In a significant move COFCO, a major Chinese state-owned agribusiness firm, started operations at its largest port terminal outside of China. The COFCO Export Terminal (TEC), located in the Port of Santos, Brazil, Latin America’s largest port, will be able to handle 14 million tons of commodities such as grains and sugar annually by 2026.
China’s involvement in Brazilian ports goes back several years. In 2017, China Merchants Ports Holdings acquired a 90 percent stake in TCP Participações, the operator of the container terminal at the Port of Paranaguá in Paraná, southern Brazil, a key port in the nation. In November 2024, China Merchants signed a letter of intent with Portos do Paraná, the state port authority, to expand Paranaguá Container Terminal.
More recently, in early March, the company announced a deal to purchase Vast Infraestructura, Brazil’s sole privately run terminal capable of accommodating large oil tankers, in the Port of Açu on the northern coast of Rio de Janeiro. Additionally, China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) is currently involved in the construction of the future port of São Luís in Maranhão, in the north of Brazil. According to academic news organization The Conversation, China may invest in even more Brazilian ports, as 22 terminals are scheduled to be auctioned before the end of 2025.
China’s aggressive entry in Latin America, as well as its port strategy, signals its goal to access exports essential to its food and energy security, and raises significant concerns about potential geopolitical leverage and economic dependency, in this case for Brazil.
“Ports are strategic areas where the effective exercise of national sovereignty must be guaranteed, as the country owns the land where they are located,” Marcos Pedlowski, associate professor at the Laboratory of Anthropic Space Studies at the Darcy Ribeiro State University of Northern Rio de Janeiro, told Diálogo. This applies to China and any other international power, the professor added.
“I believe there are already examples of government agencies losing access to port facilities, which raises basic questions regarding tax payments, the movement of goods, and the regulation of labor relations,” Pedlowski said.
The Brazil COFCO project in Santos, with a $302 million budget, is a significant expansion and will exceed the capacity of COFCO’s terminal in Rosario, Argentina, which handles 6 million tons per year. In Brazil, COFCO secured a 25-year concession for the 98,000 square meter area and expects to complete all operations by 2026, effectively tripling its port capacity in the South American country.
COFCO also announced an investment of some $210 million in rail transport to enhance its logistics and support its new terminal at the Port of Santos. This includes acquiring 979 wagons and 23 locomotives. The objective is to transport up to 4 million tons of grain and sugar from COFCO’s warehouses, crushing plants, and sugar mills in São Paulo’s interior to the Port of Santos.
China’s growing presence in ports, whether through state-owned enterprises or private companies, provides the Chinese Communist Party with a wide range of data on cargo, ships, and other activities, which could be used for intelligence gathering, as mandated by China’s National Intelligence Law. The concerns, experts say, include potentially identifying vulnerabilities in supply chains; monitoring port infrastructure, including crane equipment and other systems; disrupting shipments in times of conflict or for political leverage, among other scenarios.
“This control can even provide information on the transport of military equipment,” Celso Grisi, professor of administration and economics at the University of São Paulo and an expert in foreign trade, told Brazilian daily Estadão.
Experts are also concerned about the potential for China to establish naval bases in deep-water ports, seen as a way for China to secure its supply routes and project its power. According to think tank the Council on Foreign Relations, there are at least 14 ports worldwide with berth sizes capable of accommodating naval vessels where China holds a majority stake, suggesting their potential for naval purposes. Three of these strategically located ports are in the Americas, including Brazil’s Paranaguá Port Terminal, Peru’s Chancay Port, and Jamaica’s Kingston Freeport Terminal.
For Professor Pedlowski, Brazil’s heavy reliance on China for agricultural and mineral commodity exports grant Beijing significant influence over Brazilian infrastructure, including ports, railways, and highways. China’s large purchases give it leverage to negotiate access and potentially influence decisions regarding infrastructure development in Brazil, particularly related to transportation and logistics.
“[…] Obviously alignment with China will have implications for Brazil, some positive and some negative,” says Pedlowski. “The Brazilian government will have to take this into account and make strategic choices. This is not a time to act naively or without considering that certain options will have consequences […]. It’s something that will definitely have to be considered.”
