Toplines
The PRC hosted the 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) heads of state summit in Tianjin from August 31 to September 1 and used it to promote Beijing’s vision for challenging the US-led international order and eroding US global influence. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping announced the establishment of the Global Governance Initiative (GGI)—a framework for reforming global institutions—at the summit.[1] The core principles underpinning the GGI, according to Xi, include giving a greater voice to developing countries on the world stage and promoting multilateralism—both implicit references to combating US global influence.[2] Xi identified “the Cold War mentality, hegemonism, and protectionism” as central issues that the GGI must counter—again references to the United States. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a concept paper for the GGI, accompanying Xi‘s announcement, and identified three key issues affecting global governance: the Global South is underrepresented, the United Nations is losing relative influence and authority, and global governance organizations are ineffective at addressing international issues, such as sustainable development and climate change.[3] The CCP framing of the GGI is consistent with CCP efforts to frame itself as the leader of the Global South and to legitimize it and its revisionist partners’ efforts to upend the US-led international order. PRC partners, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, endorsed the GGI upon its announcement.[4]
The GGI is the latest in a series of international initiatives that Xi has established since 2020 to promote PRC-led mechanisms for global governance. The others are the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative.[5] The PRC uses these initiatives to attract international support for its hegemonic agenda and portray itself as a fairer, more benign global leader than the United States.
PRC state media celebrated the attendance of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the SCO summit. Modi met with Xi, marking the most significant milestone in a months-long rapprochement between India and the PRC.[6] India has been traditionally a more skeptical participant of PRC institution-building on the world stage. The Modi-Xi meeting comes as tensions between the United States and India have increased, as Washington has imposed heavy tariffs on India for its continued import of Russian oil.
The PRC hosted an extravagant military parade immediately after the SCO summit to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the Japanese surrender in World War II. Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attended the parade. The PRC likely scheduled the parade to immediately follow the SCO summit to give the impression of robust international support for the emergence of the PRC as a major military power and defender of the postwar global order.
The PRC used the military parade to drive narratives supporting the Taiwanese Kuomintang (KMT) and criticizing Japan.The PRC lauded the KMT role in World War II, presenting the two parties as close partners in defeating Imperial Japan.[7] The PRC simultaneously associated the Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) with Japanese imperialism—a framing that has gained some traction in Taiwanese discourse. The PRC also continued its efforts to portray the DPP as an authoritarian oppressor, criticizing it for discouraging Taiwanese officials from attending the parade.[8] A Taiwanese delegation, including former KMT chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu and former senior Taiwanese Navy officer Lu Li-shih did attend the parade, however.[9] A senior PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs official separately called on Japan to acknowledge its imperialist and militaristic history and abandon its current efforts to build its military.[10] PRC rhetoric framed Japan as a US pawn similar to how it portrays the DPP as such.[11]
The military parade and its associated messaging illustrated how the PRC uses the memory of World War II to explain its opposition to the DPP. PRC state media argued that the DPP has shown “Nazi-like tendencies,” which could help the PRC justify further aggression toward Taiwan.[12] This framing resembles the Russian exploitation of World War II history to justify its own invasion of Ukraine. Russian leaders have routinely described Ukraine as a Nazi state throughout the war in order to validate its efforts to destroy it.
Key Takeaways
- PRC: CCP leaders hosted the 25th SCO heads of state summit in Tianjin and used it to promote their vision for challenging the US-led international order and eroding US global influence. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi notably attended amid increased tensions between the United States and India over the continued Indian import of Russian oil.
- PRC: The PRC hosted an extravagant military parade to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the Japanese surrender in World War II. The PRC scheduled the parade immediately after the SCO summit likely to give the impression of robust international support for the emergence of the PRC as a major military power and defender of the postwar global order.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The China Coast Guard (CCG) conducted four incursions into Kinmen’s restricted waters in July 2025, highlighting the PRC’s normalization of such incursions. Four CCG ships simultaneously entered Kinmen’s restricted waters twice on August 24 and 25, totaling four incursions.[13] The CCG typically does not conduct all of the incursions at the end of the month, nor in such short succession from one another. Taiwan held its second round of legislative recall elections on August 23. The CCG may have waited until after the recalls to conduct the incursions to avoid bolstering DPP support, as the DPP has framed the importance for recalling KMT legislators as essential to protect Taiwan from PRC aggression. The CCG incursions are part of the PRC effort to reduce Taiwanese threat awareness and readiness and test Taiwanese response protocols. They also enforce PRC territorial claims and undermine Taiwanese sovereignty. The Taiwanese Coast Guard Association (CGA) has counted eighty-five incursions into Kinmen’s restricted waters since February 2024. These incursions typically happen three to four times a month. The Coalition Defense of Taiwan (CDOT)-ISW has recorded each reported incursion back to September 2024.
