While the Chinese company has acknowledged that SATHD Europe is affiliated with it (pic below), the company's legal status lists 44-year-old 
national, Wei Dong, president of Hong Kong-based company Sateherd HK Ltd, as its sole shareholder. Created in Nov 2019, four months before its French subsidiary, this company and its director were mentioned in an article in the Samoa Observer in Nov 2022. The Polynesian archipelago's main daily newspaper reported that the authorities had halted the construction of a satellite ground station being built by a telecommunications company called Sateherd Samoa for national security reasons, citing a risk of espionage. Sateherd Samoa's three directors include Wei, the president of Sateherd HK Ltd.
These discoveries prompted the DRSD to share all its information with other 
intelligence services. As a sign that the matter was being taken seriously, it was decided in the spring of 2022 to create an inter-agency unit bringing together DGSI domestic intelligence, DGSE foreign intelligence, DNRED customs intelligence, the finance ministry's anti-money laundering unit Tracfin as well as the DRSD. This was an unusual set-up for economic counter-intelligence, where working together on such secret matters was not the norm.
Working in the background, the French spies pooled their information and closely monitored the activities of the Toulouse-based company and its president. They encountered difficulties in establishing and documenting clear evidence of espionage. This requires proving both the illegal collection of information and, even more difficult, its transmission to a foreign power. After several months, the inter-agency unit, which held several meetings in Paris and Toulouse, decided instead to play the obstruction card, focusing on the fact that the antenna had been installed illegally. The case was referred to the courts. A judicial investigation into the improper use of radio frequencies or equipment was opened by the prosecutor in nearby Saint-Gaudens.
These investigations reveal that the equipment in Boulogne-sur-Gesse was indeed capable of intercepting French satellite communications. Better still, investigators found that the secret antenna was specifically targeting French satellites and was tuned to their communication frequencies. However, the question of whether this data was transmitted to a third party remains uncertain.
A classified note from one of the five French intelligence agencies involved estimates that the facts, particularly the modus operandi, are characteristic of an operation carried out by Ministry of State Security (MSS), China's main secret service. Between the late 1990s and the mid-2010s, it was the MSS that led the recruitment of two DGSE agents who were eventually convicted of treason in 2020. French counter-espionage agents also agree that the aim of this operation was to find out how French satellite operators, including CNES, Airbus and Thales Alenia Space, communicated with their satellites.
When contacted, the French ministry of armed forces confirmed that the DRSD had indeed alerted the national frequency agency and that "the competent authorities [had referred the matter] to the public prosecutor." For his part, the public prosecutor in Saint-Gaudens, Christophe Amunzateguy, declined to comment, as did Airbus and the CNES. Likewise for the embassy in France and Emposat. As for Dong H., she replied: "All I can tell you is that everything is false."
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national, Wei Dong, president of Hong Kong-based company Sateherd HK Ltd, as its sole shareholder. Created in Nov 2019, four months before its French subsidiary, this company and its director were mentioned in an article in the Samoa Observer in Nov 2022. The Polynesian archipelago's main daily newspaper reported that the authorities had halted the construction of a satellite ground station being built by a telecommunications company called Sateherd Samoa for national security reasons, citing a risk of espionage. Sateherd Samoa's three directors include Wei, the president of Sateherd HK Ltd.
These discoveries prompted the DRSD to share all its information with other intelligence services. As a sign that the matter was being taken seriously, it was decided in the spring of 2022 to create an inter-agency unit bringing together DGSI domestic intelligence, DGSE foreign intelligence, DNRED customs intelligence, the finance ministry's anti-money laundering unit Tracfin as well as the DRSD. This was an unusual set-up for economic counter-intelligence, where working together on such secret matters was not the norm.
Working in the background, the French spies pooled their information and closely monitored the activities of the Toulouse-based company and its president. They encountered difficulties in establishing and documenting clear evidence of espionage. This requires proving both the illegal collection of information and, even more difficult, its transmission to a foreign power. After several months, the inter-agency unit, which held several meetings in Paris and Toulouse, decided instead to play the obstruction card, focusing on the fact that the antenna had been installed illegally. The case was referred to the courts. A judicial investigation into the improper use of radio frequencies or equipment was opened by the prosecutor in nearby Saint-Gaudens.
These investigations reveal that the equipment in Boulogne-sur-Gesse was indeed capable of intercepting French satellite communications. Better still, investigators found that the secret antenna was specifically targeting French satellites and was tuned to their communication frequencies. However, the question of whether this data was transmitted to a third party remains uncertain.
A classified note from one of the five French intelligence agencies involved estimates that the facts, particularly the modus operandi, are characteristic of an operation carried out by Ministry of State Security (MSS), China's main secret service. Between the late 1990s and the mid-2010s, it was the MSS that led the recruitment of two DGSE agents who were eventually convicted of treason in 2020. French counter-espionage agents also agree that the aim of this operation was to find out how French satellite operators, including CNES, Airbus and Thales Alenia Space, communicated with their satellites.
When contacted, the French ministry of armed forces confirmed that the DRSD had indeed alerted the national frequency agency and that "the competent authorities [had referred the matter] to the public prosecutor." For his part, the public prosecutor in Saint-Gaudens, Christophe Amunzateguy, declined to comment, as did Airbus and the CNES. Likewise for the embassy in France and Emposat. As for Dong H., she replied: "All I can tell you is that everything is false."
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