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PREFACE

The year 2018 marked the bicentennial of Karl Marx's birth, which gave rise to a great number of symposia and exhibitions reflecting a revived interest in Marx not only in Germany. Our opening feature article presents the keynote address delivered at the "Marx at 200" symposium that the German Historical Institute Washington organized this past spring in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. In "Karl Marx and the History of Capitalism," Jürgen Kocka (WZB, Berlin), the author of *Capitalism: A Short History* (2016), reflects on — to borrow a famous phrase — "what is living and what is dead in the thought of Karl Marx," that is, which elements of Marxian theory are still useful for scholars seeking to write the history of capitalism today. After a lucid overview of Marx's understanding of capitalism, Kocka makes two arguments. First, he provides a trenchant analysis of those elements of Marx's theory — such as his underestimation of the flexibility of capitalist relations — that led him to the false prediction that capitalism would decline and collapse. Second, while conceding that anyone writing a history of capitalism today has to go beyond Marx, he argues that several features of Marxian thought can be made fruitful for such a historical analysis. According to Kocka, these features include Marx's focus on ambivalence as a central feature of capitalism; the aggressive dynamics and resulting instability of capitalism; the connection between capitalism and violence, especially in the early phases of capitalist development; and the constant threat of a "dynamic spillover" of capitalist principles into non-economic spheres of life.

Once again, our fall issue presents a special thematic section, this time on "Knowledge and Copyright in Historical Perspective." It is co-edited and introduced by Sarah Beringer and Atiba Pertilla (both of the GHI), who organized the spring 2018 lecture series from which the articles presented here are drawn. As Beringer and Pertilla explain in their introduction, the central issue raised in this thematic *Forum* is the tension between the quest to protect knowledge production through copyright, patents, and other forms of intellectual property rights, on the one hand, and strong economic incentives to appropriate, replicate or remix someone else's intellectual property, on the other. In the section's first article, art historian Nancy Troy (Stanford University), the author of *The Afterlife of Piet Mondrian* (2013), uses the case study of Yves Saint Laurent's famous

1965 cocktail dresses that mimicked Piet Mondrian's abstract paintings to illuminate the economic and cultural significance of "copying" in the triangular relationship between haute couture, art, and the ready-to-wear fashion industry. Next, Mario Daniels (Georgetown University) examines the Reagan administration's aggressive efforts to reign in the international circulation of scientific technological knowledge, arguing that this effort was spurred by an increasingly inextricable mixture of concerns about American economic competitiveness and national security considerations.

The section's final article, "Why Are Universities Open Access Laggards?", combines a historical perspective on copyright with a powerful plea for open access publishing. Peter Baldwin (UCLA), the author of *Copyright Wars: Three Centuries of Transatlantic Battle* (2014), argues that the traditional copyright system has been undermined by two transformations: the advent of digital technology, which has reduced the cost of disseminating content to almost nothing, and the fact that nowadays most academic authors are salaried employees rather than independent writers. Since these developments have removed the two main reasons for the existing copyright regime, Baldwin calls on universities — both the professoriate and university libraries — to abandon traditional copyright in favor of open access publication, which would make academic publications available to everyone.

The "Conference Reports" section once again reflects the wide range of the Institute's scholarly programs, reporting on recent conferences whose topics range from the post-World War I settlement of 1919 to transoceanic perspectives on American studies; from the history of American urbanism to black European history; and from the history of capitalism to the study of manuals and handbooks from a history of knowledge perspective. We also report on two recent seminars for junior scholars, in early modern and late modern German history. Finally, we include a report on the spring 2018 conference "In Global Transit: Jewish Migration from Hitler's Europe to Asia, Africa and Beyond," which is part of a conference series whose next meeting will take place at the GHI's Pacific Regional Office in Berkeley next May.

Please turn to our news section for recent GHI news. For up-to-date information on upcoming events, publications, fellowships, and calls for papers, please also consult our website — http://www.ghi-dc.org — as well as our Facebook page.

Simone Lässig (Director) and Richard F. Wetzell (Editor)

Features

KARL MARX AND THE HISTORY OF CAPITALISM[1]

Jürgen Kocka
WZB / BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER

I.

In recent years Karl Marx has again become a major topic of scholarly analysis and public discourse. At least in Germany this discourse is moving in two different, even opposite directions. One side sees Marx as a man of the nineteenth century, strongly influenced by that century's first half in particular, that is, by the age of the French Revolution and its aftermath, by Hegel's philosophy and its critiques, by early industrialization particularly in England, and by the theories of political economy emerging from there (Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill). This means understanding Marx's thought, his life and his politics as time-specific. It means "historicizing" him without denying his outstanding importance for the following decades and perhaps for today. It also means sharply distinguishing between the historical Marx on the one hand and the Marxisms of later decades on the other, that is, between Marx as revealed by historical research and the doctrines and ideologies, distortions and myths which were later represented as his legacy, through which he became an influential historical force for different political purposes, and which defined his "historical greatness" in the long run more than his biography proper.

Major biographies have been published which successfully advance the project of historicizing Marx.[2] The new edition of Marx-Engels Collected Works, the new MEGA — thus far 59 published volumes with 32 still to come — has had a similar effect. It has shown the tremendously heterogeneous, frequently contradictory nature of Marx' writings, very fragmented and not yet published at the time of his death in 1883, which left scope for very different ways of editing, arranging and completing them later on. This job of editing, arranging and amending was effectively started by Friedrich Engels, Marx' closest friend, but continued by others under very different political regimes throughout the twentieth century. The distinction between Marx and Marxism is old. But now it has gained a new meaning and a solid empirical foundation.[3]

On the other hand, the new discourse about Marx consists of a much more present-related approach practiced by authors and speakers

1 Lecture delivered at the symposium "Marx at 200" held at the German Historical Institute Washington, April 12, 2018 and co-sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Goethe Institut Washington, DC. The lecture format has been preserved in this published version. Only a few adjustments have been made and some footnotes were added to selectively acknowledge my intellectual debt to other authors and to facilitate access to further reading.

2 Jonathan Sperber, *Karl Marx. A Nineteenth-Century Life* (New York/London, 2013); Gareth Stedman Jones, *Karl Marx. Greatness and Illusion* (London, 2016); concise: Wilfried Nippel, *Karl Marx* (Munich, 2018); with emphasis on his political activities: Wolfgang Schieder, *Karl Marx. Politik in eigener Sache* (Darmstadt, 2018).

3 Wilfried Nippel, "Die Politik des Vorworts," *Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte* 11/3 (Herbst 2017): 67-78; Jürgen Herres, *Marx und Engels. Portrait einer intellektuellen Freundschaft* (Ditzingen, 2018). New historical approaches to Marxism after Marx: Christina Morina, *Die Erfindung des Marxismus. Wie eine Idee die Welt eroberte* (Munich, 2017); Gerd Koenen, *Die Farbe Rot. Ursprünge und Geschichte des* Kommunismus (Munich, 2017).

who turn to Marx in order to either admire what they see as the eternal truths of his teaching or who try to learn from him in order to deal with present-day problems like the crisis of capitalism, increasing social inequality, the burdens of globalization or the problems of "neoliberalism" in different spheres of life.[4] They ask: "What would Marx have said?," and somehow imply that if we had followed him we would be better off now. Referring to Marx in this way often is more of a political gesture than a substantial argument, a gesture signaling dissatisfaction, criticism and intellectual protest, a sign of self-identification with the left.

The bicentennial of Karl Marx' birth was an occasion for commemorating, celebrating and — to some extent — monumentalizing him again. His birthday was staged as an event, mainly in Trier, the West German town with Roman origins where Marx was born on May 5, 1818. There was no shortage of official speeches, talk shows, and mainstream media coverage as well as some pop culture elements, e.g. the portrait of the "bearded prophet from Trier" appearing on T-shirts and the like, but also an occasion for informative exhibitions, numerous scholarly conferences and substantial discussions in the national and international media. The dominant way of remembering Marx did not lead to his glorification or condemnation, but to sober information, historical contextualization and multidimensional evaluation.

In general, something like a mild Marx renaissance is occurring, not in politics proper, but in the cultural sphere, in the *feuilleton,* in intellectual discourses and in the different spaces in which social criticism takes place, at least in Germany. This new interest in Marx is partly driven by different concerns about growing inequality in our societies, world-wide crises of socioeconomic origins or dimensions, and a revived interest in social criticism. Marx no longer is a hotly disputed object of ideological battles, as was the case during large parts of the twentieth century. The direct exploitation of his theories, his name and his legacy in order to justify contemporary strategies, positions and parties has become rare nearly everywhere. The distance between him and the present has grown. But this has opened up the chance to read him in a new way and rediscover elements in his work which continue to be challenging, inspiring and fascinating.

First, I would like to turn to a different though related discussion. I mean the new interest in capitalism, especially among historians and social scientists, but also in the public debate. The concept, which had originated and flourished in the early decades of the twentieth

4 This attitude is not altogether absent in another recent biography: Jürgen Neffe, *Marx. Der Unvollendete* (Munich, 2017).

century, had virtually disappeared from serious research and non-polemical scholarly discussion outside Marxist and Marxist-Leninist circles during the cold war period. But since the 1990s this has changed. Presently the concept is "in," particularly among historians, and especially in the English-speaking world. Some authors have started to speak of a "New History of Capitalism" they see emerging. The concept serves both analytical and polemical purposes. As Sven Beckert recently observed: "During the past few years, few topics have animated the chattering classes more than capitalism. In the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008, questions about the nature, past and viability of capitalism suddenly appeared on evening talk shows and in newspapers throughout the world."[5]

There are many who prefer *not* to use the concept, most economists and many economic historians among them. One should not exaggerate the depth nor the scope of this semantic revival of "capitalism." But the concept is used again, not just in polemics but in scholarly texts, and many historians engage in serious talk about how best to conceptualize a history of capitalism.[6]

Clearly the discourses on Marx and on capitalism are related to each other. Some would say present-day crises spurred both to a significant extent. Debates about Marx usually touch on capitalism, one of the main topics, perhaps *the* main topic, of Marx. On the other hand, critical discussions about capitalism frequently touch on Marx. Whoever writes a history of capitalism has to deal with Marx as an *object* of study: Marx as a thinker who excelled in formulating anti-capitalist criticism, as somebody who played a major role in the emerging European labor movement first in 1848/49 and then again in the 1860s, and Marx as a figure whose legacy became an important source of imagination and legitimation for different non-capitalist and anti-capitalist movements and regimes in the twentieth century and even today.

But what exactly can we take from Marx' thought and writings when we want to describe and explain capitalism in the past and present? What can we take from him when it comes to writing a history of capitalism and to understanding what capitalism means today? This is the question which I propose to discuss in the rest of this lecture.

II.

Karl Marx rarely used the term "capitalism." But Marx wrote so extensively and penetratingly about the capitalist mode of production

5 See Sven Beckert, "The New History of Capitalism," in *Capitalism: The Reemergence of a Historical Concept*, ed. Jürgen Kocka and Marcel van der Linden (London/New York, 2016), 235-249 (quote p. 235).

6 Recent research literature is presented and reviewed in: Jürgen Kocka, "Writing the History of Capitalism," *Bulletin of the GHI* 47 (Fall 2010): 7-24; J. Sklansky, "The Elusive Sovereign: New Intellectual and Social Histories of Capitalism," *Modern Intellectual History* 9 (2012): 233-248; Friedrich Lenger, "Die neue Kapitalismusgeschichte: ein Forschungsbericht," id., *Globalen Kapitalismus denken. Historiographie-, theorie- und wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Studien* (Tübingen, 2018): 1-48.

that his understanding of capitalism shaped future generations more strongly than the work of any other single person. The main components of his notion of capitalism may be summarized in four points:[7]

First, Marx saw the *market*, which presumed a division of labor and money economy, as a central component of capitalism. He emphasized how merciless competition spurs technological and organizational progress while simultaneously positioning market players against each other. He brought out the *compulsive character* of the "law" of the market, a law capitalists and workers, producers and consumers, sellers and buyers have to obey on penalty of failure, no matter what their individual motives might be.

Second, Marx discussed at length capitalism's trend towards essentially unlimited *accumulation* as one of its distinguishing features, that is, the formation and continuous increase of capital more or less as an end in itself, initially as "original accumulation" owing to transfers from other sectors (not without expropriation and not without force), later as the reinvestment of profits, but ultimately derived from the value that labor created: capital as congealed labor.

Third, Marx saw a core of the capitalist mode of production in the tension between capitalists as owners of the means of production, along with the entrepreneurs and managers depending on them, on the one hand, and workers, contractually bound but otherwise freely employed in return for wages and salaries without ownership of the means of production, on the other. Both sides were bound to each other by an exchange relationship (labor in exchange for wages or salary, labor as a commodity) and by a relationship of dominance and dependency that enabled the "exploitation" of workers by capitalists: exploitation in the sense that a portion of value earned by workers, so-called surplus value, was not made available or paid out to them. This portion passed into the possession of the capitalist/entrepreneur, who used it partly to advance accumulation and investment, partly to provide for what he consumed. The *capital-wage labor relationship* understood this way not only advanced the dynamism of the system. It simultaneously provoked class struggles that would lead to a confrontation between the *bourgeoisie* and the *proletariat* facing each other as irreconcilable adversaries. This was, according to Marx, the precondition for revolution that, carried by the proletariat, would abolish the system of capitalism in favor of another, specifically socialist or communist, alternative, though Marx did not enter into any more detailed discussion of this alternative system. With

7 This summary closely follows Jürgen Kocka, *Capitalism. A Short History* (Princeton, NJ, 2016), 7-10.

this prediction, which could simultaneously be read as a call for the proletariat to attend to its historical mission, Marx transformed his theoretical conception into a practical political guideline, which is how many understood it ever since the late nineteenth century.

Fourth, Marx analyzed the enormous *dynamism* of the capitalist system that, sustained by the bourgeoisie, was dissolving everything traditional, was on its way to spreading all over the world and had not only the drive but also the capacity to extend its logic into non-economic areas of life. Marx was convinced that the capitalist mode of production had a tendency to shape society, culture, and politics decisively. What the economist Adam Smith had described as a "commercial society" and the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel had called "bourgeois" or "civil society," Marx portrayed as a *social formation* heavily influenced by the capitalist economy.[8]

How valid and indeed how useful is this view of capitalism for understanding and explaining the history of capitalism? Let me first address some weaknesses and then some strengths of the Marxian approach.

III.

Marx predicted the long-term decline of capitalism due to its own dynamics, which would finally bring it down and prepare the transition to a post-capitalist system, namely socialism. In his extensive writings there are at least three theoretical approaches to explaining the expected collapse of capitalism.

First, Marx understood well that capitalist growth comes in ups and downs, booms and busts, interrupted by crises. He has a lot of pertinent arguments to account for this fluctuating pattern, especially in terms of overproduction and under-consumption in an economy in which major decisions are taken in a decentralized and competitive way instead of being centrally planned. But Marx went further. His ill-conceived theory of the falling rate of profit anticipated the capitalist engine to slow down, profits to dry out and stagnation to follow. With this notion Marx built on older theories by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, who had expressed either the fear or the hope that the economy would stop growing because the rate of profit would eventually fall so low that new investments would no longer be profitable. Basically these authors of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries — including Karl Marx — could not imagine the tremendous multiplication of

8 Based on insights and comments by Marx (and Engels) spread out over their extensive oeuvre. Most important for Marx' theory and description of capitalism: his "Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie" (1857-58, first published in 1939); "Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Erstes Heft (1859); "Das Kapital," vol. I (1867) and vols. II and III (compiled from Marx' unpublished manuscripts and published by Engels in 1884/85 and 1894); "Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei" (1848); "Lohnarbeit und Kapital" (1849). These sources should now be used in the new and still unfinished Marx/Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA). English translations: *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels Collected Works (MEWC),* 50 vols. (Moscow, London and New York, 1975-2000). For an introduction to Marx' work as an economist see Sperber, *Karl Marx,* 419-463; Stedman Jones, *Karl Marx*, 375-43; Jerry Z. Muller, *The Mind and the Market: Capitalism in Western Thought* (New York, 2002), 166-207; still very useful: Eduard Heimann, *Geschichte der volkswirtschaftlichen Lehrmeinungen* (Frankfurt/Main 1949), ch. VI.

human needs and desires which would take place when the means of satisfying them would become real possibilities. They underestimated the dynamics of the future. They were contemporaries of early industrialization and conditioned by the experiences, observations and discourses of their time.[9]

Second, Marx developed the notion of a contradiction between the *relation*s of production and the *means* of production. With this formula he referred to a growing tension or incompatibility between the social and political *conditions* including property rights and law on the one hand and the *economic processes* including technological and organizational innovation on the other — economic processes which take place in that framework of social, legal and cultural relations but after a while tend to push beyond this framework which increasingly impedes them and even prevents further innovations before it is finally changed, frequently in an abrupt, revolutionary way. I see this as a very helpful notion that historians can apply to the description and explanation of historical change in different fields again and again.[10]

Marx described the capitalist relations of production as the framework that had hosted and supported all the changes, innovations, and advances in an increasingly industrialized economy but was now just about to change its role from a supporting to an impeding factor. It needed to be replaced, he thought, by a post-capitalist set of relations if the economy was to stay dynamic. Thus he dramatically underestimated the flexibility and changeability of capitalist relations, and he underestimated capitalism and its ability to adjust to new challenges and opportunities.[11] Marx' main ideas were formulated in the 1840s and 1850s. He was and remains a contemporary of early industrial capitalism, which was already very visible in England and just emerging on the continent.

9 Similar points convincingly argued in Sperber, *Karl Marx*, 437-463; for a basic analysis see Keith Tribe, "Karl Marx's 'Critique of Political Economy': A Critique", id., *The Economy of the Word. Language. History, and Economics* (Oxford, 2015): 171-254. In the first and the last phases of his political life Marx developed other theories why capitalism would end, stressing political action and the role of the working class. See further below. He also knew and described countervailing factors which would work against the tendency of the profit rate to decline. Engels, however, when editing *Capital* vol. III in 1894 made Marx' argument less ambiguous and more straightforward, predicting the fall of the rate and the collapse of capitalism as more or less necessary — something the German Social Democrats, whom Engels advised, wanted to hear. Presently, some prominent non-Marxist economists do not exclude capitalist stagnation in the long run and find some merit in Marx' notion of the falling rate of profit. See Hans-Werner Sinn, "Was uns Marx heute noch zu sagen hat," *Re. Das Kapital. Politische Ökonomie im 21. Jahrhundert,* ed. Mathias Greffrath (Munich, 2017), 73-94, esp. 80-83.

10 E.g., to the analysis of the downfall of the Soviet Union in the 1980s and 90s. The centralized, state-administered and protectionist relations of production had been conducive to economic advancement in earlier phases of Soviet industrialization from the 1920s to the 1970s, but became a restraining and impeding framework once the means of production reached a more advanced stage at which new forms of communication needed more flexibility, decentralization and cross-border networking than allowed in the rather rigid and hierarchical Soviet system. See Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture* (Cambridge, MA, 1996).

11 For more on this, see L. Boltanski and E. Chiapello, *Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme* (Paris, 1999); and Jens Beckert, *Fictional Expectations and Capitalist Dynamics* (Cambridge, MA, 2016).

Third, Marx referred to the role of the working class in order to argue that and why capitalism will go down and be replaced by a post-capitalist order. Marx observed and analyzed the rise of *Lohnarbeit* — work for wages or salaries on a contractual basis, workers without owning the means of production, but free of non-economic (e.g. feudal) bonds — as a decisive feature of capitalism. He vividly described workers' exploitation by capitalists, their poor and miserable working and living conditions which he thought would grow even worse in an unavoidable process of further pauperization. He partly observed, partly anticipated, and certainly worked for processes of *class formation*, bringing these workers together opposite the bourgeoisie, consolidating them into a large social grouping with common interests, a shared consciousness and the ability to act collectively, a *class* which would become steadily more anti-capitalist, oppose the increasingly united capitalists and finally topple the system that had brought forward this *proletariat* and had thus produced its own grave digger.

This argumentation contains productive analytical tools that have been used by historians of class formation ever since.[12] To the extent that it contains empirical truth it reflects the conditions of the Industrial Revolution and of industrial capitalism in its initial phase. But even with respect to this period Marx' view was highly selective and exaggerated. His view was biased by his problematic *labor theory of value,* which overstressed the role of work as *the* value-creating factor and underestimated other sources of increasing productivity like trade, organization and particularly knowledge. For Marx the difference between qualified and unqualified work was unimportant, he expected that the rise of machinery would obliterate this difference altogether. In that he was dramatically wrong. The working class has not become more homogeneous, neither within individual societies nor worldwide, on the contrary. Marx also severely underestimated the possibility of distributing the gains of increasing productivity in a way which would remain unequal, but lead to rising welfare of most workers as well.

It took a long while before it really became clear that workers would never form a class as Marx had expected them to do.[13] Most recently research on plantation capitalism in the colonial period and on labor relations in the Global South have effectively started to question the central role of *Lohnarbeit* as a criterion of capitalism since it seems that economic performance fulfilling most capitalist criteria

12 I have repeatedly used a refined Marxist concept of class evolution (and class devolution) for analyzing social historical phenomena of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Most recently in: Jürgen Kocka, *Arbeiterleben und Arbeiterkultur. Die Entstehung einer sozialen Klasse* (Bonn, 2015), 21-28, 413-421.

13 Of course, different people accepted this at different points in time, some never believed it, and there are still some who continue to expect it to happen, on a global scale. Very important: Eric Hobsbawm, "The Forward March of Labour Halted?," *Marxism Today (September 1978): 279-286.*

can function with unfree labor for a very long time while new forms of self-employment, whether precarious or not, turn out to be fully compatible with advanced forms of post-industrial capitalism.[14] All this clearly transcends the conceptual world of Marx.

For Marx capitalism was not only a system of production and distribution, that is an economic phenomenon, but also a socio-political and a socio-cultural system, that is a *societal formation* in which the dominance of capital conditions the social, political, legal and cultural relations as a whole.[15] Until today those who see themselves in the intellectual and political tradition of Marx conceive of capitalism not only as a form or type of economy, but also as a social, political and cultural system. This can be a burden and lead astray. Marx, like other socialists of the nineteenth century, developed theories (or theoretical views) that did not reflect basic processes of modernization which were underway at least since the eighteenth century and led to a differentiation of separate spheres of life — politics distinguished from economy and culture, the public distinguished from the private —, spheres of life which certainly interacted and influenced one another (with economic factors playing a strong role), but followed different logics and enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis one another. While liberal theories of society and state began to reflect this process of differentiation already in the nineteenth century, most socialist theories did not.[16]

As a consequence, Marx and his followers did not develop concepts which could have led them to make not only the interrelations between, but also the relative autonomy of economic, political, social and cultural dimensions a central theme. They did not and do not pay much attention to the fact that capitalism as an *economic* system or practice can and does exist and flourish not under all, but under very different political, social and cultural conditions, as historians and comparatists know, but some social theorists easily neglect. Therefore they frequently fail to acknowledge that capitalist economies can be deeply shaped by their social contexts and by political influences (which they influence but do not determine) and consequently differ significantly over time and space and with changing social, political and cultural conditions. They tend to overstate capitalism's causal responsibility for all the world's evils.[17] This indicates a clear limit to the usefulness of Marxian analysis of capitalism for any history of capitalism to be written today since factors such as the changing relations between market and state, regulation and deregulation, the

14 See Marcel van der Linden, *Workers of the World. Essays toward a Global Labor History* (Leiden, 2008), 17-61.

15 For a good synthesis see Wolfgang Küttler, "Kapitalismus," *Historisch-kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus,* ed. Wolfgang Fritz Haug et al., vol.7/I (Hamburg 2008), 238-272.

16 This argument is developed convincingly in: Axel Honneth, *Die Idee des Sozialismus. Versuch einer Aktualisierung* (Berlin, 2015), 121-147.

17 As problematically reiterated in a Marxist tradition by Nancy Fraser, "Behind Marx's Hidden Abode. For an Expanded Conception of Capitalism," *New Left Review, 2nd ser. 86* (March/April 2014): 55-72. She defines "capitalism" as an "institutionalized social order" (62) and holds that "What all the talk about capitalism indicates, symptomatically, is a growing intuition that the heterogeneous ills — financial, economic, ecological, and social — that surround us can be traced to one common root." (55). I have criticized such a holistic view and argued in favor of defining capitalism as an economic system or practice with varying social, political and cultural conditions and consequences: Jürgen Kocka, "Durch die Brille der Kritik: Wie man Kapitalismusgeschichte auch schreiben kann," *Journal of Modern European History* 15 (2017): 480-488, esp. 482f.

rise of the welfare state as well as changing forms of social and cultural "embeddedness" are absolutely essential dimensions of every history of capitalism. It is the changing relation between capitalism and other spheres of life which has shaped and changed the nature of the capitalist economy since the time of Marx.[18]

These changes have been tremendous. Of course, it would be completely wrong to blame Marx for not foreseeing them. Still, it cannot but be deplored that the analytical tool kit Marx used and left to his followers did neither invite nor facilitate empirical analysis of the changing relationship between different, partly autonomous though interrelated spheres of historical reality. This is what historians have to do.

The picture of capitalism which Marx — or rather Marx and Engels — painted was decisively influenced by the dynamic conditions they were able to observe in the first two thirds of the nineteenth century in western Europe. Marx and Engels perceived the Industrial Revolution as a secular upheaval, with very good reason. They correctly recognized the social dynamite inherent in the burgeoning labor question. Consequently, they conceptualized capitalism in a way that made it appear fully developed only as *industrial capitalism*, with factory, machinery and massive wage labor at its core. Marx did not deny the existence of older varieties of capitalism prior to industrialization, especially agrarian capitalism, yet this was not relevant for his analysis. He was interested in capitalism in its then modern, industrial form and its emergence. His major empirical evidence came from the English case. He did not develop a set of concepts which would easily serve to analyze the history of earlier types of capitalism nor the forms of capitalism which have emerged in the one and a half centuries since Marx died.

IV.

But there is another side. In order to recognize and utilize the fruitfulness of the Marxian analysis of capitalism some intellectual steps of abstraction are required. Some of Marx' insights have become either indispensable or at least highly recommendable elements for any historical analysis of capitalism.

This holds true for the basic notion of *ambivalence* characterizing many elements of Marx's view. For example, he develops the connection between efficiency and conflict intrinsic to capitalism. Marx also

18 See Kocka, *Capitalism*, 145-161.

argues that in the capitalist type of economy, division of labor and exchange (stressed so strongly by Adam Smith) go hand in hand with dominance and subordination, with inequality and hierarchy (not much emphasized by Adam Smith). Marx does not question that the capitalist mode of production has led and is leading to important innovations and advances, and he sees the bourgeoisie as a progressive force in many ways. At the same time he emphasizes the downside of advancement, the *costs of progress*, the sacrifices it demands, and he knows that benefits and costs are very unequally distributed among individuals, social strata and classes. He understood and emphasized that there are winners and losers in the history of capitalism. As a consequence, Marx has an eye for the intrinsic relation between capitalism and protest, between capitalism and anti-capitalism, between capitalism and its enemies.[19] One does not have to accept every detail of Marx' theories and analyses, his partly gloomy, partly utopian predictions, in order to appreciate this basically ambivalent, sobering mood which, in my reading, informs much of his writing. Present-day historians of capitalism can only win by adopting this mood — and this mode — of ambivalence. It is appropriate.

Here lies another strength of Marx' analysis. He stringently exposes capitalism's overwhelmingly *dynamic force*. He shows how essential, unavoidable, even compulsory continuous investment, profit orientation, accumulation and expansion are in this economic system which we call capitalistic. He argues that business leaders *have* to move forward if they do not want to fall back (or drop out). He convincingly shows how impossible it is within capitalism to be satisfied with the status quo and how little it matters what capitalists and entrepreneurs subjectively think and prefer, since they have to follow the rules of the game or quit altogether. He has overdone this point, I believe.[20] But he grasps an essential characteristic of capitalism showing its often aggressive dynamics, its essential dependence on growth, its structural dissatisfaction with what has been reached, its permanent quest for more, and that also means: its basic instability — if left alone. As a consequence, Marx exposes capitalism's expansive and expansionist energies. He observes its tendency to move across borders, and he predicts its global expansion already in 1848. This was early — and correct. He also states — either as an observation or as a prediction — capitalism's powerful inclination to export its principles — such as competition, marketization, continuous quest for more, and permanent checks — beyond the economic sphere into other spheres of life (if not checked). Rosa Luxemburg spoke of

19 The relation between capitalism and its critique can be key for writing the history of capitalism over the centuries. See Jürgen Kocka, "Capitalism and Its Critics. A Long-Term View", in Ulbe Bosma and Karin Hofmeester, eds., *The Lifework of a Labor Historian. Essays in Honor of Marcel van der Linden* (Leiden, 2018), 71-89.

20 Marx categorized capitalists as mere personifications of economic laws, as "Charaktermasken." See Erich Streissler, "Die Rolle des Unternehmers bei Marx und der Neuen Linken," in *Der Unternehmer im Ansehen der Welt*, ed. Günter Schmölders (Bergisch Gladbach, 1972), 267-282. This was a problematic underestimation of "subjective factors." Business and economic historians, practitioners and most social scientists know that the orientations, preferences and visions of capitalists and entrepreneurs did and do count.

capitalism's permanent drive towards "Landnahme," that is towards the capture of new territory.[21] I believe that these different dimensions of dynamic expansion of capitalism are nowhere better analyzed than in Marx' writing or in writing embedded in Marxist traditions.

A third example of Marxian strengths: He draws our attention to the connection between capitalism and violence in the early phases of capitalist developments. This is not the place to reconstruct his much discussed notion of "original accumulation." It must suffice to recall that according to Marx, it takes extra-economic forces to set the process of accumulation in motion, extra-economic forces which often include expropriation, theft, repression and sometimes violence. Marx analyzes this with respect to the rise of English agrarian capitalism in the early modern period — remember his famous treatment of "enclosures."[22] In the same context, Marx had an eye for the repressive effects of colonialism. We could add many other examples which show that it usually takes force, coercion, and often violence to create a capitalist market economy, the proponents of which like to stress its nonviolent character and tend to forget its violent origins. This is an important topic for research today for which Marx' writings continue to be relevant.[23]

Finally, a word on the notion of capitalism as a social, political and cultural system determined by the capitalist economy and the dominance of capital in particular. I have previously criticized this Marxian view as holistic, insufficiently differentiated and counter-productive. I stand by this opinion, but I would like to add that this approach can be fruitful if reformulated as a set of questions rather than a statement about the existence of a determined interrelationship. In other words: Asking the question *whether* or proposing the hypothesis *that* the asymmetric power relations within the capitalist economy heavily influence the distribution of status and power in society and politics at large will lead to the empirical discovery of such influences where they existed or exist: in many cases they did, in many cases they did not. No doubt the expansionist character of capitalism tends to have its principles intrude into spheres outside the economy, especially today. Starting from a Marxian analysis of capitalism may help draw attention to this dynamic spillover of capitalist principles into non-economic spheres of life, including politics, education and culture. It may help us to consider strategies for stopping or at least mitigating this spillover since the intrusion of capitalism into the world of politics, education, religion, or into private life may contradict our

21 Rosa Luxemburg, *Akkumulation des Kapitals. Ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Erklärung des Imperialismus* (Berlin, 1912).

22 *Capital*, vol. I, ch. 24.

23 See Heide Gerstenberger, *Markt und Gewalt. Die Funktionsweise des historischen Kapitalismus* (Münster, 2017).

values and the principles on which our liberal-democratic systems are built. Non-capitalist spheres of life may also be indispensable for the existence of capitalism itself.[24] Anyway: exploring non-economic conditions and consequences of economic structures, processes and inequalities is something the concept of "capitalism" allows for and indeed demands, particularly if informed by a flexible, non-deterministic, non-holistic Marxian framework.

This, I think, is what "historicizing" Marx should mean: exposing the time-specificity of his approaches, revealing their limits, and at the same time preserving and adjusting them for purposes we may pursue in the present time. When writing a history of capitalism nowadays, one has to move far beyond Marx, but one can learn from him nevertheless. Historical contextualization and a high appreciation of Marx are certainly compatible.

24 Different authors have dealt with this problem in different ways. See Karl Polányi, *The Great Transformation* (New York, 1944); Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,* 2nd ed. (New York, 1947); Michael J. Sandel, *What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets* (New York, 2012).

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

Forum: Knowledge and Copyright in Historical Perspective

Edited by
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KNOWLEDGE AND COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: INTRODUCTION

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Knowledge is central to most human practices. Its discovery, production, adaptation, and expansion often give those who "possess" knowledge economic, political, or social advantages over those who do not. This dynamic drives the quest to protect knowledge through patents, copyright, and other forms of ownership rights while creating incentives for others to appropriate or abuse knowledge generated or controlled by others. Both the creation and abuse of knowledge have been facilitated by technological progress. This is particularly the case in the current era of digitization, when the Internet and artificial intelligence make the replication and remixing of someone else's intellectual property easier than ever before.

The GHI's 2018 Spring Lecture Series "Illicit Knowledge: Copyright, Piracy, and Intellectual Property in Historical Perspective" sought to contribute to the consideration of this shift by providing context through the lens of the history of knowledge, the GHI's special research focus since 2015. In a period which has given rise to slogans like "information wants to be free," we were particularly drawn to the questions of moral ambivalence that often arise in debates over intellectual property: what one country views as an act of industrial espionage, for example, may be seen as an act of patriotism somewhere else. The questions the lecture series aimed to address were as multifaceted as knowledge itself: Who are the actors? What are their motives? What trends can be detected over time, by sector, and in terms of different cultural influences? And how do new technologies — such as digitization — change our perception of copyright and the fair use of knowledge?

Our goal for the lecture series was to gain perspective on these issues by learning from scholars whose research touches upon discourses of intellectual property, including its benefits, its abuse, and the various forms of legal, political, and social protection it receives. In addition to covering a broad timeframe stretching from the 1960s to the present day, we wanted to address a wide array of sectors.

Industrial espionage and trade secrets were one of our target areas. Another lecture was to examine intellectual property in the fine arts or performing arts. In a third lecture we wanted to address the topic of counterfeiting and the creation of pirated goods. And lastly, due to our own background in research, we sought to address the question of intellectual property in academic publishing, which closely relates to the pressure to publish.

The essays in this special issue of the *GHI Bulletin* are revised versions of three of the four "Illicit Knowledge" lectures. Taken together, they reflect the lecture series' topical and chronological breadth, but also its intellectual depth. The one lecture not reprinted here is that by Justin Williams, "Hip-Hop Aesthetics: Theft, Borrowing, or Artistic Practice?," adapted from his book *Rhymin' and Stealin': Musical Borrowing in Hip-Hop*, published by the University of Michigan Press in 2014. This lecture explored the development of a hip-hop community that drew its musical texture from a web of cross-references, including borrowing and sampling sounds through both formal and bootleg channels. Celebrated for their creativity, many DJs and other performers nonetheless faced legal challenges to their practices that eventually led to new kinds of re-use agreements. While the lecture was one of the liveliest the GHI has hosted, replete with examples of original culture and their adaptation over multiple generations of hip-hop culture, its auditory nature did not allow for a written version that would portray the topic to the readers in a satisfactory way.

The first lecture turned essay in this thematic "forum" is *Nancy Troy*'s study of the cultural significance of "copying" in haute couture and the garment industry, centered around the infamous 1965 series of cocktail dresses designed by Yves Saint Laurent mimicking the abstract style of Dutch artist Piet Mondrian. As Troy argues, tensions between originality and reproduction had existed ever since haute couture emerged in nineteenth century France. Licensed copies based on a design prototype were made available immediately — particularly in the American market, where department stores provided garments for the masses. Troy describes how couture houses were eager to participate in the licensing of their designs since it enabled them to increase profit significantly when compared with selling solely to private individual clients. Yet, with further proliferation through the license and sales system, chances for cheap counterfeited knockoffs of popular designs increased and unauthorized copies swamped the markets — as was the case with Saint Laurent's

Mondrian dresses. As Troy explains, this can be attributed in part to variations in copyright law, which in the case of couture is particularly difficult to enforce due to the brevity of the fashion cycle. In France, intellectual property rights for fashion design have traditionally been wide-ranging, but in the United States — where most of the knockoffs were produced and sold — the law has never provided copyright for garment designs. Copyrights have thus had little effect on the design and distribution of couture clothes and consequently copies and counterfeits remain an integral part of the fashion industry.

Mario Daniels' essay on the intertwined relationships between technology transfer, industrial espionage, and the geostrategic interests of nation-states in the late twentieth century explores the controversial practice of Japanese technology transfers in the 1980s, which — as Daniels points out — mirrors present-day debates about a potential U.S.-China technology war. He prompts us to pay attention to the underlying geostrategic controversy in which many nations — in East Asia and elsewhere — have seen the acquisition and absorption of foreign technology through legal and/or illegal methods as a form of pursuing development. The United States, on the other hand, has seen its exclusive control over technological knowledge as indispensable to its hegemonic position and thus as a central issue of national security. Daniels stresses that Cold War strategies of preventing the USSR from obtaining American technology via transfers from Western European allies were at the root of the United States' rigid interpretation of intellectual property rights protection. Simultaneously, narratives of technology theft by Japanese firms, who had evolved into strong competitors particularly in the global automotive and semi-conductor markets, fed into concerns about American economic decline and a possible end to its exceptionalism. According to Daniels, the so-called "betrayal" of the United States' benevolent role in creating the post-WWII system for its Western allies eventually caused the U.S. government to implement strict intellectual property rights and restrictions on foreign investment.

