China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 22, 2025

Authors: Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, Alfred Han, Karolina Hird, and Nathan Blustajn of the Institute for the Study of War;

Yeji Chung and Alex Chou of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal, Brian Carter, and Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: August 20, 2025

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Taiwan is cracking down on PRC identity documents and increasing restrictions on PRC nationals and ID-holders in Taiwan. The Taiwanese Ministry of the Interior (MOI) announced on August 12 that Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) legislator-at-large nominee Li Zhenxiu is ineligible to serve as a lawmaker due to her PRC citizenship.[1] The TPP holds eight seats in the Legislative Yuan (LY) and commonly votes with the Kuomintang (KMT). Li is not currently in office, but the TPP nominated her as a possible replacement lawmaker, effective in 2026. This step would fulfill the TPP’s promise to cycle out its lawmakers halfway through their term. The MOI also removed a Hualien County village warden, Teng Wan-hua, for her PRC citizenship on August 8. The MOI discovered in January that Teng and four other village wardens possessed PRC citizenship in violation of the Nationality Act, which bans foreign nationals from holding government office in Taiwan.[2] Both Li and Teng could serve in government office if they renounced their PRC citizenship within a year of taking office, however. The TPP and other critics of the MOI’s decision argued that Taiwanese law does not treat the PRC as “another country” but rather as the “Mainland area” of the Republic of China, even though the current Lai Ching-te administration has increasingly referred to the PRC as a foreign country.[3]

Taiwan has vetted hundreds of thousands of civil servants, military members, and teachers since March 2025 to ensure that they do not possess PRC household registration, passports, or ID cards.[4] Household registration is a PRC system that legally binds people in the PRC to the area they live in for key government services such as education and subsidized housing.[5] Taiwan’s Republic of China (ROC) government treats PRC household registration as functionally equivalent to PRC citizenship because the ROC and PRC do not recognize each other and both officially claim to be the true government of all of China and Taiwan. The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) announced on August 18 that Taiwan will routinely ensure military personnel and public servants do not hold PRC ID cards beginning in 2026.[6] Taiwanese counter-infiltration policies have also included an MOI directive in April 2025 that required over 140,000 PRC spouses of Taiwanese people to submit proof or an affidavit that they have given up their PRC household registration by June 30, or risk losing Taiwanese residency.[7] The MOI also announced new regulations in late July to require PRC nationals applying for Taiwanese residency to prove that they have given up their PRC passport and household registration. The Taipei Times reported on August 12 that the Taiwanese government planned to propose similar regulations for would-be immigrants from Hong Kong and Macau.[8]

The Lai administration has justified these efforts as part of President Lai’s “17 Measures,” which were announced in March 2025 and aim to combat PRC infiltration.[9] The Taiwanese government has uncovered dozens of cases of espionage or subversion on behalf of the PRC by Taiwanese military and law enforcement personnel, political aides, civic leaders, and others in the last year alone.[10] It has also noted efforts by the PRC—especially the Fujian Provincial government—to encourage Taiwanese people to move to Fujian and acquire PRC identity documents in the name of “cross-strait integration.”[11] It is unclear how many cases of espionage and subversion in Taiwan have involved immigrants from the PRC. Taiwan notably deported three PRC nationals married to Taiwanese men in March for promoting an armed invasion of Taiwan, however.[12]

The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) criticized efforts to amend Taiwan’s residency regulations and said that PRC passports are protected by law.[13] Taiwan is not seizing PRC passports, however, only applying legal pressure to press individuals to give up their passport. The PRC frequently frames Taiwan’s efforts against PRC espionage as government overreach, setting the conditions to frame Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as authoritarian.

Key Takeaways

• Taiwan: Taiwan is increasing restrictions on residents holding PRC identification cards to encourage the renunciation of PRC citizenship. This crackdown is part of a greater campaign against PRC espionage and infiltration into Taiwanese society.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The second and final round of Taiwanese recall elections is very unlikely to change the balance of power in the Legislative Yuan (LY). Seven opposition Kuomintang (KMT) legislators will face recall elections on August 23.[14] The recalls are likely the last opportunity for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to regain a majority in the LY before the next legislative election in 2028. The DPP can regain a majority by unseating at least six KMT legislators and winning their LY seats in subsequent special elections. The KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) coalition currently holds a collective majority in the LY.

