Cavalier's Take

We had planned a two-day trip to Kahna Wildlife Sanctuary in the winters of 2015.  What an immense pleasure was it for us to enter the sanctuary on a clear wintery day, with the sun reassuring its emergence, thus lifting our spirits. The cleanliness, maintenance of vehicle tracks, signages, route marking and requisite pruning in the sanctuary premises was visible and noteworthy. The first day went eventless, with ‘Munna’ (the then famous tiger, whose name resounded throughout Kahna wild life sanctuary) making himself scarce! However, sighting of innumerable species of birds, types of deer, monkeys etc saw the day through.  Now, our only hope rested on the next day’s proceedings.

The next day was as pristine and glorious as the previous day. Though clad in jackets and mufflers, the cold morning air gushing past our faces was somehow refreshing in the open Gypsy.  The wide openness of the jungle interspersed with tree lines, rocky outcrop, streams, and meadows made it all a grand landscape and an enjoyable motor ride. By 3 pm the modified Gypsy vehicle had traversed all the ‘nook and corners’ of the sanctuary, alas with no luck of spotting the Tiger. No sooner that we had lost all hopes of the ‘tiger sighting’ that our guide received intimation of Munna, the tiger,having been sighted a short distance away. We sped and were the first to reach the intended area. What we then saw was an amazing sight. Munna was walking alone on the jeep track, intermittently urinating to mark his territory, with our Gypsy following him approximately 20 meters behind. All aspects related to animal behavior in the jungle on sighting or sensing the tiger’s presence in the vicinity including the varied and diverse ‘calls’ from different animals, was being witnessed by us in reality! What with the monkeys and chimpanzees jumping from tree to tree and others keeping their eyes fixed on the tiger, fully prepared to meet any threat that may arise. Whether it was the sambar, spotted deer, monkeys, chimpanzees, or other animal visible to us, were all calling out with impunity; while Munna gaited along most leisurely on the Jeep track, indeed like the ‘King of the forest’, unmindful of anyone’s presence in his vicinity! He did look backwards most casually just once, probably when our vehicle got too close to him. What a treat was it to ride in the vehicle just 20 odd meters behind Munna for almost 45 minutes…a life time experience indeed.

We were told that Munna had killed a deer the previous night and now his stomach seemed to be full. Apparently, he was looking for a suitable spot to enjoy good sleep. Surely, after a long walk, he veered off the track, lay down and slid in to deep sleep.  

Written By

Lt Gen Rajan Bakhshi

It gives us immense pride to observe the nationwide transformation in the quality of our national highways and expressways. This is reflective of the deep sense of commitment exhibited by the concerned ministry in Delhi. However, the utterly chaotic state of traffic on our roads, both on the highways and in cities is remorseful and frustrating. Talking of the highways first; there are times when one wonders whether increase in the number of lanes would actually make any difference in our context! The freedom of adopting any lane on our highways, irrespective of the type of vehicle weight/speed creates ideal conditions to compound the misery. No wonder that faster moving vehicles have to snake their way through heavier ones, which often simultaneously occupy all the lanes and move in near equal slow speed, thus denying any overtake! Considering the democratic rights of the two wheelers on the highway road space, they also crave to enjoy the ‘free for all’ conditions, thus occupy lanes at will and race with vehicles designed to move far faster than theirs!
Moving on to graver criticalities that are prevalent on roads in our cities and towns. Unfortunately, the basic components pertinent in road space management, namely, the planners that evolve traffic regulations, the implementing authority and the commuter, are all blameworthy with varying degrees of default. Only a few major issues, amongst the many, are being highlighted. The planners have to ensure that laws formulated are realistic, practical, sound and implementable. Therefore, immaculate prospective traffic plans should be evolved that encompass all essential aspects of effective traffic management. A few important ones include: laying down of practical speed limits, ensure seamless merger/non Criss crossing of traffic, preventing defile formation by maintaining uniform width of roads (constant number of lanes), earmarking of lanes for different category of vehicles etc. Implementation/execution is the key and pivotal aspect in ensuring the requisite road discipline. Peculiar to our environment, most drivers/riders become law abiding with the sheer presence of a uniformed policeman at traffic points, failing which, it becomes a ‘free for all’ situation, with the colour of traffic lights becoming irrelevant!! On high traffic volume roads, even a defective vehicle can cause traffic disruption, for which speedy recovery plans need to be in place. Somehow blatant and wilful encroachment of public roads by hawkers and parked vehicles is being overlooked. Our road space commuters are dynamic/self-centred and ruthless. Somehow, we have lost our sense of patience and the Lucknowy andaz of ‘pahle aap’. Infact in consonance with the jet styled lives that we now lead, the profound and ardent thinking is’pehle mein’, which has manifested in utter disregard to the existing traffic rules. Our cities/towns have all category of vehicles milling around in all the road lanes, with each trying to be faster than the other! In such a melee, traffic light junctions witness Criss crossing of traffic, since those intending to turn Right are parked in the extreme Left Lane. In many places wrong side driving has become an acceptable part of life, and if the vehicle has its head lights switched On, then the right to be moving in the opposite direction is well established and acceptable!
We understand that there are experts available in this field. However, it is high time that those responsible address this important issue for public convenience, reduction in road rages and road accident deaths. The unfortunate part is that no visible effort in this regard can be seen even on the horizon. This humble endeavour is to highlight the basic aspects that may assist in improving matters. There is a need to earmark road lanes as per vehicle weight and permitted speed limit, hence, ensuring safe and comfortable movement for all, including faster moving vehicles. The ‘harakari’ two-wheeler riders must remain on the extreme Left of the road. Thus, relentless enforcement of ‘lane driving’ commands utmost importance. There are numerous other issues like methodology of overtaking, vehicle parking, appropriate location of bus stands, taxi stands etc, which are beyond the scope of this note.
Surely, there is the inescapable need to educate/motivate people with road side signages, extensive media campaigns and to demonstrate stringent compliance in the issuance of driving licence. Monitoring and implementation must be exercised utilising the advance technology available in this field and laying down traffic offence fines that should pinch the offender. However, cameras with e-challan facilities should be updated at regular intervals and all transactions should be online. Traffic police needs to monitor potential traffic jam areas/points on the google map, especially during peak traffic hours. This would ensure in despatching quick reaction teams, when required. The ‘odd/even’ scheme has merit for consideration, since the number of vehicles plying on our roads need to be drastically reduced.

Finally, we should not forget that till such time we all do not attain the desired traffic maturity levels/self-discipline, boots on the ground by our traffic policemen would remain absolutely essential. Reiterating the fact, that the answer for improvement in conditions primarily lies in ernest/sincere implementation of the laid down regulations. At the same time, it is noteworthy that a few of our cities like Chandigarh have exhibited high standards of execution/implementation of traffic regulations. Surely the others can follow suit!

Lt Gen Rajan Bakhshi, PVSM, UYSM, ADC

Former GOC in C, Central Army

The saga of the Chinese incursions which had commenced many months ago, when the summers were setting in and now that the north Indian winters are round the corner, it surely seems to be an unending Chinese adventure in eastern Ladakh. However, the one thing that stands constant is the large Chinese military presence in eastern Ladakh! The severity of the winter in Ladakh is known to all, including the Chinese. However, they do not seem to be vary of that fact. How fascinating to realize that even though months have passed by, yet no one seems to be any wiser about their overall motive.