The last essay in our series, by *Peter Baldwin*, analyzes how the latent conflict between knowledge transfer and the protection of scholarly intellectual property has created an ambivalent stance towards open-access publication in the current academic world. Baldwin begins by discussing the historical distinction between the "moral rights" that copyright protection provides — "those of attribution and

integrity" — and the "economic rights" — that is, the right to profit from the propagation of a particular work. In the present day, however, he notes that with most scholarship being conducted by employees of universities and other research institutes, it would be more useful for them to see their salaries, rather than royalties, as compensation for the intellectual property they create. Academics, he argues, should continue to assert their moral rights to their work but jettison their economic rights and instead embrace open-access publication. In the digital era, when page capacity is no longer a constraint, he calls for academics — particularly in history and the humanities — to reimagine the pipeline for disseminating research and shift towards forms of publication that do not allow entrenched journal publishers to profit from the largely uncompensated labor of peer reviewers and editorial boards. Provocatively, he suggests that U.S. university libraries should also reinvent themselves by canceling expensive journal subscriptions, cooperating to digitize their book collections *en masse* for access from a single portal, and repurposing their space after shrinking their print collections. Even more provocatively, he argues this can be accomplished within the budgets already devoted to university library spending. If academic researchers are willing to change the practices they use to disseminate knowledge, he concludes, they will cultivate larger audiences "outside the academic bubble" who seek access to research at minimal expense and thus produce far broader benefits than the current system, which largely entrenches existing hierarchies of prestige and profit.

These three contributions, and the lecture series as a whole, illustrate the iterative process of creating knowledge and the usefulness of taking a historical perspective on this process. Over the course of the lectures, we learned how the development and dissemination of intellectual property by designers, artists, corporate researchers and university scholars leads to the creation of new forms of knowledge even as attorneys, lobbyists, publishers, librarians, and other actors develop and negotiate legal, political, and cultural barriers that structure access to intellectual property. As the lectures demonstrated, the creation of knowledge, its adaptation, abuse and of course its protection are at the center of current debates in all areas of our society, from international politics to academia to culture and the arts. Regardless of the sectoral and thematic focus, these debates lead to one central question: can and should knowledge and intellectual property still be protected in the digital age? And if so, how? Our hope is that the diverse audiences that joined us for the original lecture

series and our readers in the *Bulletin* will profit from the insights from the history of knowledge offered here.

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MONDRIAN'S DRESS: YVES SAINT LAURENT, COPYING (AND) THE COUTURE COPY

Nancy J. Troy
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

How many sales to private clients did it take in the fall and winter of 1965-66 to transform a few simple-looking couture creations by Yves Saint Laurent into an international fashion sensation? The answer, it turns out, is not very many, because the relevant sales were not those made to individual customers, even to such world-famous celebrities as Princess Grace of Monaco and the English ballet star, Dame Margot Fonteyn. Although their purchases conferred the cachet of an international social elite on the dresses that paintings by Piet Mondrian had inspired Saint Laurent to design, the number of women willing and able to spend their time and money on acquiring fabulously expensive clothes from a Parisian couture house was modest at best.[1] And despite the enormous prices charged for individually fitted couture clothes, the profits that the couture house earned from those sales were far less than the sums that accrued from the commercial reproduction of the same designs — the most successful ones, at least. These were sold or licensed according to a variety of arrangements to authorized distributors, department store boutiques or specialty shops; more problematically for the original creators, they might be adapted by clothing manufacturers in whose hands they were likely to become increasingly loosely related design knockoffs, mass produced for sale at ever decreasing prices. The process, as reported by the Miami Herald on October 31, 1965 (Figure 1), is compressed into a series of four images that descend diagonally across the front page of the women's section, showing how a Mondrian dress originally for sale at $1,020 was quickly offered at lower and lower prices, ultimately ending up a few months after its introduction at a mere $3.99.

As they proliferated throughout the distribution system, the most popular couture designs — for example this model as well as other Mondrian dresses — might be counterfeited in an effort to pass unauthorized copies off as dresses made by Saint Laurent, but more often they inspired cheap, rapidly produced versions that gestured in the direction of Mondrian's abstract idiom but whose materiality and craftsmanship were easily distinguished from Saint Laurent's couture prototypes. Even so, what guaranteed the commercial success of a

1 "In September 1965, there were a mere 3,000 couture clients — a tremendous decline from the estimated 12,000 in 1962." Colleen Hill, *Paris Refashioned 1957-1968* (New York, 2017), 85. Writing about the American clientele for Paris couture during the decades following World War II, Melissa Leventon observes, "A couture patron required money, leisure, a social life that provided opportunities for couture to be worn and appreciated, and the desire to be in the forefront of fashion. Extended trips to Europe, particularly during the summer, have been regular features of the year for many couture patrons, and a woman who met these requirements might travel to Paris once or twice a year to view the collections, spending several weeks there having her choices fitted. Once a couture house had a client's measurements, a mannequin could be built to replicate her figure, a tremendous time-saver." Melissa Leventon, "Shopping for Style: Couture in America," in *New Look to Now: French Haute Couture 1947-1987*. Stephen de Pietri and Melissa Leventon (New York, 1989), 23-27. Not only was Parisian ready-to-wear becoming more acceptable and encroaching ever more on the domain of couture during this period, but most successful couture houses were themselves marketing their own related but less expensive designer ready-to-wear lines.

The Miami Herald
Sunday
October 31, 1965
for and about Women
Part II
Page 19E

MONDRIAN

BY ENA NALINTON

Abstract Eyes, Nails Complete 'The Look'

By ELEANOR HART

Cheap Copies

Just a Flash

Figure 1. ***The Miami Herald,*** **Part II, October 31, 1965, p. 19E. © 1965 McClatchy. All rights reserved. Used by permission and protected by the Copyright Laws of the United States. The printing, copying, redistribution, or retransmission of this content without express written permission is prohibited.**

high-end couture design was arguably the knockoff rather than the one-off; anyone who purchased a couture creation was in fact acquiring a multiple, a copy, rather than a singular original.

The tensions between originality and reproduction, the limited edition and mass production, elite patronage and popular appeal, hugely expensive models and cheap — or at least progressively cheaper — alternatives have been significant factors in the history of haute couture ever since it emerged in France in the second half of the nineteenth century. Beginning around 1858, when dressmaker Charles Frederick Worth created a design prototype that would be adapted to the requirements of numerous individual clients, the possibility of multiple and eventually mass production had always been a feature of haute couture. Indeed, Worth himself sold models destined for copying by American department stores. And while he and other couturiers always struggled mightily to maintain strict control over the proliferation of copies, including those emanating from their own workrooms, labels were sewn into Worth garments in order to lay claim to the authenticity of the designs, and thereby to distinguish an actual Worth gown from an unauthorized copy.

Pirating was not, of course, deterred by such a simple device; even before the First World War when the younger French couturier Paul Poiret visited the United States in 1913, he quickly learned that it was not just possible but easy to purchase counterfeit versions of his house label by the hundreds at minimal cost. "If our customers want the French-labeled goods," an American label manufacturer declared at the time, "we supply 'em. That's what we're in business for, to give 'em what they want… Any woman knows that she can't get a new Paris hat for twenty dollars. If she doesn't she's a fool, and she deserves to get swindled."[2] After the First World War, Madeleine Vionnet continued to grapple with the enduring challenge to the authenticity of her mark, even devising couture labels that reproduced not only her signature but also an imprint of her finger. By thus

2 Samuel Hopkins Adams, "The Dishonest Paris Label: How American Women are Being Fooled by a Country-Wide Swindle," *Ladies' Home Journal*, March 1913, repr. *Dress: The Journal of the Costume Society of America* 4, 1978: 17-23.

suggesting that the label had become an actual indexical mark of authenticity, Vionnet indicated the lengths to which designers would go in trying to protect the originality of their made-to-order clothes, which is to say, clothes that were actually adapted for multiple clients from a unique prototype that was not for sale.

If the copy has always been integral to the structure and the culture of couture, this is so not only because the garments actually in circulation were based on a design prototype, or because pirated copies might be readily available, especially in the American market, it is also because there was no effective way to prevent the circulation of counterfeit copies. Even in France, where fashion designs have enjoyed extensive and longstanding intellectual property rights, protection was always difficult to enforce in a commercially effective manner, given the brevity of a fashion cycle tied to seasonal change. The situation is even more challenging in the United States, where the law has never provided copyright protection for the design of a dress, no matter how innovative its form or ingenious its construction. A dress, in the eyes of American law, shields the wearer; it is primarily functional rather than artistic in nature, unlike a decorative object or work of applied art, and it therefore fails to qualify for protection as intellectual property, even under the rubric of the design patent. "The design patent statutes," Rocky Schmidt explains, "grant protection to 'a new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.'... In order to be eligible for design patent protection, however, the design of an article of manufacture must be novel, non-obvious, original, ornamental, and meet the test of invention. Courts have consistently held that garment designs do not meet these requirements."[3] And even if they were to do so, the thorough search of existing designs, necessary in order to demonstrate that a candidate for design patent is indeed innovative, is far too lengthy to be practicable, since it generally exceeds what is called the "style life" of the garment, that brief period during which a new style retains its marketability as fashion. With no effective way to protect a novel design under the law, it is no surprise that repetition plays a predominant role, especially in the American fashion system.

As much as couturiers tried to circumvent the unauthorized appropriation of their designs, the business model of haute couture was reliant not so much on the prevention of copying as on a rather unwieldy and difficult-to-regulate system that produced copies at varying levels of fidelity to the prototype and destined for a highly

3 Rocky Schmidt, "Designer Law: Fashioning a Remedy for Design Piracy." *UCLA Law Review* 30, no. 3 (April 1983): 861-80. I draw here on my discussion of the legal status of the copy in *Couture Culture: A Study in Modern Art and Fashion* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2003), 261.

differentiated market operating at multiple price points. As costume curator and scholar Alexandra Palmer has explained of couture in the post-World War II era, the prototype is "the garment produced as a template for production of the particular design… Thus, an haute couture model, or more technically, a Couture-Création model, was not a one-of-a-kind design. It was part of a line that was then repeated and sold, and had complex rules governing sales to private clients, department stores, and commercial buyers."[4] It is thus fair to say that there were no couture originals on the market. To the contrary, originals — prototypes — were made not to be sold but rather to be shown, publicized and copied in a variety of commercial settings.

Given the immense scale of the fashion industry and the great variety of consumers to which any particular design might be adapted, the distinctions between different degrees of authenticity could be surprisingly nuanced. Although the relevant terminology was not strictly policed, Palmer identifies the categories: "In a high-priced copy…the design, fabrics, and trims were exactly the same as the original model and were obtained through the *référence* [an inventory of materials and their sources, provided by the couture house]. The product was considered identical to a model ordered from the Paris workroom, complete with three fittings, but the price could be up to 70 percent lower. This could be advertised as an 'exact copy.' A 'line-for-line copy,' or 'reproduction,' implied a close copy of the style, though the fabric could differ. It was based on the couture original but 'changes are made: details and workmanship are eliminated. Machine work is substituted for handwork. The result is called a line-for-line copy, though in many cases it should be called an adaptation'."[5]

Prices obviously varied considerably as manufacturers made alterations that simplified the basic design template, allowing for cheaper fabrics, less expensive accessories, faster production and, ultimately, the possibility of reaching a much broader clientele. In fact, the typical American fashion client welcomed such changes, which adapted French clothes to American circumstances, including more versatile, often synthetic fabrics capable of adapting to different climates; less complex construction that made the garment easier to put on and actually wear in real-life situations, incorporating the practicality of, for example, zippers rather than a multitude of buttons or snaps.

As the process of close copying morphed into one of adaptive change and the distance mounted between the expensive couture creation and cheap, mass marketed dresses, the design prototype became ever

4 Alexandra Palmer, *Couture & Commerce: The Transatlantic Fashion Trade in the 1950s* (Vancouver, 2001), 16.

5 Palmer, *Couture & Commerce*, 169. In this passage, Palmer quotes Bernard Roshco, *The Rag Race: How New York and Paris Run the Breakneck Business of Dressing American Women* (New York, 1963), 191.

more remote from what qualified as a knockoff, since the latter shared the general design features of the model but was made without any pretentions to being mistaken for it. Yet we should by no means assume that copies at any price point were necessarily undesirable. Certainly at the upper end of the market, Bernard Roshco reported in 1963, they might be just as coveted as the Paris product. "The line-for-line copies have been worn by women who are as well known for being well dressed as Mrs. John F. Kennedy, Mrs. Henry Fonda, Merle Oberon, and other ladies of sartorial distinction. The wife of the French ambassador to the United Nations was once reported to have delayed her departure from New York long enough to see the line-for-line copies before going home to Paris."[6] Thus American manufacturers could compete successfully for the attention of clients who were thought to be buying their clothes from elite couture houses in France. From this Roshco concluded that the old order was dying out: "Nowadays the most creative and original couturiers derive a substantial part of their income from the models sold for copying in the United States. The trend of the times has made them designers for the wholesale trade as well as dressmakers for the luxury trade. When the collections are shown, buyers for Macy's and Ohrbach's now get the front-row seats once reserved for nobility."[7] Even wealthy women were happy to supplement their inordinately expensive Paris clothes with more reasonably priced purchases made closer to home, in New York.

Not only were wealthy clients pleased to have access to copies, but, Palmer points out, citing an article in *Newsweek*, Paris couture houses were also correspondingly pleased to participate in the copy economy. The houses typically doubled the profit they could make from the sale of a given model to a private client if that same item were purchased for copying by an authorized manufacturer: "The manufacturer then reproduced the garment just as designed, without fittings or styling alterations, lowering the cost and raising the profit margin. In [1957], a $400 couture dress ordered by a private client could thus have realized a profit of about $30 for the couture house but a much higher profit if ordered by a manufacturer. Paradoxically, the same North American mass-manufacturing system that supported the couture industry also left couturiers struggling to maintain their exclusive tradition and wondering how they could tap into some of the profit that so many others were making on their designs."[8] The response to this conundrum, as far as Yves Saint Laurent and his partner Pierre Bergé were concerned, was the creation in September 1966 of Saint

6 Roshco, *The Rag Race*, 154-5.

7 Roshco, *The Rag Race*, 156-7.

8 Palmer, *Couture & Commerce*, 169.

Figure 2. Yves Saint Laurent with two models — on the left in ready-to-wear, on the right, in haute couture. *Elle* (France), September 9, 1971, p. 9. Photograph by Henri Elwing.

Laurent Rive Gauche, a ready-to-wear line designed by Saint Laurent and sold in an independent shop on the Rue de Tournon at the edge of the student quarter on the Left Bank of the Seine and, significantly, on the other side of town from the haute couture premises, which were located in an affluent neighborhood on the Right Bank.

According to fashion historian Jéromine Savignon, Saint Laurent Rive Gauche amounted to an "ideological revolution of ready-to-wear that was radically independent from the closed circle of couture and that had its own global creative identity and prices that were deliberately accessible."[9] But Savignon's account tends to obfuscate the circumstances in which Rive Gauche was conceived and what accounted for its tremendous success. First of all, the clothes on offer were not necessarily unrelated to Saint Laurent's couture line, as the designer himself acknowledged when he made a point of demonstrating for the press the close visual relationship between his ready-to-wear and couture fashions (see Figure 2). In fact, Colleen Hill has argued, "Beyond the obvious cachet of Saint Laurent as its designer, the popularity of Rive Gauche can be attributed to the fact that many of its offerings closely resembled those from his couture house."[10] Furthermore, Hill points out, Saint Laurent's prices were not as accessible as one might expect from the rhetoric that has infused the story of Rive Gauche, including what the designer himself had to say about his desire to reach a wide range of consumers, "from 15 to …still young at heart." Notwithstanding Saint Laurent's youth-oriented, democratizing intentions, Rive Gauche prices, according to Hill, "were in fact better suited to wealthier, and probably older, women."[11]

Even the turn to ready-to-wear was not exactly new or revolutionary, since Dior as well as other couture houses had been selling lower priced ready-to-wear in their own boutiques for years. André Courrèges provides an excellent counter-example to Saint Laurent, since his orientation toward a younger, more audacious client mix arguably preceded Saint Laurent's, becoming readily evident with

9 Jéromine Savignon, "The Voyage to Rive Gauche," in *Saint Laurent Rive Gauche: Fashion Revolution*, forward Pierre Bergé, trans. Willard Wood (New York, 2012), 19.

10 Hill, *Paris Refashioned*, 90.

11 Hill, *Paris Refashioned*, 91.

the introduction in 1964 of his so-called space-age collection, a futuristic, minimalist look characterized by short skirts and slim trousers in white or bright colors, often worn with flat-heeled, white ankle boots and a hat shaped like a helmet. Unlike Saint Laurent, however, Courrèges at the time lacked the financing required to build a significant ready-to-wear edifice on the promise of his early couture success. Forward-looking design without the means for wide diffusion was not a winning formula.[12]

Figure 3. Yves Saint Laurent with Betty Catroux and Loulou de la Falaise at the opening of a Saint Laurent Rive Gauche boutique in London, September 10, 1969. Photograph by Beverley Goodway. Mirrorpix/Getty Images.

What did set Rive Gauche apart from Courrèges and other ready-to-wear operations was its access to financing, due to the 1965 purchase by cosmetics and perfume firm Lanvin-Charles of the Ritz, of 80 percent of the Saint Laurent House. This infusion of cash made it possible for Rive Gauche to pursue rapid, seemingly unlimited expansion and as a result, create a readily recognizable brand identity. The kind of hip, youth-inspired clothing sold in the Rive Gauche boutiques could be found elsewhere in Paris, not only in ready-to-wear designed by Courrèges, but also outside the couture orbit by such *stylistes* as Emmanuelle Khanh, Christiane Bailly and Michèle Rosier. But the backing of Lanvin-Charles of the Ritz by President and CEO Richard Salomon gave Bergé and Saint Laurent the means to repeat the marketing formula defined by the original Paris shop, opening recognizably related, trendy looking outlets in carefully selected neighborhoods of other French, European and American cities, and eventually around the world. All the shop fronts presented similarly sleek glass and metal treatments, using identical lettering and the same brightly colored pink and orange Rive Gauche logo (Figure 3). The interiors were also designed according to a common color scheme, with bold juxtapositions whose effect Emma McClendon has described as "equal parts eccentric bohemian and 1960s modern."[13] Linking store openings to the appearance of glamorous models and actresses engendered a series of public relations spectacles that

12 Not until several years later did financing from L'Oréal enable Courrèges to embark on the global expansion of a chain of boutiques on a scale approaching that of Rive Gauche. See Vanessa Friedman, "André Courrèges, Fashion Designer who Redefined Couture, Dies at 92," *New York Times*, January 8, 2016; https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/09/business/andre-courreges-fashion-designer-who-redefined-couture-dies-at-92.html?_r=0, accessed August 14, 2018.

13 McClendon, "Branding the Boutique," *Paris Refashioned*, 210.

attracted mobs of consumers eager to purchase Saint Laurent clothes who did not care that their manufacture had been contracted to an outside company, C. Mendès, which also produced the ready-to-wear lines of rival couturiers, including Patou, Grès and Chanel.

It was no secret that mass manufacture, whether through licensing or, eventually, through the development of designer ready-to-wear, was needed to sustain the life of even the most successful couture houses, including Dior, where Saint Laurent had been trained, and the house he subsequently founded together with Pierre Bergé. As design critic and Saint Laurent biographer Alice Rawsthorn has observed, "Pierre swiftly realized that although an impressive client-list was important for the company's cachet, its future lay with the commercial buyers who placed larger orders and with licensing deals along the lines of those that [business manager] Jacques Rouët had negotiated for Christian Dior."[14] Like Dior, Pierre Cardin, and several other French couturiers, Saint Laurent and Bergé aggressively developed their ready-to-wear business after they opened the first Rive Gauche storefront in 1966, and the two also continued to expand the number of their licensing arrangements, of which, according to fashion journalist Alicia Drake, there were no fewer than 180 in 1980.[15] And yet, unlike Cardin, for example, who reveled in his status as what one biographer has called "the man who became a label,"[16] Bergé claimed to be conservative with respect to licensing: "'A name is like a cigarette; the more you puff on it, the less you've got left,' Bergé likes to say when the question of franchising and merchandising comes up," Axel Madsen observed in 1979. "'You've got to know how to say no. There will be no YSL automotive tires, although we've had a request from America. In couture, we're first. In ready-to-wear, we're first, and in franchising, we're in the lead, with Dior and Cardin'."[17] Thus even as he bragged about how extensively he exploited the name, Bergé well understood that the power of the brand and its licenses had to be guarded from overexposure if their economic value were to be sustained over the long term.

As Bergé guided the Saint Laurent brand with supreme self-assurance through the complex and contradictory landscape of originality and reproduction at the heart of the couture industry, he also honed the practice of cloaking the brand in the rhetoric of art. Indeed, both Bergé and Saint Laurent laid claim to the art quotient of haute couture as a practice, which they actively, and strategically, reinforced on many levels. The fact that during the course of a 40-year career

14 Alice Rawsthorn, *Yves Saint Laurent: A Biography* (London, 1996), 67.

15 Alicia Drake, *The Beautiful Fall: Lagerfeld, Saint Laurent, and Glorious Excess in 1970s Paris* (New York, 2006), 277.

16 Richard Morais, *Pierre Cardin: The Man Who Became a Label* (London, 1991).

17 Axel Madsen, *Living for Design: The Yves Saint Laurent Story* (New York, 1979), 57.

as the central figure of his *maison de couture* Saint Laurent frequently infused his fashion creations with fine art is a matter of record, if only because his stylistic borrowings from such canonical artists as Van Gogh, Braque, Matisse, Picasso and, of course, Mondrian, were always strikingly obvious. Indeed, that was precisely the point. And yet, his first foray into this arena was not launched as the public relations juggernaut it soon became. Which is to say that Saint Laurent's Mondrian dresses did not receive their moniker from the designer or the couture house. At least, they were not identified by Mondrian's name in the printed program of the fashion shows in which they were initially presented. Instead, the association was made by others: the commercial buyers and the journalists who immediately recognized the source and repeatedly reinforced it in the numerous press accounts that followed the inaugural presentation of the collection in early August 1965. Soon thereafter, Saint Laurent told what became an oft-repeated story of how his mother had given him a book about Mondrian in which he discovered the artist's work through reproductions of his paintings. He was quite obviously not shy about acknowledging his debt to Mondrian, although he never sought copyright permission for his appropriation of the style or of the name that quickly became inextricably attached to his dresses.

Figure 4. Yves Saint Laurent, Dress. fall/winter 1965-1966. Wool. Gift of Mrs. William Rand, 1969 (C.I.69.23). The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, NY, USA. Image copyright © The Metropolitan Museum of Art. Image source: Art Resource, NY.

The Saint Laurent dress designs associated with Mondrian are distinguished in most instances by basic geometric grids of black or dark lines and off-white rectangular planes, sometimes accompanied by vivid primary colors (Figure 4). Although some of the relevant dresses appeared in succession to one another as the collection was initially presented, not all were grouped together, and it was consequently not obvious how many there actually were, or, indeed, what design features a Mondrian dress should exhibit. Given these uncertainties, it is still not clear which dresses ought to qualify for the Mondrian designation. When a number of them were shown hanging in a row of short sleeveless shifts in the 1983 Saint Laurent retrospective at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the display included one example from the collection of the Met's Costume Institute that is marked by

Figure 5. "Yves Saint Laurent: 25 Years of Design," The Metropolitan Museum of Art, The Costume Institute Galleries, December 14, 1983 — September 2, 1984. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, NY, U.S.A. Image copyright © The Metropolitan Museum of Art. Image source: Art Resource, NY.

a large, uninterrupted panel of shocking pink (second from the right in Figure 5). The accompanying label identified it as a "MONDRIAN DRESS" — despite the fact that it bears no resemblance whatsoever to any painting by Mondrian.[18] Conversely, another example in the collection of the Costume Institute at the Met is distinguished by an asymmetrical and multi-colored formal arrangement, arguably presenting a highly convincing evocation of Mondrian's signature compositional style (see Figure 4). Not only was this the first Mondrian dress to appear on the cover of a fashion magazine but it was also shown there in full color and rendered even more vivid by the incipient movement of the model, who was captured on one foot as she appears to lean diagonally across the white ground of the cover's printed page (Figure 6). Of all the dresses in the group, this is the one that has

18 Laurence Neveu of the Musée Yves Saint Laurent Paris has shared information about private-client purchases of Mondrian dresses drawn from the only surviving sales book from the Fall-Winter 1965-66 season in the museum archive, in an email message dated November 2, 2015. Her tally counted 11 Mondrian dresses, including 2 floor-length gowns and 9 cocktail dresses, including the one discussed here, with bright pink panels bordered by black on front and back. The *Oeuvre intégral*, published with the blessing of Pierre Bergé by Editions de la Martinière in 2010, documents every couture collection in the house's 40-year history; in an editorial supplement, it identifies a total of only 6 Mondrian dresses from the Fall-Winter 1965-66 collection. Meanwhile, Saint Laurent biographer Laurence Benaïm describes the Mondrian line this way: "Ten straight dresses traversed by black lines, rectangles and squares in primary colors, yellow, red, blue." *Yves Saint Laurent* (Paris, 1993), 140. Not only do the numbers fail to correspond, but the assumption that all of the dresses associated with Mondrian shared the painter's characteristic formal vocabulary is also faulty. Accounting for these inconsistencies requiring more detailed analysis than is possible here, would likely reveal the role played by the press in complicating the identity of the Mondrian dresses and, at the same time, show how the couture house seems to have privileged the homogeneity of the Mondrian line over the years, presumably in order to consolidate its iconic brand identity.

been most closely associated with Saint Laurent on one hand and with Mondrian on the other. Yet its initial and enduring popularity was due not to the design's appeal to the relatively few private clients who purchased a made-to-order couture copy (other designs in the Mondrian series were more sought-after than this one) but instead to the publicity accorded the dress by trade journals, fashion magazines and mass circulation publications.[19]

Figure 6. Vogue (Paris), September 1965, cover. Photograph by David Bailey.

As important as press coverage was to the successful launch of any couture collection, allowing press access to the presentation of designs was seen by virtually all couturiers as certain to encourage copying of the designs for the purpose of unauthorized reproduction. Bergé in particular was known and controversial in the mid-1960s for trying to prevent copying by blocking or at least delaying press access to showings of Saint Laurent's collections. And yet, copying was in a sense the essence of the Mondrian line. It emerges as a distinguishing feature not simply because the prototypes created by Saint Laurent were reproduced for his individual clients, nor even because those same prototypes were reproduced on a massive scale in the process of their commercial manufacture, whether authorized or not. Both of these are circumstances common to the circulation of all couture fashions. Instead, copying was central to the very conception of the Mondrian dresses in the first place because in them Saint Laurent revealed an unmistakable visual debt to the compositional features of Mondrian's abstract paintings.[20] Through his appropriation of Mondrian's instantly recognizable style, including straight black lines in horizontal and vertical relationships that divide a near-white

19 Although it provides only partial evidence of private-client purchases, the surviving sales book (see n. 18, above) indicates that model no. 81 (Figure 4) sold only three times, while no. 77, the version purchased by Margot Fonteyn and Princess Grace, sold eleven copies. In accounting for this discrepancy, one might imagine that the relative simplicity of the latter design (with a far simpler grid and only a single patch of color at the left shoulder) could have seemed much more wearable to a mature client; on the other hand, the composition of no. 81 is especially close to Mondrian's paintings but could perhaps appear awkward or unflattering when the wearer would be seated, or assume a posture other than standing straight.

20 See the discussion of what might be described as the canonical Mondrian dresses in Frederique van Reij, "Wearing Mondrian: Yves Saint Laurent's Translation from High Art to Haute Couture," *The Rijksmuseum Bulletin*, vol. 60, no. 4, 2012: 342-359.

ground and thereby generate flat, rectangular planes, some of which are filled with primary colors, Saint Laurent ran headlong into Mondrian's authorial status as the originator of that style, the figure with whom it was always identified, the locus of the copyright — even if that was never enforced by Mondrian's heir, Harry Holtzman, who noted seven years after the fact, "Yves St. Laurent used the name of Mondrian extensively in Paris and in N.Y., and elsewhere, apropos his fashion exploitation of Mondrian's paintings, ... without consent."[21]

Of course, in hewing closely to the features of Mondrian's classic paintings, Saint Laurent necessarily departed from them in order to adapt the style to the physical realities of the female body. For that very reason, in a Mondrian dress created by Saint Laurent, the style necessarily became his own, yet, as his dresses were in turn copied *ad infinitum*, the style began to function as something like a brand icon invested with authorial associations but otherwise circulating as if unmoored, without a persuasive link to the distinguishing material features of either Mondrian's or Saint Laurent's work. To put this another way, if a couture model of a Mondrian dress presents its authorship as split between the claims of the painter and the dress designer, the relative stability of this situation was threatened when the two terms — Saint Laurent and Mondrian — were drained of meaning by the proliferation of knockoffs ever more remote from the prototypes. In this way, Mondrian's style, his authorship, his paintings became inextricably intertwined — some might say confused — with what rapidly emerged as the ubiquity of not only Saint Laurent's fashionable creations but also, and arguably more significantly, the knockoffs they engendered. Thus the unique and authentic character of Mondrian's individual paintings entered into a new kind of dialogue not just with couture dresses but with the full range of knockoffs as well. Saint Laurent drew Mondrian into the world of haute couture, and also, inevitably, into the world of mass-production and commodity culture in which couture has long been embedded.

Together with Bergé, Saint Laurent was operating across the spectrum from elite to popular culture, building a ready-to-wear business alongside their continuing commitment to haute couture, while at the same time assembling an outstanding art collection with the newfound wealth they accrued through merchandising arrangements and licensing deals that Bergé began to negotiate during the 1960s.

21 Harry Holtzman, Letter to Mr. Eberle, a representative of the international copyright agency Cosmopress (Geneva), July 10, 1972. Harry Holtzman Papers. General Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University. This correspondence is discussed in my book, *The Afterlife of Piet Mondrian* (Chicago, 2013), 172. My thanks to historian and art historian Vanessa Schwartz for pointing out that as adaptations of Mondrian's style in a different medium — and not reproductions of particular works — the dresses would likely not have been subject to copyright provisions.

Becoming millionaires many times over, they eventually owned five works by Mondrian that were displayed in their private apartments. One of them (see Figure 7) eventually accrued additional value precisely because it was owned by Saint Laurent and closely identified with his Mondrian dresses.[22] As Mondrian's formal language circulated with increasing frequency beyond the confines of the traditional art world populated by museums, dealers, auction houses and private collectors, intensive merchandising of his style made the iconic forms of his pictures ever more visible and commodified in contexts outside both the fine arts and fashion.



Figure 7. Yves Saint Laurent, undated. Photographer Alexander Liberman, 1912—1999. Alexander Liberman photography archive. Getty Resesarch Institute, Los Angeles (2000.R.19). © J. Paul Getty Trust.

Benno Temple, Director of the Haags Gemeentemuseum, has described Saint Laurent's Mondrian dress as "the mother of all Mondrian merchandise," but the elite fashion designer was certainly not alone in popularizing the Dutch artist's work some twenty years after his death.[23] In fact, Mondrian's paintings were also being (re)discovered, represented and appropriated during the 1960s by American Pop artists including Roy Lichtenstein and Tom Wesselmann who, like Saint Laurent, appreciated the iconic features of Mondrian's abstract work that they experienced especially in reproductions. We owe this remarkable conjunction of Mondrian, couture culture and pop art to the visual rhetoric of reproduction in which Mondrian's style had already for several decades been immersed to the point where it arguably became familiar outside the art world not so much as original paintings but as widespread graphic design adaptations and their application to all sorts of banal domestic objects.[24] Here the style was distilled into flat arrangements of straight lines and rectangular forms that relinquished their connection to the material specificity of Mondrian's paintings as this imagery circulated through the world of commodity culture.

22 I present this argument in greater detail in *The Afterlife of Piet Mondrian*, postscript; see esp. p. 231.

23 Benno Temple, quoted in Laura Klompenhouwer, "Museum koopt 'moeder van de Mondriaan-merchandise,'" *NRC*, January 6, 2015; https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/01/06/museum-koopt-moeder-van-de-mondriaan-merchandise-1454129-a1253410. Accessed February 19, 2018.

24 See Margit Weinberg-Staber. *Mondrian auf der Tube: Popularisierung und Trivialisierung der Ideale* (Zurich, 1990), and Troy, *The Afterlife of Piet Mondrian.*



Figure 8. George Segal, *Portrait of Sidney Janis with Mondrian Painting*. 1967. Plaster figure with Mondrian's Composition, 1933, on an easel. The Museum of Modern Art, New York, NY, U.S.A. Digital Image © The Museum of Modern Art/Licensed by SCALA / Art Resource, NY. © 2018 The George and Helen Segal Foundation / Licensed by VAGA at Artists Rights Society (ARS), NY.

Mondrian's paintings also gestured to the world of the commodity when they were appropriated by a small number of pop artists newly prominent in the 1960s. For example, George Segal's 1967 sculptural portrait of Sidney Janis (Figure 8) shows the subject admiring an original painting by Mondrian, a favorite from Janis' own collection, displayed as if for sale on the art dealer's presentation easel. Not only had Janis been largely responsible for establishing a vibrant market for Mondrian's paintings in America during the 1950s, but he was also a prominent promoter of pop art, having in 1962 organized an early group exhibition devoted to what was then called The New Realism, in which Segal as well as Roy Lichtenstein and Tom Wesselmann were represented.

Both Lichtenstein and Wesselmann were admirers of Mondrian's paintings as images whose powerful graphic impact came across in reproductions and adaptations in books and especially in the mass media publications through which Mondrian's work reached a broad and popular audience. As Lichtenstein told John Coplans in a 1970 interview, all of his sources were gathered in the same way: "The comics, and paintings of Picasso, Mondrian, Monet, and WPA murals, as well as the most modern heads and designed objects, are all available to me as reproductions."[25] That reproductions of Mondrian's work also entered the elite world of Saint Laurent's couture house arguably speaks to the alignment of his dresses not so much with the fine art of Mondrian — obvious likeness notwithstanding — as with the relatively unrefined Pop art of Lichtenstein and Wesselmann. We can easily recognize an homage to Mondrian in particular works by these artists, but visual likeness — no matter how immediate — is not the only feature that insures the relevance or commonality of their work in this context. Indeed, even as we acknowledge a claim to likeness, or the copy, there is more to what pop art and the Mondrian dress together can tell us about the overlapping and mutually reinforcing narratives of art and fashion in the mid-1960s.

Instantly recognizable for its relationship to Mondrian, in the mixed media context of Wesselmann's *Still Life* #20 (Figure 9) the

25 John Coplans, "Interview: Roy Lichtenstein," in *Roy Lichtenstein*, ed. John Coplans (New York, 1972), 106.

reproduction of Mondrian's *Tableau I* (1921) joins a variety of other ordinary household elements: part of a kitchen sink with its attached faucet, a tubular light fixture and a cabinet door that opens onto shelves displaying a jumble of commonly available cleaning and personal hygiene products. At lower right, appearing to rest on a painted blue table is a collage that brings together printed images of food items in the remaining two colors of Mondrian's typical palette, including a loaf of Diet Lite bread, two bottles of Ballentyne Ale and a glass of Coca-Cola — all products of familiar brands represented by prominent logos. The composition and coloring of the whole assemblage, like the equally familiar Mondrian image it includes in the form of a reproduction displayed above the table, recapitulate the features of Mondrian's art while displacing them to the overlapping realms of middle-class domesticity, commercial advertising, and consumer culture — from the banality of which Mondrian's work is normally thought to be located at a distant remove.

Figure 9. Tom Wesselmann, *Still Life #20*. 1962. Gift of Seymour H. Knox, Jr., 1962. Albright-Knox Art Gallery, Buffalo, New York, New York State, U.S.A. Photo credit Albright-Knox Gallery / Art Resource, NY. © 2018 Estate of Tom Wesselmann / Licensed by VAGA at Artists Rights Society (ARS), NY.

Similar to Wesselmann, Lichtenstein also presented an instantly recognizable image of Mondrian's work in each of two oil paintings, *Non-Objective I* (Figure 10) and *Non-Objective II*, both dating from 1964. As much as these works immediately conjure Mondrian's signature style, they do so through the screen of Lichtenstein's own flatly painted and graphically simplified style, including the signature Ben-Day dots that — no matter how carefully Lichtenstein worked to spread them evenly across several planes of his paintings — intentionally signal banality and repetition as opposed to the refinement and subtlety that characterize the delicately brushed surfaces of Mondrian's mature paintings. As in the Mondrian dresses, Lichtenstein's display of likeness is unmistakable, although he too stopped short of referencing any particular works by the Dutch artist. Nevertheless, his paintings draw as much on the aesthetics of mass-circulation advertising and the comic strip as they do on Mondrian's classic modernist style, which is their ostensible subject.