Most or all of the August 23 recall elections will likely fail to trigger special elections. All 24 recalls on July 26 failed to trigger special elections amid low voter turnout and low support for recalls.[15] A recall against a TPP mayor also failed, even though she had already been convicted of corruption and suspended from her post for the past year.[16] The recall election results suggest that these recall elections failed due to the unpopularity of the recall elections, not due to public support for the at-risk legislators. A referendum on restarting a nuclear power plant will also be held on August 23. This referendum may increase voter turnout, but it is unlikely to overcome low public support for the recalls.[17] A Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) poll released on August 11 showed that only 31.7 percent of voters nationwide supported the mass recalls, while only 28.7 percent of voters voting on August 23 supported the recalls.[18] The poll also showed a ten-point decline in support for the recalls nationwide since an earlier poll in July that was conducted before the first wave of recalls failed.

DPP minority leader Ker Chien-ming, United Microelectronics founder Robert Tsao, and various DPP-aligned civic groups launched the unprecedented mass recall campaign against a majority of KMT legislators in January. The mass recall was a reaction to controversial legislation pushed through by the KMT-led opposition coalition, including record cuts to the government budget and new restrictions that paralyzed the Constitutional Court.[19] The recall movement initially seemed to heavily favor the DPP. Thirty-one of the 35 petitions to recall opposition lawmakers reached the signature threshold to trigger recall elections. None of the 15 recall petitions targeting DPP lawmakers succeeded, and dozens of local KMT officials were charged with signature fraud.[20] Coalition Defense of Taiwan (CDOT)-ISW assessed in May and June 2025, after the KMT failed to reach signature thresholds for its petitions, that the KMT was struggling to mobilize supporters for its recall effort.[21] The low enthusiasm for the KMT-backed recall campaign did not translate to majority support for recalling KMT legislators, however.

The failure of the recall effort thus far has weakened President Lai Ching-te and the DPP, possibly reducing their leverage in the opposition-led LY. Lai’s approval rating in several polls, including TPOF and My Formosa, showed a sharp drop from around 45 percent to the low 30s since the first wave of recalls, though other factors, including US tariffs on Taiwan, likely also contributed to his low approval rating.[22] Former Taiwan Vice President Annette Lu of the DPP called for Lai to step down as DPP chair and to form a coalition government.[23] The DPP has been largely unable to prevent the passage of opposition-backed legislation in the LY since the January 2024 election because the DPP holds a legislative minority and because Taiwan lacks a presidential veto power. The DPP used the constitutional review process earlier in Lai’s presidency to have the Constitutional Court block and strike down legislation. This has not been possible since December 2024 because the LY raised quorum requirements for the Constitutional Court and blocked all court nominees. These nominees would have filled vacant seats on the court and enabled it to meet quorum and strike down legislation.[24] The failure of the recalls will also likely reduce the DPP’s political leverage over the opposition because the threat of initiating recalls will no longer be credible or possible, because politicians who survive a recall vote in Taiwan are not eligible to be recalled for the remainder of their term.[25] The DPP’s lower popularity may also reduce its ability to mobilize supporters for public protests. The DPP will likely have to seek compromises with the opposition parties to pursue its agenda. This agenda includes boosting defense spending.

The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) announced that Fujian-based development efforts to integrate Kinmen with the PRC have progressed. TAO Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian said during an August 13 press conference that “technical preparations” for electrification and bridge construction between Fujian and Kinmen are “basically completed.”[26] PRC state news outlet Xinhua reported that Zhu used the press conference to denigrate Taiwanese officials, saying that restrictions by Taiwan’s DPP officials had prevented the resumption of cross-strait direct passenger flights.[27]

