Xi Jinping is now chasing his ultimate prize: a change in US policy that Beijing hopes could isolate Taiwan.
As Trump has shown interest in striking an economic accord with China in the coming year, Xi is planning to press Trump to formally state that the US “opposes” Taiwan’s independence.
Since coming to power in late 2012, Xi has made bringing Taiwan under Beijing’s control a key tenet of his “China Dream” of national revival. Now, well into an unprecedented third term, he has repeatedly emphasized that “reunification” is inevitable and can’t be stopped by outside forces — a reference to Washington’s political and military support to Taipei.
Xi is no longer satisfied with the US position adopted by the Biden administration that Washington “does not support” Taiwanese independence. That statement reassured Beijing but didn’t deviate from the US’s strategically ambiguous “One China” policy, which acknowledges Beijing’s claim over Taiwan without endorsing it.
For Xi, the difference between not supporting Taiwan’s independence and explicitly opposing it is more than semantics. It would signal a shift in US policy from a neutral position to one that actively aligns with Beijing against Taiwanese sovereignty — a change that could further cement Xi’s hold on power at home.
The Trump administration hasn’t inherited the Biden-era language of not supporting Taiwanese independence.
Xi believes that he can entice a switch on Taiwan from Trump, who Beijing thinks is eager to secure an economic bargain. In talks with their American counterparts, Chinese policy advisers outside the government have already stressed the need for the US to officially announce its opposition to Taiwan’s independence.
“Driving a wedge between Washington and Taipei is the holy grail of the Taiwan problem for Beijing. It would undermine Taiwan’s confidence and increase Beijing’s leverage over Taipei.”
“Xi likely sees the coming period of interactions with Trump as the best opportunity to try to pull Washington and Taipei apart.”
The US’s relationship with Taiwan appears to have grown more uncertain.
Trump, unlike Biden, has largely avoided explicitly stating whether the US would intervene militarily if China were to invade Taiwan.
The Trump administration recently delayed some military aid and denied Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te a US transit stop — a move that led to Lai’s canceling his trip to Latin America. Those actions have raised questions in both Washington and Taipei about whether it is giving priority to a trade deal with China over support for Taiwan.
In a January call with Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Secretary of State Marco Rubio privately reiterated the reassurance of nonsupport for Taiwanese independence. Beijing then publicized the remark in an official account of the call without US permission, which irked Rubio.
The US readout of the January call instead focused on the concerns Rubio expressed to Wang over Beijing’s “coercive actions” against Taiwan. An updated State Department fact sheet on the US-Taiwan relations in February even removed the Biden-era phrase stating that the US doesn’t support Taiwan independence.
Xi is expected to use every chance he gets with Trump to press the American leader to adopt a firm stance against Taiwanese independence.
“China will push for its position persistently and repeatedly so as to inch forward, and in the process undermine Taiwan’s confidence in US commitment.”
https://wsj.com/world/china/trump-xi-talks-china-taiwan-8ed82d1b?mod=mhp…
Xi Jinping is now chasing his ultimate prize: a change in US policy that Beijing hopes could isolate Taiwan.
As Trump has shown interest in striking an economic accord with China in the coming year, Xi is planning to press Trump to formally state that the US “opposes” Taiwan’s independence.
Since coming to power in late 2012, Xi has made bringing Taiwan under Beijing’s control a key tenet of his “China Dream” of national revival. Now, well into an unprecedented third term, he has repeatedly emphasized that “reunification” is inevitable and can’t be stopped by outside forces — a reference to Washington’s political and military support to Taipei.
Xi is no longer satisfied with the US position adopted by the Biden administration that Washington “does not support” Taiwanese independence. That statement reassured Beijing but didn’t deviate from the US’s strategically ambiguous “One China” policy, which acknowledges Beijing’s claim over Taiwan without endorsing it.
For Xi, the difference between not supporting Taiwan’s independence and explicitly opposing it is more than semantics. It would signal a shift in US policy from a neutral position to one that actively aligns with Beijing against Taiwanese sovereignty — a change that could further cement Xi’s hold on power at home.
The Trump administration hasn’t inherited the Biden-era language of not supporting Taiwanese independence.
Xi believes that he can entice a switch on Taiwan from Trump, who Beijing thinks is eager to secure an economic bargain. In talks with their American counterparts, Chinese policy advisers outside the government have already stressed the need for the US to officially announce its opposition to Taiwan’s independence.
“Driving a wedge between Washington and Taipei is the holy grail of the Taiwan problem for Beijing. It would undermine Taiwan’s confidence and increase Beijing’s leverage over Taipei.”
“Xi likely sees the coming period of interactions with Trump as the best opportunity to try to pull Washington and Taipei apart.”
The US’s relationship with Taiwan appears to have grown more uncertain.
Trump, unlike Biden, has largely avoided explicitly stating whether the US would intervene militarily if China were to invade Taiwan.
The Trump administration recently delayed some military aid and denied Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te a US transit stop — a move that led to Lai’s canceling his trip to Latin America. Those actions have raised questions in both Washington and Taipei about whether it is giving priority to a trade deal with China over support for Taiwan.
In a January call with 