The CGA reported on September 3 that 17 PRC government vessels have operated around Kinmen since September 2.[14] This surge in activity coincided with the eve of the PRC military parade. The report provided no further details on what exactly those government vessels are.
CCG intrusions into the waters south of Kinmen resemble a rehearsal for operations to isolate the island from resupply or intervention by sea, which would require PRC ships to position themselves south of the island. The simultaneous CCG entries into the restricted waters around Kinmen provide the CCG with experience choreographing the initial actions for a blockade of Kinmen. The CCG likely aims to desensitize Taiwan and its partners to such intrusions, which could help cultivate surprise in an actual blockade scenario.
The PRC has used a combination of CCG patrols, oil exploration, and possibly fishing boats to erode Taiwanese control and security around Pratas Island. Pratas (or Dongsha) is a Taiwanese-administered atoll in the northern South China Sea, which hosts a CGA base. CCG ship 3102 circled the atoll within its contiguous zone on August 20 and August 27.[15] Data from ship tracking software Starboard Maritime Intelligence shows that the ship approached Pratas with its transponder deactivated before both patrols but turned the transponder on during most of the patrol, likely to reduce Taiwanese threat awareness and test response protocols. The circular patrol path is consistent with the pattern of six CCG patrols from May 28 through July 2, rather than the irregular and possibly experimental patrol patterns seen later in July and early August.[16] The CGA also reported that a PRC fishing boat illegally crossed into the Pratas contiguous zone on August 20—the same day as the first CCG patrol—and deployed small boats on August 21.[17] The CGA said that it boarded and detained two small boats and expelled the larger ship from Taiwanese-controlled waters.
The CGA stated that the PRC might exploit the end of the PRC fishing moratorium in the South China Sea, which ended on August 16, to harass, test, and strain Taiwanese law enforcement capabilities. PRC fishing traffic in the Taiwan Strait has increased following the end of the moratorium, thus increasing the chance for confrontations and territorial violations. The PRC actions around Pratas since February 2025 follow the “Kinmen model” that the PRC has normalized around Taiwan’s Kinmen archipelago since February 2024. PRC state media described the model in 2024 as involving normalizing CCG “law enforcement” patrols around Taiwan’s outlying islands, starting with Kinmen, in the name of protecting fishermen.[18] The model would assert PRC legal jurisdiction around the islands, erode Taiwan’s sovereignty, and potentially set conditions for a future quarantine or seizure of the islands from Taiwan.
A September 2 Jamestown Foundation report revealed that the PRC China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has been operating 12 permanent or semi-permanent structures, as well as dozens of support ships, in Taiwan’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) west of Pratas since at least May 2020.[19] The major structures include seven oil rig structures, three floating production storage and offloading vessels, and two semi-submersible oil platforms. The PRC claims Taiwan and does not acknowledge the Taiwanese government’s legitimate jurisdiction in any waters, but in practice, has tacitly respected some of Taiwan’s maritime boundaries. The PRC oil exploration in Taiwan’s EEZ shows deliberate disregard for Taiwan’s EEZ claims and further erosion of Taiwanese control. The PRC has also been conducting oil exploration and extraction in its own EEZ waters near the same location.[20]
PLA aerial incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in August 2025 remained within the new normal of over 300 per month. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported 322 PLA sorties that crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s ADIZ.[21] This is a decline from 392 incursions in July, which was the highest monthly total in the past year, but is consistent with recent trends. ADIZ incursions have surpassed 300 for seven months in a row—over double the monthly average prior to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s election in 2024. The PRC has normalized a higher frequency of ADIZ incursions to degrade Taiwan’s threat awareness and response threshold and to probe response protocols.
This new normal of ADIZ incursions represents one of the many aspects of intensifying PRC coercion against Taiwan and the Lai administration. The normalization of more frequent ADIZ incursions by PLA aircraft raises the threshold of coercive activity that would trigger a Taiwanese response, making it more difficult for Taiwan to detect and respond to a real threat effectively. Taiwan must put personnel on standby to respond to ADIZ incursions, which strains resources and exhausts personnel.