Kinmen’s proximity to the PRC makes it an ideal testing ground for PRC “peaceful reunification” policies. Kinmen is also a stronghold of the KMT, which supports closer ties with the PRC than the DPP.[28] The PRC uses economic and infrastructure integration efforts to build political support for unification in Taiwan. Fujian, the closest PRC province to Taiwanese territory, is often the site of these efforts.[29] This economic coercion is coupled with military coercion. The PRC has gradually normalized China Coast Guard (CCG) presence near Taiwan-controlled territory under the “Kinmen model” of operations. The Kinmen model is the PRC’s use of CCG vessels to project PRC presence into Kinmen waters, ultimately eroding its sovereignty. PRC and Taiwanese officials have each discussed a bridge linking Xiamen, Fujian Province, to Kinmen. Kinmen constituents have reportedly voiced support for the bridge, but the idea remains politically unpalatable in Taiwan proper.[30] Kinmen officials have countered that the Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge would not pose a threat to Taiwanese national security, as “Kinmen holds little military or strategic value.”[31] Kinmen currently hosts around 5,000 Taiwanese soldiers and is considered a possible target for a PRC amphibious assault.[32] CDOT-ISW assessed in August 2024 that Kinmen is uniquely vulnerable to PRC intrusion and that the PRC could ultimately escalate its current lines of effort to coerce Kinmen into demilitarizing.[33]

Northeast Asia

Japan

The PRC condemned Japan after Japanese cabinet officials visited a controversial shrine commemorating the Japanese role in World War Two. The Japanese Agriculture Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and Finance Minister Katsunobu Kato visited the Yasukuni Shrine—a shrine that commemorates Japan’s role in the World War Two and enshrines 1,066 convicted war criminals—on August 15 to commemorate the end of the war.[34] They are the first cabinet ministers to visit the shrine since Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba took office in October 2024. Ishiba did not visit the shrine, but he did send a ritual offering to the shrine.[35] The PRC, North Korea, and Russia regularly condemn visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese politicians.[36] South Korea also condemns Japanese visits to the shrine, but these condemnations have not recently resulted in any changes in South Korean policy.

The PRC condemned the Japanese government for the Yasukuni Shrine visit.[37] The spokesperson of the PRC Embassy in Tokyo further accused “certain forces in Japan” of glorifying and distorting its imperial history.”[38]

The PRC has intensified rhetoric regarding Japan’s imperial past throughout 2025, which is the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two. PRC criticism of Japanese militarism comes as Japan rebuilds its military and increases its ability to project force. The PRC’s statements frame Japan as a non-peaceful country by implying that Japan may pursue military expansion again. The PRC has also released statements that mention Imperial Japan’s colonization of South Korea and the Philippines when bilateral defense relations between Japan and its former colonies improve.[39] The PRC makes similar statements that mention Imperial Japan’s colonization of Taiwan when Japan comments on cross-Strait issues that do not align with the PRC’s so-called “one-China” narrative.[40]

North Korea

Vice Director of Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Kim Yo Jong denied that North Korea dismantled its propaganda speakers along the border after South Korea said North Korea removed the speakers on August 14. North Korea has emphasized that it has no intention to entertain South Korean efforts at inter-Korean dialogue. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung welcomed the reports that North Korea had dismantled its propaganda speakers and expressed his intention for inter-Korean dialogue on August 12.[41] Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Workers’ Party of Korea General Secretary Kim Jong Un and also the WPK vice director of propaganda, denied South Korea’s announcement that North Korea had dismantled its loudspeakers on August 14.[42] She further criticized South Korea’s claim as “baseless” and one-sided conjecture and proclaimed that North Korea has no intention of removing its loudspeakers in the future.[43] Kim Yo Jong previously said on July 28 that Pyongyang had no reason to engage in talks with the new progressive administration in Seoul.[44]

Kim Yo Jong said on August 14 that North Korea is closely monitoring the US attitude and “outdated way of thinking,” which is an implicit acknowledgement that North Korea may be open to talking with the United States, but only on North Korea’s terms.[45] Kim’s mention of the US “attitude” suggests that North Korea seeks a change in the way that the Trump administration approaches the negotiations. The Trump administration has offered to negotiate on denuclearization, but North Korean officials have rejected these offers.[46] North Korea further refused to accept Trumps’s letter to Kim Jong Un. Kim Yo Jong stated that “we have no interest in talks that obsess over the irreversible past, and we need no further explanation as to why we are not interested,” meaning that North Korea is not willing to abandon its nuclear weapons program.[47]

