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KRITERION
Nr. 20 (2006), pp. 14-21
Virtue Foundherentism
Brian Lightbody
Brock University,
Ontario (Canada)
Abstract
Foundherentism is a new and promising the-
ory of epistemic justification that has not re-
ceived its due in the secondary literature.
Accordingly, in this paper, I will exam-
ine foundherentism with three principal con-
cerns in mind. First, I explain the epistemic
components of foundherentism. Second, I
defend foundherentism against the charge of
reliabilism. While third and finally, I ar-
gue that foundherentism needs to be supple-
mented with a virtuous component.
Over ten years have passed since Susan Haack
introduced her remarkable, yet, largely misinter-
preted and unacknowledged work Evidence and
Inquiry into epistemological circles. Evidence and
Inquiry, fleshes out in considerable detail, Haack’s
new theory of epistemic justification Haack bap-
tizes, ‘foundherentism.’ As the name implies,
‘foundherentism’ combines the strengths of the
traditional foundationalist and coherentist epis-
temic positions without absorbing either of their
well-worn problems. Moreover and as Haack her-
self notes foundherentism has been very influen-
tial in such diverse fields as education and law.1.
However, philosophers, especially in epistemology,
have been less impressed. Only a handful of ar-
ticles have attempted to examine the merits of
foundherentism while those that have, are less
than charitable misinterpreting or indeed misrep-
resenting Haack’s promising and unique position
as the case may be.2Thus, in order to do jus-
tice to this remarkable and promising theory of
1See the interview with Susan Haack, “The Intellectual
Journey of an Eminent Logician-Philosopher” at http://
www.miami.edu/phi/haack/DrHaackInterview.pdf
2See [1] and compare with [3]. To see two antipodal
readings of the same work.
epistemic justification, this paper will explain, de-
fend and then criticize foundherentism in three
separate sections. In the first section, I exam-
ine and explain as concisely as possible, Haack’s
foundherentist position. Indeed, such an expla-
nation is quite pressing when one considers the
very brief and (very misguided) reviews of Haack’s
Evidence and Inquiry in the secondary literature
[9]. My second purpose is to debunk, what ap-
pears on the surface, to be a devastating criticism
of foundherentism as articulated by Andrew C.
Clune. Clune argues that Haack is a closet relia-
bilist and therefore, foundherentism is ultimately
incoherent—foundherentism claims to be truth in-
dicative but at bottom is really truth conducive. I
will conclude that Haack seems to be able to avoid
the charge of reliabilism and indeed that a careful
and close reading of Evidence and Inquiry shows
that she had already anticipated this misinterpre-
tation. Third and finally, I will examine one re-
maining problem concerning foundherentism that
Haack glosses over in her most recent work De-
fending Science Within Reason, which I call the
“virtue problem.” I conclude that the true prob-
lem for Haack is that she places too much epis-
temic importance and responsibility on the epis-
temic subject charged with gathering and evalu-
ating the evidence in an intellectual inquiry but
without providing any guidelines or tools in or-
der to facilitate this process. However, even if
Haack does supplement her position with a vir-
tuous component, such additional criteria for the
justification of p could only be “objective” or truth
conducive. “Virtue foundherentism” as I call it,
would be a contradictory and perplexing dual-
aspect hybrid of truth conducive and truth eviden-
tial components. Thus, though promising, “virtue
foundherentism” is ultimately incoherent as it is a
species of reliabilism after all, but of the virtuous
type.
1
In Evidence and Inquiry, Susan Haack proposes
nothing less than a complete reconstruction of
epistemology as traditionally conceived. Though
Haack is in full agreement with the traditional
project of epistemology, that is, of determining
Lightbody, B.: Virtue Foundherentism
the conditions for justified true belief, neverthe-
less, Haack feels there is a great need to re-
examine epistemology, including its specific ques-
tions, methodologies and conventional positions
with “fresh eyes” in order to move forward. There
seem to be two equally important reasons for
Haack’s proposed reconstruction. First, Haack ar-
gues against those philosophers who suggest that
the usual project of epistemology, as the search
for knowledge is “radically misconceived” [8, p.