Taiwan is boosting its military cooperation with the US Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), which aligns with Taiwanese President Lai’s efforts to increase Taiwanese defense spending and bolster its drone capabilities. The DIU, which oversees technological innovation within the US Department of Defense (DOD), will dispatch liaisons to twelve countries, including Taiwan and Japan. The DOD established the DIU in 2015 and tasked it with focusing on great-power capabilities, including drones, two years ago.[22] The DIU Taiwan liaison will reportedly operate in the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the de facto US embassy in Taiwan.[23]
Taiwan cooperating with the DIU reflects its efforts to build de facto diplomatic and military ties with the United States. US Senator and Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Roger Wicker visited Taiwan and discussed joint weapons production in an August 30 press conference.[24] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Wicker’s visit as a violation of PRC sovereignty.[25] Wicker’s visit follows a September 2024 visit by US drone industry representatives as the United States and Taiwan explore drone supply chains that circumvent the PRC.[26] It also follows President Lai’s announcement that Taiwan aims to increase its defense budget to three percent of GDP, which the PRC criticized.[27] Taiwan’s procurement efforts reflect an overall shift toward autonomous weapons, as Taiwan announced plans to acquire 50,000 indigenous drones by 2027.[28] Taiwan’s yearly Han Kuang exercises employed micro-surveillance and reconnaissance drones for the first time in 2025.[29]
China
The PRC military parade showcased weapons systems that could enhance PLA force projection and deterrence capabilities in a conflict over Taiwan. The PLA showcased a range of weapons and military equipment, including nuclear missiles, submarine drones, and a directed energy weapon.[30] The Global Times reported that the PRC showcased three intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)—the DF-5C, DF-31BJ, and DF-61—as well as the JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) and JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile.[31] This is the first time that the PRC has publicly displayed all three legs of its nuclear triad.[32] The US assessed that PRC missile silos expanded from a few dozen to nearly 300 in 2022.[33] A massive increase in the number of storage silos indicates a similarly large increase in missile production, and the 2024 China Military Power Report stated that some of the PRC‘s ICBMs are likely stored in these new silos.[34] The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Federation of American Scientists (FAS) both estimated that the PRC has increased its nuclear arsenal from around 500 warheads in 2024 to around 600 in 2025, making the PRC nuclear arsenal the fastest growing in the world.[35][36]
The PRC military parade showcased a number of new unmanned systems, reflecting the stated PRC intent to develop new unmanned aerial and maritime systems.[37] Autonomous underwater systems coupled with anti-ship missiles could reinforce the PLA anti-access/area denial concept, which is meant to limit freedom of operation of foreign militaries around the Taiwan Strait and prevent outside entry into a war there.
The PRC released little information on the LY-1 naval directed energy weapon at the parade. Directed energy weapons, such as the LY-1, can in theory engage multiple targets and fire at the speed of light without depleting munitions stocks.[38] These capabilities could provide cost-effective defense designed to combat drone swarms and missiles. The PLA could use directed energy weapons to increase PLA Navy survivability in a potential conflict.
Northeast Asia
Japan
The Japanese Ministry of Defense submitted its largest defense budget request in history. The ministry requested 8.8 trillion yen (60.2 billion US dollars) in defense spending for the 2026 fiscal year, which begins on April 1, 2026.[39] The proposal marks the 14th consecutive year of increased defense budget requests. The defense budget would involve establishing a multilayered “Synchronized, Hybrid, Integrated and Enhanced Littoral Defense (SHIELD)” by acquiring a large number of ground, surface, sub-surface, and aerial drones, likely based partly on lessons learned in Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense also seeks to strengthen its stand-off capabilities and integrated air defense system. The ministry called for improving domestically produced Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles, hypersonic/hyper-velocity munitions, and AEGIS-equipped surface vessels, while foreign purchases will include interceptor missiles, such as the SM-3 and SM-6, joint strike missiles for F-35A fighters, and joint air-to-surface stand-off missiles for upgraded F-15 fighters. The ministry further proposed a series of upgrades to the Japan Self-Defense Force’s (JSDF) existing platforms, including Patriot systems, modifications to Mogami-class frigates to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles, and modifications to F-2 fighters to accommodate newer missiles. Other key priorities include enhancing Japan’s command, control, and communications systems, utilizing civilian transportation for island deployments, and increasing the JSDF’s munition stockpiles for force sustainability. The ministry proposed to build one new frigate—a reduction from its previous requests to build two ships in 2024 and three ships in 2025. Japan may be focusing its frigate-building capacity to fulfill a recent deal with Australia.[40] The ministry will send the initial budget request to the Ministry of Finance for review, before presenting it to the cabinet for final approval in December 2025, which the Diet will then consider.
