Executive Summary: The Kremlin is trying to influence the upcoming Moldovan parliamentary elections on September 28, 2025, as it tried with Moldova’s presidential election and referendum about EU integration in Fall 2024. These election influence campaigns are part of Moscow’s overall efforts to achieve its long-held strategic objective of preventing Moldova from integrating into the West. The Kremlin learns critical lessons each time it leverages election cycles to pursue this objective, and Moscow is adapting its previous efforts to influence Moldovan elections while also implementing tactics it has employed against Ukraine, Georgia, and Romania. The pro-Western Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) currently holds the majority in the Moldovan Parliament, and the Kremlin is supporting various electoral blocs in order to deprive PAS of its majority. A Kremlin-friendly Moldovan Parliament would be able to undo many of the efforts Chisinau has successfully pursued in recent years on its path toward Western integration. The Kremlin may aim to use such a parliament to pass laws that would exploit the neutrality clause in the Moldovan Constitution to prevent Moldova’s military cooperation with NATO and NATO states or to pass a foreign agents law to derail Moldova’s EU accession process.
The Kremlin’s Unchanged Strategic Objectives in Moldova
The Kremlin is trying to influence Moldova’s September 2025 parliamentary elections after having failed to do so in the Fall 2024 presidential election and referendum. Former Soviet republic Moldova has made significant progress on its path to join the EU since the initial election of current Moldovan President and PAS Founder Maia Sandu in 2020 and the establishment of PAS’s parliamentary majority in 2021. Sandu won reelection in November 2024 in a runoff against former Moldovan Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo, and a referendum to amend the Moldovan Constitution to define EU membership as a “strategic objective” passed in October 2024. The Kremlin attempted to prevent Sandu’s reelection and the referendum’s passing through various means, including by using pro-Russian Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor to funnel money into Moldova via Russian state-owned banks in order to buy votes.[1] ISW assessed in October 2024 that the reelection of Sandu and the passing of the referendum would not set Moldova’s EU path in stone, and the Kremlin is again trying to interfere in the upcoming September 2025 parliamentary elections to prevent PAS from holding onto its parliamentary majority.[2]
Moldova’s geographic location between Ukraine and NATO member Romania means its importance to the Kremlin is disproportionate to its small size, as the Kremlin continues to pursue its strategic objective of reestablishing its influence over Chisinau. The Kremlin has maintained its objective of reestablishing its influence over Moldova throughout the 21st century, despite Moldova’s significant movement towards the West in recent years.[3] Leaked documents reportedly drafted in 2021 outlined the Kremlin’s plans to increase Moldova’s involvement in the Eurasian Economic Union and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — Russia’s much weaker analogues to the EU and NATO — by 2030.[4] Russia’s election interference campaigns in 2024 and 2025 have attempted to find legal mechanisms to prevent Moldova’s EU integration or future NATO membership. Russia maintains close political, economic, military, and security ties to Transnistria, the pro-Russian breakaway parastate in Moldova, in which Russia has maintained a limited contingent of troops since 1992. The Kremlin has previously enjoyed significant influence in Chisinau, particularly during the presidency of Igor Dodon (2016-2020). Russia is attempting to reestablish this influence by bringing a Kremlin-friendly majority into the Moldovan Parliament — or, at a minimum, by preventing a strong pro-Western majority from coming to power again. A Kremlin-friendly government in both Chisinau and Tiraspol would simultaneously allow the Kremlin to threaten NATO to Moldova’s west and Ukraine to its east.
The Kremlin’s information operations targeting Moldova
Russia began to significantly surge its “Matryoshka” (nesting doll) and “Overload” social media disinformation campaigns targeting Moldova in April 2025 — likely signaling the start of Russia’s multipronged effort to influence the September parliamentary elections. Russia first launched its Matryoshka operation, which aims to widely post and spread fake pro-Russian content online, in late 2023.[5] The fake content often impersonates Western public figures and media outlets in order to lend credibility to the disinformation. Russia’s Overload operation, a continuation of the Matryoshka campaign, further aims to overload fact-checkers with content that requires checking.[6] The Matryoshka and Overload operations are part of Russia’s larger “Doppelganger” campaign, which Russia began using at least in February 2022 and which aims to “clone” legitimate websites of media outlets and public institutions.[7]
NewsGuard, a service that evaluates and rates the credibility of information sources, reported in July 2025 that the Matryoshka campaign spread 39 false claims targeting Moldova, including many claims about Sandu’s and PAS’s alleged corruption, between mid-April and mid-July 2025 after not targeting Moldova at all previously.[8] NewsGuard stated that Matryoshka has published an average of three fake stories per week since Moldovan authorities announced the September 2025 election in April 2025. Matryoshka spread Romanian-, Russian-, and English-language claims by impersonating 23 media outlets, including the BBC, The Economist, Fox News, and Vogue, and the claims reportedly garnered nearly two million views on Telegram, where many of the claims originate.