611]. Rather, Haack wants to demonstrate that
the traditional project of discovering conditions,
criteria and rules for establishing justified true be-
lief is still a viable and worthwhile pursuit. Thus,
Haack’s first motive for a radical reconstruction of
epistemology, is to deter us from taking the all too
easy and tempting path of exclaiming the death
of philosophy via the death of epistemology, pace
Richard Rorty, and instead, to urge us to continue
on the “the bloody hard way” of the traditional
pursuit of knowledge and truth.3
However, although Haack holds that epistemol-
ogy as traditionally conceived, is a worthwhile and
feasible pursuit, we must be clear that she con-
ceives epistemic justification somewhat differently
than traditional theorists. Consequently, the sec-
ond reason for a proposed reconstruction of episte-
mology, appeals to those who see the merit in con-
tinuing with the time-honored custom of seeking
clear criteria for epistemic justification and ratifi-
cation, yet, find themselves at an impasse between
those two great, traditional, epistemological posi-
tions, those of foundationalism and coherentism
respectively speaking. Both of these positions,
as we will discover, have their merits but also
their age-old and much struggled with difficulties.
Hence, Haack’s proposed solution is meant to syn-
thesize these two positions into a new one (found-
herentism) preserving the merits of each position
while simultaneously ameliorating and dissolving
each theory’s respective difficulties.
Accordingly, Haack, much like Descartes in his
Meditations, begins Evidence and Inquiry by ex-
amining the principal problems and difficulties
of specific foundationalist and coherentist posi-
3This quote comes from none other than Ludwig
Wittgenstein, who is one of Rorty’s “intellectual heroes”
[12, p. 170].
tions in chapters one, two and three of her book.
Each traditional, epistemic position, according to
Haack, is prone to two separate problems. Foun-
dationalism, briefly summarized here, holds that
some beliefs are more basic, that is, more epistem-
ically secure than others and that all other beliefs
derive their justification from these few, basic, be-
liefs.4However, as stated, foundationalism leaves
itself open to what Haack calls the ‘swings and
roundabouts argument’: one must make a choice
between epistemic security on the one hand and
epistemic content. The second objection, Haack
calls the ‘up, back and all the way down objec-
tion’: upper-tier beliefs can help justify basic be-
liefs and vice versa, therefore justification is not
one-directional, as the foundationalist would have
it. Since the foundationalist cannot challenge ei-
ther of these objections without being a founda-
tionalist, foundationalism is not a very good the-
ory of knowledge [7, p. 30-33].
Coherentism, on the other hand, again briefly
defined, holds that justification depends exclu-
sively on the relationship between beliefs in a spe-
cific belief system. That is, a belief system is jus-
tified if and only if all of the beliefs are consistent
with one another. However, it too, is subject to
two different objections. The first objection, is the
isolation objection, or what Haack, following C.I.
Lewis, calls ‘the drunken sailors objection’: since
consistency is both a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the justification for a belief set then it
is possible for a belief set to be consistent and
yet fail to be true. The second objection Haack
names ‘the too much to ask argument’: it is “too
much to ask” that is, unrealistic, for an epistemic
subject to hold a completely consistent set of be-
liefs. Thus, since the coherentist cannot respond
to these objections without being a coherentist the
same conclusion applies: a new epistemic theory
is in order [7, p. 21-24].
With this demolition of the two traditional the-
ories of epistemology out of the way, in chapter
4I realize that this is a rather curt summary of founda-
tionalism in general and does not take into consideration
the sheer plethora of foundationalist, and indeed founda-
tionalist like theories of epistemic justification. Here, I am
simply following the manner in which Haack defines foun-
dationalism and her overall argument. The same can also
be said, when I define coherentism.
15
KRITERION, Nr. 20 (2006), pp. 14-21
four of Evidence and Inquiry, Haack turns her
attention to articulating the goals, structure and
method of the foundherentist position. According
to Haack, the goal of articulating an alternative
epistemic position to foundationalist and coheren-
tist theories of justification is simply to explicate
a definite and specific type of,
Epistemic justification which conforms to the
desiderata which emerged from the arguments of
previous chapters: to allow the relevance of ex-
perience to empirical justification (which will re-
quire an articulation of the interplay of causal and
evaluative aspects); and to allow pervasive mutual
support among beliefs (which will require an ac-
count of the difference between legitimate mutual
support and objectionable circularity [7, p. 73].
As we will see, Haack’s proposal combines the
merits of the foundationalist and coherentist po-
sitions into a harmonious unity. Like the founda-
tionalist, Haack’s position is open to causal ev-
idence of both sensory and introspective kinds.
