Elsevier

NeuroImage

Volume 66, 1 February 2013, Pages 385-401
NeuroImage

fMRI reveals reciprocal inhibition between social and physical cognitive domains

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.10.061Get rights and content

Abstract

Two lines of evidence indicate that there exists a reciprocal inhibitory relationship between opposed brain networks. First, most attention-demanding cognitive tasks activate a stereotypical set of brain areas, known as the task-positive network and simultaneously deactivate a different set of brain regions, commonly referred to as the task negative or default mode network. Second, functional connectivity analyses show that these same opposed networks are anti-correlated in the resting state. We hypothesize that these reciprocally inhibitory effects reflect two incompatible cognitive modes, each of which may be directed towards understanding the external world. Thus, engaging one mode activates one set of regions and suppresses activity in the other. We test this hypothesis by identifying two types of problem-solving task which, on the basis of prior work, have been consistently associated with the task positive and task negative regions: tasks requiring social cognition, i.e., reasoning about the mental states of other persons, and tasks requiring physical cognition, i.e., reasoning about the causal/mechanical properties of inanimate objects. Social and mechanical reasoning tasks were presented to neurologically normal participants during fMRI. Each task type was presented using both text and video clips. Regardless of presentation modality, we observed clear evidence of reciprocal suppression: social tasks deactivated regions associated with mechanical reasoning and mechanical tasks deactivated regions associated with social reasoning. These findings are not explained by self-referential processes, task engagement, mental simulation, mental time travel or external vs. internal attention, all factors previously hypothesized to explain default mode network activity. Analyses of resting state data revealed a close match between the regions our tasks identified as reciprocally inhibitory and regions of maximal anti-correlation in the resting state. These results indicate the reciprocal inhibition is not attributable to constraints inherent in the tasks, but is neural in origin. Hence, there is a physiological constraint on our ability to simultaneously engage two distinct cognitive modes. Further work is needed to more precisely characterize these opposing cognitive domains.

Highlights

► Physical reasoning tasks activate the TPN and deactivate the DMN. ► Social reasoning tasks deactivate the TPN and activate the DMN. ► Activated/deactivated regions match areas of maximal anti-correlation. ► Findings are not explained by task engagement, or internal vs. external attention. ► TPN versus DMN dichotomy reflects opposing cognitive modes.