North Korea is unlikely to engage in any dialogue with South Korea, despite President Lee’s attempts. North Korea views South Korea as an unworthy dialogue partner because North Korea falsely believes South Korea is a proxy of the United States.[48] Kim Yo Jong’s statement indicates that North Korea believes any serious dialogue must occur in a bilateral format with the United States, not in a multilateral format.

South Korea

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung said that South Korea recognizes and respects the North Korean regime in his Liberation Day address on August 15, signaling efforts to reduce military and human rights pressure as part of his North Korea engagement policy.[49] This "engagement policy” offers a series of South Korean concessions without any similar North Korean steps. Lee outlined “tension-reducing measures,” including halting anti-North Korean leaflet distribution and loudspeaker broadcasts, and restoring the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA).[50] The Yoon Suk-yeol administration suspended the CMA, which was adopted in 2018 and banned hostile acts between the Koreas, after North Korea breached its terms.[51] Lee added that South Korea will not pursue unification of the Korean Peninsula by absorption and will “patiently wait for North Korea to respond.”[52] North Korea has rejected these overtures and made no concessions. Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Workers’ Party of Korea General Secretary Kim Jong Un and also the WPK vice director of propaganda, implied on August 20 that North Korea would negotiate only with the United States, not South Korea, stating that it does not accept South Korea as its “diplomatic counterpart.”[53] This statement indicates that South Korean concessions will not accomplish Lee’s policy objective towards North Korea, which is decreasing tensions, because North Korea is unwilling to engage in productive negotiations with South Korea on a bilateral basis.

Ministry of Unification spokesperson Koo Byung-sam announced on August 18 that South Korea will abandon the previous Yoon administration’s “8.15 Unification Doctrine,” which emphasized establishing a “free, democratic, and unified nation” on the Korean Peninsula.[54] Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said on August 18 that the doctrine violated the 1991 inter-Korean Basic Agreement and scrapping it would represent a “normalization” of South Korea’s policy toward North Korea. The Unification Ministry also plans to withhold its annual report on human rights violations in North Korea. Chung argued that using North Korean human rights issues as a tool to attack the regime contravenes the 1991 agreement’s provision that both Koreas must refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.[55] North Korea has made no similar policy shifts.

The Lee administration is pursuing a North Korean policy centered on coexistence and peace on the Korean Peninsula, but North Korea has so far spurned these overtures. Lee’s approach aligns with the policies of past progressive South Korean governments, including those of Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in. The government aims to create conditions conducive to dialogue, mirroring efforts under Moon to facilitate a trilateral summit with the United States and North Korea. North Korea’s current policy position indicates that it will not agree to dialogue with South Korea, however.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung criticized anti-PRC protests in South Korea and dispatched envoys to Xi during his visits to Japan and the United States, reflecting Lee’s desire to revitalize South Korean–PRC relations. Former PRC Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming urged the Lee administration to “crack down” on anti-PRC sentiment in South Korea at the Korea–PRC High-Level Leaders Forums on July 29.[56] Lee criticized on August 12 South Korea’s discrimination against foreigners and condemned "verbal abuse and violence” at an anti-PRC "hate” protest outside of a PRC consulate in Daerim-dong. Lee said that the protest was "beyond the bounds of free expression.”[57] PRC Ambassador to South Korea Dai Bing said on August 14 that he "highly values" South Korea's efforts to address discrimination and violence against foreigners.[58] Dai’s endorsement of Lee’s statements on August 12 indicate that the PRC believes South Korea conceded to the PRC’s demands to "crack down” on anti-PRC sentiment. Lee is set to send a group of special envoys to the PRC in late August, which coincides with his upcoming trips to Japan and the United States with Japanese and US leaders from August 23 to 25.[59] The envoys will likely convey Lee’s request that CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) summit in South Korea in late October.