Like the coherentist, this causal evidence though
important and necessary for justification, is not
a sufficient condition for justification. Conse-
quently, there must be an evaluative component,
performed by the epistemic subject, by examining
the belief in p within the context of the relevant
beliefs, within the belief set, of a specific individ-
ual and at a specific time. In short, Haack’s pro-
posal as we shall see, combines the positive aspects
of each of the aforementioned traditional epistemic
theories while also demonstrating that the found-
herentist is not open to the traditional objections
we saw in the above.
In order to understand the basics of Haack’s
foundherentism we must first comprehend her dis-
tinctions, terms and definitions. Accordingly, I
shall first examine Haack’s understanding of the
term ‘belief.’ Haack makes a distinction between
two different meanings of ‘belief.’ The first, Haack
calls the state of belief a person is in, (hereafter
S-beliefs) when there exists, a causal relationship
between a particular individual and the world.
That is, an S-belief simply refers to the immediate
causal position one is in when they believe that p.
This causal position, as we will see, may be either
sensory or introspective [7, p. 74].
The second component, Haack calls the ‘C’ or
content of one’s beliefs. In short, S-beliefs can
be equated with someone’s believing something,
that is, the act of believing, while the C-beliefs
are defined as what they believe. Thus, the con-
tent of a belief or C-belief represents the proposi-
tions or statements that can be constructed from
a person’s state of belief (S-belief). Therefore,
Haack offers both a causal and evaluative (double
aspect theory of justification). Providing a very
condensed and cursory summary of her position,
“how good one’s C-evidence is” will be composed
of three separate, yet, interdependent parts: 1)
the causal S-beliefs, 2) the translation of S-beliefs
into C-evidence and 3) the evaluative stage or how
‘good’ A’s evidence is with respect to p. I shall
now examine each of these stages in turn.
The first stage of epistemic justification then,
for A, is to consider all of A’s S-beliefs, which de-
note all of the related sensory, introspective, etc
states of ‘A’ which are all part of the causal nexus
when he or she is in the act, state or process of
believing that p. Second, the C-beliefs are the
propositions and statements that accurately re-
flect S-beliefs. That is, the C-beliefs are simply the
propositions and statements ‘A’ can create from
A’s S-beliefs. Third and finally, this new C-belief
faces a tribunal of sorts: the person tests the co-
gency of this new C-belief in light of what he or
she already knows from all of the C-reasons that
are relevant and related to this new C-belief. If the
new C-belief is coherent with the person’s previ-
ously strongly warranted belief system, then the
new C-belief is also justified. If, on the other hand,
the new belief conflicts when placed in the con-
text of one’s C-reasons, then the individual may
use this new belief to determine whether his be-
lief system, as a whole, is justified or not. Third
and finally, whether the belief system as a whole
is justified, largely depends on the comprehensive-
ness of the belief system. That is, how many re-
lated C-beliefs ‘A’ has and how these beliefs are
organized. With all of this stated in somewhat ab-
stract terms, let us to turn to Haack’s crossword
analogy to concretize her epistemic schema [7, p.
74].
Perhaps the best metaphor to explain the nov-
elty and epistemic merits of Haack’s position is
16
Lightbody, B.: Virtue Foundherentism
that of a crossword puzzle.5A crossword puzzle
is composed of three elements. First, we have the
puzzle itself with all of its intersecting entries. Sec-
ond, we have the entries themselves. While third
and finally, we have the clues (both across and
down) in order to fill in the appropriate entry. A
successful crossword puzzle then, will depend on
whether all of the entries have been filled in cor-
rectly. However, in order to “fill in” a crossword,
each entry must correctly answer its correspond-
ing clue, while every entry must correctly fit or
be supported by the already filled in intersecting
entries.
Analogously, the foundherentist can also say
that the justification of a belief depends on three
interrelated yet, independent aspects. First, how
favourable the C-evidence is with respect to p or,
in other words, how well our evidence fits the clue
in the crossword puzzle. The second aspect can
be defined as how secure our evidence is inde-
pendently of the clue and entry of the crossword.
That is, how secure, how certain are we, that all
of the intersecting entries that directly intersect
with the C-belief in question are correct accord-
ing to each of their respective clues. While third
and finally, there is the comprehensiveness condi-
tion, where we examine the crossword as a whole.
