We do not have enough evidence to conclude that Jonathan Powell’s action on China had murky motivations.
But it is interesting to analyse Powell’s history in light of the CCP’s well studied programme of elite capture.
In Hidden Hand (Hamilton & Ohlberg, 2020), “elite capture” describes how the CCP cultivates influential Western figures, politicians, business leaders, diplomats, academics, to shape discourse and policy from within democratic systems.
Rather than overt coercion, it works through access, prestige, and networks: invitations to high-level dialogues, flattering exchanges, and mutually beneficial “Track II” diplomacy, all designed to make cooperation with Beijing seem natural and non-threatening.
A lot of research documents how united front organisations (like the China–U.S. Exchange Foundation, CPAFFC, or think tanks aligned with the Party’s foreign-affairs system) provide the platforms and funding for these relationships, often blurring lines between state and “civil” society.
Against that backdrop: since 2023, Powell has repeatedly engaged with Grandview Institution (国观智库) — a Beijing think tank tied to PRC policy circles — and with Inter Mediate, his UK-based mediation NGO.
Aug 2023 – Beijing:
Visited Grandview Institution, met former ambassador Cui Tiankai and PLA general Chen Xiaogong.
Mar 2024 – Peking University:
Gave a talk on conflict mediation with Stephen Biegun at PKU’s Institute of International and Strategic Studies.
Mar 2024 – Beijing:
Visited Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) with Grandview and Inter Mediate teams.
Sept 2024 – Beijing:
Chaired the 1st U.S.–China Strategic Stability Dialogue hosted by Grandview (co-organised with Inter Mediate).
Apr 2025 – London:
Met Grandview delegation at Inter Mediate office to plan next China-U.S. dialogue.
Apr 2025 – Jiaxing, Zhejiang:
Joined the 2nd Strategic Stability Dialogue, co-hosted by Grandview and CUSEF (a United Front-linked group).
This is textbook terrain for elite capture: high-prestige Western interlocutors convening dialogues that project mutual understanding while normalising CCP-approved framings like “strategic stability,” “win–win cooperation,” etc.
In elite-capture theory, the key isn’t corruption, it’s agenda control. The CCP doesn’t need to “buy” elites; it just needs them to internalise Beijing’s preferred narratives and help neutralise criticism from within their own systems.
To be clear: there’s no public evidence Powell accepted funding from the CCP or its affiliates. But the pattern, repeated PRC-hosted dialogues with UF-linked entities, fits the Hidden Hand model of “socialising” and capturing elites, subtly coaxing them towards a posture more amenable to the Party State.