United Kingdom: Opaque research ties, hidden CCP influence at the expense of a large Chinese student diaspora
by Tau Yang • China Strategic Risk Institute
The UK hosts one of the world’s most reputable higher education sectors. With a strong emphasis on world-class research and international partnerships, the academic rigor and global prestige of British universities have attracted students and collaborations from around the world.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of the UK’s most important academic partners, second only to the United States in the number of co-authored publications with British universities. This relationship is supported by a complex network of institutional and individual research collaborations, which notably accelerated during the “golden era” of UK-China relations in the 2010s. Government-funded programs such as the £200 million UK-China Research and Innovation Partnership Fund have further cemented this collaboration.
Concerns about UK-China academic partnerships primarily focus on potential links between Chinese university partners, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the Chinese state. A key risk lies in the possibility that research partnerships may contribute to China’s rapid military development, facilitate human rights abuses, or result in academic censorship both within and beyond China.
Moreover, despite being publicly funded institutions, British universities have faced challenges regarding transparency and accountability in these partnerships. The large-scale, commodified recruitment of Chinese international students has also exposed universities to financial dependency, while institutional support for these students remains limited.
This study was informed by Freedom of Information (FOI) requests submitted to the 80 top-ranking British universities. The requests covered a range of inquiries concerning the scale and nature of collaborations with Chinese entities. In total, 45 universities disclosed information in response, but only 14 responded in full. Additionally, 40 universities were included based on links identified through secondary research. Altogether, we collected 1,518 records from 85 British universities, with 88.6% (1,345 records) obtained via FOI responses and 11.4% (173 records) sourced through secondary research.
The CCP’s hidden influence and the risks of transnational repression
In response to the FOI requests, no British university reported that any PRC entity had influenced its decision-making processes regarding course curricula, research, or grants. However, concerns about hidden influence and the associated risks of transnational repression remain significant within the UK higher education sector, raising serious implications for academic freedom and the well-being of both students and staff.
One example of hidden influence involves visiting scholars and PhD programs funded by the China Scholarship Council (CSC), which operates directly under the Chinese Ministry of Education. Recipients of CSC scholarships are subject to a “rigorous review” of their “political ideology” and are required to implement “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” CSC-funded fellowships and PhD programs are widely available at British universities. This arrangement not only allows the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to exert political influence over British university programs but may also constitute discrimination under the UK’s Equality Act 2010, which protects individuals with genuinely held beliefs. At least 38 British universities have entered into agreements with the CSC to host visiting scholars and PhD students across a broad range of academic disciplines.
Another example of CCP influence can be found in UK-China Joint Educational Institutes (JEIs). At least 45 British universities have established JEIs in China, making the UK the most engaged country globally in this scheme. JEIs typically offer joint or dual degrees governed by UK higher education standards, with students having the opportunity to study in both countries. However, according to a report by the China Strategic Risks Institute, the CCP exercises shadow managerial control over JEIs, and the presence of CCP branches within these institutes is mandatory. British universities appear either unaware of or unwilling to acknowledge this involvement, raising serious concerns about potential contradictions with their commitments to academic freedom and equality, as well as possible evasion of UK regulatory frameworks.
The extent of CCP influence in both the CSC and JEI schemes could come under scrutiny with the implementation of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023, which takes effect on 1 August 2025. Regulatory Advice issued by the Office for Students (OfS) in June 2025 suggests that certain practices underpinning CSC scholarships and JEI arrangements may be prohibited under the Act (see Examples 25 and 26).
Collaboration with defense-linked Chinese universities in STEM research
During this investigation, a total of 1,108 records were collected pertaining to collaborations between British and Chinese universities, with the remaining 410 records involving partnerships with research institutes, companies, and other entities. Of these, 27.3% related to STEM-focused joint research projects, and 9.4% involved Chinese universities classified as “high” or “very high” risk, according to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) China Defence Universities Tracker. It is important to note that this figure may represent only the tip of the iceberg in terms of links between British universities and military-linked Chinese entities, as the ASPI tracker covers only 32.2% of the collaborations examined.