Did we investigate all of the relevant C-evidence
for the clue? Are there any other factors that
may come into play when investigating the propo-
sitions? Have we been diligent enough in defining
them? How much of the crossword puzzle has been
filled in etc. Stating all of this more succinctly we
can therefore conclude that the primitive expli-
candum for the foundherentist can be expressed
as follows: “A is more/less justified, at time t, in
believing that p, depending on how good his evi-
dence is” [7, p. 74].
2
With this brief summary of Haack’s position
in mind, we can now turn to evaluate the mer-
its of Andrew C. Clune’s article “Justification of
Empirical Belief: Problems with Haack’s Found-
5To make this clearer, Haack provides in figure 4.1 a di-
agram of a completely filled in crossword puzzle explaining
the relationships and analogues to foundherentism, 82.
herentism.” Clune, in this very short, yet, pene-
trating article, claims that on two distinct levels,
foundherentism is in fact, a species of reliabilism.
On the level of justification, foundherentism holds
that
“1. Experience provides a partial justi-
fication of each and every empirical be-
lief and this justification occurs indepen-
dently of the support of other beliefs” [3,
p. 462].
That is, Haack must provide adequate and suffi-
cient reasons as to why the senses justify at least
and only in part, our beliefs. However, as Clune
correctly notes, the only justification Haack pro-
vides to demonstrate that the senses can serve to
justify our beliefs is
1. “Experience (sensory and introspective) is a
source of empirical information”; and
2. “It is the only ultimate source of such infor-
mation available to us” [3, p. 462].
However, if Clune is right, then Haack simply as-
sumes the senses are reliable and hence is reli-
abilist. Therefore, Haack’s ultimate grounds for
the justification for any empirical belief would be
the senses only because the senses are reliable, ex-
ternal, truth conducive, belief-forming processes.6
6Haack does not give a strict definition of what reliabil-
ism is however, it is implied that all reliabilist theories are
non-evidential (they are external and not internal theories
of epistemic justification and are, therefore, only interested
in examining reliable belief-forming processes.) Second, in
general, reliabilist positions hold truth-conducive theories
of justification [7, p. 139-158 and esp. p. 139]. Alvin I.
Goldman argues that there are reliabilist indicator theories
though he admits that the “reliable process theories have
been far more influential.” See Goldman’s article, “Re-
liabilism” [5, p. 433]. Although F.P. Ramsey is usually
credited with articulating the first true reliabilist epistemic
position, see his [11], in my mind, it is not until D.M. Arm-
strong published Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1973), that a fully worked out
reliabilism is produced. Goldman does, in fact, produce,
what I would call a proto-reliabilism, in his “A causal the-
ory of knowing”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64, 1967,
357-372 but his distinct and influential reliabilist position
is only fully articulated in his much later writings. See
Goldman’s Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1986.)
17
KRITERION, Nr. 20 (2006), pp. 14-21
On the other hand, because of Haack’s reliabil-
ism on the level of justification, Clune concludes
that she must also be a reliabilist on the level of
ratification. Haack’s foundherentist position as we
saw, is truth indicative; all Haack can provide are
reasons for thinking that foundherentism is truth-
ful based on what we consider to be reasonable
and rational explanations and provided that the
senses are reliable indicators of truth. However,
it is this last point, which Clune thinks, reveals
Haack to be a closet reliabilist. Clune writes,
“In order for foundherentism to be ad-
equate as a theory of justification, the
subject’s beliefs must be truth ‘indica-
tive’, and this is only possible if the
senses are reliable means of detecting in-
formation about the environment” [3, p.
462].
Thus, since it is the evidence of the senses, which,
Haack presupposes, anchor our beliefs to our envi-
ronment, she can only conjecture that foundheren-
tism is truth indicative to knowledge. Therefore,
she does not, and cannot, provide any reasons or
evidence to justify her claim that “the ultimate
evidence with respect to empirical beliefs is expe-
riential evidence both sensory and introspective”
[7, p. 213]. Rather, she must simply assume that
the senses as well as introspection are reliable most
of the time and thus, Haack does not present an
internal evidential or ‘indicative’ epistemic posi-
tion at all. Rather, the ultimate ground of found-
herentism must be the senses and this means that
Haack, at bottom and despite all of her postur-
ing to the contrary, really presents a causal and
external theory of justification and therefore is a
reliabilist.