Introduction

The last decade has witnessed rapidly growing interest in the brain's task negative or default mode network (DMN1), both in health and disease (Andrews-Hanna, 2012, Broyd et al., 2009, Buckner et al., 2008). The DMN is a constellation of regions that includes areas in medial parietal/posterior cingulate, medial prefrontal, lateral inferior parietal and superior temporal cortices. This network exhibits activity decreases during performance of a wide variety of tasks (Binder et al., 1999, Shulman et al., 1997). Tasks that deactivate the DMN also activate a second common network, the task positive network (TPN) (Fox et al., 2006, Fransson, 2005), which includes areas in dorsal parietal and lateral prefrontal cortices. Spontaneous activity in these two networks is temporally anti-correlated in the resting state (Fox et al., 2005, Fox et al., 2009). Thus, mutual antagonism between the DMN and the TPN is regularly observed both in the resting state and during task performance (Fox et al., 2005, Fox et al., 2009, Fransson, 2005, Golland et al., 2007, Greicius et al., 2003, Tian et al., 2007, Uddin et al., 2009). While some methodological concerns about the validity of anti-correlations that involve regression of the mean signal have been noted (Murphy et al., 2009), observations that don't use mean signal regression also identify anticorrelated regions (Chai et al., 2012, Chang and Glover, 2009, Fox et al., 2009). In addition, there is evidence that the hypothesized physiological inhibition is relevant to understanding performance in normal (Christoff et al., 2009) and diseased states (Fassbender et al., 2009, Kennedy, 2006, Lustig et al., 2003, Pomarol-Clotet et al., 2008). As a result, it has been suggested that the anti-correlation between networks may prove functionally more important than DMN activity itself (Broyd et al., 2009, Fox et al., 2005, Uddin et al., 2009). The goal of this investigation is to shed light on the cognitive significance of this tension between the TPN and DMN.
The relationship between the TPN and DMN has been likened to a two sided see-saw, such that activity in one network decreases below baseline as activity in the other increases above baseline (Meyer et al., 2012). This analogy is wholly consistent with findings from resting state functional connectivity analyses. However, evidence from task-based studies most clearly supports only one half of the full range of motion of the see-saw: activity in the TPN parametrically increases in activation in response to cognitive effort or task demand, while the DMN shows parametric decreases (Christoff et al., 2009, Mason et al., 2007, McKiernan et al., 2003). Demonstrations of the converse pattern, in which the DMN is activated and TPN deactivated, have been much more elusive. Accounting for this asymmetry represents a significant theoretical opportunity, as there are a number of competing accounts which critically depend on characterizing the processes which lead to activation of the DMN and deactivation of the TPN. We consider three broad hypotheses which might account for the relationship between the TPN and DMN: two that are frequently mentioned in the literature on the default network, and a third which derives from a distinct literature. The first hypothesis is that the relationship between the TPN and DMN reflects a tension between goal-directed cognition versus spontaneous cognition or mind-wandering. The second hypothesis is that this relationship reflects a tension between externally versus internally directed attention. The third hypothesis is that it reflects a tension between distinct cognitive modes associated with social and non-social domains. The motivation and evidence for these hypotheses will be briefly reviewed.
The first hypothesis is directly related to the “task-positive” and “task negative” (or “default mode”) labels, which have come to be associated with the two networks (Raichle et al., 2001). These labels were suggested by early findings that a broad range of tasks activate the TPN and deactivate the DMN (Shulman et al., 1997). This hypothesis predicts that it should not be possible to identify goal-directed tasks that activate the DMN and/or deactivate the TPN. It is challenged by more recent findings that identify goal-directed tasks which activate the DMN above a resting baseline (Iacoboni, 2004, Sestieri et al., 2010, Spreng et al., 2010), including one task which demonstrates parametric increases in DMN activity associated with social working memory load (Meyer et al., 2012). Hence Spreng (2012) suggests that the labels ‘task positive’ and ‘task negative’ are “more likely the byproduct of the desire for rigorously controlled experimental designs (i.e., externally directed stimuli) than meaningful descriptors of functional brain networks.”
The second hypothesis appeals to attention to account for the tension between the TPN and DMN (Broyd et al., 2009, Buckner and Carroll, 2007, Buckner et al., 2008). These accounts build on the observation that a common feature of tasks that activate the TPN and deactivate the DMN is focused attention to the external environment. According to various accounts, focused attention may be in competition either with broad exploratory attention (Gilbert et al., 2007), or with a variety of types of internal attention, including attention to self (Andrews-Hanna, 2012, Fransson, 2006, Gusnard, 2001), conceptual association (Bar, 2009, Binder et al., 1999), episodic retrieval (Buckner and Carroll, 2007), and mental simulation or model building (Spreng et al., 2010). One study has presented evidence for both activation of DMN regions and deactivation of TPN regions (Spreng et al., 2010). On this basis, the authors argue for a variant of the internal versus external attention account. The TPN comprises regions which lie in two distinct networks, as defined by positive functional connectivity: the dorsal attention network (DAN) and the fronto-parietal control network (FPCN). Spreng (2012) argues the TPN does not represent a unitary functional network, but rather reflects distinct cognitive factors which are confounded in many tasks. Hence, Spreng argues that the tension between the TPN and the DMN is a ‘false dichotomy.’ Instead, Spreng suggests that the true tension lies between the DAN and the DMN, and reflects “competition between exogenous and endogenous loci of information processing.” However, this account runs into three difficulties. First, findings from resting state functional connectivity indicate that the regions which are most anti-correlated with the DMN lie in both the FPCN and the DAN.2 Since these analyses are neutral with regard to task, the value of characterizing the TPN as a network in tension with the DMN cannot be explained away by appeal to task confounds. Second, there have not been any demonstrations of goal-directed tasks which activate the DMN while deactivating the entire TPN. Spreng et al. (2010) show deactivation of the DAN alongside activation of both the DMN and FPCN. However, that study does not identify specific deactivated regions, and therefore does not demonstrate alignment between task induced activations/deactivations and anti-correlated regions derived from functional connectivity. Third, the cognitive characterization of the tension as being due to internal versus external attention appears problematic for one class of tasks which have been consistently associated with the DMN. A large number of studies have implicated the DMN in social cognition (Amodio and Frith, 2006, Mars et al., 2012, Schilbach et al., 2008, Van Overwalle, 2009). Many of these tasks differ from other tasks which are classified as involving internally directed cognition in a significant respect: they require attention to external stimuli. For instance, (Iacoboni, 2004) finds activation of the default network above resting levels while participants watch videos of unfamiliar individuals engaged in social interactions. Social cognition tasks may essentially involve attention to ‘internal states’, however, these are often the ‘internal states’ of unfamiliar individuals, not of the participant.
The third hypothesis, which we favor, is the ‘opposing domains hypothesis’. According to this hypothesis, the task positive and task negative networks reflect two incompatible cognitive modes, each of which can be directed towards understanding the external world. Instead of appealing to attention, this hypothesis is more closely allied to dual-process models of cognition, which hold that distinct cognitive modes can be engaged by externally directed tasks (Evans, 2003, Kahneman, 2003, Sloman, 1996). These modes are hypothesized to be associated with two broad cognitive domains, namely social information processing (reasoning about the minds of others) and non-social information processing (reasoning about physical objects). The opposing domains hypothesis is motivated by theoretical work in a distinct literature on the problem of consciousness (Hill, 1997, Jack and Shallice, 2001, Levine, 2000, Nagel, 1974, Robbins and Jack, 2006), however for current purposes we focus on considering this hypothesis as a candidate for explaining the tension between the TPN and DMN. A direct prediction of both this hypothesis and the internal vs. external attention hypothesis is that, in addition to tasks that activate the task positive network and deactivate the task negative network, it should also be possible to identify goal-directed tasks that activate the task negative network and deactivate the task positive network. In other words, it should be possible to identify goal directed tasks that push the see-saw to both extremes of its full range of motion. Further, since the definition of the TPN and DMN was initially established by reference to anti-correlated networks seen in resting connectivity (Fox et al., 2005), there should be a close correspondence between these anti-correlated networks and the regions shown to be in tension by the tasks. The key difference between these hypotheses is that the internal vs. external attention hypothesis predicts this pattern should be produced by external and internal tasks, even when the social processing demands of the tasks are similar. In contrast, the opposing domains hypothesis predicts that this pattern should be produced by social and non-social tasks, even when the attention demands of the tasks are similar. We know of no reports which test the first prediction, as existing reports confound internal focus with social processing (Sestieri et al., 2010, Spreng et al., 2010). The present study aims to test the second prediction.
To test our hypothesis, we designed tasks which were specific in terms of which domain they recruited from, but not in terms of the processes they recruited from a given domain. The motivation for this approach follows from two considerations. First, there already exist carefully controlled studies which have shown that social and physical reasoning are associated with distinct brain areas (Martin and Weisberg, 2003, Mitchell, 2002). However, these studies did not find evidence of activation and deactivation relative to baseline consistent with the opposing domains hypothesis. We hypothesize that this pattern was not observed because the tasks only required processing of surface features (e.g., patterns of movement, or semantic associations between two words). They did not require participants to represent the mental states of identifiable conspecifics, nor encourage participants to apply principles of physics in order to understand mechanical processes. Two recent reviews of work in social cognitive neuroscience argue that the desire to produce rigorously controlled studies has encouraged the use of task designs that are too artificial to shed light on many important social cognitive processes (Schilbach et al., in press, Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). Rather than designing our tasks to distinguish distinct process involved in social or mechanical reasoning, we used ecologically valid tasks designed to engage rich mechanical and mental state representations. For example, our social texts were modified from a prior study of false belief by adding additional emotional and moral content, producing narratives similar to soap opera (Appendix B). Second, some studies have demonstrated co-activation of the DMN and regions in the TPN (Meyer et al., 2012, Spreng et al., 2010). According to the opposing domains hypothesis, this could occur because these studies involved cognitive components associated with both of the two distinct cognitive modes. Hence, a key goal of this study was to identify tasks which predominantly recruit processes associated with just one of these cognitive modes.
The experimental tasks followed a 2 × 2 factorial design with cognitive domain and perceptual modality as crossed factors (Fig. 1). On each trial, after reading the text or watching the video clip for 20 s, a simple yes/no question was presented as text and participants were given 7 s to answer by pressing a key (Fig. 2). The social videos depicted conversations between two individuals who often misunderstood each other. The questions concerned one actor's belief about the emotional state of the other actor. The social texts were adapted from a prior study (Saxe and Powell, 2006) and described scenarios in which at least one protagonist had a false belief. The questions tested understanding of this false belief. The mechanical videos were clips excerpted from the Video Encyclopedia of Physics (Education Group and Associates, 1995). The questions were counterfactuals that tested understanding of the illustrated physical principle. The mechanical texts described puzzles similar to and adapted from examples found in popular scientific puzzle books. The questions asked participants to predict what would happen next. To disambiguate the opposing domains hypothesis from the external vs. internal attention hypothesis, we made the social texts significantly longer than the mechanical texts, while holding reading difficulty constant.

