Stanford student Elsa Johnson is presumably “Anna” in the investigative article “Uncovering Chinese Academic Espionage at Stanford” published in The Stanford Review in May. Now Elsa speaks out in person.
It all started with a message sent to Elsa on Instagram by a stranger, a man calling himself Charles Chen and claiming he’s an international student at Stanford, on June 10, 2024.
“Have we met on campus?”
It’s the same playbook: someone claiming to be a 
student “slips into your DMs”. They start out friendly with inquiries about your home life and ask whether or not you have mutual friends. Sometimes they point out shared interests and invite you to hang out.
Then the hard sell begins, with offers of an all-expenses-paid trip to China. They might flatter you with compliments and claim you can make money in the country as a social media star. If the conversation progresses, they may ask about your research, academic achievements over the years or the software you might use in class.
This is exactly what Charles did. He shared videos of another woman he claimed was a Stanford student. “She was on a TV show in China and is famous now!” The implication: Elsa, too, could become prosperous and popular in China.
On June 27, Charles pressed the point. “You really should travel to China soon … A bunch of people at Stanford have been to China this summer. If someone pays for you, would you come?”
He sent her a flight itinerary from LA to Shanghai that cost $912 with China Eastern Airlines. “I can take care of your accommodation and transportation here.” He showed her a bank wire worth $5,485 that he received in May to prove he could afford it.
Elsa told him it’s too expensive but he persisted. “It’s not worth it for a quick trip,” she replied.
Elsa alerted two trusted Chinese experts at Stanford to tell them she’s worried she’s being targeted. They put her in touch with an FBI contact who worked with the college on cases of CCP-related espionage. She met them in Sep, handing over the screenshots and the names of other people that Charles said he had been in touch with.
Charles was found to have no affiliation with Stanford. He had probably posed for years as a student with fake Instagram and LinkedIn profiles that he used to target people researching China-related topics.
Elsa identified as many as 10 other female students who had been targeted by this individual since 2020.
Charles was likely to be associated with ministry of state security, and he’s probably conducting an elaborate entrapment operation targeting young female students.
The FBI confirmed that several of the 1,129 students at Stanford were reporting to the CCP.
The fact that he targeted young, white American women is significant. The CCP apparently sees people like Elsa as valuable assets in their propaganda war, who can give the impression that there’s nothing to fear from China.
These spies want to learn how leading universities such as Stanford are developing key technologies that are giving the US an edge over China. They target young, sometimes naive, students working in these fields with the aim of befriending them and grooming them to share their knowledge. Some students have even been approached by strangers about working for Chinese tech companies such as Baidu and Huawei.
Most students see thru this espionage. But inevitably, some don’t, and accidentally disclose sensitive info. Others may even be sympathetic to the CCP’s cause and knowingly cooperate. Perhaps Charles assumed Elsa could be persuaded to spy on other Stanford students.
At first Elsa was extremely frightened to talk about what happened to her out of fear of being further targeted. She loves Chinese culture and wants to be able to visit China, but speaking out could lead to retaliation by authorities.
But now she realizes that her experience is emblematic of Beijing’s larger efforts to infiltrate US institutions and she has to do something.
thetimes.com/us/news-today/
student “slips into your DMs”. They start out friendly with inquiries about your home life and ask whether or not you have mutual friends. Sometimes they point out shared interests and invite you to hang out.
Then the hard sell begins, with offers of an all-expenses-paid trip to China. They might flatter you with compliments and claim you can make money in the country as a social media star. If the conversation progresses, they may ask about your research, academic achievements over the years or the software you might use in class.
This is exactly what Charles did. He shared videos of another woman he claimed was a Stanford student. “She was on a TV show in China and is famous now!” The implication: Elsa, too, could become prosperous and popular in China.
On June 27, Charles pressed the point. “You really should travel to China soon … A bunch of people at Stanford have been to China this summer. If someone pays for you, would you come?”
He sent her a flight itinerary from LA to Shanghai that cost $912 with China Eastern Airlines. “I can take care of your accommodation and transportation here.” He showed her a bank wire worth $5,485 that he received in May to prove he could afford it.
Elsa told him it’s too expensive but he persisted. “It’s not worth it for a quick trip,” she replied.
Elsa alerted two trusted Chinese experts at Stanford to tell them she’s worried she’s being targeted. They put her in touch with an FBI contact who worked with the college on cases of CCP-related espionage. She met them in Sep, handing over the screenshots and the names of other people that Charles said he had been in touch with.
Charles was found to have no affiliation with Stanford. He had probably posed for years as a student with fake Instagram and LinkedIn profiles that he used to target people researching China-related topics.
Elsa identified as many as 10 other female students who had been targeted by this individual since 2020.
Charles was likely to be associated with ministry of state security, and he’s probably conducting an elaborate entrapment operation targeting young female students.
The FBI confirmed that several of the 1,129 students at Stanford were reporting to the CCP.
The fact that he targeted young, white American women is significant. The CCP apparently sees people like Elsa as valuable assets in their propaganda war, who can give the impression that there’s nothing to fear from China.
These spies want to learn how leading universities such as Stanford are developing key technologies that are giving the US an edge over China. They target young, sometimes naive, students working in these fields with the aim of befriending them and grooming them to share their knowledge. Some students have even been approached by strangers about working for Chinese tech companies such as Baidu and Huawei.
Most students see thru this espionage. But inevitably, some don’t, and accidentally disclose sensitive info. Others may even be sympathetic to the CCP’s cause and knowingly cooperate. Perhaps Charles assumed Elsa could be persuaded to spy on other Stanford students.
At first Elsa was extremely frightened to talk about what happened to her out of fear of being further targeted. She loves Chinese culture and wants to be able to visit China, but speaking out could lead to retaliation by authorities.
But now she realizes that her experience is emblematic of Beijing’s larger efforts to infiltrate US institutions and she has to do something.
thetimes.com/us/news-today/
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Byron Wan
@Byron_Wan
the CCP is orchestrating a widespread intelligence-gathering campaign at Stanford. In short, there are Chinese spies at Stanford
Given its dominance in AI, Stanford is academic target number one
of the approximately 1,129 Chinese International students on campus,