Where do Saint Laurent's Mondrian dresses fit into this picture of pop art's take on the art of Piet Mondrian? Like his contemporaries, Saint



Figure 10. Roy Lichtenstein, *Non-Objective I*, 1964, oil and Magna on canvas. The Eli and Edythe L. Broad Collection. Photo credit: Douglas M. Parker Studio. © Estate of Roy Lichtenstein.

Laurent appreciated the graphic power and simplicity of Mondrian's spare compositions which, as previously mentioned, he too encountered in the reproductions of a book, most likely the 1957 French language edition of Michel Seuphor's *Piet Mondrian: Life and Work*, a source originally published in English in the United States the year before, which was probably mined by the American artists as well.[26] Notwithstanding — or, indeed, perhaps because of — the last minute timing of his decision to appropriate Mondrian's compositional and coloristic principles, supposedly just two weeks before the showings began in early August 1965, likeness between the paintings and the dresses is unmistakable. That from the beginning the commentary surrounding Saint Laurent's dresses always invoked the paintings, often conveying the notion that their resemblance was close enough to collapse any distinctions between the two, was something of a mixed blessing insofar as it almost inevitably suggested that Saint Laurent had merely copied rather than invented these designs. Anxious to counter this notion, those who have written about Saint Laurent's Mondrian dresses generally point out that even if the garments are remarkably faithful to the paintings and indeed they became famous as the designs that initiated the couturier's oft-cited romance with fine art (his homages to works by well known modern artists), "Saint Laurent wasn't copying." According to Bernard Blistène, curator and since 2013 director of the Musée national d'art moderne, Centre Pompidou, Paris, "[Saint Laurent] didn't put a painting on a dress. He explored variations *based* on Mondrian. … His dresses always remained dresses, they never became paintings or pastiches of painting."[27] Yet, in their undisguised appropriation of Mondrian's most obvious stylistic features, these dresses share the unabashed likeness that we find in the works by pop artists, while the garments' reiteration in untold numbers of knockoffs confirms their undeniable popular appeal. Individually and as a group, they instantiate or embody the passage of Mondrian

26 Whether Saint Laurent's mother had offered the book as a Christmas gift or for his birthday (accounts differ on this point), it was in any case not until her son was well into designing the Fall-Winter couture collection that he paid attention to the reproductions, as he himself recounted: "It wasn't until I had opened a Mondrian book my mother had given me for Christmas that I hit upon the key idea." Yves Saint Laurent, quoted in Madsen, *Living for Design*, 117.

27 Bernard Blistène, "Masterpiece Theater: Yves Saint Laurent's Shows of Admiration" [interview of Blistène by Farid Chenoune], in *Yves Saint Laurent*, (Paris, 2010), 310.

from elite art to pop culture. Just as pop art, in its appropriation of Mondrian's imagery, renegotiated the distinction between original and reproduction, high and low, so Saint Laurent's Mondrian dresses further muddied the distinction between the elite couture creation and the multiple knockoffs it inspired. In effect, Saint Laurent's Mondrian dresses might best be understood as a form of pop art in their own right.

That the Mondrian dresses would eventually be singled out and lauded as Saint Laurent's first foray into the identification between fashion and art only complicates these issues by suggesting that the fashionable dress could be rescued from the banality of its widespread reproduction through its identification with the uniqueness and individual creativity ascribed to fine art. Just as Mondrian was being appropriated by pop culture and circulated through its economy of reproduction, Saint Laurent was appealing to the domain of art, where the discursive currency was measured in terms of originality and uniqueness. Artists like Lichtenstein and Wesselmann traded on this very duality, making works of art that called into question the distinction between original and copy, which was, of course, a core gesture of haute couture as well.

Although Bergé disposed of the couple's five works by Mondrian along with the rest of their extraordinary art collection the year after Saint Laurent's death in 2008, he used part of the auction proceeds to assure the preservation of hundreds of couture prototypes in a museum that is officially recognized by the French State. Among the objects in the Musée Yves Saint Laurent is the most famous of the Mondrian dresses (see Figure 4), which has entered the collection in two versions: the prototype and a couture reproduction — the two giving silent testimony to haute couture as both original and copy sharing a design that belongs to Mondrian and Saint Laurent at one and the same time.

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JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND THE DECLINE OF THE U.S. "INDUSTRIAL BASE" IN THE 1980S

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GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

In December 2016, President Obama prohibited the acquisition of the German company Aixtron by the Chinese investment fund Fujian Grand Chip. Aixtron builds equipment for the production of microchips and light-emitting diodes (LEDs) used, for example, in consumer electronics and in the car industry.[1] Even though Aixtron is a German company, it is subject to U.S. law because it has a subsidiary in the United States. And even though Aixtron is not a defense company, the U.S. government cited national security concerns in order to block the takeover.

The Obama administration used the authority given to it by the "Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007" (FINSA) to stop the deal. The act allows for a review of any "merger, acquisition, or takeover that is proposed … by or with any foreign person" from a national security standpoint.[2] These reviews are conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). This committee is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and composed of representatives from several arms of the executive, including the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce and State.

CFIUS assesses the possible risks that foreign direct investments pose to U.S. national security. The final decision to block a merger or acquisition is made by the president, who usually follows CFIUS' recommendation. Presidential decisions are exempt from judicial oversight.[3]

In the Aixtron case, CFIUS came to the conclusion that "[t]he national security risk posed by the transaction relates, among other things, to the military applications of the overall technical body of knowledge and experience of Aixtron …, and the contribution of Aixtron's U.S. business to that body of knowledge and experience."[4]

In other words, the United States wanted to deny the company's know-how to China, its biggest geostrategic and economic competitor in the international system. Indeed, both sides, China and the U.S.,

1 "Die Chinesen werden nochmal aufgehalten," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 24, 2016, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/unternehmen/wirtschaftsministerium-stellt-aixtron-uebernahme-durch-chinesen-in-frage-14495317.html (accessed April 27, 2018).

2 P.L. 110-49, Sec. 721 (a) (3).

3 For an overview see James K. Jackson, *The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)*, Congressional Research Service, January 16, 2018.

4 Department of Treasury, "Statement on the President's Decision Regarding the U.S. Business of Aixtron SE," December 2, 2016, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0679.aspx (accessed April 27, 2018).



Figure 1. Membership of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. Source: Government Accountability Office report 18-249, 2018, p. 4.

have come to understand scientific-technological knowledge as a key resource in their political, military and economic power struggle. Whereas China sees knowledge as a crucial lever to catch up with the United States, the U.S. understands knowledge as the foundation of its position as world leader and superpower. And while China has embarked on a vigorous campaign to acquire and absorb technology from the West — not least through illegal methods like economic espionage –, the U.S. tightly controls and regulates the sharing of knowledge in order to keep the technological edge.[5] In the mindset of the U.S. National Security State, technological superiority and lead time form the bedrock that American global predominance and national security are built upon.

In order to maintain the technological lead, the U.S. has since the 1940s developed a wide array of bureaucratic tools to control knowledge flows that cross national borders. Government secrecy, or classification, is arguably the most rigid and best known of these interlocking and overlapping regimes. But the communication of knowledge is also regulated by a far-reaching, sprawling and highly complex system of export controls that covers not only the movement of physical goods but also the transmission of scientific-technological knowledge in the form of data, printed paper and even oral conversations. Even the U.S. visa system is part of this toolbox. In combination with export controls it regulates the travel of foreign scientists and engineers on the basis of the knowledge they carry in their heads and fingertips.[6] All these regulations exist alongside and independently of the intellectual property regime. Thus, to a surprising extent, the U.S. government monitors and shapes the international flow of knowledge by bureaucratically keeping tabs on the movement of information, "things" and people.

5 Evan A. Feigenbaum, "Who's Behind China's High-Technology 'Revolution'? How Bomb Makers Remade Beijing's Priorities, Policies, and Institutions," *International Security* 24:1 (1999): 95-126. Tai Ming Cheung, "Innovation in China's Defense Technology Base: Foreign Technology and Military Capabilities," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39:5-6 (2016): 728-761. Hugo Meijer, *Trading with the Enemy: The Making of US Export Control Policy toward the People's Republic of China* (Oxford, 2016).

6 See Mario Daniels, "Why and How Borders Matter to the Sharing of Knowledge: The Interplay of U.S. Visa Restrictions and Export Controls in the Cold War," in *Writing the Transnational History of Technology*, ed. John Krige (Chicago, 2019).

Through CFIUS the U.S. government has added money in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the list of targets of this remarkably creative set of instruments for making something as elusive as knowledge controllable. This is a relatively new development. Despite deeper historical roots, reaching back as far as World War I and the early Cold War, it was only in the globalizing 1980s that foreign direct investment became a serious concern of the National Security State. When CFIUS was established by Executive Order in 1975 to monitor the impact of OPEC "petrodollars" it only had the authority to review but not to block investments. Moreover, the committee hardly ever met — it was merely a "paper tiger."[7] That changed profoundly in the 1980s. Today, CFIUS plays an increasingly prominent role in shaping the tense technological relations between China and the U.S., as the recent Broadcom-Qualcomm case shows.[8]



Figure 2. Process of Reviewing Transactions. Source: Government Accountability Office report 18-249, 2018, p. 8.

This article offers some building blocks for an intellectual history of CFIUS as well as of U.S. national security and the crucial role they play in today's political economy of knowledge. I will tell the complex story of why and how, in the 1980s, foreign direct investment became closely linked to knowledge regulation. In particular, I will shed light on how money spent on technology became framed as a national security issue. I argue that one of the driving forces behind this process was the fear of losing knowledge to another deeply feared competitor who preceded China by two decades: Japan. And I will show that cases of industrial espionage and illegal technology transfer played a special, prominent role in shaping the way the U.S. government and public thought about the international political economy of knowledge in the 1980s. Concerns about illegal knowledge transfers highlighted the challenges that the globalization of knowledge

7 Souvik Saha, "CFIUS Now Made in China: Dueling National Security Frameworks as a Countermeasure to Economic Espionage in the Age of Globalization," *Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business* 33:199 (2012): 199-234, at 209. Jackson, *Committee on Foreign Investment*, 3-5.

8 Cecilia Kang, Alan Rappeport, "Trump Blocks Broadcom's Bid for Qualcomm," *New York Times*, March 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/12/technology/trump-broadcom-qualcomm-merger.html (accessed April 27, 2018).

production and dissemination posed to the United States economy and national security. Fears of the loss of knowledge to both communist enemies and longstanding allies fueled political efforts to fill some of the perceived loopholes in the defense perimeter that the U.S. had built since World War II. Classification, export controls and visa policies were not deemed to be comprehensive enough. Controlling the flow of money in order to control the acquisition of knowledge was the latest strategy devised to close a dangerous gap that seemed to open up in the 1980s as Japan laid siege to U.S. markets. And, just like today in the case of China, computer and semiconductor technology was at the heart of the conflict.

I. The U.S. Fight against "Illegal Technology Transfer" and the Hitachi Spy Case

The incoming Reagan administration placed the fight against the uncontrolled and dangerous loss of technology to foe and friend alike at the top of its political agenda. In January 1982 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger alarmed the American public. In an article in the *Wall Street Journal* Weinberger pointed out that the Soviet military was using computer chips that were faithful copies of technology that RCA was building for the Pentagon.[9] Since export controls tightly regulated the sales of semiconductor and computer technology to the Eastern Bloc, the Soviets had obviously obtained it illegally through unlawful purchase, theft or economic espionage. And this, Weinberger assured his readers, was not an isolated case: The "Soviets have organized a massive, systematic effort to get advanced technology from the West. The purpose is to support the Soviet military build-up." This effort posed an existential threat to national security because an "important part of our own national defense as well as the security of our allies and friends around the globe is the 'quality edge' we have enjoyed for many years."[10] A widely quoted CIA report from June 1982 concurred and warned of a "steady erosion of the technological superiority on which U.S. and allied security currently is based."[11]

Weinberger and the CIA were only two voices in the Reagan administration's vigorous campaign to fight what was christened "illegal technology transfer." Using a powerful rhetoric of espionage, treason, subversion and illegality, the Reagan administration profoundly changed the public perception of technology transfers through a flood of policy papers, speeches and newspaper articles. With considerable

9 Caspar W. Weinberger, "Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union," *Wall Street Journal*, January 12, 1982, 32. *Newsweek*, January 1, 1982, 34.

10 Weinberger, "Technology Transfer," 32.

11 CIA, "The Technology Acquisition Efforts of the Soviet Intelligence Services: Interagency Intelligence Memorandum," June 1982, 3. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82M00786R000104810001-5.pdf (accessed April 28, 2018).

exaggeration, unregulated technology transfer was turned into an acute, existential danger to the United States.

The Reagan administration's language was not just rhetoric. It was a central component of an aggressive set of policies that increasingly reined in the circulation of scientific-technological knowledge. By using all components of the national security toolbox, the U.S. was fighting not only for keeping the lead but to win the Cold War — if necessary, even against its own allies. In June 1982, the same month the CIA published its report, the Reagan administration escalated the conflict within the Western alliance over the construction of a new Soviet gas pipeline with the help of Western technology. In a bid to wage economic war, the U.S. government used export controls as a club against Western European companies and their governments in order to stop their technology sales across the Iron Curtain. What followed was one of the most serious crises in the Western alliance since the onset of the Cold War. The Reagan administration left no doubt that knowledge and the question of control over its circulation were at the very heart of U.S. foreign and national security policy.[12]

Only four days after the U.S. government had begun to target U.S. allies with export controls, a major spy scandal hit the front pages of the national newspapers. In what the *Washington Post* claimed was probably "the biggest industrial espionage case ever," on June 22, 1982, the FBI charged eighteen men, "including several high-ranking executives of Hitachi, the Japanese electronics giant, with paying an undercover agent" more than 600,000 dollars for stolen technical data about IBM's newest computers.[13] These charges were the result of an elaborate investigation and sting operation that the FBI had begun seven months earlier in the context of geared-up efforts to protect technology, mainly against Soviet bloc spies. The FBI had cooperated closely with IBM in setting up a shell company that conducted undercover negotiations not only with Hitachi but also with Mitsubishi about the illegal purchase of information about, among other things, the hard- and software of IBM's newest mainframe computer 3081. Since both Japanese companies built and sold IBM-compatible computers, the illegal acquisition that the sting operation dangled before them was designed to reduce IBM's lead time by six months or even a year, save R&D expenditures and secure market shares.[14] Worthy of a Hollywood movie, the FBI caught the final and most incriminating transaction with Hitachi representatives on video.[15]

12 Patrick J. DeSouza, "The Soviet Gas Pipeline Incident: Extension of Collective Security Responsibilities to Peacetime Commercial Trade," *Yale Journal of International Law* 10:1 (1984): 92-117. Angela E. Stent, "East-West Trade and Technology Transfer: The West's Search for Consensus." *The World Today* 40:11 (1984): 452-462. Bruce W. Jentleson, "From Consensus to Conflict: The Domestic Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade Policy," *International Organization* 38:4 (1984): 625-660.

13 Mark Potts, Mary Thornton, "Plot to Steal IBM Data is Charged to Japanese," *Washington Post*, June 23, 1982, A1.

14 David A. Vise, "Pressure to Learn IBM Plans," *Washington Post*, June 24, 1982, B1, B 10.

15 Michael S. Malone, "Hitachi-F.B.I Tapes Are Released," *New York Times*, May 16, 1983.

The spy case hit the news and stirred intense emotional reactions on both sides of the Pacific at a time of deepening tensions between the United States and Japan. Two close Cold War allies now found themselves increasingly at odds in their trade relations. In 1982 the U.S. was struggling with a deep recession that appeared to be a seamless continuation of the disturbing crisis experience of the 1970s. The unemployment rate of 10.8% at the end of the year was the highest in the U.S. since the Great Depression. Especially hard hit was the American manufacturing sector, not least the car industry.[16] Even though this economic crisis was part of a global recession, it fed into growing worries about a perceived decline of "competitiveness" of the U.S. national economy in the world markets.

Indeed, competitiveness became *the* buzzword of U.S. economic policy for the entire 1980s and well into the 1990s. It captured the painful experience of a relative decline of the U.S. as the predominant power in the international system of the postwar era. As the geopolitical weight of the U.S. was reduced in the wake of the Vietnam War, its economic clout seemed to be diminished by the catching-up of Western Europe and Japan. This could have been interpreted as a predictable re-equilibration of a world capitalist system that had been shaped by the preponderance of American power at the end of World War II and in the early Cold War. Instead the U.S. public saw it as an existential crisis and threat. The rhetoric of competitiveness implied fears of a nation losing its grip and growing weak and impotent. In this narrative, infused with the ideology of American exceptionalism, other nations were about to fill the vacuum created by American power in decline and would ultimately push aside the U.S. as world leader. It appeared to be a bitter irony that the most threatening economic adversaries were political friends. Even worse, the U.S. itself had enabled their rise after 1945 as part of its Cold War strategy of shoring up the West economically in order to contain Communism militarily and ideologically. It seemed that after having given generously for decades, the U.S. was being taken advantage of by ungrateful allies and had ended up with the short end of the stick.

The growing U.S. trade deficit became the political symbol of this decline. Since the mid-1970s, the gap between imports and exports had widened constantly, from 9.3 billion dollars in 1976 to 36.4 billion dollars in 1982 — and it was about to triple in the following two years. Almost 50% of the 1982 deficit (17 billion dollars)

16 Michael A. Urquhart, Marillyn A. Hewson, "Unemployment Continued to Rise as Recession Deepened," *Monthly Labor Review* 106:2 (1983): 3-12.

resulted from trade relations with Japan. Even more disconcertingly, the Japanese exports to the United States had grown disproportionately in the manufacturing sector, the former pride of the U.S. economy.[17]

But the U.S. economy was not just losing its grip — it was under attack. Many U.S. pundits and politicians argued that the Japanese successes were not just based on a smart industrial policy, superior management techniques or higher product quality alone. In their view, Japan made inroads into U.S. markets because of unfair trade practices. Japan shielded its markets with protectionist measures, used price dumping to hurt U.S. competitors and doled out subsidies to its companies. In short, Japan took advantage of American open markets without reciprocating, thus tilting the economic playing field in its favor.[18]

In this tense climate, the Hitachi industrial espionage case seemed to embody everything that was wrong with Japanese-U.S. relations. There had been suspicions about Japanese industrial espionage in the U.S., and especially in Silicon Valley, at least since the late 1970s, and the computer industry had complained for quite a while about Japan's widespread product piracy and disregard for intellectual property. But now, for the first time, two of the largest Japanese companies had been caught red-handed, and a House subcommittee that held hearings on unfair trade practices in 1983 was certainly not alone in assuming that the Hitachi case could well "just be the tip of an iceberg."[19] Even worse, Hitachi had targeted IBM, the crown jewel of the U.S. computer industry, with the very same instruments that the Soviet intelligence services used to steal American technology. While there was much talk about a U.S.-Japanese trade war, in 1982, Japanese-American relations began to look strikingly similar to a cold war.

II. The Defense Industrial Base and the Globalization of Technology

However, this similarity ran deeper than this brief analysis of the perception of industrial espionage in the early Reagan years suggests. The very concept of "competitiveness" was Janus-faced and as much about the Soviet Union and military and political power as it was about Japan, economic competition and market dominance. In fact, the two strands of the industrial espionage discourse were two sides of the same coin. In the 1980s, market competition became

17 Stephen E. Haynes, Michael M. Hutchison, and Raymond F. Mikesell, "Japanese Financial Policies and the U.S. Trade Deficit," *Essays in International Finance* 162 (1986): 3 (Tab. 1).

18 See e.g. Clyde. V. Prestowitz, Jr., *Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead* (New York, 1988).

19 *Unfair Foreign Trade Practices: Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy*, June 27 and July 27, 1983, Washington, D.C., 1984, 7 (Representative Doug Walgren), 59 (Representative Gerry Sikorski).

increasingly "securitized," and the issues of Cold War security became increasingly "economized." An example of this fusion is the concept of the "defense industrial base." Far from being an esoteric idea relevant only to the Pentagon's war planners, the notion of the "defense industrial base" (and its variations like "industrial base" and "technology base") played a key role in the competitiveness debates well into the 1990s — and is still influential today. It is rooted in a set of assumptions about how high technology, national security and the national economy interact.[20]

First, the maintenance and improvement of modern military capabilities rely heavily on a constant infusion of high technology into weapons systems. Indeed, the concept of deterrence — at the very heart of Cold War relations between the Soviet Union and the United States — was based on the constant mobilization of cutting-edge technology. It functioned as a force multiplier to offset the quantitative advantage of the much larger conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact. In the context of an incessant arms race, military power thus depended on staying technologically ahead of the enemy. As the final report of the Defense Science Board on "The Defense Industrial and Technology Base" summed it up: "Our national security is based on a strategy of deterrence. … The effectiveness of our deterrent depends upon our ability to maintain … technological superiority".[21]

Second, research and development pursuing the most advanced military technology is the result of a complex public-private partnership. The American postwar system of innovation forged close contractual relations between the federal government (especially the military), universities, and the private business community. Hence, industrial innovation and military power are closely intertwined, so much so that in a large segment of the U.S. economy they form a powerful "Military-Industrial Complex."[22]

Third, the state's military capabilities depend on a healthy, strong and reliable economic system that — despite the key role of the federal government — is firmly anchored in free-market and free-enterprise ideology and practices. U.S. companies can only be strong partners for the military if they do well, generating revenue needed for the investment in innovation and modern production facilities. In an increasingly internationalized economic and technological system the health of high-tech companies depends on exports and international market shares.

20 The following arguments are derived from *Final Report of the Defense Science Board 1988 Summer Study on the Defense and Industrial Base*, Vol. 1 and 2, Washington, D.C., 1988. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a202469.pdf; http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a212698.pdf; *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Semiconductor Dependency*, Washington, D.C., 1987. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a178284.pdf (all accessed August 14, 2018).

21 *Final Report of the Defense Science Board 1988 Summer Study*, Vol. 1, 1.

22 Alex Roland, *The Military-Industrial Complex* (Washington, D.C., 2001). Paul A.C. Koistinen, *State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1945-2011* (Lawrence, 2012). James Ledbetter, *Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial Complex* (New Haven, 2011).

Fourth, despite the importance of global markets, including international technology transfers, there is a need for a strong *national* economy. Since the international trading system might break down in the event of war, only national resources can be reliably and quickly mobilized to meet the needs of modern warfare. In other words, because economic globalization generates (technological) dependencies, it diminishes the predictability that military planners seek.

In short, the concept of the "defense industrial base" that became current in the 1980s intertwined economic competitiveness and military power, and the main link between them was high technology. The Defense Science Board boiled this complex relationship down to one paragraph:

> The National Technology Base is the essential foundation of our national industrial base. The competitiveness of our national industrial base depends on a continuous creation and infusion of technology just as our national security relies on technology to give our military forces the capability to defeat adversaries who can muster numerically superior forces.[23]

Of course, none of this was entirely new in the 1980s. This set of assumptions has been at the very heart of the idea of "total war" and has therefore been an integral part of economic and national security thinking at least since World War I. One could even argue that the intimate relationship between economics and the military is an essential characteristic of the Cold War. I argue, however, that the U.S. discussion about the "defense industrial base" in the 1980s recalibrated and rebalanced this relationship between national security and the national and international economy. Only by shedding light on this recalibration is it possible to fully understand the U.S. fears of industrial espionage — and the Aixtron case mentioned at the outset.

I argue that this recalibration of national security and national economic policies was a reaction to several closely connected challenges posed by profound structural changes that had accelerated in the 1970s. These challenges are usually referred to as "globalization" and "technological change." I want to use the example of the computer industry to discuss what these terms mean in the context of my story.

23 *Final Report of the Defense Science Board 1988 Summer Study*, Vol. 1, Appendix A, "Draft Presidential Directive: The National Industrial and Technological Base", A-1.

Computers and their beating hearts, semiconductors, or "chips," are children of war. In the 1940s and 50s, they were predominantly developed for military purposes and with military money, and for a quarter of a century or so the military was arguably the most important customer of the computer industry. Therefore, the U.S. federal government was the key player in this technological field, forging tight public-private partnerships with U.S. companies such as IBM. Clearly, this is also a story of U.S. dominance. Without denying the contributions made in other countries, the rapid technological progress in computing was driven by U.S. government funding and by U.S. companies, which were the pacemakers and held the largest global market shares for decades.[24]

All this changed in the 1970s and 1980s. In the computer industry, the big push towards globalization was tied to technological diffusion, the spread of technological know-how, research and development and production to ever more regions of the world. Not only did Japan and several Western European countries catch up and reach production more or less on par with U.S. standards.[25] The larger trend was also the establishment of global assembly lines that internationalized computer production. American computers included more and more parts built in other countries, fostering complex networks of technological and economic interdependence. The relative weight of the U.S. in the computer world shrank.

At the same time computer technology became thoroughly commercialized, diminishing the role of the U.S. military. In the first postwar decades computer development had been driven by the logic of "spin-off": the military had pushed for cutting-edge technology that then slowly migrated into civilian applications. Beginning in the 1970s, this relation was inverted. More often than not the most advanced technology was now the result of civilian research and development, and the military reaped the advantages of new products and processes, developed on the outside. Increasingly, the military bought technology off the shelf like any other customer. Computers were "dual use" technologies — meaning they were put to military as well as civilian uses — but, starting in the 1970s, the boundaries between these spheres were becoming more and more blurred.

By the late 1980s, globalization, commercialization and technological diffusion had not only civilianized computer technology; they had

24 Kenneth Flamm, *Creating the Computer: Government, Industry, and High Technology* (Washington, D.C., 1988).

25 On Japan see Marie Anchordoguy, *Computers Inc.: Japan's Challenge to IBM* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989).

also turned the Pentagon into a customer on civilian *international* markets. Thus the "defense industrial base" had become increasingly dependent on commercial technology that was developed, produced and traded globally. Even though these structural shifts helped the Pentagon to cut costs and were also arguably beneficial for its keeping up with rapid technological change, they had worrisome implications for U.S. national security.

A typical study of April 1982, titled "The Threat of Foreign Competition to U.S. High Technology Industries: National Security Considerations," prepared for Reagan's newly established "Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade," discussed some of the disconcerting implications of these structural changes. It dealt specifically with Japan, classifying the ally frankly as "by far the most formidable challenger to U.S. technological and economic leadership," a competitor for political power and a danger to national security.[26] The basis of political leadership was, according to this report, a national lead in access to and control over technological knowledge. Stating that this lead was eroding due to Japanese competition, the report warned of nothing less than the decline of U.S. hegemony, presenting a kind of natural law in the guise of a historical argument:

> Recent history indicates that leadership in what were high technology industries at the time was critical in the rise of nations to power, in their vitality in peacetime, and survival in wars. Crucial, little opposed, and sometimes not clearly perceived, changes in the world distribution of power and security of nations took place in peacetime as a result of the ability of some nations to capitalize on advanced technology in the development of their industrial base. The outcome of wars often merely reflected the change which had taken place beforehand.[27]

On a less holistic level the erosion of U.S. technology posed two more immediate dangers. One was the scenario that dependence on Japan would give it the lever to deny militarily vital technologies to the U.S., thus impairing the American ability to make independent political decisions and to mobilize for war.[28] The report claimed that in the field of semiconductors the U.S. "surge capability for war" had already been "curtailed" because "current U.S. defense production has become extensively dependent on imports of electronic components."[29]

26 [Victor Basiuk], "The Threat of Foreign Competition to U.S. High Technology Industries: National Security Considerations: A Study Prepared under Contract with the U.S. Department of Commerce," April 1982, iv. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP-85T00153R000300070005-7.pdf (accessed April 29, 2018).

27 Ibid., I-1.

28 Ibid., v.

29 Ibid, iii.

In the second scenario, the rise of Japanese technological leadership had another serious effect on the U.S. stance in the Cold War: it would strengthen Communism. It was presumed that the use of export controls against the Soviet bloc was most effective in fields in which the U.S. was the main or only source of technology. Bluntly assuming that Japan would do business with the common enemy, the report warned that by losing leadership to Japan "the United States will lose direct control over the transfer of the most advanced technologies to the Soviet Union … As a technological and economic superpower, Japan will be considerably more independent from U.S. influence with regard to technology transfer to the Soviet Union. When transferred to the USSR, Japanese technology could augment Soviet military power. The United States would thus be squeezed between the economic pressure of Tokyo and enhanced military pressure of Moscow."[30] In short, forfeiting leadership, independence and control over technological knowledge posed an existential danger to the United States.

Less than half a decade later, both of the report's scenarios seemed to have become reality. In the spring of 1987, American national newspapers reported that Toshiba and the Norwegian company Kongsberg had secretly sold high-performance computer-controlled milling machines to the Soviet Union in violation of export controls. These machine tools were used to produce propellers for nuclear submarines that generated less noise and were therefore more difficult to detect, potentially allowing the Soviets to sneak nuclear rockets into the backyard of the United States. The deal had all the trappings of a Cold War espionage case as the KGB was the direct trading partner in a deal consummated in the style of a covert action. The Toshiba-Kongsberg case created an uproar, especially in the U.S. Congress.

As a result, Congress discussed a series of bills with the specific intent to punish Toshiba's and, by extension, Japan's "traitor trade" that endangered U.S. national security. In the same vein, the Reagan administration put diplomatic pressure on the Japanese government to tighten up its export control system in order to forestall further technology transfers to the enemy.[31]

At the same time, another conflict raged over the planned acquisition of the U.S. semiconductor producer Fairchild by its competitor Fujitsu, Japan's leading computer company. American concerns about the growing trade deficit, Japan's unfair trade practices and the loss

30 Ibid., v.

31 Beverly Crawford, "Changing Export Controls in an Interdependent World: Lessons from the Toshiba Case," in *Export Controls in Transition: Perspectives, Problems, and Prospects*, ed. Gary K. Bertsch and Steven Elliott-Gower (Durham, 1992), 249-290. Stephen D. Kelly, "Curbing Illegal Transfers of Foreign-Developed Critical High Technology from Cocom Nations to the Soviet Union: An Analysis of the Toshiba-Kongsberg Incident," *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* 12:1 (1989): 181-223.

of U.S. competitiveness had only grown since the Hitachi spy case in 1982. Added to this explosive mix were fears of Japan's foreign direct investment in the United States and its ostensible effect of deepening American technological dependency.

Figure 3. "Lawmakers Take Swing at Toshiba." *The Kerrville Times*, July 2, 1987, p. 6. AP Photo/Lana Harris.

III. Yet Another Challenge to U.S. Power: Japanese Foreign Direct Investment

At once a driver and an effect of globalization, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the U.S. expanded at a pace not previously seen in the postwar era. After 1945, the outflow of FDI from the U.S. to foreign countries was generally much higher than the influx. As late as 1977, the overall amount of foreign direct investment in the U.S. (inward FDI stock) was relatively small at $51.5 billion, whereas U.S. companies had invested $146 billion abroad. But the year 1977 marked a historical turning point. From then on, FDI in the U.S. grew markedly faster than outgoing U.S. investments, even though the latter always exceeded the inward flows. Fueled by the liberalization, in countries such as Britain and Japan, of state controls over the movement of capital across borders,[32] in the following one and a half decades, the FDI stock in the U.S. expanded rapidly to $83 billion in the early 1980s and to $185 billion in 1985. In 1986, the year of the Fairchild controversy, its growth sped up even more, with the FDI stock swelling to $220 billion (and subsequently reaching $403 billion in 1990 and $1.5 trillion in 2004).[33] By the end of the 1980s, this powerful surge had turned the U.S. into the "world's largest host of incoming foreign direct investment."[34]

Even though FDI in the U.S. was relatively small compared to the national economy as a whole (10.5% of the total net worth of all U.S. nonfinancial corporations) and far below the levels in France (27%), West Germany (18%) or Britain (20%), the developments of the 1980s caused a debate about the benefits and dangers of foreign economic

32 Bill Emmott, *Japanophobia: The Myth of the Invincible Japanese* (New York, 1993), 57.

33 Edward M. Graham and David M. Marchick, *US National Security and Foreign Direct Investment* (Washington, D.C., 2006), 21-22. Edward M. Graham and Paul Krugman, *Foreign Direct Investment in the United States*, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C., 1995), 14-15. Edward M. Graham, "Foreign Investment in the United States and U.S. Interests," *Science* 254:5039 (1991): 1740-1745, at 1740-1741.

34 Jonathan Crystal, *Unwanted Company: Foreign Investment in American Industries* (Ithaca, 2003), 1.

influence in the United States.[35] Indeed, in the 1980s, for "the first time since the nineteenth century, foreign-owned subsidiaries were becoming a significant presence on American soil."[36]

Much more of the FDI came from Western European countries, mainly the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, than from Japan.[37] And even among critics there was no doubt that most of the money flowing in had many beneficial effects on the U.S. economy. Yet against the backdrop of deteriorating U.S.-Japanese relations, investments by companies like Fujitsu or Sony took center stage in the public discourse. The battle lines between opponents and supporters of Japanese FDI ran right through the Reagan administration, Congress, the business community, academia and the national press. Although it oversimplifies a complex debate, one can say that the question of Japan's investment pitted international-minded free traders against nationalist and protectionist "hawks" who called for great caution, citing national security, the national interest, the national economy and the national technological base. This was a clash of opposing philosophies of how international relations and the global economy worked, roughly following the fault line between liberalism and realism. This clash shaped the interpretation of the empirical facts of the Japanese multinationals' entering the U.S. market. On the one hand, the liberal free traders argued that the international mobility of money was a key aspect of the global division of labor that would be advantageous to all trading partners by fostering competitive advantages. They pointed, for example, to the creation of new jobs in the U.S., the positive effects of FDI on the deteriorating U.S. balance of payments and also the transfer of new technologies from abroad which made the U.S. economy more competitive. In their understanding, the national origin of money did not (and should not) matter. In theory, but also in their actions, Japanese investors were not any different from, say, British ones. To claim otherwise only betrayed a hostile, even xenophobic double standard directed against Japanese FDI, they felt.[38]

The "hawks," on the other hand, described Japanese investment as a Trojan horse that carried aggressive trade competition into the United States, further hollowing out American competitiveness. Japanese companies, the story went, were taking control of a large segment of the U.S. national economy and of a great number of American workers, thus exerting growing influence within the United States and curtailing U.S. sovereignty as well as economic and political power.

35 Graham, "Foreign Investment," 1741-1742.

36 Crystal, *Unwanted Company*, 1.

37 Graham, "Foreign Investment," 1741, Table 1.

38 See e.g. Emmot, *Japanophobia*, 1-64.

Whereas the liberals argued for an understanding of trade and FDI as an international win-win scenario, the hawks tended to describe them as a zero-sum game. Every Japanese success was a loss to the United States.

The hawks' arguments were at the center of a powerful wave of economic nationalism that drove much of the debate about Japanese FDI in the U.S. Even though outnumbered by the liberals, the realist advocates of economic nationalism and protectionism — foremost among them the polemically dubbed "Japan-bashers" such as Clyde Prestowitz — wielded enormous influence on the public discourse, Congress and the Reagan administration, not least through a veritable cotton-industry of books critical of Japan.[39]

Many of the economic nationalists' fears revolved around technology and the danger of the United States losing its technological lead and superiority. To the hawks FDI allowed foreign investors to acquire American know-how by means of the check book, circumventing the existing mechanisms of knowledge regulation such as export controls, classification or, in the private sector, intellectual property laws. Against this backdrop, buying a company seemed to be a way of acquiring technology that was equivalent to industrial espionage. The perceived challenge of FDI came to a head when Fujitsu announced in October 1986 that it wanted to buy the American semiconductor company Fairchild.

IV. The Fairchild-Fujitsu Case and the Problem of Knowledge Dependency

As they took a stance against the Fairchild-Fujitsu deal, the national security hawks in the Reagan administration, as well as representatives of the economically embattled U.S. semiconductor industry, did not mince words. They described Fujitsu's offer as an act of war. Stephen Bryen, the Department of Defense's Deputy Undersecretary for Trade Security, an especially vociferous hardliner, likened the Fujitsu offer to the "opening gun" of a battle, adding: "If one of the flagship companies of our semiconductor industry could fall into the hands of the Japanese, we could end up with no U.S. semiconductor industry. We could lose the technology race by default." Similarly, industry representatives feared, in finest Cold War rhetoric, that selling Fairchild would have a "domino effect" or, with reference to another American war, would be "like selling Mount Vernon to the redcoats."[40] The strident language reflected not only Fairchild's

39 See Norman J. Glickman and Douglas P. Woodward, *The New Competitors: How Foreign Investors are Changing the U.S. Economy* (New York, 1989), 13-19. Prestowitz, *Trading Places*. For another example of anti-Japan literature see William R. Nester, *American Power, the New World Order and the Japanese Challenge* (Houndsmills, 1993).