Innumerable reasons have been spelt out on the Chinese political, diplomatic and military intent over all these months. Considering that the Chinese adventure has already seen a rather long-time span and yet continuing, most of these conjectures now stand nullified. After all, there is never the need for them to express annoyance that lasts over so many months!

Many have expressed the possibility of the Chinese presently engaging us in asymmetrical/hybrid warfare. Surely it could well be a possibility, however, we are aware that all Chinese actions are not only well planned but are also executed with full gusto and enormity of effort. After all, such warfare which encompasses the combination of conventional and irregular tactics aimed at psychological aspects including media management, coercive diplomacy and disinformation would certainly have an overwhelming impact, the evidence of which is not yet telling! However, ‘testing the waters’ over a prolonged period including the treacherous winter months could well be part of the hybrid bit.

The Indian uproar on reoccupying Aksai Chin and Gilgit Baltistan could certainly have sent a strong message that would have prompted immediate and stern military action by them. This could well be the rationale for the large concentration of forces specifically in eastern Ladakh only. Consultation of the map would make it clear that by occupying the Depsang plains and extending to areas till Demchok, the Chinese have severely restricted our offensive options to reoccupy Aksai Chin. The area may be desolate and arid where nothing grows, however, it provides the vital connectivity between the two troubled Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. The western highway (G 219) is the life line for strategic induction and replenishment of forces designated for operations in eastern Ladakh.

This time around, the Chinese were fortunate to be able to reach and deploy along the LAC, as perceived by them, in most of the areas in eastern Ladakh. Somehow, despite the strategic surveillance and intelligence means available with us to track the Chinese mobilisation over large distances, matters still remained easy for them to reach their desired occupation areas. Surely, they must be absolutely clear that this luxury may not be available to them ever again. Therefore, they may not be keen to vacate the areas already under their occupation, instead they would attempt to reinforce and hold these in strength; a trend that remains visibly clear and a ground reality.

It needs to be noted that this is the first time ever that the Chinese have inducted such a large quantum of force in to eastern Ladakh. What could offer a better opportunity for them to train and practice battle drills and procedures in the actual operational area under extreme climatic conditions in order to psychologically, mentally and physically harden the inexperienced soldiers amongst them. It would also provide them the opportunity to assess our military potential and exploit our weakness, if any, during winters. Gone are those days when ‘campaigning season’ was determined and operational plans prepared accordingly. Considering the array of facilitating means available today, the battle philosophy should lend itself for sustained operations throughout the year, implying the feasibility of operations during winters in the mountains and during summers in the desert. Not to forget that the Chinese had launched their offensive in the winter months of 1962!

The Chinese adventure in eastern Ladakh seems to have underestimated our political will and the fighting potential of the Indian military. We did exceedingly well in exhibiting our determined resolve, offensive intent in words and in actions on the ground. Starting from the brutal Galwan valley action, gaining the Kailash mountain heights, raising the ante in north Pangong Tso area, posturing of forces including armour and supporting arms all along the frontier with China, relentless continuation in infrastructure development including border roads, occupation of forward air fields, efficient logistic management, presence of our blue water naval resources in the south china sea in conjunction with international naval powers and the favourable diplomatic/political response from the world community are amongst the many  factors that have contributed in raising the rude shock for the dragon.

Holistic analysis of the prevalent situation would logically prompt the dragon to refrain from further escalation. Suffice to mention that it is easier to hold ground in the mountains than launching offensive operations especially in high altitude areas like Ladakh. Even though nothing is impossible, yet favourable results would accrue at an enormously high price! In any case the Chinks would fight only when they are certain of resounding and overwhelming victory. We must not lower our guard at any cost and ensure that the Tricolour flies with ever increasing pride and fortitude.

                                                                  JAI HIND

Written By
Lt Gen Rajan Bakhshi, PVSM, UYSM, ADC.
Former GOC of Leh based 14 Corps
and GOC in C, Central Army

General

Central sector comprises the entire stretch bordering China in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand over a frontage of 545 km. The most distinctive aspect here, is that from the middle Himalayan heights of around 6000/7000 ft, the greater Himalayan range assumes a steep ascent to the passes located on the watershed at altitudes around 18000ft, forming a rather steep gradient. However, the ascent to the watershed from the Chinese side is gradual and far easier to negotiate, being part of the Tibetan Plateau. .

Topography On The Chinese Side

G 219 is the Western National Highway located in depth and starts from general area opposite own Lohit valley in eastern Arunachal Pradesh. This implies that the highway runs all along the entire length of the Indo-China frontier for over 3500 km, at a distance ranging from 70 to 200 km from the border. Road G 303 is located between G 219 and the border / LAC in the intermediate zone. Series of roads/ tracks emanate from G 303, which run towards the watershed. There are two significant valleys between G219 and the watershed; one with River Indus (in depth) and the other with river Satluj (closer to the watershed). Indus continues to flow along the frontier and enters India at Demchok in eastern Ladakh, while Satluj enters earlier in Lahaul – Spiti region of Himachal Pradesh. Both G 219 and G 303 are closest to the border/ LAC at Demchok and lake Mansarovar.

Chinese road S 207 runs from Lipulekh pass and meets G 219 near lake Mansarovar. Ngari is an important road junction where link road G 317 from the Central Highway meets G 219 and continues further westwards to area near Demchok and onwards to Kashgar in Xinjiang province.

Himachal Segment.

The 260 km border in Himachal is shared by two districts; 140 km in Kinnaur and the balance in Spiti. There are two major axes which run towards the Indo – China border; one from Shimla to Reckong Peo/ Pooh (NH 505) and the other from Manali across Rohtang onwards to Leh (NH 3). Both these axes meet at Gramphoo Jn, south of Keylong in Lahaul- Spiti region and are vital supply routes to Ladakh. Interdiction of our National Highway/Gramphoo Jn would be a severe setback for the logistics support to Ladakh. Two offshoot roads from NH 505 runs towards the border on the watershed, south of Nako. Chinese roads S 302 and Y 706 running on their side also terminate close to the border opposite own roads. Threat perception in this sector should be considered in conjunction with areas opposite Uttarakhand and eastern Ladakh.

Uttarakhand Segment

Uttarakhand shares 285 km of border with China, having five major road axes that run towards the watershed from the plains. However, only two of these roads from own as well as the Chinese side reach the watershed/border. These are Rudraprayag – Joshimath – Mana Pass and Pithoragarh – Gunji – Lipulekh Pass. The only important disputed area in the sector is Barahoti, which is primarily used as grazing ground. Only a dirt track is available to reach Niti pass from the Chinese side to access Barahoti. Uttarakhand is also referred to as “Dev Bhumi“, the land for ‘tapasaya’ and is interspersed with Hindu religious places including the ‘Char Dham’ ( Badrinath, Kedarnath, Gangotri and Yamunotri), Hemkund Saheb and countless others. An intrusion in Uttarakhand can be devastating, as it could offer the Chinese the shortest approach to the hindu heartland with prominent holi shrines and the Indo Gangetic plains. The National Capital is located only a little over 400 km away! This eventuality would provide stupendous psychological ascendency to the adversary.

Own Criticalities

For those not familiar with mountainous terrain along the Himalayas, it must be generally understood that movement for a large body of troops is possible only along roads and tracks, while broken / irregular foot tracks / trails / cross country move is viable only for a small group, moving on man packed basis. Keeping this in mind, the under mentioned areas gain operational criticality.

Himachal. Gramphoo, Area opposite Chinese roads Y 706 and S 302 in Lahul – Spiti district, both located south of Nako. Lastly, the Sangla valley.