Nevertheless, although Clune seems to under-
stand Haack’s argument he misrepresents Haack’s
position with regard to two important points.
First, Haack does not think, pace the reliabilist,
that foundherentism is truth conducive but rather
asserts the much less ambitious, much less de-
manding and therefore, much more defensible po-
sition that foundherentism is only truth indica-
tive. What this means is that the ultimate rat-
ification of foundherentism and unlike reliabilism
is not causal but rather evaluative and internal.
Haack argues that foundherentism is truth indica-
tive because we can only provide what we take
to be truth indicative; what we believe to be rea-
sonable evidence, warranted by what we think are
rational reasons [7, p. 210]. And, if this fails to
satisfy the radical skeptic and all the Gettier para-
doxes he can muster, then so be it. This is the
best we can do. Hence, the ratification of found-
herentism is once more, dependent on a double
aspect—it is dependent not only on assuming the
senses are reliable but also on the reasons or more
specifically, what we consider to be a cogent, ra-
tional, reasons to defeat the skeptic. By neglect-
ing the second aspect of foundherentism, Haack
does indeed appear to be a reliabilist. However,
it is precisely this second aspect, or the evaluative
aspect of foundherentism, which differentiates it
from reliabilism in general. For this evaluative
component applies across the board. That is to
say, even at the level of our sensory experience
there is still interpretation at work.
Secondly, the related misrepresentation by
Clune occurs when he also presents Haack’s no-
tion of sensory evidence as one that is innocent or
pure of theory. He fails to acknowledge, that even
at this level, the senses are still conditioned, or
‘theory impregnated’ by our evolutionary trajec-
tory as human beings, and by our cognitive capac-
ities as individuals. Therefore, our senses are not
purely empirical causal structures, which perfectly
or even reliably (50 percent +1 of the time) mirror
the world as it really is. Even at this level, there is
still work for the evaluative and interpretative pro-
cesses to understand what we really saw, heard,
smelled and tasted based on our increasing under-
standing of our specific, species biological makeup.
As Haack makes this clear,
“Built into my account of perceptual ev-
idence, as in our pre-analytic concept of
the evidence of the senses, is a concep-
tion of perception as at once direct and
interpretative. In normal cases, percep-
tion is of things and events in the world
around us; but there is pervasive inter-
penetration of perceptual experience and
background beliefs” [7, p. 612].
It is for this very reason that Haack goes in to
18
Lightbody, B.: Virtue Foundherentism
considerable detail, in chapter five:
“The Evidence of the Senses: Conjec-
tures and Refutations,” to explain that,
“perception (is) of things and events
around one, not of sense-data, colour
patches, or whatever. But at the same
time it allows for the pervasive inter-
penetration of background beliefs onto
our beliefs about what we see, hear” [7,
p.110].
In other words, and following the work of noted
ecological psychologist J.J. Gibson, Haack argues
that perception, for human beings, is distinctly
human: “A perceptual system, a system for the
detection of information afforded by the things
and events in their (the specific species) environ-
ment” [7, p.114] (also, see [4]). Hence, though
perception seems to be truth indicative it is not,
truth conducive nor on its own reliable as the re-
liabilist would have it. Perception is always inter-
preted whether biologically, unconsciously or con-
sciously speaking. Haack’s point is that only an
internal and evidential epistemic position such as
foundherentism takes all of these points into con-
sideration.
3
From my brief analysis, Haack seems correct to
conclude that only an internal, evidential, epis-
temic position such as foundherentism can truly
warrant our beliefs. That is to say, we can only
justify a proposition according to what we believe
to be the evidence that supports it. While simul-
taneously, we must also trust that our reasoning
abilities and methods of evidence collecting are
valid and sound. However, there remain addi-
tional problems inherent to any internal and ev-
idential theory of justification, which Haack sim-
ply does not acknowledge. If, as Haack claims, the
primitive explicandum for foundherentism can be
summarized as follows: “A is more/less justified,
at time t, in believing that p, depending on how
good his evidence is.” Then, there is a tremendous
epistemic as well as ethical onus and responsibility
placed squarely on the shoulders of A, to be able
to distinguish between what is the sustaining evi-
dence for pas opposed to the inhibiting evidence
for p. For A to use good judgment as well as have
the capacity and skill required for valid and sound
reasoning. For A to ensure that they have been
vigilant in discovering all of the sustaining and
inhibiting evidence for p. A must also guard him
or herself against falling into the trap of ‘wishful
thinking’ or believing that p, because they hope
that p. Conversely, A must possess courage to be-
lieve that peven if he fears p is true. In essence,
Haack’s position needs to be further supplemented
with an account of the specific epistemic virtues
A is required to possess and exercise in order to
fully justify any empirical inquiry. Foundheren-
tism then needs to explain precisely and in very
explicit terms, just what these specific virtues are
and how A can satisfy them.
