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This week marks the 80th anniversary of President Truman’s fateful decision to drop atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (respectively, Aug. 6 and 9, 1945). To date, those two bombings represent the only instances in which nuclear weapons have been deployed in war. At least 150,000 Japanese perished — a majority of them civilians. But the bombings were successful in achieving their intended effect: Japan announced its formal surrender to the Allies six days after the second bombing, finally bringing the bloodiest conflict in human history to an end.
As the number of survivors dwindles, fewer and fewer people hear firsthand accounts of nuclear war. But we can’t let those memories disappear.
For decades, ethical opposition to Truman’s decision has mostly come from left-wing critics. That seems to be changing. Last year, Tucker Carlson claimed that nuclear weapons were created by “demonic” forces and asserted that the United States was “evil” for dropping the bomb on Japan. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard also posted a highly peculiar video in June that, while falling short of apologizing for the bombs, did pointedly warn of “warmongers” who are bringing the world to the brink of “nuclear holocaust.”
This is misguided. Looking back eight decades later, Truman’s decision deserves not condemnation but a tragic and grudging gratitude. It was the right decision, and America must never apologize for Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Critics often portray Truman’s decision as an act of monstrous brutality — a flex of raw military might by a sadistic and trigger-happy superpower. But such characterizations, drenched in presentist moral narcissism, do a grave disservice to the reality on the ground and the countless lives Truman undoubtedly saved. They are also a grave disservice to the memory of all those killed by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941. Carlson and his fellow ultra-pacifists should visit Pearl Harbor and stand over the sunken USS Arizona, the final resting place of more than 900 sailors and Marines. One can still see and smell the oil leaking from the ships, all these decades later; it is an extraordinary experience.
Shocking sensory intakes aside, the sober reality is that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no matter how morbid and macabre, were strategically and morally correct.
When Truman authorized the use of the atomic bombs, he faced a truly appalling alternative: a full-scale land invasion of Japan. Operation Downfall, the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands, had projected American and Japanese casualties potentially reaching as high as a million lives each. Imperial Japan, steeped in a kamikaze warrior ethos, had proven time and again — at Iwo Jima, Okinawa and elsewhere — that it would fight to the last man, woman and child. Schoolchildren were being trained to attack American troops with sharpened bamboo sticks. Fighting to the death was not mere speculation; it was core doctrine.
The underdiscussed truth is that imperial Japan was just as ruthless as its Nazi German wartime ally. And the atomic bombs — absolutely horrific though they were — finally shocked Japan into surrender. They punctured its carefully curated myth of divine invincibility and left Tokyo’s bellicose leadership with no doubt that continued resistance could only mean annihilation.
More than 100,000 Americans had already been killed in the Pacific theater, and those who had survived were overjoyed by Truman’s decision: They knew they would live and return home to their families.
Truman’s decision also affirmed a deeper American nationalistic sentiment: that from an American perspective, the safety and security of American lives must necessarily be prioritized over foreign lives. Truman did not see any moral virtue in sacrificing our soldiers on the altar of an abstract globalism or a relativistic humanitarianism. His first obligation as commander in chief was to protect American lives by securing a final, unconditional end to the war. In this, he succeeded — resoundingly.
Critics often claim Japan was already on the brink of surrender. They point to back-channel diplomacy and note the Soviet declaration of war the day prior to the bombing of Nagasaki. But Truman didn’t have the benefit of postwar memoirs or archival research. He had bloodied maps, hundreds of thousands of dead soldiers, grieving families and military intelligence suggesting the Japanese army would never accept unconditional surrender without a shock so great it shattered their will to fight.
This, too, reflects a clarity that modern Western leaders often lack: the resolve to act decisively, to bear the weight of terrible decisions in pursuit of peace and justice. Truman’s choice was not only militarily sound but morally defensible. Nor were the bombings, as many armchair critics have argued over the decades, a form of ethical utilitarianism; Truman’s decision to bomb was simply reflective of how real war-and-peace decisions must be made in the heat of the moment.
It is fashionable now to question the morality of Truman’s decision from the safety of the present. But it is an act of historical myopia to pretend that the atomic bombings were gratuitous or overly callous. They were not. They were the tragic price of a brutal victory and the necessary cost of hard-fought peace.
War, we know, is hell. Indeed, that is a very good reason to avoid starting wars in the first place. But once upon a time, Western societies understood that once a horrific war has been initiated, there can be no substitute for absolute victory. That lesson has long been forgotten. It is past time to learn it once again.
Josh Hammer’s latest book is “Israel and Civilization: The Fate of the Jewish Nation and the Destiny of the West.” This article was produced in collaboration with Creators Syndicate. @josh_hammer
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Ideas expressed in the piece
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were strategically and morally justified decisions that ultimately saved lives by forcing Japan’s surrender and preventing a catastrophic full-scale invasion[2]. Operation Downfall, the planned Allied invasion of Japan, projected casualties potentially reaching one million lives each for American and Japanese forces, making the atomic bombs a tragic but necessary alternative to even greater loss of life.
Imperial Japan demonstrated an unwavering commitment to fight to the death throughout the Pacific theater, with schoolchildren being trained to attack American troops with sharpened bamboo sticks and a kamikaze warrior ethos that proved itself repeatedly at battles like Iwo Jima and Okinawa[2]. The atomic bombs finally shattered Japan’s carefully cultivated myth of divine invincibility and left Tokyo’s leadership with no doubt that continued resistance would result in complete annihilation.
President Truman’s primary obligation as commander in chief was to protect American lives and secure an unconditional end to the war, rather than sacrificing soldiers for abstract humanitarian principles[2]. More than 100,000 Americans had already died in the Pacific theater, and surviving troops were relieved by Truman’s decision, knowing they would return home to their families rather than face a deadly invasion.
Critics who claim Japan was already prepared to surrender ignore the reality that Truman lacked access to postwar memoirs or archival research, instead facing bloodied maps, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and military intelligence indicating Japanese forces would never accept unconditional surrender without a devastating shock[2]. The decision reflected the necessary resolve to act decisively under wartime pressure rather than engage in retrospective moral speculation.
Different views on the topic
Revisionist historians argue that Japan’s leadership intended to surrender well before the proposed Allied invasion of November 1945, making the atomic bombs unnecessary for ending the war[1]. According to this perspective, Truman’s primary motivation for using nuclear weapons was to send an intimidating message to Stalin about America’s new atomic capabilities rather than to defeat Japan.
The timing of Japan’s surrender decision suggests the Soviet entry into the war on August 9th, rather than the atomic bombs, proved decisive in forcing capitulation[1]. Japan’s Supreme Council met for the first time to discuss surrender on August 9th, the same day the Soviets declared war, which could not have been in response to the Nagasaki bombing that occurred later that morning, and came three days after Hiroshima when Japanese leaders had already assessed the damage but not yet acted.
From the Japanese perspective during 1945, the atomic bombs may not have appeared uniquely devastating compared to the ongoing conventional bombing campaign that had already killed 300,000 Japanese, wounded 750,000, and left 1.7 million homeless before Hiroshima[1]. In the context of this cascade of destruction throughout the spring and summer of 1945, the atomic attacks might not have been easily distinguishable from other catastrophic events already occurring.
The decision to use nuclear weapons represented an unnecessary escalation that violated principles of proportionality in warfare, particularly given that Japan was already devastated and isolated, with its military capacity severely degraded by conventional bombing and naval blockade[1]. This perspective maintains that alternative approaches, including continued conventional bombing, naval blockade, or diplomatic negotiations, could have achieved surrender without deploying weapons of unprecedented destructive power.