Uttarakhand. The threat may emerge along the following axes, with an order of priority which should commence with the Lipulekh Pass – Pithoragarh, Mana Pass – Joshimath – Rudraprayag, Niti Pass – Joshimath – Rudraprayag, Harsil – Uttarkashi and finally the Munsiyari axis.

Own Strategic Philosophy

When dealing with a stronger adversary, there is invariably the need to identify her vulnerabilities as also maintain credible allies, who assume a deterrence role. Joint operations should be executed in all the existing military formats; over land, sea and in the air, fragmenting his resources in order to attain the politico – military objectives. There are two major Chinese vulnerabilities which lie to the west. These are; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), where billions of dollars are at stake and yet remains susceptible to our interference and the other being, the long-disputed Aksai Chin. One of the major lessons that we should draw from the ongoing tussle with China is that we need to now adopt an offensive mindset. An offensive stance is reflective of strong Comprehensive National Power, needing a rather strong Political will and deep commitment for implementation of our bold intent. A timid response to the big Bully, would force us into a reactive mode, with the whip remaining in the hands of the Chinese!

A bold and determined nation would start putting ‘spoke in the wheels’ from the time the adversary commences mobilisation from the peace time locations. In case, hostilities have not been declared, these actions need not involve overt interdiction means. It is the first time ever, that such heavy force levels have been inducted by China along the LAC in eastern Ladakh. May be, that rehearsing their non battle-hardened PLA (the last war being against Vietnam, a few decades ago) was an aim, thus putting them through the paces of physically undertaking battle procedures and drills in the designated operational areas. With strategic surveillance and timely decision making, own forces should reach theLAC, as perceived by us, before the Chinese arrival and improve our defensive posture, occupying pre-selected tactically favourable ground. The inordinately long induction route for the Chinese should be taken as one of their vulnerabilities, hence exploited.

Own Offensive Option in Central Sector

There are many offensive options that can be considered along the Chinese frontier. In one such option, Central sector could assume the role of a pivot, capturing and holding vital Chinese areas along their maintenance/induction routes including communication centres. These road arteries are extremely vital to the enemy for build-up of forces in eastern Ladakh and their subsequent logistics sustenance. Similar action should to be taken in Xinjiyang province. This is likely to draw reasonable quantum of enemy forces, thus gaining leverage in western and eastern sectors.

It would be pertinent to point out here that there is an apparent need to change our threat perception to now be based on China rather than Pakistan. A strong resurgent India is the need of the hour, which fortunately is within the realm of absolute attainment.

JAI HIND!

Written By

Lt Gen Rajan Bakhshi, PVSM, UYSM, ADC

Former GOC in C, Central Army & GOC, 14 Corps

Veteran

To defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our country, the great Indian Army is amongst the very few armies in this world that has to operate across a vast multitude of terrain and climatic conditions, prevalent along its borders. Ranging from mountains, high altitude and glacial terrain to the plains of the Punjab, the arid thar desert, jungles, riverine country to the island territories is indeed a tall order, for any world army.

The major differences that emerge when varied terrain configurations are compared with each other, include the multitude of vastly divergent climatic conditions, local food habits, habitat, survival techniques, mental and physical toughness of the locals, to name a few! However, the army recruitment is based on ‘all India basis’ and each soldier is expected to serve in any of the discussed terrain conditions. Undoubtedly, soldiers hailing from vastly different conditions and backgrounds, perform their task to the very best of their ability. However, for a soldier, born and brought up in a coastal township or in the dry expanse of the Thar desert; fighting in the high altitude areas would certainly demand that extra degree of effort to adapt to the harsh weather and terrain conditions, surmount them and then execute the assigned operational task. Conversely, such hardships are of little concern to the local inhabitant, who is able to adapt to the conditions with relative ease and far lesser effort, since there are many facets of life in these conditions, which come naturally to them. The most difficult adaptation relates to the high altitude and glacial areas along our frontiers with China. The thin, oxygen deprived air in these areas makes it mandatory for all personnel to undertake time consuming acclimatisation at varying altitudes. Even with all this done, it may yet not be easy to perform better than the locals …’sons of the soil’.

It was primarily with this and a few other considerations that ‘sons of the soil’ concept was accepted by the nation and was implemented in the Indian Army by raising the Scout battalions (bns) in all regions bordering China. Thus, we now have Ladakh, Garhwal, Kumaon, Sikkim and Arunachal Scouts, deployed in their respective areas. Ladakh Scouts are the oldest and the largest regiment amongst the Scouts. They have five bns and are tasked to recce and interdict the enemy in the high altitude border region. This regiment had displayed exemplary valour and grit in the face of the enemy at Turtuk, Batalik, Kargil and the Siachen Glacier at different times, ever since its raising on 01 June 1963, thus stands honoured with a large number of decorations and citations.

I have had the honour of serving with the Ladakh Scouts and observing their performance at close quarters. The Ladakhi soldier who is lovingly referred to as ‘Nunu‘ is not only extremely physically fit, ferocious and a daring fighter; he also retains a fertile, clear and a sharp intellect. Hardworking, highly disciplined, loyal and task oriented, Nunu is an asset to have on your side. Their biological constitution helps them to operate with relative ease in the rarified high altitude environment, thus qualify for immediate application in any emergent situation. In 2013, on receiving the message that the Chinese were erecting tents near the Raki Nala, the immediate action was to dispatch our Ladakh Scout elements to the area. The three weeks long face of witnessed many Chinese soldiers being replaced due to illness, including common cold, cough and fever. The face of at approximately 15000 feet altitude included the performance of sentry duties by day and by night, irrespective of the weather and temperature conditions. Our Nunus were undeterred by any adversity, whether it was the operational conditions by night in that dark, erring pin drop silence or the bone chilling weather conditions prevalent, with not one falling sick or requiring relief. Their performance against all such odds was surely in the highest traditions of soldiering, under stressful operational conditions cupelled with high altitude survival and extreme cold.

Surely other regions having Scout bns would have had similar experiences. However, this narrative would confine itself to Ladakh Scouts and relate to the existing jostling between the Indian and the Chinese Army in Eastern Ladakh. Having witnessed the massive Chinese build up opposite the 826 kms of frontage in Eastern Ladakh, it would be fair to understand that additional forces have now become an operational imperative for this theatre. Since most of the Chinese formations that are tasked for Ladakh, have to transit over extremely long distances, sound and timely intelligence/surveillance inputs based on the area of interest of GOC 14 Corps/ Northern Army Commander must be ensured. This would facilitate in the timely move of additional resources from within and outside the northern theatre. Considering the possibility of a two front war, it may not be wise to expect too much from the integral resources of the Northern Army. Therefore, speedy induction of reserves over long and arduous land route from areas outside the command, would become time critical. In any case, the problem does not finish by moving and locating a division sized force at the designated location in Ladakh. To start with, strict and time consuming acclimatisation procedure has to be ensured, along with the provision of suitable habitat, routine administration and foolproof logistic support. All this is far easier said than done, especially in Ladakh, where the logistic chain from the plains is long, arduous, time critical and yet subject to weather and terrain disruptions. The land route is open for six odd months only, with air maintenance remaining the only source of replenishment at other times. However, in keeping with the present operational situation in Eastern Ladakh, there is a definite need for at least one additional infantry division placed on the orbat of 14 Corps, suitably located in Ladakh and dedicated for application in Eastern Ladakh. That apart, we must also have muscles to undertake offensive options available in the area. Timely launch of these operations by us, could foreclose many offensive options, otherwise available to the Chinese. Thus, the Mountain Strike Corps has to be revived, this time around with yet more additional forces on its orbat, making it a complete reality at the earliest.

