The International Lunar Research Station: China's New Era of Space Cooperation and Its New Role in the Space Legal Order
Introduction
China's rise as a space power is one of the defining developments in international space society1 in the 21st century. However, the paradox is that China's power is defined in terms of space capacity but barely in terms of space cooperation. China's space cooperation is disproportionally underdeveloped in comparison with the degree of advancement of its capability. The overall layout of the China Lunar Exploration Program (CLEP) embraces international participation in many ways, but the implementation of its first stage, the Chang’E Program, has only resulted in a handful of contributed payloads and scientific data sharing.2 Beijing has been trying to remedy and reverse this situation by resorting to multilateralism, characterised by a proactive approach to dealing with external constraints and increasing soft power. It is in this political context that the vision for the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) has been developed since 2016.
China's National Space Agency (CNSA) formally announced the ILRS proposal in 2019 as revealing the future development of CLEP.3 This is China's first initiative on a multilateral cooperative platform for a specific program, as opposed to incorporating foreign contributions into the implementation process, as with the Chang’E Program. The essential goal is to establish a research platform and infrastructure complex on the moon's surface and in its orbit, with the possibility of long-term unmanned operation and the prospect of a human presence. It will be carried out through several missions from 2020 to 2035, which can be roughly divided into the reconnaissance, construction, and utilisation phases. CNSA and Roscosmos signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the ILRS in March 2021.4 The roadmap and partnership guidelines were released 3 months later.5 The intensity of the negotiations between China and Russia and other potential partners and the frequency of related press releases demonstrate China's commitment to the ILRS.
The ILRS initiative will significantly strengthen and improve China's status as a space power in direct opposition to the United States on the frontline of the final space frontier. For the first time, China and the United States will be actual competitors in their intentionally chosen programs within roughly the same time period, that is, the IRLS versus the Artemis program, though it might not be China's primary or initial intention to compete the United States. The Artemis program is a US-led international endeavour that was announced in 2019 and similarly aims at establishing a long-term presence on the moon, including the return of astronauts, through close collaboration with commercial and international partners based on the Artemis Accords. The Artemis program consolidated a sizable list of signatory nations as of June 2022,6 in contrast to the ILRS’ two partners and lack of a clear arrangement for a cooperative pattern and a legal framework.
Tension between competition and cooperation is common in space activities.7 The interplay of competition and cooperation challenges, forces compromise in, and maintains and develops the space order.8 Recently, great power competition, primarily among China, Russia, and the United States, has attracted much international attention, and space has re-emerged as a central arena.9 International space politics continue to be defined by the policies and preferences of the United States as the leading space power, but a modicum of leadership transition is occurring as a result of China's attempts to assume the role of a ‘responsible power’.10 The two long-term and large-scale lunar cooperative platforms are embarking upon a journey towards a new mixed structure of cooperation and competition, intensifying and complicating relations among the space powers in the process. The configuration discourse on the ILRS will improve the organisational structure and interplay of competition and cooperation and set the stage for China's decisive role in the space order.
The remainder of this article analyses the evolution of China's approach to space cooperation defined by the dynamics of techno-nationalism and external constraints and its new reliance on multilateralism to increase its soft power. It then underlines the implementation framework to ensure the internationalisation of the unprecedented initiative of the ILRS through a comparison with the Artemis program. Finally, it assesses China's potential as a leader in contributing to the development of international space law.
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Section snippets
The metamorphosis of China's approach to space cooperation
The history of China's space cooperation points to a gradual metamorphosis from a nearly isolated actor to an active leader. Its evolution can be roughly divided into three phases according to the primary emphasis: national independence from the 1950s to the 1970s, bilateral cooperation from the 1980s to the 2010s, and multilateral cooperation as of the 2010s.
For nearly three decades, there was minimal space cooperation, except for several years when China received technical aid from the Soviet
The defining dynamics between techno-nationalism and external constraints
The evolution of China's space cooperation is defined by the dynamics between techno-nationalism and external constraints. Through multilateralism, China intends to proactively tackle external constraints based on its scientific and technological advancement.
Techno-nationalism is a useful and powerful ideology and framework to understand China's enduring quest for self-sufficiency in scientific and technological innovation.27
Realising the multilateralism of the ILRS initiative
Theoretically, China's rise as a space power could elevate the relevance of cooperation to a new level of international endeavour. In reality, Beijing's primary concern is making the ILRS truly international. From the perspective of soft power, converting space capacity and resources into preferred outcomes largely depends on China's skills to attract extensive and intensive international involvement.51
The ILRS’ contribution to strengthening China's influence on the development of international space law
Some commentators consider China-led cooperation with an emphasis on ‘cooperation for the common interests’ to be an ideal approach to achieving a global common in outer space,82 but there has been
Author statement
The author declares that this work is my original research and has not published previously, nor under consideration for publication elsewhere, in whole or in part.
Funding
Strategic Economy Interdisciplinarity of Beijing Universities Advanced Disciplines Initiative (No. GJJ2019163).
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
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