Lee appears to be revitalizing diplomatic efforts to rekindle ties with the PRC following a period of strained bilateral relations under the Yoon administration. Yoon prioritized ideological alignment with the United States. Lee pledged to maintain friendly relations with all four of South Korea’s neighboring countries—the PRC, Russia, Japan, and North Korea—during his presidential campaign.[60] Lee and Xi held a phone call on June 10, in which they emphasized bilateral cooperation.[61] Lee’s stance against the anti-PRC protests conceded to PRC demands and his decision to dispatch special envoys at the same time he visits Japan and the United States shows his desire to avoid alienating the PRC in his foreign policy. These concessions aim to balance relations rather than appearing to align too closely with the United States.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC attempted to reassert control over Scarborough Shoal and limit Philippine efforts to document PRC aggression in the South China Sea. The United States deployed the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Higgins and the Independence-class littoral combat ship USS Cincinnati into the South China Sea following the August 11 collision between a CCG and PLA Navy (PLAN) vessel in the area, and the USS Higgins performed a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) around Scarborough Shoal on August 13.[62] This is the first known US military operation in waters around the Scarborough Shoal in at least six years.[63] A PRC fighter jet also intercepted a small Philippine Cessna Caravan, a civilian aircraft that can only seat up to 14 passengers, on August 13.[64] The PRC fighter jet came within 61 meters of the Philippine plane, and a PLAN warship also issued radio challenges telling the plane to leave the area.[65] PRC Spokesperson for the South Sea Fleet Senior Colonel He Tiecheng claimed that the USS Higgins illegally entered PRC territorial waters and was “driven away” on August 14.[66] US 7th Fleet spokesperson Commander Megan Greene disputed the claim and stated the FONOP complied with international law.[67] The PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) spokesperson Jiang Bin urged the Philippines to cease its “infringement” on PRC sovereignty on August 15.[68]

The EU, Australian, Canadian, American, and Japanese ambassadors, along with Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, condemned the PLAN and CCG’s efforts to target Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessels on August 11, which ultimately led to the collision between the PLAN and CCG vessels.[69] PCG spokesperson Jay Tarriela also stated that the PRC jammed PCG drone signals on August 11, which prevented the PCG from recording footage of the incident.[70] He stated this was the first signal jamming incident that the PCG encountered near Scarborough Shoal. The PRC appears to be taking increasingly aggressive action around Scarborough Shoal by coordinating CCG and PLAN operations to drive out Philippine ships and to attempt to limit Philippine airspace activity over Scarborough Shoal. The signal jamming and plane interception incidents indicate a deliberate attempt to limit Philippine efforts to document PRC activity around Scarborough Shoal.

Oceania

Australia began its combined Alon exercise with the Philippines on August 15. Greater Australia-Philippine defense cooperation reflects coalition-building efforts in the Indo-Pacific. The Alon exercises began in 2023. Alon 2025 will feature over 3600 personnel and will take place from August 15 to 29 on Palawan and Luzon, Philippines. Australia will deploy guided-missile destroyer HMS Brisbane along with EA-18G Growlers, F/A-18F Super Hornets, and a C-130J Hercules.[71] Australia reported that the Royal Canadian Navy and US Marine Corps will also participate. The United States will send approximately 350 personnel and deploying a MV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.[72] Canada will send a Halifax-class frigate, HMCS Ville de Québec, and an embarked CH-148 Cyclone helicopter.[73]

Other observing partner nations include South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, and Indonesia.[74] Australia reported that Alon will represent “the largest overseas joint force projection activity that Australia has conducted within our region in recent history.”[75] Philippine Navy Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad reportedly said that the Philippines will plan further combined exercises in 2025 but did not elaborate upon which countries would be involved.[76]

Alon’s novelty and illustrate a growing commitment to collective Indo-Pacific security among US allies and partners. Australia is the second country, after the United States, to sign a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the Philippines, reflecting the Philippine’s intent to bolster its joint security against threats in the Pacific.[77] The Philippines signed a similar Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Japan and is in talks with France, Canada, and other countries for other defense agreements.[78] The Alon exercises follow Australia’s large Talisman Sabre exercises, which involved 19 countries.[79] Alon also follows the Philippines’ joint patrol with India in the South China Sea and talks between the Philippines and India for the Philippines to acquire more BrahMos missiles from India.[80] US and allied coalition-building in the Indo-Pacific reflects comprehensive efforts to respond to PRC aggression against Taiwan, the Philippines, and other regional actors. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning said that military cooperation should not be directed against third parties when asked about Alon during a regular press conference on August 20.[81]

Russia

A version of this text appeared in ISW's Adversary Entente Task Force update on August 20. 