It may be prudent to raise additional Ladakh Scout bns, thereby increasing their strength to a division worth of hardy ‘sons of the soil’ forming part of three/four infantry brigades, each comprising three bns. This formation should be permanently located in Ladakh, optimising operational requirements, reliable medical status of the troops, administrative and logistic ease. The formation should be raised as an Infantry Division with the primary task of holding ground and scouting role as the secondary requirement. They could be rechristened as ‘ The Ladakh Light Infantry’, if so desired!!! This would mitigate major operational and logistic problems related to the immediate availability of infantry reserves, which are fully acclimatised and ready for application. Relevant operational lessons from the ongoing actions with China in Eastern Ladakh would probably weigh heavily in favour of this modification in the force structure for Ladakh. Going a step further, Ladakhis could also be inducted into the Mechanised Forces. Considering the large mechanised elements that the Chinese have earmarked and this time physically inducted in Eastern Ladakh (primarily 4 Motorised and 6 Mechanised Divisions), there is little choice for us but to match up, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Mechanised Forces located in Ladakh could also be manned by the ‘sons of the soil’, thus cementing firm integration within the two fighting arms; infantry and armour, with little concern regarding their medical status! 

‘Sons of the soil’ can be expected to put in their utmost to defend the sacred soil of their homeland, thereby ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country.

JAI HIND.

Written by:

Revolution in Military affairs has prompted dynamic, and drastic changes in the ever evolving modern day warfare, necessitating the optimisation of the fleeting opportunities as and when they emerge. This facilitates the turn over of vintage technology, weapon systems, operational philosophy and force multipliers. The major factors which remain constant are our neighbours and the prevalent terrain.

The great Indian Army has been fighting a cross section of armies, world wide, over vastly varied terrain configurations ever since time immemorial. Recounting times from the First World War (1st WW) and the evolution of the “Tank”since the battle of Somme, a world wide realisation emerged on the significance of this fighting machine and thus commenced the vigorous, unannounced war to upgrade it technologically. 

Tank continued to emerge as a vibrant battle winning factor across the Second World War, Indo-Pak conflicts of 1947 ( crossing of Zozila ), 1965 and 1971. Employment of tanks was also witnessed in the battle of Chushul in Eastern Ladakh during 1962. After 1971 conflict, the operational performance of the Indian Armoured Corps was considered to be rather decent. Therefore over the next many years, tank holdings in the army saw a rapid increase not only in numbers but with technological upgrades as well. It was during this phase that we saw ideal combination of mobile resources being garnered to fight as a homogeneous Mechanised Force. In order to maintain  the desired operational balance between tanks and Infantry Combat Vehicles, many more such units were also raised. This gave a major numerical impetus to the Mechanised Forces (MF).

However, as time went by beyond 1990’s and we found ourselves well into 2k, without any war, where MF could be employed with impunity; is when the future of the MF started to be questioned within the army circles ! Well, it was certainly a logical doubt, which needed to be addressed. After all it was exorbitant to maintain the kind of mechanised fleet that we had, especially at a time, when the national focus and effort was primarily on fighting terror and maintaining vigil along the mountainous border regions, with secondary importance to the plains sector along the international border (IB) with Pakistan, where tanks possess a major role.  With this as the background, there was talk to divert a portion of the budgetary allocation from the MF to others within the army. Taking the argument further, it was being recommended that the numerical strength of the MF should be reduced and proportionately replaced by Armed Helicopters, which could be utilised by others as well !!!

Whenever, matters reach such a  magnitude, wherein ones sheer worth/existence becomes a suspect; is when humans fight back most vigorously. Clearly the MF had to Remain Relevant under the prevailing circumstances. There was no doubt that the mindset of armour commanders had to undergo a major change. The notion of operational employment and fighting only in the plains of the Punjab and the deserts of Rajasthan had to be shunned and alternatives derived and accepted. This was “easier said than done”. After all perceptions that had been conceived, improved and practiced over years, do take time to be reversed or even modified. Fortunately, timely acceptance to change the employment philosophy for MF to now include High Altitude Areas (HAA), further enhanced their role and task as a fighting force! Surely a few years later they are in the process of proving and physically exhibiting their RELEVANCE in the HAA of Sikkim and Eastern Ladakh.

It may be  surprising to note that large portion of the terrain in Eastern Ladakh is conducive for the employment of MF. Depsang plains ( altitude around 16000 feet) form the major portion of Aksai Chin and the expanse of this  high altitude plateau can accommodate a large quantum of Mechanised elements. The plateau is characterised with rocky outcrop, hills, small rivers, streams, valleys and defiles, facilitating the conduct of defensive battle. Study of the ground would indicate the likely avenues that can be exploited by the Mechanised elements of the adversary . The defender would need to occupy/hold dominating terrain features along these avenues, while MF would poise themselves in such a manner that they are able to deny the gaps/ defiles / bottlenecks  between the dominating features that the adversary may be attempting to exploit. In this process maximum destruction,delay and attrition would be caused to the adversary. This battle would be fought in conjunction with all combat support elements, anti tank weapon systems including Attack Helicopters. This narrative was written during the very early stages of the massive faceoff with the Chinese in eastern Ladakh. None the less, the operational scenario did develop in consonance with what has been stated above. The PLA had amassed one Motorised and one Mechanised Division apart from other forces in this area. Most fortunately, the ever efficient Border Roads Organisation (BRO), had already completed the strategic Darbuk-Daulat Beg Oldie… DBO road by then. Therefore the Indian army could manage to induct adequate Mechanised Forces in sub sector north (area DBO).

The other area suitable for Mechanised Forces runs from Chushul to Demchok . The valley floor in this area has a sprinkling of open spaces, which could be exploited by the defender by also employing Mechanised elements to fight a successful defensive battle. Irrespective of the fact that armour can not be employed in the classical manner in such terrain, however, it retains immense operational significance in order to achieve the desired results in battle. What could be more heartening to note that our medium tanks could manage to reach and deploy at heights in excess of 16000 feet, achieving complete surprise on the PLA, in operationally significant/ vital areas of Rezang La, Gurung hill/ Magar hill in the Chushul sector. There are a few other areas for MF in Eastern Ladakh, which need not be discussed here. The employment of armour in North Sikkim follows similar operational philosophy.

Much has been discussed on the necessity of a light tank, which would provide the additional advantage in terms of undertaking strategic mobility with far greater ease and reduced logistic support. However, discussion on this aspect is beyond the scope of this narrative. In any case, what stands out most clearly is the fact that own medium tanks have performed rather well during the most challenging times in eastern Ladakh. Never the less, it is important to note that apart from high altitude areas, the additional employment avenues that should also be undertaken by MF include Out of Area contingencies, Amphibious Warfare and pertinent employment in the valleys of NE India. That would further enhance the RELEVANCE scale for the MF in times ahead.

The era of tanks is destined to see endless moons in years ahead, remaining a source of inspiration for young cavaliers, reminding them off the sweat and blood that generations of cavalrymen sacrificed toiling in the quest to not only remain relevant, but retain its position as the battle winning factor.

JAI HIND.