40 William C. Rempel and Donna K.H. Walters, "Trade War: When Chips were Down," *Los Angeles Times*, November 30, 1987, 1.

symbolic significance as one of the founding fathers of Silicon Valley but also the protectionist lobbying skills of an industry that was in dire straits and appeared to be losing more and more ground to Japanese companies. Moreover, since Fairchild was a major defense contractor many observers feared Fujitsu would gain access to classified technologies.[41]

The Fairchild case coincided with two momentous turning points in Japanese-American trade relations. In 1986 FDI from Japan began to grow much faster than that from any other nation.[42] And this was also the year in which Japan's global market share of integrated circuit exports was for the first time on par with the U.S. share. The curves of American decline and Japan's rise finally crossed. In this context, Fairchild's crisis conjured up all the negative implications to be feared from the erosion of the defense industrial base. These implications were spelled out in a report by the Defense Science Board (DSB) that was put together for the Department of Defense (DoD) almost at the same time as the public debates about Fairchild were heating up. It apparently provided and reinforced the arguments about imminent technological dependency the DoD fielded against the Fujitsu-Fairchild acquisition.[43]

This DSB report, titled "Defense Semiconductor Dependency" and published in February 1987, was a sophisticated analysis of the role that scientific-technological knowledge played in U.S. technological leadership and competitiveness. The DSB stated that the erosion, or potentially even the loss, of the national knowledge base was the principal reason for U.S. economic and military decline. At the same time, production and national control over knowledge were touted as key to future U.S. power.

The report began with an alarm call. After repeating the creed that U.S. military capabilities relied on technological superiority, the DSB stated: "The United States has historically been the technological leader in electronics. However, superiority in the application of innovation no longer exists and the relative stature of our technology base in this area is steadily deteriorating."[44] With a distinct sense of urgency, Charles A. Fowler from the Office of the Secretary of Defense pointed out in his cover letter that this was not just a military problem. The DSB report, he wrote in a dramatic gesture, "focuses on a critical national problem that at some time in the future may be looked upon in retrospect as a turning point in the history of our nation. The implications of the loss of semiconductor technology and

41 Jose E. Alvarez, "Political Protectionism and the United States International Investment Obligations in Conflicts: The Hazards of Exon-Florio," *Virginia Journal of International Law* 30:1 (1989): 1-187, at 61, fn. 331 and 334.

42 Graham, "Foreign Investment," 1741.

43 Jackson, *The Committee on Foreign Investment*, 5.

44 *Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Semiconductor Dependency*, 1.

manufacturing expertise, for our country in general and our national security in particular, are awesome indeed."[45]

Focusing on the most important and most sophisticated kind of chip, the dynamic random access memories (DRAMs), the DSB took stock of the American position vis-à-vis Japan. The picture was disconcerting indeed: In "slightly over a decade the U.S. share of the most advanced generation of DRAM has fallen from near 100 percent to less than 5 percent." Japan had become the dominant producer because of unfair trade practices, the close cooperation of government and high-technology companies, superior capital market structures and a larger "technical manpower base" (i.e. a higher share of engineers among the population). Moreover, Japan had outspent the United States in regard to R&D expenditures. The trend was unmistakable: in one technological sub-field after another, the United States' technological lead was slipping or had already been lost to Japan.[46]

The consequences were far-reaching. If the DoD wanted to buy state-of-the art chips it had to turn to Japanese producers. Even though, in relative terms, the Defense Department had lost its role as a key customer of the semiconductor industry, in absolute terms it still represented a huge demand for computer chips. It bought about three percent of all semiconductors produced worldwide — in sales dollars its share was in the vicinity of ten percent.[47] How much weapons systems of the latest generation depended on foreign technology was not exactly clear, but the DSB estimated that it was a "significant fraction [...] — up to several tens of percent."[48] Especially worrisome was the situation in the field of the most advanced supercomputers. Dual-use high-performance computers played a prominent role in military command and intelligence functions, weapons design and nuclear weapons testing and were therefore among the most tightly export-controlled technologies. In 1986, a hundred percent of the memory capacity and ten percent of the logic elements of U.S. supercomputers were "derived from Japanese manufactured semiconductors."[49]

The loss of leadership also meant reduced American control over technology flows to the Soviet Union with incalculable effects on the U.S. military technological lead in the arms race.[50] But more importantly, there was the distinct danger that the United States and not the Soviet Union might be the target of technology denial. The DSB reasoned that "it would not be an illogical strategic business

45 Ibid., cover letter: Charles A. Fowler: Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, February 9, 1987.

46 Ibid., 2-3, 5-9, 60, quotes at 5, 9.

47 Ibid., 4.

48 Ibid., 2.

49 Ibid., 66.

50 See ibid., 3.

policy to delay release of the most advanced chips to competitors … , including the United States. Even if foreign manufactured chips are to be available to U.S. manufacturers, it would appear likely that these chips will be a generation behind those" the Japanese would use in their products.[51] Indeed, the fear of technological denial — in peace as well as in wartime — was one of the most disturbing scenarios articulated in the DSB report.[52] Not only was the United States losing the lead — there was the distinct danger that it would be kept behind indefinitely.

To counter this threat and to "reverse the trend toward the export of semiconductor manufacturing and technology leadership," the DSB advocated stabilizing and expanding the national technology base. The dangers of technological denial were "not a critical problem as long as the U.S. has the knowledge and the resources to substitute domestic sources in a timely fashion should the supply of foreign products and technology be interrupted."[53] Knowledge retained by individuals working for U.S. companies was seen as the decisive weapon to fight Japanese competition and American decline: "In order to retain infrastructure for … industries as those of computers and telecommunications, which supply DoD needs, action must be taken to maintain a strong base of expertise in the technologies of device and circuit design, fabrication, materials refinement and preparation, and production equipment."[54] The DSB understood "expertise" as a complex field of different kinds of knowledge developed and shared within national collectives of engineers and scientists. Applied know-how, used and acquired in production processes, not just theoretical knowledge, was central. The shop floor in a semiconductor production facility was at least as important as a lecture hall or laboratory at a university. Face-to-face interaction was key: "In Japan, many engineering techniques are learned in the company, where engineers can acquire a deep, but narrow, expertise."[55] Here the DSB was referring to accumulated experience, which consists not only of the entirety of acquired information, but also of "bodily" coded knowledge that can only be gained through individual practice. This experience can be communicated in written form to a limited extent only; sharing of such knowledge requires the physical presence and direct communication of people. Historians of science call this "tacit knowledge."[56]

This meant that the "industrial base" was not simply about building technological products — it was also a repository of national

51 Ibid., 66.

52 See ibid., 2, 10.

53 Ibid., 3.

54 Ibid., 4.

55 Ibid., 9.

56 Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, "Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons," *American Journal of Sociology* 101:1 (1995): 44–99. Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (Garden City, NJ, 1966).

knowledge. If this repository was depleted and lost, the United States would lose its technological superiority and its chance to catch up with Japan. Without skilled engineers there would be no semiconductor industry. But without a semiconductor industry there would also be no skilled workforce: "A competitive semiconductor industry is therefore essential in order to attract individuals necessary for maintaining a competitive technology base in the area. Further, the reservoir of human skills and expertise developed in the semiconductor industry is necessary not only for this industry, but also for new and perhaps not-yet-invented industries related to it. These skills cannot be retained and developed in academia alone."[57] The DSB therefore advocated funding research and development in the field of industrial semiconductor *production*.

Conclusion: Exon-Florio, "National Economic Security" and Knowledge Control

Because of the massive criticism in the U.S. Fujitsu withdrew its bid to buy Fairchild in March 1987. But that did not stop the debate about the central problem: What could the United States do to avoid losing technological knowledge to competitors and enemies — which would equal losing both the Cold War and the economic battle against Japan. In contrast to the Toshiba submarine case that could be addressed by tightening up the time-tested tool of export controls, only limited legal instruments were available to stop foreign investors from acquiring knowledge by simply buying U.S. companies. In the fearful climate of 1986/87, the rapid growth of FDI in the 1980s and the increasing number of Japanese acquisitions in the U.S. high technology industries pointed at a supposedly glaring gap in the national security toolbox of knowledge control.

In 1988 Congress closed this loophole by passing the Exon-Florio amendment, which provided the new statutory basis for CFIUS and is the direct predecessor of the "Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007" (FINSA) whose effect on Aixtron I discussed at the beginning. The Exon-Florio amendment made it possible to go beyond the mere review of FDI and prohibit acquisitions, takeovers and mergers outright by a presidential decision. In practice, up until the present, CFIUS's national security risk assessments have been explicitly shaped by considerations of how to preserve U.S. technological leadership and the defense industrial base. The Committee's reviews ask if FDI would give foreign companies — and

57 *Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Semiconductor Dependency*, 10-11.

especially companies partially or completely owned by foreign governments — access to classified scientific-technological information, technologies covered by export control regulations and so-called "critical technologies" deemed to be crucial to U.S. technological prowess or part of the national "critical" infrastructure (for example cyber technologies). Invariably, the nationality of the individuals involved in the business transaction is a key criterion. Thus, CFIUS complements all the other instruments in the national security toolbox of knowledge control.[58]

Because CFIUS works in secrecy, it is difficult to assess the impact it has had on technology transfers in the last two decades. But it is also all too easy to underestimate the effects of this national security review process. Since, in addition to the Aixtron case, presidential decisions have blocked FDI in only four other cases between 1988 and 2018, the regime appears to be negligible. Yet from 1988 to 2010 CFIUS reviewed a total of 2380 cases,[59] and in all these reviews the national security risk assessment does not follow a binary logic of approval or denial. In many cases, CFIUS negotiates so-called "mitigation measures" with the investor. One of the aims of these agreements is to limit foreign control over American technology by excluding classified information from the business transaction, curtailing the access of foreign citizens to technologies or even forcing companies to divest themselves of parts of the company that are seen as too sensitive to be transferred to foreign parties.[60] These mitigation measures are a powerful tool of technology and knowledge control that is used quite often — between 2011 and 2013 in twenty-seven instances, and in eleven cases in 2013 alone.[61] Moreover, companies may cancel FDI deals because they fear the negative political publicity that a CFIUS review can cause. Fujitsu is not the only example in which FDI failed because of intense political opposition. Moreover, we do not know how often companies withdraw because they do not want to accept CFIUS's technology control measures or even refrain from engaging in FDI because of the prospect of dealing with CFIUS. But of the 2380 cases mentioned, 117 ended prematurely due to withdrawal.[62]

Clearly, the Exon-Florio amendment and its later renditions up to FINSA share a deliberately open and very broad understanding of "national security." This understanding reflects the developments since the 1980s towards an increasing securitization of economics and economization of security. In fact, the 1980s saw the rise and

58 Jackson, *The Committee on Foreign Investment,* 18-19. Graham and Marchick, *US National Security*, 53-56. Brandt J.C. Pasco, "United States National Security Reviews of Foreign Direct Investment: From Classified Programmes to Critical Infrastructure, This is What the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States Cares about," *ICSID Review* 29:2 (2014): 350-371.

59 Graham and Marchick, *US National Security*, 57. "Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Committee_on_Foreign_Investment_in_the_United_States (accessed August 16, 2018).

60 For some examples see Graham and Marchick, *US National Security*, 59-73.

61 Mary Ellen Stanley, From China with Love: Espionage in the Age of Foreign Investment, *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, 40:3 (2015): 1033-1079, at 1044, fn. 76.

62 Graham and Marchick, *US National Security*, 57. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Committee_on_Foreign_Investment_in_the_United_States (accessed August 16, 2018).

ubiquitous use of the term "economic security" or, in the rendition of the U.S. PATRIOT Act of 2001, "national economic security."[63] This controversial concept, conflating national security and economics, has shaped the U.S. policies that regulate international knowledge flows up to the present day.[64]

All the cases presented in this article, from the Hitachi industrial espionage case, the Toshiba-Kongsberg export control scandal and the Fujitsu-Fairchild FDI controversy to the Aixtron acquisition have in common that they stirred fears about the loss of American scientific-technological knowledge to competitors and enemies. Today, the concerns about FDI from China are infused with intense fears of economic and military espionage and the circumvention of U.S. export controls.[65] Whether it was about Japan, the Soviet Union or China — the losses of technology were and are always seen as endangering national security by weakening the national economy through giving access to dual use technologies. Indeed, the continued blurring of the boundaries between military and civilian technologies is the main reason why the idea of "economic security" has exerted such a powerful influence on U.S. policy in the last forty years.

The concept of "economic security" also grapples with the challenges of globalization. Global trade, international science, research and development, world-spanning assembly lines, the ever-growing global flows of foreign direct investment all put strains on national security. While economic activity appears to be stripped of national characteristics, American security not only remains in an emphatic sense "*national* security," it is based on the notion that national economic prowess is the basis of national power in the international system. Consequently, as much as the U.S. technological system has been globalized and internationalized since the end of World War II and even more after the end of the Cold War, in political terms, it has never lost a distinct techno-nationalist streak. It is the American conviction that both national economic welfare and military might rest on technological leadership, on the U.S. being ahead of everybody else, friend or foe. Hence, the free global flow of technology has been, and still is, seen as inherently dangerous and in need of government control in order to monitor and, if it seems necessary, prohibit the mobility of information, things, people and money, all of which are carriers of knowledge.

63 See the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001 which is part of the USA PATRIOT Act. 42 U.S. Code § 5195c, section c (definition of critical infrastructure). https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/5195c (accessed April 30, 2018).

64 Ellison F. McCoy, "The Reauthorization of Exon-Florio: A Battle Between Spurring the U.S. Economy and Protecting National Security," *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law* 22:3 (1992): 685-700, at 690. Graham and Marchick, *US National Security*, 40-56.

65 Stanley, "From China with Love." Graham and Marchick, *US National Security*, 95-121. Saha, "CFIUS Now Made in China."

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WHY ARE UNIVERSITIES OPEN ACCESS LAGGARDS?

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Copyright was invented in the eighteenth century to give cultural producers property rights in their works, allowing them to live from their efforts.[1] It was specifically intended to benefit those who worked independently, not for wages or salary. Work-for-hire was the only element of copyright dealing with salaried employees. That evolved only later in any detail, and then not equally in all nations. Work-for-hire gives employers — not the creators — most rights in works produced by their employees. It was introduced in the nineteenth century to deal with commissioned art works. Who owned a portrait, the painter or the commissioner? But it was elaborated in law mainly in the twentieth century, especially in the U.S., and largely at the behest of the film industry. It is not hard to see why. Film is an inherently collaborative art form, demanding cooperation among scores of different creators, all with reasonable claims to be important participants.

Copyright stakes two primary claims: the artistic or moral rights, like those of attribution and integrity, and the economic or monopoly rights. The first give authors the right to be identified as such and to prevent their works from being changed without approval. They are largely uncontroversial and need no further comment here. The property right grants a temporary monopoly over dissemination, thus stimulating creators to further efforts by rewarding them. Equally important, copyright's monopoly made dissemination possible in the first place. In the analogue era, publishing cost money: royalties and editorial efforts, but even more so the cost of producing and distributing the work, conventionally in the form of books. Who would front the money involved if others could publish the same work at the same time while dodging most expenses? By giving them a temporary monopoly, copyright protected the first publishers from piracy.

Since it was first institutionalized, two changes have fundamentally altered the legal landscape of copyright. First, most authors, or content producers, are no longer independent workers. Few authors make a living from their works alone. How many no one knows. A 1976 study calculated that only three hundred U.S. writers could live off their literary earnings (of ten million aspiring colleagues). A 1979 survey of

1 This is a revised version of a talk given at the German Historical Institute in Washington DC in June 2018. I am grateful to Sarah Beringer and Atiba Pertilla for the invitation, and to Ross Mounce and Michael Kellogg for advice and research help.

over two thousand writers revealed that almost half held paid positions besides freelance writing.[2] Instead, the bulk of authors today are employees of universities, think tanks, museums, other cultural institutions, or of corporations. Even most novelists and poets have day jobs as creative writing teachers. Such authors are paid for their work by salary. For them a property monopoly makes no sense. They do not rely on it to survive, nor arguably do they deserve it since they have already been rewarded.

At the outset of the copyright system in the early nineteenth century, that was not true. Even in the universities, tenured professors, whom we now regard as among those most comfortably ensconced in salaried employment, were a minority. When the German universities expanded in the nineteenth century, most teaching fell to irregularly employed *Privatdozenten*, paid — if they could collect them — by fees from students attending their courses.[3] But today the norm is that the bulk of all content is produced by salaried authors. We live in an age of institutional patronage. Compared to when Hegel died, in the 1830s, Germany today has per capita a dozen times more professors.[4] Similar trends hold elsewhere. Most authors are now salaried employees for whom — other than the aesthetic claims — copyright should be a matter of indifference.

It is surprising that this development alone has not encouraged reform of the inherited system. Compare Hollywood and academe. Film is a huge cultural industry that has largely exempted itself from the dictates of traditional copyright by invoking work-for-hire. Occasionally the screen writers' guild goes on strike. But in fact Hollywood has some of the strongest unions in the country, the envy of other industries, and the most employee-friendly contracts. That solves the property aspects of copyright. Attribution and other moral rights are resolved by detailed prescription, the outcome of which are those comically elaborate credits, with endless producers, executive producers, co-executive producers, and the like, all scrolling like the invitation list to a Moonie wedding before the action starts.

2 John Tebbel, "The Book Business in the US," in David Daiches and Anthony Thorlby, eds., *The Modern World* (London, 1976) 3: 533; Paul W. Kingston et al., "The Columbia Economic Survey of American Authors: A Summary of Findings," Center for Social Sciences, Columbia University, 1981, 14.

3 By 1950, professors made up only 26% of the teaching staff at German universities. Alexander Busch, "The Vicissitudes of the *Privatdozent*," *Minerva*, 1, 3 (1963) 319.

4 Forty per million in 1835, 507 in 2010: Claude Diebolt, *Die langfristige Entwicklung des Schulsystems in Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, C.3. Anzahl der Lehrer in Deutschland (1835–1940), Deutschland, Professoren an den Universitaten, 1997 [2005], Gesis, histat: Historische Statistik. Available at http://www.gesis.org/histat/table/details/F19F3B-6F210A682349F308D8618F1D0C/0200000000000000 0000000000000000; Statistisches Bundesamt, H201—Hochschulstatistik, Professoren nach Geschlecht, Insgesamt. Excel file provided by Statistisches Bundesamt.

Academe, in contrast, remains ensnared in traditional copyright. Not because it is smaller or less significant than the entertainment industry. Quite the contrary. However popular Hollywood's product, however well paid its top auteurs and moguls, the university world is orders of magnitude larger. American colleges and universities employ ten times as many people as the motion picture and recording industries, their income is at least five times as great.[5] What distinguishes the entertainment from the academic industry, of course, is that one is for-profit, paying its own way. The university world in contrast is financed almost wholly by tax dollars, directly or indirectly. Whether via government grants or the tax deductibility of donations to universities, the research function is largely underwritten by the public. 80% of the world's academic research is thus funded.[6] All the more reason why academia should no longer be governed by traditional copyright.

Besides the wholesale replacement of the independent by the salaried author, the second big change since the early days of copyright concerns dissemination. The expense of putting out books necessitated a guarantee to publishers of a temporary monopoly allowing them to recoup their costs. Digital technology has now upended this inherited ecosystem in a number of ways. Some are minor. It has, for example, streamlined the editorial process, making revision and typesetting activities that have been de-physicalized. Copy-editing has largely been replaced by word-processing software. Being a copyeditor at a publisher these days is akin to being an elevator operator in a push-button lift.

Peer review has been provided largely for free, apart from the costs of organizing it. That is therefore but a minor part of what publishers brought to the table in the first place. But even more revolutionary is the question now raised of why peer review has to be undertaken by publishers at all. Why must it occur before publication? The hard sciences have begun to turn peer review into a process less like a trial by jury and more akin to a conversation among colleagues. Instead of submitting a manuscript to reviewers, taking onboard one round of comments, and then publishing once and for all, digitality allows a more fluid process. A preliminary version is posted on the web, commented on by colleagues. Revisions follow. By this point everyone who cares about the subject has seen the manuscript and dissemination has effectually taken place. But only now does publication in a technical sense occur. In the hard sciences that is increasingly something

5 In 2009 four- year colleges in the U.S. had a staff of 3.7 million. With enrollments of almost 13 million in 2009 and an average tuition of $21,657, that suggests an annual income from this source alone of $280 billion. To that came approximately $60 billion in federal and private R&D funding in 2011. 388,000 people worked in the motion picture and recording industries in 2013. Its gross intake was 61.2 billion in 2010. Figures from: Institute of Education Sciences Digest of Education Statistics, 2011 Tables and Figures, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11 /tables/dt11_196.asp; Congressional Research Service memo from Sue Kirchhoff, 9 December 2011 at http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111212/02244817037/congressional-research-service-shows-hollywood-is-thriving.shtml; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Industries at a Glance*; Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries: NAICS 512; Workforce Statistics: Employment, Unemployment, and Layoffs; Employment, all employees (seasonally adjusted), http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag512.htm#workforce.

6 https://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?ao=20&key=RxArFbnG1P&n=360010.PDF%20.

that matters only to future historians, not to today's practitioners. The point of traditional prepublication review was to spare publishers the cost of bringing out works not worth it. Now that the expense of publication has dropped, however, this falls away. The review can be done before publication, as part of publication, or after it. The timing is largely irrelevant.[7]

Mathematicians, physicists, and computer scientists already work largely through pre-publication manuscripts posted online. ArXiv is one of the most successful of such sites, with costs of about $10 per article to host.[8] Since arXiv does not actually publish articles, a better comparison is Scipost (https://scipost.org), which provides journal certification as well, but still for a fraction of the lifetime cost of traditional subscriptions or conventional open access journals. Computer scientists are yet further along this route. They consider even articles passé and too cumbersome to keep up with the pace. Instead, conference papers are the currency of the realm — posted, commented, and revised at a rapid clip. Their promotion and tenure procedures have adjusted accordingly.[9]

These are important changes introduced by digitality to the editorial and review functions that publishers used to provide alone. All of them undercut publishers' claims to add value. But they pale compared to the effect digitality will have on dissemination. Once the work has been reviewed, edited, and made digitally presentable, it can now be accessible to everyone in the world at the further cost only of running and maintaining the servers where it lives. Other issues, like backward compatibility (ensuring that digital records are kept abreast of current technology), are part of digitality in general and not peculiar to publishing. They are equally a problem for any other form of record-keeping, whether government or corporate, and must be solved by society as a whole. With largely costless dissemination, the second major argument for copyright has also vanished.

What does this mean for the three main engines of dissemination: bookstores, libraries, publishers? Bookstores will continue to disappear in their current incarnation. Some books will remain in tangible form. Whether they are bought in physical locations or online will depend on consumer preference. As their dissemination function vanishes, bookstores will turn even more into what they have become already today: coffee shops with a somewhat more elaborate inventory.

7 Timothy Gowers, "The End of an Error? Considering the Alternatives to Formal Peer Review," *Times Literary Supplement*, 24 October 2017.

8 Richard Van Noorden, "Open Access: The True Cost of Science Publishing," *Nature*, 495, 7442 (27 March 2013), https://www.nature.com/news/open-access-the-true-cost-of-science-publishing-1.12676.

9 Matthew Hutson, "Boycott Highlights AI's Publishing Rebellion," *Science* 360, 6390 (18 May 2018): 699.

Most functions that libraries serve are equally doomed. Digitality ends the need for physical libraries to store and lend content. We used to go to the village well to collect our water, now we open the tap at home. So too will the digital flows be managed. In the medium term, libraries may well serve a socializing function, as educational facilities more like schools or adult education centers than repositories of content. We hear much about libraries' new functions as social centers. Sites of connection, not collection, says Frances Pinter.[10] All well and good, but deep down, libraries are not part of the hospitality industry. Other perhaps than undergraduates, people do not go to there to socialize, but for a similar reason why Willie Sutton robbed banks, because that is where the content is.

Beyond that, the dirty little secret of the analogue library is that they all broadly replicate each other. Even the biggest research collections have much the same content as their competitors. Once that is digitized and posted online, what will be their point? A few items that each one alone might possess will remain, motivating some visits. But in that sense libraries will have become archives. And ultimately the same fate awaits archives as will overtake libraries even before that.

Yet there remains a crucial function that libraries may be well-positioned to accomplish. Digitizing all books does not solve all problems. Paper copies have to be kept as insurance against catastrophe. The Internet Archive stores its books in containers in the Bay area. Nicholson Baker's crusade on behalf of decommissioned periodicals was a farcical variant on that quest.[11] As the Google Books Project has shown, kinks remain to be worked out in the digitization process before copies become as good as possible. And some scholars will still need the paper copies for reasons of their own. Physical editions of past publications will not wholly vanish. But these are all minor issues.

More importantly, someone will have to be the long-term archivist. When libraries license e-books for their patrons, they are stored on the servers of the publishers or the middle-men. What happens when they go bankrupt? Who will be responsible for the ultimate storage of our patrimony? The content that is up in the cloud will need to be preserved, kept up to date, and otherwise usable in perpetuity. This function we cannot entrust to publishers in the future any more than today. Perhaps libraries will become the preservationists of the digital. The big difference is that instead of having to maintain 120,000 collections, we will have just one.

10 "An Interview with Frances Pinter," *Knowledge Unlatched*, http://www.knowledgeunlatched.org/2013/01/an-interview-with-frances-pinter/.

11 Nicholson Baker, *Double Fold: Libraries and the Assault on Paper* (New York, 2001).

Finally, the publishers: their main reason, disseminating works, no longer exists. One might expect them to follow the bookstores and libraries into oblivion. But in fact the opposite is happening. Rather than going quietly into that dark night, the publishers are putting up a kind of horror movie return from the dead, a last gasp of rent-seeking monopolistic behavior before the inevitable end.

Not the book publishers. Arguably, they have lost control of their enterprise. Digitality has provoked an explosion of creativity, most of it outside the conventional arena. While the number of traditional books has remained largely steady, born-digital editions, published through Amazon and the like, have avalanched. Three hundred thousand print and binding titles come out annually, but over four million non-traditional works were issued in 2010. This tsunami quieted somewhat in subsequent years, yet still triple the rate of conventional works at one million annually.[12] In the former Eastern Bloc it used to be said of scholars that, censored in what they could write officially, they wrote privately for the desk drawer — works that might one day be published after a regime change or perhaps abroad. Now it seems that everyone had manuscripts tucked away, just waiting for a new technology allowing this creative pressure to erupt. Who is writing, for whom, about what, not to mention where and how these works will be preserved for posterity — such questions remain largely unexplored.

The periodical publishers, however, are a different story. They have monopolies on non-substitutable goods. If readers cannot afford a certain article in a physics journal, it is not as though they can read another competing, cheaper one instead. Goods with this sort of monopoly pricing, like first-class postage or electricity, are usually carefully regulated.[13] Publishers have mercilessly exploited this hammerlock — monopoly without regulation — increasing the subscription cost of scientific periodicals at triple the consumer price index over the past decades.[14] Indeed, they are firming up their quasi-monopoly. Over half of all natural science and medical research is now published by the largest five academic publishing houses: Reed-Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Springer, Taylor & Francis, and, depending on the metric, either the American Chemical Society or Sage Publishing. The social sciences are even worse off. In 1973, one in ten articles were published by the big five, now it is more than half. 71% of all psychology papers are published by them.[15]

However dire the situation seems though, this too will pass. The periodical publishers' rent-seeking monopolies cannot last. Increasingly,

12 https://www.statista.com/statistics/248345/number-of-titles-published-in-the-us-by-type/

13 Richard Edwards and David Shulenberger, "The High Cost of Scholarly Journals (and What to Do about It)," *KU ScholarWorks*, 2, https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/12546/Highe%20Cost%20of%20Scholarly%20-%20Change.pdf.

14 Association of Research Libraries, *ALR Statistics, 2003-04*, Graph 4, http://www.libqual.org/documents/admin/2012/ARL_Stats/2004-05arlstats.pdf. More recent continuing bad news in "Top Universities' Journal Subscriptions 'Average Four Million,'" *Times Higher Education*, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/top-universities-journal-subscriptions-average-4-million-pounds.

15 Vincent Larivière, Stefanie Haustein, Philippe Mongeon, "The Oligopoly of Academic Publishers in the Digital Era," *PLOS One*, 10 June 2015, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0127502.

the governments that fund most scientific research see no reason to pay for profit margins of 30 and 40%. They are demanding that tax-financed research be freely available to those who pay for it in the first place. In the hard science periodical literature this is gradually becoming policy. Having started slowly in the late 1980s, open access periodicals now bring out almost a third of all published research.[16] The humanities and softer social sciences, in contrast, have barely begun addressing the problem. And the issue of monographs, which remain the medium of choice in some of these fields, is only just now being broached.

The UK is perhaps furthest along in this process. Because most research funding flows through centralized government control, the British authorities can make demands without precedent elsewhere. Periodical literature that university departments wish to submit to determine their productivity, their rank, and thus their funding must now be largely open access. Even more ambitiously, monographs will soon have to be as well. An ecosystem of open access publishers is therefore slowly emerging in the UK and elsewhere to meet what promises to be a growing demand.

Several Anglophone publishers have already developed open access programs. To publish a book thusly means fronting the costs in advance to offer readers works free of charge. Such publishing fees vary quite a bit. Palgrave is $17,500, Brill $6940, Open Book about $5000, Ubiquity between $5000 and $12000, Cambridge $10,000, the University of California's Luminos series $15,000 per volume. Where will authors find the money to allow the world to read their works? Assume that $10,000 is what it costs to make a manuscript presentable in machine-readable form, post it on the web, arrange for printed copies for those who want to pay for them, and maintain its storage. Sticking with the U.S. figures to keep things simple, given that 300,000 conventional books are published annually, that requires an investment of three billion dollars. There are almost 120,000 libraries of various sorts in America. Their combined acquisitions budgets — not running costs or staffing or the like, but the cost of buying content — is $4.7 billion for the most recent year available.[17]

In other words, through the enormously inefficient means of buying analogue copies in various numbers, distributing them randomly at nodal points in different quantities throughout the nation, and asking the public to make its way laboriously to these libraries to read books while sitting in expensive, centrally-located real estate, while being

16 Heather Piwowar et al., "The State of OA: A Large-Scale Analysis of the Prevalence and Impact of Open Access Articles, *PeerJ* (2018) 6:e4375, https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.4375.

17 Numbers from: Institute of Museum and Library Services; Research: Data Collection; Supplementary Tables; Public Library Revenue and Expenses; Table 26. Total collection expenditures of public libraries and percentage distribution of expenditures, by type of expenditure and state: Fiscal year 2012; Total collection expenditures; Total (in thousands), 73, http://www.imls.gov/assets/1/AssetManager/FY2012%20PLS_Tables_21_thru_31A.pdf; Tai Phan et al., National Center for Education Statistics, *Academic Libraries: 2012: First Look*, January 2014, Table 9. Expenditures for different types of information resources at academic libraries, by control, level, size, and Carnegie classification of institution: Fiscal year 2012; All information resources; All U.S. academic libraries, 12, http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014038.pdf; Amy Bitterman et al., U.S. Department of Education, *Characteristics of Public Elementary and Secondary School Library Media Centers in the United States: Results From the 2011–12 Schools and Staffing Survey: First Look*, Table 1, Number of public schools that reported having library media centers, by selected school characteristics: 2011–12; Total number of schools; Number of schools with a library media center, 6, http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013315.pdf; *Library and Book Trade Almanac*, 60th ed., ed. Dave Bogart (Medford NJ, 2015), 381.

heated, cooled, and otherwise maintained, we could be making every book published every year available to every inhabitant of the globe.

This still leaves a few loose ends. It does not cover periodicals, nor the existing materials in libraries — not that in the public domain, nor that which remains in copyright, whether orphaned or firmly parented. It is hard to know how many books exist. The best guess comes from a software engineer at Google Books in 2010 who estimated that there were 129,000,000 books in the conventional sense, and 146 million if we include bound volumes of periodicals and government documents.[18] It has been estimated that perhaps 25% of these are in the public domain, so 36 million. And that there are 30 million books in print and in copyright. But since there are 28 million such in English alone, this is likely an underestimate, so let us call it 40 million. That leaves 70 million books in copyright and out of print. A combination of 106 million public domain and in-copyright but out-of-print works could thus be digitized.

Assume 100 million as a round number of works in need of scanning. At 200 pages per book that is 20 billion pages. The Internet Archive charges five cents per page to scan and run optical character recognition, thus a total cost of one billion dollars. Some of the work has already been done via Hathi Trust, JSTOR, Google Books project, and the like. Google alone is said to have scanned twenty-five million books. So this figure would be lower anyway. In other words, for about a billion dollars, all public domain and out-of-print works, not just those published in the U.S., could be made freely available on the web. That is of course a one-off cost. Let us then assume that making all periodicals open access will cost approximately the same as doing so for all books, viz three or four billion dollars annually. This is in line with estimates of total current costs of article publishing of $10 billion globally, a figure that then needs to be discounted by the 40% profit margin baked in, the lower costs inherent in open access publishing more generally, and the participation of the rest of the world in raising revenues.[19] That leaves us with the question where these funds will come from.

The total operational budgets (not counting acquisitions, which we have already earmarked for open access publishing) of public and academic libraries in the U.S. is well over thirteen billion dollars annually.[20] Let us assume that as content is digitized, half of these budgets that would otherwise go to cataloguing, storing, heating, cooling, lending, re-shelving, preserving, and all the other costs of keeping the books

18 Leonid Taycher, "Books of the World, Stand Up and Be Counted! All 129,864,880 of you," *Inside Google Books*, 5 August 2010, http://booksearch.blogspot.com/2010/08/books-of-world-stand-up-and-be-counted.html?m=1.

19 Ralf Schimmer, Kai Karin Geschuhn, Andreas Vogler, "Disrupting the Subscription Journals' Business Model for the Necessary Large-Scale Transformation to Open Access." *Max Planck Digital Library Open Access Policy White Paper*, 28 April 2015, 5, http://dx.doi.org/10.17617/1.3.

20 Numbers in Institute of Museum and Library Services, *Public Libraries in the United States Survey: Fiscal Year 2012* (December 2014), 8, http://www.imls.gov/research/public_libraries_in_the_us_fy_2012_report.aspx; U. S. Department of Education, *Academic Libraries: 2012* (January 2014), 11, 13, http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014038.pdf.

as physical objects circulating and in good shape, becomes redundant. The conclusion is that with the monies already sloshing around in the library system, we can both publish all future content as open access, as well as digitize and disseminate all existing library content.

It bears repeating: with the monies already in the library system we can make everything in it and everything that ever will be in it available to anyone anywhere in the world who has access to the internet. Everyone will have the Library of Congress on their tablet, and as other nations follow suit, even more than that. And it will not cost a penny more than is already spent on a vastly less efficient system. For the first time in history we can make all content available freely to all humans. It is no longer a technical or physical impossibility. It is not even a financial issue. The obstacles now are purely legal. If every country does it too, the payoff becomes global.

That's the vision. How do we get from here to there? And why are we not falling over ourselves to do it as quickly as possible? Some movement in the right direction is occurring. Copyright law is slowly being softened up to allow digitizing orphaned works — those that, though technically still protected, are out of print and bereft of identifiable rights holders. Just a few years ago, the Norwegian *Bokhylla* project looked like an example to follow. It allows all books published in Norway before 2000 to be read on screen from IP addresses within Norway.[21] Today, however, it seems more like a state subsidized boondoggle for publishers who double dip. If we licensed the Library of Congress's holdings at the same price per page paid by the Norwegians, it would cost a hundred million dollars annually. If, however, we take into consideration that the U.S. population is sixty times the Norwegian and rights owners forced us to scale up proportionately, the cost would be six billion dollars annually.[22] Since that is well above the total library acquisitions budgets, it suggests that the Norwegians are overpaying.

Meanwhile, things have moved on. The Internet Archive has started a program of "controlled lending" that applies digital technologies to the traditional library model. It shifts the books it owns to digital. They cannot be downloaded, but anyone anywhere can read them on screen, one person at a time per copy owned. Has copyright been violated in the act of making the digital copy that is read on screen? Or can one argue that the Internet Archive is merely doing what we expect of libraries, but now harnessing the convenience of digitality to the task, thus permitting patrons to read anywhere?

21 "Literature Goes Online for Free in Norway," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 January 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/literature-goes-online-for-free-in-norway-20140120-hv8zt.html.

22 Peter Hirtle, "Norway, Extended Collective Licensing, and Orphan Works," *LibraryLaw Blog*, 21 March 2014, http://blog.librarylaw.com/librarylaw/2014/03/norway-extended-collective-licensing-and-orphan-works.html.

The New York Public Library is now emulating and expanding this approach by working directly with authors and their heirs to make more books available online. NYPL intends to produce a demand-driven open access request procedure for out-of-print works. A request for a book with no existing, easily available digital option will trigger a process in which, in collaboration with a group such as the Author's Guild, NYPL will try to find and make an agreement with the rights holder that enables scanning, conversion, and non-commercial digital distribution of the book. In return the rights holder will get a digital version from NYPL which they can sell online if they choose, as well as access to circulation statistics for their work. All sides win. Rights holders will discover something that only libraries (and perhaps second-hand bookstores) could tell them — which currently unpublished works remain popular and potentially commercially viable — and the reading public will gain unimpeded digital access to otherwise out-of-print works.