The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (IDS) reviewed roughly 300 accounts linked to the Overload operation on X (formerly Twitter), Bluesky, and TikTok that were active in the second quarter of 2025.[9] The IDS found that the Overload accounts barely mentioned Moldova in the first quarter of 2025 but targeted Moldova “more aggressively” than any other country in the second quarter, with messages claiming that Moldova is corrupt and that Sandu is dishonest. Finnish software company CheckFirst reported in June 2025 that the four key themes that Overload is pushing in Moldova are anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, claims of terrorist attacks and mass riots ahead of the elections, smear campaigns against Sandu, and calls for violence against Sandu.[10]
Russia’s disinformation campaigns are likely attempting to sway the Moldovan diaspora to either not vote for PAS or not vote at all in September 2025. Moldovan National Security Adviser Stanislav Secrieru told Politico in August 2025 that Russia’s disinformation campaigns on social media are trying to target the Moldovan diaspora.[11] The IDS noted that 96 percent of the Overload posts it analyzed in the second quarter of 2025 were in English, a significant rise from 69 percent in the first quarter, and that the most impersonated news outlets were Euronews, the BBC, and Deutsche Welle.[12] The Moldovan diaspora, which makes up an estimated one-third of the Moldovan electorate, has voted heavily in favor of pro-Western politicians in recent years, and votes from abroad were key to securing the reelection of Sandu and the passing of the pro-EU referendum in Fall 2024.[13]
Russia’s disinformation campaigns appear to be specifically targeting France’s growing support for Moldova. CheckFirst reported that the Overload operation surged disinformation targeting Moldova in May 2025 and that the most frequently used key terms were “Sandu” and “Macron” (French President Emmanuel Macron).[14] These disinformation campaigns targeting Moldova’s relations with France come as France has emerged as a key European supporter of Moldova and its Western integration efforts. Sandu and Macron signed agreements in March 2025 to work together to detect digital disinformation and to strengthen Moldova’s energy independence (in the aftermath of Russia’s artificially created gas crisis in Moldova in early 2025).[15] Sandu and Macron also signed a defense agreement in March 2024 that included joint training and exercises and expanded cooperation in military intelligence, information technology, and military telecommunications, airspace control and management, and logistical support.[16]
Russia appears to be learning lessons from its interference in the 2024 Romanian presidential election by extensively using TikTok in the Moldovan Matryoshka and Overload campaigns. CheckFirst and the ISD reported that the Overload operation expanded to TikTok in late May 2025 and that narratives there largely focused on Moldova.[17] The ISD identified more than 60 TikTok accounts linked to Overload between May 26 and June 30.[18] CheckFirst assessed that the Overload-linked TikTok accounts framed the Moldovan diaspora in Europe as an increasing criminal and social threat to Europe and blamed Sandu for corruption and economic issues within Moldova.[19] CheckFirst reported that the 13 videos it identified as part of Overload garnered over 30,000 shares and almost three million views, and likely exploited TikTok’s algorithm that favors content with significant early engagement. NewsGuard also reported that it found 50 TikTok accounts spreading Matryoshka narratives in June 2025 that garnered more than 50,000 views, but that similar campaigns on Instagram and Facebook were on a significantly smaller scale.[20]
Romanian intelligence assessed that Russia conducted influence campaigns to interfere in the November 2024 Romanian elections, which the Romanian Constitutional Court subsequently annulled.[21] Romanian intelligence services stated in documents declassified in December 2024 that Russia created “extensive” networks of social media channels to promote far-right, pro-Russian content. Romanian intelligence also stated that the campaign of pro-Russian ultranationalist Calin Georgescu, who won the first round of the later annulled election, used thousands of accounts on TikTok to spread content and used a channel on Telegram to coordinate and disseminate instructions to the TikTok accounts. Romanian intelligence services also reported that TikTok identified a large-scale campaign to promote the far-right Party of Young People (POT), which supported Georgescu’s presidential campaign, in the last two weeks prior to the December 2024 Romanian parliamentary elections. TikTok officials further reported that one of the “networks” of accounts targeting Romanian and Moldovan users had ties to Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik.
The Kremlin’s campaign to influence the 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections
The Kremlin aims to reestablish its influence over Chisinau via the September 2025 parliamentary elections. The reelection of a strong PAS majority in parliament would continue parliamentary support for the Sandu government and Moldova’s wider Western integration efforts for another four years. The Kremlin’s preferred outcome of the parliamentary election is a pro-Russian party or electoral bloc securing a majority in parliament or various Kremlin-friendly parties or blocs forming a coalition. The Kremlin would still benefit from an outcome that forces PAS to form a coalition with one or more Kremlin-friendly parties or blocs; however, this would force PAS to seek compromises and would limit the pro-Western party’s power.
Recent polling suggests that PAS may be at risk of not securing a majority in parliament even with heavy support from the diaspora. (Note: All polls referenced throughout only interviewed Moldovans living in Moldova and do not take into account the views of the significant number of Moldovans living abroad.) Polling from July 2025 found that 30 percent of decided voters would vote for PAS, and further polling from August 2025 found that 33.8 percent of decided voters would vote for the party.[22]
Moldovan diaspora participation will likely be over 200,000 in the upcoming election, with many voters abroad likely voting for PAS, but this support may not be enough for PAS to secure a parliamentary majority. Roughly 67,000 diaspora voters voted in the 2019 parliamentary elections and 150,000 in the first round of the 2020 presidential election.[23] Diaspora turnout, however, jumped drastically in the second round of the 2020 presidential election (when Sandu beat Dodon) to about 263,000, and diaspora turnout has stayed above 200,000 in the parliamentary and presidential elections since.[24] PAS received roughly 12 percent of its total votes from the Moldovan diaspora in the 2021 parliamentary election, and Sandu similarly received roughly 11 to 14 percent of her total support from the diaspora in the first and second rounds of the 2024 presidential election.[25] PAS could stand to gain similar bumps from diaspora voting in the upcoming parliamentary elections, should trends from previous years continue. The polling from July and August that showed 30 to 33 percent support for PAS suggests that PAS may not be able to secure a majority even with extensive diaspora support like that in previous years.[26]
The outcome of the parliamentary elections will likely depend on the still large pool of undecided voters. Roughly 19 and 40 percent of voters stated that they were undecided in July and August, respectively, and PAS could secure a majority should a significant portion of these voters choose to vote for PAS.[27]
The Victory Bloc
The Kremlin-linked Victory bloc failed to meet the requirements to register for the September 2025 elections. Shor led the Victory bloc, which also includes Yevgenia Gutsul as the executive secretary of the bloc’s national political council.[28] Gutsul was the governor of Gagauzia, a pro-Russian autonomous region in Moldova, until Moldovan authorities sentenced Gutsul to seven years in prison in August 2025 on illegal campaign financing charges due to her role in the Shor Party’s use of funding from Russia.[29] Shor’s Victory bloc is tied to the Kremlin; the bloc held its inaugural congress in Moscow in April 2024, and senior bloc members, including Shor and Gutsul, attended Russia’s May 9 Victory Day parade in 2024, reportedly at the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin.[30] Gutsul has held multiple meetings with important Kremlin officials disproportionate to her low status as a regional governor in Moldova. Gutsul met in March 2024 with Putin in an event that garnered significant coverage on the Kremlin website and in Russian state media and with Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko, who is reportedly in charge of the Kremlin’s campaign against Moldova.[31]
The Victory bloc’s platform includes calls for the creation of a union state between Russia and Moldova.[32] The bloc opposes Moldova’s EU integration, advocating for Moldova to instead join the Eurasian Economic Union. Shor used an interview with the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti after the bloc’s founding congress in 2024 to call for the federalization of Moldova with a reintegrated Transnistria.[33] Shor’s calls for Moldova’s federalization directly mirror the Russia-backed 2003 Kozak Memorandum that aimed to settle the Transnistrian conflict by essentially granting Moscow significant influence over Moldovan federal policy.[34]
The Moldovan CEC in July 2025 blocked the Victory bloc’s registration to participate in the September 2025 elections, and the Moldovan Supreme Court upheld the CEC’s decision in August 2025.[35] The CEC banned the bloc from running in part due to the four parties’ continued association with the former Shor Party, which Moldovan authorities declared unconstitutional in 2023.[36] Moldovan law prohibits the creation of new parties to continue the work of unconstitutional parties as successor parties.[37]
Shor still plays a key role in the Kremlin’s influence campaign in Moldova, however, despite the Victory bloc’s inability to run in the upcoming elections. Shor offered Moldovan citizens $3,000 per month to participate in an “indefinite” tent protest in Chisinau starting on August 16.[38] Shor claimed that Moldovans would be able to open bank accounts directly at the protests in order to start receiving the promised funds. Shor did not specify the bank through which Moldovans would receive the money, but Shor has maintained deep connections with the Russian state-owned bank Promsvyazbank (PSB). Shor affiliates helped Moldovans open PSB accounts to receive payments in return for attending protests before the October 2024 election.[39] Gutsul signed a deal with PSB in April 2024 in which PSB agreed to provide about $100 per month to Gagauzian government employees and pensioners.[40] The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned cryptocurrency exchange Garantex and its successor Grinex in August 2025 for financing cybercriminals.[41] OFAC reported that Garantex’s and Grinex’s operations are linked to A7, a Shor- and PSB-owned company that provides cross-border settlement platforms for sanctions evasion.