About The Author

Lt Gen Rajan Bakhshi, PVSM, UYSM, ADC is a former General Officer Commanding of the Leh based 14 Corps and handled the face off with the Chinese in 2013. He retired as General Officer Commanding in Chief, Central Army.

The nation remembers the 1999 conflict with Pakistan so very vividly because the media could provide live coverage from the front line in people’s bedrooms, located hundreds of miles away. That was the technology aided service at the time. Today technology supported media coverage is identifying geographical landmarks and superimposing force levels on the satellite imagery covering the Chinese transgressions in Eastern Ladakh. With such levels of transparency in near real time reporting, not much can remain hidden for long.

One vividly remembers the time close to mid-day on 15 April 2013, when I was informed about the Chinese transgression at Raki Nala in the Depsang sector. No sooner than we had finished with all the immediate military counter measures and reporting drills, that we started feeling the weight and glare of the Indian media! Since the area of the transgression was located in the “No Thoroughfare” zone for civilians, media was not permitted to go beyond Leh. Many reporters who arrived at Leh, despite knowing this, had to be picked up at the airport itself and lodged in hotels. Well, this in no way mellowed their enthusiasm, zeal and zest. Imagine, viewing the television in your office as the Corps Commander in Leh and observe the media claiming live coverage from forward areas which were placed out of bounds for them. They were showing old video clips of army convoy movement including artillery guns being staged forward etc. Surely this was news to me and my Headquarters, handling the situation!!! Well that was as far as the national coverage was concerned!

Reports on the Chinese transgression in the Pangong Tso, Galwan valley and Hot Spring areas had been confirmed. However, the reporting on the existing operational situation in the Galwan valley by our media had an enormous variation…the pendulum swing was just too wide and erratic without substantiation.
It may not be out of context to state that the Chinese are capable of starting a conflict with reasons and logic that suits them. Therefore, most are kept guessing on their motives and intentions. Whatever be their aim for the present adventure, they surely have a far bigger agenda this time around.
The standoff in 2013 for instance was localised with limited troops. There was no aggression from either side, despite soldiers from the two armies standing guard merely 50 meters apart, by day and by night at an altitude of approximately 16000 ft. above mean sea level. I would like to state with soldierly pride that our troops faired far better, mentally, emotionally and physically. Unlike them, we never had men falling sick with cold, cough and fever. Nor did we exhibit fear of being ambushed at night, unlike their search lights which lit the sky for most part of the night! However, the bonhomie at the battalion level between us was heartening and reassuring. Surely my battalion commanders could ask for a meeting at the BPM hut at any time of the day or night and it was always honoured. I remember the call that night when something which was considered rather important at Delhi was required from the Chinese at 2.30 am. The Chinese battalion commander did honour our request with the desired urgency.
This time with the multiple transgressions, large strength of troops, weapon resources, creation of infrastructure including defence works and above all the brutal physical offensiveness that has been glaring and most disturbing. It may be prudent to deduce that this time the Chinese motive is an amalgam of military and diplomatic issues.

There have been a large number of learned individuals who have applied their minds to determine the likely Chinese intent for their present aggressiveness. Thus a large number of military, diplomatic and geo strategic issues have been quoted by scores of commentators. Irrespective of these, we should be absolutely clear in our mind that the big bully with a straight expressionless face should not be permitted to have its way this time around. Enough is enough and we need to understand that “hearts of heart “the dragon respects a strong opponent, while the weak ones are bullied at will.

There are distinct areas in Eastern Ladakh which can be exploited by the Chinese with offensive intent. All these avenues commence from the Western Highway (NH 129), located further East of the LAC.

Area Sub Sector North (SSN). Daulat Beg Oldie and the Karakoram Pass are location in this sector. Known as the Depsang plains, the area is a high altitude plateau with average height of 16000 feet, however is conducive for the employment of Mechanised Forces.

Area South of Depsang and North of Pangong Tso. Characterised by narrow ingress valleys along small rivers/ nalas which meet the Shyok. These include Galwan, Raki etc. The confluence of Galwan with Shyok is vital and needs to be held with adequate strength, failing which the Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road can get threatened by ready domination and may thus cut off the land route to SSN. Sasoma-Murgo road is likely to be a distant expectation.

 Area Pangong Tso- Lukung. Fingers 1 to 8 are located on the Northern banks of the lake and the road along this bank starts from Finger 5 and runs East wards to meet the Western Highway.

Area Chushul- Dungti – Demchok.

The Chinese had come with requisite preparations and now seem to have attained their tactical objectives at the Pangong Tso, leaving them with no hurry to restore status quo ante. Sirijap was lost by us in 1962, now they are claiming till Finger 5. Such nibbling of our territory has been carrying on since years. Areas North of the lake are sensitive to them due to the ingress routes coming to these areas along roads and tracks emanating from the Western Highway. This time they have fortified their defences sited on dominating Finger heights. Evicting them would mean paying rather heavily for favourable results, thus the situation could well result in a new status quo/ realigned LAC. Surely we seem to be in for a long haul.

The dragon has now got used to defying the laid down rules of engagement involving international protocols, thereby keeps changing its stance unilaterally, even in cases where formal negotiations and agreements had been reached. Galwan, for instance had never been disputed ever earlier and they are now claiming it to be theirs! It is high time that we put an end to such deplorable behaviour, unmindful of the cost.

In any case we should continue with our infrastructure development as planned. Darbuk- Shyok-DBO road is the life line for our troops in the SSN and must be completed soonest. Feeder roads going towards the LAC could always wait for a while. Technology to tackle perma frost has to be procured and Sasoma- Murgo axis completed. Vital road axes which are venerable to interdiction should be provided the requisite protection, even if certain areas have to be physically held. The criticality lies in the timely induction of Our Forces earmarked for SSN including Mechanised Forces. Building up own forces in other areas of Eastern Ladakh is not as challenging as the one for SSN.

Unified Intelligence inputs are essential for such formations, including aerial, space and ground based resources which complement the desired area coverage for timely decision making. We may need to re-examine our operational philosophy to include the desired force levels to be maintained for physical occupation of vital areas and these should be placed on the orbit of this formation .

It may not be prudent to necessarily fight the enemy every time you encounter him. At times it may be better to exercise the Quid Pro Quo(QPQ) option. Therefore, QPQ can be undertaken in pre-selected options in Eastern Ladakh or even in the Central/ Eastern sectors in response to the present Chinese adventurism. Considering that the Chinese are creating turbulence for many nations around the world, it may be time for a collective economic boycott which should accrue overwhelming consequences for her. This would need widespread cooperation around the globe since the Chinese economy is the second largest in the world and growing.

Finally we must settle for status quo ante as it existed in end April 2020. Proud to notice the national unity, fervour, steadfastness and the offensive intent. Let’s not forget the political constraints and allied compulsions in a democracy as compared to the communist system of governance.

JAI HIND

Authored by Lt Gen Rajan Bakhshi, PVSM, UYSM, ADC

Former GOC, 14 Corps

The only armoured corps general to have been fortunate to command this prestigious formation ever since it’s raising, over 20 years ago. He was the corps commander during the 2013 faceoff with the Chinese at Raki Nala in the Depsang Plains.