This trend of collaboration with defense-linked Chinese universities, as identified by the ASPI tracker, is even more pronounced among the UK’s research-intensive Russell Group universities. Among their STEM research partnerships with Chinese universities, 42.1% involve institutions classified as “high” or “very high” risk, compared to 30.9% for their non-Russell Group counterparts.
Furthermore, at least 80 STEM-related partnerships have been established with Chinese universities that appear on export restriction end-user lists—maintained by countries such as the United States, Canada, and Japan—or have been linked to espionage or cyberattacks, according to analysis conducted by ASPI (hereafter referred to as entities on end-user lists or engaged in espionage). For example, between 2020 and 2023, University College London hosted at least 10 joint research partnerships with such Chinese universities in areas including quantum technologies, materials science, biosciences, and sustainable energy.
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Working with companies linked to rights abuses and Chinese defense industry conglomerates
A total of 185 instances were recorded involving joint research projects between UK universities and Chinese research institutes, private enterprises, or state-owned enterprises. However, British universities have typically been unwilling to clarify the nature of these collaborations. Under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, which allows exemptions for “prejudice to commercial interests,” many universities cited this clause to withhold details of their partnerships.
Huawei and BGI Genomics are two of the most prolific private-sector partners, having collaborated with at least 25 and 15 British universities, respectively. Yet, of the 40 partnerships identified in this investigation, only six were voluntarily disclosed through FOI requests. The remaining 34 were sourced from existing media and think tank reports, during which UK universities frequently appeared unwilling to engage or provide further information.
Both Huawei and BGI Genomics are deeply controversial. Huawei has previously been found supplying technology used in ethnically targeted surveillance against Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and its 5G equipment has been banned from critical infrastructure in several countries, including the UK. BGI Genomics has reportedly shared globally collected prenatal genomic data with entities linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), raising concerns among regulators in Germany, Australia, Estonia, and Canada.
The investigation also reveals a concerning level of collaboration between UK universities and Chinese state-owned defense conglomerates. British universities have partnered with seven of the 12 largest Chinese defense conglomerates, as identified by the ASPI tracker, across at least 22 partnerships. These state-owned entities are central to China’s Civil-Military Fusion strategy and maintain close ties with the PLA in the development of advanced weaponry and military technologies.
Identifying collaborations with defense conglomerates has been particularly challenging due to the often opaque structures of their research subsidiaries and the use of commercial aliases. For example, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)—a central player in the PLA’s research, development, and production of missiles, rockets, and other aerospace systems—has at least eight documented collaborations with British universities. Five of these partnerships were initially identified under alternative names or through affiliated research entities, including ChinaRocket Co., Ltd., the Beijing Institute of Aerospace Control Devices, the State Key Laboratory of Space-Ground Integrated Information Technology, and the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology.
In addition, at least three joint research laboratories have been established in the UK by CASC-affiliated entities, all focused on advanced engineering and aerospace technologies. These joint laboratories include: the UK-China Advanced Structure Manufacturing Technology Laboratory (hosted by Imperial College London); the Sino-British Joint Advanced Laboratory on Control System Technology (hosted by the University of Manchester); and the Space Mechatronic Systems Technology Laboratory (hosted by the University of Strathclyde).
Opaque financial relationships
Of the 80 universities that received FOI requests, only 15 (18.8%) disclosed the amount of financial income received from Chinese entities, totaling £49.4 million. This figure is likely just the tip of the iceberg. For example, the University of Cambridge declined to respond to this investigation’s FOI request in full. However, self-disclosed aggregate data on its website indicates it received £75.6 million from Chinese sources between 2017 and 2021, with all funders except Huawei listed anonymously.
By contrast, Imperial College London was among the most financially transparent institutions in this investigation, disclosing £35.6 million in funding from Chinese entities between 2010 and 2023. Notably, all of this funding was allocated to STEM-related research, with eight funders identified as “high” or “very high” risk by the ASPI tracker, including several listed on export control end-user lists or linked to espionage activities.