The PRC state-owned paramilitary enterprise Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) is expanding industrial and development cooperation with Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan, potentially setting conditions for the PRC’s involvement in Russian drone production. XPCC’s involvement in Russian military drone production would be the most direct case to date of state-directed PRC support for Russia’s war effort. XPCC participated in the third annual “Rostki: Russia and China—Mutually Beneficial Cooperation” forum in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, on August 18 and 19, among business representatives from 36 countries.[82] XPCC is a PRC state-owned enterprise and paramilitary organization that operates in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).[83]Tatarstan is home to several major Russian state-owned arms manufacturers as well as the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ), where Russia produces large quantities of Iranian-origin Shahed-model attack drones for use against Ukraine.[84] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on August 18 that XPCC Deputy Secretary General Lü Huiying stated that the XPCC plans to deepen its partnership with the Republic of Tatarstan “in industrial and trade spheres” and that the XPCC and Tatarstan will work to “develop joint projects in energy and mechanical engineering.”[85] Lü noted that the XPCC is interested in Tatarstan due to its “oil reserves” and “solid industrial base.”

The XPCC is a CCP-controlled paramilitary formation critical to the CCP’s control over Xinjiang, playing governmental, agricultural, industrial, military, and security roles.[86] The United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the XPCC and several XPCC officials in 2020 in connection with their role in “serious human rights abuse against ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.”[87] Several international organizations have recognized the XPCC as a key perpetrator of intense repressive measures against Uyghurs in Xinjiang, including forced labor.[88]

The XPCC’s links with Russia predate the August 2025 Rostki conference. The XPCC has historically used Russia to sell food products to international markets via its Russia-based companies, although Western sanctions on Russia post 2022 weakened the XPCC’s ability to use Russia for sanctions circumvention.[89] The XPCC stated in 2016 that its main exports to Russia included electromechanical products.[90] XPCC enterprises have also invested in various Russian businesses.[91] XPCC Secretary He Zhongyu led an XPCC delegation to Russia and Belarus in November 2024 for the previous Rostki forum in Kazan, where he promoted the work of the XPCC to Russian businesses and enterprises.[92]

Russia’s drone production industry already shares links with Xinjiang, and by extension, the XPCC. Reuters in September 2024 reported plans for various Russian state enterprises to establish a joint Russia-PRC drone research and production center in the Kashgar Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Xinjiang.[93] The Kashgar-based drone center would likely produce the Garpiya-3 attack drone for Russia’s use in Ukraine, according to Reuters.[94] The XPCC’s Third Division has administrative control over the Kashgar SEZ and, therefore, must have been involved in plans to establish joint drone production in Kashgar, given its high degree of involvement in Xinjiang’s economy.[95] The XPCC may also be providing forced Uyghur labor to joint Sino-Russian drone production enterprises in Kashgar.

The fact that XPCC representatives have voiced interest in developing bilateral XPCC-Tatarstan contacts is noteworthy due to Tatarstan’s outsized role in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). The Alabuga SEZ relies heavily on vulnerable foreigners, particularly women, and Russian schoolchildren to maintain high drone production numbers.[96] CDOT-ISW has not yet observed direct evidence that the XPCC is cooperating with the ASEZ, but the XPCC appears to be trying to establish itself in Tatarstan. These efforts may expand to ASEZ, which may, in turn, look to the XPCC as another source of labor. The XPCC has a robust forced labor infrastructure that has leveraged Uyghur labor in the Xinjiang economy using a variety of repressive and coercive tools.[97] The XPCC, therefore, has the capabilities to provide the ASEZ with a pool of laborers, as well as a cadre of trained guards and security elements. The XPCC’s historical export of electromechanical products to Russia, as well as its apparent renewed interest in cooperating with Tatarstan, suggest that the XPCC may be preparing for broader cooperation with the Russian DIB via Tatarstan even if it does not provide Russia with an exploitable human labor base.