It was in early 1988, that one received posting orders to a Brigade Headquarters (Bde Hq) located in High Altitude Area (HAA) in Arunachal Pradesh (Eastern India). Looking forward to a different lifestyle in the mountains, one reported at Palam Air Force Station, Delhi with high spirits, to board the Guwahati bound Indian Air Force(IAF) courier flight(flt). A courier flt is definitely a unique experience. Since these transport aircrafts (acs) are primarily designed for load carriage, they do not have seating like the commercial acs. Therefore, we were loaded into the ac as if a herd of cattle! The powerful ac engines were deafening even inside the ac, not that anyone in the herd was keen to strike a conversation…most seemed to be reminiscing the lovely time that they had just spent with their families/ loved ones. Sitting on bench like seats, in a row, along the length of the ac, many were faking a brave front, with their hearts aching within! The windows in the ac were too high even for a seven-footer, thus nobody could look outside! Probably keeping us in such confinement was a novel way to make people forget the sojourn that they had just finished at home!

Soon one had reached Tawang (approx 10′,000 feet) and after the requisite acclimatization, ‘huffing and puffing’ set off on foot for the Bde Hq, a days walk in HAA! Being a tankman, the slippery soil found in this area added much to my discomfort, however, one had to continue and maintain pace with the others, lest one’s physical fitness level became a suspect! In any case, whenever one saw a mule on the ground or a helicopter flying overhead during the long and arduous walk, my mind would grumble on the perceived poor reception arrangements made for me!

The Chinthe Bde was located near the tri-junction between India, China and Bhutan. The initial battles during the Indo-China conflict of 1962 in the Namka Chu-Dhola-Hathungla-Tsangdhar sector were fought right here… in this rugged, isolated, desolate and freezing mountainous terrain. Infact, it was after 25 years of the conflict, that the Indian Army had returned and re-occupied areas lost in 1962. Ofcourse, this time around, essentials in terms of personnel clothing, arms, ammunition, equipment, habitat and logistics were well planned and diligently executed.

Lumpo, was the location of Brig Dalvi’s Bde Hq in 1962, and so was the Chinthe Bde Hq located here in 1987. The Chinthe Bde was fortunate to have then Brig(later Lt Gen) BS Malik, from 3/5 Gorkha Rifles at the helm. A born leader, with extremely high mental and physical endurance levels, he always led from the front setting personal example. Our boss had a large heart and appreciated the hard work being put in by all ranks, under most trying conditions. There were days when due to inadequate rations, humans had to be fed with only boiled rice and tinned egg powder omelettes and the mules with bamboo shoots! Thus he had most aptly named the Bde area as the ”Siachen of the East”…personifying the degree of difficulty in the serving conditions.

In those days the entire Brigade, including the Bde Hq was air maintained (there were no roads in the bde sector). Lumpo had two helipads and a Dropping Zone (DZ), a designated area on ground where the supply loads supported with parachutes are expected to land after having been ejected from an ac. The barracks for habitat were constructed with tin sheet roofs and light weight wooden planks (Jolly Boards) for walls. Therefore no communication means were required to speak with our neighbors, since normal pitched voice could well do the job! Little imagination would thus be required to visualise the thundery conditions in the living quarters after a dinner of preservative loaded, gas forming, tinned food!

Lumpo DZ was located along a spur jutting out towards the swift flowing Namjang Chu(river) below, with steep drops on the sides. Incase those vintage acs did not release the load in time, the priceless essential supplies would render irretrievably, having fallen hundreds of feet below the DZ. On this particular day, somehow we had lost a fair amount of load. It was then decided that on a trial basis, the army would position an officer at a vantage point to guide the pilot about the release of the load, through the radio. Fortunately for me, the winds were not that strong and 90 percent of the loads dropped within the DZ! There after, whenever the aerial drops were scheduled, one had an office free time, making radio calls to the pilot while basking in the sun with coffee and snacks at hand! The overall losses had since been minimised!

It was an early morning call from my Airforce friend located at Tawang, who had the task of flying logistic sorties in support of the Army. He inquired on whether one was desirous of accompanying him on logistic sorties planned for other areas that day. It was a good opportunity to reconnoiter those far flung areas, where one would never be able to go otherwise. He promising to drop me back after lunch. The helicopter (heptr) landed on schedule, unloaded cargo for Lumpo and we flew back to Tawang to reload for the next sortie scheduled for Mago. The MI 17 heptr had the tail portion of the body floor cover removed for parachute drops, providing a clear view of the ground below. On appropriate distance from Mago DZ, the heptr started a gradual descent. I was looking out at the scenery below, when all of a sudden we got caught in an air pocket and the heptr fell a few hundred feet like a stone. With a horrific and panic stricken look, one saw the ground approaching at such a rapid pace that it surely was time for us to say our final prayers! After a few seconds the trees on the ground seemed ever so close, however, we stabilised just in time and managed to recover. Having minuscule flying hours to my credit, one was surely shaken up to the last bone and cursed myself to have accepted the joy ride offer! Never again was the pledge!

Some where in 1988-89, the then Indian Prime Minister(PM) was visiting China for the first time after 1962 operations. Around noon on this bright sunny day, one of our forward posts, having a clear view of the Chinese side, reported that Mr Rajiv Gandhi along with Mrs Sonia Gandhi had landed at a forward Chinese post located in close vicinity. Enumeration on the details of the 15 minutes spent at the post were also spelt out. Since none of our other posts could see this area, the information could not be emergently verified from another source. However, such important information is immediately and simultaneously reported up the chain of command, including the Army Hq in Delhi, and so was this. Within minutes there were massive fire works in the divisional Hq at Tawang! The information passed was bogus with blatant lies, as the PM having concluded his visit to China, had already returned to Delhi the previous day! The official inquiry revealed that someone junior at the post, had master minded this uniqueness, just for fun! …the young man had a lot of answering to do thereafter!

At last we had received the much awaited permission to advance beyond Hathung La and physically clear bunkers at the forward posts including Dhola. Thus we would become the first ever to revisit the area where Namka Chu battles were gallantly fought by our troops against heavy odds. Those were extremely nostalgic and emotional moments, when we first set our eyes on those historic bunkers, that had been constructed by our troops in 1962 (almost 25 years ago). They had accomplished this task with minimum resources and time, occupying them later with grossly inadequate ammunition/fire power, obsolete equipment and summer clothing to fight the overwhelming Chinese offensive. The standard of construction and fortification of the bunkers were simply demonstrative. All the skeletons were extracted with utmost respect and honour. The most striking and proud REALITY IN ALL THE BUNKERS WAS THAT NONE OF THE SKELETONS HAD THEIR BACK TOWARDS THE ENEMY. THEY WERE ALL FACING THE ENEMY … HAVING LAID DOWN THEIR LIVES WHILE FIGHTING TILL THE VERY END.

During the Indo-China war of 1962, the Victor and the Vanquished could be identified effortlessly. However, when all the skeletons were collected and were being given the much deserved military funeral by the Indian Army, the Chinese Army located in visual distance across the valley, were seen reversing their arms as well, in honour of the fallen Indian soldiers. These are the gracious virtues which the military service bestows on the uniformed lot, always thanked God for having blessed me to be part of this great lot!

This narration is a tribute to our then Cdr, Brig BS Malik, the great soldier, who had paved the way for future generations by relaying the foundation in the reoccupied historic war zone, which was testimony to the fierce battles that were fought in 1962. However, we were struck with immense grief, when we lost Lt Gen BS Malik in March 2019, all in a flash. Our prayers for you to rest in eternal peace, Sir.

Written By

Lt Gen Rajan Bakhshi, PVSM, UYSM,ADC

Former GOC in C, Central Army

The practice of successive family generations adopting the same profession stands applicable across a wide spectrum, with the Indian Army probably topping the list in achieving the generation lineage with organisational pride. After all, the army proudly thrives on its legacy and traditions with regimental/army bonhomie and the extended family spirit.

