The Persian Gulf’s geopolitical flexibility is a useful revelation

The Middle East has thrown out the old rulebook. 

Gone are the days of rigid alliances and permanent enemies. In their place, the wealthy Gulf states — led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar —  are taking a new approach: Cutting flexible, case-by-case deals to buy stability while keeping every option on the table. This is very useful: It helped end, or at least pause, the ruinous Gaza war. 

Nevertheless, there are more than a few quid pro quos. A proposed sale of up to 48 cutting-edge F-35 stealth fighters to Saudi Arabia by President Trump cuts directly to the core of American foreign policy in the Middle East. 

For decades, the qualitative military edge — a statutory commitment guaranteeing Israel’s technological superiority over any regional coalition — has served as the unshakeable bedrock of U.S. defense strategy. 

Can Washington reconcile this massive arms deal with its strategic obligation to protect Israel’s qualitative military edge, or is this sale a direct and fundamental breach of the commitment that underpins regional stability?

June’s 12-day Iran-Israel war was a gear shifting point towards easing the region into a new way of behaving. When U.S. airstrikes hit Iran’s nuclear facilities this summer, there was great confusion about the results. One preliminary assessment suggested the strikes delayed Iran’s program by mere months; the Pentagon claimed up to two years. 

That gap matters. It is why Gulf capitals are hedging their bets, refusing to choose a permanent side.

The new architecture is one of two loose, opposing alignments — Iran-China-Russia-Turkey on one side, and Saudi Arabia-United States-European Union-Egypt-Israel on the other. But critically, the Gulf states function as indispensable intermediaries.  

Look at how Saudi Arabia operates now. In July, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hosted Iran’s foreign minister in Jeddah to discuss regional security, a clear sign of diplomatic rapprochement. In May, Riyadh publicly backed U.S.-Iran nuclear talks. 

Yet, the Kingdom also draws red lines: There will be no diplomatic relations with Israel without a reliable path to Palestinian statehood based on the 1967 lines.  

Trump’s Washington has, to its credit, adapted to this. It has decoupled U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation from immediate Israel normalization. Technical tracks now advance even when the political ones stall — a critical recognition that in this region, everything cannot move together. 

The U.S.-orchestrated United Nations Security Council resolution vote on Monday regarding the establishment in Gaza of an international stabilization force did not stop there: It included explicit reference to the Saudis’ prerequisite of a “credible pathway” toward Palestinian statehood.  

Iran, too, has apparently internalized the new sequencing logic. During June’s war, it reportedly told mediators (routed through Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Oman) that attacks must cease before nuclear negotiations could resume. Tehran aimed, after the war, to bargain sanctions relief for reversible nuclear weaponry steps. 

Meanwhile, Qatar continues to provide what others cannot: It rides two horses at the same time. Indeed, Israel’s failed strikes in Doha in September, aimed to kill Hamas leaders but killing low-level Hamas personnel instead, sparked outrage in the country. 

Albeit not immediately, Qatar’s prime minister affirmed nonetheless that nothing would deter its essential mediation role. By early October, Doha was coordinating with Egypt and Washington on the Trump administration’s 20-point Gaza peace plan — a proposal that perfectly exemplifies how compartmentalized deal-making now works in practice. 

That Trump plan, unveiled in late September, emerged not from fixed bloc diplomacy but from Gulf-channeled negotiations. Whether the core pathway of the plan towards its mid- and long-term objectives will be implemented is yet to be seen. 

The somewhat loose framework relies on the same actors playing their designated roles: Qatar and Egypt mediating between Hamas and Israel, Saudi Arabia providing the crucial political cover and Arab collaborators to manage Gaza’s transition. 

Its 19th point out of 20 notes that “when the [Palestinian Authority] reform program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.”  

The weak points of this architecture became visible in late September when U.N. sanctions snapped back on Iran, reimposing the arms embargo and nuclear restrictions. Russia and China called the action “illegal.” 

This fierce divergence among the great powers revealed both the limits of Western coercion and the rising, critical value of Gulf-mediated alternatives. 

Two operational rules now govern this landscape: 

• Keep channels open before, during and after conflict. The Jeddah meeting occurred weeks after the Israel-Iran armed conflict.  
• Separate technical tracks from headline politics. Nuclear cooperation discussions proceed independently of normalization talks. The planned Gaza technocratic governance structure is deliberately insulated from political resolution. 

The Gulf states have concluded that the only viable strategy is to purchase stability deal by deal, relationship by relationship. 

Whether this approach produces a lasting order or prolongs volatility remains the great, open question. But today, with sanctions restored, conflicts simmering and great powers divided, the Gulf’s pragmatic flexibility may be the only buffer preventing the Middle East from blowing up, again. 

Gilead Sher is a fellow at the Rice University Baker Institute, a former chief of staff and policy coordinator to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and served as a senior negotiator at the Camp David summit and Taba talks between 1999 and 2001. Aaron Pasha contributed to this piece.