Will growing Philippines-Vietnam naval ties reshape South China Sea diplomacy?
The two sides deepen maritime partnership as Manila seeks to finalise a code of conduct in the waterway when it helms Asean next year
Philippine Navy chief Vice-Admiral Jose Maria Ambrosio Ezpeleta and his Vietnamese counterpart Tran Thanh Nghiem met last week in Manila, where they reaffirmed their commitment to conducting joint activities, humanitarian coordination and regional maritime security.
Ezpeleta said Philippine and Vietnamese naval forces “already have a very good relationship” and “we help each other in many ways, particularly now that we share the same issues and concerns”.
“Hopefully, we can find ways to ease the pressures in our waters while further strengthening this partnership,” said Ezpeleta, who also thanked Hanoi’s continued help with rescuing distressed Filipino fisherfolk at sea.
Nghiem’s trip to Manila comes months after the Philippine army top brass visited Vietnam and held talks with the country’s military leaders.
This includes maintaining traditional mechanisms like ship visits and joint search-and-rescue operations, and adding new steps such as their first joint coastguard drills held last August.
“These activities indicate that the relationship is evolving towards operationally meaningful cooperation. If sustained, such initiatives, including future naval port calls or ship-to-ship dialogues, could make the Vietnam-Philippines partnership a model of practical maritime collaboration in the South China Sea,” Tran told This Week in Asia.
Julio Amador, interim president of the Foundation for the National Interest, said the intensifying of ties signified that both sides “feel that this is the time for their neighbours to engage more deeply with each other,” despite their varied approaches to tackling Beijing’s tactics in the South China Sea.
“Vietnam is not very public when it comes to criticisms of China, rightly so, because its own strategic considerations can be quite different from Manila,” said Amador, who is also the founder and trustee of the non-profit policy advisory firm FACTS Asia.
“So in that sense, to engage in something like this with the Philippines … with the possibility of earning condemnation or the ire of China, really speaks about the way that they’re perceiving the strategic environment.”
Observers said deepened naval cooperation could include activities in humanitarian help and disaster relief, as well as more frequent goodwill exchanges on islands like the Northeast and Southwest Cays within the Spratly Islands, where the two countries have overlapping claims.
“Additionally, defence-industrial collaboration could grow, as Philippine officials have noted Vietnam’s strengths such as quality military textiles as potential areas to source equipment and technology,” Phan Xuan Dung, research officer at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and a PhD candidate at the Australian National University, told This Week in Asia.
Setting the stage for a COC?
As the Philippines takes over the chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations next year, observers say a stronger partnership with Vietnam may help inject momentum into closer cooperation on maritime matters among the bloc, including the possible finalisation of a code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.
While Hanoi and Manila “can be expected to synchronise their positions so that Asean statements and initiatives on the South China Sea are stronger and more unified”, a lack of consensus among other members could derail that strategy, he added.
“Enhanced Vietnam-Philippines cooperation also sets an example of claimant states working together, which could encourage others such as Malaysia and Brunei to align on an approach towards the South China Sea,” he added.
“Vietnam is actually reclaiming more than any other Asean claimants amid its competition with China. The difference is that [the Philippines] doesn’t see Vietnam as a strategic threat, but we have to be mindful that we have overlapping claims with Vietnam and their reclamation is just as damaging as China’s,” he said.
While Amador was sceptical of achieving a finalised COC by next year, he said the “goodwill” shown by Hanoi and Manila could encourage claimant states to collaborate in other areas.
“If the naval cooperation will bear fruit, it will show that we can have cooperative activities not necessarily just with Western partners.
“We haven’t had serious cooperative activities with Asean countries. If it moves towards that direction, then it’s all for the better for our regional stability,” he said.
Japan-Philippines defence pact comes into force amid China tensions
The Reciprocal Access Agreement that took effect on September 11 will see Japanese troops on Philippine soil for the first time since WWII
Japan’s National Diet approved the pact in June, six months after the Philippine Senate unanimously ratified it, paving the way for its full effect. The RAA will ease greater military cooperation between both countries by streamlining procedures for joint training, disaster response operations and force deployment.
“The entry into force of the RAA validates the strength of our people-to-people ties, shared values and common purpose for the security and stability of the region,” the Department of Defence said in a statement.
Deterring China
The RAA’s enforcement came after a series of developments between both countries that signified deepening cooperation, especially on the strategic front, analysts said.
“The most immediate and significant development from the new Japan-Philippines RAA taking effect is how it will create more opportunities for joint military exercises and increased military operational cooperation,” William Chou, senior fellow and deputy director, Japan Chair at the think tank Hudson Institute in Washington, told This Week in Asia.
Coming on the back of a series of similar treaties, “it’s evident that Japan is taking proactive steps to work effectively with like-minded countries on Indo-Pacific security issues”, he said.
Satoru Nagao, a non-resident fellow of the Hudson Institute, told This Week in Asia that the pact indicated that both countries were willing to exchange troops fluidly and collaborate more closely.
Japan has previously pledged support for the Philippines in the Southeast Asian country’s coastguard modernisation efforts.
Manila cries foul over Beijing’s nature reserve plan in South China Sea
It signed the Official Security Assistance agreement in December, pledging 1.6 billion yen (US$10.8 million) for coastal radar systems, automatic rigid-hull inflatable boats and other equipment.
Tokyo also proposed to transfer six of its used Abukuma-class destroyer ships to Manila in July, a move that was set to greatly improve the Philippine Navy’s anti-submarine capabilities and bolster its maritime defences.
“The RAA, the proposed transfer of Abukuma-class destroyers, the transfer of coastguard ships, and the sale of air and maritime defence radars to the Philippines [show] that the Philippines places a great deal of faith on Japan as a partner in the South China Sea,” Chou said.
Nagao said that the Japanese ships added tremendous value to the Philippine Navy’s limited forces, which before the transfer possessed only three frigates and other smaller ships.
“The Philippine Navy has very limited forces … these Abukuma-class frigates are very precious naval ships for the Philippines. Through training and maintenance, Japan and the Philippines would collaborate more deeply, and they would need the RAA for people-to-people exchanges,” he said.
The Philippines had been increasingly turning to Japan for its defence needs, necessitating more long-term and frequent exchanges between both countries’ forces, making the RAA more important, he added.
Observers said that the Philippines and Japan’s collaboration came at a pivotal point.
“From the East China Sea, to Taiwan and the South China Sea, both Japan and the Philippines are facing (mainland) China’s threat. With the US and Taiwan, they can collaborate to enhance defence capabilities,” Nagao said.
Chou said Japan would also benefit from cooperating with the Philippines in an environment frequently subjected to grey zone tactics.
“Much of what China has been doing in the South China Sea has been exploiting legal and territorial grey zones in its intimidation of the Philippines,” he said.
“Closer cooperation between Manila and Tokyo can better prepare Japan for ways to respond more effectively to such grey zone aggression, be it in the South China Sea, in the Taiwan Strait, or in waters closer to home.”