Other initiatives also seek to force-feed the circuits of works that can legally be digitized and made available. Carl Malamud's Public.Resources.Org is expanding the public domain to its full extent. U.S. copyright excludes "works of the U.S. government" from protection. That includes scientific research by federal employees — such as doctors at the Centers for Disease Control or the National Institutes of Health — conducted as part of their official duties. Malamud has found well over a million journal articles in this category.[23] He and others are also seeking to identify that half of all works for which copyright was not renewed in the period (1923-63) when the law still required authors specifically to apply to extend their rights.[24]

Meanwhile, open access has become akin to going ecological or environmental. Everyone claims to be for it and to do it, but in fact there is a lot of greenwash, or in this case openwash. All the big scientific publishers now claim to be open access. They publish hybrid journals where authors can pay to make their articles available even as others remain behind the paywall. Universities are allowing contributing alumni continued access to JSTOR and other perks of the digital paradise they enjoyed as students before being ejected into the bleak post-lapsarian world on the far side of the paywall. But little of this goes to the core of the issue.

The publishers are double-dipping. They collect publishing fees even as they continue to charge libraries standard subscription rates.

23 Carl Malamud, "Who May Swim in the Ocean of Knowledge?" *Wire*, 2 March 2018, https://thewire.in/228888/who-may-swim-in-the-ocean-of-knowledge/.

24 University of Michigan, "Copyright Review Management System — IMLS National Leadership Grant," http://wayback.archive-it.org/5871/20171110030439/https:/www.lib.umich.edu/copyright-review-management-system-imls-national-leadership-grant.

The libraries cannot resist because they have to have the full journal available regardless of how many open access articles it contains. Front-loading the payments for publication through gold open-access has created perverse incentives, now being exploited. The academic world is awash with faux open access journals whose primary interest is collecting publishing fees, then slapping the results — good, bad, and indifferent — up on a website somewhere, if even that. Six percent of U.S. academic articles appear in suspect periodicals — effectively professorial vanity presses.[25] Some serious self-policing is urgently required.

In all this, where are the big university research libraries and their core clientele, the professoriate? Absent from the vanguard and often fighting rearguard battles against open access, is the dispiriting answer. As a caste, the professoriate has ignored and at times resisted their universities' attempts to make them deposit at least prepublication versions of works in open access repositories. Even though the average academic monograph now sells but sixty copies, and even though professors happily collect that part of their salaries intended to cover the research effort, they insist on being counted among the independent creators, entitled to publish their works as they please and collect royalties as best they can.[26] The worst offenders are those who are vested in copyright as authors of textbooks which they hope will sell widely and make them wealthy. Scholarly societies in the humanities often live off the subscriptions to their journals. These were usually sold at reasonable prices, but many have now thrown in their lot with the big presses, becoming bundled as part of packages that are offered to university libraries in take-it-or-leave-it deals.

Many academics live within the university bubble without even realizing it. Jill Lepore — a force of nature and an enviable scholarly talent — gives voice to this academic obtuseness when she writes that "most of what academics produce can be found, by anyone who wants to find it, by searching Google."[27] That is simply false, except in the plushy-feathered nest of a university proxy server. The professoriate is well-served by the existing system, but no one else is. Take as an example Wikipedia's footnotes. Wikipedia is the greatest assemblage of human knowledge ever, the closest we will ever get to the Enlightenment idea of a universal encyclopedia. And yet its sources, indicated in the footnotes, are largely locked down. For the entry "Holocaust" for example, there are references to about 150 books and articles. Of these, a dozen appear to be clickable, but only two or three actually go

25 "Publish and Don't Be Damned," *Economist*, 23 June 2018.

26 Benedicte Page, "'Group Action Needed to Safeguard the Academic Book', Warns Report," *Bookseller*, 12 June 2017, https://www.thebookseller.com/news/group-action-needed-safeguard-academic-book-warns-report-567951.

27 Jill Lepore, "The New Economy of Letters," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 3 September 2013.

to the source without some sort of subscription or affiliation to JSTOR or other paywalled databases. The average reader who wants to check the source of a claim in the article is barred from doing so, except by going to the nearest major research library, wherever that may be.

Lepore's attitude is the smug insiderism that spurred Aron Swartz to release as much of JSTOR as he could download. It is what has made Sci-Hub one of the darlings of the open access movement.[28] It is now the largest open access academic resource in the world. After just six years of existence, it hosts 67 million papers, two-thirds of all published research, and is available to anyone.[29] It violates every copyright law in existence and continues only because it is hosted somewhere in the Ukraine, supported by Russia as a way of poking a stick in the eye of the West.

Why then do academics continue to submit much of their work to subscription journals and to sign away their copyright to publishers? Inertia and ignorance is part of the answer. Scholars are not the ones who have to pick up the tab. They do not care what journal articles cost those outside academia. They often do not even know how much that is. In the analogue era, authors could order offprints of articles to send to would-be readers without subscriptions. In the sciences, requests for offprints from developing nations often came on pre-printed cards with heartfelt appeals for a copy, pointing out that otherwise there was no hope of reading the work. Today such reminders of the global information divide no longer prick the consciences of the professoriate.

Prestige too is a motive. Commercial operators have bought many of the best-regarded journals. New alternatives that promise wider readership, but less status, are often shunned. Tenure and promotion still depend markedly on where content is published. Universities outsource much of their quality control work to publishers. It is not uncommon for tenure cases to be sustained once a book is accepted by a prestigious press. Academia's collective laziness prevents it doing the work that the presses supposedly undertake instead — even though the readers for the publishers are the same colleagues who should be evaluating for internal departmental review.[30] The desire for prestige blinds even young scholars to how, by sticking with traditional outlets, they effectively extinguish their work. To publish with a conventional press these days means to drop your book into a black hole where only those will see it who can afford the three-figure price of the average Routledge or OUP monograph, or who happen

28 Ian Graber-Stiehl, "Science's Pirate Queen," *Verge*, 8 February 2018, https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/8/16985666/alexandra-elbakyan-sci-hub-open-access-science-papers-lawsuit.

29 Daniel S. Himmelstein et al., "Sci-Hub Provides Access to Nearly All Scholarly Literature," *eLife* 2018; 7:e32822 doi: 10.7554/eLife.32822.

30 Themes I have discussed in Peter Baldwin, "Betting on Vetting: Evaluation, not Publication, Should Be Academe's New Priority," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 17 February 2014.

to enjoy lending privileges at a major research university library. In the humanities and social sciences, monograph publication is effectively privatization.

It is time to bring the professoriate under a work-for-hire system, much like Hollywood. Naturally, the university world resists such suggestions. Professors still fancy themselves more akin to Romantic artistes than Hollywood's scriptwriters. But that is an increasingly archaic view. They are paid salaries for their research. They should have their work recognized by attribution and some version of the integrity right, allowing them to decide its final form. But why they should have a monopoly of dissemination remains a mystery.

In the meantime, while awaiting the millennium, what can we do? The vast majority of publications funded by public monies should be open access. That is on the verge of becoming reality in the UK. An ecosystem of open access publishers is springing up to meet the anticipated demand. In Australia that is already in place, and more monographs there are now published freely accessible than conventionally closed.[31] Demands are heard to nationalize academic publishing, as a public function that is increasingly failing its duty.[32] Research funding in the U.S. does not flow through the same central control as in Britain, but the problem still falls entirely within the universities' remit should they want to take it up. The academic world does not need to coordinate with publishers or anyone else to require that publications considered in the promotion portfolio be open access, or at least to give extra weight to those that are.

We can encourage periodicals to review open access books. Hoping to sprinkle a bit of stardust on the first cohort of authors in its Luminos series, the University of California Press took out a full-page ad in the *New York Review of Books*. Have the major academic review outlets — NYRB, LRB, TLS, NYT and so forth — reviewed their first open access book? Either way, the day it will have happened will be a milestone. And they should be encouraged to make it a habit. Imagine the pleasure of clicking to download at the instant of having read a review of an interesting book. And of course senior scholars — no longer in thrall to the demands of prestige — must show the way by publishing their own work in such formats. Lionel Gossman, distinguished professor emeritus of literature at Princeton, is an admirable exemplar, having published several works in recent years with Open Books.[33]

31 Colin Steele, "Open Access in Australia: An Odyssey of Sorts? *UKSG Insights*, *26*, 3 (2013) 282–289, http://doi.org/10.1629/2048-7754.91.

32 David Matthews, "Is it Time to Nationalise Academic Publishers?" *Times Higher Education*, 2 March 2018, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/blog/it-time-nationalise-academic-publishers.

33 Of course, Amazon gives no hint that his works are available for free download from the publishers. See http://commons.princeton.edu/lgossman/ My own attempt to set a good example was less successful. Only having come to an agreement with Princeton UP to release my latest book in an open access edition two years after publication did I notice that the press has no such program. After the agreed-upon interval they sent me a PDF, satisfied that they had kept up their part of the bargain. It is now available at https://archive.org/details/thecopyrightwars00bald.

Digitality has fundamentally undermined copyright. We are mostly salaried content producers now who do not need its protections. Dissemination has become significantly costless, removing the other main argument for copyright. The university world is that part of content production which least needs or deserves traditional copyright. It is that part which should be most interested in universal access and the extraordinary promise it holds out for the world outside the academic bubble. But despite that, it is barely a follower and often a hindrance. For shame!

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Conference Reports

IN GLOBAL TRANSIT: JEWISH MIGRANTS FROM HITLER'S EUROPE IN ASIA, AFRICA, AND BEYOND

Conference organized by the Max Weber Stiftung India Branch Office at Loreto College, Kolkata, India, February 14-18, 2018. Conveners: Andreas Gestrich (GHI London), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), Anne Schenderlein (GHI Washington), and Indra Sengupta (GHI London). Participants: Tobias Brinkmann (Penn State University), Anuradha Chatterji (independent scholar, previously Loreto College, Kolkata), Maria Framke (University of Rostock), Atina Grossmann (Cooper Union), Sarah Hagmann (University of Basel), Susanne Heim (Institut für Zeitgeschichte Munich-Berlin), Pragya Kaul (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), Razak Khan (Hebrew University), Amit Levy (Hebrew University), Shail Mayaram (CSDS Delhi), Sebastian Musch (Hochschule für Jüdische Studien, Heidelberg), Flora Roberts (University of Tübingen), Kenneth X. Robbins (collector and author, Washington DC), Jael Silliman (independent scholar, Kolkata), Swen Steinberg (TU Dresden), Tapati Guha Thakurta (CSSS, Kolkata), Gerhard Wolf (University of Sussex).

This was the first of three conferences focusing on new directions in the history of migration and refugee movements. Each conference is being organized in collaboration with one of the three branch offices that the GHI London and Washington and the Max Weber Foundation have opened in recent years.

The first panel of the first day was chaired by Indra Sengupta. Maria Framke delivered the first paper titled "India: A Safe Haven for Jewish Refugees? Exploring the Entangled Web of Indian Anti-Fascism, Anti-Colonialism and Humanitarian Solidarity in the Inter-War Period." Notwithstanding antifascist leanings by several of its influential members and widely existing sympathies with the persecuted Jews, the Indian National Congress did not provide any concrete help to them primarily due to domestic considerations. By contrast, the dispatch of the Indian medical mission to China occurred in an internationalist antiimperialist context, which allowed the Congress to take a prominent stance against British politics without jeopardizing its own interests in India. Framke's paper showed that the implementation of anticolonial humanitarian initiatives in India did not only depend on different domestic and foreign policy parameters but must be understood in the context of wider imperial and international entanglements. The second presenter was Pragya Kaul, who delivered

a paper titled "Between Colonizer and Colonized: Nationalism, the War and Refugee Identity Formation in British India." European Jews seeking refuge in British India in the mid to late 1930s entered a profoundly colonial space. Here, opposing pro-German and anti-European sentiments on the part of the Indians, and pro-white and anti-German sentiments on the part of the colonial administration abounded. More significantly, however, refugees entered a space where the dominating reality was a nationalist struggle for independence, and a counter-struggle to ensure the maintenance of the colony, especially as its resources and armies were fundamental to British survival and success in the Second World War. Integrating traces left by Jewish refugees with narratives from records of the colonial government of India, this paper explored how the context of colonialism and nationalism determined how Jewish refugees were perceived and received by the local population of colonists and colonized. The paper highlighted the degree to which the structures of colonialism and nationalist rebellions are integral to understanding the perceptions which shaped the space in which Jewish refugees constructed their identities.

The papers successfully inaugurated the theme and scope of the conference, which dealt with the concept of transit inviting the notions of uncertainty and fluidity. The discussion following the presentations ranged from Gandhi's notion of the Jewish state to questions regarding the Jews' "whiteness."

The second session was titled "Local Interactions and Anti-Semitism" and chaired by Anne Schenderlein. Flora Roberts spoke on "Jews in Wartime Central Asia: Locals, Refugees and the Specter of Anti-Semitism." She argued that anti-Semitism took new forms in Central Asia during the Second World War. While this adversely affected the existing local Jewish population, the newly arrived Jewish refugees were the most vulnerable targets. Their integration into the existing Jewish communities alleviated that effect. The second paper, "Trauma, Privilege and Adventure in Transit: Jewish Refugees in Iran and India," was delivered by Atina Grossman. It examined the intensely ambivalent and paradoxical experiences, sensibilities, and emotions of bourgeois Jews who found refuge in the "Orient" after 1933. Relying on an extensive family archive of correspondence and memorabilia as well as material from British colonial and international Jewish aid agencies' archives, she focused on her German Jewish father's internment experience and, more generally, on the role of

Jewish aid agencies during the Second World War as well as the early postwar period. These uprooted Jews navigated complex and unfamiliar terrain; as her father's letters from a prison in Quetta, an internment camp in Dehradun, a "parole center" in Purandhar, and finally cosmopolitan Bombay on the verge of independence and partition reveal. Homeless and stateless, they had lost their livelihoods and professions and were unsure of their families' fate or what their future held, yet they were also privileged as adventurous Europeans in the racialized hierarchy of "exotic" non-western, colonial spaces. In volatile colonial British India, Axis nationality Jews faced the particular paradox of internment as "enemy aliens" or occasionally "suspect enemy agents" while struggling to prove their anti-Nazi credentials. At the same time, the Bombay Jewish Relief Society worked on sometimes conflicting fronts to assist interned Jewish refugees and to support the British war effort against the Nazis. After the war they sought to enlist wealthy Indian Jews (in Bombay and Calcutta) and prominent independence leaders like Gandhi and Nehru in campaigns to support desperate Jewish survivors in Europe. The paper probed the refugees' understanding of their own unstable position and their efforts to come to terms with emerging revelations about the destruction of European Jewry, narrating a family story folded into a larger historical "remapping" of war, the Holocaust, empire, and displacement with India as a key site.

The first day of the conference concluded with a roundtable on "Jewish Refugee History outside the University: Archives, Collections and Exhibitions" chaired by Tapati Guha Thakurta. Jael Silliman delivered a visual treat with her work "Recalling Jewish Calcutta: Jewish Portraits, Indian Frames: Women's Narratives from a Diaspora of Hope." Using material from the archives of Jadavpur University and Dublin University along with personal archives across the world, she showed numerous images representing broader narratives like the relationship between Jews and Muslims in Calcutta, Jewish integration in Calcutta, how Iraqi Jews became Anglicized, etc. She also presented specific case histories of a Jewish magician, various actresses, beauty queens and politicians. Moreover, she narrated a visual saga of Jewish heritage buildings located in the city. Kenneth X. Robbins' paper was titled "The Reception of Jews in Calcutta: The Wonderful Sojourns of European Jewish Refugees and Baghdadi Jews in Calcutta." He began with the question why only a small number of Jews came to India and how they managed to achieve so much despite the small size of their community. What was their relationship with the Indian population

and how did the British officials treat the Jews? He also examined why Jewish immigrants did not choose to settle in the port city of Cochin although it had been a safe haven for Jews for ages. Anuradha Chatterjee's presentation was a unique one as it talked about a school project run as part of the British Council International School Award in 2016. Her students worked on a project on the Jews of Calcutta between 1933 and 1945. Students attended workshops on Anne Frank, prepared a questionnaire for interviews, went on excursions to Jewish heritage sites, had email correspondence with students in the USA and finally prepared 60 charts. They studied how Calcuttans fared as hosts to the Jewish population in distress and learned about the ordeals the Jews faced in the process of re-settlement. Finally, they drew conclusions on the relationship between these two groups. The discussion mainly revolved around the question of the archive, its character, location, availability and, most importantly, its ownership as it is closely related with the interrogation of memory. The need for larger diasporic archives also requires scholars to become global citizens in order to record such histories of displacement and transit and diasporic networks. The session also sparked interesting discussions on why the Jews chose to migrate again from Calcutta since most of them were living comfortably. Finally the need for community historiography along with professional writing was duly recognized.

The second day of the conference began with a panel entitled "Knowledge" and chaired by Simone Lässig. The first paper, "Jewish Migrants from Germany to British Ceylon and Their Networks of Knowledge 1933-1950," was delivered by Sebastian Musch. Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany who went to Ceylon met Buddhists of German descent who had arrived there back in the 1920s. Musch explained that some of the most canonical Buddhist texts in Sri Lankan Theravada Buddhism go back to Buddhists of German and German Jewish descent like Siegmund Shlomo Feniger, Anton Gueth, and Else Buchholz. During the war this group split over their diverging political views. Swen Steinberg then presented his paper on "Destinations in Asia and Africa in Newspapers and Journals of the German Political Refugees." It analyzed the coverage of escape destinations in Asia and Africa in newspapers and journals written by political refugees from Germany and Austria, which were published in Czechoslovakia and France between 1933 and 1940 and later in the UK. Of particular interest was the information that came from refugees living in these Asian and African countries and regions — often in the form of letters to newspaper editors, for example. Yet these letters contained more

than information: they relayed concrete knowledge that had been acquired in the experience of migration and recommendations to the reader based on these experiences. Since the newspapers were also distributed in the adopted countries of the letter writers, processes of knowledge circulation were at work as well. It is essential to note that from 1935 on global escape increasingly became a topic within various dissenting political groups (socialists, social democrats, communists, democrats / liberals) and their newspapers. In addition to conveying specific knowledge, which came partly from the destination countries and regions, the reporting was always embedded in political and mostly colonial-critical contexts.

The discussion afterward revolved around the "Orient" as a destination of Jewish migrants, whether it attracted them due to a prior fascination with oriental "exotica" or whether they simply headed there out of desperation. Did the Jews want to be represented specifically as European Jews or simply as European survivors of Jewish origin? Whatever their stance might have been, survival in the tropics for a European came with hazards of health and hygiene, which also varied by gender. Participants felt a keen interest for a deeper discussion on religious conversion among the German Jews. Similarly interesting nuances were developed regarding the political migrants and their experiences in exile — such as the role of the Comintern, whether the immigrants harbored any political ambitions in their new homelands, and whether there was any discussion in the letters to the editor about the Jewish future or to what extent a Jewish way of life could survive in these circumstances. The first part of the panel ended with an in-depth discussion of the concept of knowledge, its relation with skills, its expression in language and its orientations during transit and different experiences, both at specific and universal levels.

The panel continued with Razak Khan's paper, "Migrant Lives and Ideas: Jewish and Muslim Intellectual Entanglements in Colonial India." It delved into the "minority connection" that was forged between German Jews and Indian Muslims in Weimar Germany and traced its journey and afterlife in colonial India. Khan focused on individual biographies and accounts and situated them within the larger Jewish-Muslim intellectual dialogues that resonated in the interwar period. In particular, this paper followed the entangled lives and thoughts of four Jewish figures in colonial India. While Josef Horovitz (Arabic and Islamic Studies visiting scholar at Aligarh University) and Magnus Hirschfeld (a German sexologist) sojourned briefly through India, two

Jewish women — Lubow Derczanska and Gerda Philipsborn — made India their permanent home in times of discrimination and persecution in Europe. The contrast afforded by the different duration of their stay in India sheds light on the refracted knowledge and experiences shared by Indian Muslims and German Jewish migrants, particularly in the areas of religion, culture and education. This paper juxtaposed the broader brushstrokes of history and archival collections with the delicate hues of personal relationships and friendships that were forged during the subjects' stay in India and that are narrated in affective archives of autobiographies and memoirs. Amit Levy's presentation, "Meeting in the Intellectual Sphere: German-Jewish Émigré Orientalists in British Mandate Palestine and Culture Rapprochement with the Arabs," showed that while Jewish refugee Orientalists may have dreamed of peaceful coexistence with the Arabs, they themselves failed to facilitate it partly because of their deep entrenchment in German ideals of *Bildung* (education). Some of the eminent German-Jewish Orientalists at Hebrew University wanted to only teach classical Arabic, grammar, and translation, thinking that this knowledge would make Arabic scholars accept and look up to them. Focusing on knowledge of the distant past, they did not have knowledge of the present, leaving this to mainstream Zionists and military officers who had different ideas of rapprochement.

The fourth panel, chaired by Shail Mayaram, commenced with Susanne Heim's paper entitled "Resettling Jews." Heim surveyed different plans and initiatives for Jewish resettlement in the 1930s and early 1940s, asking why most settlement projects failed even though they were based on realistic plans and institutions. She commented on U.S. and British government initiatives like the Evian conference, "Project M," and settlement plans for British Rhodesia. The Soviet Union did not take part in the Evian conference but started an unsuccessful resettlement project of its own in Birobodzhan, which was supposed to use Jews as a bulwark against Japanese expansionism. Aside from governments, Jewish organizations also surveyed the prospects of Jewish resettlement. Heim concluded that governmental and non-governmental institutions often contradicted each other and that their plans had little to do with the ideas of the Jews who were supposed to settle in different places. Gerhard Wolf focused on how the U.S. government grappled with the escalating refugee crisis from the Evian conference until the end of the war. Wolf suggested to consider Evian as a turning point in evolving U.S. planning that saw the future political stability of Europe tied to finding a solution to the

continent's alleged demographic problems like population pressure and ethnic conflict, among other things. Seen from this perspective, we might better appreciate the radical departure that the proposed mass resettlement of Jews around the world meant when compared to the approach of the League of Nations, for example. Subsequent wartime planning only solidified this approach, leading to a concerted effort after the war to assist Jews, other national minorities and those who were seen to contribute to overpopulation to emigrate overseas.

The fifth panel, chaired by Andreas Gestrich, was called "Non-governmental Networks and Organizations during and after the Holocaust." The first paper, titled "Shaping New Global Places in Times of Transit: Relief Organizations in Shanghai during World War II," was presented by Sarah Hagmann. The topic of her paper was the translocal network of Meyer Birman (1891–1955), manager of the Shanghai-based Far Eastern Bureau of the Jewish relief organization HIAS-HICEM during World War II. She examined how the bureau's activities were influenced by the particular situation of a temporal and spatial transit, which meant being disconnected from its headquarters in Europe and the USA. She argued that there is a strong connection between experts in international organizations, the dissemination of knowledge, and the flexibility of international organizations. Birman's network of Jewish communities and HIAS-HICEM bureaus in neutral countries such as Switzerland, Sweden and Portugal as well as his cooperation with the International Red Cross shaped temporary *global* spaces which increased his agency for the organization of relief on a *local* level for the about 20,000 Jewish refugees. The second presenter, Tobias Brinkmann, titled his talk "Stranded in Between: Jewish Refugees in Shanghai and Other Treaty Ports after 1945." He focused on the little-known postwar history of the Jewish refugee community. Between 1918 and 1945 Shanghai served as a safe haven for Jewish refugees, initially from Eastern Europe and after 1933 primarily from Germany and Austria. After the Japanese capitulation in August 1945 it proved difficult for Jewish refugees to find a way out of the city. The displaced persons camps in the American and British occupation zones in Germany constituted the only viable option for larger groups. However, in 1945/46 few refugees wanted to return to war-ravaged Central Europe. In May 1948 the founding of the State of Israel opened up a new perspective, but evacuation proved to be challenging. In late 1948, as Communist forces were advancing towards Shanghai and Nanjing, more than 5,000 Jews remained in the city. In 1950 the International Refugee

Organization (IRO) was able to move a group of over one hundred Jewish refugees to San Francisco. However, U.S. officials refused to admit the refugees and transported them on a sealed train to Ellis Island. After several weeks of internment the group was taken to DP camps in West Germany. The last Jewish refugees only left Shanghai in the early 1950s. The fear of communism and little-disguised anti-Semitism made it exceedingly difficult for representatives of Jewish aid organizations and the IRO to secure new homes for Jewish refugees. The paper also draws attention to the importance of extraterritorial spaces for stateless refugees. The post-1945 Jewish history of Shanghai also shows that the founding of a Jewish state did not completely "solve" the Jewish refugee problem. The question what to do with Jewish refugees who did not want to settle in Israel sheds light on the relations between Jewish diaspora organizations such as the World Jewish Congress, the state of Israel in its formative phase, and international humanitarian NGOs such as the IRO.

The concluding discussion was led by Anne Schenderlein, who summarized the main points of the conference. During the subsequent open forum, one of the participants stated that the focus on transitory states of refugees reminds us that ideas of citizenship and belonging are often being constructed in a transnational frame. Among the themes that were mentioned and deserve further discussion in future conferences are objects and material culture, generation and age, class, and the question of how to usefully combine micro- and macrohistorical perspectives.

Mayurakshi Das (Triveni Devi Bhalotia College, India)

CULTURES OF CAPITALISM IN WEIMAR AND NAZI GERMANY

Conference at the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI), February 23-24, 2018, co-sponsored by the GHI, McMaster University, and the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung. Conveners: Pamela Swett (McMaster University), Moritz Föllmer (University of Amsterdam), and David Lazar (GHI). Participants: Simone Derix (University of Duisburg-Essen), Julia Erol (University of Heidelberg/ University of Trondheim), Sina Fabian (Humboldt University Berlin), Moritz Föllmer (University of Amsterdam), Stephen Gross (New York University), Molly Loberg (California Polytechnic State University), Jan Logemann (University of Göttingen), Claudia Roesch (GHI), Tim Schanetzky (University of Jena), Anne Schenderlein (GHI), Alexa Stiller (University of Bern), Claus-Christian Szejnmann (Loughborough University), Sören Urbansky (GHI), Richard Wetzell (GHI), Jonathan Zatlin (Boston University).

"In History Departments," a 2013 *New York Times* headline declared, "It's Up With Capitalism." Even before the financial crisis of 2008, as the *Times* reported, historians, above all historians of the United States, had begun to show a newfound interest in capitalism and its workings. The steady flow of new research that has appeared since the article in the *Times* has spotlighted the influence of social and cultural circumstances in shaping economic activity and the pursuit of profit. Taking a cue from the rapidly growing literature on the history of U.S. capitalism, the conference "Cultures of Capitalism in Weimar and Nazi Germany" set out to reconsider the meanings and practices of capitalism in interwar and wartime Germany and, in turn, to open a dialogue between specialists in economic and business history and political, social, and cultural historians.

Moritz Föllmer and Pamela Swett opened the conference by suggesting several themes and questions to frame discussion of the conference papers. Noting that typologies rarely hold up to historical scrutiny, Föllmer underscored the argument implicit in the title of the conference: namely, that there was no one culture of capitalism in either Weimar or Nazi Germany. It might therefore be useful, he suggested, to think about capitalism in interwar Germany in terms of key tensions rather than of defining traits, in particular the tension between *Kapitalismuskritik* and the tacit spread of capitalist practices and modes of thinking. In her introductory remarks, Pamela Swett highlighted the contrast between the flexibility and adaptability,

on the one hand, and, on the other, the uncertainty that marked the Weimar period. The question of whether that flexibility proved to be an advantage in adapting to the new circumstances of Nazi rule and, in turn, served the regime's interests, Swett suggested, might be a productive line of inquiry. She also called attention to the central place of expectations and imagined futures in capitalism. Consideration of capitalist actors' flexibility in the short term, Swett suggested, must go hand in hand with attention to their hopes for and visions of the future.

The first panel, "Discourses of Capitalism," dealt with images and theories of capitalism in interwar Germany. Claus-Christian Szejnmann presented a thematic analysis of satirical cartoons and illustrations from the later years of the Weimar Republic that touched on economic issues. Such images, he argued, reflected an "anti-capitalist *Zeitgeist*" that linked the economic crisis of the late 1920s/early 1930s to the moral failings of businessmen, financiers, and wealthy consumers. The Nazis, he suggested, were able to exploit that discontent with capitalism and the widespread feeling that some sort of change was imperative. Challenging U.S.-centric accounts of the origins of development theory, Stephen Gross examined theories of demography, economic development, and capitalism in interwar Germany. German area studies specialists were concerned above all with the issue of Germany's dependency on imported food and viewed it against the backdrop of the feared threat of overpopulation in many regions of the world. Whereas some area studies specialists advocated eastward expansion and forced population relocation as a solution to the twinned challenges of German food dependency and rural overpopulation in Eastern Europe, others anticipated the arguments of post-1945 American scholars in seeing agricultural development and expanded international trade as mutually beneficial to more and less economically developed countries.

"Consumer Capitalism" was the topic of the second panel. Sina Fabian shed light on "Marketing and Selling Beer in Interwar Germany." Pointing to the various challenges brewers faced during the interwar period, she analyzed the marketing strategies they adopted to improve the public image of beer. Jan Logemann's paper examined debates among marketing experts, market researchers, product designers, and graphic artists on shaping and responding to consumer demand. Contradictory perceptions of capitalism came to the fore in those debates. Although all agreed on the importance of consumers

and consumerism, Logemann argued, marketing professionals were at odds on whether to promote efficient, rationalized consumption or to cater to consumers' desire for change and innovation. Molly Loberg concluded the panel with a paper analyzing the claims businesses filed for governmental compensation for damages incurred during outbreaks of public unrest during the Weimar Republic and Nazi era. In response to pervasive violence in the public sphere, Loberg found, business owners argued that the state had an obligation to protect businesses and to ensure a safe space for capitalism.

The third panel investigated the role of "Bankers, Savers, and Investors." Simone Derix opened the panel with a paper exploring the interplay of visibility and invisibility in interwar German capitalism. Focusing on the example of the Thyssen family, Derix highlighted the contrast between the efforts of the wealthy to make visible actions and behavior consistent with public expectations, on the one hand, and, on the other, their determination to keep certain of their financial dealings well out of public view. Jonathan Zatlin's paper, "The Slavery of Interest: Racializing Credit Creation in Interwar Germany," challenged the view that anti-Semitism was not socially acceptable among the Weimar Republic's business and banking elite and, in turn, the argument that Germany's leading bankers were motivated by pragmatic rather than ideological concerns in adopting the Nazi regime's racist goals as their own. The widespread association of Jews with money-making and, in particular, financial impropriety carried unmistakable anti-Semitic implications, Zatlin argued, and lent credibility to accusations of Jewish responsibility for the banking crisis of the early 1930s. Pamela Swett concluded the panel with a paper on the activities of Stuttgart's municipally owned savings banks (*Sparkassen*) during the Nazi era. The banks' managers, she explained, tried to capitalize on the perception of the *Sparkassen* as a *völkisch* alternative to commercial banks. Yet even while trying to benefit from anti-capitalist sentiments, they were as firmly committed to the pursuit of profit as their private sector competitors were and based their business decisions on much the same financial criteria. Perhaps more importantly, Swett suggested, capitalism provided the *Sparkasssen* managers with a framework that allowed them to engage in activities with criminal implications — not least, the "Aryanization" of businesses owned by Jews — without serious reflection on the moral consequences of their actions.

The fourth panel focused on "capitalist agents" in interwar Germany. Tim Schanetzky compared the careers of two noted industrialists — the

American Henry J. Kaiser and the German Friedrich Flick — from the perspective of their uses of the "semantics of success." During World War II, Kaiser and Flick both played up their reputations for successful business leadership in seeking government contracts for their firms. Whereas Kaiser actively sought the public eye and personalized his firms' achievements as his own, Flick, a figure of controversy well before the Nazis had come to power, deliberately shunned publicity and focused his efforts to burnish his reputation during the Nazi era on business leaders and government officials. Schanetzky nonetheless saw a crucial similarity in the two men's use of the semantics of success and their entrepreneurial strategies: each presented himself as serving his nation while trying to parlay government spending in the short term into long-term advantage for himself. The question to what extent figures such as Flick could act to redress problems with Germany's capitalist system was central to Weimar-era *Kapitalismuskritik*, as Moritz Föllmer explained in his paper "Capitalism and Agency in Interwar Germany." Critics on the left and right alike, underscoring capitalism's resilience, debated the possibilities for reform or intervention in the short term while holding out the hope of more fundamental change in the future. Whereas some critics, mainly on the left, thought capitalism left little scope for human agency in trying to steer the economy, others, particularly on the far right, maintained that change was possible with sufficiently decisive action. The Nazis, Föllmer argued, took that latter view to an extreme, linking it with a call for action against "Jewish high finance," and presented their economic policies as powerful acts of will aimed at clearing away the structural impediments that previously hindered the German economy.

The papers presented in the fifth panel, "Capitalism, the State and War," highlighted the ambiguities of the Nazi regime's stance toward the private sector during World War II. In her paper, "Norwegian Hydropower as a Tool of Autarky Politics," Julia Erol situated the plans formulated during the German occupation for exploitation of Norwegian hydropower within a much longer history of foreign interest in Norway's water resources. Building on the work of prewar private sector initiatives, the German occupation regime established a working group to prepare long-term plans for the transmission of electricity generated in Norway to Germany. Those plans were to serve the larger goal of state-directed autarky within a "Greater German Empire" (*Großgermanisches Reich*). Whereas the framework for the development of Norwegian hydropower resources for Germany's benefit

was to be established by the German state, Erol noted, German private sector firms, which were to be given strong market incentives, were supposed to take the lead in the eventual realization of the working group's goals. Alexa Stiller pointed to a similar blurring of the public/private distinction in the economic sphere in her paper "*Völkisch* Capitalism: Himmler's Bankers and Nazi Settlement Practice in Annexed Western Poland." Shortly after Germany's conquest of Poland, Heinrich Himmler, in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationhood (Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volktums), ordered the creation of a private limited liability company, the Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand-Aktiengesellschaft (DUT), to handle the financing of the resettlement of ethnic Germans in the western Polish territories annexed by Germany. As a private firm, the DUT could borrow from commercial lenders without adding to the already heavy burden of public debt. It worked hand in hand with commercial and publically owned banks along with state and party agencies, Stiller argued, to promote "*völkisch* capitalism" in the annexed Polish territories — that is, a system of private ownership and market mechanisms that served the wartime needs of the Nazi state and rested upon the ideologically driven exclusion of putatively racially inferior groups.

The concluding discussion centered on two questions: First, how should we interpret the prevalence of criticisms of capitalism in the interwar era? And second, what, if anything, was particular to capitalism in Germany during that period? One conference participant noted that the topics examined in several of the papers — such as marketing strategies, the pursuit of "invisibility" by the affluent, and bankers' adaptation of their business practices to Nazi racial policy — can in effect be seen as responses to various strains of interwar *Kapitalismuskritik*. Another argued that capitalism under the Weimar Republic was not fundamentally different from capitalism in any number of other European countries at the time; the German particularity lay, rather, in the extremity of the outcome of the response to the economic crisis of the early 1930s. No clear consensus emerged on the place of capitalism in German economic, cultural, and social life under Nazi rule. Although private enterprise, market mechanisms, and the entrepreneurial pursuit of profit remained of decisive importance, it remains an open question whether capitalism can be said to have constituted the core of the German economic system under the Nazis. Several of the conference participants suggested that the notion of "*völkisch* capitalism" Alexa Stiller outlined in her paper might offer

a promising approach to understanding the Nazi regime's attempt to harness the productive capacity of capitalism for ideological ends.

Turning to possible avenues for further research, the conference participants noted several topics that were not addressed during the conference. Contemporary perceptions of markets, international trade, and globalization are one aspect of German cultures of capitalism that warrants closer examination. The conference, the participants agreed, also gave short shrift to workers, organized labor, and debates about labor. As one participant noted, the conference had effectively taken a top-down perspective and focused on agents from the upper reaches of German society. Analysis of middle- and working class practices and attitudes and closer attention to the urban/rural divide might disclose other German cultures of capitalism.

Martin Kristoffer Hamre (GHI)

BOUNDED DEMOCRACY: GLOBAL WORKSHOP ON AMERICAN URBANISMS

Workshop at the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI), March 1-2, 2018. Conveners: Anke Ortlepp (GHI/ University of Cologne) and Bryant Simon (GHI/ Temple University). Participants: Freia Anders (University of Mainz), Jonathan Anjaria (Brandeis University), Lizabeth Cohen (Harvard University), Andrew Diamond (Sorbonne University), Elisabeth Engel (GHI), Robert Gioelli (University of Cincinnati), Jan Hansen (Humboldt University), Stefan Höhne (Technical University Berlin), Sarah Lemmen (University of Bremen), Patricia Morton (University of California, Riverside), Suleiman Osman (George Washington University), John Robinson (Washington University), Anne Schenderlein (GHI), Alexander Sedlmaier (Bangor University).