The Patriotic Bloc
The Kremlin is likely supporting the Patriotic bloc, with its pro-Russian platform, as an alternative to the Victory bloc. The Moldovan CEC had denied the Victory bloc’s registration to participate in the October 2024 presidential election and referendum campaign in part due to the parties’ continued association with the unconstitutional Shor Party.[42] The CEC’s repeat denial in July 2025 would not have come as a shock to the bloc or the Kremlin. Early polls may also have pushed the Kremlin to pursue other options beyond the Victory bloc. Polling from July 2025 – before Moldovan authorities denied the Victory bloc’s registration – suggested that the Victory bloc only had the support of seven to eight percent of voters.[43] Electoral blocs must secure at least seven percent of the vote in order to gain seats in the parliament, and early polls suggested that the Victory bloc would have risked not meeting the threshold.[44]
The Moldovan CEC registered on August 3 the Patriotic electoral bloc, which includes Igor Dodon’s Socialist Party, Irina Vlah’s Heart of Moldova party, and Vasile Tarlev’s Future of Moldova party.[45] Vladimir Voronin’s Communist Party joined the bloc on August 8.[46] Dodon served as Moldova’s president from 2016 to 2020; Voronin was the president from 2001 to 2009; Vlah was the governor of Gagauzia from 2015 to 2023; and Tarlev was prime minister from 2001 to 2008 under Voronin. Dodon stated in late July when he first announced the four parties’ plan to join together in a bloc that the bloc supports Moldova’s neutrality, wants to restore relations with Russia, and opposes “Euro-unionists.”[47] Voronin stated in late July that the bloc is not against the “European direction” but prioritizes Moldova’s independence and sovereignty.[48]
Members of the Patriotic bloc have historical ties to the Kremlin and to Shor. Independent investigative journalism organization RISE Moldova and Russian investigative outlet Dossier Center reported in 2020 that Dodon maintained close connections with the Kremlin and Russian security services during his presidency.[49] Socialist Party deputies reportedly periodically visited an office in Chisinau near the Moldovan presidential administration building that housed a group of political consultants from Moscow. RISE and Dossier Center found that Dodon often had Russian representatives review his speeches and that a “Moldovan subdivision” within the Russian Presidential Administration, which a colonel from Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) ran, kept an extensive record of briefs, biographies, and sensitive information about Moldovan politicians and officials, including high-ranking officials in the Moldovan defense and security forces.[50] Dossier Center reported that Dodon maintained a steady stream of phone calls with Russian State Duma Deputy Grigory Karasin and the head of Russian state-owned development corporation Vneshekonombank (VEB), Igor Shuvalov.[51] (VEB also has ties to Shor. VEB owned shares of Banca de Economii, which Shor previously led as its chairperson. Banca de Economii was one of the three Moldovan banks from which Shor and others stole one billion dollars in 2014.[52] Shor reportedly created a company with VEB in Russia in early September 2024, likely to facilitate money transfers from Russia to Shor for vote buying.[53])
Vlah also reportedly received prepared speeches and slogans from Moscow during her 2015 gubernatorial campaign and reportedly made several undisclosed trips to Russia in 2023.[54] Vlah has promoted pro-Russian policies, and her slogan in 2015 was “Being with Russia is in our hands!” Vlah, however, has shifted her platform in recent years to appear more pro-EU, likely in an attempt to create distance between herself and the Kremlin and to gain pro-Western voters’ support.
Tarlev initially founded the Renaissance Party in 2011, which was largely defunct before becoming one of the parties in Shor’s Victory bloc in April 2024.[55] Tarlev ran in the October 2024 presidential election, and Moldovan investigative outlet CU Sens reported that Shor and Shor-linked organizations paid Moldovans to attend Tarlev’s campaign events in the lead up to election.[56]
Dodon, Vlah, and Tarlev travelled to Moscow for high-level meetings immediately after first proposing the formation of an opposition bloc – likely to coordinate with the Kremlin. Dodon first announced the prospect of left-wing political parties creating a political bloc on July 4.[57] Dodon, Vlah, and Tarlev met on July 10 with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak in Moscow.[58] Novak was the Russian Minister of Energy from 2012 to 2020 before becoming deputy prime minister, a role in which he heavily focuses on energy-related issues. Novak played a critical role in the Russian-created gas crisis in Transnistria in early 2025.[59] Novak claimed during the July 2025 meeting with the Moldovan politicians that Russia is “intent on preserving and developing centuries-old ties” with Moldova and “reinforcing friendly relations.”[60] Novak claimed that Russia has “consistently” supplied gas to Moldova at “considerably more favorable prices” compared to Europe and called for Moldova to return to direct Russian gas supplies. Dodon claimed that he and Novak discussed the possibility of resuming direct Russian gas supplies to Moldova “after a change of power” following the upcoming parliamentary elections.[61]
Dodon, Vlah, and Tarlev also met on July 11 with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev in Moscow.[62] Patrushev is the son of Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, one of Putin’s longtime advisors. The Kremlin readout of the meeting, which the Kremlin touted as being about Moldovan-Russian agricultural-industrial cooperation, stated that Patrushev claimed that both states have a “common culture, … similar moral and ethnical values, and belonging to the Orthodox world.” Patrushev further claimed that Russia aims to maintain dialogue with the forces in Moldova that advocate for strengthening Moldova’s statehood and sovereignty and for preserving Moldova’s neutral status.
Initial polling does not indicate that supporters of the Victory bloc are moving to vote for the Patriotic bloc despite their overlapping platforms, suggesting that the Kremlin’s plan may be failing. Polling from July 2025 (conducted before the CEC denied the Victory bloc’s registration) found that 7.3 percent of voters supported the Victory bloc and that 26.8 percent would vote for the Patriotic bloc.[63] Subsequent polling from August (after the denial of the Victory bloc’s registration) only saw a two percent bump for the Patriotic bloc.[64]
Early polling suggests that the Patriotic bloc could secure a quarter to a third of the vote, however. A significant portion of the Moldovan diaspora is unlikely to vote for the Patriotic bloc given the diaspora’s trend in recent years of supporting pro-Western parties and politicians. Polling from July and August 2025 found that 30.1 to 34.8 percent of decided voters within Moldova stated that they would vote for the Patriotic bloc.[65] Political parties must secure at least five percent of the vote in order to gain seats in the parliament, whereas electoral blocs must gain seven percent of the vote.[66] The July 2025 poll indicated that the only party within the Patriotic bloc that would have likely met the individual party threshold was the Socialist Party.[67] The Patriotic bloc could therefore stand to at least double their votes running as a bloc as opposed to individual parties.
