>>17151>Tor1.) The CIA controls all public nodes to the network.
2.) Security issues relating to it (like "Sybil" unmasking attacks).
3.) The exit relay problem.
4.) The network is rickety now due to network-wide DDOSes thay's breaking sites and fucking the network up, and it's not as "robust" as it claims.
I2Pis also trash. It was literally written in JAVA! Python shits on Java! It even requires you to install the latest version of it to even access the network! What a croc of shit! That's why hackers (and I'm not even talking STATE ones, either) can deanonymize users through the I2P network simply by abusing Java, since Java is proprietary garbage and anyone promoting this network is a shill.
>HyphanetTypically uses multi-hop encrypted overlay (e.g., ChaCha20-Poly1305) and only protects traffic in transit between nodes; may depend on correct manual configuration.
Traffic analysis resistance is limited: some implementations rely on hop-based anonymization, but no built-in dummy traffic or Sybil throttling. Metadata protection depends on overlay configuration; misconfiguration can leak IPs or patterns. Has minimal built-in protection for sybil/bad actor resistance. Malicious peers could intercept, drop, or manipulate traffic without being detected. Relies on TCP/IP overlay; typically doesn’t support mesh, offline, or non-IP transport layers, requires bootstrapping via known nodes; exposure at the network layer is higher, and while it can tunnel through arbitrary nodes, but name resolution is not decentralized; usually requires manual peer discovery.