When my father, himself a veteran third generation cavalier, inquired from his three sons on their choice of profession, it was only myself who had elected to don the admirable army uniform. Of course, one major consideration that clinched the deal in my case, was the mistaken belief that this would mark the end of books and studies! Even though my brothers were doing very well in the corporate world, some how, my parents visible pride in my uniform established me as their favourite, probably being easier to identify themselves with a fauzi!

Well, tide and time waits for no one and soon I was due to complete almost 20 years of service in the army. Obviously, we could not have asked for a better life style than what we had been relishing in the army for all these years. Back in late 1990s, this was the length of service when selection to the rank of Colonel was undertaken. After a stringent selection process, those who stood approved, not only put on Colonels rank but also assumed Command of a unit having over 500/600 men and others. Infact there were times when, the ULTIMATE desire that a commissioned officer always harbored in his heart, was to become a Commanding Officer one day. All ranks above that were considered as ‘bonus‘.

With this ultimate desire in mind, one had been working hard all along and did feel that one had been performing adequately well. However, these ambitions took a rather awful beating, when a friend, who was known to be ‘well informed’ on selection result matters spoke to me. His candid advise to me was to ”relax”, since one was not expected to measure up to the desired selection standards! We were now like a punctured balloon, which had little chance of being airborne again!!! There surely was gloominess that had set into our lives, not withstanding the confident smiling faces that we were projecting! That is when my father stepped in to advise us that”what ever god does, is always for ones good/has a silver lining.”

It was after many moons in 1995 that heartfelt gaiety and enthusiasm re-emerged into our lives, when the declassified selection results stood in my favour!!! It was a dream come true story that was soon to unfold for us at Hisar Military Station(HMS)(township approx 150 km West of Delhi), where one would assume Command of an Armoured Regiment.

The nominated day arrived and with much fanfare, ones life time ambition of attaining command was fulfilled. My regiment had some how remained far away from the main stream theatre for Mechanised formations, having been stationed in an isolated area in the North East. However, HMS was enormous in size and had a large number of units and higher Headquarters located within the premises. Therefore unlike earlier times, we now found ourselves in the show window, much against our wishes ofcourse!!!

All units in the Indian Army comprise of three basic blocks …officers, junior commissioned officers (JCOs) and jawans. At the unit level, apart from the commanding officer(CO) and his second in command, the rest of the officers and JCOs form part of the junior leadership that leads the jawans and executes the assigned task. The junior leadership in my regiment was extremely spirited and deeply conscientious, however, this young profile of officers and JCOs were inexperienced in their present appointments.

Sub unit commanders are officers who are the prime executives in a unit. In those days their average service profile in other units was around 15 /16 years. However, our unit profile was just about half this service length! Such situations do emerge in units due to the cyclic rotation of officers in varied assignments over the years. As if that was not enough; during the first few months of my command, almost 65 percent of our experienced JCOs proceeded on retirement. This large void was now being filled by intelligent, hardworking and committed junior leaders. They would also mushroom to become our assets, however, after increased experience and expertise over a period of time. All units in our army have almost similar stock of jawans, who hail from rural India. Therefore, unit proficiency and performance has a lot to do with unit ethos and the standard of leadership.

On arrival in HMS, we were initially allotted old barrack type accommodation(accn), where we learnt to co-exist with white ants, snakes, scorpions, deer and blue bulls! However, soon we were shifted to permanent (read modern) accommodation spread over a large area . Though comfort and civilized status had increase manifold, however, the work load to settle down as the’first occupants’ was certainly an uphill task…although it was accomplished meticulously.

After a while when our immediate boss visited my regiment, he seemed rather pleased with the flowers and the well manicured lawns. He was particularly impressed with the tulips, complimenting me twice, saying ”lovely tulips”…to which I acknowledged most confidently and thanked him… I would truthfully admit that my knowledge on flowers at the time was dismal. At lunch, I mentioned this to my wife, who had helped us plan the regimental flower plantation. She seemed astonished, since there were no Tulips planted anywhere in the unit area! I was now on unsure grounds and waffling but managed to describe the flowers that had been referred to by the boss. ”Oh those ones… ofcourse they are Californian Poppies”. Surely another flower(apart from the Rose) had now been added to my wisdom…that much also for my immediate boss and the world of flowers!

Infact, our big boss ( General Officer Commanding ) was an illustrious soldier with immense foresight, brilliance, incisive thought process and unlimited physical/mental endurance. His overall aim was to have the formation ‘ready for war at all times’. Thus the focus remained on equipment status/state of readiness, timely and smooth execution of battle procedures and drills, apart from professional knowledge and effective leadership at various levels. In order to achieve the aim ‘quantification standards’ were formulated for all activities that were related to battlefield readiness. Now started the fun, when all sub units and units were scanned through the quantification model, marks totaled and ranking ascertained.

Due to the young leadership profile, one realised that we would have to work rather hard to aspire for a better ranking. However, training is a gradual and a graduated process, which is time and effort consuming. Therefore during the first year of such validation, we kept failing in our endeavors and there was lots to be desired in our performance in competitive events. My bosses were visibly upset and one did receive stern counselling ‘off and on’, since they seemed to be loosing patience. Somehow, despite the low success rate, we did not lose heart and kept the morale high…retaining the confidence that success shall kiss us one day!

The greatest silver lining in those gloomy days was that my regiment was a well knit outfit, which only needed ‘path finding’ to achieve success. My officers led from the front with personal example; grooming the young junior leadership, honing professional skills, motivating the men and ensuring proficiency in the execution of battle procedures and drills. There was complete and absolute unity of purpose at the unit level, with each and every one working hard to achieve the best results.

The busy schedule kept us unmindful of the passing time, till one day after 11 months, when we tasted our very first success with top honours in an important professional competition after many many months. My unit was overwhelmed with joy and their countenance was vibrant with increased self confidence, esteem and heaving with pride. One could sense the psychological ascendancy that success had infused into my pack. I knew that after having ‘tasted blood’ in the form of success, my boys would want to taste it more often!

Soon the second training year commenced and the spate of validations re-commenced. Till now we were considered to be in the category of those who ‘also ran’. It was not long that this equation started taking a steep turn in our favour, much to the dismay of many, who were considered favorites in most of the competitive events. The going had been indeed ‘very tough’ ever since the beginning of my command tenure. However, the tough managed to get going!!! Fruits reaped with sustained and immense hard work under trying conditions, some how remain etched in ones mind for years on end. With the joint effort of all ranks, my regiment had measured up to the high professional standards and brought us glory and pride!

Thus terminated the much awaited life time desire of regimental command... surely there were no regrets!!!

EKTA MAAN VEERTA

Written By :-

Lt Gen Rajan Bakhshi, PVSM, UYSM, ADC

Veteran

Former GOC in C, Central Army

The hierarchical rank structure in the Indian Armed Forces is extremely steep, thus climbing each step is an immense feat in itself. However the ascend to ranks at dizzy heights at the top of the pyramid, is possible not just with ones professional acumen but also needs sparkling luck and divine blessings…the difference in merit between contenders can even go down to the third decimal! The selected lot continue to remain in the ‘rat race’, now hoping for a favorable placement for their next assignment!