The Alternative Bloc
The Kremlin may also be supporting the Alternative bloc. The Alternative bloc, which formed in early 2025 and successfully registered with the CEC in late June 2025, consists of the National Alternative Movement (MAN) party, the Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova (PDCM), and the Common Action Party-Civil Congress (PAC-CC).[68] Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban leads the MAN party; former Moldovan Prime Minister Ion Chicu leads the PDCM party; and former Communist Party deputies Mark Tkachuk and Iurie Muntean co-lead the PAC-CC party. Former Moldovan Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo, who lost to Sandu in the second round of the 2024 presidential election, is part of the bloc as an independent.
Several of the bloc’s leaders have links to the Kremlin and other Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians. Stoianoglo’s presidential platform ostensibly supported Moldova’s European integration but labeled Russia as a “development partner” with which Moldova “must be friends.”[69] EU Reporter reported in October 2024 on alleged leaked audio recordings of April 2024 conversations between Adrian Albu, a senior leader of the Socialist Party who represented Stoianoglo in presidential debates in 2024, and Yury Gudilin, a Russian political technologist and former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer.[70] The conversations showed that Gudilin oversaw travel plans for Albu to Russia and that Gudilin and Albu discussed Socialist Party members’ meetings with FSB officers and Nikolai Patrushev.
Ceban reportedly received support from Gudilin as well. The US Treasury Department stated in October 2022 that the Kremlin failed to influence the 2020 and 2021 elections in Moldova and subsequently recognized the loss of the population’s support for the “old pro-Russian political elite,” such that Gudilin offered to support MAN, which Ceban had announced the creation of in late 2021.[71] Ceban was previously the Secretary of Ideology in the Socialist Party, which he joined in 2012 after leaving the Communist Party.[72] The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) banned Ceban in July 2025 from entering Romania (and subsequently the entire Schengen area), citing unspecified national security reasons.[73] Romanian Foreign Minister Oana Toiu implied that the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) uncovered information that led to the decision.[74] Toiu stated that “it is very difficult to listen to Ceban’s denial of ties with Russia when you know his entire career and history,” but did not offer further details.
RISE Moldova and Dossier Center reported in 2020 that the former assistant to Chicu periodically visited the aforementioned office housing a group of political consultants from Moscow in Chisinau.[75]
The Kremlin may hope that the Alternative bloc will be able to take votes away from PAS by promoting a seemingly pro-Western platform. The Alternative bloc presented its campaign platforms in early August, wherein Ceban criticized the current government for not sufficiently pursuing Moldova’s European integration, which the bloc claims is its “main goal.”[76] Stoianoglo has attempted to frame the bloc as focusing more on domestic economic and social issues than on foreign policy, however.[77] The bloc stated in August 2025 that it supports Moldova’s neutrality.[78]
Kremlin-affiliated and Kremlin-friendly Moldovan opposition forces that ran against Sandu in the 2024 presidential election tried to attract votes away from Sandu by promoting similar-sounding pro-EU platforms, and the Kremlin is likely repeating this strategy to draw votes away from PAS in 2025.[79] Sandu secured 42 percent of the vote in the first round of the 2024 presidential election, whereas 50 percent of Moldovans voted for the EU referendum – indicating that support for the EU does not necessarily translate into support for Sandu and that the Alternative bloc may be able to take votes away from PAS.[80]
European integration is also a leading issue for Moldovan voters abroad, and the Kremlin may hope that the Alternative bloc will be able to secure a significant portion of the diaspora’s votes away from PAS. The Kremlin likely hopes that its support of various electoral blocs, including ones with overlapping platforms, will also help take some of the undecided voters away from PAS.
The Kremlin’s possible support of the Alternative bloc suggests that Moscow is learning lessons from its previous influence campaigns and adapting them to the current political climate in Moldova. Russia is tailoring its efforts to influence the upcoming Moldovan parliamentary elections based on the current political situation in the country, which differs from that of 2024. The Sandu government has been proactive in identifying and publicizing Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians’ efforts to influence elections. Moldovan authorities have foiled multiple Kremlin-linked plans in previous elections, including Shor’s vote buying schemes.[81] Russia is likely adapting to the Sandu government’s focus on Shor and his affiliates by backing a wider range of parties this round. The Kremlin is likely using information that it gathered during the Fall 2024 presidential election to better prepare Kremlin-supported parties to run against PAS in September. The Kremlin likely assessed after the 2024 election, for example, that Dodon’s endorsement of Stoianoglo (who was running as an independent) actually hurt Stoianoglo’s campaign given Dodon’s historical ties to the Kremlin. Moscow likely assessed that Stoianoglo should participate in the 2025 elections aligned with seemingly pro-Western political forces – not Dodon.
The Kremlin may hope for the Alternative bloc and the Patriotic bloc to garner enough votes to form a coalition together, thereby preventing a PAS majority or a PAS-led coalition in the parliament. August 2025 polling of decided voters found that roughly 30 percent would vote for the Patriotic bloc and roughly 11 percent for the Alternative bloc.[82] The poll found that Our Party had support from 9.3 percent of decided voters and may be the only other individual party outside of PAS to meet the five percent threshold to gain seats in the parliament. Renato Usatii, the former mayor of Moldova’s second largest city, Balti, which is heavily pro-Russia, leads Our Party and has ties to Russia.[83] Usatii had business ties to Russian state-owned Russian Railways and is reportedly deeply entangled in Moldovan and Russian corruption and organized crime. Usatii and Our Party signed a cooperation agreement with the Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) and its leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky in 2017. Usatii ran in the 2024 presidential election, calling for Moldova to join neither the EU nor the Eurasian Economic Union. The Alternative and Patriotic blocs may seek to form a coalition with Our Party should the two blocs not gain enough votes to form a majority either alone or together.
The Return of Vladimir Plahotniuc
The Kremlin may seek to leverage the arrest and extradition of Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc to Moldova in its election interference campaign. Plahotniuc had largely captured Moldova’s state institutions up until 2019.[84] Plahotniuc was wanted internationally for his role in the theft of one billion dollars from three Moldovan banks – the equivalent of 12 percent of Moldova’s GDP at the time.[85] Shor reportedly coordinated the theft with Plahotniuc.[86] Greek authorities arrested Plahotniuc in late July 2025, and his lawyer later stated that Plahotniuc agreed to extradition to Moldova.[87]
Russia also demanded Plahotniuc’s extradition as Russian authorities charged Plahotniuc in 2017 with the attempted murder of a banker in London in 2012.[88] Moldovan General Police Inspectorate Head Viorel Cernauteanu recently told The Insider that the Russian extradition request is “an attempt to provide Plahotniuc with protection and freedom” and noted that Russian authorities also previously issued an arrest warrant for Shor, who now lives in Russia but has not been arrested.[89] Russia’s demand for Plahotniuc’s extradition is likely an attempt to cover up his reported connections to the Kremlin and create plausible deniability.
