development of local media remain to be implemented (such as tax breaks for Ukrainian-language media and publications, or a tariff on Russian-language media and publications).

Members of the *Ukrajinoznavstvo* movement are particularly guilty of such unsupported aspirations. Their demand for Ukrainian-language schools for ethnic Ukrainians in Russia has little chance of being met, especially when Russian-language schools remain in Ukraine. The goal of establishing Ukrainian-studies departments in foreign universities is an understandable one, and if realised would promote Ukrainian interests abroad by raising awareness and interest. This plan appears to rely on goodwill or diaspora involvement to be successful, since the Ukrainian university community does not seem to have funding to send scholars abroad, pay for lecturers to work in other countries or to publish translated

materials for foreign consumption. One scholar's attempt to gain control over the representation of Ukrainian words in foreign languages or in transliteration demonstrates how unrealistic some of these aims can be.

Another element of language planning which remains problematic is the element of messianism or messianic ideas which some scholars propagate[2]. From the standpoint of sociology or anthropology, the belief that Ukraine occupies a unique place in the history of the world, that its culture is somehow superior and that its people have a mission in the international community to bring enlightenment to others can probably be explained in terms of insecurity and reaction to upheaval. Ukraine has been the object of numerous foreign campaigns and subject to foreign rule many times in its history. Ukrainian culture has been undermined and under-valued, or assimilated into that of ruling powers. As an independent country, Ukraine faces a depleted stock of viable national icons and ideologies leading some scholars to resort to elevated notions of Ukraine's messianic role for inspiration. It is important to remember that these ideas do not have the support of mainstream political or academic figures, but as one potentially subversive trend Ukrainian messianic beliefs should be noted. If a political or academic figure who supported this rather grand vision of Ukraine's international role ever did gain prominence, the consequences could be serious. Extreme nationalism can accompany such ideas, which has led to the justification of violence, genocide and tyranny in the recent past, all of which could cause the world community to recoil should Ukraine begin to demonstrate such trends. Such beliefs in

[2] L. Fylypovych, 'Ideia mesiansvta ukrayins'koho narodu', in the papers of the Second Annual Congress of Ukrainists in L'viv, (1995), pp. 50-3, is an example of this.

Ukraine have caused concern in the mainstream, if not for their potentially explosive content, then for the ridicule and contempt they inspire abroad.

One need look no further than education in Ukraine for some idea of how to forge a successful plan for language promotion. As discussed in the education chapter, this sector has benefited from a policy containing both long and short-term goals that have been formulated to fit the Ukrainian reality. Although the long-term aims of policymakers are ambitious, the pace has been slow and cautious, improvisation occurs when there is a lack of funding and realistic incentives have been provided. Although language planning in education remains a work in progress, there are signs that it will be a success.

One should not be in the habit of consultation with a crystal ball when predicting the future of Ukraine in general, or of its language planning policies in particular. A number of factors coincide in Ukraine which could underpin the success of attempts to promote Ukrainian, while there are also very definite obstacles and pitfalls with which policy-makers must contend. The presence of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers of other ethnic groups remains an issue since Ukraine cannot abandon its liberal minorities policy without considering the potential outcry and loss of support this could cause. Financial limitations prevent the implementation of this policy on a grand scale, and do not allow language to become a priority ahead of the promotion of industry and the improvement of the economy and standard of living in Ukraine These two problems need not prevent the success of language planning; rather the presence of tension between sectors of the population only indicate a slow pace of change is required.

Ukraine may benefit from a number of favourable factors as well. Its strategic importance (due to size, natural resources and geographical and political position as a buffer against Russia) means that the West will continue to take an interest in the welfare of Ukraine, and will remain supportive of any policy which places distance between Ukraine and the former Soviet Union. Similarly, although the population does bear the effects of Soviet rule and the seeming laziness and apathy this created, Ukrainians as a whole are educated, highly skilled and becoming aware of their national identity. If certain policy-makers remain unhelpful by formulating impossibly general and daunting schemes, then equally there are scholars and other enthusiasts working diligently to create a workable lexicon and to introduce the masses to literary, standard Ukrainian. Newspapers are full of linguistic debates, young people appear eager to read mass literature in Ukrainian when it is available and the presence of 'New Russian' jokes demonstrate a change in orientation, a rejection of past humility in favour of increasing patriotism and participation in the new state.

One is reluctant to leave the future of Ukraine in the hands of the young or youthful. After all, the older generation has not only survived Soviet rule; the older intelligentsia preserved Ukrainian culture and language under that repressive regime and outlasted the policies that sought to destroy Ukrainian culture and independence. These Ukrainians have a valuable sense of the language, of what words will best fit the changing lexicon together with a knowledge of Ukrainian literature. Younger educated Ukrainians, however, may be freer in their willingness to ignore previous taboos and stretch the language to incorporate

thoroughly modern ideas, new slang and topics their elders may not have wished to discuss publicly. This may be the most important goal that language planners set for themselves: any successful promotion of Ukrainian as the state language must not only utilise the knowledge and sensibilities of older Ukrainians, it must also capture the interest and the support of the young.

Here Ukraine shows potential. To those who wrote while fearing possible repercussions should their work anger Soviet leaders, the open climate must provide not only inspiration but also a drive to express their ideas. Certainly a great deal of diagnostic and even exhortative work has appeared since independence, from which valuable insights can be gleaned. Meanwhile, young musicians, authors and entrepreneurs have gone about modernising the language by creating Ukrainian-language software, writing new fiction and recording Ukrainian-language popular music. All of these contributions enable a new image of Ukraine to emerge. No longer a republic of Cossack warriors, peasants and romantic-minded poets, Ukrainians can begin to see themselves as a modern nation of entrepreneurs, academics and civic-minded participants in the new state. Both as the driving force behind the shaping of this national identity, and a result of it, language planning in Ukraine and the speaking of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine remain a viable determining force in the success of independent Ukraine.

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