The positive news regarding my promotion board results arrived while we were offering prayers at a Japanese temple in Darjeeling( East India)! We thanked God for the kindness and were eagerly looking forward to the next assignment. Soon rumour mongering about the placement of the approved lot to various Corps Headquarters commenced. Most of the indicators for me were pointing towards Leh, which was rather surprising for a tankman like myself! Rumours were also rife that slots which were most suited for a tankman were infact being assigned to those who had their domain competence in mountain warfare, fair enough to achieve interoperatability within the Army. One can not comment on others but the rumours in my case turned out to be ‘bang on’!

There was ofcourse the initial dilemma in ones mind regarding my placement, since the assignment did not facilitate me to draw upon my domain specialisation, hence it did not figure in my comfort zone as well! However, soon after having assumed command, only my soul can vouch on how sincerely one thanked God for bestowing this rare honour of Commanding this prestigious and mighty formation, deployed in one of the most challenging operational environment on earth.

In order to achieve the overall military Objective in the Corps Zone, it is an operational imperative to achieve seamless integration of all the resources and stake holders on the orbat of the Corps. One was extremely proud to observe the outstanding contribution that each arm and service had rendered, thus would illustrate a few with examples.

Acclimatization for all inductees into High Altitude Area (HAA) should be followed strictly, as one did witness fatal cases, when this was ignored. In any case once the human body gets acclimatized to the rarefied air, life becomes far more normal and enjoyable (a game of tennis in late afternoons became a routine affair, after requisite acclimatization!). Infact, flying in non pressurised helicopters(heptrs) at those dizzy heights while visiting troops deployed in the vast expanse of Ladakh’s super HAA (suitably equipped with oxygen bottles, which need to be consumed at regular intervals on mandatory basis!), commenced only on completing acclimatization. There was never a problem thereafter.

The Indian Army comprises of troops from the length and breath of our country. Irrespective of where the soldier hails from…the vast Indian Coastline, Island Territories, sprawling Thar Desert or the ever humid rain forests; all soldiers are given equal opportunity to serve in all the terrain configurations existing in the Indian sub continent, including such inhospitable high altitude areas. Not withstanding that, ‘it is only to see and believe’ the cheerfulness with which our jawans readily accept and adapt to difficult, varied and grave conditions. The sheer thrill of visiting and having a glass of tea with these ever robust, confident and professionally competent jawans deployed at altitudes around 20,000 feet, surely fills ones heart with immense pride and deep gratitude.

The tiny Cheetha heptr and later the ALH, were force multipliers of a rare kind, with flights that facilitated us in executing operational tasks ranging from communications, supply to isolated posts and casualty evacuation(cas evac). Due to strong wind conditions that set in the area, heptr flying used to cease at noon. Having its own helipad, the Garrison Hospital at Leh is located across the road from the Flag Staff House. Thus, sound of the heptr engine in the afternoon always got me concerned, as the sortie could not have been any other than a cas evac one…human life was always too precious. Our extremely committed aviators, who were already operating in one of the most difficult/hazardous flying conditions, always went beyond the call of duty, when human life was at stake.

Due to the isolation and difficult accessibility to posts, a large number of young and extremely committed Army doctors/ Nursing Assistants are deployed at these posts. Their sheer presence is always a great morale booster for the men. I remember of a doctor who was deployed at 18,000 feet and had refused to go on leave for his sisters wedding, expressing that his presence at the post was far more vital, than in Kerala! Some how, the situation regarding the availability of doctors at the time had made it difficult to organise for his relief. However, as soon as one got wind of this, we managed a relief and had this doctor brought down to base in a special heptr sortie, for onward dispatch to Kerala !!!

Construction and Maintenance of roads in these areas is an herculean task that is undertaken by the Border Roads Organisation. They had constructed and now maintain the highest motorable road in the world which crosses Khardung La at over 18000 feet. Heart goes out to the men and the civilian labour that works tirelessly, unmindful of snow, altitude and the biting cold conditions to facilitate our troops.

Maintenance of logistic support for the formation is certainly a nightmare. The two road axes(through Zoji La and Rohtang) remain closed for almost six months, due to very heavy snow accumulation. In anycase, even during fair weather conditions, these extremely lengthy road axes remain subjected to landslides and other disruptions. Thus the aerial route gains utmost importance during the non functional period of the surface means. Our Air Force friends cannot be thanked enough for their relentless and extraordinary efforts, in ensuring the priceless resupply of essentials for the Army. This reminds me of a particular Saturday in 2012, when we were facing an emergency for certain supply items for posts in Siachen. The IAF boss in Udhampur proved the fact that he was indeed ‘a call away’, as the very next day … a Sunday, they flew in the maximum number of sorties that are possible within one day!!! Such jointmanship keeps the lamp burning at the most arduous spot in Ladakh.

‘Tide and time waits for no one”, soon my tenure was drawing to an end. However, despite the steep learning curve that one had been subjected to, it did seem that the cherry on the cake was yet to be put! The dawn of 15 April 2013 was no different from other days in Leh. Bright sunshine and calm winds prompted an impromptu Sunday cricket match between the Corps Hq team and the rest of the Leh military garrison. Sometime close to noon, one was informed that a routine Chinese foot patrol which had been taking this particular route since months, had suddenly halted on our side of the LAC and was in the process of pitching tents to lodge their soldiers. This was indeed a very serious occurrence and pertinent emergent measures were duly undertaken from our side… thus started the three weeks long ‘stand off ‘with the Chinese at over 16,000 feet. It was a rare experience with immense learning value for any soldier, leave alone a tankman like me!!! It was not long till ‘hell broke loose’ and our Army telephones had started buzzing almost non-stop.

Obviously, with a national security situation of this magnitude at hand, our Army Chief, Army Commander and many others wanted to hear immediately…first hand information on the operational situation on-ground. Blessed were we to have bosses like Lt. Gen. KT Parnaik as our Army Commander and General Bikram Singh as the Army Chief, to successfully see through the long ordeal.

Three weeks is a long time when soldiers from two different armies stand guard, facing each other at a distance of approx 15 to 20 meters. The following issues merit sharing:-

(a) Both the armies exercised restrain and did not exhibit hostility at the ‘stand off’ site. However, the Chinese seemed extremely insecure about their security/safety during the hours of darkness

(b) The official meetings at the LAC between the two sides were cordial and in conformity with high military traditions

(c) Our men at the ‘stand off’ site demonstrated a far fitter/ tougher mental and physical profile, despite the freezing cold conditions. Surely ‘sons of the soil’ concept adopted by the Indian Army was a shot in the right direction!…ever proud of our Scouts.

The Fire and Fury Corps has undertaken innumerable welfare projects for the civilian population in Ladakh. That apart, the Army has been assisting the civil administration in times of severe natural disasters and has thereby won the confidence of the people. One can state with confidence that there are many civil activities in Ladakh which flourish only because of close Army support.

Ladakh, the holy land of the Lamas, is reflective of purity, calmness and serenity. Its beauty and enchantment is simply unique and awfully overwhelming. On the other hand, one could not have drawn greater professional satisfaction, pride and military elan, without the reigns of 14 Corps; which in turn offered me the rare opportunity to grasp and feel the uniqueness of the environment.

Reflecting back on times gone by, one realizes the meaning / importance of ‘divine blessings’ ; which came my way in the form of LADAKH WITH THE FIRE AND FURY CORPS.

Written by:-

Lt. Gen. Rajan Bakhshi, PVSM, UYSM, ADC

Veteran

Former General Officer Commanding, The Fire and Fury Corps