Canada’s Brussels meetings signal a strategic pivot from US dependence

Canada’s foreign minister is in Brussels this week for meetings with NATO and European Union counterparts.

At first glance, this appears to be nothing more than a routine diplomatic visit: the kind of ministerial shuffle that is the perpetual backcloth of politics and rarely moves any needles of strategic consequence. 

In fact, it is a critical waypoint in the Carney government’s much wider effort to rebalance Canada’s external relationships — away from a position of deep structural reliance on the U.S. and toward a broader and more varied set of partnerships that would be anchored by Europe. 

The visit is more than a gesture. It is an extension of an emerging foreign policy doctrine that seeks to give Canada more room to maneuver in a geopolitical environment where American stability, focus and leadership can no longer be presumed. 

Canadian foreign policy, for decades, was constructed around a single assumption: that the U.S. would remain a reliable foundation for North American defense, economic integration and diplomatic clout.

That arrangement served Canada reasonably well through the post–Cold War era of American confidence. But the world that made that arrangement workable is no more. Washington’s attention is today pulled between the Indo-Pacific, domestic tumult and a more disaggregated global order. U.S. politics is increasingly volatile. American economic policy is more protectionist. 

The Carney government is responding to these structural shifts by broadening Canada’s alliances — and by doing so in a way that mitigates the vulnerabilities that come with overreliance on a single partner.

This is where Brussels comes in. The new Canada-EU Security and Defense Partnership, signed earlier this year, represents the most ambitious framework for transatlantic cooperation that Canada has entered into since the early days of NATO itself. 

It is not a treaty of mutual defense. It is, in some ways, more flexible and more consequential. It codifies formal channels of cooperation for military mobility, cyber defense, maritime security, emerging technologies, resilience against hybrid threats, long-term support for Ukraine and more. 

Perhaps most significantly, it opens the door for Canadian participation in European defense-industrial initiatives. This means procurement pathways that do not run exclusively through the United States. 

This last point is worth dwelling on. Canada’s defense-industrial base has been linked to U.S. production and regulation for generations. That tether gave Canada stability but at the cost of autonomy. 

The Carney government sees an opportunity here to rebalance that relationship by working more closely with Europe’s rapidly developing defense sector. European rearmament, once unthinkable, has become a defining feature of the post-Ukraine strategic landscape. 

Major European states are now investing heavily in capabilities directly relevant to the Arctic, the North Atlantic, space, cyber and hybrid competition — precisely the domains where Canada has underinvested. 

The Arctic is the starkest example of how this reorientation could alter Canada’s strategic posture. 

Ottawa has long relied on U.S. surveillance, infrastructure and operational capacity in the North. But the Arctic today is a contested space. It is being shaped not just by Canadian and U.S. interests, but by Russian deployments and exercises, Chinese polar activity and the addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO. 

Europe, not just the United States, now has skin in the northern game. Nordic states in particular bring capabilities, experience and political will that are complementary to both American and Canadian strengths. 

By leaning into these partnerships, Canada can build a more resilient Arctic posture that is not dependent on U.S. attention or priorities. 

There will be critics who warn that Canada cannot afford to dilute its relationship with the United States. This misses the Carney government’s point. 

This is not about distancing Canada from its most important ally. It is about ensuring that Canada’s national interests are not held hostage to the oscillations of American politics. 

A diversified alliance portfolio makes Canada a stronger, not a weaker player within NATO. It allows Ottawa to engage Washington not from a position of vulnerability and limited choices, but from a position of greater stability and credibility. 

The Brussels visit is thus only one part of a much larger and coherent project: one of reshaping Canada’s place within the alliance, anchoring Canadian diplomacy in both Washington and Europe, reducing the economic and defense vulnerabilities that come from overconcentration. 

If the Carney government follows through — by modernizing the military, participating in European procurement initiatives in a meaningful way and treating Arctic security as a transatlantic, not just a continental issue — Canada will emerge as a more autonomous and relevant actor within NATO. 

Whether this happens will not depend on the symbolism of the meetings this week. It will depend on what comes next. The world no longer rewards countries that place all of their strategic eggs in one basket. Canada is finally starting to act like a state that understands this. Brussels is only the first step.  

Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minn., a senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, and a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities in Washington.