The Kremlin’s relationship with Plahotniuc has varied in the past, but the Kremlin appears to have been trying to work with him in recent years to influence Moldovan politics. Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service assessed in 2020 that Plahotniuc’s control over the Moldovan legislative, executive, and judiciary branches prevented Russia from achieving its objectives in Moldova.[90] Estonian intelligence stated that the FSB conducted a media and social media influence operation in early 2018 against Plahotniuc to create a negative image of him in the West and deter the West from working with him.[91] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin facilitated a coalition in mid-2019 between Dodon’s Socialist Party and the pro-European NOW Platform DA and PAS electoral bloc (ACUM), which included Sandu’s PAS party, in order to remove Plahotniuc from power.[92]
The Insider reported in July 2025, however, that Plahotniuc had been regularly traveling to Russia and Belarus between July 2024 and April 2025 with fake passports.[93] The Insider reported that wiretaps from 2019 to 2024 showed that Russian authorities arranged for Plahotniuc to meet with Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration Dmitry Kozak. Plahotniuc and his Russian contacts reportedly discussed Plahotniuc’s return to Moldovan politics, and his meeting with Kozak was reportedly meant to precede a meeting with Putin. The Insider reported that Plahotniuc’s Russian contacts told him that the current situation in Moldova was Plahotniuc’s fault and that he “had all the power but…played around.” Plahotniuc reportedly stated that he was trying to correct his mistakes and was ready to return to Moldova.
Kozak had been heavily involved in Russia’s efforts in Moldova since the early 2000s. Kozak oversaw the failed 2003 Kozak Memorandum that would have settled the Transnistrian conflict by federalizing Moldova such that the Kremlin would have enjoyed significant influence over the Moldovan Parliament.[94] ISW previously assessed that Kozak later successfully facilitated the return of the Kremlin’s influence in Moldova under the veneer of diplomatic alignment with the West.[95] Kozak has been a key member of Putin’s inner circle, managing the Kremlin’s Ukraine campaign since 2020 until Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko took over following the full-scale invasion in 2022.[96] The New York Times reported in August 2025 that Western and Russian sources indicated that Kozak has lost influence in Moscow, however, after his criticisms of Russia’s war in Ukraine in the past few months and that the Kremlin subsequently shifted Kozak’s Moldova portfolio to Kiriyenko.[97] Plahotniuc’s regular contacts with Kozak in 2024 and early 2025 likely occurred when Kozak was still the chief architect of Russia’s efforts in Moldova.
Plahotniuc claimed that he would publish information about himself and the current situation in Moldova, and the Kremlin may intend for Plahotniuc’s allegations to hurt the reputation of Sandu and PAS in the lead up to the September elections.[98]Plahotniuc opened various social media accounts after his arrest and claimed that Moldovan authorities are scared that he will reveal information about his case that will damage their image.[99] Plahotniuc claimed that Moldovan authorities are further scared that his presence in Moldova will remind Moldovans of the “normal times” before PAS and Sandu came to power and make Moldovans realize that the current government is oppressive and deceitful.[100] Plahotniuc stated on August 13 that he hopes to return to Moldova to resume political activity.[101]
The Kremlin or Kremlin-linked actors may be conducting a campaign on social media to promote Plahotniuc. Moldovan investigative outlet Ziarul de Garda (ZdG) reported in early August 2025 that fake, AI-generated accounts on Meta and TikTok appeared about a week after Plahotniuc’s arrest and began spreading sponsored pro-Plahotniuc content.[102] ZdG found that the accounts spread the same four video clips about Plahotniuc’s extradition, his ability to easily win the upcoming elections, PAS authorities’ alleged apathy about the situation in Moldova, and his last press conference before he fled Moldova. ZdG found that three of the 10 ads posted by one page garnered 50,000 views. Andrei Rusu of the Moldovan disinformation and corruption monitor WatchDog assessed that the “volume and synchronization” of the campaign suggest that a team is centrally preparing the multi-account information operation system. Rusu stated that the social media pages may be connected to Shor.
Possible Kremlin objectives in the Moldovan Parliament
Russia may aim to secure a Kremlin-friendly majority in the parliament in order to prevent Moldovan authorities from calling a referendum to remove the neutrality clause from the constitution. The Moldovan Constitution states that Moldova “proclaims its permanent neutrality” and “does not admit the stationing of foreign military troops on its territory” (a reference to Russia’s continued deployment of a contingent of Russian troops in Transnistria for over three decades).[103] Sandu has spoken about the possibility of removing the neutrality clause from Moldova’s constitution, which would open up Moldova to possible NATO membership or unification with NATO member Romania in the future.[104] The Kremlin tried – and failed – to prevent the 2024 pro-EU referendum from passing or from meeting its required voter turnout.[105] The Kremlin may have concluded at that time that it is difficult to prevent a referendum about issues related to Moldova’s Western integration from passing once the referendum is on the ballot. Russia likely now aims to prevent Moldovan authorities from being able to call a referendum about the neutrality clause in the first place. Moldovan law allows for 100,000 Moldovan citizens, the government, or one-third of parliament to initiate constitutional referendums like the one that would be able to change the neutrality clause. The Moldovan president appoints the prime minister in conjunction with the parliamentary factions, and the parliament approves the prime minister’s cabinet, giving the parliament significant influence over two of the three processes to call constitutional referendums. Russia likely seeks a pro-Russian parliament in order to prevent Moldovan authorities from being able to pursue these two avenues.
Pro-Russian politicians have previously proposed laws that would have more definitively defined the constitutional neutrality clause in ways that would benefit Russia, and the Kremlin may aim to use a pro-Russian parliament to try this again. The Socialist and Communist parties introduced a draft law to parliament in April 2024 that would have more clearly defined the neutrality clause.[106] The draft law included calls for Moldova to refuse “any kind of interaction” with military alliances; to not agree to any military cooperation programs aimed at implementing the standards of member states of military-political blocs; to ban the deployment of foreign troops, military bases, training, and research centers on Moldovan territory; to ban the passage of forces and weapons through Moldova in the interests of belligerents; to not use Moldovan territory or airspace for military actions directed against other states; and to not make agreements that “contribute to the economic and political preparation for the outbreak of war.” The Socialist and Communist parties submitted a similar draft law in March 2022 as well.[107]
The Kremlin likely aims to use a law severely defining Moldova’s constitutional neutrality in order to create a “buffer state” out of Moldova that is off limits to the West. Russia, however, would have a significant advantage in this allegedly neutral “buffer state” since it already has a contingent of troops stationed in Moldova’s east.
