SOURCE: AFI
Aviation historian Anchit Gupta highlighted a critical flaw in the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) historical reliance on the MiG-21 as a jet trainer, attributing its high accident rate to the lack of Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs) and the aircraft’s demanding flight characteristics. Speaking at a defense symposium in New Delhi, Gupta emphasized that the MiG-21, a Soviet-era fighter known as the “Flying Coffin” due to over 400 crashes since its induction in 1963, was ill-suited for training due to its requirement for high-speed landings and its reputation as an immensely difficult aircraft to fly. His analysis sheds light on a decades-long challenge that has shaped IAF pilot training and safety protocols.
Gupta pointed out that the absence of dedicated AJTs forced the IAF to use the MiG-21 for both combat and advanced training, exposing rookie pilots to its unforgiving nature. The aircraft’s delta-wing design and high landing speed—often exceeding 250 km/h—demanded exceptional skill, particularly in low-visibility conditions or on shorter runways, a frequent scenario in India’s diverse terrain. Coupled with its temperamental avionics and engine reliability issues, this mismatch contributed to a crash rate of approximately one per 10,000 flying hours during the 1980s and 1990s, claiming over 200 pilots’ lives. Gupta cited specific incidents, including the 1999 crash near Jaisalmer and the 2019 Budgam collision, as examples of the risks amplified by inadequate training platforms.
The turning point came with the induction of the BAE Hawk 132 AJT in 2007, following a $1.2 billion deal with the UK in 2004 to procure 66 aircraft, with 24 built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) under license. Gupta noted that the Hawk 132, with its advanced avionics, two-seat configuration, and lower landing speed (around 140 km/h), provided a safer transition for pilots from basic trainers like the Kiran to combat aircraft. Post-2007, the MiG-21’s role as a trainer diminished, with the IAF progressively phasing out the fleet—down to 45 aircraft by 2025 from a peak of 874. Gupta highlighted that this shift correlated with a dramatic reduction in crash rates, dropping to one per 30,000 flying hours, underscoring the Hawk’s impact on safety.
The IAF’s initial delay in acquiring AJTs, attributed to bureaucratic hurdles and budget constraints, left a gap that the MiG-21 could not bridge, according to Gupta. He argued that earlier investment in trainers like the Hawk could have saved lives and extended the MiG-21’s operational life for combat roles. The final phase-out of the MiG-21, scheduled for 2025 with the last squadron decommissioning, aligns with the induction of indigenous platforms like the Tejas Mk1A and the upcoming Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), reflecting India’s push for self-reliance under Atmanirbhar Bharat.
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