This workshop brought together cultural, urban, environmental and architectural historians, sociologists and urbanists to discuss the changing relationship between the built environment, public space, and democratic culture in the United States and around the world in the twentieth century. It focused on the making, unmaking, and remaking of public space and how the law, urban planning, architecture, popular culture, and people on the street created real and imagined dividing lines between people and communities. Participants explored how spaces and boundaries were often deliberately and repeatedly made to bring people together and more often to keep them apart for legal, social, political, business, and ideological purposes. Discussion questions about how dividing lines were drawn, obscured, resisted and renegotiated by historical actors included: Who has the power and agency to make and unmake public spaces — in terms of ideology, but also in terms of design and building? How have conceptions of the public changed over time and region? What is a democratic public space? What do (physical and symbolic) boundaries look like? What is the role of political power and legal oversight in the making of public space? What is the role of the state, commerce, the arts, and popular culture in the construction of urban environments? How does ideology shape the public? How does the public, in turn, shape ideas about democracy, citizenship and built environments?

The workshop opened with a keynote address by Lizabeth Cohen. In her lecture entitled "Place, People, and Power in City Building in Postwar America" Cohen explored the benefits and costs of rebuilding American cities through the life and career of urban planner Edward J. Logue.

Logue contributed to major redevelopment projects across the Northeast. Cohen elaborated on his training, vision, and urban planning activities in New Haven and Boston. She showed that Logue was instrumental in drafting plans for the "New Boston" that emerged in the 1960s. One of the centerpieces of his ambitious urban renewal agenda for the city was Government Center. It transformed Scolley Square, one of Boston's popular working class entertainment districts in its colonial center, into a public service area. Cohen argued that while the project contributed to the city's economic revitalization, many Bostonians disliked the design and architecture of the new buildings (including City Hall) and rejected the area as a gathering ground for the public. Looking at her case study, Cohen delivered a reinterpretation of modernist urban planning and its consequences for urban public space and American democracy.

The workshop's first panel, "Public Space, Identity, and Citizenship," focused on urban public space as an arena for the negotiation of collective identities and notions of citizenship. Jonathan Anjaria in his paper "The Slow Boil: Street Food, Rights, and Public Space in Mumbai" focused on food vendors and their use of public sidewalks in Mumbai, India. He showed how for decades food vendors have used sidewalks to sell their food although it is officially illegal to do so. Regular raids by municipal authorities have not led to the disappearance of food vendors, who vacate premises before a raid only to return soon thereafter. Anjaria showed how a complicated web of bribes and extortion has produced some form of coexistence between food vendors and municipal law enforcement. He concluded by arguing that we have to read the food vendor's activities as an effort to contest spatial boundaries. By claiming the sidewalks as their space to do business in public, food vendors continuously renegotiate the form and content of their rights as citizens of the city. Alexander Sedlmaier and Freia Anders focused on squatters as agents in shaping urban environments and access to public space in their paper, "Global Perspectives on Squatting." Focusing on different urban contexts in both the Global North and South, they examined how squatters and urban activists have occupied what they called "temporary autonomous zones" and "insurgent public spaces" and in so doing challenged conventional notions of space and urban authority. They showed how such practices have responded to urban planning and development that produced ever more privatized, gentrified, and securitized spaces and communities. Along the way, they argued, public space was transformed into "protected" zones that were supposed to be sealed off from non-elite citizens. Suleiman Osman's contribution, "Glocal

America: The Politics of Scale in the 1970s," investigated the agency of communities on a local level. Local, regional, national and global scales, he pointed out, have always been constructed for a variety of political purposes. Localism in the 1970s could be both progressive and reactionary. While globalism signaled a more radical planetary politics for some local activists on the left, it was also the language used by new multinational corporations, whose politics they often rejected.

The second panel investigated the role of the state in the policies and practices of boundary making. John Robinson's paper, "Filtering Out Cabrini: Race, Housing, and the Politics of Boundary Reclassification," investigated the significance of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit as tool of spatial transformation in urban neighborhoods in the city of Chicago. He showed that in recent years, the LIHCT was increasingly used by private developers — both commercial and community-based — to pressure the city to open up new urban areas for housing construction. Robinson argued that developers put pressure on existing racial and class boundaries by questioning zoning practices and, incidentally, the redlining they entailed. He also demonstrated how market forces rather than state action have imposed racial progress on communities, renegotiating notions of public and private space along the way. Robert Gioielli focused on the connections between metropolitan inequality and energy intensive suburban lifestyles in his paper, "Fighting 'Public' Housing: White Flight, Sprawl and Climate Change in Metropolitan America." Looking at the St. Louis suburb Black Jack, he investigated how the struggle between planners and local stakeholders over the construction and design of a publically subsidized housing complex reflected the contested nature of public space and its imagined purpose in suburban America. Fighting the housing project and rewriting zoning ordinances, the predominantly white residents of Black Jack defended their racial and class privilege to draw residential boundaries. Jan Hansen explored the connection between municipal services and public rights in his paper "Clean, White, and Male: Water Infrastructure and the Making of Modern Los Angeles (1870–1920)." Designing and building infrastructure, he showed, was never neutral. By bringing water not to those who needed it, but to those who had the political power to get it, municipal governments helped to bolster private real estate markets and sketch red lines based on class and ethnicity across the maps of the emerging metropolis. Hansen showed how in the process access to water infrastructure became a signifier of inclusion in or exclusion from urban public space, which in this case was located underground.

The third panel, "Actors, Agency, and Borders," focused on the agency of diverse urban actors and stakeholders in shaping and reshaping urban environments by drawing, contesting, or erasing physical and/or social borders and boundaries. Andrew Diamond's paper, "City of Neighborhoods on the Make: Race, Authenticity, and Community in Chicago," began by pointing out the alarming levels of inequality and the persistence of segregation in Chicago. These divisions, he argued, were no accident but the result of generations of real estate-led policy making. Some were explicitly racist, and more recently, the boundary drawing appeared to be color-blind and class neutral, but only on the surface. In the end, Diamond showed, boundary making was what city leaders did in Chicago and elsewhere; this was an essence of urbanity. Patricia Morton dealt with architecture and design in one of New Haven, Connecticut's largest public housing projects in her paper, "Public Life and Public Housing: The Case of Church Street South, New Haven." Morton explained how architects and planners deliberately experimented with innovative designs and spatial layouts designed to invite social interaction between future residents, who were mostly working class African Americans. Investigating the significance of real and symbolic boundaries, she elaborated on the role of design and why the project ultimately failed as a public place. Stefan Höhne explored urban boundaries and their contestations on both collective and individual levels in his paper, "Trouble beneath the City: Boundary Making and the Politics of Complaint in the New York City Subway, 1953-1968." Analyzing letters of complaint from customers to the local transit authority, he identified issues these subway riders were unhappy with at a time when the system was in steep decline: crime, violence, neglect, the social make-up of subway ridership, and poor service quality. He suggested that we read these often denunciatory articulations as efforts to redraw social boundaries in the city and to deal with the larger social, political, and economic problems of the time.

The concluding discussion took up issues that had emerged in the productive panel discussions that followed each set of presentations. Discussion returned to notions of agency and power; dynamics of social inclusion and exclusion; state power and its different scales; and the materiality of public space. The workshop's debates and discussion provided a starting point for further research into the relationship between the built environment, public space, and democratic culture.

Anke Ortlepp (GHI/University of Cologne)

INAUGURAL WEST COAST GERMANISTS' WORKSHOP

Workshop at UC Davis, March 17-18, 2018. Co-sponsored by the new Pacific Regional Office of the German Historical Institute Washington DC (GHI West), the Department of German Studies and the Davis Humanities Institute, the Institute for Social Sciences at UC Davis, and the Max Kade Center for Austrian-German-Swiss Studies at USC. Conveners: Frank Biess (UC San Diego), Edward Ross Dickinson (UC Davis), Paul Lerner (University of Southern California) and Ulrike Strasser (UC San Diego). Participants: Andreas Agocs (University of San Diego) Colleen Anderson (Stanford University), Roii Ball (UCLA), Ian Beacock (Stanford University), Volker Benkart (Arizona State University), Jonathan Dentler (USC), Elizabeth Drummond (University of Munich), Johannes Endres (UC Riverside), Ann Goldberg (UC Riverside), Benjamin Hein (Stanford University), Anna Holian (Arizona State University), Manuela Homberg (UC Berkeley), Michael Homberg (UC Berkeley), Sky Michael Johnston (UC San Diego), John McCole (Oregon State University), Jörg Neuheiser (UC San Diego), Christiane Reves (Arizona State University), Isabel Richter (UC Berkeley), Sven-Erik Rose (UC Davis), Chenxi Tang (UC Berkeley), Karl Toepfer (San Jose State), Andrea Westermann (GHI West).

Scholars of German history and culture working on the West Coast face geographic challenges that those further east usually do not: they are far from Central Europe, and they are farther from each other than, for example, those in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, or even Midwest of the United States. This has tended to limit opportunities for intellectual exchange, collaboration, and networking — at least without time-consuming and expensive travel. In order to start improving this situation, the group of conveners initiated the first West Coast Germanists' Workshop.

For the inaugural workshop, the organizers chose an open topic paper format. Rather than focus on a particular theme or themes or adopt the usual conference panel format, they opted for a more free-form discussion. Contributors were asked for short, informal pieces and pre-circulated a "thought piece" addressing how their current research project speaks to issues of historiographical or methodological concern in German/European history and studies. Be it a comment on broad trends in our disciplines, a summary of the implications of findings in an ongoing research project, the discussion of a particular problem of translation or method, or an

interpretive comment on a particular source — participants came up with many useful contributions.

The outcome was impressive: The conference had three sessions with a total of 23 papers on a wide range of topics. Conveners Edward Ross Dickinson and Frank Biess served as commentators for the sessions, during which some shared concerns clearly emerged. One major question was how our professional identity as Germanists keeps being relevant to our work, which has recently been inspired by the transnational and global turns in the humanities and social sciences. Edward Ross Dickinson swiftly reviewed our program and pointed to his new book, *The World in the Long Twentieth Century,* to highlight this development. The scholarly rewards yielded by engaging with larger scales are concurrent though with the relative decline in interest for German or Central European topics in the History and Literary Studies Departments and student bodies at universities in the Western U.S., as many participants argued. Frank Biess suggested that whether we interpret this decline as a mistaken shift of intellectual and political focus or as an overdue correction to how history, its epochs, geographies, and methods are represented on a departmental level, we must find intellectual rather than strategic answers to these challenges.

Yet another trend emerging from the collection of papers might be one such answer: Germanists, too, find themselves re-embracing economic questions, sometimes rather surprisingly or reluctantly so. Other participants suggested that German culture has been both embedded in and a critically important element of cultural globalization in the modern era. In both respects, at least some participants felt that a focus on Central European topics and a focus on global matters are complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. There was a strong sense, too, among some participants that German studies can only benefit from a less Eurocentric perspective.

Finally, participants expressed their interest in holding this workshop annually as a regular opportunity to discuss research, historiographical trends, professional developments, and German history and culture generally. The climate of collective excitement and collegiality that animated the workshop reflected this interest as well. The GHI West is happy to support that scholarly exchange, and the next workshop will be held on April 6-7, 2019 at USC's Max Kade Center for Austrian-German-Swiss Studies. A combination of large group and breakout sessions might be a good mix catering to

our many needs and wishes when coming together as West Coast Germanists.

Andrea Westermann (GHI West) and Edward Ross Dickinson (UC Davis)

The full conference program is available online at https://www.ghidc.org/fileadmin/user_upload/GHI_Washington/Events___Conferences/2018/2018_West_Coast_Conference_program_web.pdf

SETTLEMENT AND UNSETTLEMENT: THE ENDS OF WORLD WAR I AND THEIR LEGACIES 2018 ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE MAX WEBER FOUNDATION

Conference at the German Historical Institute Washington DC (GHI), March 22-24, 2018. Conveners: Max Weber Foundation, GHI Washington, American Historical Association (AHA), the National History Center (NHC), German Historical Association (Verband der Historiker und Historikerinnen Deutschlands, VHD). Participants: Mustafa Aksakal (Georgetown University), Madeleine Dungy (European University Institute), Hans van Ess (Max Weber Stiftung, Bonn), Leila Fawaz (Tufts University), Carole Fink (Ohio State University), Donal Hassett (University of Bristol), Madeleine Herren-Oesch (University of Basel), Axel Jansen (GHI), Jan C. Jansen (GHI), Anna Karla (University of Cologne), Jesse Kauffman (Eastern Michigan University), Noriko Kawamura (Washington State University), Dane Kennedy (National History Center), Simone Lässig (GHI), Jörn Leonhard (University of Freiburg), Adele Lindenmeyr (Villanova University), Michele Louro (Salem State University), Jamie Martin (Georgetown University), Regine Mathias (University of Bochum), Tosh Minohara (Kobe University), Nicholas Mulder (Columbia University), Roberta Pergher (Indiana University), Barbara Potthast (University of Cologne), Volker Prott (University of Melbourne/ Aston University), Laura Robson (Portland State University), Aviel Roshwald (Georgetown University), Birgit Schäbler (University of Erfurt/Orient-Institut Beirut), Paul Schweitzer-Martin (University of Heidelberg), Claudia Siebrecht (University of Sussex), Leonard Smith (Oberlin College), Jeremi Suri (University of Texas at Austin), Heidrun Tempel (German State Department), Elizabeth Thompson (American University), Adam Tooze (Columbia University), Sean Andrew Wempe (Washington State University), Miklós Zeidler (Eötvö Loránd University).

The armistice of November 11, 1918, is widely commemorated as the end of World War I, but that event was only part of a protracted process with far-reaching consequences. A series of peace treaties, starting with Brest-Litovsk in 1918 and continuing through Lausanne in 1923, brought the war to a stuttering conclusion. With its institutes, the Max Weber Foundation is present in a number of places that played a major role in the shaping of the postwar order, such as Paris, Moscow, Istanbul and Tokyo. The centenary of the 1918 Armistice thus provided the perfect occasion for the 2018 Annual Conference of the Max Weber Foundation, which took place at the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC and set out to reassess the postwar settlement's global repercussions.

The conference was opened on the evening of March 22 by Simone Lässig, Hans van Ess and Dane Kennedy, who highlighted the legacies of the Great War, including the principle of national self-determination, the redrawing of borders, decolonization and forced migration, and noted new research trends and the need to reassess the war's legacies. In his keynote lecture, "Overburdened Peace: Competing Visions of World Order in 1918/19," Jörn Leonhard presented a tableau of questions and developments at the end of the war, laying the groundwork for many subsequent discussions at the conference. He started with different perspectives on the signing of the Versailles Treaty in June 1919, including such aspects as solemn diplomacy, guilt, and punishment of war crimes. He then examined the combination of continuities and discontinuities that became characteristic of the postwar settlement. The war efforts had provoked rising expectations in all societies and states involved, while the realities of the peace settlements, shaped by compromise, lead to massive disillusionment. Leonhard also highlighted key aspects of the contradictory postwar moment such as competing ideas of world order, the demise of monarchical empires in continental Europe, a selective application of the principle of national self-determination, violence unleashed by the principle of ethnic homogeneity, and the tension between the economics and the politics of settlement. He focused on five strands of such legacies: First, the continuity of violence despite the end of state warfare; second, the transition from languages of loyalty to the ethnicization of politics; third, based on Reinhard Koselleck's model, the reversal of spaces of experience and horizons of expectation; fourth, the competing visions and revolutions of rising expectations, especially when it came to minorities; and, finally, the new tension between nationalism and internationalism. In his conclusion, Leonhard argued that World War I must not be seen as a coherent and monolithic historical entity that has its "before" and "after" but as a series of events and developments characterized by continuities as well as discontinuities.

On March 23, the conference's series of panels began with a panel on "Treaties and the Making of the Postwar Order." In the first paper, Jesse Kauffman reassessed the Peace of Brest-Litovsk by challenging the ways in which German and American historiographies have dismissed the document. He sought to reconsider the peace agreement by laying out how their intervention in the Ukraine drew Germany and Austria into this regional conflict. Both powers aimed to halt the Russian empire's disintegration and to support their own war efforts

in the West. In contrast to these short-term goals, Kauffman acknowledged that the long-term goals are harder to trace because the border situation between Russia, Poland, and the Ukraine remained complicated. In the following paper, on the politics of recognition at the Paris Peace Conference, Leonhard Smith showed how, after the major political shifts at the end of the Great War, the recognition of states emerged as an important question for international law. Examining the cases of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and post-Ottoman Turkey, Smith stressed the tension between the constitutive and the declarative theory of recognition. Next, Tosh Minohara presented a longue-durée analysis of the contentious issue of the "racial equality clause" that Japanese delegates pushed, unsuccessfully, to get included in the League of Nations Covenant. Prior to the Great War, Japan had been marked by westernization, modernization and economic growth. Military victories, especially over Russia in 1905, had elevated Japan's national pride. By proposing a racial equality clause in Paris, Minohara argued, the Japanese government was responding to legislation discriminating against Japanese immigrants in California. The peace settlement and legislation in the following years (e.g. the United States 1924 Immigration Act) led to a turn away from westernization. The Japanese felt rejected and humiliated by the West, and turned increasingly towards pan-Asianism.

The conference's second panel, on "Wilsonianism and its Discontents," combined perspectives on the principle of self-determination in European and colonial territories. Roberta Pergher focused on Fascist Italy and the rights of others, while Miklós Zeidler examined revisionism as a means of nation-building in interwar Hungary. Pergher's paper explored the place of "others" in Fascist Italy's colonial territories in Libya and in Northern Italy, both territories in which Italian claims to sovereignty were questioned. She argued that, appealing to the principle of self-determination, the fascists developed massive resettlement schemes to claim Italian sovereignty over the contested territories. Zeidler analyzed the centrality of territorial revisionism in Hungarian nationalism after the treaty of Trianon and pointed to its highly religious varnish. Hungary's suffering was linked to the passion of Christ, while the neighboring countries were equated with Judas and the Allies with Pontius Pilate. Such ideas were infused into Hungarian schools by a mandatory school prayer "I believe in one Hungary … in the resurrection of Hungary," constructing pride, national conservatism and religious traditions as collective memory.

In the first of a two-panel series on "Empires after the War," Noriko Kawamura began by noting that the Japanese felt humiliated by Wilson and then offered an analysis of the post-World War I search for a new order in the Pacific. She traced how the group of pro-western politicians in Japan shrank after the Washington treaty imposed limits on Japanese naval power in the Pacific. This treaty slowed down naval mobilization for about a decade, but in its shadow a total war mentality against the U.S. arose. In the following presentation, Donal Hassett examined how the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of colonial soldiers during the Great War changed the relationship between France and its colonies. He showed how the "blood tax" of soldiers from the colonies nourished hopes for reforms and the granting of full citizenship rights throughout the empire. Different models and ideas were developed in Algeria, Madagascar and Senegal. While the French state promoted a narrative of imperial unity, activists in the colonies used the experience of war in a variety of ways, ranging from equal rights claims to nationalist visions.

The second of the two "Empires after the War" panels began with Sean Andrew Wempe's presentation on colonial German responses to the Treaty of Versailles and the "colonial guilt" discourse. Reminding us that Germany had been the third largest colonial power after England and France, the paper showed how Germany was ostracized from the European "civilization mission" of colonialism. While German colonial rule was condemned as especially gruesome by the Allies, German colonial activists wrote revisionist histories of German imperialism stretching from the Crusades to the Hanse and their own time. From these narratives they derived moral superiority and advancement, and also sought to use the League of Nations as a forum for German colonial revisionism. Leila Fawaz then delivered a moving talk on World War I and the reshaping of daily life in the Eastern Mediterranean. She showed how strongly the Great War impacted the Middle East and its borders. To this day, commonly accepted narratives that could form a shared memory for the purposes of identity are missing. The discussion highlighted that the problems of missing memory and narratives also affect textbooks used in schools.

The conference's second day concluded with a panel discussion at the Residence of the German Ambassador to the United States. After introductory words by the ambassador, Peter Wittig, the evening's panel discussion was led off by Adam Tooze with a brief keynote on "1918: The Botched Entry into the American Century." Tooze showed

how no state was fully satisfied with the outcome of the 1919 negotiations. Although Wilson envisioned peace without victory, this project failed, not least due to domestic and economic pressures. The keynote was followed by a panel discussion with Aviel Roshwald and Jeremi Suri, chaired by Heidrun Tempel. Suri questioned the U.S.-centrism of Tooze's interpretation of the 1918-19 situation and the implication that the United States was the only global player that could have assured a better outcome. Instead, Suri suggested an interpretation that would focus more strongly on how diplomacy failed due to larger socio-political transformations from the end of the nineteenth century to the postwar period. Roshwald called attention to the ambiguities of the postwar settlements, especially with regard to the idea of ethnic nationalism enshrined in the League of Nations system and the gap it created between reality and promise.

The conference's third day began with the fifth panel, on "Internationalisms." Madeleine Herren-Oesch's paper on the coincidence of densification and disentanglement characterized the postwar system as one that was designed to facilitate the circulation of goods, but not of people. Her analysis of ethnographic maps, population exchange, and the role of citizenship and passports demonstrated that although contemporaries regarded refugees and stateless people as evidence of temporary dysfunction, they had become a structural feature of the new world order. Herren-Oesch argued that these elements of disentanglement should be taken as a starting point for a "global history from below." Next, Michele Louro examined Jawaharlal Nehru, the future prime minister of India, and his numerous links to antiimperialist networks in interwar Europe, where he also became a leading member of the League against Imperialism. Whereas Nehru is usually interpreted from a national, India-centered perspective, Louro stressed the deep and lasting impact that the experience of international comradeship and anti-imperial internationalism left on Nehru's political thinking and action. In the panel's final paper, Claudia Siebrecht investigated the role of youth education within the activities of the League of Nations. Exerting a moral and emotional appeal, the League tried to promote a change in mentality towards a more international world by targeting younger generations. It tried to influence school curricula and organized Christmas card exchanges between countries. These strategies can be understood as nation-building on an international level.

The sixth panel focused on "Post-war Economies / Labor and Economy after the War." Anna Karla examined the material dimension

of reparations and the importance of deliveries in kind as a form of reparations. Explaining the involvement of the German building industry in projects of material reconstruction throughout Europe, she argued that these deliveries were burdensome for Germany but also a chance for the German economy to rebuild international business ties and create jobs. In the next paper, Madeleine Dungy investigated the discussions about labor migration in the International Labor Organization (ILO) as well as the Economic Committee of the League of Nations. While both organizations took on questions of labor migration, a highly controversial topic of the time, their course was largely marked by different forms of inaction. As a result, circulating property and money were often better protected in the interwar era than moving people. In the panel's final presentation, Nicholas Mulder addressed the place of economic sanctions as one of the League of Nation's means of peace-keeping and traced their role back to the spirit of blockade during the war. Whereas, before the Great War, sanctions had only been part of active warfare, the blockade against Germany was not lifted when fighting ended in 1918 but only terminated with the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919. Afterwards, Russia became an object of experimentation for economic warfare.

The conference's final panel focused on the interwar problem of minority protection. Volker Prott portrayed the League of Nations as incubator for ideas and asked why the League failed to secure peace. One reason was the lack of hard power to enforce rules. This was evident in the minority treaties monitored by the Minority Section of the League, which relied on informal mechanisms and expert resolutions. Next, Laura Robson argued that there was an imperial genealogy of the postwar minority protection regime. According to Robson, the imperial prototype of the minority system was to be found in the capitulatory privileges imposed on the Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Instead of constituting a step towards internationally guaranteed human rights, the legal regime of minority protection should be understood as a postwar recasting of nineteenth-century imperial practices in a language more appropriate to the interwar era.

In the round-table discussion that concluded the conference, Barbara Potthast commented on the conference from the perspective of Latin American history, noting how the Great War was a catalyst for social, cultural, political and economic developments in Latin America. Elizabeth Thompson emphasized the need for historians to question

agency in history and reiterated the different perspectives on the League of Nations, taking the Islamic world into account while pointing to the thwarted efforts by Syrian nationalists in 1918–19 to build an independent and modern state. Leonard Smith underscored the importance of two questions. First, what did "the world" actually mean in the interwar period? And second, who were considered a "people"? Adele Lindenmeyr noted that Russia had barely been mentioned at the conference although it had been an engine of unsettlement and had given rise to a new ideology that posed a powerful alternative to the West. The concluding discussion revealed how many aspects of the legacies of the Great War remain to be analyzed, including the history of emotions and examining the effects of damaged honor, studying the role of religion for states and nationality, and taking pacifism seriously as a global project of the time.

Paul Schweitzer-Martin (University of Heidelberg)

MARX AT 200: A SYMPOSIUM

Symposium at the GHI Washington, April 12, 2018. Organized in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Goethe Institut Washington, DC. Conveners: Warren Breckman (University of Pennsylvania), James Brophy (University of Delaware), Simone Lässig (GHI), and David Lazar (GHI). Participants: Ritu Birla (University of Toronto), Jürgen Herres (Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe), Jürgen Kocka (WZB/Berlin Social Science Center), Noam Maggor (Queen Mary University of London), Timothy Shenk (Washington University / New America), Jonathan Sperber (University of Missouri), Gareth Stedman Jones (Queen Mary University of London).

The 200th anniversary of Marx's birth on May 5, 1818, occasions reflection on the strange mix of distance and proximity that marks our relationship to him. Two hundred years. Just to say it drives home that Marx belonged to an epoch that grows more and more remote, born as he was within living memory of the French Revolution and the first stirrings of the industrial age. Grasping Marx requires historical erudition and historical imagination, because his world is not ours. Trying to reach back to that historical figure, separated from us by many decades but also by generations of heroic myth-making and demonic vilification, is an estimable challenge.

Yet to say that Marx was born two hundred years ago is also to experience a shock, because his words still have the capacity to ring true, to take our breath away with their critical acumen, and to open new pathways for our thinking. Two hundred years after his birth, Marx is still good to think with. Of course, the political projects that claimed his name are long gone. Some commentators in the aftermath of the Cold War believed that Karl Marx would vanish with those regimes. Or, at most, put in Jacque Derrida's sympathetic terms in the early 1990s, Marx might be dead, but his specter will continue to haunt us with visions of social justice and equality in a democracy not yet realized, but always *à venir*, always *to come*. Perhaps it is closer to the truth that Marxism in the postcommunist world may be thought of as a theory happily rescued from the burden of a failed experiment. But a theory of what and for what? Certainly the longstanding Marxist struggle to unite theory and practice seems dead, a victim of a much more fractured political, social and economic landscape than that in which Marx and his successors wrote. It may be that in the absence of the charged ideological environment of the short twentieth

century, we can recognize in Marx a "classic," a thinker of enduring value with a unique perspective on perennial questions of fundamental human concern. To suggest this would, of course, send Marx spinning in his grave. After all, philosophers had hitherto interpreted the world; the point was to change it. Marx expected communism would abolish philosophy by realizing it. Yet we have to accept that Marx as philosopher lives on precisely because, as Theodor Adorno once claimed with characteristic melancholy, the moment of philosophy's realization has been missed.

Yet if Marx was wrong about communism and maybe even about philosophy, perhaps he was right about capitalism. Or at least right enough that we can recognize value in his insights into the economic and social dynamics of his own epoch and, possibly, of our own. Or, perhaps not. To put the question in the provocative terms that the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce once asked of Hegel, what is living and what is dead in Karl Marx? To take stock of both Marx's historical distance from us and his continuing capacity to challenge us seems a fitting undertaking on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of his birth.

In the first session of the symposium, three notable biographers took up the question of the "historical Marx." What were their guiding threads in organizing Marx's life? What are the essential themes that shaped Marx's political and intellectual career? And what contribution might the biographer make to ongoing theoretical and political engagements with Marx? Jürgen Herres, a researcher involved in the continuing work of the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA), emphasized that historicization must mean not only positioning Marx in context, but also attending carefully to philological and editorial questions, an approach that has recently borne fruit in the MEGA's valuable new edition of *The German Ideology*. Gareth Stedman Jones and Jonathan Sperber, authors of the two most notable recent English-language biographies of Marx, emphasized the imperative to return to sources, give balanced consideration to Marx's ideas, political activities and private life, and recognize Marx as a "German." Herres expressed a view that all three affirmed, that biographical knowledge does not bury Marx; rather it is a precondition for our theoretical grasp and our sense of the current and future potential of Marx's legacy.

The second session, "Marx for Historians of Capitalism," explored the relationship of Marx to the so-called New History of Capitalism.

What distinguishes the "new" history of capitalism from the "old," and how should we situate Marx in this methodological and interpretive evolution? Ritu Birla argued for the pressing relevance of what she called the "Trans-Marx," a figure able to inspire a global history of capitalism that must be interdisciplinary, recognizes sites that bourgeois capitalism allegedly did away with, acknowledges patterns of uneven development, and reactivates Marx's attention to historical contingency. Noam Maggor maintained that Marx has not in fact been very central to the New History of Capitalism, which, true to its name, has focused less on labor and more on capital. Maggor sees gains in this historical approach, even as he plead for the importance of maintaining the kinds of larger frameworks inspired by Marx, but largely dispensed with by historians studying particular processes and agents. Timothy Shenk argued that the history of capitalism boom was the product of the 2008 financial crisis, when an intellectual elite primed by a post-Cold War consensus on the inevitability of liberal capitalism found itself confronted by a disaster that did not fit their understanding of how the world worked. The problem, from Shenk's perspective, was that this historiographical current reflected too much of the mentality it set out to critique. Too often, it subscribed to an economism that made it impossible to deal satisfactorily with politics, an absence that has become especially glaring in our time of populist upheavals. Jürgen Kocka's evening lecture on "Karl Marx and the History of Capitalism" wove together Marx's dual status as historical figure and present resource to make a magisterial case for the ongoing significance of Marx for our understanding of capitalism.

Warren Breckman (University of Pennsylvania)

MIGRANT KNOWLEDGES: CONCEPTS, VOICES, SPACES

Conference at the Pacific Regional Office of the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI West), UC Berkeley, April 20-21, 2018. Sponsored by the Volkswagenstiftung. Keynote event co-sponsored by the Institute of European Studies, the Asian American and Asian Diaspora Studies program, the Center for Latin American Studies, and the Center for Chinese Studies. Conveners: Albert Manke (GHI West / University of Bielefeld); Lok Siu (GHI West); Andrea Westermann, (GHI West). Participants: Eiichiro Azuma (University of Pennsylvania), Vivek Bald (MIT), Monica DeHart (University of Puget Sound), Jeroen Dewulf (UC Berkeley), Kijan Espahangizi (University of Zurich), Nicholas de Genova (Independent Scholar, Chicago), Fredy González (University of Colorado), Leslie Hernández Nova (European University Institute), Madeline Hsu (University of Texas), Evelyn Hu-Dehart (Brown University), Simone Lässig (GHI), Ana Paulina Lee (Columbia University), Kathleen Lopez (Rutgers University), Kevin Ostoyich (Valparaiso University), Massimo Perinelli (Rosa Luxemburg Foundation), Claudia Roesch (GHI), Julia Roth (University of Bielefeld), Carlos Sanhueza Cerda (University of Chile), Sofie Steinberger (University of Cologne), Sören Urbansky (GHI).

As the first major event after its official inauguration in November 2017, GHI West hosted the workshop "Migrant Knowledges: Concepts, Voices, Spaces." With particular but not exclusive focus on the inter-area and interdisciplinary history of the Americas from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries, the workshop explored possible methodologies, narratives, and empirics that facilitate a critical engagement with the concept of "migrant knowledges." The notion brought various aspects to the fore: Knowledges differ in kind and form across space, time, and cultures; knowledge is produced in specific (gendered and class-structured) contexts on the one hand; it also is constantly in transit, translated, forgotten, or questioned on the other.

The format of the workshop aimed to spark exploratory discussion and debate through one keynote talk and three consecutive roundtables with each participant submitting short pre-circulated statements. As it turned out, the workshop was a dialogue across U.S.-American and European communities of research. Welcome addresses were given by the directors of the two co-hosting institutes, Simone Lässig and Jeroen Dewulf.

Keynote speaker Evelyn Hu-Dehart presented a global history that reaches back to the early Spanish colonial period and argued that the first "American" Chinatown emerged in present-day Philippines and that the growth of the Chinese diaspora in the Philippines was central to the consolidation of the Spanish Empire. The Chinese played an essential role in facilitating the trans-oceanic Manila Galleon trade that connected Asia, the Americas, and Europe. The area of Manila where the Chinese congregated and were later forcefully relegated marked the first "American Chinatown" because it was not only one of the earliest Chinese settlements outside of China but was situated within the legal territorial jurisdiction of the Americas-based New Spain. Throughout the lecture, she presented early colonial representations of these Chinese that resonate with stereotypes that have prevailed to the present, including the Chinese being "overly hardworking," "economically over-competitive," and "expert artisans in replicating" items for trade. Hu-Dehart connected these early stereotypes with her current research on Barcelona, where she suggested that similar practices are taken up by recent Chinese migrants. One critical difference, she pointed out, is that these migrants are not creating ethnically-distinct cultural institutions like Chinese food restaurants. Rather, these migrants are economically integrating into Spain without asserting their ethnic difference. She used the example of Chinese bodega entrepreneurs to illustrate this point, which was questioned by some participants in the subsequent Q&A session moderated by Lok Siu: The entrepreneurs might not culturally assert their ethnic difference; sociologically it makes a difference though whether you stand behind or in front of the bar.

During the first roundtable dedicated to the topic of concepts, Kijan Espahangizi argued for studying the emergence of knowledge on migration and re-settling as a way to reframe societal history in comprehensive and transnational ways and come to a history of the present post-migrant societies, in his case, Germany and Switzerland. Espahangizi, just as Claudia Roesch, urged us to keep in mind the vital while selective interdependencies of multiple producers of migrant knowledges: state authorities, civil society actors including migrant organizations, and academic disciplines such as an emergent "migrant sociology." Interestingly enough, not only in the USA but also in a seemingly secular postwar Western Europe, churches, in particular, made sure to mediate between international debates on refugees, migrants, developmentalism, or the U.S.-American civil rights movement. A culturalist turn in the 1980s shifted perceptions, categories,

and notions of migration — an epistemic shift with far-reaching political consequences and in need of further analysis. Julia Roth emphasized the intellectual and epistemic afterlives of empires in the contemporary history of Latin America. She made a point of including less politically or scholarly formalized types of knowledges such as music, dance, or poetry in order to come to a better description and understanding of the world. Expanding on the research agenda of the history of science, Carlos Sanhueza Cerda presented a history of German-European-Chilean networks of scientific knowledge-making in the nineteenth century with a particular emphasis on the processes of translation and adaptation that made knowledge travel. All three papers exemplified what in German-speaking Europe has come to be known as *Wissensgeschichte*; an approach emphasizing, for instance, the benefits of transversal reading, i.e. symmetrical and relational reading across genres of literary and non-fiction texts (which also includes economic statistics, building plans, etc.). Grounded in an autonomy of migration approach, Nick de Genova confirmed that in the middle of both activist struggles and activist research epistemological questions are repeatedly addressed, if often unassumingly or without any disciplinary claims or "grandiose pretentions." De Genova highlighted the fact that migrants of necessity inhabit the categorical contradictions and conflicting goals they interrogate — making their subversion one that comes with embodied experiences and at a high cost. One of the questions that spilled over to the next roundtable was how to deal with ignorance as the other side of knowledge in the history of knowledge but also in the history of migration.

Roundtable 2 was entitled "Voices." Massimo Perinelli's example of the German neonazi terrorist group NSU murdering nine migrant citizens and one female police officer without ever coming into the focus of criminal investigators shows, in an extreme case, the inadvertent and willful effects of structural racism producing and maintaining collective ignorance. While it is important that the many stories that had too long been silenced have been told and researched in the aftermath of the terrorists' self-disclosure, the protracted powerlessness, injustice, and psychological after-effects the concerned families have suffered are here to stay. Leslie Hernández Nova's paper took the psychological after-effects of migration as a starting point. She argued for combining the methods of memory studies, oral history, and visual studies for better capturing and understanding the individual self-positioning of young migrants. Madeline Hsu and Fredy González explored a problem that contemporary historians face when

trying to make the individual lives of Asian immigrants such as the Chinese railroad workers in the American West more visible. Limited English proficiency or limited literacy are the reasons why sources written by migrants in their new (labor) environments are rare. Hsu highlighted two strategies to deal with the challenge: First, past lives and labor histories can be more generically reconstructed through the legacy of archaeological ruins of the working camps and construction sites. This allows for collaboration with historians of material culture and might yield insights that are contributing not only to a history from below but to overarching concerns in historiography, for instance, questions of temporalities or ideas of the environment as archive. In a similar vein, Kathleen Lopez argued for what could be called an archaeology of political cultures. Efforts at nation building come with their own temporalities and the possible consequence of privileging or erasing the presence of either earlier or more recently arrived groups of ethnic minorities. The second strategy to write richer histories from below is offered by multi-lingual and multi-sited research efforts, also endorsed by González and other participants. Harking back to the questions of Roundtable 1, the question was raised whether a necessary and persistent look at minority identities and state power was blinding us, perhaps, to overall societal developments at the same time? To put it bluntly: How could we make use of the alternative migrant archives once we got rid of the too readily homogenized national accounts Western research institutions and state organizations have been crafting and, perhaps inadvertently, still tend to craft ? Should there be yet another wave of reading the archives against the grain? And what could such "pieces" of migrant knowledges look like?