Russia is already violating Moldova’s neutrality clause by deploying troops in Transnistria and would continue to explicitly violate the clause should parliament approve such a law in the future.
Such a law would derail Moldova’s cooperation with NATO, however, have implications for Western support for Ukraine, and degrade Moldova’s ability to defend itself against Russia. Moldova has long cooperated with NATO and individual NATO states, particularly France.[108] Moldova has participated in the Fire Shield exercises with the United States and Romania on Moldovan and Romanian territory since 2015, for example.[109] A law such as the one the Socialists and Communists proposed would prohibit many aspects of these relationships. NATO is currently constructing what will be its largest base on the coast of Romania, about 120 kilometers from Moldova’s southern border. Restrictions on the use of Moldovan airspace would pose limitations on NATO’s ability to use the Romanian base to sortie aircraft to deter or defend against possible future Russian aggression in Europe.
Such a law would have implications for Ukraine as well. Moldova does not currently serve as a major transit hub for Western military aid to Ukraine, but such a law would explicitly prohibit such support in the future. Restrictions on foreign use of Moldovan airspace would also limit any possible future Western security guarantees imposing a no-fly zone and air shield over post-war Ukraine.[110]
A law prohibiting Moldova’s cooperation with NATO or NATO states would also decrease Moldova’s ability to defend itself against a Russian invasion in the future. The law would prohibit NATO or NATO states from helping Chisinau to increase the combat capabilities of the Moldovan military or from coming to Moldova’s assistance in the event of an invasion. The threat of a Russian invasion of Moldova is currently extremely low, but this could change in the future depending on the battlefield situation in Ukraine.[111] ISW continues to assess that Putin maintains his objective of fully conquering Ukraine — an outcome that would dramatically increase the risk to Moldova.[112]
Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians are using their election campaigns to set conditions for a future pro-Russian parliament to propose — and pass — a law on Moldova’s neutrality. Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians within both the Patriotic and Alternative blocs are running on platforms that call for strengthening the neutrality clause. Dodon of the Patriotic bloc claimed in a February 2025 interview with Kremlin newswire TASS that Moldova is violating the neutrality clause by allowing Western weapons deliveries to Ukraine through Moldova.[113] Dodon signed on June 23 a “Declaration on the Sovereign Policy of Moldova in the 21st Century,” which stated that Moldova’s neutrality is “irreversible” and that Moldovan accession to military blocs, Moldovan participation in military actions, and the deployment of foreign military facilities on Moldovan territory are forms of “inadmissible” interference.[114] Dodon urged all Socialist Party elected representatives at the local level to adopt the declaration at their council meetings. Dodon further stated on July 30 that the Patriotic bloc stands for the preservation of Moldova’s neutrality.[115]
Vlah claimed on August 2 that the Patriotic bloc plans to “confirm” Moldova’s neutrality at the UN following the September elections and will insist that NATO approve a declaration that it will not involve Moldova in any military actions.[116] Tarlev similarly called on July 11 for an end to military exercises with NATO states within Moldova after the parliamentary elections and claimed that the constitutional clause already prohibits this.[117] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated during his July 10 meeting with Dodon, Vlah, and Tarlev in Moscow that Russia wants to continue dialogue with Moldovan political forces that advocate for the preservation of Moldova’s neutral status.[118]
The Alternative bloc presented its campaign platforms in early August, wherein Stoianoglo claimed that the neutrality clause is not only a guarantee that Moldova will not participate in any armed conflicts but also represents Moldova’s national position condemning any war.[119] Muntean of the Alternative bloc claimed on July 5 that Moldovans are making demands for the strengthening of the state’s constitutional neutrality.[120]
The Kremlin is further conducting information operations that aim to instill fear in Moldovan society and increase support for a future law severely defining Moldovan neutrality. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed in July 2025 that NATO is preparing to involve Moldova in a possible NATO-Russia war and is turning the “once peaceful” Moldova into a military testing ground.[121] The SVR claimed that NATO is planning to transfer NATO troops to Russia’s borders via Moldova. The SVR claimed that NATO will use Moldovans as “cannon fodder” in the event of a Russian-NATO war. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu also published an article in Russian state newswire RIA Novosti on August 11, claiming that NATO plans to make Moldova part of its military infrastructure, but without security guarantees or the protection of NATO membership.[122] Shoigu claimed that Moldovan authorities are conducting information and propaganda campaigns to push the public to abandon neutrality and join NATO, which Shoigu claimed would “inevitably” lead to the loss of Moldova’s sovereignty. The SVR’s and Shoigu’s threats in the weeks before the parliamentary elections are aimed at stirring up support for Moldovan political parties with pro-neutrality and anti-NATO platforms. The threats are meant to convince Moldovans not to allow foreign militaries to use Moldovan territory out of fear of drawing Moldova into a future NATO-Russia war.
The SVR also threateningly noted that Moldova is “located near the Ukrainian theater of military operations.”The SVR’s threat is aimed at maintaining fear in Moldova about a possible Russian invasion of Moldova via Ukraine and Transnistria, even though the threat of this currently remains low. The threat to Moldova could increase should the battlefield situation in southwestern Ukraine shift, however, and a ceasefire in Ukraine that results in the Russian military occupation of Crimea and parts or all of Kherson Oblast would also increase the possibility that Moscow would be able to reconstitute its forces and successfully invade and occupy all of Moldova via land or sea at a later date.
Moldovan public opinion about neutrality, Russia, and NATO membership has not dramatically changed despite Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since February 2022, likely pushing the Kremlin to try new rhetorical efforts to translate fear into support for the Kremlin’s preferred parties. Polling from November 2022, August 2023, February 2024, June 2024, and May 2025 showed that Moldovans’ support for NATO membership stayed between 26 to 32 percent and that the percentage who viewed Russia as a great or moderate threat to Moldova stayed between 39 and 46 percent.[123] The polls also indicated that the number of respondents who believed that neutrality was the best guarantee of Moldova’s security stayed relatively consistent between 54 to 62 percent.