British universities are now required to increase transparency around foreign funding, as stipulated in the UK’s Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023, which came into force on 1 August 2025. However, at the time of writing, implementation details of such schemes have not yet been announced.
The commodification of Chinese student recruitment
One distinctive feature of UK–China academic relations is the heavily commodified recruitment and admissions infrastructure targeting Chinese international students. Currently, the UK is the second most popular destination for Chinese students studying abroad, following only the United States.
Our records indicate that British universities have disclosed at least 66 commercial partners based in China that are specifically tasked with recruiting Chinese international students. Additionally, at least 203 Chinese universities have entered into progression, articulation, double, or joint degree agreements with UK counterparts. At least 45 British universities have also participated in establishing Joint Educational Institutes (JEIs) to deliver British degree programs to Chinese students within the PRC.
This strong emphasis on Chinese student recruitment raises concerns about structural vulnerabilities in the financial models of UK universities. In the 2021/22 academic year, Chinese international students accounted for 26% of total tuition fee income for Russell Group universities. Amidst declining domestic enrolment and rising financial pressures, many institutions have become increasingly dependent on international student recruitment.
At the same time, this large-scale recruitment stands in stark contrast to the often poor quality of experience Chinese students report. Numerous studies and investigations have found that British universities frequently fail to address the intersecting challenges faced by Chinese students, including a lack of integration, stereotyping, racism, and transnational repression. Many Chinese students experience significant ostracization in British university settings today.
Confucius Institutes
The UK currently hosts 30 Confucius Institutes (CIs)—the highest number of any country. While these centers are nominally dedicated to Mandarin language instruction and cultural exchange, a previous report by the Henry Jackson Society found that only four UK-based CIs strictly limit their activities to those functions. All other 22 CIs investigated by the HJS report have engaged in a range of influence operations targeting businesspeople, political networks, academics, and the general public. The report also identified at least £33.4 million in funding for British CIs from Chinese partners. By contrast, only seven British universities disclosed Chinese funding of CIs in response to this investigation, with the total amount reaching just £4.8 million, excluding figures obtained through secondary research.
Several examples in the Henry Jackson Society report illustrate CI influence within the UK political sector. Between 2019 and 2021, Welsh officials met five times with staff from Welsh-based CIs to discuss the Welsh Government’s “draft international strategy.” Additionally, eight events have been co-organized by Welsh authorities and CIs since 2016. On one occasion (date undisclosed), the CI at the University of Southampton donated £13,000 to the local city council.
Recommendations
Improve transparency on overseas partnerships, especially financial ties. Building on the Government’s implementation of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 and its overseas funding disclosure requirements, British universities must enhance transparency across all aspects of their collaborations with Chinese entities. This includes disclosing financial income, the results of any risk assessments, and the nature of collaborations, particularly those with implications for national security, academic freedom, or significant public interest.
Design strict internal safeguards for research collaborations with Chinese entities and raise awareness among key stakeholders. The high number and proportion of research partnerships with Chinese institutions subject to sanctions or implicated in espionage is a cause for concern. In today’s landscape, the boundary between basic scientific collaboration and sensitive technology transfer is increasingly blurred. Rather than relying solely on broad regulatory restrictions, which may be overly burdensome and ineffective, universities should develop robust internal safeguards led by academic experts with deep subject knowledge. Key decision-makers must be trained on the PRC’s military ambitions and record of human rights violations. Partnerships with Chinese entities linked to military development or rights abuses should be subject to rigorous scrutiny and enhanced due diligence.
Invest in independent, culturally informed support services for Chinese students. Current recruitment practices targeting Chinese students have created challenges that compromise both the financial sustainability of British universities and the well-being of the students themselves. Universities must move beyond viewing Chinese international students primarily as revenue sources and instead invest in robust, culturally informed support services that reflect these students’ substantial financial contributions and the complex difficulties they may encounter while studying in the UK. These services should leverage partnerships with trusted UK-based third-party organizations experienced in supporting Chinese students, while deliberately avoiding collaboration with entities linked to or influenced by the CCP.
Explore more data on UK-China academic engagements here.
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