Building Taiwan's Resilience
Insights into Taiwan’s Civilian Resilience Against Acts of War
ResearchPublished Jul 17, 2025
In this report, the authors consider aspects of Taiwan’s civilian resilience efforts in the face of a potential act of war by China, which could range from a military blockade to kinetic strikes and even invasion. They identify key components of Taiwan’s civilian resilience across seven functional resilience areas, each area’s strengths and vulnerabilities, and how Taiwan could improve its civilian resilience capabilities.
China’s increased military threats and intimidation activities against Taiwan and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have prompted Taiwan’s government and civil society to strengthen the country’s resilience. Although Taiwan has a rich history of volunteerism and ample experience with disaster response, the efforts to build the nation’s civilian resilience against a potential wartime scenario are still in their initial stages. In this report, the authors consider aspects of Taiwan’s civilian resilience preparedness efforts that are particularly pertinent to building resilience against potential acts of war, which could range from a military blockade to kinetic strikes and even invasion.
The authors define civilian resilience as civilian society’s ability to anticipate, prepare for, mitigate, and survive an act of war and rebuild following the end of hostilities. They apply an analytical framework based on seven thematic resilience areas (psychological resilience and societal cohesion, health and welfare, critical infrastructure and vital services, continuity of government and governance, transportation and mobility, food and water, and external networks) to evaluate Taiwan’s civilian resilience, its strengths and vulnerabilities, and how Taiwan could improve its civilian resilience capabilities. Drawing on their review of open-source primary and secondary sources and more than 40 interviews with government officials, subject-matter experts, civic leaders, and others from Taiwan, the United States, and Europe, the authors identify key areas in which the United States and the international community could further assist Taiwan’s civilian resilience preparations.
Key Findings
- Taiwan’s government and civil society have initiated various resilience preparedness initiatives, which are supplemented by Taiwan’s rich history of volunteerism and ample experience with disaster response. Taiwan has solid foundations for further resilience-building, such as a well-developed health care system, a proactive civil society, and existing disaster management infrastructure.
- Taiwan’s resilience-building efforts are complicated by the absence of consensus among Taiwan’s political elites and within society over the China threat and how to meet it, a deep-seated reluctance to contemplate readying the society for the possibility of a large-scale conflict, and a lack of common understanding of the value of preparedness for war.
- Integration of civilian response with military scenarios in exercises is relatively recent. During a conflict, however, Taiwan’s society might be required to hold out longer without assistance, and key infrastructure nodes might be purposefully targeted. A resilient society and infrastructure may offer Taiwan’s decisionmakers more strategic options.
- Resilience-building is a continuous process. Taiwan has embarked on boosting its resilience across multiple areas. Some of the areas for improved preparations include Taiwan’s energy supply and distribution, communications networks, health care system, hardened and underground storage sites, food manufacturing and reserves, and water treatment solutions. A particularly important area is ensuring broad societal and political support for resilience-building programs at both the state and municipality levels.
Recommendations
- The United States and the international community should provide advice and share experiences on how to normalize resilience-building throughout Taiwan’s society and across political divisions. They should also advise on the requirements that a military scenario may impose on civil society and the mechanics of building resilience across different civilian domains.
- The United States and the international community should seek opportunities to collaborate on technologies and research conducive for resilience-building, thus boosting Taiwan’s capabilities and finding new resilience solutions for their own use.
- The United States and other international actors should educate the Taiwan government on the value and models of working with various civilian groups in support of national and regional resilience.
- The United States and the international community should assist Taiwan in adapting resilience lessons from other countries to Taiwan’s circumstances and implementing them in ways that gain community acceptance.
- The United States and the international community should seek to instill confidence within Taiwan’s society in the country’s ability to endure military attacks by China and convey the message that a focus on whole-of-society resilience is not a step toward war but rather something many countries around the world are doing in light of growing threats.
- The United States and the international community should seek to emphasize the importance of fostering interparty cooperation and cooperation across all layers of society on issues of common interest, such as national resilience.
- Taiwan must strengthen its independent and objective scientific research on whole-of-society resilience.
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This research was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division.
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