Roundtable 3 was dedicated to "Spaces." Structuralist approaches to migrant subjectivities and agencies, just like the material culture approaches, have much to offer. Participants of this roundtable agreed that spatial metaphors are conceptual frames, even epistemological containers that shape our perception of the "area" of analysis, the research questions we pose, and the methodologies we deploy. Each scholar elaborated on how the spatial metaphors of diaspora, borderlands, hemispheric and the Pacific have informed their research and ongoing work or were, on closer examination, discarded. Ana Paulina Lee reconstructed how migrants produced knowledge about their relational position in Brazil by placing themselves in the larger history of race, labor, and nation building in Brazil and elsewhere, such as the USA, for instance. Eiichiro Azuma underscored the metageographical

dimension implicit in concepts like the Pacific. Historians of different areas, he argued, are conditioned "to envision a geographical bounded space in particular prescribed ways when they frame their own studies around the theme of the Pacific." This results in many Pacifics, which are often incompatible with each other. Vivek Bald, in his archival project "Bengali Harlem," switched from a range of methodological notions of diaspora to the concepts of circuits and networks when researching the history of South Asian peddlers and ship workers in the USA. He did so first to highlight the sojourn labor realities and multiple mobilities involved and second to include into the analysis the labor history of women in support of the peddlers and workers; women who stayed put in the home villages and agricultural holdings when male villagers left, and those African American and Puerto Rican women who became the wives of the South Asian migrants in the U.S., connecting their husbands to their own local and economic environments. In her research on Mexican borders in the twentieth century, Sofie Steinberger suggested to focus on border zones as a lens for a globally-informed (economic) history of Mexico by combining the macro analysis of national and international regulations, negotiations and interests regarding territory, security, and (shadow) economies with micro analyses of political, geographic, and economic knowledge held by those on the move; knowledge that helped scale and re-scale, shape, and furnish the territorial and social spaces within Mexico and beyond. Roundtable 3 definitely called our attention to processes of scaling– from the local to the national to the regional to the global. The spatial metaphors discussed in this roundtable created different maps that indicate different spheres of power and nodes of importance as well as coextensive or alternative power relations. The metaphors or concepts allowed for absences to become apparent and different or previously submerged knowledges and phenomena to emerge. At GHI West, these questions will be further pursued in upcoming conferences and initiatives, such as a website drawing together ongoing historically-minded research and contributions around the notion of migrant knowledges while at the same time presenting this research in ways that cut across the many disciplinary fields of research on migration.

Andrea Westermann (GHI West)

FOURTEENTH WORKSHOP ON EARLY MODERN GERMAN HISTORY

Workshop organized by the German Historical Institute London (GHIL) in co-operation with the German History Society and the German Historical Institute Washington, and held at the GHIL on 11 May 2018. Conveners: Bridget Heal (University of St Andrews), Katherine Hill (Birkbeck, University of London), David Lederer (NUI Maynooth), Alison Rowlands (University of Essex), and Hannes Ziegler (GHIL). Participants: Richard Calis (Princeton University), Philip Hahn (University of Tübingen), Catherine Hill (London University), Jan Hillgaertner (University of St Andrews), Ulrike Ludwig (University of Frankfurt), Crawford Matthews (University of Hull), Ahuva Liberles Noiman (University of Jerusalem), Yanan Qizhi (Pennsylvania State University), Ansgar Schanbacher (University of Göttingen), Adam Storring (Cambridge University), Edmund Wareham (Oxford University).

This workshop on early modern German history — the fourteenth since 2002 — was held at the German Historical Institute in London and brought together scholars from England, Scotland, Ireland, the United States, Israel, and Germany. As in previous years, an open call for papers was issued and a few invitations were extended to scholars from Germany. The one-day workshop was attended by as many guests and discussants (including visitors from Oxford and Nottingham universities) as active participants. True to the ideals of the workshop, the setting was fairly informal and focused on the open discussion of ongoing research, methodological problems, and projects (as well as books) in the making. Rather than being pressed into a coherent framework, the ten papers presented were loosely organized into thematic sections around topics such as news and the newspaper, political culture, religious cultures, and communal cultures. One particularly welcome feature was that several papers also ventured outside the period usually denominated as early modern and thus presented the opportunity to discuss transformations and changes from the late medieval to the modern period.

The day started with a session on news chaired by Alison Rowlands. Richard Calis presented part of his doctoral dissertation in a paper on the credibility of news from the Ottoman Empire in the micro-historical setting of the household of the Tübingen scholar Martin Crucius (1527–1606). Drawing on the extensive documentation of Crucius's interviews and conversations with travellers and pilgrims

from Ottoman-controlled Greece, Calis developed the notion of an 'economy of trust' that regulated — through various formal and informal codes and conventions, often in written form — the exchange of news in cross-cultural encounters within the Crucius household. Calis focused on material culture in particular because, he suggested, it indicated the ways in which Crucius aimed to establish trust in individual Greek travellers and the news they brought. Calis concentrated especially on Crucius's astonishing scrutiny of personal appearance (dress, language, and so on) and material evidence, such as seals and letters of recommendation.

The exchange of news was also the focus in Jan Hillgaertner's paper, albeit in the more formal setting of printed newspapers. In recounting the history of written newspapers from their invention in early seventeenth-century Strasbourg, Hillgaertner aimed to emphasize the often overlooked advantages of newspapers as historical sources while highlighting the limitations of working with these documents. After presenting a statistical analysis of the spread and development of newspapers throughout the seventeenth century and patterns in the reporting of British news in German and Dutch newspapers, Hillgaertner emphasized potential problems and limitations. These included the subsequent loss of seventeenth-century newspapers and obvious omissions and errors in reporting at the time. Errors, however, also present an interesting starting point for further research as they are indicative of the speed of travelling news, patterns of reporting, reader experiences, and potentially even orchestrated false news campaigns.

The second session, chaired by David Lederer, evolved around symbolic communication and political culture. Ulrike Ludwig presented a synopsis of her recently published monograph on the duel in the Holy Roman Empire. She argued that the concept of the duel familiar to modern observers is a product of the nineteenth century rather than a suitable model for early mod- ern conflicts of honour. Thus the duel as an analytical concept is of little use in making sense of the varieties of these conflicts, as it denotes a narrow idea of conflict with highly standardized and formalized features that fails to grasp early modern realities. Ludwig therefore chose to start from the word itself rather than applying a problematic analytical concept. She pursued the idea of the duel from early sixteenth-century Italy to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Germany, highlighting French influences in narrowing the legal definition of a duel. This subsequent narrowing

and formalizing of the concept in the nineteenth century went hand in hand, she argued, with the invention of a tradition that is still influential in current debates.

Crawford Matthews presented part of his ongoing research on British–Prussian relations in the context of the acquisition of royal status by Frederick I of Prussia. In a close focus on the "Dreikönigstreffen" held in Potsdam and Berlin in 1709, Matthews argued that Frederick aimed to use the occasion of a visit by the kings of Denmark and Poland to enact his royal status in the presence of the two visitors. In doing so, he relied especially on the British ambassador, Baron Raby, who developed various ceremonial occasions to high- light the king's royal rank, such as a christening in Potsdam, seating arrangements at the dinner table, and the presentation of valuable objects in the residence of the ambassador. In addition to demonstrating Frederick's equal rank vis-à-vis the two other monarchs, Matthews argued that the ceremonial expenditures at Raby's residence, and his status as a representative of the British monarch trans- formed the meeting — albeit only temporarily — into a meeting of four monarchs.

The final paper of this session also focused on a Prussian monarch. Adam Storring analysed the motives of Frederick the Great of Prussia in portraying himself as personally in charge of the leadership of his army throughout his early reign, especially during the Silesian campaign in 1740 and in the War of the Austrian Succession. He argued that Frederick followed ideas of traditional kingship, as represented particularly by Louis XIV of France, while at the same time reacting to Enlightenment ideas formulated and transmitted by Voltaire. Beyond his well-known emulation of Louis's cultural patronage, Frederick was also influenced by military ideas of traditional kingship discussed by Voltaire. In seeking to achieve Voltaire's notion of the *grand homme*, Frederick explicitly sought recognition on the basis of his military success, which was most explicitly attached to the idea of personal leadership in battle.

Catherine Hill opened the third session of the day with a focus on religious cultures in early modern Germany. Ahuva Liberles Noiman presented findings from her ongoing Ph.D. research on the problem of conversion to Christianity in the fifteenth-century Jewish community of Regensburg. She asks how conversion affected the relationships between Jews and Christians in a late medieval urban microcosm and how the converts' ties with their social networks changed and were rearranged through the act of converting. Through the micro-historical

lens of a biographical study of Kalman, the cantor at Regensburg before 1470, Noiman illustrated the difficulties faced by converts on the threshold of baptism. In a liminal position between Christianity and Judaism, Kalman was perceived as a spiritual threat to the Jewish community. Yet his position also offered distinct advantages, for example, as a composer of religious polemics based on his intimate knowledge of both religions. Cases such as Kalman's thus offer valuable insights for understanding Jewish community life and the problems of religious and social belonging in the midst of a predominantly Christian society.

Social and religious ties in the context of a religious community were also the focus of Edmund Wareham's paper. Drawing on a unique collection of surviving letters written by the Benedictine nuns of Lüne, comprising a corpus of 1,800 letters dating from between 1460 and 1555, Wareham analysed the reaction of the Lüne nuns to the introduction of the Reformation by the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg in the 1530s. Apart from providing valuable insights into women's writing in relation to the Reformation, this process also sheds light, Wareham argued, on the problematic concept and critical status of religious vows in the tumultuous years of the early Reformation period. Looking at various aspects such as the performative and transformative function of vows, especially in the context of religious life in sixteenth-century Germany, Wareham ultimately outlined first ideas for a broad study of vows in early modern Germany drawing on various social contexts that can be fruitfully analysed by looking closely at how vows were conceptualized, rejected, or re-affirmed.

The final paper in this session, delivered by Yanan Qizhi, focused on dreams and dream interpretations in early modern Lutheranism. Following the career of individual Lutheran preachers from six generations of German Lutheranism, from the early Reformation period to the late Pietist movement of the mid eighteenth century, Qizhi proposed to study dreams within the cultural and historical contexts of these writers and their everyday experiences rather than in a grand narrative of a history of ideas as in existing research. One aim of her research is to explore the discrepancy between the public dismissal of the value of dreams by early reformers (Luther and Melanchthon, among others) and the immense value these writers attached to dreams personally. For the purpose of her study, Quizhi highlighted the value of ego-documents for researchers studying the meanings and interpretations attached to individual dreams as this type of writing was particularly relevant to the Lutheran communities.

The final session on communal cultures, chaired by Bridget Heal, opened with a paper by Philip Hahn on a forthcoming book about sensory communities. Taking the early modern town of Ulm as a case study, he illustrated how discussions in both urban and sensory history can benefit from a micro-historical analysis of urban sensory cultures. The "urban sense-scape," Hahn argued, was highly instrumental in ritual performative community-building. He stressed the importance of understanding senses as subject to historical change, and not only embedded in specific contexts but intricately connected to each other in a way that could be termed "inter-sensoriality." Hahn then outlined the structure of his monograph, in which he highlights the changing patterns of perceiving and sensing the city, changing forms of sensory perceptions, especially in terms of perceived dangers, and the community's reactions to this in matters of policy. The senses, Hahn concluded, thus not only contribute to the understanding of urban community-building, but also offer opportunities to study long-term changes beyond established chronological boundaries of historical research.

Finally, Ansgar Schanbacher offered insights into his post-doctoral project on natural hazards and resource management in early modern cities. In explicitly combining scholarly discourses on technical and medical solutions and everyday practices of city authorities and inhabitants, Schanbacher aimed to evaluate the reactions of various actors to natural hazards and scarcity. As a focus of his research, Schanbacher chose the three medium-sized cities of Braunschweig, Utrecht, and Würzburg, whose different social, economic, and political settings offer opportunities for comparisons. While the project encompasses issues such as gardens and urban agriculture, and natural disasters such as floods, fire, storms, and disease, Schanbacher presented his initial findings concentrating on the supply of firewood and peat. Here he showed how the authorities of the three cities reacted to problems of scarcity in very different ways during the same period, from 1650 to 1800, ranging from free trade policies to specific ordinances and regulations in times of crisis. Schanbacher ultimately portrayed early modern cities as ecosystems subject to specific contexts and historical change.

All told, the papers presented at the workshop reflected different phases of research from the very early stages to recently completed projects and monographs. At the same time, they indicated major findings, addressed methodological problems, or pitched new conceptual

ideas. In doing so, they fully lived up to the basic idea of the workshop, which is to provide a platform for discussing ongoing research on early modern Germany and encouraging exchange between scholars working on different areas and themes. Unsurprisingly, this focus helped to stimulate an open and lively discussion that highlighted connections and contradictions between the papers in a critical and fruitful way. As in previous years, it was an interesting and productive day providing much food for further thought and debate.

Hannes Ziegler (GHI London)

TRANSOCEANIC AMERICAN STUDIES

Conference at the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI), May 17-18, 2018. Conveners: Juliane Braun (University of Bonn/GHI), Benjamin Fagan (Auburn University/GHI). Participants: Alvita Akiboh (Northwestern University), Ernesto Bassi Arevalo (Cornell University), Sarah Beringer (GHI), Hester Blum (Pennsylvania State University), Michelle Burnham (Santa Clara University), Ananya Chakravarti (Georgetown University), Christopher Connery (University of California, Santa Cruz), Eric Covey (Miami University), Marlene L. Daut (University of Virginia), Alexandra Ganser (University of Vienna), Matthew Hiebert (GHI), Axel Jansen (GHI), Ryan Tucker Jones (University of Oregon), Mark B. Kelley (University of California, San Diego), Atiba Pertilla (GHI), Nicole Poppenhagen (University of Flensburg), Brian Russell Roberts (Brigham Young University), Martha Elena Rojas (University of Rhode Island), Chelsea Stieber (Catholic University of America), Jens Temmen (University of Potsdam), Sören Urbansky (GHI), Nicole Waller (University of Potsdam), Andrea Westermann (GHI West), Maria A. Windell (University of Colorado), Kariann Akemi Yokota (University of Colorado, Denver).

The Transoceanic American Studies conference was organized to provide an interdisciplinary forum to explore the interconnectedness of the Americas to the Pacific and Atlantic oceans and of those oceans to one another. The conference brought together scholars working in Atlantic Studies, Pacific Studies, and the emerging field of transoceanic studies to comment on current trends and introduce new methods and perspectives to better understand the transoceanic American world. In their introduction, Juliane Braun and Benjamin Fagan remarked on the transnational turn and the significance of applying this framework to oceanic American studies. Towards this end, the conference incorporated papers that developed a theoretical and methodological framework for transoceanic studies, explored specific accounts of interconnectivity between the Americas and the surrounding oceans, and further integrated the voices of indigenous oceanic communities into a narrative of the Americas. The first panel introduced innovative theories and methodologies that could help scholars reorient their view of American studies within a transoceanic perspective. The subsequent four panels offered a series of case studies that incorporated many of the new theories and methods, while also touching on key themes within the field of transoceanic American studies.

The first panel explored "Theories and Methodologies" related to the field of transoceanic studies. Michelle Burnham's talk, "Transoceanic Thinking and American Literary History," began with a gripping anecdote of the oceanic practice of wave piloting as a way of navigating from point to point. The anecdote served as a metaphor throughout her paper as she argued for scholars to approach transoceanic history in a similar way, that is, by exploring new routes that deviate from linear and land-locked narratives of American literary history. Christopher Connery followed by introducing the theory of Psychohydrography and its potential as a new field practice for exploring the transoceanic world. Connery argued that by physically tracing the space where water and land meet, scholars can find the hidden histories of aqueous communities. Nicole Waller's paper presented a method to connect the Pacific and Atlantic oceans by looking to the Arctic. Waller's analysis of the region explained the Arctic's importance in the geopolitical world as both a transit space and a terraqueous world. The complexity of this area is a source of contention for the region's indigenous communities as well as others claiming the territory. Hester Blum continued this discussion with her paper on "Polar American Studies." Blum highlighted the crucial role the Arctic plays in discussions of American security, economy and even identity. Both Waller and Blum's critical analyses of the Arctic highlighted the importance of oceanic spaces for nations. This panel presented essential and innovative theories, methods, and trends in transoceanic American studies and provided an effective foundation for the remainder of the conference.

The second panel, "Interrogating Empire," focused on instances of American imperialism. Kariann Akemi Yokota challenged Atlanticist approaches to American history and urged scholars to consider the importance of the Pacific Ocean to early American national and imperial formations. Yokota's paper used the ginseng root to explore the relationship between America and China in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from the perspective of both countries. Echoing Yokota's effort to analyze the American imperial narrative, Alvita Akiboh examined the materiality of imperialism in the United States' Caribbean and South Pacific colonies. Akiboh tracked the Americanization of offshore territories through the implementation of a national material culture (i.e. flags, currency, and the United States Postal Service). She also explored how the adaptation of this American material culture by indigenous communities underscores the issue of dual identities. Eric Covey concluded the panel with his paper,

"Main Currents of American Studies off the Shores of Africa." Covey focused on two cases of America's expanding intervention in and around Africa: America's relationship with the Ottoman Empire and its reaction to increased Chinese industry in Africa. Covey argued that the United States has consistently framed its engagements with Africa as military interventions rather than attempts to assist in economic development.

Ernesto Bassi Arevalo began the third panel on "Transoceanic Archipelagos" with his paper, "The Sea as Territory and the Creation of a Transimperial Greater Caribbean." Arevalo invited scholars to consider the sea as a primary site of information and interaction for historical research. Moving from the Spanish to the French Caribbean, Marlene L. Daut focused her paper on the Haitian Atlantic. Similar to Yokota and Arevalo, Daut sought to decolonize transoceanic histories of experience by examining the work of prominent nineteenth-century Haitian writers and their efforts to align themselves with the Confederación antillana, an organization formed to end European and U.S.-American domination of the Caribbean. Brian Russell Roberts similarly challenged continental approaches to the study of the Americas with his paper, "Borderwaters, Polynesian-Arawaks, and Remembering Los Alamos." Roberts looked to Mark Twain's *Huckleberry Finn*, the migration of Polynesian-Arawaks from Melanesia to Latin America and the Caribbean, and Los Alamos to analyze the critical role of water, shorelines, and archipelagoes for the formation of borders, governmentalities, and identities.

The fourth panel, "Transoceanic Mobilities", focused on oceanic narratives as a way to explore the transoceanic experience. Maria A. Windell's paper on early U.S. naval writing focused on travelogues as a means to challenge traditional political narratives. Windell argued that naval writings could uncover unconventional histories as they described accidents of power but were also used to authenticate authority, and thus illuminated, both in content and context, the unpredictability and shifting nature of transoceanic power in the nineteenth century. Mark Kelley echoed the importance of travel writing in transoceanic studies by considering the sea as a sentimental space for sailors. Kelley provided an analysis of sailors' writings to explore the complexities of experience at sea and highlighted the importance of material objects to tease out the affective dimension of seafaring. Alexandra Ganser concluded the panel with her discussion of "Maritime Mobilities in North American Refugee Narratives."

Ganser argued for the significance of the idea of unsettlement in transoceanic American studies with her analysis of refugee literature. Each of the panelists focused on different narratives of the sea, but the diversity of the works studied revealed the size and complexity of the oceanic archive.

The fifth panel, "Transoceanic Seascapes," focused on the ocean itself as an object of study. Ryan Tucker Jones' paper on animal migration in the Pacific incorporated an environmental perspective. Similar to many presenters at the conference, Jones denationalized his approach to Pacific history and argued that by looking at migration patterns, scholars can further understand the interconnectivity of the Pacific World. Martha Elena Rojas followed with her discussion on "Decolonizing the Ocean." Rojas explored the surprising presence of the ocean in artworks created by prisoners detained at Guantanamo. She argued that the context and stories of these images provide a transoceanic history from a subaltern perspective. Nicole Poppenhagen and Jens Temmen concluded the panel with a joint presentation entitled "Navigating the Pacific and Atlantic Currents: Towards a Transoceanic Perspective in American Studies?" Poppenhagen explained her work on the Chinese-American diaspora and Temmen focused on American territorial expansion. Both argued for fluid conceptions of land and sea and emphasized the need for an American studies practice that highlights indigenous and minority perspectives.

In the concluding panel, the participants reflected on five issues that had emerged as recurring themes throughout the conference: the questions of archive, language, theory, scale, and sites of transoceanic American studies. The scholars discussed the need to explore new archives and to recover materials related to transoceanic studies as a way to gain different and more diverse perspectives on the history, literature, and culture of the Americas. These archives may include texts that were written and published outside the Americas and do not contain obvious thematic links to the American continent as a geographic space. They may also extend beyond the textual to include material objects. In this vein, the issue of language was raised as participants argued that scholars engaged in transoceanic studies must incorporate sources from languages other than English in order to work against one-sided discourses. On the question of theory and the development of a transoceanic methodology, the participants agreed that it was important to recover and honor the genealogy of oceanic thinking as it has emerged from indigenous and minority

communities, as well as from scholars in Oceania, Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. The question of the distinction between global and transoceanic approaches to history, literature, and culture animated the participants' discussion on the scale of transoceanic studies. A global framework, some participants pointed out, analyzed its object of study from above, while the strength of a transoceanic approach lay in its geographic situatedness and its focus on the connections between at least two oceans. In the discussion on transoceanic spaces, the conference participants collected a number of sites that lent themselves especially to transoceanic studies. These sites include oceans, islands, littorals, archipelagoes, edges, cliffs, beaches, and ships. Finally, the conference participants reflected on the creativity and comingling of scholars from overlapping fields, and offered possibilities for utilizing this new community for ongoing collaborations within transoceanic American studies.

Madeleine Miller (GHI)

24TH TRANSATLANTIC DOCTORAL SEMINAR IN GERMAN HISTORY: NINETEENTH- AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY GERMAN HISTORY

Seminar at the GHI West, the Pacific Regional Office of the German Historical Institute Washington, in Berkeley, California, from May 30 to June 2, 2018. Co-organized by the German Historical Institute Washington and the BMW Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University. Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI). Faculty mentors: Frank Bösch (Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam), Robert Kunath (Illinois College, Jacksonville, IL), Andrew Port (Wayne State University, Detroit, MI), Isabel Richter (Universiy of California, Berkeley). Participants: Irit Bloch (City University New York, Graduate Center), Logan Clendening (University of California, Davis), Netta Cohen (Oxford University), Linda Conze (Humboldt University, Berlin), Marc-Andre Dufour (University of Toronto), Philipp Ebert (University of Cambridge), Samuel Huneke (Stanford University), Claudia Kreklau (Emory University), Anna Leyrer (Universität Basel), Anne MacKinney (Humboldt University, Berlin), Christina Matzen (University of Toronto), Thomas Rohringer (Internationales Forschungszentrum Kulturwissenschaften, Vienna), Benedikt Sepp (University of Konstanz), David Spreen (University of Michigan), Carolyn Taratko (Vanderbilt University), Karolin Wetjen (University of Göttingen).

The twenty-fourth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History, co-organized by the German Historical Institute Washington and the BMW Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University, was dedicated to nineteenth- and twentieth-century German history and was hosted by GHI West, the Pacific Regional Office of the German Historical Institute Washington, on the University of California Berkeley campus. As always, the seminar brought together eight doctoral students from North America and eight from Europe, all of whom are working on dissertations in modern German history. The seminar was organized in eight panels, featuring two papers each, which opened with two comments by fellow students, followed by discussion of the pre-circulated papers.

The seminar started with a panel on the history of science featuring two papers that both addressed the question how the production of knowledge affects identities. Anne MacKinney's paper "Registering Nature: Lists between Scholarly Work and Administrative

Responsibility in the Berlin Zoological Museum (1810–1840)" examined the documentary practices employed by nineteenth-century naturalists to evaluate specimens and incorporate them into the collections of the Berlin Zoological Museum. This kind of work with paper and specimens, MacKinney argued, helped forge the persona of the scientific administrator, thus elucidating the processes by which divisions of labor and identity were redrawn within Berlin's diversifying naturalist community. Netta Cohen's paper "Oriental Air, Occidental Identity: Zionist Transfer of Medical Climatology to Palestine, 1918–1948" studied the development of medical climatology by Jewish physicians in Palestine during the British Mandate. Tracing the origins of medical climatology in the context of western history as well as in the specific Jewish and Zionist contexts, Cohen's paper investigated the transfer of climatological research to Palestine by central European physicians and its cultural and political implications in its new destination.

The second panel was devoted to Germany history in the post-1945 era. In his paper "'A Freemasonry of the Perverse': Gay spies in East Germany" Samuel Huneke examined the existence of gay spy networks in East Germany between 1950 and 1970, a period during which Western services actively recruited gay East Germans, believing them to be desirable collaborators. As the Stasi became aware of these networks, Huneke argued, it came to regard the gay subculture with a suspicion that would shape how it treated gay activism in later decades. Philipp Ebert's paper "Verjährung als vergangenheitspolitisches Vehikel: Genese und politische Legitimation strafrechtlicher DDR-Aufarbeitung, 1961-1993" contended that the criminal trials dealing with East German state crimes did not result from a political initiative but from legal path-dependencies that arose from the work of West Germany's Zentrale Erfassungsstelle in Salzgitter and criminal investigations in the GDR that got underway in the transitional period between the fall of the Wall and reunification.

The third panel brought together two different papers on the history of criminal justice and on the history of religion. Christina Matzen's paper "The Intimacies of Carceral Life: Imprisoned Women in Postwar West Germany" examined the liberation of the Aichach prison in order to analyze how women's sexuality and criminality became entangled in postwar West Germany. Matzen advanced the thesis that bourgeois notions of gender and sexuality led to the unequal treatment and thus to the imprisonment of women and, more

specifically, that targeting women for venereal disease and using them as scapegoats to evade confronting Nazi crimes was a postwar strategy that is vital for understanding the larger process postwar reconstruction. Karolin Wetjen's paper "Ein Ritual etablieren: Die Taufpraxis der Leipziger Mission am Kilimandscharo" explored the establishment of the ritual of baptism in the missionary work of the Lutheran Leipziger Missionsgesellschaft in the area around Mount Kilimanjaro in colonial German East Africa in the late nineteenth century. The concrete implementation of the baptismal ritual, she argued, was shaped at least as much by local actors as by mission-related debates about theology and religion that were taking place in Imperial Germany.

The fourth panel was dedicated to food history. Claudia Kreklau's paper "Making Modern Eating: Food 'Adulteration,' Legal Responses, and Back to Nature Movements in the German Empire, 1860-1890" investigated the incorporation of industrial food products into the German middle class diet. As the "food police" identified the threat of "food adulteration," the state reacted with food legislation, while the middle classes turned to vegetarianism. This dual phenomenon, Kreklau argued, constituted the advent of "modern eating." Carolyn Taratko's paper "Surrogate Foods in Peace and in War" investigated the status of surrogate foods in Germany during the decades leading up to World War I and during the war itself. After examining notions of habit and hunger, Taratko argued that surrogacy projects were employed as a technology to overcome wartime shortages and resource depletion, representing a technocratic fix to the political problem of hunger in wartime Germany.

The fifth panel combined two microhistories in the cultural history of the 1920s, one exploring a controversial criminal trial, the other the friendship between two prominent women. In her paper "When Silence is Deafening: Covert Anti-Semitism and the Question of Authority" Irit Bloch examined the 1926 "Magdeburg Affair," a criminal investigation and trial, as a case study to understand how German judges of the Weimar era manipulated procedural law to reach desired outcomes. The complex motivations for the judges' conduct, she argued, included a strong degree of covert anti-Semitism and sympathy to right-wingers as well as a misguided sense of judicial power being curtailed after 1918. Anna Leyrer's paper "Die Schwester, der Freundschaftstraum: Lou Andreas-Salomé und Anna Freud" examined the relationship between Anna Freud and Andreas-Salomé

during the 1920s as part of a history of friendship, especially friendship between women. Even though friendship was seen as competing with familial relationships, Leyrer contended, it was at the same time cast and understood in familial terms.

The sixth panel dealt with the First World War. Marc-Andre Dufour's paper "That Sinking Feeling: The U-Boat Option and German Conceptions of Victory in the First World War" used the question of unrestricted submarine warfare as a lens to examine how German politicians and military leaders struggled with different conceptions of time and future during World War I. As civilians, generals and admirals approached the submarine question with their specific hopes and fears, U-Boats became the miracle weapon that could win it all for Germany, despite strong objections from the civilian leadership. Turning to the home front, Thomas Rohringer's paper "Zwischen Bürgerpflicht und Opfergabe: Moralische Ökonomie und Re-Integration Kriegsbeschädigter 1914-1918" analyzed the petitions that injured Habsburg soldiers submitted to the Habsburg imperial family and its ministries during the war. The new motif of the *Opfergabe* (sacrifice) as the primary strategy of legitimation in these petitions, Rohringer argued, signaled the disintegration of a moral economy of duty, which had previously regulated the relationship between the monarchy and its soldiers.

The seventh panel was dedicated to the cultural history of Weimar and Nazi Germany. Logan Clendening's paper "Contested Bodies in Nature: Recreational Bathing in Weimar Germany" investigated the surging popularity of outdoor mixed-sex swimming, sunbathing, and nudism in Weimar Germany, which was widely perceived as evidence of a nation unmoored from conventional gender norms after World War I. The diverse conceptions of gender, the body, and nature that this mass phenomenon generated, Clendening contended, made public bathing sites staging grounds for broader political contestations over the future of the nation. Linda Conze's paper "Das Fest in der Fotografie: Zur medialen Herstellung von Gemeinschaft zwischen Weimarer Republik und Nationalsozialismus" studied photographs of celebratory crowds to probe the interaction between public festivities and photography in processes of community building on the cusp of the transition from Weimar to Nazi Germany. According to Conze, a comparison between state-commissioned and local photographs of May Day festivities in the early 1930s reveals a multiplicity of photographic representations that goes well beyond the images of the disciplined *Volkskörper* that is so familiar from Nazi propaganda imagery.

The seminar's final panel featured two papers on the student movement and leftist politics in the wake of 1968. David Spreen's paper "Cold War Imaginaries: Mao's China and the Making of a Postcolonial Left in Divided Germany" situated parliamentary and public debates about legal proceedings against Maoist parties in West Germany in the broader context of SPD *Ostpolitik* and conservative opposition thereto. Spreen argued that the way intelligence officers and bureaucrats carefully separated Maoism from "foreign extremism" disguised the transnational character of the Maoist Left in 1970s West Germany. Benedikt Sepp's paper "Bewegtes Denken, harte Körper: Der Zerfall der antiautoritären Bewegung in West-Berlin 1968-1970" examined the late phase of the West Berlin anti-authoritarian movement, which disintegrated into competing splinter groups around 1968. Sepp contended that the splinter groups' turn toward dogmatic Marxism and rigid organizational structures is best understood as a process of "hardening" (*Verhärtung*) of body, theory, and practice that represented a reaction against the preceding "movement" phase.

Meeting at UC Berkeley's Institute of European Studies, where the GHI West offices are located, the seminar was characterized by a marvelous combination of scholarly rigor and congeniality. The final discussion provided an opportunity to reflect on common themes and research trends. Keeping in mind that the dissertation projects presented at the seminar are not a representative sample of ongoing dissertation projects in German history in North America and Germany, it was noted that neither the *Sonderweg* debate nor National Socialism figured as primary reference points for most of the projects. Likewise, the political caesuras of 1918, 1933, and 1945 were of limited importance, as many papers were concerned with continuities across political regimes. As a sign that gender history and the history of sexuality have had an impact on the mainstream of history, it was also remarked that gender and sexuality figured in many projects whose main themes extended into other areas of history. Although one of the participants rightly observed that every doctoral student should write a dissertation that is meaningful to themselves, it was also clear that all of the papers presented at the seminar had relevance for a better understanding not only of German history but of European history and, last but not least, of our present predicament. The completion and publication of the dissertations presented at the seminar is eagerly awaited.

Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

LEARNING BY THE BOOK: MANUALS AND HANDBOOKS IN THE HISTORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Conference at Princeton University, June 6-10, 2018. Co-organized by the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI) and Princeton University. Conveners: Angela Creager (Princeton University), Mathias Grote (Humboldt-University Berlin), Elaine Leong (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin), and Kerstin von der Krone (GHI). Made possible by grants from the GHI Washington and Princeton University (the Center for Collaborative History, the International Fund, and the David A. Gardner '69 Magic Project in the Humanities Council) with additional travel funding from the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin (MPI). Participants: François Allisson (University of Lausanne), Elaine Ayers (Princeton University), Tonny Beentjes (Utrecht University), Marianne Brooker (University of London), Simon Brown (University of California Berkeley), Marcel Bubert (University of Münster), Wilson Chan (University of Hong Kong), Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche (University of Lausanne), Karine Chemla (CNRS/Paris Diderot), William Deringer (MIT/ Princeton University), Sven Dupré (Utrecht University), Elisabeth Engel (GHI), Michael Gordin (Princeton University), Thijs Hagendijk (Utrecht University), Marta Hanson (Johns Hopkins University/ Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University), Evan Hepler-Smith (Harvard University), Florence Hsia (University of Wisconsin), Hansun Hsiung (MPI Axel C. Hüntelmann (Charité Berlin), Susanne Jany (Humboldt University, Berlin), Boris Jardine (University of Cambridge), Evangelos Katsioris (Princeton University), Daniel Kevles (Yale University), Charles Kollmer (Princeton University), Reinhild Kreis (University of Mannheim), Federico Marcon (Princeton University), Matteo Martelli (University of Bologna), Michael McGovern (Princeton University), Anna-Maria Meister (Princeton University), Matthew Melvin-Koushki (University of South Carolina), Staffan Müller-Wille (University of Exeter), Sue Naquin (Princeton University), Jennifer M. Rampling (Princeton University), David Robertson (Princeton University), Alrun Schmidtke (Humboldt University Berlin), Isabelle Schuerch (University of Bern), Nigel Smith (Princeton University), Pamela H. Smith (Columbia University), Liat Spiro (Harvard University), Eveline Szarka (University of Zurich), Umberto Veronesi (University College London), Xue Zhang (Princeton University).

The conference "Learning by the Book: Manuals and Handbooks in the History of Knowledge" spanned five days, twelve panels, a month of publishing 35 blogs in lieu of pre-circulated papers, and the first

public presentation of an early modern manuscript recently acquired by Princeton University's Special Collections. The latter directly corresponded to several of the organizers' pre-posed questions on this type of literature, i.e. how are practices and protocols recorded, distributed or preserved, and how are objects or processes named, registered or classified? What kind of credit accompanies the development or compilation of methods or reference literature? When and why do certain books become commercially successful or canonical, and others obsolete? How does their circulation relate to the commodification of required materials, or to more informal forms of exchange?

By publishing blog posts on the GHI's *History of Knowledge* blog (www.historyofknowledge.net) as well as *The Recipes Project* (recipes.hypotheses.org) in the run-up to the conference, both of which encouraged the use of the hashtag #lbtb18 under which plenty of documentary twitter entries may still be browsed, the event attained an unusual public visibility. The organizers also facilitated remote attendance by video- and audio streaming of all presentations and discussions.

Framed by an introduction from the conveners, a keynote address by Pamela H. Smith and a final commentary by Michael Gordin, the conference was organized around four practices associated with handbooks or manuals, namely "preserving," "revising," "teaching," and "selling." These proved to overlap in many cases and helped to carve out key issues guiding a great variety of distinct material objects. In their introductory remarks, the organizers stressed their common interest in historicizing practices and the codification thereof. Angela Creager referred to formal training, power dynamics and alternatives to hierarchical classroom setups as well as to the fundamental question of "how practices relate to text and knowing to doing." Mathias Grote spoke about the significance of instructional literature and introduced a conceptual history of the manual and the handbook, referring to book formats and efforts to classify texts. Especially the notion of "vademecum science," a translation of Ludwik Fleck's *Handbuchwissenschaft*, was a theme that was frequently referred to in later discussions and had significant bearing on epistemological aspects of communication formats. Elaine Leong invited participants to rethink the temporality of knowledge along with issues of priority, property, secrecy and value of knowledge, which were common themes in the case studies. With reference to her editorship at the

Recipes Project, she highlighted the textual feature of fluidity and corresponding practices of re-writing, re-arranging or re-interpreting recipe knowledge. Historicizing knowledge and bringing together current research from different fields is one of the current core interests of the GHI, as Kerstin von der Krone emphasized.

