Jinchao Wei, who was an active-duty US Navy sailor stationed at Naval Base San Diego when he agreed to sell Navy secrets to a Chinese intelligence officer for $12,000, was convicted by a federal jury today of espionage.
Following a five-day trial and one day of deliberation, the jury convicted Wei of six crimes, including conspiracy to commit espionage, espionage, and unlawful export of, and conspiracy to export, technical data related to defense articles in violation of the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. He was found not guilty of one count of naturalization fraud.
Wei is scheduled to be sentenced on Dec 1.
Wei, aka Patrick Wei, was arrested in August 2023 on espionage charges as he arrived for work on the amphibious assault ship USS Essex at Naval Base San Diego, the homeport of the Pacific Fleet. He was indicted by a federal grand jury, accused of sending national defense information to an intelligence officer working for China.
Wei, in his role as a machinist’s mate, held a US security clearance and had access to sensitive national defense information about the ship’s weapons, propulsion and desalination systems. Amphibious assault ships like the Essex resemble small aircraft carriers and allow the US military to project power and maintain presence by serving as the cornerstone of the US Navy’s amphibious readiness and expeditionary strike capabilities.
On Feb 14, 2022, Wei was recruited by a 
intelligence officer via social media who at first portrayed himself as a naval enthusiast who worked for the state-owned China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation. The evidence showed that even during the early days of his espionage career, Wei strongly suspected the intelligence officer’s true identity and motive.
On Feb 22, 2022, Wei told a friend who was also in the US Navy that he thought he was “on the radar of a China intelligence organization,” as he was in contact with an individual who was “extremely suspicious,” “interested in the maintenance cycle of naval ships,” and wanted him to “walk the pier” to “see which ships are docked” on a “daily basis.” Wei said that this person would pay him $500. Wei told his friend that he is “no idiot” and that “this is quite obviously fucking espionage.”
Wei’s friend suggested that Wei delete the contact. Instead of heeding his friend’s advice, the very next day Wei transitioned his communications with the intelligence officer to a different encrypted messaging application that he believed was more secure and began spying for the intelligence officer.
The evidence showed that between Mar 2022 and when he was arrested in Aug 2023, Wei, at the request of the intelligence officer, sent photographs and videos of the Essex, advised the officer of the location of various Navy ships, and described the defensive weapons of the Essex. He also described problems with his ship and other ships based at Naval Base San Diego and elsewhere. And, he sent the intelligence officer thousands of pages of technical and operational information about US Navy surface warfare ships like the Essex that he took from restricted US Navy computer systems.
In exchange for this information, the officer paid Wei more than $12,000 over 18 months. In one of his larger thefts of US Navy data, Wei sold the intelligence officer at least 30 technical and operating manuals about US Navy systems. These manuals contained export control warnings and detailed the operations of multiple systems aboard the Essex and similar ships, including power, steering, weapons control, aircraft and deck elevators, as well as damage and casualty controls. In total, Wei sold the intelligence officer approximately 60 technical and operating manuals about US Navy ships, as well as dozens of photographs and papers about the US Navy and Wei’s assignments on the Essex. Many of the manuals contained conspicuous export-control warnings on their cover pages.
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intelligence officer via social media who at first portrayed himself as a naval enthusiast who worked for the state-owned China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation. The evidence showed that even during the early days of his espionage career, Wei strongly suspected the intelligence officer’s true identity and motive.
On Feb 22, 2022, Wei told a friend who was also in the US Navy that he thought he was “on the radar of a China intelligence organization,” as he was in contact with an individual who was “extremely suspicious,” “interested in the maintenance cycle of naval ships,” and wanted him to “walk the pier” to “see which ships are docked” on a “daily basis.” Wei said that this person would pay him $500. Wei told his friend that he is “no idiot” and that “this is quite obviously fucking espionage.”
Wei’s friend suggested that Wei delete the contact. Instead of heeding his friend’s advice, the very next day Wei transitioned his communications with the intelligence officer to a different encrypted messaging application that he believed was more secure and began spying for the intelligence officer.
The evidence showed that between Mar 2022 and when he was arrested in Aug 2023, Wei, at the request of the intelligence officer, sent photographs and videos of the Essex, advised the officer of the location of various Navy ships, and described the defensive weapons of the Essex. He also described problems with his ship and other ships based at Naval Base San Diego and elsewhere. And, he sent the intelligence officer thousands of pages of technical and operational information about US Navy surface warfare ships like the Essex that he took from restricted US Navy computer systems.
In exchange for this information, the officer paid Wei more than $12,000 over 18 months. In one of his larger thefts of US Navy data, Wei sold the intelligence officer at least 30 technical and operating manuals about US Navy systems. These manuals contained export control warnings and detailed the operations of multiple systems aboard the Essex and similar ships, including power, steering, weapons control, aircraft and deck elevators, as well as damage and casualty controls. In total, Wei sold the intelligence officer approximately 60 technical and operating manuals about US Navy ships, as well as dozens of photographs and papers about the US Navy and Wei’s assignments on the Essex. Many of the manuals contained conspicuous export-control warnings on their cover pages.
