The relationship between China and Latin America, often presented as a mutually beneficial partnership, is raising questions beyond just trade and investment. While Beijing promotes a “win-win” narrative, experts point to environmental damage, increased external debt, growing control over critical infrastructure, and technological expansion that could have significant consequences for regional autonomy.
According to U.S. think tank Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Beijing has solidified its presence through “South-South cooperation,” involving trade, investment, and assistance. Its “soft power” initiatives, including cultural exchanges, official visits, and educational programs, have fostered diplomatic ties, projecting an image of a “reliable partner.”
The China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Forum, established in 2014, has been a key tool for China to consolidate its influence, Rosa María Marcuzzi, an academic at the National Autonomous University of Mexico Faculty of Political and Social Sciences told Diálogo.
“At its most recent meeting, held in May, high-level regional leaders participated, including the presidents of Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, along with China’s president. Within the CELAC framework, a new 2025-2027 action plan was signed in areas such as technology, renewable energy, and telecommunications,” Marcuzzi said. Despite projecting a comprehensive strategic relationship, “a trade deficit persists” for several countries in the region, she noted.
China also conditions its relations on countries severing ties with Taiwan, a tactic that has been effective with several nations. Its rapprochement with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela has also strengthened ties with regimes.
Strategic resources and logistical control
China’s economic interest in the region is heavily driven by its demand for natural resources. The Lithium Triangle — Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile — holds a significant portion of global lithium reserves, crucial for technology and military industries. Securing access to lithium is strategic for Chinese industrial development, Mexican media outlet Grupo Fórmula reported.
In Peru, the Port of Chancay, inaugurated in 2024 and majority-owned by China’s COSCO Shipping, exemplifies this expansion. The port, described by experts as capable of hosting both commercial and military activities, reinforces raw material and agricultural exports to Asia.
China has invested in more than 129 ports worldwide and controls at least 17 Latin American ports as part of a global logistics strategy, European foreign affairs magazine Modern Diplomacy reported. This control enables Beijing to exert pressure on local governments, gain an advantage over Western competitors, and gather sensitive information on regional movements, solidifying its geopolitical presence in mineral-rich areas.
If this trend continues, “in 10 years it will be impossible to disengage from China,” Vladimir Rouvinski, director of the Department of Politics and International Relations at ICESI University in Colombia, told Diálogo. He warned that some regional governments “are not considering the lessons of other countries that have ceded strategic sectors, which could create serious risks in the future.”
Financing, debt, and trade agreements
China’s direct investment and financing, primarily channeled through state-owned banks, focus on infrastructure and energy projects, often securing access to natural resources like oil. Venezuela has been the main recipient, followed by Brazil, according to CFR.
While these investments offer more flexible conditions, they carry risks of over-indebtedness, leading several countries to renegotiation terms. Chile, for instance, faces warnings about growing economic dependence.
China has signed free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru. More than 20 countries, including Colombia more recently, have joined its Belt and Road Initiative, a global influence strategy.
“China adapts its strategy to the conditions of each country,” noted Rouvinski. “When it encounters little oversight or transparency, it tends to move forward with less open agreements and stricter financial conditions, increasing the risks of dependency.”
Technology and digital autonomy
The involvement of Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE in Latin America’s digital infrastructure, particularly in countries like Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, is a growing concern. According to 3GIMBALS, an intelligence consulting firm for national security, China’s legal framework facilitates cooperation between these companies and intelligence agencies, posing risks to data protection and communications. China’s presence in 5G networks, data centers, cloud services, and smart cities could limit states’ ability to make autonomous digital decisions.
Costa Rica illustrates these concerns. After Huawei won 3G contracts in 2009, its 5G deployment strategy faced scrutiny. In an interview with FDI Intelligence, a publication of the Financial Times, Costa Rica’s Foreign Trade Minister Manuel Tovar cited “unusual pressure from the Chinese government in the bidding process.”
In August 2023, Costa Rica banned 5G suppliers from countries not signatories to the Budapest Convention, excluding any Chinese companies, including Huawei. Despite this, Huawei organized an event in April 2024 for Costa Rican Electricity Institute employees, including a key public procurement official, raising conflicts of interest questions, FDI Intelligence reported.
“The growing presence of Chinese companies in strategic sectors such as telecommunications, ports, energy, and mining should be a cause for concern for all of Latin America,” Rouvinski said. “In the long term, control of these assets could pose significant strategic risks to regional sovereignty.”
The integration of Chinese artificial intelligence and data storage systems further reinforces Latin America’s technological dependence and expands China’s influence, according to 3GIMBALS. The firm recommends diversifying suppliers, promoting secure digital alliances, and strengthening cybersecurity cooperation to counteract this.
Environment and social tensions
A study by Oxford University, China in Latin America, found that Chinese trade and investment in the region are linked with environmental degradation and social conflicts. Beijing-funded projects in mining, oil, and agriculture are concentrated in biodiverse and ecological vulnerable areas.
These developments intensify pressure on fragile ecosystems, generate tensions with local communities, and contribute to deforestation through associated infrastructure like dams, roads, and railways.
Some governments have begun to respond. Ecuador strengthened its Environmental Assessment and Enforcement Agency following protests against Chinese projects in Mirador and Río Blanco. Panama suspended mining licenses after local protests, leading to a review of environmental compliance.
Mitigating risks
To avoid asymmetrical relationships with China, Marcuzzi suggests regional countries “strengthen their domestic economies, address social inequalities, and strengthen their democracies.” Only with solid foundations, she said, “will it be possible to negotiate with Beijing from a more equitable position and protect their long-term interests.”
Ultimately, “the key lies in promoting deeper public debate and greater awareness of the implications of collaboration with China […],” Rouvinski concluded. “The lack of questioning about the transparency of its agreements and the dependence that has been acquired represent a fundamental challenge that demands attention.”