Pamela H. Smith's keynote, "From Lived Experience to the Written Word: Making, Writing, and Knowing in the Early Modern Workshop," introduced the hands-on research approach practiced at her "The Making and Knowing Project" at Columbia University, which includes laboratory work drawing on early modern recipes. Questioning the extent to which early modern manuals could have been meant as books to be learned from, Smith elaborated on instructional literature as a source for historical research, which might lead to the conclusion that instructional texts were not always meant as helpful "how-to" guides, but were generally considered to raise the status of artisans and of practical experiential knowledge.

While the aforementioned clustering around practices gave each day a practical theme, the panels were organized around focal points such as "improvisation and non-standardization," "devotional and domestic knowledge" or "protocols and recipes," each of which comprised three 20-minute presentations followed by individual Q&A's moderated by a chairperson.

The first panel focused on artisanal knowledge, discussing annotated manuscripts, the textualization of artisanal know-how, and manuals' reputed place in apprenticeship-learning. Presentations ranged from fourteenth-century China (Wilson Chan) to seventeenth-century England (Jenny Boulboullé) to the Netherlands of the eighteenth century (Thijs Hagedijk/Tonny Beentjes).

Collections as institutions and practice were discussed in the second panel featuring Elaine Ayers on nineteenth-century botanical collection manuals as instructions in imperial contexts, Marianne Brooker on virtual museum visits by means of a printed guide to architect John Soane's museum, and Charles Kollmer on collecting practices for pure cultures of algae in the early twentieth century, who discussed the interdependence between researcher E. G. Pringsheim and his research subject, algae.

The next panel was titled "Protocols & Recipes." Matteo Martelli presented late antique and early Byzantine compendia of alchemy

and medicine, for which, he argued, the codex format was of special importance, since it afforded collecting and securing medical practices. Staffan Müller-Wille presented joint research with Giuditta Parolini (Technische Universität Berlin) on textbooks and manuals from the early history of Mendelian genetics in which retracing handwritten calculations and corrections provides insights into the "practice of theory" by geneticists-to-be. Angela Creager concluded the panel with her compelling presentation of a mid-twentieth century laboratory manual, which was one of the few bestsellers in handbook production presented at this conference. It was interesting to note that its material features differed substantially from mid-twentieth century publishing conventions and that this handbook in ring binder-format maintained distinct features of its origins on the laboratory desk.

Lastly, a panel on administration and industry focused on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The panelists elaborated on the transfer of expertise by means of print in Chinese governance (Xue Zhang), on the practice of risk in insurance manuals (Elisabeth Engel) and on manuals' use for nineteenth-century engineers (Liat Spiro). Elisabeth Engel introduced the perplexing genre of the "complete digest," whereas Liat Spiro in her account of mechanical drawings conceptualized engineers' pocket books as almanacs, both of which added to the complexity of handbook and manual production that had previously been established by contributors with ancient, mediaeval and early modern sources. A motif common to all three presentations was the tension between individual and governing, managing or educating bodies.

The day — broadly centered on issues of preserving — concluded with a closing discussion chaired by Mathias Grote. Of the manifold threads that were started here, issues of success versus failure from writers' and readers' perspectives, canonization and potential conflicts arising from confronting old and new knowledge were addressed. Rather than understanding manuals as "how-to" guides, some of the presentations suggested an alternative interpretation as "have-to" instructions. Authorship, moreover, could be individual, collective, or anonymous, all of which bore on the texts' usage, but was never straightforward. Texts could in any case be read as testaments of practice.

With a general focus on practices of revising, the second full day of the conference started off with a panel on improvisation and

non-standardization, whose participants presented diverse approaches from archaeology to philology and book history. Umberto Veronesi explained his archaeological approach to writing a history of artisanal practice in British colonial America by means of analyzing material finds from glaziers' workshops. Jennifer M. Rampling argued how philosophical language allowed alchemical practitioners to keep alchemical works up-to-date in that philosophical, or seemingly obscure, wording might have facilitated fluidity of interpretation. François Allison and Cléo Chassonery-Zaïgouche were the first to prominently feature material from publishers' archives by drawing their audience's attention to the Cambridge Economic Handbooks series published by Cambridge University Press, which despite their titling were intended for undergraduate teaching, again highlighting the fluidity of terminology and the complexities involved in labelling.

The next panel on editions and transmission started with a remote presentation by Karine Chemla from Paris. Her presentation highlighted commentaries to a canonical Chinese mathematical work compiled from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. Hansun Hsiung explored cheap pedagogical prints whose denotation in Chinese-Japanese Kanji script (bangaku or "late life learning") alluded to readers' temporal horizons and differing expectations of learning from books. Mathias Grote's take on editions focused on mid-twentieth century "sciences of classification," namely Gmelin's *Handbuch* and Bergey's manual, books on inorganic chemistry and microbiology, respectively, both of which subsequently lost their book status when they were transformed for database use. Although they might have differed in scope initially — one regarded as taxonomic and systematic, the other as practically useful as catalog — both depended on encyclopedic practices, e.g. critical apparatuses.

This panel was followed by a library session held in a special collections room at Princeton University's Firestone Library. Speakers presented physical copies of handbooks or manuals relevant to their respective talks. Concise introductions of each speaker's sources were followed by informal questions and answers. The aforementioned presentation of a spectacular new acquisition by Princeton University, namely a Ripley Scroll dated 1624, concluded this segment of the conference with an insightful and exciting commentary by Jennifer M. Rampling.

Presentations on twentieth-century sources in a panel on classification and cases rounded out the day. Axel Hüntelmann argued that

handwritten case books in the hospital or private medical practices underwent two significant changes throughout the century, namely when casefiles replaced casebooks and when record keeping replaced keeping books, all relevant to paper technologies of bookkeeping. Michael McGovern connected changes in editorial models to material characteristics of information technology with a focus on electronic publishing in biomedicine. Lastly, David Robertson explored the coding of the World Health Organization's "International Classification of Disease," a handbook commonly referred to as ICD-9.

The penultimate day — covering case studies broadly connected by a common interest in teaching — commenced with a panel on devotional and domestic knowledge. Simon Brown analyzed preaching manuals in the context of clerical expertise and the preachers' as well as readers' personae. Elaine Leong showed how sixteenth- and seventeenth-century printed medical books from London were used by their owners, some of which appropriated books by adding recipes or actively rewriting recipes in translation processes. In this sense, appropriating knowledge was closely linked to consuming, and the material remnants of this practice are not solely printed matter, but hybrids of printed book and manuscript. Kerstin von der Krone had already stirred up curiosity at the library session where she had presented examples of the catechisms she is working on, retracing dialogic arrangements and their status within Jewish tradition.

The next panel focused on manuals for calculation. Boris Jardine presented an early modern book that included a paper instrument for calculation. D. Senthil Babu's contribution on handbooks of the mind was limited to his blog post, and Evangelos Kotsioris positioned a twentieth-century paper instrument for calculation within Cold War history as well as within longer traditions of the talismanic use of objects.

A panel on historical "how-to"-accounts of handling animals, plants and people began with Isabelle Schuerch's presentation on two mediaeval riding manuals, which she compellingly connected to aristocratic values. Federico Marcon elaborated on the dual meaning of the study of books in Japan, with the term referring both to the material container as well as to the text itself. He explained how updating texts yielded more prestige than producing new texts in early modern Japan. Anna-Maria Meister highlighted how in twentieth-century architecture, publishing a handbook could enhance an author's status as expert. Connecting Ernst Neufert's printed *Bauentwurfslehre* with

his unpublished *Lebensgestaltungslehre*, she explored the architect's claims to extensive knowledge.

In the panel on wielding power, inquisitors, bureaucrats, emperors and anonymous users of magical handbooks were portrayed. Marcel Bubert explored manuals by Frederick II and Bernard Gui from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Matthew Melvin-Koushki emphasized the quantity and importance of occult-scientific manuals of early modern Persian origins, and Eveline Szarka explored how an early modern Necromancer's handbook might have been used to perform by the book, and was an approach to actively practice religion even if rituals failed.

The last panel grouped talks on codification and commerce, and it distinctly demonstrated how documentation and access to sources, with special emphasis on company archives, shape historical research. Susanne Jany explored from published sources how handbooks in architecture received considerable public support. These were aimed at work processes and buildings' purposes and helped to establish and propagate new approaches in modern architecture. Based on findings from publishers' archives, Alrun Schmidtke argued that a mid-twentieth century physics handbook could be derived from publishing formats as different as monographs and periodicals, an ambiguity that alluded to publishers' business models. Reinhild Kreis connected historical approaches of production and consumer studies and — drawing on company archives as well as more readily accessible printed products — highlighted that advertisement strategies drew on publishing genres such as recipe books or manuals in order to place certain branded products.

In his concise and stimulating commentary, Michael Gordin engaged in what he called an "exercise of categorization," summing up themes of the conference as well as drawing the attendees' attention to problematic blanks. Elaborating on the reasons why handbooks or manuals might have been written, he distinguished between supply and demand orientation and interests in editorial and authorial status. Although the handbooks and manuals that were touched upon during the conference did not all belong to the same category — either practice or reference — he also noted that each object or venture did in fact belong to a tradition. With regards to practice or implementation of certain processes, Gordin noted the absence of explicit arguments regarding tacit knowledge. Finally, "status" was shown to be a common theme among contributors, either in terms of

authorship, of discipline or of media and materiality more generally. The final question how changes in the status of authorship might again be a specific modern issue was met with applause and in the final discussion, chaired by Angela Creager, all participants seized the eagerly anticipated opportunity to connect five days' worth of presentations. Participants left with a distinct feeling that the last word on the subject of handbooks has yet to be spoken.

Alrun Schmidtke (Humboldt University Berlin)

DEFINING BLACK EUROPEAN HISTORY

Conference at the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI), June 22–23, 2018. Co-sponsored by the University College London Global Engagement Fund, the University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts, the University of New Mexico History Department, and the Transatlantic Program of the European Recovery Program through the "German History: Intersections" project. Conveners: Jeff Bowersox (University College London), Tiffany N. Florvil (University of New Mexico), Atiba Pertilla (GHI), Kira Thurman (University of Michigan). Participants: Robbie Aitken (Sheffield Hallam University), Mara Blake (Johns Hopkins University), Debra Blumenthal (University of California, Santa Barbara), Jennifer Boittin (Penn State University), Andrew Daily (University of Memphis), Silke Hackenesch (University of Cologne), Kennetta Hammond Perry (De Montfort University), Axel Jansen (GHI), Nick Jones (Bucknell University), Justin Joque (University of Michigan), Marc Matera (University of California, Santa Cruz), Maxim Matusevich (Seton Hall University), Robin Mitchell (University of California, Channel Islands), Jennifer Palmer (University of Georgia), Lara Putnam (University of Pittsburgh), Meredith Roman (SUNY Brockport), Erin Rowe (Johns Hopkins University), Eileen Ryan (Temple University).

"Defining Black European History" was conceptualized as an opportunity to bring together scholars investigating the diverse experiences of the Black diaspora in Europe across multiple eras and in a wide variety of national and transregional contexts to examine how using Black Europe as an analytical category can surface the agency of Black lives while deconstructing national and imperialist narratives of European history and the silencing of the Black experience. Such work has often been met with pushback because of the myth of a timeless "white Europe" that helps to foster racism in contemporary Europe, as the analytical category of race is constantly underplayed and even erased from national narratives. The Black European History conference gave historians of Black Europe the opportunity to share their studies and stories and engage in a wider discussion of the discipline as a whole.

Lead conveners Jeff Bowersox, Tiffany N. Florvil, and Kira Thurman designed the conference with three main goals in mind: to examine the significance of Black Europe as an analytical category, to interrogate the limitations of the discipline in both content and practice,

and to move the discipline out of the academic world and encourage public engagement with Black European history. The current methodology and historiography of European history is fractured in its downplaying of race as a category of analysis, and the conveners invited participants, whose papers spanned the chronological and geographic distance from the late medieval Iberian Peninsula to the Cold War Soviet Union, to illustrate the benefits of this analytical lens. The conference was divided into five thematic panels with the inclusion of a workshop on digital humanities and a concluding panel designed for reflection and discussion of interest in future collaborations. The conference was a balance of content, practice, and encouragement to engage the public and adopt creative practices, making it a vital event in the progression of the discipline.

The first panel introduced issues of "Methodology and Historiography" relating to histories of Black Europe that would be contemplated throughout the conference. Jennifer Boittin began the panel with a discussion of the concept of Black Europe and colonial aphasia in contemporary France. Boittin noted the absence of race as a factor within mainstream French national narratives, pointing to the legacy of the contrasts between the colonial empire's refusal to make racial categories official and the racialized deployment of police violence and political repression. Another hardship that complicates/obscures the discipline is the violence that is inscribed within archival records. Lara Putnam's discussion on women's labor migration in the greater Spanish Caribbean during the early twentieth century raised vital questions regarding the role of agency and silence in sharing accounts of sexual violence. Putnam admitted to struggling with her role as a historian in telling the stories of young Black women and girls who were victims of sexual assault and using sources bounded by the state's legal frameworks. Debra Blumenthal concluded the panel with a discussion of the different forms of Black agency found in late medieval Iberia, bringing an important chronological perspective to the discussion. Blumenthal's talk raised the question of whether "Blackness" was a geographical category, a racial category, or both during this period, further complicating the concept of Black Europe. Each of the three panelists expressed the difficulties in the methodology and current historiography of Black Europe, setting the tone for the remainder of the conference.

The second panel focused on exploring and telling the histories of Black Europe through "Public Memory and Public Engagement."

Eileen Ryan began the panel via Skype with her discussion on Andrea Aguyar's role in the unification of the Italian states and his memorialization in contemporary Italy. One larger theme she introduced was the issue of national identity and how Blackness initiated a struggle to define whiteness in bordering European states. Robbie Aitken's paper on the historical memory of the experience of Black Germans during and after the Holocaust raised the importance of public engagement with the histories of forgotten victims. The majority of Aitken's talk concerned the opportunity for historians to seek out better primary sources and more interdisciplinary collaborations in order to create a richer and more well-rounded public history. Finally, Erin Rowe's paper on material culture and memory in Iberia's Black history revealed the widespread diversity of religious iconography in Spain and Portugal in the early modern period, and the current tendency to reject these histories by some within the local communities where such imagery is found. Rowe and the other panelists focused on the attempted erasure of Black culture in local and national narratives and the potential for future re-surfacing of these stories in public engagement.

The second panel was followed by a workshop on digital tools. Mara Blake and Justin Joque encouraged the group to think digitally throughout their research processes and presentation of results. Blake and Joque began the workshop by inviting the participants to share their experiences with digital humanities in and outside of the classroom. They then presented three types of digital tools that could be used to better present Black European history to a wider public: mapping and spatial presentations, data visualization, and textual analysis. The final section of the workshop was dedicated to using the discussed digital tools to brainstorm possible collaborations within the group. Blake and Joque made a compelling argument for the use of digital humanities to improve the research process and efforts to engage and disseminate Black European history to the public.

The third panel was concerned with restoring Black agency by centering the narrative of Black lives in the histories of Black Europe. Jennifer Palmer's paper on centering women of color in the French Empire reimagined conventional European personal narratives. Palmer focused on the journey of Marie Victoire Morisseau, an eighteenth-century woman living in Saint-Domingue, to prove her freedom to the state. In contrast to histories of gaining agency, Meredith Roman's paper discussed the pseudo-freedom of Black students in

the mid-twentieth century Soviet Union. Roman criticized the limits of students' agency by exploring their use as political tools against the United States during the civil rights era. Nick Jones concluded the panel by first airing the recently released music video "Apeshit" by Beyoncé and Jay-Z, whose setting in the Louvre placed Blackness at the center of the development of traditional European "high" art. Jones' paper argued that a way to build narratives of Black agency is through cultural "necromancy," by revealing Black practices that had been suppressed in the history of early modern Spain and then tracing the persistence of those practices in contemporary Spanish culture. The third panel demonstrated how Black European history forces historians to excavate the experiences of Black people while also crafting narratives that reflect agency rather than solely victimization.

The fourth panel, "State and Nation," dealt with the connection between Black lives and different varieties of European political orders. Kennetta Hammond Perry began the panel via Skype with her paper on the violent death of David Oluwale in twentieth-century England. Perry used the difficult process of piecing together Oluwale's history to expose state-instigated violence in physical form by the police and other agents and in the form of violence in the archives that both shaped and excised the record of Oluwale's experiences. Much like Putnam's criticism of learning about Black lives through the legal texts of their oppressors, Perry explained it was her role as a historian to tell these stories as a way of paying homage to Oluwale and deconstructing the ongoing racism overlooked by European governments. Maxim Matusevich's paper examined the history of African studies scholarship in the Soviet Union and its place in longstanding discourses about Russian anxieties about being on the geographical and metaphorical margins of European whiteness. In addition, he examined the conflicts that arose when African scholars visiting the Soviet Union pursued agendas that deviated from the expectations established by the communist state's preexisting stereotypes of Blackness. Robin Mitchell's paper on the capture and torture of Suzanne Simone Baptiste, the wife of Toussaint L'Ouverture, examined the circulation of stories and images of violence performed on the Black female body as a component of escalating political tensions between France and the United Kingdom in the aftermath of the Haitian revolution. The fourth panel highlighted the suppression of Black agency throughout European history, often in the service of important political agendas at the local, national, and international levels.

The final panel, "Time and Space," focused on Blackness in various forms of cultural production. Andrew Daily's paper interrogated the geographic bounding of both Europe and Black Europe. He used the writings and interpretations of Martinican writer and philosopher Edouard Glissant to question the conventional concept of Europe. Daily argued historians of Black Europe should be aware of the unique opportunity inherent in its use as an analytical category and continue to challenge Eurocentric histories by excavating stories that bend the idea of Europe in both time and space. Marc Matera's paper analyzed the Jamaican sculptor Ronald Moody and his Afro-Asian style of Black modern art. Matera explained how looking at Moody is crucial to understanding the movement of Black art in twentieth century Britain, as its Afro-Asian elements decentralizes the typical centrality of Britain and Europe in narratives of Black modernism. The final paper by Silke Hackenesch explored overt racism in German material culture in the twentieth century. She examined the malleability of chocolate as a signifier with the history of a racially offensive icon used by a popular chocolate brand to interrogate cultural aphasia and the ways that Blackness has been used to "perform" exoticism.

The concluding discussion reflected on the conference and future collaboration possibilities. There was a consensus that prior to the conference, most of the participants had experienced difficulty in solidifying the concept of Black Europe, both as a category of analysis for their own scholarship and in the form of pushback both within the academic world and from the general public. Additionally, the archives posed a threat in the type of accounts produced on Black lives. Because of these complications, the group felt the conference acted as a solidifying event to cement a discourse and establish a network of those involved in Black European history. The participants saw how themes of nation, agency, erasure, empire, identity, and the concept of Blackness and whiteness, played a constant role in the variety of papers that spanned over time and space. These themes helped continue to build the theoretical frame of the discipline of Black European History. Because of their focus on similar conceptual ideas and shared experience of empowerment and strife, the participants found a natural desire to collaborate and evolve as a discipline. The conference ended by looking at short, medium, and long-term opportunities to develop the field in academia and the broader public and establish it as a vital component of European history.

Madeleine Miller (GHI)

GHI News

NEW GHI PUBLICATIONS

1. Publications of the German Historical Institute (Cambridge University Press)

Brendan Karch, *Nation and Loyalty in a German-Polish Borderland: Upper Silesia, 1848–1960*

Sara Thomsen Vierra, *Turkish Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany: Immigration, Space, and Belonging, 1900–1990*

Jeffrey T. Zalar, *Reading and Rebellion in Catholic Germany, 1770–1914*

2. Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)

Julius Wilm, *Settlers as Conquerors: Free Land Policy in Antebellum America*

3. Studies in German History (Berghahn Books)

Jennifer Evans, Paul Betts, and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, eds., *The Ethics of Seeing: Photography and Twentieth-Century German History*

Hartmut Berghoff, Frank Biess, and Ulrike Strasser, eds., *Explorations and Entanglements: Germans in Pacific Worlds from the Early Modern Period to World War I*

4. Digital Publications

"Learning by the Book: Manuals and Handbooks in the History of Knowledge": blog series, https://historyofknowledge.net/lbtb/

STAFF CHANGES

Jonathan Casey joined the GHI in April 2018 as an IT staff member. He previously worked at the University of Illinois at Chicago, where he earned his degree. He has worked for various internet technology companies in the past.

GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to European and North American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars to pursue research projects that draw upon primary sources located in the United States. We are particularly interested in research projects that fit into the following fields: German and European history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the USA in international relations, and American history (European doctoral and postdoctoral scholars only).

The proposed research projects should make use of historical methods and engage with the relevant historiography. We especially invite applications from doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars who currently have no funding from their home institutions. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to five months.

The GHI also offers a number of other long-term doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles to strengthen key research interests at institute, including: the history of knowledge, the history of race and ethnicity, the history of religion and religiosity, the history of family and kinship, the history of migration, and North American history. In addition to these opportunities, several new fellowships programs have been introduced: the Binational Tandem Research Program for "The History of Knowledge" and "Global and Trans-regional History," and the Gerda Henkel Postdoctoral Fellowship for Digital History.

For further information about these programs and current application deadlines, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns' interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS, 2018/19

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"Typophoto" and the Reinvention of Photography in Weimar Germany

Sophia Egbert, Universität zu Köln
Religion und Psychologie. Evangelikale Counseling-Studiengänge in den USA (1945-1998)

Daniel Eggstein, Universität Konstanz
"Eine soziale Bewegung in der Wissenschaft": Ökologisch orientierte Forschung in Deutschland und den USA in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren

Julia Engelschalt, Universität Bielefeld
Klima, Krankheit und Krieg: Vergleichspraktiken US-amerikanischer Ärzte und Tropenmediziner im Umfeld des Spanisch-Amerikanischen Krieges, 1898-1916

Ryan Heyden, McMaster University
The German Red Cross and Humanitarianism in Divided Germany, 1945-1989

Laura Nicolaiciuc, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Mapping the Monuments. Die American Harvard Group und das American Council of Learned Societies als Initiatoren des amerikanischen Kunstschutzes in Europa

Pascal Pawlitta, Institut für Zeitgeschichte München / Universität Augsburg
Politisierung des Klimas. Die Entstehung der internationalen Klimapolitik (ca. 1979-1992)

Stephan Schmitt, Universität Erfurt
Reporting Home: Repercussions of Colonial Rule upon American Race Relations

Yves Schmitz, Philipps-Universität Marburg
Waffenschmuggel und imperialstaatliche Durchdringung in Grenzregionen des südlichen Afrikas und Nordamerikas in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts

Caterina Schuerch, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Disziplinen- und nationenübergreifende Allianzen, und eine gemeinsame Vision: physico-chemische Biologie in der Zwischenkriegszeit

Kerstin Schulte, Universität Bielefeld / Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology
"Volksgemeinschaft" hinter Stacheldraht. Die Internierungslager in der britischen und US-amerikanischen Besatzungszone und ihre Bedeutung für die deutsche Nachkriegsgesellschaft, 1945-1950

Emanuel Steinbacher, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
The "Crime of the Century": High Society, Medien und Familie in den USA in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts

Georg Wolff, Heidelberg Center for American Studies, Universitat Heidelberg
American Conservatism and the Struggle against Federal Authority. Grassroots Organizing, Activism, Discourse

Short-term Postdoctoral Fellowships

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The U.S. and the European Colonization of Africa

Mathias Haeussler, Lumley Research Fellow, Magdalene College, University of Cambridge
Cold War Elvis: the Double-Edged Sword of U.S. Cultural Power in the East-West Conflict

Adam Knowles, Drexel University
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Andreas Hübner, University of Flensburg
German Migrants in North America, 1871–1941

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Encounters in Eden? Missions, Philanthropy and Protestant Dissent in Eighteenth-Century North America

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Nicholas Underwood, UC Berkeley
Yiddish Culture, Jewish Migration, and the Making of Post-Holocaust France, 1944–1962

RESEARCH SEMINAR AND COLLOQUIUM, SPRING/SUMMER 2018

January 10	**Benjamin Fagan (Auburn University)** Insurrectionary History: Time, Space, and Black Atlantic Revolution
January 18	**Christoph Nitschke (Keble College, University of Oxford)** The Panics of 1873 and U.S. Foreign Relations
	Andrew Kless (University of Rochester) Infighting at the Front: Officers, Bureaucrats, and Politicians at War in German-Occupied Russian Poland, 1914-1915
January 24	**Juliane Braun (Universität Bonn)** Translating the Pacific: Imperial Imaginations, Nature Writing, and Early Modern Print Cultures
February 7	**Luca Scholz (Stanford University)** Movement and the Geography of the State in the Old Reich
February 21	**Claudia Roesch (GHI Washington)** Children by Choice — A Comparative History of the Planned Parenthood Federation of American and Pro Familia — the German Society for Marriage and Family
March 8	**Vincent Lagendijk (Maastricht University)** From the American South to the Global South: The Tennessee Valley Authority in the 20th Century
	Christina B. Matzen (University of Toronto) Imprisoned Women: Gender, Politics, and Criminology in Nazi, Communist, and Democratic Germanies
April 25	**Daniel Jütte (New York University)** The Thirty Years' War at 400: A New Window on the Prague Defenestration (1618)
May 3	**Lena Marie Rudeck (Max Planck Institute for Human Development / Freie Universität Berlin)** Between Pleasure and Immorality: Western Allies' Soldiers' Clubs in Germany as Sites of Encounters between Occupiers and the Occupied, 1945-1955
	Jakob Schönhagen (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg) Weltflüchtlingspolitik, 1950-1973

May 16	**Philipp Nielsen (Sarah Lawrence College)** Building Democracy: Emotions, Architecture and Politics in Post-War Germany
May 30	**Sören Urbansky (GHI Washington)** Same but Different: Sinophobia in Vladivostok, San Francisco and Singapore
June 7	**Philipp Schulte (Universität Heidelberg / EHESS Paris)** "Es ist doch mein Bild!" Bildkonflikte, Recht am eigenen Bild und *right to privacy* in Deutschland und den USA, 1880-1930
	Daniela Weiner (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) Teaching a Dark Chapter: Holocaust and Resistance Representations in East German, West German, and Italian History Textbooks, 1943-2000
June 13	**Albert Manke (GHI West)** Transnational Strategies of Californian Chinese during the Exclusion Era
	Lok Siu (GHI West) Pathways to Citizenship: Japanese Peruvians in post-WWII United States

GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2018/19

June 6-10	**Learning by the Book: Manuals and Handbooks in the History of Knowledge** Conference at Princeton University Conveners: Angela Creager (Princeton University), Mathias Grote (Humboldt University Berlin), Elaine Leong (MPI for the History of Science, Berlin), Kerstin von der Krone (GHI Washington)
June 14-15	**Observing the Everyday: Journalistic Practices and Knowledge Production in the Modern Era** Second Workshop at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin Conveners: Kerstin von der Krone (GHI Washington) and Hansjakob Ziemer (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin)
June 14	**Copyright and Intellectual Property: Why Is Academia Reluctant to Embrace Open-Access Scholarship?** Lecture at the GHI Speaker: Peter Baldwin (University of California, Los Angeles)
June 22-23	**Exile and Emigration in an Age of War and Revolutions (ca. 1750-1830)** Workshop at Re:work International Research Center, Berlin Conveners: Linda Colley (Princeton University) and Jan C. Jansen (GHI Washington)
June 22-23	**Defining Black European History** Conference at the GHI Conveners: Jeff Bowersox (University College London), Tiffany N. Florvil (University of New Mexico), Atiba Pertilla (GHI Washington), and Kira Thurman (University of Michigan)
September 27 — 30	**The Nexus of Migration, Youth, and Knowledge** Panel Series at the Forty-Second Annual German Studies Association Conference, Pittsburgh, PA Conveners: Andrea Westermann (GHI West, Berkeley), Onur Erdur (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
October 8-10	**Agents of Cultural Change: Jewish and Other Responses to Modernity, ca. 1750–1900** Conference at GHI Washington Conveners: Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), Zohar Shavit (Tel Aviv University), Kerstin von der Krone (GHI Washington)

October 17-20 **Bucerius Young Scholars Forum at GHI West: "Histories of Migration: Transatlantic and Global Perspectives"**
Bucerius Young Scholars Forum at GHI West (Berkeley)
Convener: Andrea Westermann (GHI West)

October 25-27 **Reconstructing Historical Networks Digitally: New Approaches, Opportunities and Epistemological Implications of Social Network Analysis**
International Workshop and Conference at the German Historical Institute Washington
Conveners: Matthew Hiebert (GHI Washington), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), and Katherine McDonough (Stanford University)

November 8 **A Different Sort of Neoliberalism? Making Sense of German History Since the 1970s**
32nd Annual Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Paul Nolte (Freie Universität Berlin), Comment: Lisa McGirr (Harvard University)

November 9 **Twenty-Seventh Annual Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute**
Presentation of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize at the GHI

November 20-21 **Knowledge and Society in Times of Upheaval**
Conference at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB)
Convener: Andreas Eckert (Humboldt Universität Berlin), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington) and Franz Waldenberger (DIJ Tokyo)

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Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Rüdiger Graf (ZZF Potsdam), Quinn Slobodian (Wellesley College), Heidi Tworek (University of British Columbia), Anne Schenderlein (GHI Washington)

March 24-28	**Entangling Pacific and Atlantic Worlds: Past and Present** Symposium at GHI West Conveners: Sarah Beringer (GHI Washington), Wencke Meteling (Marburg University), Sören Urbansky (GHI Washington). Co-organized with the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius
May 19-22	**In Global Transit: Forced Migration of Jews and other Refugees (1940s-1960s)** Conference at GHI West and The MAGNES Collection of Jewish Art and Life at the University of California, Berkeley Conveners: Wolf Gruner (USC Shoah Foundation Center for Advanced Genocide Research, Los Angeles), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington, Francesco Spagnolo (The Magnes, UC Berkeley), Swen Steinberg (University of Dresden)
May 28-June 4	**Histories of Migrant Knowledges in and across the Transpacific: Agencies, Scales, Translations** Conference at UC Berkeley Organized by The Forum Transregionale Studien, the Max Weber Stiftung, GHI West, The Maria Sibylla Merian Center for Advanced Latin American Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences (CALAS), and the Institute of European Studies, UC Berkeley
May 29-June 1	**25th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: German History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries** Seminar at the GHI Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington)
June 6-8	**Political Culture and the History of Knowledge: Actors, Institutions, Practices** Conference at the GHI Washington Conveners: Shadi Bartsch-Zimmer (Institute of the Formation of Knowledge at the University of Chicago), Kijan Espahangizi (Center "History of Knowledge" at the University Zurich and the ETH Zurich), Nils Güttler (Center "History of Knowledge" at the University Zurich and the ETH Zurich), Kerstin von der Krone (GHI Washington), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), Monika Wulz (Center "History of Knowledge" at the University Zurich and the ETH Zurich)

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The collection includes books on American history written by German authors as well as historical literature of the institute's past research foci: global history, religious studies, exile and migration studies, environmental history, and economic history. The collection includes only print materials, mostly secondary literature; there are no archival holdings.

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

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

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

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

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









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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Transatlantische Historische Studien



Katharina Scheffler

Operation Crossroads Africa, 1958–1972

Kulturdiplomatie zwischen Nordamerika und Afrika

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 57

419 pages
$ 96,–
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Operation Crossroads Africa (OCA) war in den sechziger Jahren die größte in Afrika tätige private Freiwilligenorganisation. 1957 gegründet initiierte OCA zahlreiche Hilfsprojekte in verschiedenen Regionen Afrikas.
Auf der Grundlage umfangreicher Archivstudien und Zeitzeugeninterviews untersucht Katharina Scheffler die Anfangsjahre der Organisation. Sie beleuchtet ihre Gründung sowie die institutionellen und gesellschaftlichen Hürden, die es anfänglich zu überwinden galt. Ein besonderes Augenmerk gilt den Erlebnissen der Freiwilligen selbst und deren Rolle als inoffizielle Botschafter Amerikas auf der einen und als Vorreiter für interkulturelle Verständigung auf der anderen Seite.

In *Encountering Empire*, Elisabeth Engel traces how black American missionaries – men and women grappling with their African heritage – established connections in Africa during the heyday of European colonialism. Reconstructing the black American 'colonial encounter', Engel analyzes the images, transatlantic relationships, and possibilities of representation African American missionaries developed for themselves while negotiating colonial regimes. Illuminating a neglected chapter of Atlantic history, Engel demonstrates that African Americans used imperial structures for their own self-determination. *Encountering Empire* thus challenges the notion that pan-Africanism was the only viable strategy for black emancipation.

Elisabeth Engel

Encountering Empire

African American Missionaries in Colonial Africa, 1900–1939

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 56

303 pages
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Larissa Schütze

William Dieterle und die deutschsprachige Emigration in Hollywood

Antifaschistische Filmarbeit bei Warner Bros. Pictures, 1930–1940

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 55

347 pages
$ 87,–
978-3-515-10974-1 HARDCOVER
978-3-515-11014-3 E-BOOK

Nach einer erfolgreichen Karriere im Kulturbetrieb der Weimarer Republik akzeptierte der deutsche Regisseur William Dieterle im Jahre 1930 ein Vertragsangebot der US-Filmgesellschaft Warner Bros. Pictures. Dort gelang ihm der Aufbau eines Netzwerkes deutschsprachiger Künstler, dem Persönlichkeiten wie Max Reinhardt und Fritz Kortner angehörten. Es entstanden außergewöhnliche Filme, die zum Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus und zur Repräsentation eines „anderen Deutschland" in der Emigration beitrugen. Larissa Schütze beschreibt auf der Basis der Firmenunterlagen Dieterles Integration in die institutionellen Strukturen der Warner Bros. Studios und rekonstruiert die Produktionsgeschichte seiner dort entstandenen Filme unter Berücksichtigung der politischen, gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen im Amerika der dreißiger Jahre.

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Melanie Henne

Training Citizenship

Ethnizität und Breitensport
in Chicago, 1920–1950

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 54

378 pages
$ 93,–
978-3-515-10955-0 HARDCOVER
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Vorstellungen von „guter Staatsbürgerschaft“ dominierten in den USA der Zwischenkriegszeit, die von einer restriktiven Migrationsgesetzgebung geprägt war. Die Einwanderungdebatten waren mit strikten Amerikanisierungsforderungen verknüpft. Am Beispiel von Mitgliedern der Gymnastikorganisation *Sokol* sowie Sportler/innen des *Jewish People's Institute* (JPI) in Chicago wird gezeigt, wie tschechische und jüdische Migrant/innen und ihre Nachkommen Sport als Strategie der Legitimierung und im Kampf um Anerkennung nutzen. Ihre Handlungsoptionen standen dabei im Spannungsfeld von Adaption, Ablehnung und Umdeutung dominanter US-Staatsbürgerschaftskonzepte und beinhalteten die Integration kultureller Selbstbilder.

Ab der Wende zum 18. Jahrhundert engagierten sich protestantische Landeskirchen vermehrt im atlantischen Raum und veränderten so die nordatlantische Welt des Protestantismus grundlegend. Abseits der Pfade nationalhistorischer Interpretationen behandelt Alexander Pyrges diesen über kirchliche und herrschaftliche Grenzen hinweg wirkmächtigen Prozess.
Im Zentrum steht das Kolonialprojekt Ebenezer: Im Jahr 1734 gegründet wurde die Gemeinde Ebenezer in der britischen Kolonie Georgia jahrzehntelang durch anglikanische und lutherisch-pietistische Kirchenreformer in England und im Alten Reich gefördert. Die Studie gibt Aufschluss über die religiöse Verdichtung der nordatlantischen Welt im 18. Jahrhundert.



Alexander Pyrges

Das Kolonialprojekt EbenEzer

Formen und Mechanismen protestantischer Expansion in der atlantischen Welt des 18. Jahrhunderts

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 53

507 pages
$ 108,–
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Anja Schäfers

Mehr als Rock 'n' Roll

Der Radiosender AFN
bis Mitte der sechziger Jahre

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN – VOL. 52

454 pages
$ 102,–
978-3-515-10716-7 HARDCOVER
978-3-515-10728-0 E-BOOK

Der amerikanische Militärsender *AFN* ist in Deutschland zur Legende geworden. Das *American Forces Network* soll mit populärer Musik und lässigen Moderatoren nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg junge Deutsche begeistert und „amerikanisiert“ haben. Anja Schäfers untersucht die Institutions-, Programm- und Wirkungsgeschichte des Senders bis Mitte der 1960er Jahre. Es wird deutlich, dass *AFN* kein reiner Musiksender war, sondern ein vielseitiges Programm mit Informationen, Bildung und Unterhaltung geboten hat. Nur ein Bruchteil der deutschen Jugendlichen hat *AFN* eingeschaltet und ihn meist selektiv wahrgenommen. Trotzdem spielte der Sender eine nicht unbedeutende Rolle in den gesellschaftlichen Auseinandersetzungen in West- und Ostdeutschland.

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