The US Army announced that it will temporarily deploy the Typhon missile system in Japan beginning September 11. The US Army announced that the Typhon system will be temporarily housed at the Marine Corps Air Station in Iwakuni, Japan, for exercise Resolute Dragon 25, which will occur between September 11 and 25.[41] This is the first time that the US Army has deployed the system to Japan. The Typhon system can launch modified SM-6 missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of approximately 1000 miles.[42]
PRC and Russian officials criticized the US deployment of the Typhon system to Japan.[43] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs furthermore said that Russia will respond with “appropriate military-technical measures” if Japan does not reconsider the deployment.[44] These criticisms come as the PRC and Russia have increased air and naval activities around Japan.[45] The PRC and Russia are likely concerned about the mobility and concealability of the Typhon system, which can fit in a commercial container.[46]
North Korea
Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un attended the PRC’s 80th Victory over Japan military parade on September 3, signaling improved PRC-North Korean relations and an attempt to portray North Korea as a legitimate state in the international community.[47]Kim stood next to Xi and Putin to watch the PRC military parade, marking the first time since 1959 that the leaders of the PRC, Russia, and North Korea stood together in Tiananmen Square.[48] A parade narration by PRC state broadcaster CGTN described North Korea as a “traditional” neighbor and stressed its contributions to the “anti-fascist struggle” and its efforts toward “socialist construction.”[49] Kim held a two-hour summit with Putin thereafter.[50] Kim also spoke with Xi on September 4 for the first time since their last summit in 2019. Xinhua News Agency reported that Kim and Xi expressed their desire for increased communication and high-level exchanges to safeguard their “common interests.”[51]
Kim’s attendance at the parade shows that the PRC-North Korean relationship has recovered at least partially from its 2024 downturn. The relationship appeared to deteriorate significantly in 2024 despite its designation as a PRC-North Korean “Year of Friendship.”[52] PRC-North Korean relations may have soured due to North Korea’s missile tests and increased belligerence toward South Korea in 2024; PRC opposition to the North Korean nuclear weapons program; North Korea’s mutual defense agreement with Russia, which likely reduced Beijing’s leverage over Pyongyang; and North Korea’s troop deployment in Russia’s war in Ukraine, which risked damaging the PRC reputation by association.
The PRC appears to be facilitating North Korea’s participation in its vision of a multilateral order. PRC officials emphasized North Korea’s contributions in the war against Japan, thus including North Korea together with Russia in their historic narrative of the victory against Japan. Beijing’s calls at the SCO summit to resist “bullying” by Western powers and build economic resilience against sanctions would clearly appeal to North Korea, one of the world’s most heavily sanctioned and economically isolated countries. Beijing may also feel that North Korea’s image is less politically toxic now that North Korea has declared victory in combat operations in Russia’s Kursk Oblast and committed additional troops to rebuilding Kursk, rather than further combat.[53] Kim’s public participation in a multilateral event alongside many world leaders, particularly from the Global South, may be an opportunity to legitimize North Korea’s presence on the international stage. Kim may also be seeking to showcase North Korea’s alliances with the PRC and Russia in response to South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s August 25 summit with US President Donald Trump.[54][55]
North Korea avoided a direct denouncement of the United States while harshly criticizing South Korean President Lee Jae Myung about his statement during the visit to Washington D.C. North Korean state media denounced President Lee as a “denuclearization delusion paranoia hypocrite” on August 27. Pyongyang further asserted that the progressive Lee administration is no different from the former conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration and reaffirmed South Korea as an “enemy.”[56] President Lee delivered a speech on August 25 at the DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, in which he emphasized strengthening the US-South Korean alliance and cooperation between the two allies on denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula.[57] Lee revealed a three-step denuclearization roadmap on August 21, pledging to continue a conciliatory policy toward the North to achieve the ultimate denuclearization goal.[58]
North Korea’s labeling of South Korea as an “enemy state” signals its unwillingness to pursue dialogue even under the new and relatively conciliatory progressive government. Pyongyang will likely push for concessions from Seoul to initiate dialogue as North Korea continues to showcase its strength globally.