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[1] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/08/13/2003841960

[2] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/08/10/2003841793

[3] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/08/13/2003841960

[4]

https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3311859/taiwan-cracks-down-public-servants-mainland-id-and-residency

[5] https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-hukou-system/

[6] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202508180026

[7] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/07/04/2003839726

[8] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/08/12/2003841896

[9] https://english.president.gov dot tw/News/6919

[10] https://jamestown.org/program/taiwan-exposes-more-prc-military-infiltration-cases/ ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/27/taiwan-jails-four-soldiers-including-three-who-worked-in-presidential-office-for-spying-for-china ; https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202506260010

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-february-13-2025

[12] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3303677/taiwan-orders-3-mainland-chinese-leave-promoting-military-takeover-island

[13] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202508/t20250813_12717812.htm

[14] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/08/17/2003842189

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-1-2025

[16] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202507260017

[17] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202508110015

[18] https://www.tpof dot org/%e5%9c%96%e8%a1%a8%e5%88%86%e6%9e%90/%e5%a4%a7%e7%bd%b7%e5%85%8d%e3%80%81%e6%a0%b8%e4%b8%89%e5%85%ac%e6%8a%95%e8%88%87%e5%8f%b0%e7%81%a3%e6%b0%91%e4%b8%bb%ef%bc%882025%e5%b9%b48%e6%9c%8812%e6%97%a5%ef%bc%89/

[19] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202503270021

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-june-27-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-9-2025

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-june-27-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-9-2025

[22] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-12/taiwan-s-lai-sees-approval-at-lowest-of-tenure-after-setbacks ; https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E9%81%AD%E5%A4%A7%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E5%8F%8D%E5%99%AC-%E5%85%A9%E4%BB%BD%E6%B0%91%E8%AA%BF%E9%A1%AF%E7%A4%BA%E8%B3%B4%E6%B8%85%E5%BE%B7%E6%BB%BF%E6%84%8F%E5%BA%A6%E5%87%BA%E7%8F%BE%E9%9B%AA%E5%B4%A9-%E4%B8%8D%E6%BB%BF%E6%84%8F%E5%BA%A6%E8%B6%85%E9%81%8E%E4%BA%94%E6%88%90-075018720.html?guccounter=1

[23] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6180349

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-18-2025

[25] https://www.laws.taipei.gov dot tw/Law/LawSearch/LawArticleContent/FL001996

[26] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202508/t20250813_12717809.htm

[27] http://www.news dot cn/tw/20250813/83d4ffa83a7a4f14bc1182ab5b69b287/c.html

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[30] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/5018007; https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/08/24/2003805214

[31] https://www.kmdn.gov dot tw/1117/1271/1273/578296/

[32] https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/taiwan-strait-crises-island-seizure-contingencies-0#:~:text=with%20minimal%20risk.-,Kinmen,%E2%80%9Creunifying%E2%80%9D%20Taiwan%20by%20force.

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/exploring-prc-short-war-coercion-campaign-seize-taiwan%E2%80%99s-kinmen-islands-and-possible

[34] https://mainichi dot jp/english/articles/20250815/p2g/00m/0na/011000c

[35] https://www.japantimes.co dot jp/news/2024/10/17/japan/japan-ishiba-yasukuni-shrine/

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https://encykorea.aks.ac dot kr/Article/E0080605

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[54] https://nk.news1 dot kr/news/articles/5882165; https://unikorea.go dot kr/books/aug15_unification_doctrine/index.html#page=10

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[64] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chines the e-fighter-intercepts-philippine-plane-over-disputed-shoal-manila-says-2025-08-13/

https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/1955545417132998832

https://cessna.txtav.com/en/turboprop/caravan

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