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Byron Wan@Byron_Wan
Aug 09 23
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🔥 Jinchao Wei, who was born in China, was first approached by a intel officer in Feb 2022 while he was applying to become a naturalized US citizen.
When Wei went home for Christmas to see his mother, who lives in Wisconsin, she’s aware of her son’s arrangement. She also encouraged him to keep helping the intel officer because it might get him a job someday with the CCP after he leaves the US Navy.
The judge has ruled to keep Wei in federal custody without bond.
apnews.com/article/china-
During the trial, the government presented evidence including phone conversations, electronic messages, and audio messages that Wei exchanged with his Chinese handler. These messages showed how they communicated, what they spoke about, the need for secrecy, the efforts they made to cover their tracks, the tasks issued by his case handler, and how Wei was paid for his work via an online payment method.
As their relationship developed, Wei called his handler “Big Brother Andy” and obliged requests to keep their relationship secret by using multiple encrypted apps; creating multiple online accounts to accept payment for information; deleting messages and accounts; using digital “dead drops” that disappear in 72 hours; and using a new computer and phone provided by his handler.
The government told the jury that the evidence showed Wei was aware that what he was doing was wrong. He had received recent training from the Navy regarding how to detect recruitment efforts from foreign governments; he attempted to conceal his activity; and he searched the internet about another case in which a US Navy sailor was convicted of espionage, even reading a Department of Justice press release about that case.
Much of the evidence showed the evolution of Wei’s relationship with his handler — Wei’s increasing willingness to collect more and more sensitive information, and the intelligence officer’s employment of intelligence tradecraft to keep developing Wei as a spy and to conceal their relationship and activities from US authorities. For example, the jury saw photographs of the hand-written receipts that Wei created and sent to his handler to be paid and conversations that Wei and his handler had regarding the handler’s increasingly generous offers to Wei, such as a trip for Wei and his mother to travel to China. Moreover, the jury was presented with documents and records obtained from electronic accounts demonstrating the intelligence officer’s identity as a intelligence officer, including photographs and identification documents.
During his post-arrest interview Wei admitted that he gave the intelligence officer thousands of pages of technical and operating manuals and export-controlled data about US Navy surface warfare ships, and that the intelligence officer paid him thousands of dollars for these materials. He also admitted that he knew that his actions were wrong and that he had tried to hide his activities. When the interviewing agents asked Wei how he would describe what he had been doing with the intelligence officer, Wei responded, “espionage.”
Wei, during his post-arrest interview with FBI: “I’m screwed.”
FBI: “What makes you say that?”
Wei: “That I’m sharing the unclassified document to — I mean document with, uhm, him . . . I’m not supposed to do that.”
In addition to the two espionage charges, the defendant was convicted of four counts of conspiring to violate and violating the Arms Export Control Act. That law prohibits individuals from willfully exporting technical data related to a defense article without a license from the Department of State. In the present case, the US presented evidence that the defendant conspired with his Chinese handler to export three technical manuals which required a license for export. Those included the Boiler Water/Feedwater Test and Treatment manual, the Propulsion Operating Guide for the USS Essex, and the Weapons Control Systems Manual for the USS Essex.
The crime of espionage under US Code Section 794 has never been charged in this district. The statute is reserved for the most serious circumstances involving the passage of national defense information intended to harm the United States or for the benefit of a foreign power.
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intelligence officer, including photographs and identification documents.
During his post-arrest interview Wei admitted that he gave the intelligence officer thousands of pages of technical and operating manuals and export-controlled data about US Navy surface warfare ships, and that the intelligence officer paid him thousands of dollars for these materials. He also admitted that he knew that his actions were wrong and that he had tried to hide his activities. When the interviewing agents asked Wei how he would describe what he had been doing with the intelligence officer, Wei responded, “espionage.”
Wei, during his post-arrest interview with FBI: “I’m screwed.”
FBI: “What makes you say that?”
Wei: “That I’m sharing the unclassified document to — I mean document with, uhm, him . . . I’m not supposed to do that.”
In addition to the two espionage charges, the defendant was convicted of four counts of conspiring to violate and violating the Arms Export Control Act. That law prohibits individuals from willfully exporting technical data related to a defense article without a license from the Department of State. In the present case, the US presented evidence that the defendant conspired with his Chinese handler to export three technical manuals which required a license for export. Those included the Boiler Water/Feedwater Test and Treatment manual, the Propulsion Operating Guide for the USS Essex, and the Weapons Control Systems Manual for the USS Essex.
The crime of espionage under US Code Section 794 has never been charged in this district. The statute is reserved for the most serious circumstances involving the passage of national defense information intended to harm the United States or for the benefit of a foreign power.
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