The North Korean statement only targeted Lee’s denuclearization approach but made no mention of the United States.[59] This suggests Pyongyang’s willingness to interact with Washington likely to secure recognition as a nuclear state and achieve sanctions relief. North Korea will likely pursue dialogue with the United States while still preparing for the possibility of war.
South Korea
South Korean National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik met with Xi, Putin, and Kim during the V-J parade on September 3, relaying messages from South Korean President Lee Jae Myung.[60]Woo and Kim briefly exchanged greetings at the reception before the parade, marking the first high-level exchange between the two countries since North Korea cut diplomatic ties with South Korea in 2020.[61] This also marks their second face-to-face meeting since the 2018 Panmunjom summit.[62] Woo—a five-term lawmaker from the Democratic Party (DP)—is the speaker of the National Assembly and ranks second in diplomatic precedence after the president. Woo previously served on the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Special Committee under the Moon Jae-in administration in 2018. Woo also met with Putin and Xi at the reception. Putin inquired about inter-Korean relations and offered to deliver a message to Kim. Woo emphasized hope to expand inter-Korean cultural and economic cooperation.[63] Woo urged Xi to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea this October.[64]
Woo’s exchanges reflected the Lee administration’s push to improve ties with the PRC, Russia, and North Korea. Woo confirmed on September 2 that he is coordinating with the presidential office to deliver a message from Lee if he secures a meeting with Kim.[65] Woo’s statement to Putin on expanding economic cooperation with North Korea likely reflects Lee’s intention to use economic engagement as a pathway towards United States-South Korea-North Korea talks. Lee urged US President Donald Trump to take the lead in restoring diplomacy with Kim during the August 25 US-South Korean summit.[66] North Korea continues to reject dialogue with South Korea and demands that the United States abandon its Korean Peninsula denuclearization goals. North Korea showcased its next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on September 1, reflecting its continued military advancement.[67]
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The Philippines received Taiwanese delegations, established a new forward operating base, and held joint combined exercises with Western partners and allies as part of its coalition-building efforts. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that a Taiwanese business delegation visited the Philippines, and Taiwanese Foreign Affairs Minister Lin Chia-lung attended in a private capacity, according to two unspecified [68] Cabinet members. Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Maria Lazaro and the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs reiterated that the Philippines does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state ahead of the Taiwanese delegation’s visit.[69] Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement of condemnation, however, claiming that the Philippines provided “a platform for Taiwan independence separatist forces to engage in anti-China activities.”[70]
The PRC is likely concerned about recent Philippine efforts to strengthen relations with Western countries and Taiwan. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs praised the trade mission to the Philippines on August 30 for strengthening Taiwanese-Philippine economic cooperation and helping to create a “non-red” supply chain—a supply chain that does not involve the PRC—as part of a “First Island Chain alliance.”[71] The Philippines also opened a new forward operating base on the Batanes islands.[72] Philippine Navy spokesperson Roy Vincent Trinidad said that this was related to Philippine interests in cross-strait stability.[73] This base is notably located closer to Taipei than Manila as it is located less than 100 nautical miles from Taiwan.
The Philippines also recently hosted Exercise “ALON” (Amphibious and Land Operations) from August 15 to 29 across locations in Palawan, Nueva Ecija, and the West Philippine Sea.[74] Over 3,600 personnel participated, including forces from Australia, Canada, and the United States, and the exercises included amphibious operations, naval and air drills, and combined live-fire exercises.[75] Philippine, Australian, and Canadian vessels also conducted combined naval drills near Scarborough Shoal on September 2 and 3 for the 10th Multilateral Maritime Cooperation Activity (MMCA).[76] The Philippine Navy observed at least two PRC warships at least 20 nautical miles from the Australian and Canadian warships and identified one as a PLAN DDG 163 (Type 052D Luyang III-class destroyer) on September 2 and another as a PLAN Jiangkai-class frigate on September 3.[77]
Oceania
Taiwan is trying to cultivate ties with Pacific Island states, illustrating an increasing commitment to regional coalition-building. French Polynesian delegates visited Taiwan for the first time since 1987 on August 27.[78] This visit could signal bilateral efforts to coalition-build against the PRC following the PRC launch of an ICBM with a dummy warhead near French Polynesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in 2024.[79] Taiwanese President Lai made a speech at the General Assembly of the Asian-Pacific Parliamentarians’ Union the following day, reiterating Taiwan’s intent to raise defense spending to three percent of its GDP and ultimately to five percent by 2030. Lai used the speech to express interest in strengthening ties with Pacific states to attending representatives from Guam, Japan, Palau, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and the Northern Mariana Islands.[80] Lai met with Tuvaluan Parliament Speaker Iakoba Taeia Italeli on September 2 and similarly affirmed Taiwan and Tuvalu’s bilateral ties.[81] Itareli pointed out Taiwan’s technical assistance to Tuvalu, including in the form of 4G internet and the Central Pacific Cable Project.[82]
The PRC has made concerted economic and political efforts to influence Taiwan’s Pacific partners; Tuvalu, Palau, and the Marshall Islands recognize Taiwan over the PRC, however.[83] Taiwan’s efforts signal an ongoing commitment to diplomacy and coalition-building despite PRC efforts to cut Taiwan off from Pacific allies.