However and only under a very charitable in-
terpretation can it be said that Haack even im-
plicitly acknowledges that all epistemically war-
ranted, empirical, investigations will test both the
investigator’s cognitive abilities as well as his or
her character. In her most recent work, Defend-
ing Science Within Reason, Haack alludes to the
possibility of a virtuous component for foundher-
entism (yet still glossing over the true importance
of this component) by approvingly quoting Percy
Bridgman’s famous explanation of science, (and
for Haack all forms of empirical inquiry) as “do-
ing one’s damnedest with one’s mind, no holds
barred” [2, p. 551].
However, there is no further explanation as to
what, exactly, “doing one’s damnedest with one’s
mind” entails other than trying to discover the
truth as best a particular subject can. But, it
is precisely this subjective element ie. what one
believes to be rational reasons for p, what one be-
lieves to be evidence for petc. that continues to
haunt and undermine Haack’s overall project. It
would seem foundherentism is in need of some ad-
ditional, “objective”, virtuous criteria to explicate
precisely what Haack means by the evaluation of
C-evidence for p.
Yet, the difficulty that Haack faces is that if she
does specify some additional criteria for the justi-
fication of p, then such conditions can only be ex-
ternal and truth conducive with the consequence
that foundherentism, as a theory of epistemic jus-
tification, becomes a paradoxical and incoherent
19
KRITERION, Nr. 20 (2006), pp. 14-21
hybrid of evidential and truth conducive compo-
nents. Therefore, Clune is correct in claiming that
Haack is a closet reliabilist after all but somewhat
imprecise in his argumentation and understanding
of Haack’s position. More correctly put, Haack
would be a virtue reliabilist with some affinities to
Ernest Sosa and John Greco’s respective positions
(see [13, p. 278] and also [6, p. 424]).
Now, one could object to my above argument
and claim that I have merely argued for one school
of epistemic virtuous thought that concentrates
on intellectual virtues or truth-conducive cognitive
capacities. But, there is another school of virtue
epistemology called, “character” or moral virtue
epistemology. This school includes such philoso-
phers as James A. Montmarquet [10] and Linda
Trinkaus Zagzebski [14, p. 277-283]. For these
philosophers, virtue epistemology means simply
developing the proper moral virtues required for
truth finding such as intellectual courage, and
open-mindedness. Intellectual inquiry then, is
akin to moral development and requires both pa-
tience and practice. Thus, one could argue that if
foundherentism is in need of additional support
it could be supplemented from this school and
therefore virtue foundherentism remains an inter-
nal and evidential epistemic position after all.
However, once again, Haack cannot appeal to
any subjective virtuous habits of inquiry since the
same problem would arise: we can only assume
that our reasoning abilities, methods of evidence
collecting and even moral and intellectual fiber
(what Montmarquet calls “intellectual courage”)
are truth indicative. And, to base an epistemic
theory on such an assumption, is clearly unjusti-
fied. Again, we are left with the same intractable
problem as before: foundherentism is either a reli-
able, truth conducive and external (virtue or oth-
erwise) epistemic position or foundherentism is a
truth evidential and internal epistemic position,
which can only assume to be justified. Either
of these alternatives would be unsatisfactory for
Haack and once more, it would seem, yet another
promising epistemic position fails to satisfy the
skeptic.
References
[1] B. Aune. Haack’s “Evidence and Inquiry”.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
66(3):627–632, 1996.
[2] P. Bridgman. Reflections of a physicist.
Philosophical Library, New York, 1955.
[3] A. C. Clune. Justification of empirical be-
lief: Problems with Haack’s foundherentism.
Philosophy, 72:460–464, 1997.
[4] J. J. Gibson. The ecological approach to visual
perception. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1979.
[5] A. I. Goldman. Reliabilism. In J. Dancy
and E. Sosa, editors, A companion to episte-
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