Russia may also intend for a pro-Russian parliament to pass a foreign agents law to derail Moldova’s EU membership path. The Communist and Socialist bloc submitted a draft law on foreign agents in March 2025.[124] The draft law defined a foreign agent as “any legal or natural person who directly or indirectly receives external funding in the proportion of at least 50 percent of the total annual income and who carries out activities that influence the political, economic, social or educational life of the Republic of Moldova.” Moldovan Ambassador to the EU Janis Mazeiks stated at the time that the draft law was “incompatible” with EU values.[125] The EU’s CSO Meter, which monitors civil society organizations (CSOs) in states within the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative, stated that the draft law is aimed at “silenc[ing] independent voices and clos[ing] civic space” and would “undermine democratic governance.”[126] Dodon stated in February 2025 that his Socialist Party would commit to adopting a foreign agents law “following the example…of Georgia,” should the party come to power following the parliamentary elections.[127] Dodon previously criticized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 2020 for “running [Moldova] with money coming in from abroad.”[128]
The Georgian Parliament (under the pro-Kremlin Georgian Dream majority) passed a similar foreign agents law in May 2024, requiring NGOs receiving at least 20 percent of their funding from abroad to register as “foreign agents,” with penalties for non-compliance.[129] The EU subsequently stopped Georgia’s accession process in July 2024.[130] Moscow likely aims for a Kremlin-friendly majority in the Moldovan Parliament to pass a foreign agents law in the future in order to similarly suspend Moldova’s EU accession process. Georgia’s and potentially Moldova’s foreign agents laws would strongly resemble Russia’s foreign agents law, which allows the Kremlin to monitor and restrain pro-democracy, anti-Kremlin activity. The Kremlin’s election interference and information operations in the 2024 presidential election and referendum aimed to derail Moldova’s EU path, and Russia remains committed to preventing Moldova’s accession.[131]
Conclusion
The Kremlin is playing the long game in Moldova and pursuing efforts to derail Moldova’s Western integration that may not come to fruition for many years to come. Transnistria adopted laws in late July 2025 banning “propaganda” about “non-traditional sexual relationships” and the “refusal to have children.”[132] The new Transnistrian laws parallel those in Russia, prohibiting the promotion of the “childfree ideology” and “non-traditional sexual relations.”[133] Transnistria’s integration back into Moldova may be a requirement for Moldova’s EU membership and would likely be a requirement for Moldova’s potential NATO membership. EU High Commissioner Josep Borrell stated in June 2023 that “Moldova’s path [to the EU] is independent of what is happening in Transnistria” and that Moldova could join the EU with unresolved territorial conflicts as Cyprus did.[134] The parties in the Cypriot conflict, Greece and Turkey, were long-time NATO members and EU members/candidates. However, the EU states likely considered a Turkish-Greek conflict significantly less threatening than the presence of Russian troops in a potential EU member state. NATO and the EU require that all member states unanimously vote in favor of the admission of new members. It is not guaranteed that all EU states would admit Moldova without Transnistria as Borrell suggested, and NATO is very unlikely to admit a state with an unresolved frozen conflict with Russia. The Kremlin may intend to leverage these new Transnistrian laws to complicate and derail future efforts in Chisinau to integrate Transnistria back into Moldova as part of their EU or NATO membership paths.
The Kremlin has been pursuing its strategic objective in Moldova for years and will continue to do so no matter the results of the September 2025 parliamentary elections. The process of Moldova’s accession into the EU will last until at least 2030. Potential NATO membership — a prospect that Chisinau has not even officially posed as a goal — would be even further away. The Kremlin possesses multiple tools it can leverage to prevent Moldova’s accession, even should its campaign to influence the September 2025 parliamentary elections fails.[135] Sandu won the presidency in 2020, and PAS won 63 seats in parliament in the 2021 elections, paving the way for Moldovan legislative and executive branches that were committed to furthering Moldova’s Western integration. These pro-Western shifts in the Moldovan political sphere did not stop the Kremlin from launching a campaign to influence the Fall 2024 elections. Sandu’s reelection and the passing of the EU referendum in Fall 2024 similarly did not stop Russia from trying to influence the 2025 parliamentary elections. The Kremlin will not refrain from trying to influence the 2028 parliamentary elections and 2029 presidential election, even if the September 2025 elections bring about another pro-Western parliament.
[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections ; https://kyivindependent dot com/leaked-document-exposes-kremlins-10-year-plan-to-undermine-moldova/
[5] https://www.sgdsn dot gouv.fr/files/files/20240611_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_Matriochka_EN_VF.pdf
[6] https://checkfirst dot network/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Overload%C2%A02_%20Main%20Draft%20Report_compressed.pdf
[7] https://www.disinfo dot eu/doppelganger-operation/
[8] https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/russia-matryoshka-propaganda-moldova/
[9] https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/operation-overloads-underwhelming-influence-and-evolving-tactics/
[10] https://checkfirst dot network/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Overload%C2%A02_%20Main%20Draft%20Report_compressed.pdf
[11] https://www.politico dot eu/article/russia-moldova-voting-elections-candidates-west-kremlin/
[12] https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/operation-overloads-underwhelming-influence-and-evolving-tactics/
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/possible-russian-gains-georgia-and-moldova; https://apnews.com/article/moldova-election-president-russia-europe-diaspora-sandu-40b98d140fefd92a2bd06d5db8b5d82f; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[14] https://checkfirst dot network/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Overload%C2%A02_%20Main%20Draft%20Report_compressed.pdf
[15] https://www.lemonde dot fr/en/international/article/2025/03/10/macron-condemns-russian-disinformation-efforts-in-moldova-and-pledges-support-for-its-stability_6739015_4.html# ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-macron-says-moldova-is-facing-blatant-russian-destabilisation-attempts-2025-03-10/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021025
[16] https://www.politico dot eu/article/we-know-were-not-alone-facing-putins-threats-moldova-turns-to-france/; https://www.ziarulnational dot md/r-moldova-si-franta-colaborare-in-domeniul-apararii-acordul-ratificat-de-catre-guvernul-de-la-chisinau/#google_vignette; https://www.legis dot md/UserFiles/Image/RO/2024/mo%20251-253%20md/acord_131%20fr.pdf
[17] https://checkfirst dot network/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Overload%C2%A02_%20Main%20Draft%20Report_compressed.pdf; https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/operation-overloads-underwhelming-influence-and-evolving-tactics/
[18] https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/operation-overloads-underwhelming-influence-and-evolving-tactics/
[19] https://checkfirst dot network/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Overload%C2%A02_%20Main%20Draft%20Report_compressed.pdf