[1] https://www.gov dot cn/yaowen/liebiao/202509/content_7038671.htm
[2] https://english.www.gov dot cn/news/202509/01/content_WS68b584acc6d0868f4e8f53c8.html
[3] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/wjbxw_new/202509/t20250901_11699909.shtml
[4] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202509/1342410.shtml
[5] https://english.news dot cn/20231130/0c03f8294b30492dac3dfa8cccd8c9cc/c.html
[6] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/zyxw/202508/t20250831_11699054.shtml
[7] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202508/t20250829_12720887.htm
[8] https://www.mac.gov dot tw/News_Content.aspx?n=05B73310C5C3A632&sms=1A40B00E4C745211&s=A6409F1253C3AFD1
[9] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3324074/taiwanese-beijings-military-parade-include-former-kmt-chair-want-want-executive; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3316999/taiwan-caught-wwii-revisionist-dilemma-lai-reshapes-wartime-legacy; https://udn dot com/news/story/123857/8982089?from=udn_ch2cate6640sub123857_pulldownmenu_v2
[10] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/wjbxw_new/202508/t20250828_11697331.shtml
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[12] https://paper.people.com dot cn/rmrb/pc/content/202508/28/content_30100416.html
[13] https://www.cga dot gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=165779&ctNode=650&mp=999
https://www.cga dot gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=165787&ctNode=650&mp=999
[14] https://www.cga.gov dot tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=165825&ctNode=650&mp=999
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[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-july-21-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-8-2025/
[17] https://www.cga.gov dot tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=165776&ctNode=650&mp=999
[18] https://news.qq dot com/rain/a/20240512A04JA700
[19] https://jamestown.org/program/rigging-the-game-prc-oil-structures-encroach-on-taiwans-pratas-island/
[20] https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-oil-rig-standoff/
[21] https://x.com/MoNDefense?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor ; https://x.com/MoNDefense?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor ; https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?pli=1&gid=1953673365#gid=1953673365
[22] https://www.ft.com/content/1e713b6b-ebcd-4ad9-a2cd-b4e43182b2cb
[23] https://www.ft.com/content/1e713b6b-ebcd-4ad9-a2cd-b4e43182b2cb
[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/senior-us-senator-expects-joint-weapons-production-with-taiwan-2025-08-30/
[25] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/fyrbt_673021/202508/t20250829_11698385.shtml
[26] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2024/09/23/2003824203
[27] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/sy/tt_214026/16405424.html
[28] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202507230019
[29] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202507180010
[30] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/09/03/world/asia/china-military-parade-weapons.html
[31] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202509/1342582.shtml
[32] https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/china-parade-nuclear-weapons-xi-putin-kim-military/
[33] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF
[34] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF
[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-june-23-2025/
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-june-23-2025/
[37] https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/09/chinese-military-parade-highlights-naval-drones-and-missiles/; https://www.reuters.com/graphics/WW2-ANNIVERSARY/CHINA-PARADE/zdvxkgybypx/
[38] https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11882
[39] https://www.mod.go dot jp/j/budget/yosan_gaiyo/fy2026/yosan_20250829.pdf
[40] https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/08/japan-requests-largest-ever-defense-budget-for-fiscal-year-2026/
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[42] https://www.newsweek.com/us-mid-range-missile-system-deployment-japan-near-china-2121390
[43] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/fyrbt_673021/202508/t20250829_11698385.shtml ; http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/sy/tt_214026/16405424.html ; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/8/30/russia-china-blast-deployment-of-us-typhon-missiles-to-japan
