This article sets out the basis of a new ontology, or idea of human being, by expanding the logic that naturally flows from that which is original, necessary, inherent and essential to this being—upright posture. To better understand the meaning of this original Rightness for human being, it looks at the very beginning of history and at the very first ‘thing’ that could reasonably be said to exist in the human, historical world—the hand-axe. It finds in this simple tool a (...) portrait of its creator and an ontological key to an essential understanding of the human in its essential relation to the Godhead of Being. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the larger body of literature examining whether religious faith can coexist with doubt. In particular, I defend the view that there is a species of doubt—namely, when S suspends judgment about p—that is not necessarily opposed to faith. First, I revisit the Chrisian view of doubt as sin, which typically involves either (a) a willful refusal to believe some divinely revealed proposition or (b) a culpable indifference to it. Next, I demonstrate that a different case exists: (...) S may withhold judgment on p not out of willful rejection, but because she sees that her reasons for believing or disbelieving p are incommensurable. In such a situation, S’s rational choice between either option becomes undefined. S then doubts p not because she wilfully rejects it but because it is rational for her to refrain from adopting an attitude towards p on incommensurable grounds. In the end, I argue that such a case of doubt, because it mimics rational deliberation, can be construed as an intellectual virtue. (shrink)

This paper develops a conceptual and theological framework for understanding sacred places within the Christian tradition. It begins with phenomenological reflections on the nature of place, highlighting how places are constituted not merely as coordinates in space but as meaningful sites of human experience. Against this background, a typology of places is outlined in order to situate sacred places more precisely. The classical distinction between the sacred and the profane is then revisited, drawing on Durkheim, Eliade, and Nancy, while also (...) identifying its limitations in Christian theology. Finally, the paper sketches some contours of a topology of sacred places by analysing different modalities of divine presence and their degrees of representation, from creation as God’s oikos to the Eucharist as Christ’s real presence. (shrink)

Arguments such as the Consequence Argument suggest that causal determinism is incompatible with free will. Philosophers like Leigh Vicens and Peter Furlong have extended this reasoning to theological determinism, arguing that if God’s will determines the world, human freedom is precluded. In response, some compatibilists maintain that natural and theological determinism are fundamentally distinct. This paper defends and develops this compatibilist position. I argue that theological determinism can be reconciled with robust, libertarian-style free will, provided we adopt a substance-causal framework. (...) On this model, agents are understood as fundamental substances with intrinsic causal powers, and divine determinism is itself construed not as an event-causal chain, but as God’s continuous act of creating and sustaining these agential substances. (shrink)