[20] https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/russia-matryoshka-propaganda-moldova/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/likely-kremlin-backed-election-interference-against-romania-threatens-bucharests
[22] https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/primul-sondaj-din-perioada-electorala-arata-un-viitor-parlament-fara-o-majoritate-clara/33508250.html; https://imas dot md/pic/archives/49/[imas]%20barometrul%20socio-politic_iunie%202025.pdf
[23] https://alegeri dot md/w/Rezultatele_alegerilor_preziden%C8%9Biale_din_2020#Votarea_peste_hotare_2; https://web.archive.org/web/20190225044844/https://pv.cec.md/cec-template-proportionale-rezultate-preliminarii.html
[24] https://alegeri dot md/w/Rezultatele_alegerilor_preziden%C8%9Biale_din_2020#Turul_II.2C_15_noiembrie_2020; https://web.archive.org/web/20210712190912/https://pv.cec.md/parlamentare2021-rezultate.html ; https://alegeri dot md/w/Alegeri_preziden%C8%9Biale_din_2024_%C3%AEn_Republica_Moldova#Rezultate_din_20_octombrie_2024; https://alegeri dot md/w/Alegeri_preziden%C8%9Biale_din_2024_%C3%AEn_Republica_Moldova#Turul_II_din_3_noiembrie_2024
[25] https://web.archive.org/web/20210712190912/https://pv.cec.md/parlamentare2021-rezultate.html; https://alegeri dot md/w/Alegeri_preziden%C8%9Biale_din_2024_%C3%AEn_Republica_Moldova#Turul_II_din_3_noiembrie_2024; https://alegeri dot md/w/Alegeri_preziden%C8%9Biale_din_2024_%C3%AEn_Republica_Moldova#Rezultate_din_20_octombrie_2024
[26] https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/primul-sondaj-din-perioada-electorala-arata-un-viitor-parlament-fara-o-majoritate-clara/33508250.html; https://imas dot md/pic/archives/49/[imas]%20barometrul%20socio-politic_iunie%202025.pdf
[27] https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/primul-sondaj-din-perioada-electorala-arata-un-viitor-parlament-fara-o-majoritate-clara/33508250.html; https://imas dot md/pic/archives/49/[imas]%20barometrul%20socio-politic_iunie%202025.pdf
[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042124
[29] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/05/moldova-gagauzia-yevgenia-gutsul-sentenced
[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042124; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2024
[31] https://dfrlab.org/2024/03/19/kremlin-media-blitz-gagauzia/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030724; https://szru dot gov.ua/en/news-media/news/the-kremlin-counts-on-the-split-of-moldova-before-the-eu-summit; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/10/world/europe/putin-russia-ukraine-war-dmitri-kozak.html
[32] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24508935
[33] https://www.eurointegration dot com.ua/rus/news/2024/04/23/7184478/
[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[35] https://www.intellinews dot com/moldovan-court-upholds-ban-on-ilan-shor-s-parties-from-september-elections-394295/
[36] https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/cec-a-respins-inregistrarea-blocului-electoral-victorie-afiliat-lui-sor-pentru-alegerile-parlamentare/33478571.html
[37] https://www.dw dot com/ro/moldova-o-fac%C8%9Biune-a-grup%C4%83rii-%C8%99or-exclus%C4%83-din-alegeri/a-73343283
[38] https://nokta dot md/shor-otkryto-prizval-k-nepovinoveniju-i-poobeshhal-platit-3000-za-protesty/
[39] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uh_7uHp3LF0&t=139s
[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[41] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0225
[42] https://isw.pub/UkrWar08072024; https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/cec-a-respins-inregistrarea-blocului-electoral-victorie-afiliat-lui-sor-pentru-alegerile-parlamentare/33478571.html
[43] https://imas dot md/pic/archives/49/[imas]%20barometrul%20socio-politic_iunie%202025.pdf
[44] https://www.legis dot md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=148963&lang=ro#
[45] https://newsmaker dot md/ru/czik-zaregistrirovala-blok-dodona-vlah-i-tarleva-dlya-uchastiya-v-parlamentskih-vyborah
[46] https://newsmaker dot md/ru/czik-oficzialno-zaregistrirovala-patrioticheskii-blok-v-kotoryi-voshla-partiya-kommunistov
[47] https://newsmaker dot md/ro/dodon-voronin-tarlev-si-vlah-vor-sa-candideze-impreuna-la-parlamentare-se-infaptuieste-o-dorinta ; https://socialistii dot md/chetyre-oppoziczionnye-partii-moldovy-obyavili-o-formirovanii-predvybornogo-patrioticheskogo-bloka/; https://socialistii dot md/chetyre-oppoziczionnye-partii-moldovy-obyavili-o-formirovanii-predvybornogo-patrioticheskogo-bloka/
[48] https://www.infotag dot md/politics-en/325642/
[49] https://www.occrp dot org/en/news/phone-reveals-moldova-russian-connections; https://www.rise dot md/articol/kremlinovicileaks/
[50] https://dossier dot center/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/9-mld-slfdiofdofjldfjkf.pdf; https://fsb dot dossier.center/mld-en/; https://www.occrp dot org/en/news/phone-reveals-moldova-russian-connections; https://dossier dot center/mld/
[51] https://dossier dot center/mld/
[52] https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-russian-laundromat-exposed/two-huge-scams-one-moldovan-businessman; https://moldovalive dot md/fugitive-oligarch-ilan-shor-has-gone-into-business-with-the-russian-government-the-companies-specialize-in-financial-services/
[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[55] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042124; https://newsmaker dot md/ru/tarlev-shor-i-3-zachem-zabytyy-aksakal-moldavskoy-politiki-idet-v-prezidenty
[56] https://cusens dot md/ro/investigatii/vasile-tarlev-sustinut-de-ilan-sor-din-culisele-kremlinului/; https://www.occrp dot org/en/feature/a-russian-non-profit-interferes-in-moldovas-eu-referendum-and-builds-an-anti-western-influence-machine
[57] https://newsmaker dot md/ro/opozitia-in-bloc-la-parlamentare-dodon-asta-vor-cetatenii
[58] http://government dot ru/en/news/55606/
[59] https://newsmaker dot md/ru/glava-mid-vengrii-rasskazal-kto-poprosil-postavlyat-gaz-v-pridnestrove; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/23162419; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021025
[60] http://government dot ru/en/news/55606/
[61] https://newsmaker dot md/ru/dodon-vlah-i-tarlev-snova-pobyvali-v-moskve-lider-psrm-rasschityvaet-na-vozobnovlenie-postavok-rossiiskogo-gaza-posle-smeny-vlasti; https://t.me/igordodon/9416
[62] http://government dot ru/news/55622/
[63] https://imas dot md/pic/archives/49/[imas]%20barometrul%20socio-politic_iunie%202025.pdf
[64] https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/primul-sondaj-din-perioada-electorala-arata-un-viitor-parlament-fara-o-majoritate-clara/33508250.html
[65] https://imas dot md/pic/archives/49/[imas]%20barometrul%20socio-politic_iunie%202025.pdf ; https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/primul-sondaj-din-perioada-electorala-arata-un-viitor-parlament-fara-o-majoritate-clara/33508250.html
[66] https://www.legis dot md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=148963&lang=ro#
[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6DdAqDJwDHo
[68] https://alternativa dot eu/ru/blok-alternativa-politicheskij-proekt-dlya-sovremennoj-i-edinoj-moldovy/
[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections
[70] https://www.eureporter dot co/world/moldova/2024/10/30/kremlins-trojan-horse-on-route-to-moldova-presidency/; https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2024/11/01/ally-of-moldovan-presidential-hopeful-revealed-to-have-ties-to-russias-fsb-en-news; https://ipn dot md/en/adrian-albu-alexandr-stoianoglo-will-advocate-balanced-foreign-policy/
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[72] https://socialistii dot md/ru/cheban-socialisty-prodolzhat-pomogat-didakticheskim-kadram-i-obespechat-im-dostojnye-uslovija-truda/
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