[44] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/8/30/russia-china-blast-deployment-of-us-typhon-missiles-to-japan
[45] https://asia.nikkei dot com/politics/defense/chinese-russian-warship-activity-surges-around-japan-s-southwest ; https://news.usni.org/2025/04/11/russian-incursions-drive-increase-in-japanese-fighter-scrambles-officials-say ; https://defence-blog.com/japan-reports-increased-chinese-military-activity/
[46] https://defencesecurityasia dot com/en/typhon-missile-deployment-japan-indo-pacific-escalation/
[47] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250903059053009?section=international/all&site=topnews02
[48] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250903059053009?section=international/all&site=topnews02
[49] https://www.nknews dot org/2025/09/kim-jong-un-arrives-at-chinese-military-parade-in-beijing-cgtv/
[50] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250903177400009; https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250903120752009?section=nk/news/all&site=topnews01
[51] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250904176900009?section=nk/news/all&site=topnews01
[52] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-9-2025
[53] https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korea-confirms-troop-deployment-russia-first-time-kcna-report-2025-04-27 ; https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korean-military-officials-return-from-fighting-in-russias-war-on-ukraine/
[54] https://www.reuters dot com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-lee-dodges-zelenskiy-moment-high-stakes-trump-summit-2025-08-26/
[55] https://www.reuters dot com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-lee-dodges-zelenskiy-moment-high-stakes-trump-summit-2025-08-26/
[56] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1756360937-989053743/%ec%a1%b0%ec%84%a0%ec%a4%91%ec%95%99%ed%86%b5%ec%8b%a0%ec%82%ac-%eb%a1%a0%ed%8f%89-%ec%9c%84%ec%84%a0%ec%9e%90%ec%9d%98-%eb%b3%b8%ec%83%89-%eb%93%9c%eb%9f%ac%eb%82%b8-%eb%a6%ac%ec%9e%ac%eb%aa%85/
[57] https://www.khan.co dot kr/article/202508260911001
[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-29-2025
[59] https://www.chosun dot com/politics/north_korea/2025/08/28/TX5UHTRFJJCXRJMB27ODOCJMBI/; https://www.khan.co dot kr/article/202508270932001
[60] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250903136952001
[61] https://nk.news1 dot kr/news/articles/5900351
[62] https://www.chosun dot com/politics/north_korea/2024/10/15/TGIJ3LIPAZCBVCTUEZIDEPKPPY/
[63] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250903120752009?section=nk/news/all&site=topnews01
[64] https://www.hani.co dot kr/arti/politics/assembly/1216784.html
[65] https://nk.news1 dot kr/news/articles/5900351
[66] https://www.hani.co dot kr/arti/international/america/1215127.html
[67] https://nk.news1 dot kr/news/articles/5897953
[68] https://apnews.com/article/philippines-china-taiwan-lin-visit-b411126df7b235dab9e7276898ebdafa
[69] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6189692;
https://www.pna dot gov.ph/articles/1257594;
https://www.pna dot gov.ph/articles/1257583;
https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202508280004;
https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/acn/202508290328.aspx
[70] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202508/t20250829_11698421.shtml
[71] https://www.mofa.gov dot tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=120577
[72] https://www.inquirer dot net/454052/navy-opens-new-forward-operating-base-on-strategic-batanes-island/
[73] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aopl/202509020233.aspx
[74] https://www.pna.gov dot ph/articles/1257596
[75] https://www.pna.gov dot ph/articles/1257518;
https://www.pna.gov dot ph/articles/1257596
[76] https://www.inquirer dot net/454377/china-warships-shadow-ph-australian-canadian-drills-near-scarborough/
[77] https://tribune dot net.ph/2025/09/03/phl-australia-canada-wrap-up-maritime-drills-in-bdm-despite-chinese-interlopers
[78] https://www.ocac.gov dot tw/OCAC/Eng/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=329&pid=78823019; https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/08/28/2003842814
[79] https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2024/09/26/french-polynesia-says-chinese-missile-landed-not-far-from-its-eez-in-pacific/
[80] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/08/28/2003842836
[81] https://www.president.gov dot tw/News/39419#new
[82] https://www.president.gov dot tw/News/39419#new
[83] https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/support-threefold-taiwans-pacific-island-allies
