Over the past decade, China has expanded its global influence through the Digital Silk Road (DSR), combining technological infrastructure with its geopolitical objectives. Under its military-civil fusion strategy, Beijing exports connectivity and digital platforms, along with capabilities for state surveillance, cyberattacks, and mass collection of public and private data.
This strategy, led by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary Xi Jinping, allows Beijing to align economic development with military strengthening. In a report, Central American think tank Expediente Abierto states the regime uses large volumes of data to feed algorithms for “smart warfare” scenarios, dominated by digital networks and autonomous systems. The U.S. State Department has warned that China is acquiring foreign intellectual property for military purposes and has reorganized its scientific and technological apparatus to that end.
“In its Defense White Paper, the CCP was clear: Its civilian technological progress is closely linked to the strengthening of its military power,” Jorge Serrano, security and intelligence advisor to the Peruvian Congress, told Diálogo. “Although part of the document is confidential, they released that section to show their intention to use technology as a tool of internal power and global pressure.”
Chinese information and communication technology companies are expanding their global reach through the DSR. With more than 1 billion users in their domestic market, they are installing fiber optic cables, 5G networks, data centers, cloud services, and e-commerce platforms on several continents.
“It’s all part of a single power structure. Everything is subject to China’s master plan: an economic, political, and geopolitical projection, sustained by military power,” Serrano said. “There is no purely civilian Digital Silk Road; when analyzed in depth, everything is linked to strategic military objectives.”
Submarine networks
Submarine cables form the backbone of the global internet, carrying over 95 percent of international data traffic. Control or significant involvement in these vital arteries is a key, often less visible, element of China’s DSR strategy.
In 2018, China Unicom and Huawei Marine collaborated on the South Atlantic Inter Link (SAIL) cable, connecting Brazil and Cameroon and expanding China’s digital footprint in the South Atlantic, according to the report by Spain-based think tank Elcano Royal Institute.
Beijing’s growing role in building and financing these undersea networks raises strategic concerns among Western intelligence agencies and analysts. It not only establishes new digital routes for data flow but also potentially creates vulnerabilities for data interception, surveillance, or even disruption, furthering China’s geopolitical influence and its ability to gather intelligence.
Digital presence in Latin America
The DSR, as the digital component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), often involves low-visibility agreements. However, several Latin American and Caribbean countries that signed BRI memoranda of understanding are also participating in digital initiatives, according to a report by the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs of the U.S. Air Force’s Air University.
Mexico and Brazil stand out as key recipients of DSR investment, even without formally being part of the BRI. This reflects China’s strategic interest in strengthening its technological presence in the region, posing risks of digital dependence and potential exposure to surveillance or information control practices, the report notes.
The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs also documents cases highlighting these risks globally: state interference in Poland, diversion of African Union data to servers in China, and support for surveillance of opponents in Uganda and Zambia.
Technology, surveillance, and control
In Latin America, several countries have adopted mass biometric surveillance technologies, mostly manufactured in China. Companies such as Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, and Dahua have installed systems in Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador, consolidating their presence through regional distributors. This infrastructure poses risks to privacy and regional digital sovereignty, according to international nongovernmental organization Access Now.
Even as international concerns mount, companies such as Huawei continue global expansion. A report by the East Asia Forum of the Australian National University warns these companies, regardless of ownership, respond to state directives, leading to government control of initially autonomous projects.
“China’s technology sector is advancing rapidly. Because it has these capabilities, it offers them — at low cost — to Latin American governments,” Serrano said. “The worrying thing is that they accept it because they need it, but China uses this technology as a tool to consolidate its expansion in the region.”
Exporting an authoritarian model
Experts have warned that the DSR could export the CCP’s authoritarian model, affecting civil liberties and information autonomy. Chinese companies have helped regimes such as those in Venezuela and Cuba install surveillance systems. Beijing has also trained more than 36 partner countries in real-time internet monitoring and censorship, according to U.S. think tank Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
The CFR warns that allowing Chinese companies to build 5G networks and set technological standards could facilitate espionage and political pressure if Beijing were to use data leaks to influence foreign elites. The DSR could also reinforce state control of the internet through filtering, data localization, content moderation, and surveillance, accelerating a divide between open and closed digital models.
Implications for hemispheric security
Integrating Chinese technologies into digital infrastructure carries far more risks than benefits. Chinese technology companies like Huawei and ZTE are legally required to collaborate with the CCP regime, potentially compromising sensitive data and affecting the security and economic stability of third countries. Beijing considers cyberspace a strategic domain and has developed capabilities to attack critical and military infrastructure.
Recent cases illustrate these concerns:
– The parastatal firm DeepSeek, based in Zhejiang province, China, was recently flagged by South Korean authorities for transferring user data to its servers without consent.
– The Beijing-based energy supplier Ming Yang, which has close ties to the CCP military and is involved in strategic energy projects, has raised concerns that exported photovoltaic equipment could include hidden remote access functions.
“In the white papers of several countries, there is no warning that the growing link with a state such as China poses a risk to security, national defense, or democratic stability,” Serrano said. “On the contrary, greater access to cooperation, technology, and knowledge offered by China is presented as an achievement. There is no awareness of the risk.”
Window of opportunity
According to Serrano, a window of opportunity remains. “It is essential that strategic governments, such as that of the United States, establish direct dialogue with Latin American presidents and share critical information, as happened with Panama, a country that already had a high level of ties with China,” he said.
The DSR can expand to any sector, including education, mining, or ports, as with the Port of Chancay in Peru. “Today, there are no clear restrictions,” Serrano concluded, adding that Latin American leaders must make informed decisions based on intelligence and real knowledge of their relationship with China.