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Section snippets

Participants

Forty-five student volunteers were paid $50 to participate. The majority (43/45) of participants were recruited from a separate behavioral study of individual differences in social and non-social reasoning. All participants were drawn from the undergraduate population of Case Western Reserve University. All participants were fluent English speakers and reported no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and normal hearing. The

Behavior

Mean accuracy for the four conditions was as follows: Social movies 85.3%; Mechanical movies 71.7%, Social texts 80.4%, Mechanical texts 65.7%. fMRI analyses that control for task difficulty are reported below the primary analyses.

fMRI

The fMRI data were analyzed using the method of strict cognitive conjunction: We report regions as sensitive to domain only when the contrast between social and mechanical tasks was statistically significant independently within each modality (text and video)(Friston

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by funding to AIJ from the NSF 0841313, the Leonard Krieger Fund and the University Hospitals Case Medical Center Spitz Brain Health fund; and by funding to AZS from NIH/NINDS 30NS048056. The authors would like to thank Hillel Chiel, Randy Buckner and Chris Frith for comments on earlier drafts.

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      The social network in the brain consists of a series of interconnected areas including the superior temporal sulcus, lateral fusiform gyrus, medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate, insula and amygdala, and shows activity overlap with the so-called default mode network (DMN; Goodson, 2005; Mars et al., 2012). This has led some authors to propose that social cognition is the default mode or baseline state of thought (Iacoboni et al., 2004; Jack et al., 2013; Tavares, Lawrence, & Barnard, 2008). The social network can be triggered in a bottom-up or a top-down fashion, both involving the activation of the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS; Wheatley, Milleville, & Martin, 2007).

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