The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has revived Mao Zedong’s doctrines of “people’s war” and “protracted war,” transforming them into an economic and political strategy to mobilize society, build global coalitions, and wage a long struggle against the United States.
This year is the 80th anniversary of what the CCP claims as its victory in what it calls the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression” (1931–1945) and the “World Anti-Fascist War.” It also marks the final phase in the drive to achieve the centenary goals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2027, a milestone the Party frames around “harnessing the core strengths of a ‘people’s war’ and mobilizing the people for just causes.”
The Maoist principle of “people’s war” holds that the strength of an army lies in the people rather than in weapons. Historically, the CCP relied on civilian mobilization, militias, and guerrilla tactics to overcome better-equipped adversaries, from the Japanese occupation to the Korean War. This doctrine became the foundation of the PLA’s combat effectiveness, emphasizing that mass participation could offset technological disadvantages.
The CCP and its current leader, Xi Jinping, repurposed the “people’s war” principle to justify China’s COVID-19 lockdowns and now apply it to trade, casting the United States as the new enemy in place of World War II Japan. State media have similarly urged the public to revisit Mao’s 1938 essay “On Protracted War” as guidance for enduring a long struggle, warning against defeatism or hopes of a quick victory.
Since taking office in 2012, Xi has repeatedly invoked Mao’s work, with state media outlet Beijing Daily likening U.S. tariffs to a hammer and cautioning that compromise would only embolden Washington. The CCP frames “people’s war” and “protracted war” as foundations for prevailing in a prolonged struggle, extending beyond military conflict to economic, political, and societal domains, and calls on the state, businesses, academia, and citizens alike to align behind common objectives.
Some Chinese authors have redefined protracted war in economic terms, linking it to long-term planning, five-year strategies, and national development goals. In practice, this plays out less as open warfare and more as “protracted competition,” where Beijing pursues incremental advantages through technological development, economic resilience, and “gray zone” coercive activities that stop short of open conflict. This approach sidesteps large-scale battles while gradually shifting the balance of power.
Maoist concepts are employed not only as external signaling but also for internal mobilization, reinforcing ideological unity under Xi. Within this framing, the trade war is cast as “a test of national strategic resilience” between China and the United States, echoing the “people’s war” doctrine of endurance and persistence. Chinese strategic writings emphasize confidence that, as long as the policies are correct, time is on the CCP’s side and that China is prepared to face challenges.
The CCP has expanded Mao’s wartime principle of mobilizing militias and civilians against Japan into an economic strategy in which the entire nation—including the state, companies, and workers—contributes to building the economy, boosting exports, and competing with the United States. Much like a wartime autocracy directing all resources, the Party insists that it should play an active role in supporting enterprises affected by the trade war through special financing, employment, and other policy support.
This embodies state-market integration, through which government coordination fuses with market mechanisms to achieve strategic goals, mirroring the “people’s war” emphasis on mobilizing all of society under a unified command.
Just as Chinese partisans once relied on asymmetric tactics against Japan’s modern military, the CCP now emphasizes asymmetric methods in economic competition. It casts China as David and the United States as Goliath, acknowledging that China’s gross domestic product is only about two-thirds that of the United States while conceding U.S. superiority in research and development. To offset this imbalance, Beijing highlights its strengths in industrial application and market penetration and relies on its vast domestic market, manufacturing capacity, and state coordination to avoid competing on purely market terms.
Wartime self-reliance is now framed in economic terms through the CCP’s “dual circulation” strategy, which seeks to reduce foreign dependence and strengthen domestic technological development. China seeks to take over the high-tech markets no longer dominated by the United States, the European Union, and Japan, aiming to achieve technological independence and secure critical industries. In parallel, China exploits its dominance in global supply chains as a form of leverage, much like guerrilla forces using terrain advantages to offset conventional inferiority.
As part of the “people’s war” emphasis on coalition-building against a superior adversary, the CCP positions itself as the leader of the Global South, extending the concept beyond China to the international arena. Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Wang Yi, have urged BRICS nations to unite against U.S. protectionism, portraying China as the defender of the common interests of the vast majority of countries in the world, particularly those of the BRICS and the Global South.
Alongside bloc-building, Beijing seeks the moral high ground, portraying the CCP as a so-called responsible and benevolent world power while casting the United States as a selfish agent of chaos. Beijing promotes China as an accountable country by claiming to implement measures such as strict drug control policies and support international trade systems. This parallels the “people’s war” principle of winning “hearts and minds” on a global scale.
Ultimately, the CCP is drawing on Mao’s concepts of “people’s war” and “protracted war,” applying strategic patience, comprehensive mobilization, asymmetric competition, and coalition-building to wage economic warfare against the United States.
